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The American Revolution and Early Republic
This List Is By:
Nic Wood
UVA
PhD Student at UVA.
This is a collection of sources relating to the American Revolution and Early republic era, including both sources from the era and sources that influenced political thought at the time.
1: Frank William Taussig, State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff [1790]
Frank William Taussig, State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff, with an Introduction by F.W. Taussig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1892).
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/294 on 2008-02-12
The text is in the public domain.
INTRODUCTION
The papers and speeches contained in this volume have been used for some years with advantage in a course on the Tariff History of the United States, conducted by the present writer in Harvard University. They serve to illustrate the mode in which the tariff problem has been approached from time to time by great statesmen, and afford a stimulating introduction to a discussion of the principles of international trade and of customs policy. No one of them can he said to be very scarce, or difficult of access to those having large libraries at command; but some are to be found only in the Congressional Documents, and others only in expensive editions of the writings of the respective authors. They are now reprinted in the hope that more easy access to them will be of service to teachers and students of economics, and will bring to the attention of thoughtful citizens serious and sober arguments removed from the heat of contemporary discussion.
The first paper on the list, Hamilton's “Beport on Manufactures,” is the most famous; though doubtless it has been referred to with praise or blame by many who never succeeded in reading it. Hamilton was requested to prepare the report by resolutions passed in the House of Representatives in January, 1790; but he did not present it until nearly two years later, in December, 1791. During this period he was busy with the numberless questions of legislation and administration which confronted the newly organized federal government. Considering the conditions under which he thus wrote, and the stage which economic theory had reached in his time, the report is a great intellectual feat. The marshaling of the opposing arguments, the tireless examination of every aspect of the question, the careful investigation of the facts of industry and trade, the specific recommendations and conclusions at the close, all bear the stamp of Hamilton's peculiar and powerful intellect. There are repetitions, and some obvious inconsistencies in arrangement; some parts are obsolete, referring to arguments or industrial conditions which now belong to the past; but the report remains the strongest presentation of the case for protection which has been made by any American statesman.
Hamilton's report is printed in the various editions of his works, and in the “State Papers on Finance,” as well as in the Congressional Documents; but nevertheless it can hardly be said to be easy of access to the ordinary reader.
The second paper, Gallatin's “Memorial of the Free Trade Convention,” was prepared under very different circumstances. In 1831, when the early protective controversy was at its height, a convention of the friends of free trade was held in Philadelphia. The proceedings were not of any unusual character; but on adjourning, the convention appointed a committee, of which Gallatin was chairman, to draft a memorial to Congress. That memorial, written by Gallatin, is the document here reprinted. Its authorship, though not publicly stated, was well known, and led to Clay's bitter and discreditable attack on the aged statesman.1 The memorial was printed at the time in the Congressional Documents, and is now most easily found in that form. A pamphlet edition was published in New York, and it was also printed in Niles's “Register” and in Raguetfs “Banner of the Constitution.” It is not in Mr. Adams's edition of Gallatin's writings, and on the whole is less accessible than Hamilton's report.
Although thus prepared as a private memorial, Gallatin's paper is written as if presented to Congress by its author while still Secretary of the Treasury. It has the dignity and the measured tone of his State papers. Beginning with a consideration of the revenue situation at the time, it proceeds to a discussion of the principles which underlie the protective controversy, and ends with a detailed examination of the tariff act then in force, the act of 1828. Gallatin's sober and sagacious mind marks both the reasoning on the questions of principle, and the presentation of the facts of the case as they then stood. In manner and matter, the memorial is a model of what a discussion of the tariff question should be.
The third document, Walker's “Treasury Report” of 1845, is again a formal state paper, being the report on the finances submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to Congress, at its first meeting aftef the election of President Polk. It begins with the usual statements and estimates of the revenues and expenditures, and then passes abruptly to a discussion of the tariff question. It has secured a place in our tariff history as a presentation of the case against protection, comparable in some ways to the place of Hamilton's presentation of the case against free trade. No doubt, it is not equal in intellectual quality to Hamilton's Report; and it clearly falls below Gallatin's memorial in tone and in substance. But it marks a new stage in the discussion of the tariff question, and deserves study as one of the famous public papers brought out by that question. It should be read in the light of the tariff act of 1846, passed in the course of the session of Congress at which it was presented. That act was framed largely at Walker's suggestion, and its provisions give an indication of his meaning in some passages in the report which have an uncertain sound. The report is at present accessible only in the Congressional Documents.
Last come the speeches of Clay and Webster on the tariff act of 1824. These stand somewhat apart from the other papers, and it is not without hesitation that they have been selected from the mass of oratory on the tariff question. But the fame of the men, the soberness of their discussion, taking place as it did at a time when the tariff was not yet an issue between parties, and the intrinsic importance as well as the historical interest of the speeches, seem to warrant their being added to this collection. In them, as in the other parts of the volume, the reader will find passages which refer to conditions very different from those of the present, and arguments which are no longer heard in the protective controversy. But these passages are none the less instructive for the historical study of the tariff question; and in any case it seemed best to present the texts in all cases in full, without attempt at abridgment or condensation. The speeches of Clay and Webster have been reprinted from their collected writings.
Alexander Hamilton (Secretary of the Treasury), Report on the Subject of Manufactures (1790).
The Secretary of the Treasury, in obedience to the order of the House of Representatives of the 15th day of January, 1790, has applied his attention, at as early a period as his other duties would permit, to the subject of manufactures; and particularly to the means of promoting such as will tend to render the United States independent on foreign nations for military and other essential supplies. And he thereupon respectfully submits the following Report: —
The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States, which was not long since deemed very questionable, appears at this time to be pretty generally admitted. The embarrassments which have obstructed the progress of our external trade have led to serious reflections on the necessity of enlarging the sphere of our domestic commerce; the restrictive regulations, which in foreign markets abridge the vent of the increasing surplus of our agricultural produce, serve to beget an earnest desire that a more extensive demand for that surplus may be created at home; and the complete success which has rewarded manufacturing enterprise, in some valuable branches, conspiring with the promising symptoms which attend some less mature essays in others, justify a hope that the obstacles to the growth of this species of industry are less formidable than they were apprehended to be; and that it is not difficult to find, in its further extension, a full indemnification for any external disadvantages which are or may be experienced, as well as an accession of resources favorable to national independence and safety.
There still are, nevertheless, respectable patrons of opinions unfriendly to the encouragement of manufactures. The following are, substantially, the arguments by which these opinions are defended:
“In every country (say those who entertain them), agriculture is the most beneficial and productive object of human industry. This position, generally, if not universally true, applies with peculiar emphasis to the United States, on account of their immense tracts of fertile territory, uninhabited and unimproved. Nothing can afford so advantageous an employment for capital and labor, as the conversion of this extensive wilderness into cultivated farms. Nothing equally with this can contribute to the population, strength, and real riches of the country.
“To endeavor, by the extraordinary patronage of government, to accelerate the growth of manufactures, is in fact to endeavor, by force and art, to transfer the natural current of industry from a more to a less beneficial channel. Whatever has such a tendency must necessarily be unwise. Indeed, it can hardly ever be wise in a government to attempt to give a direction to the industry of its citizens. This, under the quick∗ sighted guidance of private interest, will, if left to itself, infallibly find its own way to the most profitable employment; and it is by such employment that the public prosperity will be most effectually promoted. To leave industry to itself, therefore, is in almost every case the soundest as well as the simplest policy.
“This policy is not only recommended to the United States by considerations which affect all nations; it is, in a manner, dictated to them by the imperious force of a very peculiar situation. The srnallness of their population, compared with their territory; the constant allurements to emigration from the settled to the unsettled parts of the country; the facility with which the less independent condition of an artisan can be exchanged for the more independent condition of a farmer; these and similar causes conspire to produce, and for a length of time must continue to occasion, a scarcity of hands for manufacturing occupation, and dearness of labor generally. To these disadvantages for the prosecution of manufactures, a deficiency of pecuniary capital being added, the prospect of a successful competition with the manufacturers of Europe must be regarded as little less than desperate. Extensive manufactures can only be the offspring of a redundant, at least of a full population. Till the latter shall characterize the situation of this country, it is vain to hope for the former.
“If, contrary to the natural course of things, an unseasonable and premature spring can be given to certain fabrics by heavy duties, prohibitions, bounties, or by other forced expedients, this will only be to sacrifice the interests of the community to those of particular classes. Besides the misdirection of labor, a virtual monopoly will be given to the persons employed on such fabrics, and an enhancement of price, the inevitable consequence of every monopoly, must be defrayed at the expense of the other parts of the socie∗ty. It is far preferable that those persons should be engaged in the cultivation of the earth, and that we should procure, in exchange for its productions, the commodities with which foreigners are able to supply us in greater perfection and upon better terms.”
This mode of reasoning is founded upon facts and principles which have certainly respectable pretensions. If it had governed the conduct of nations more generally than it has done, there is room to suppose that it might have carried them faster to prosperity and greatness than they have attained by the pursuit of maxims too widely opposite. Most general theories, however, admit of numerous exceptions, and there are few, if any, of the political kind, which do not blend a considerable portion of error with the truths they inculcate.
In order to an accurate judgment how far that which has been just stated ought to be deemed liable to a similar imputation, it is necessary to advert carefully to the considerations which plead in favor of manufactures, and which appear to recommend the special and positive encouragement of them in certain cases and under certain reasonable limitations.
It ought readily to be conceded that the cultivation of the earth as the primary and most certain source of national supply; as the immediate and chief source of subsistence to man; as the principal source of those materials which constitute the nutriment of other kinds of labor; as including a state most favorable to the freedom and independence of the human mind, — one, perhaps, most conducive to the multiplication of the human species, — has intrinsically a strong claim to preeminence over every other kind of industry.
But that it has a title to anything like an exclusive predilection in any country ought to be admitted with great caution. That it is even more productive than every other branch of industry requires more evidence than has yet been given in support of the position. That its real interests, precious and important as without the help of exaggeration they truly are, will be advanced rather than injured by the due encouragement of manufactures, may, it is believed, be satisfactorily demonstrated. And it is also believed that the expediency of such encouragement, in a general view, may be shown to be recommended by the most cogent and persuasive motives of national policy.
It has been maintained that agriculture is not only the most productive, but the only productive species of industry. The reality of this suggestion in either respect has, however, not been verified by any accurate detail of facts and calculations, and the general arguments, which are adduced to prove it, are rather subtile and paradoxical than solid or convincing.
Those which maintain its exclusive productiveness are to this effect: —
Labor bestowed upon the cultivation of land produces enough not only to replace all the necessary expenses incurred in the business, and to maintain the persons who are employed in it, but to afford, together with the ordinary profit on the stock or capital of the farmer, a neat surplus, or rent, for,the landlord or proprietor of the soiL But the labor of artificers does nothing more than replace the stock which employs them, — or which furnishes materials, tools, and wages, — and yield the ordinary profit upon that stock. It yields nothing equivalent to the rent of land. Neither does it add anything to the total value of the whole annual produce of the land and labor of the country. The additional value given to those parts of the produce of land which are wrought into manufactures is counterbalanced by the value of those other parts of that produce which are consumed by the manufacturers. It can therefore only be by saving, or parsimony, not by the positive productiveness of their labor, that the classes of artificers can in any degree augment the revenue of the society.
To this it has been answered, —
- 1. “That inasmuch as it is acknowledged that manufacturing labor reproduces a value equal to that which is expended or consumed in carrying it on, and continues in existence the original stock or capital employed, it ought on that account alone to escape being considered as wholly unproductive. That though it should be admitted, as alleged, that the consumption of the produce of the soil by the classes of artificers or manufacturers is exactly equal to the value added by their labor to the materials upon, which it is exerted, yet it would not thence follow that it added nothing to the revenue of the society or to the aggregate value of the annual produce of its land and labor. If the consumption, for any given period, amounted to a given sum, and the increased value of the produce manufactured in the same period to a like sum, the total amount of the consumption and production during that period would be equal to the two sums, and, consequently, double the value of the agricultural produce consumed. And though the increment of value produced by the classes of artificers should at no time exceed the value of the produce of the land consumed by them, yet there would be at every moment, in consequence of their labor, a greater value of goods in the market than would exist independent of it.
- 2. “That the position that artificers can augment the revenue of a society only by parsimony is true in no other sense than in one which is equally applicable to husbandmen or cultivators. It may be alike affirmed of all these classes, that the fund acquired by their labor, and destined for their support, is not, in an ordi nary way, more than equal to it. And hence it will follow that augmentations of the wealth or capital of the community — except in the instances of some ex traordinary dexterity or skill — can only proceed, with respect to any of them, from the savings of the more thrifty and parsimonious.
- 3. “That the annual produce of the land and labor of a country can only be increased in two ways, — by some improvement in the productive powers of the use ful labor which actually exists within it, or by some increase in the quantity of such labor. That with regard to the first, the labor of artificers being capable of greater subdivision and simplicity of operation than that of cultivators, it is susceptible, in a proportionately greater degree, of improvement in its productive powers, whether to be derived from an accession of skill or from the application of ingenious machinery; in which particular, therefore, the labor employed in the culture of land can pretend to no advantage over that engaged in manufactures. That with regard to an augmentation of the quantity of useful labor, this excluding adventitious circumstances must depend essentially upon an increase of capital, which again must depend upon the savings made out of the revenues of those who furnish or manage that which is at any time employed, whether in agriculture, or in manufactures, or in any other way.”
But while the exclusive productiveness of agricultural labor has been thus denied and refuted, the superiority of its productiveness has been conceded without hesitation. As this concession involves a point of considerable magnitude in relation to maxims of public administration, the grounds on which it rests are worthy of a distinct and particular examination.
One of the arguments made use of in support of the idea may be pronounced both quaint and superficial. It amounts to this, that in the productions of the soil nature cooperates with man, and that the effect of their joint labor must be greater than that of the labor of man alone.
This, however, is far from being a necessary inference. It is very conceivable that the labor of man alone, laid out upon a work requiring great skill and art to bring it to perfection, may be more productive in value than the labor of nature and man combined when directed towards more simple operations and objects. And when it is recollected to what an extent the agency of nature, in the application of the mechanical powers, is made auxiliary to the prosecution of manufactures, the suggestion which has been noticed loses even the appearance of plausibility.
It might also be observed, with a contrary view, that the labor employed in agriculture is in a great measure periodical and occasional, depending on seasons, and liable to various and long intermissions, while that occupied in many manufactures is constant and regular, extending through the year, embracing, in some instances, night as well as day. It is also probable that there are among the cultivators of land more examples of remissness than among artificers. The farmer, from the peculiar fertility of his land, or some other favorable circumstance, may frequently obtain a livelihood even with a considerable degree of carelessness in the mode of cultivation; but the artisan can with difficulty effect the same object without exerting himself pretty equally with all those who are engaged in the same pursuit. And if it may likewise be assumed as a fact that manufactures open a wider field to exertions of ingenuity than agriculture, it would not be a strained conjecture that the labor employed in the former, being at once more constant, more uniform, and more ingenious than that which is employed in the latter, will be found, at the same time, more productive.
But it is not meant to lay stress on observations of this nature; they ought only to serve as a counterbalance to those of a similar complexion. Circumstances so vague and general, as well as so abstract, can afford little instruction in a matter of this kind.
Another, and that which seems to be the principal argument offered for the superior productiveness of agricultural labor, turns upon the allegation that labor employed on manufactures yields nothing equivalent to the rent of land, or to that neat surplus, as it is called, which accrues to the proprietor of the soil.
But this distinction, important as it has been deemed, appears rather verbal than substantial.
It is easily discernible that what in the first instance is divided into two parts, under the denominations of the ordinary profit of the stock of the farmer and rent to the landlord, is in the second instance united under the general appellation of the ordinary profit on the stock of the undertaker; and that this formal or verbal distribution constitutes the whole difference in the two cases. It seems to have been overlooked that the land is itself a stock or capital, advanced or lent by its owner to the occupier or tenant, and that the rent he receives is only the ordinary profit of a certain stock in land, not managed by the proprietor himself, but by another to whom he lends or lets it, and who, on his part, advances a second capital to stock and improve the land, upon which he also receives the usual profit. The rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer are, therefore, nothing more than the ordinary profits of two capitals belonging to two different persons, and united in the cultivation of a farm. As in the other case, the surplus which arises upon any manufactory, after replacing the expenses of carrying it on, answers to the ordinary profits of one or more capitals engaged in the prosecution of such manufactory. It is said, one or more capitals, because, in fact, the same thing which is contemplated in the case of a farm sometimes happens in that of a manufactory. There is one who furnishes a part of the capital, or lends a part of the money, by which it is carried on, and another who carries it on, with the addition of his own capital. Out of the surplus which remains, after defraying expenses, an interest is paid to the money lender for the portion of the capital furnished by him, which exactly agrees with the rent paid to the landlord; and the residue of that surplus constitutes the profit of the undertaker or manufacturer, and agrees with what is denominated the ordinary profits on the stock of the farmer. Both together make the ordinary profits of two capitals employed in a manufactory: as in the other case the rent of the landlord and the revenue of the farmer compose the ordinary profits of two capitals employed in the cultivation of a farm.
The rent, therefore, accruing to the proprietor of the land, far from being a criterion of exclusive productiveness, as has been argued, is no criterion even of superior productiveness. The question must still be whether the surplus, after defraying expenses of a given capital employed in the purchase and improvement of a piece of land, is greater or less than that of a like capital employed in the prosecution of a manufactory, or whether the whole value produced from a given capital and a given quantity of labor employed in one way be greater or less than the whole value produced from an equal capital and an equal quantity of labor employed in the other way; or rather, perhaps, whether the business of agriculture or that of manufactures will yield the greatest product, according to a compound ratio of the quantity of the capital and the quantity of labor which are employed in the one or in the other.
The solution of either of these questions is not easy; it involves numerous and complicated details, depending on an accurate knowledge of the objects to be compared. It is not known that the comparison has ever yet been made upon sufficient data properly ascertained and analyzed. To be able to make it on the present occasion with satisfactory precision would demand more previous inquiry and investigation than there has been hitherto either leisure or opportunity to accomplish.
Some essays, however, have been made towards acquiring the requisite information, which have rather served to throw doubt upon, than to confirm, the hypothesis under examination. But it ought to be acknowledged that they have been too little diversified, and are too imperfect to authorize a definitive conclusion either way, leading rather to probable conjecture than to certain deduction. They render it probable that there are various branches of manufactures in which a given capital will yield a greater total product, and a considerably greater neat product, than an equal capital invested in the purchase and improvement of lands; and that there are also some branches in which both the gross and the neat produce will exceed that of agricultural industry, according to a compound ratio of capital and labor. But it is on this last point that there appears to be the greatest room for doubt. It is far less difficult to infer generally that the neat produce of capital engaged in manufacturing enterprises is greater than that of capital engaged in agriculture.
The foregoing suggestions are not designed to inculcate an opinion that manufacturing industry is more productive than that of agriculture. They are intended rather to show that the reverse of this proposition is not ascertained; that the general arguments which are brought to establish it are not satisfactory; and, consequently, that a supposition of the superior productiveness of tillage ought to be no obstacle to listening to any substantial inducements to the encouragement of manufactures which may be otherwise perceived to exist, through an apprehension that they may have a tendency to divert labor from a more to a less profitable employment.
It is extremely probable that on a full and accurate development of the matter, on the ground of fact and calculation, it would be discovered that there is no material difference between the aggregate productiveness of the one and of the other kind of industry; and that the propriety of the encouragements, which may in any case be proposed to be given to either, ought to be determined upon considerations irrelative to any comparison of that nature.
II. But, without contending for the superior productiveness of manufacturing industry, it may conduce to a better judgment of the policy which ought to be pursued respecting its encouragement to contemplate the subject under some additional aspects, tending not only to confirm the idea that this kind of industry has been improperly represented as unproductive in itself, but to evince, in addition, that the establishment and diffusion of manufactures have the effect of rendering the total mass of useful and productive labor in a community greater than it would otherwise be. In prosecuting this discussion, it may be necessary briefly to resume and review some of the topics which have been already touched.
To affirm that the labor of the manufacturer is unproductive because he consumes as much of the produce of land as he adds value to the raw materials which he manufactures, is not better founded than it would be to affirm that the labor of the farmer, which furnishes materials to the manufacturer, is unproductive because he consumes an equal value of manufactured articles. Each furnishes a certain portion of the produce of his labor to the other, and each destroys a correspondent portion of the produce of the labor of the other. In the mean time, the maintenance of two citizens instead of one is going on, the state has two members instead of one, and they together consume twice the value of what is produced from the land.
If, instead of a farmer and artificer, there were a farmer only, he would be under the necessity of devoting a part of his labor to the fabrication of clothing and other articles, which he would procure of the artificer, in the case of there being such a person, and of course he would be able to devote less labor to the cultivation of his farm, and would draw from it a proportionably less product. The whole quantity of production in this state of things, in provisions, raw materials, and manufactures, would certainly not exceed in value the amount of what would be produced in provisions and raw materials only, if there were an artificer as well as a farmer.
Again, if there were both an artificer and a farmer, the latter would be left at liberty to pursue exclusively the cultivation of his farm. A greater quantity of provisions and raw materials would of course be produced, equal at least, as has been already observed, to the whole amount of the provisions, raw materials, and manufactures, which would exist on a contrary supposition. The artificer, at the same time, would be going on in the production of manufactured commodities, to an amount sufficient not only to repay the farmer in those commodities for the provisions and materials which were procured from him, but to furnish the artificer himself with a supply of similar commodities for his own use. Thus, then, there would be two quantities or values in existence instead of one, and the revenue and consumption would be double in one case what it would be in the other.
If, in place of both these suppositions, there were supposed to be two farmers and no artificer, each of whom applied a part of his labor to the culture of land, and another part to the fabrication of manufactures, in this case the portion of the labor of both bestowed upon land would produce the same quantity of provisions and raw materials only as would be produced by the entire sum of the labor of one applied in the same manner; and the portion of the labor of both bestowed upon manufactures would produce the same quantity of manufactures only as would be produced by the entire sum of the labor of one applied in the same manner. Hence the produce of the labor of the two farmers would not be greater than the produce of the labor of the farmer and artificer, and hence it results that the labor of the artificer is as positively productive as that of the farmer, and as positively augments the revenue of the society.
The labor of the artificer replaces to the farmer that portion of his labor with which he provides the materials of exchange with the artificer, and which he would otherwise have been compelled to apply to manufactures; and while the artificer thus enables the farmer to enlarge his stock of agricultural industry, portion of which he purchases for his own use, he also supplies himself with the manufactured articles of which he stands in need. He does still more: besides this equivalent which he gives for the portion of agricultural labor consumed by him, and this supply of manufactured commodities for his own consumption, he furnishes still a surplus which compensates for the use of the capital advanced, either by himself or some other person, for carrying on the business. This is the ordinary profit of the stock employed in the manufactory, and is in every sense as effective an addition to the income of the society as the rent of land.
The produce of the labor of the artificer, consequently, may be regarded as composed of three parts, — one by which the provisions for his subsistence and the materials for his work are purchased of the farmer, one by which he supplies himself with manufactured necessaries, and a third which constitutes the profit on the stock employed. The two last portions seem to have been overlooked in the system which represents manufacturing industry as barren and unproductive.
In the course of the preceding illustrations, the products of equal quantities of the labor of the farmer and artificer have been treated as if equal to each other. But this is not to be understood as intending to assert any such precise equality. It is merely a manner of expression adopted for the sake of simplicity and perspicuity. Whether the value of the produce of the labor of the farmer be somewhat more or less than that of the artificer is not material to the main scope of the argument, which hitherto has only aimed at showing that the one as well as the other occasions a positive augmentation of the total produce and revenue of the society.
It is now proper to proceed a step further, and to enumerate the principal circumstances from which it may be inferred that manufacturing establishments not only occasion a positive augmentation of the produce and revenue of the society, but that they contribute essentially to rendering them greater than they could possibly be without such establishments. These circumstances are: —
- 1. The division of labor.
- 2. An extension of the use of machinery.
- 3. Additional employment to classes of the community not ordinarily engaged in the business.
- 4. The promoting of emigration from foreign countries.
- 5. The furnishing greater scope for the diversity of talents and dispositions which discriminate men from each other.
- 6. The affording a more ample and various field for enterprise.
- 7. The creating in some instances a new, and securing in all a more certain and steady demand for the surplus produce of the soil.
Each of these circumstances has a considerable influence upon the total mass of industrious effort in a community; together they add to it a degree of energy and effect which are not easily conceived. Some comments upon each of them, in the order in which they have been stated, may serve to explain their importance.
1. As to the division of labor.
It has justly been observed, that there is scarcely anything of greater moment in the economy of a nation than the proper division of labor. The separation of occupations causes each to be carried to a much greater perfection than it could possibly acquire if they were blended. This arises principally from three circumstances.
1st. Ihe greater skill and dexterity naturally resulting from a constant and undivided application to a single object. It is evident that these properties must increase in proportion to the separation and simplification of objects, and the steadiness of the attention devoted to each, and must be less in proportion to the complication of objects and the number among which the attention is distracted.
2d. The economy of time, by avoiding the loss of it, incident to a frequent transition from one operation to another of a different nature. This depends on various circumstances, — the transition itsslf, the orderly disposition of the implements, machines, and materials employed in the operation to be relinquished, the preparatory steps to the commencement of a new one, the interruption of the impulse which the mind of the workman acquires from being engaged in a particular operation, the distractions, hesitations, and reluctances which attend the passage from one kind of business to another.
3d. An extension of the use of machinery. A man occupied on a single object will have it more in his power, and will be more naturally led to exert his imagination in devising methods to facilitate and abridge labor than if he were perplexed by a variety of independent and dissimilar operations. Besides this, the fabrication of machines in numerous instances becoming itself a distinct trade, the artist who follows it has all the advantages which have been enumerated for improvement in his particular art, and, in both ways, the invention and application of machinery are extended.
And from these causes united, the mere separation of the occupation of the cultivator from that of the artificer has the effect of augmenting the productive powers of labor, and with them the total mass of the produce or revenue of a country. In this single view of the subject, therefore, the utility of artificers or manufacturers towards promoting an increase of productive industry is apparent.
2. As to an extension of the use of machinery, a point which, though partly anticipated, requires to be placed in one or two additional lights.
The employment of machinery forms an item of great importance in the general mass of national industry. It is an artificial force brought in aid of the natural force of man, and, to all the purposes of labor, is an increase of hands, an accession of strength, uninemnbered, too, by the expense of maintaining the laborer. May it not, therefore, be fairly inferred that those occupations which give greatest scope to the use of this auxiliary contribute most to the general stock of industrious effort, and, in consequence, to the general product of industry?
It shall be taken for granted, and the truth of the position referred to observation, that manufacturing pursuits are susceptible in a greater degree of the application of machinery than those of agriculture. If so, all the difference is lost to a community, which, instead of manufacturing for itself, procures the fabrics requisite to its supply from other countries. The substitution of foreign for domestic manufactures is a transfer to foreign nations of the advantages accruing from the employment of machinery in the modes in which it is capable of being employed with most utility and to the greatest extent.
The cotton mill, invented in England within the last twenty years, is a signal illustration of the general proposition which has been just advanced. In consequence of it all the different processes for spinning cotton are performed by means of machines which are put in motion by water, and attended chiefly by women and children, and by a smaller number of persons, in the whole, than are requisite in the ordinary mode of spinning. And it is an advantage of great moment that the operations of this mill continue with convenience during the night as well as through the day. The prodigious effect of such a machine is easily conceived. To this invention is to be attributed essentially the immense progress which has been so suddenly made in Great Britain in the various fabrics of cotton.
3. As to the additional employment of classes of the community not originally engaged in the particular business.
This is not among the least valuable of the means by which manufacturing institutions contribute to augment the general stock of industry and production. In places where those institutions prevail, besides the persons regularly engaged in them, they afford occasional and extra employment to industrious individuals and families who are willing to devote the leisure resulting from the intermissions of their ordinary pursuits to collateral labors, as a resource for multiplying their acquisitions or their enjoyments. The husbandman himself experiences a new source of profit and support from the increased industry of his wife and daughters, invited and stimulated by the demands of the neighboring manufactories.
Beside this advantage of occasional employment to classes having different occupations, there is another of a nature allied to it, and of a similar tendency. This is the employment of persons who would otherwise be idle (and in many cases a burden on the community), either from the bias of temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other cause, indisposing or disqualifying them for the toils of the country. It is worthy of particular remark that, in general, women and children are rendered more useful, and the latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments than they would otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that four sevenths nearly are women and children, — of whom the greatest proportion are children, and many of them of a tender age.
And thus it appears to be one of the attributes of manufactures, and one of no small consequence, to give occasion to the exertion of a greater quantity of industry, even by the same number of persons, where they happen to prevail, than would exist if there were no such establishments.
4. As to the promoting of emigration from foreign countries.
Men reluctantly quit one course of occupation and livelihood for another, unless invited to it by very apparent and proximate advantages. Many who would go from one country to another, if they had a prospect of continuing with more benefit the callings to which they have been educated, will often not be tempted to change their situation by the hope of doing better in some other way. Manufacturers who, listening to the powerful invitations of a better price for their fabrics or their labor; of greater cheapness of provisions and raw materials; of an exemption from the chief part of the taxes, burdens, and restraints which they endure in the old world; of greater personal independence and consequence under the operation of a more equal government; and of what is far more precious than mere religious toleration, a perfect equality of religious privileges, would probably flock from Europe to the United States to pursue their own trades or professions, if they were once made sensible of the advantages they would enjoy, and were inspired with an assurance of encouragement and employment, will with difficulty be induced to transplant themselves with a view to becoming cultivators of land.
If it be true, then, that it is the interest of the United States to open every possible avenue to emigration from abroad, it affords a weighty argument for the encouragement of manufactures, which, for the reasons just assigned, will have the strongest tendency to multiply the inducements to it.
Here is perceived an important resource, not only for extending the population, and with it the useful and productive labor of the country, but likewise for the prosecution of manufactures without deducting from the number of hands which might otherwise be drawn to tillage, and even for the indemnification of agriculture for such as might happen to be diverted from it. Many, whom manufacturing views would induce to emigrate, would afterwards yield to the temptations which the particular situation of this country holds out to agricultural pursuits. And while agriculture would in other respects derive many signal and unmingled advantages from the growth of manufactures, it is a problem whether it would gain or lose as to the article of the number of persons employed in carrying it on.
5. As to the furnishing greater scope for the diversityof talents and dispositions which discriminate men from each other.
This is a much more powerful mean of augmenting the fund of national industry than may at first sight appear. It is a just observation that minds of the strongest and most active powers for their proper objects fall below mediocrity, and labor without effect if confined to uncongenial pursuits. And it is thence to be inferred that the results of human exertion may be immensely increased by diversifying its objects. When all the different kinds of industry obtain in a community, each individual can find his proper element, and can call into activity the whole vigor of his nature. And the community is benefited by the services of its respective members in the manner in which each can serve it with most effect.
If there be anything in a remark often to be met with, namely, that there is in the genius of the people of this country a peculiar aptitude for mechanic improvements, it would operate as a forcible reason for giving opportunities to the exercise of that species of talent by the propagation of manufactures.
6. As to the affording a more ample and various field for enterprise.
This also is of greater consequence in the general scale of national exertion than might perhaps, on a superficial view, be supposed, and has effects not altogether dissimilar from those of the circumstance last noticed. To cherish and stimulate the activity of the human mind by multiplying the objects of enterprise is not among the least considerable of the expedients by which the wealth of a nation may be promoted. Even things in themselves not positively advantageous sometimes become so by their tendency to provoke exertion. Every new scene which is opened to the busy nature of man to rouse and exert itself is the addition of a new energy to the general stock of effort.
The spirit of enterprise, useful and prolific as it is, must necessarily be contracted or expanded in proportion to the simplicity or variety of the occupations and productions which are to be found in a society. It must be less in a nation of mere cultivators than in a nation of cultivators and merchants, less in a nation of cultivators and merchants than in a nation of cultivators, artificers, and merchants.
7. As to the creating, in some instances, a new, and securing in all a more certain and steady demand, for the surplus produce of the soil.
This is among the most important of the circumstances which have been indicated. It is a principal mean by which the establishment of manufactures contributes to an augmentation of the produce or revenue of a country, and has an immediate and direct relation to the prosperity of agriculture.
It is evident that the exertions of the husbandman will be steady or fluctuating, vigorous or feeble, in proportion to the steadiness or fluctuation, adequateness or inadequateness, of the markets on which he must depend for the vent of the surplus which may be produced by his labor; and that such surplus, in the ordinary course of things, will be greater or less in the same proportion.
For the purpose of this vent, a domestic market is greatly to be preferred to a foreign one, because it is, in the nature of things, far more to be relied upon.
It is a primary object of the policy of nations to be able to supply themselves with subsistence from their own soils; and manufacturing nations, as far as circumstances permit, endeavor to procure from the same source the raw materials necessary for their own fabrics. This disposition, urged by the spirit of monopoly, is sometimes even carried to an injudicious extreme. It seems not always to be recollected that nations who have neither mines nor manufactures can only obtain the manufactured articles of which they stand in need by an exchange of the products of their soils; and that if those who can best furnish them with such articles are unwilling to give a due course to this exchange, they must of necessity make every possible effort to manufacture for themselves; the effect of which is, that the manufacturing nations abridge the natural advantages of their situation through an unwillingness to permit the agricultural countries to enjoy the advantages of theirs, and sacrifice the interests of a mutually beneficial intercourse to the vain project of selling everything and buying nothing.
But it is also a consequence of the policy which has been noted, that the foreign demand for the products of agricultural countries is in a great degree rather casual and occasional than certain or constant. To what extent injurious interruptions of the demand for some of the staple commodities of the United States may have been experienced from that cause must be referred to the judgment of those who are engaged in carrying on the commerce of the country; but it may be safely affirmed that such interruptions are at times very inconveniently felt, and that cases not unfrequently occur in which markets are so confined and restricted as to render the demand very unequal to the supply.
Independently, likewise, of the artificial impediments which are created by the policy in question, there are natural causes tending to render the external demand for the surplus of agricultural nations a precarious reliance. The differences of seasons in the countries which are the consumers make immense differences in the produce of their own soils in different years, and, consequently, in the degrees of their necessity for foreign supply. Plentiful harvests with them, especially if similar ones occur at the same time in the countries which are the furnishers, occasion of course a glut in the markets of the latter.
Considering how fast and how much the progress of new settlements in the United States must increase the surplus produce of the soil, and weighing seriously the tendency of the system which prevails among most of the commercial nations of Europe, whatever dependence may be placed on the force of natural circumstances to counteract the effects of an artificial policy, there appear strong reasons to regard the foreign demand for that surplus as too uncertain a reliance, and to desire a substitute for it in an extensive domestic market
To secure such a market there is no other expedient than to promote manufacturing establishments. Manufacturers, who constitute the most numerous class after the cultivators of land, are for that reason the principal consumers of the surplus of their labor.
This idea of an extensive domestic market for the surplus produce of the soil is of the first consequence. It is, of all things, that which most effectually conduces to a flourishing state of agriculture. If the effect of manufactories should be to detach a portion of the hands, which would otherwise be engaged in tillage, it might possibly cause a smaller quantity of lands to be under cultivation; but by their tendency to procure a more certain demand for the surplus produce of the soil, they would at the same time cause the lands which were in cultivation to be better improved and more productive. And while, by their influence, the condition of each individual farmer would be ameliorated, the total mass of agricultural production would probably be increased. For this must evidently depend as much upon the degree of improvement, if not more, than upon the number of acres under culture.
It merits particular observation that the multiplication of manufactories not only furnishes a market for those articles, which have been accustomed to be produced in abundance in a country, but it likewise creates a demand for such as were either unknown or produced in inconsiderable quantities. The bowels as well as the surface of the earth are ransacked for articles which were before neglected. Animals, plants, and minerals acquire an utility and value which were before unexplored.
The foregoing considerations seem sufficient to establish, as general propositions, that it is the interest of nations to diversify the industrious pursuits of the individuals who compose them; that the establishment of manufactures is calculated not only to increase the general stock of useful and productive labor, but even to improve the state of agriculture in particular; certainly to advance the interests of those who are engaged in it. There are other views that will be hereafter taken of the subject which, it is conceived, will serve to confirm these inferences.
III. Previously to a further discussion of the objections to the encouragement of manufactures, which have been stated, it will be of use to see what can be said in reference to the particular situation of the United States against the conclusions appearing to result from what has been already offered.
It may be observed, and the idea is of no inconsiderable weight, that however true it might be that a state which, possessing large tracts of vacant and fertile territory, was at the same time secluded from foreign commerce, would find its interest and the interest of agriculture in diverting a part of its population from tillage to manufactures; yet it will not follow that the same is true of a state which, having such vacant and fertile territory, has at the same time ample opportunity of procuring from abroad, on good terms, all the fabrics of which it stands in need for the supply of its inhabitants. The power of doing this, at least, secures the great advantage of a division of labor, leaving the fanner free to pursue exclusively the culture of his land, and enabling him to procure with its products the manufactured supplies requisite either to his wants or to his enjoyments. And though it should be true that in settled countries the diversification of industry is conducive to an increase in the productive powers of labor, and to an augmentation of revenue and capital, yet it is scarcely conceivable that there can be anything of so solid and permanent advantage to an uncultivated and unpeopled country as to convert its wastes into cultivated and inhabited districts. If the revenue, in the mean time, should be less, the capital in the event must be greater.
To these observations the following appears to be a satisfactory answer: —
1. If the system of perfect liberty to industry and commerce were the prevailing system of nations, the arguments which dissuade a country in the predicament of the United States from the zealous pursuit of manufactures would, doubtless, have great force. It will not be affirmed that they might not be permitted, with few exceptions, to serve as a rule of national conduct. In such a state of things each country would have the full benefit of its peculiar advantages to compensate for its deficiencies or disadvantages. If one nation were in a condition to supply manufactured articles on better terms than another, that other might find an abundant indemnification in a superior capacity to furnish the produce of the soil. And a free exchange, mutually beneficial, of the commodities which each was able to supply on the best terms might be carried on between them, supporting in full vigor the industry of each. And though the circumstances which have been mentioned, and others which will be unfolded hereafter, render it probable that nations merely agricultural would not enjoy the same degree of opulence, in proportion to their numbers, as those which united manufactures with agriculture; yet the progressive improvement of the lands of the former might, in the end, atone for an inferior degree of opulence in the mean time, and, in a case in which opposite considerations are pretty equally balanced, the option ought perhaps always to be in favor of leaving industry to its own direction.
But the system which has been mentioned is far from characterizing the general policy of nations. The prevalent one has been regulated by an opposite spirit. The consequence of it is that the United States are, to a certain extent, in the situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce. They can indeed, without difficulty, obtain from abroad the manufactured supplies of which they are in want, but they experience numerous and very injurious impediments to the emission and vent of their own commodities. Nor is this the case in reference to a single foreign nation only. The regulations of several countries, with which we have the most extensive intercourse, throw serious obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the United States.
In such a position of things the United States cannot exchange with Europe on equal terms, and the want of reciprocity would render them the victim of a system which should induce them to confine their views to agriculture, and refrain from manufactures. A constant and increasing necessity, on their part, for the commodities of Europe, and only a partial and occasional demand for their own in return, could not but expose them to a slate of impoverishment compared with the opulence to which their political and natural advantages authorize them to aspire.
Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of complaint. It is for the nations, whose regulations are alluded to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much, they do not lose more than they gain. It is for the United States to consider by what means they can render themselves least dependent on the combinations, right or wrong, of foreign policy.
It is no small consolation that already the measures which have embarrassed our trade have accelerated internal improvements, which, upon the whole, have bettered our affairs. To diversify and extend these improvements is the surest and safest method of indemnifying ourselves for any inconveniences which those or similar measures have a tendency to beget. If Europe will not take from us the products of our soil upon terms consistent with our interest, the natural remedy is to contract, as fast as possible, our wants of her.
2. The conversion of their waste into cultivated lands is certainly a point of great moment in the political calculations of the United States. But the degree in which this may possibly be retarded by the encouragement of manufactories does not appear to countervail the powerful inducements to affording that encouragement.
An observation made in another place is of a nature to have great influence upon this question. If it cannot be denied that the interests even of agriculture may be advanced more by having such of the lands of a State as are occupied under good cultivation than by having a greater quantity occupied under a much inferior cultivation, and if manufactories, for the reasons assigned, must be admitted to have a tendency to promote a more steady and vigorous cultivation of the lands occupied than would happen without them, it will follow that they are capable of indemnifying a country for a diminution of the progress of new settlements, and may serve to increase both the capital value and the income of its lands, even though they should abridge the number of acres under tillage.
But it does by no means follow that the progress of new settlements would be retarded by the extension of manufactures. The desire of being an independent proprietor of land is founded on such strong principles in the human breast, that where the opportunity of becoming so is as great as it is in the United States, the proportion will be small of those whose situations would otherwise lead to it who would be diverted from it towards manufactures. And it is highly probable, as already intimated, that the accessions of foreigners who, originally drawn over by manufacturing views, would afterwards abandon them for agricultural, would be more than an equivalent for those of our own citizens who might happen to be detached from them.
The remaining objections to a particular encouragement of manufactures in the United States now require to be examined.
One of these turns on the proposition that industry, if left to itself, will naturally find its way to the most useful and profitable employment. Whence it is inferred that manufactures, without the aid of government, will grow up as soon and as fast as the natural state of things and the interest of the community may require.
Against the solidity of this hypothesis, in the full latitude of the terms, very cogent reasons may be offered. These have relation to the strong influence of habit, and the spirit of imitation, the fear of want of success in untried enterprises, the intrinsic difficulties incident to first essays towards a competition with those who have previously attained to perfection in the business to be attempted; the bounties, premiums, and other artificial encouragements with which foreign nations second the exertions of their own citizens in the branches in which they are to be rivaled.
Experience teaches that men are often so much governed by what they are accustomed to see and practice, that the simplest and most obvious improvements in the most ordinary occupations are adopted with hesitation, reluctance, and by slow gradations. The spontaneous transition to new pursuits in a community long habituated to different ones may be expected to be attended with proportionably greater difficulty. When former occupations ceased to yield a profit adequate to the subsistence of their followers, or when there was an absolute deficiency of employment in them, owing to the superabundance of hands, changes would ensue; but these changes would be likely to be more tardy than might consist with the interest either of individuals or of the society. In many cases they would not happen, while a bare support could be insured by an adherence to ancient courses, though a resort to a more profitable employment might be practicable. To produce the desirable changes as early as may be expedient may, therefore, require the incitement and patronage of government.
The apprehension of failing in new attempts is, perhaps, a more serious impediment. There are dispositions apt to be attracted by the mere novelty of an undertaking, but these are not always those best calculated to give it success. To this it is of importance that the confidence of cautions, sagacious capitalists, both citizens and foreigners, should be excited. And to inspire this description of persons with confidence, it is essential that they should be made to see in any project which is new, and for that reason alone, if for no other, precarious, the prospect of such a degree of countenance and support from government as may be capable of overcoming the obstacles inseparable from first experiments.
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations who have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry constitutes a more formidable obstacle than either of those which have been mentioned to the introduction of the same branch into a country in which it did not before exist. To maintain between the recent establishments of one country and the long matured establishments of another country a competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to forbid a successful rivalship without the extraordinary aid and protection of government.
But the greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of industry, in a country in which it was before unknown, consists, as far as the instances apply, in the bounties, premiums, and other aids which are granted in a variety of cases by the nations in which the establishments to be imitated are previously introduced. It is well known — and particular examples in the coarse of this report will be cited — that certain nations grant bounties on the exportation of particular commodities to enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors in the countries to which those commodities are sent. Hence the undertakers of a new manufacture have to contend not only with the natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but with the gratuities and remunerations which other governments bestow. To be enabled to contend with success, it is evident that the interference and aid of their own governments are indispensable.
Combinations by those engaged in a particular branch of business in one country to frustrate the first efforts to introduce it into another by temporary sacrifices, recompensed, perhaps, by extraordinary indemnifications of the government of snch country, are believed to have existed, and are not to be regarded as destitute of probability. The existence or assurance of aid from the government of the country, in which the business is to be introduced, may be essential to fortify adventurers against the dread of such combinations, — to defeat their effects, if formed, and to prevent their being formed by demonstrating that they must, in the end, prove fruitless.
Whatever room there may be for an expectation that the industry of a people, under the direction of private interest, will upon equal terms find out the most beneficial employment for itself, there is none for a reliance that it will struggle against the force of unequal terms, or will of itself surmount all the adventitious barriers to a successful competition, which may have been erected either by the advantages naturally acquired by practice and previous possession of the ground, or by those which may have sprung from positive regulations and an artificial policy. This general reflection might alone suffice as an answer to the objection under examination, exclusively of the weighty considerations which have been particularly urged.
The objections to the pursuit of manufactures in the United States, which next present themselves to discussion, represent an impracticability of success arising from three causes: scarcity of hands, dearness of labor, want of capital.
The two first circumstances are to a certain extent real, and within due limits ought to be admitted as obstacles to the success of manufacturing enterprise in the United States. But there are various considerations which lessen their force, and tend to afford an assurance that they are not sufficient to prevent the advantageous prosecution of many very useful and extensive manufactories.
With regard to scarcity of hands, the fact itself must be applied with no small qualification to certain parts of the United States. There are large districts which may be considered as pretty fully peopled, and which, notwithstanding a continual drain for distant settlement, are thickly interspersed with flourishing and increasing towns. If these districts have not already reached the point at which the complaint of scarcity of hands ceases, they are not remote from it, and are approaching fast towards it. And having perhaps fewer attractions to agriculture than some other parts of the Union, they exhibit a proportionally stronger tendency towards other kinds of industry. In these districts may be discerned no inconsiderable maturity for manufacturing establishments.
But there are circumstances which have been already noticed with another view, that materially diminish everywhere the effect of a scarcity of hands. These circumstances are: the great use which can be made of women and children, on which point a very pregnant and instructive fact has been mentioned; the vast extension given by late improvements to the employment of machines, which, substituting the agency of fire and water, has prodigiously lessened the necessity for manual labor; the employment of persons ordinarily engaged in other occupations during the seasons or hours of leisure, which, besides giving occasion to the exertion of a greater quantity of labor by the same number of persons, and thereby increasing the general stock of labor, as has elsewhere been remarked, may also be taken into the calculation as a resource for obviating the scarcity of hands; lastly, the attraction of foreign emigrants. Whoever inspects with a careful eye the composition of our towns, will be made sensible to what an extent this resource may be relied upon. This exhibits a large proportion of ingenious and valuable workmen in different arts and trades, who, by expatriating from Europe, have improved their own condition and added to the industry and wealth of the United States. It is a natural inference from the experience we have already had, that as soon as the United States shall present the countenance of a serious prosecution of manufactures, as soon as foreign artists shall be made sensible that the state of things here affords a moral certainty of employment and encouragement, competent numbers of European workmen will transplant themselves effectually to insure the success of the design. How indeed can it otherwise happen, considering the various and powerful inducements which the situation of this country offers; addressing themselves to so many strong passions and feelings, to so many general and particular interests?
It may be affirmed, therefore, in respect to hands for carrying on manufactures, that we shall in a great measure trade upon a foreign stock, reserving our own for the cultivation of our lands and the manning of our ships, as far as character and circumstances shall incline. It is not unworthy of remark, that the objection to the success of manufactures deduced from the scarcity of hands, is alike applicable to trade and navigation, and yet these are perceived to flourish, without any sensible impediment from that cause.
As to the dearness of labor (another of the obstacles alleged), this has relation principally to two circumstances: one, that which has been just discussed, or the scarcity of hands; the other, the greatness of profits.
As far as it is a consequence of the scarcity of hands, it is mitigated by all the considerations which have been adduced as lessening that deficiency. It is certain, too, that the disparity in this respect between some of the most manufacturing parts of Europe and a large proportion of the United States is not nearly so great as is commonly imagined. It is also much less in regard to artificers and manufacturers than in regard to country laborers; and while a careful comparison shows that there is in this particular much exaggeration, it is also evident that the effect of the degree of disparity which does truly exist is diminished in proportion to the use which can be made of machinery.
To illustrate this last idea: let it be supposed that the difference of price in two countries of a given quantity of manual labor requisite to the fabrication of a given article is as ten, and that some mechanic power is introduced into both countries which, performing half the necessary labor, leaves only half to be done by hand, it is evident that the difference in the cost of the fabrication of the article in question in the two countries, as far as it is connected with the price of labor, will be reduced from ten to five in consequence of the introduction of that poweb.
This circumstance is worthy of the most particular attention. It diminishes immensely one of the objections most strenuously urged against the success of manufactures in the United States.
To procure all such machines as are known in any part of Europe can only require a proper provision and due pains. The knowledge of several of the most important of them is already possessed. The preparation of them here is in most cases practicable on nearly equal terms. As far as they depend on water, some superiority of advantages may be claimed from the uncommon variety and greater cheapness of situations adapted to mill-seats with which different parts of the United States abound.
So far as the dearness of labor may be a consequence of the greatness of profits in any branch of business, it is no obstacle to its success. The undertaker can afford to pay the price.
There are grounds to conclude that undertakers of manufactures in this country can at this time afford to pay higher wages to the workmen they may employ than are paid to similar workmen in Europe. The prices of foreign fabrics in the markets of the United States, which will for a longtime regulate the prices of the domestic ones, may be considered as compounded of the following ingredients: The first cost of materials, including the taxes, if any, which are paid upon them where they are made, the expense of grounds, buildings, machinery and tools; the wages of the persons employed in the manufactory; the profits on the capital or stock employed; the commissions of agents to purchase them where they are made; the expense of transportation to the United States, including insurance and other incidental charges; the taxes or duties, if any, and fees of office which are paid on their exportation; the taxes or duties, and fees of office which are paid on their importation.
As to the first of these items, the cost of materials, the advantage upon the whole is at present on the side of the United States; and the difference in their favor must increase in proportion as a certain and extensive domestic demand shall induce the proprietors of land to devote more of their attention to the production of those materials. It ought not to escape observation, in a comparison on this point, that some of the principal manufacturing countries of Europe are much more dependent on foreign supply for the materials of their manufactures than would be the United States, who are capable of supplying themselves with a greater abundance, as well as a greater variety, of the requisite materials.
As to the second item, the expense of grounds, buildings, machinery and tools, an equality at least may be assumed; since advantages in some particulars will counterbalance temporary disadvantages in others.
As to the third item, or the article of wages, the comparison certainly turns against the United States, though, as before observed, not in so great a degree as is commonly supposed.
The fourth item is alike applicable to the foreign and to the domestic manufacture. It is indeed more properly a result than a particular to be compared.
But with respect to all the remaining items, they are alone applicable to the foreign manufacture, and in the strictest sense extraordinaries; constituting a sum of extra charge on the foreign fabric, which cannot be estimated at less than from fifteen to thirty per cent, on the cost of it at the manufactory.
This sum of extra charge may confidently be regarded as more than a counterpoise for the real difference in the price of labor; and is a satisfactory proof that manufactures may prosper in defiance of it in the United States.
To the general allegation connected with the circumstances of scarcity of hands and dearness of labor, that extensive manufactures can only grow out of a redundant or full population, it will be sufficient to answer generally that the fact has been otherwise; that the situation alleged to be an essential condition of success has not been that of several nations, at periods when they had already attained to maturity in a variety of manufactures.
The supposed want of capital for the prosecution of manufactures in the United States is the most indefinite of the objections which are usually opposed to it.
It is very difficult to pronounce anything precise concerning the real extent of the moneyed capital of a country, and still more concerning the proportion which it bears to the objects that invite the employment of capital. It is not less difficult to pronounce how far the effect of any given quantity of money as capital, or, in other words, as a medium for circulating the industry and property of a nation, may be increased by the very circumstance of the additional motion which is given to it by new objects of employment. That effect, like the momentum of descending bodies, may not improperly be represented, as in a compound ratio, to mass and velocity. It seems pretty certain that a given sum of money in a situation in which the quick impulses of commercial activity were little felt, would appear inadequate to the circulation∗ of as great a quantity of industry and property as in one in which their full influence was experienced.
It is not obvious why the same objection might not as well be made to external commerce as to manufactures, since it is manifest that our immense tracts of land, occupied and unoccupied, are capable of giving employment to more capital than is actually bestowed on them. It is certain that the United States offer a vast field for the advantageous employment of capital; but it does not follow that there will not be found, in one way or another, a sufficient fund for the successful prosecution of any species of industry which is likely to prove truly beneficial.
The following considerations are of a nature to remove all inquietude on the score of want of capital.
The introduction of banks, as has been shown on another occasion, has a powerful tendency to extend the active capital of a country. Experience of the utility of these institutions is multiplying them in the United States. It is probable that they will be established wherever they can exist with advantage; and wherever they can be supported, if administered with prudence, they will add new energies to all pecuniary operations.
The aid of foreign capital may safely and with considerable latitude be taken into calculation. Its instrumentality has been long experienced in our external commerce; and it has begun to be felt in various other modes. Not only our funds but our agriculture and other internal improvements have been animated by it. It has already, in a few instances, extended even to our manufactures.
It is a well known fact that there are parts of Europe which have more capital than profitable domestic objects of employment. Hence, among other proofs, the large loans continually furnished to foreign states. And it is equally certain that the capital of other parts may find more profitable employment in the United States than at home. And notwithstanding there are weighty inducements to prefer the employment of capital at home, even at less profit, to an investment of it abroad, though with greater gain, yet these inducements are overruled either by a deficiency of employment or by a very material difference in profit. Both these causes operate to produce a transfer of foreign capital to the United States. It is certain that various objects in this country hold out advantages which are with difficulty to be equaled elsewhere; and under the increasingly favorable impressions which are entertained of our government, the attractions will become more and more strong. These impressions will prove a rich mine of prosperity to the country if they are confirmed and strengthened by the progress of our affairs. And to secure this advantage, little more is necessary than to foster industry and cultivate order and tranquillity at home and abroad.
It is not impossible that there may be persons disposed to look with a jealous eye on the introduction of foreign capital as if it were an instrument to deprive our own citizens of the profits of our own industry. But perhaps there never could be a more unreasonable jealousy. Instead of being viewed as a rival, it ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary; conducing to put in motion a greater quantity of productive labor and a greater portion of useful enterprise than could exist without it. It is at least evident that in a country situated like the United States, with an infinite fund of resources yet to be unfolded, every farthing of foreign capital which is laid out in internal meliorations and in industrial establishments of a permanent nature is a precious acquisition.
And whatever be the objects which originally attract foreign capital when once introduced, it may be directed towards any purpose of beneficial exertion which is desired. And to detain it among us there can be no expedient so effectual as to enlarge the sphere within which it may be usefully employed; though introduced merely with views to speculations in the funds, it may afterwards be rendered subservient to the interests of agriculture, commerce and manufactures.
But the attraction of foreign capital for the direct purpose of manufactures ought not to be deemed a chimerical expectation. There are already examples of it, as remarked in another place. And the examples, if the disposition be cultivated, can hardly fail to multiply. There are also instances of another kind which serve to strengthen the expectation; enterprises for improving the public communications, by cutting canals, opening the obstructions in rivers and erecting bridges, have received very material aid from the same source.
When the manufacturing capitalist of Europe shall advert to the many important advantages which have been intimated in the course of this report, he cannot but perceive very powerful inducements to a transfer of himself and his capital to the United States. Among the reflections which a most interesting peculiarity of situation is calculated to suggest, it cannot escape Ms observation as a circumstance of moment in the calculation, that the progressive population and improvement of the United States insure a continually increasing domestic demand for the fabrics which he shall produce, not to be affected by any external casualties or vicissitudes.
But while there are circumstances sufficiently strong to authorize a considerable degree of reliance on the aid of foreign capital towards the attainment of the object in view, it is satisfactory to have good grounds of assurance that there are domestic resources of themselves adequate to it. It happens that there is a species of capital actually existing within the United States, which relieves from all inquietude on the score of want of capital, — this is the funded debt.
The effect of a funded debt, as a species of capital, has been noticed upon a former occasion; but a more particular elucidation of the point seems to be required by the stress which is here laid upon it. This shall accordingly be attempted.
Public funds answer the purpose of capital, from the estimation in which they are usually held by moneyed men; and consequently from the ease and dispatch with which they can be turned into money. This capacity of prompt convertibility into money causes a transfer of stock to be, in a great number of cases, equivalent to a payment in coin; and where it does not happen to suit the party who is to receive to accept a transfer of stock, the party who is to pay is never at a loss to find elsewhere a purchaser of his stock, who will furnish him, in lieu of it, with the coin of which he stands in need.
Hence, in a sound and settled state of the public funds, a man possessed of a sum in them can embrace any scheme of business which offers, with as much confidence as if he were possessed of an equal sum in coin.
This operation of public funds as capital is too obvious to be denied; but it is objected to the idea of their operating as an augmentation of the capital of the community, that they serve to occasion the destruction of some other capital to an equal amount.
The capital which alone they can be supposed to destroy must consist of—the annual revenue, which is applied to the payment of interest on the debt and to the gradual redemption of the principal; the amount of the coin which is employed in circulating the funds, or, in other words, in effecting the different alienations which they undergo.
But the following appears to be the true and accurate view of this matter: —
1st. As to the point of the annual revenue requisite for payment of interest and redemption of principal.
As a determinate proportion will tend to perspicuity in the reasoning, let it be supposed that the annual revenue to be applied, corresponding with the modification of the six per cent, stock of the United States, is in the ratio of eight upon the hundred; that is, in the first instance, six on account of interest, and two on account of principal.
Thus far it is evident that the capital destroyed to the capital created would bear no greater proportion than eight to one hundred. There would be withdrawn from the total mass of other capitals a sum of $8 to be paid to the public creditor, while he would be possessed of a sum of $100, ready to be applied to any purpose, to be embarked in any enterprise which might appear to him eligible. Here, then, the augmentation of capital, or the excess of that which is produced beyond that which is destroyed, is equal to $92.
To this conclusion it may be objected that the sum of $8 is to be withdrawn annually until the whole hundred is extinguished; and it may be inferred that, in process of time, a capital will be destroyed equal to that which is at first created.
But it is nevertheless true that, during the whole of she interval between the creation of the capital of $100 and its reduction to a sum not greater than that of the annual revenue appropriated to its redemption, there will be a greater active capital in existence than if no debt had been contracted. The sum drawn from other capitals in any one year will not exceed $8; but there will be, at every instant of time during the whole period in question, a sum corresponding with so much of the principal as remains unredeemed in the hands of some person or other, employed or ready to be employed in some profitable undertaking. There will, therefore, constantly be more capital in capacity to be employed than capital taken from employment. The excess for the first year has been stated to be $92; it will diminish yearly, but there always will be an excess until the principal of the debt is brought to a level with the redeeming annuity; that is, in the case which has been assumed by way of example, to $8. The reality of this excess becomes palpable if it be supposed, as often happens, that the citizen of a foreign country imports into the United States $100 for the purchase of an equal sum of public debt. Here is an absolute augmentation of the mass of circulating coin to the extent of $100. At the end of a year, the foreigner is presumed to draw back $8 on account of his principal and interest, but he still leaves $92 of his original deposit in circulation, as he, in like manner, leaves $84 at the end of the second year, drawing back then also the annuity of $8. And thus the matter proceeds; the capital left in circulation diminishing each year, and coming nearer to the level of the annuity drawn back. There are, however, some differences in the ultimate operation of the part of the debt which is purchased by foreigners, and that which remains in the hands of citizens. But the general effect in each case, though in different degrees, is to add to the active capital of the country.
Hitherto the reasoning has proceeded on a concession of the position that there is a destruction of some other capital, to the extent of the annuity appropriated to the payment of the interest and the redemption of the principal of the debt; but in this too much has been conceded. There is at most a temporary transfer of some other capital to the amount of the annuity from those who pay to the creditor who receives, which he again restores to the circulation to resume the offices of a capital. This he does either immediately, by employing the money in some branch of industry; or mediately, by lending it to some other person who does so employ it, or by spending it on his own maintenance. In either supposition there is no destruction of capital; there is nothing more than a suspension of its motion for a time; that is, while it is passing from the hands of those who pay into the public coffers, and thence through the public creditor into some other channel of circulation. When the payments of interest are periodical and quick, and made by the instrumentality of banks, the diversion or suspension of capital may almost be denominated momentary. Hence the deduction on this account is far less than it at first sight appears to be.
There is evidently, as far as regards the annuity, no destruction nor transfer of any other capital than that portion of the income of each individual which goes to make up the annuity. The land which furnishes the farmer with the sum which he is to contribute remains the same, and the like may be observed of other capitals. Indeed, as far as the tax which is the object of contribution (as frequently happens when it does not oppress by its weight) may have been a motive to greater exertion in any occupation, it may even serve to increase the contributory capital. This idea is not without importance in the general view of the subject
It remains to see what further deduction ought to be made from the capital which is created by the existence of the debt, on account of the coin which is employed in its circulation. This is susceptible of much less precise calculation than the article which has been just discussed. It is impossible to say what proportion of coin is necessary to carry on the alienations which any species of property usually undergoes. The quantity indeed varies according to circumstances. But it may still, without hesitation, be pronounced, from the quickness of the rotation, or rather of the transitions, that the medium of circulation always bears but a small proportion to the amount of the property circulated. And it is thence satisfactorily deducible, that the coin employed in the negotiations of the funds, and which serves to give them activity, as capital, is incomparably less than the sum of the debt negotiated for the purpose of business.
It ought not, however, to be omitted that the negotiation of the funds becomes itself a distinct business; which employs, and by employing diverts a portion of the circulating coin from other pursuits. But making due allowance for this circumstance, there is no reason to conclude that the effect of the diversion of coin, in the whole operation, bears any considerable proportion to the amount of the capital to which it gives activity. The sum of the debt in circulation is continually at the command of any useful enterprise: the coin itself which circulates it is never more than momentarily suspended from its ordinary functions. It experiences an incessant and rapid flux and reflux to and from the channels of industry to those of speculations in the funds.
There are strong circumstances in confirmation of this theory. The force of moneyed capital which has been displayed in Great Britain, and the height to which every species of industry has grown up under it, defy a solution from the quantity of coin which that kingdom has ever possessed. Accordingly, it has been coeval with its funding system, the prevailing opinion of the men of business, and of the generality of tie most sagacious theorists of that country, that the operation of the public funds as capital has contributed to the effect in question. Among ourselves, appearances thus far favor the same conclusion. Industry in general seems to have been reanimated. There are symptoms indicating an extension of our commerce. Our navigation has certainly of late had a considerable spring; and there appears to be, in many parts of the Union, a command of capital which, till lately, since the Revolution at least, was unknown. But it is at the same time to be acknowledged that other circumstances have concurred (and in a great degree) in producing the present state of things; and that the appearances are not yet sufficiently decisive to be entirely relied upon.
In the question under discussion, it is important to distinguish between an absolute increase of capital, or an accession of real wealth, and an artificial increase of capital, as an engine of business, or as an instrument of industry and commerce. In the first sense, a funded debt has no pretensions to being deemed an increase of capital; in the last, it has pretensions which are not easy to be controverted. Of a similar nature is bank credit, and, in an inferior degree, every species of private credit.
But though a funded debt is not, in the first instance, an absolute increase of capital, or an augmentation of real wealth, yet, by serving as a new power in the operations of industry, it has, within certain bounds, a tendency to increase the real wealth of a community; in like manner, as money borrowed by a thrifty farmer to be laid out in the improvement of his farm may, in the end, add to his stock of real riches.
There are respectable individuals, who, from a just aversion to an accumulation of public debt, are unwilling to concede to it any kind of utility; who can discern no good to alleviate the ill with which they suppose it pregnant; who cannot be persuaded that it ought, in any sense, to be viewed as an increase of capital, lest it should be inferred that the more debt the more capital, the greater the burdens, the greater the blessings of the community.
But it interests the public councils to estimate every object as it truly is; to appreciate how far the good in any measure is compensated by the ill, or the ill by the good: either of them is seldom unmixed.
Neither will it follow that an accumulation of debt is desirable, because a certain degree of it operates as capital. There may be a plethora in the political as in the natural body; there may be a state of things in which any such artificial capital is unnecessary. The debt, too, may be swelled to such a size as that the greatest part of it may cease to be useful as a capital, serving only to pamper the dissipation of idle and dissolute individuals; as that the sums required to pay the interest upon it may become oppressive, and beyond the means which a government can employ, consistently with its tranquillity, to raise them; as that the resources of taxation, to face the debt, may have been strained too far to admit of extensions adequate to exigencies which regard the public safety. Where this critical point is cannot be pronounced; but it is impossible to believe that there is not such a point.
And, as the vicissitudes of nations beget a perpetual tendency to the accumulation of debt, there ought to be in every government a perpetual, anxious, and unceasing effort to reduce that which at any time exists, as fast as shall be practicable, consistently with integrity and good faith.
Reasonings on a subject comprehending ideas so abstract and complex, so little reducible to precise calculation as those which enter into the question just discussed, are always attended with a danger of running into fallacies. Due allowance ought∗ therefore, to be made for this possibility. But as far as the nature of the subject admits of it, there appears to be satisfactory ground for a belief that the public funds operate as a resource of capital to the citizens of the United States; and, if they are a resource at all, it is an extensive one.
To all the arguments which are brought to evince the impracticability of success in manufacturing establishments in the United States, it might have been a sufficient answer to have referred to the experience of what has been already done; it is certain that several important branches have grown up and flourished with a rapidity which surprises, affording an encouraging assurance of success in future attempts. Of these it may not be improper to enumerate the most considerable: —
- 1.Of Skins.— Tanned and tawed leather, dressed skins, shoes, boots, and slippers, harness and saddlery of all kinds, portmanteaus and trunks, leather breeches, gloves, muffs and tippets, parchment and glue.
- 2.Of Iron.— Bar and sheet iron, steel, nail rods and nails, implements of husbandly, stoves, pots, and other household utensils, the steel and iron work of carriages, and for shipbuilding, anchors, scale-beams, and weights, and various tools of artificers, arms of dif ferent kinds, though the manufacture of these last has of late diminished for want of demand.
- 3.Of Wood.— Ships, cabinet wares and turnery, wool and cotton cards, and other machinery for manu factures and husbandry, mathematical instruments, coopers’ wares of every kind.
- 4.Of Flax and Hemp.— Cables, sail-cloth, cordage, twine and packthread.
- 5. Bricks, and coarse tiles and potters’ wares.
- 6. Ardent spirits and malt liquors.
- 7. Writing and printing paper, sheathing and wrap ping paper, pasteboards, fullers’ or press papers, paper hangings.
- 8. Hats of fur and wool, and of mixtures of both, women’s stuff and silk shoes.
- 9. Refined sugars.
- 10. Oils of animals and seeds, soap, spermaceti and tallow candles.
- 11. Copper and brass wares (particularly utensils for distillers, sugar refiners and brewers), andirons and other articles for household use, philosophical appa ratus.
- 12. Tin wares for most purposes of ordinary use.
- 13. Carriages of all kinds.
- 14. Snuff, chewing and smoking tobacco.
- 15. Starch and hair powder.
- 16. Lampblack and other painters’ colors.
- 17. Gunpowder.
Besides manufactories of these articles, which are carried on as regular trades, and have attained to a considerable degree of maturity, there is a vast scene of household manufacturing which contributes more largely to the supply of the community than could be imagined without having made it an object of particular inquiry. This observation is the pleasing result of the investigation to which the subject of this report has led, and is applicable as well to the southern as to the middle and northern States. Great quantities of coarse cloths, coatings, serges and flannels, linsey-woolseys, hosiery of wool, cotton and thread, coarse fustians, jeans and muslins, checked and striped cotton and linen goods, bedticks, coverlets and counterpanes, tow linens, coarse shirtings, sheetings, toweling and table linen, and various mixtures of wool and cotton, and of cotton and flax, are made in the household way, and in many instances to an extent not only sufficient for the supply of the families in which they are made, but for sale, and even in some cases for exportation. It is computed in a number of districts that two-thirds, three-fourths, and even four-fifths of all the clothing of the inhabitants are made by themselves. The importance of so great a progress as appears to have been made in family manufactures within a few years, both in a moral and political view, renders the fact highly interesting.
Neither does the above enumeration comprehend all the articles that are manufactured as regular trades. Many others occur which are equally well established, but which not being of equal importance have been omitted. And there are many attempts still in their infancy, which, though attended with very favorable appearances, could not have been properly comprised in an enumeration of manufactories already established. There are other articles also of great importance which, though strictly speaking manufactures, are omitted as being immediately connected with husbandry; such are flour, pot and pearl ash, pitch, tar, turpentine, and the like.
There remains to be noticed an objection to the encouragement of manufactures of a nature different from those which question the probability of success. This is derived from its supposed tendency to give a monopoly of advantages to particular classes at the expense of the rest of the community, who, it is affirmed, would be able to procure the requisite supplies of manufactured articles on better terms from foreigners than from our own citizens; and who, it is alleged, are reduced to a necessity of paying an enhanced price for whatever they want, by every measure which obstructs the free competition of foreign commodities.
It is not an unreasonable supposition that measures which serve to abridge the free competition of foreign articles have a tendency to occasion an enhancement of prices, and it is not to be denied that such is the effect in a number of cases; but the fact does not uniformly correspond with the theory. A reduction of prices has in several instances immediately succeeded the establishment of a domestic manufacture. Whether it be that foreign manufacturers endeavor to supplant by underselling our own, or whatever else be the cause, the effect has been such as is stated, and the reverse of what might have been expected.
But though it were true that the immediate and certain effect of regulations controlling the competition of foreign with domestic fabrics was an increase of price, it is universally true that the contrary is the ultimate effect with every successful manufacture. When a domestic manufacture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in the prosecution of it a competent number of persons, it invariably becomes cheaper. Being free from the heavy charges which attend the importation of foreign commodities, it can be afforded, and accordingly seldom or never fails to be sold cheaper in process of time than was the foreign article for which it is a substitute. The internal competition which takes place soon does away everything like monopoly, and by degrees reduces the price of the article to the minimum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed. This accords with the reason of the thing and with experience.
Whence it follows that it is the interest of a community, with a view to eventual and permanent economy, to encourage the growth of manufactures. In a national view, a temporary enhancement of price must always be well compensated by a permanent reduction of it.
It is a reflection which may with propriety be indulged here, that this eventual diminution of the prices of manufactured articles, which is the result of internal manufacturing establishments, has a direct and very important tendency to benefit agriculture. It enables the farmer to procure, with a smaller quantity of his labor, the manufactured produce of which he stands in need, and consequently increases the value of his income and property.
The objections which are commonly made to the expediency of encouraging, and to the probability of succeeding in manufacturing pursuits in the United States having now been discussed, the considerations which have appeared in the course of the discussion, recommending that species of industry to the patronage of the government, will be materially strengthened by a few general and some particular topics which have been naturally reserved for subsequent notice.
I. There seems to be a moral certainty that the trade of a country which is both manufacturing and agricultural will be more lucrative and prosperous than that of a country which is merely agricultural.
One reason for this is found in that general effort of nations (which has been already mentioned) to procure from their own soils the articles of prime necessity requisite to their own consumption and use, and which serves to render their demand for a foreign supply of such articles in a great degree occasional and contingent. Hence, while the necessities of nations exclusively devoted to agriculture lor the fabrics of manufacturing states are constant and regular, the wants of the latter for the products of the former are liable to very considerable fluctuations and interruptions. The great inequalities resulting from difference of seasons have been elsewhere remarked. This uniformity of demand on one side, and unsteadiness of it on the other, must necessarily have a tendency to cause the general course of the exchange of commodities between the parties to turn to the disadvantage of the merely agricultural states. Peculiarity of situation, a climate and soil adapted to the production of peculiar commodities, may sometimes contradict the rule, but there is every reason to believe that it will be found in the main a just one.
Another circumstance which gives a superiority of commercial advantages to states that manufacture as well as cultivate consists in the more numerous attractions which a more diversified market offers to foreign customers, and in the greater scope which it affords to mercantile enterprise. It is a position of indisputable truth in commerce, depending too on very obvious reasons, that the greatest resort will ever be to those marts where commodities, while equally abundant, are most various. Each difference of kind holds out an additional inducement. And it is a position not less clear, that the field of enterprise must be enlarged to the merchants of a country in proportion to the variety as well as the abundance of commodities which they find at home for exportation to foreign markets.
A third circumstance, perhaps not inferior to either of the other two, conferring the superiority which has been stated, has relation to the stagnations of demand for certain commodities which at some time or other interfere more or less with the sale of all. The nation which can bring to market but few articles is likely to be more quickly and sensibly affected by such stagnations than one which is always possessed of a great variety of commodities: the former frequently finds too great a portion of its stock of materials for sale or exchange lying on hand, or is obliged to make injurious sacrifices to supply its wants of foreign articles, which are numerous and urgent in proportion to the smallness of the number of its own. The latter commonly finds itself indemnified by the high prices of some articles for the low prices of others; and the prompt and advantageous sale of those articles which are in demand enables its merchants the better to wait for a favorable change in respect to those which are not. There is ground to believe, that a difference of situation in this particular has immensely different effects upon the wealth and prosperity of nations.
From these circumstances collectively two important inferences are to be drawn: one, that there is always a higher probability of a favorable balance of trade in regard to countries in which manufactures founded on the basis of a thriving agriculture flourish, than in regard to those which are confined wholly, or almost wholly, to agriculture; the other (which is also a consequence of the first), that countries of the former description are likely to possess more pecuniary wealth or money than those of the latter.
Facts appear to correspond with this conclusion. The importations of manufactured supplies seem invariably to drain the merely agricultural people of their wealth. Let the situation of the manufacturing countries of Europe be compared in this particular with that of countries which only cultivate, and the disparity will be striking. Other causes, it is true, help to account for this disparity between some of them; and among these causes, the relative state of agriculture; but between others of them, the most prominent circumstance, of dissimilitude arises from the comparative state of manufactures. In corroboration of the same idea, it ought not to escape remark that the West India islands, the soils of which are the most fertile, and the nation which in the greatest degree supplies the rest of the world with the precious metals, exchange to a loss with almost every other country.
As far as experience at home may guide, it will lead to the same conclusion. Previous to the Eevolution, the quantity of coin possessed by the colonies which now compose the United States appeared to be inadequate to their circulation; and their debt to Great Britain was progressive. Since the Revolution, the States in which manufactures have most increased have recovered fastest from the injuries of the late war, and abound most in pecuniary resources.
It ought to be admitted, however, in this, as in the preceding case, that causes irrelative to the state of manufactures account in a degree for the phenomena remarked. The continual progress of new settlements has a natural tendency to occasion an unfavorable balance of trade, though it indemnifies for the inconvenience by that increase of the national capital which flows from the conversion of waste into improved lands; and the different degrees of external commerce which are carried on by the different states may make material differences in the comparative state of their wealth. The first circumstance has reference to the deficiency of coin, and the increase of debt previous to the Revolution; the last to the advantages which the most manufacturing states appear to have enjoyed over the others since the termination of the late war.
But the uniform appearance of an abundance of specie as the concomitant of a flourishing state of manufactures, and of the reverse where they do not prevail, afford a strong presumption of their favorable operation upon the wealth of a country.
Not only the wealth, but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to those great objects, ought to endeavor to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise the means of subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defense.
The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of the body politic; to the safety, as well as to the welfare, of the society; the want of either is the want of an important organ of political life and motion; and in the various crises which await a state, it must severely feel the effects of any such deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the United States during the late war, from an incapacity of supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection. A future war might be expected again to exemplify the mischiefs and dangers of a situation to which that incapacity is still in too great a degree applicable, unless changed by timely and vigorous exertions. To effect this change as fast as shall be prudent merits all the attention and all the zeal of our public councils; it is the next great work to be accomplished.
The want of a navy to protect our external commerce, as long as it shall continue, must render it a peculiarly precarious reliance for the supply of essential articles, and must serve to strengthen prodigiously the arguments in favor of manufactures.
To these general considerations are added some of a more particular nature.
Our distance from Europe, the great fountain of manufactured supply, subjects us, in the existing state of things, to inconvenience and loss in two ways.
The bulkiness of those commodities which are the chief productions of the soil necessarily imposes very heavy charges on their transportation to distant markets. These charges, in the cases in which the nations to whom our products are sent maintain a competition in the supply of their own markets, principally fall upon us, and form material deductions from the primitive value of the articles furnished. The charges on manufactured supplies brought from Europe are greatly enhanced by the same circumstance of distance. These charges, again, in the cases in which our own industry maintains no competition in our own markets, also principally fall upon us; and are an additional cause of extraordinary deduction from the primitive value of our own products, these being the materials of exchange for the foreign fabrics which we consume.
The equality and moderation of individual property, and the growing settlements of new districts, occasion in this country an unusual demand for coarse manufactures; the charges of which, being greater in proportion to their greater bulk, augment the disadvantage which has been just described.
As, in most countries, domestic supplies maintain a very considerable competition with such foreign productions of the soil as are imported for sale, if the extensive establishment of manufactories in the United States does not create a similar competition in respect to manufactured articles, it appears to be clearly deducible, from the considerations which have been mentioned, that they must sustain a double loss in their exchanges with foreign nations, strongly conducive to an unfavorable balance of trade, and very prejudicial to their interests.
These disadvantages press with no small weight on the landed interest of the country. In seasons of peace they cause a serious deduction from the intrinsic value of the products of the soil. In the time of a war, which should either involve ourselves or another nation possessing a considerable share of our carrying trade, the charges on the transportation of our commodities, bulky as most of them are, could hardly fail to prove a grievous burden to the farmer, while obliged to depend in so great a degree as he now does upon foreign markets f 3r the vent of the surplus of his labor.
As far as the prosperity of the fisheries of the United States is impeded by the want of an adequate market, there arises another special reason for desiring the extension of manufactures. Besides the fish, which in many places would be likely to make a part of the subsistence of the persons employed, it is known that the oils, bones, and skins of marine animals are of extensive use in various manufactures. Hence the prospect of an additional demand for the produce of the fisheries.
One more point of view only remains, in which to consider the expediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States.
It is not uncommon to meet with an opinion, that though the promoting of manufactures may be the interest of a part of the Union, it is contrary to that of another part. The northern and southern regions are sometimes represented as having adverse interests in this respect. Those are called manufacturing; these, agricultural States; and a species of opposition is imagined to subsist between the manufacturing and agricultural interests.
This idea of an opposition between those two interests is the common error of the early periods of every country; but experience gradually dissipates it. Indeed, they are perceived so often to succor and to befriend each other, that they come at length to be considered as one; a supposition which has been frequently abused, and is not universally true. Particular encouragements of particular manufactures may be of a nature to sacrifice the interests of landholders to those of manufacturers; but it is nevertheless a maxim, well established by experience and generally acknowledged where there has been sufficient experience, that the aggregate prosperity of manufactures, and the aggregate prosperity of agriculture, are intimately connected. In the course of the discussion which has had place, various weighty considerations have been adduced, operating in support of that maxim. Perhaps the superior steadiness of the demand of a domestic market for the surplus produce of the soil is alone a convincing argument of its truth.
Ideas of a contrariety of interests between the northern and southern regions of the Union are in the main as unfounded as they are mischievous. The diversity of circumstances on which such contrariety is usually predicated, authorizes a directly contrary conclusion. Mutual wants constitute one of the strongest links of political connection; and the extent of these bears a natural proportion to the diversity in the means of mutual supply.
Suggestions of an opposite complexion are ever to be deplored as unfriendly to the steady pursuit of one great common cause and to the perfect harmony of all the parts.
In proportion as the mind is accustomed to trace the intimate connection of interest which subsists between all the parts of a society united under the same government, the infinite variety of channels which serve to circulate the prosperity of each to and through the rest, in that proportion will it be little apt to be disturbed by solicitudes and apprehensions which originate in local discriminations. It is a truth as important as it is agreeable, and one to which it is not easy to imagine exceptions, that everything tending to establish substantial and permanent order in the affairs of a country, to increase the total mass of industry and opulence, is ultimately beneficial to every part of it. On the credit of this great truth, an acquiescence may safely be accorded from every quarter to all institutions and arrangements which promise a confirmation of public order and an augmentation of national resource.
But there are more particular considerations which serve to fortify the idea, that the encouragement of manufactures is the interest of all parts of the Union. If the northern and middle States should be the principal scenes of such establishments, they would immediately benefit the more southern, by creating a demand for productions, some of which they have in common with the other States, and others of which are either peculiar to them, or more abundant, or of better quality than elsewhere. These productions principally are timber, flax, hemp, cotton, wool, raw silk, indigo, iron, lead, furs, hides, skins, and coals. Of these articles, cotton and indigo are peculiar to the southern States, as are hitherto lead and coal. Flax and hemp are or may be raised in greater abundance there than in the more northern States; and the wool of Virginia is said to be of better quality than that of any other State, — a circumstance rendered the more probable by the reflection that Virginia embraces the same latitudes with the finest wool countries of Europe. The climate of the South is also better adapted to the production of silk.
The extensive cultivation of cotton can perhaps hardly be expected, but from the previous establishment of domestic manufactories of the article; and the surest encouragement and vent for the others would result from similar establishments in respect to them.
If, then, it satisfactorily appears that it is the interest of the United States generally to encourage manufactures, it merits particular attention, that there are-circumstances which render the present a critical moment for entering with zeal upon the important business. The effort cannot fail to be materially seconded by a considerable and increasing influx of money, in consequence of foreign speculations in the funds, and by the disorders which exist in different parts of Europe.
The first circumstance not only facilitates the execution of manufacturing enterprises, but it indicates them as a necessary mean to turn the thing itself to advantage, and to prevent its being eventually an evil. If useful employment be not found for the money of foreigners brought to the country to be invested in purchases of the public debt, it will quickly be reexported to defray the expense of an extraordinary consumption of foreign luxuries; and distressing drains of our specie may hereafter be experienced to pay the interest and redeem the principal of the purchased debt.
This useful employment, too, ought to be of a nature to produce solid and permanent improvements. If the money merely serves to give a temporary spring to foreign commerce, as it cannot procure new and lasting outlets for the products of the country, there will be no real or durable advantage gained. As far as it shall find its way in agricultural meliorations, in opening canals, and in similar improvements, it will be productive of substantial utility. But there is reason to doubt whether in such channels it is likely to find sufficient employment; and still more whether many of those who possess it would be as readily attracted to objects of this nature as to manufacturing pursuits which bear greater analogy to those to which they are accustomed and to the spirit generated by them.
To open the one field as well as the other will at least secure a better prospect of useful employment for whatever accession of money there has been or may be.
There is at the present juncture a certain fermentation of mind, a certain activity of speculation and enterprise, which, if properly directed, may be made subservient to useful purposes; but which, if left entirely to itself, may be attended with pernicious effects.
The disturbed state of Europe inclining its citizens to emigration, the requisite workmen will be more easily acquired than at another time; and the effect of multiplying the opportunities of employment to those who emigrate may be an increase of the number and extent of valuable acquisitions to the population, arts, and industry of the country.
To find pleasure in the calamities of other nations would be criminal; but to benefit ourselves by opening an asylum to those who suffer in consequence of them is as justifiable as it is politic.
A full view having now been taken of the inducements to the promotion of manufactures in the United States, accompanied with an examination of the principal objections which are commonly urged in opposition, it is proper, in the next place, to consider the means by which it may be effected, as introductory to a specification of the objects which in the present state of things appear the most fit to be encouraged, and of the particular measures which it may be advisable to adopt in respect to each.
In order to a better judgment of the means proper to be resorted to by the United States, it will be of use to advert to those which have been employed with success in other countries. The principal of these are: —
1. Protecting duties, or ditties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones intended to be encouraged.
Duties of this nature evidently amount to a virtual bounty on the domestic fabrics, since by enhancing the charges on foreign articles they enable the national manufacturers to undersell all their foreign competitors. The propriety of this species of encouragement need not be dwelt upon, as it is not only a clear result from the numerous topics which have been suggested, but is sanctioned by the laws of the United States in a variety of instances; it has the additional recommendation of being a resource of revenue. Indeed, all the duties imposed on imported articles, though with an exclusive view to revenue, have the effect in contemplation; and, except where they fall on raw materials, wear a beneficent aspect towards the manufactures of the country.
2. Prohibitions of rival articles, or duties equivalent to prohibitions.
This is another and an efficacious mean of encouraging national manufactures; but in general it is only fit to be employed when a manufacture has made such a progress, and is in so many hands, as to insure a due competition and an adequate supply on reasonable terms. Of duties equivalent to prohibitions there are examples in the laws of the United States; and there are other cases to which the principle may be advantageously extended, but they are not numerous.
Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing nations, a similar policy on the part of the United States, in every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of endeavoring to secure to their own citizens a reciprocity of advantages.
3. Prohibitions of the exportation of the materials of manufactures.
The desire of securing a cheap and plentiful supply for the national workmen; and, where the article is either peculiar to the country, or of peculiar quality there, the jealousy of enabling foreign workmen to rival those of the nation with its own materials, are the leading motives to this species of regulation. It ought not to be affirmed that it is in no instance proper, but it is certainly one which ought to be adopted with great circumspection and only in very plain cases. It is seen at once that its immediate operation is to abridge the demand and keep down the price of the produce of some other branch of industry, generally speaking of agriculture, to the prejudice of those who carry it on; and though if it be really essential to the prosperity of any very important national manufacture it may happen that those who are injured in the first instance may be eventually indemnified by the superior steadiness of an extensive domestic market depending on that prosperity, yet, in a matter in which there is so much room for nice and difficult combinations, in which such opposite considerations combat each other, prudence seems to dictate that the expedient in question ought to be indulged with a sparing hand.
4. Pecuniary bounties.
This has been found one of the most efficacious means of encouraging manufactures, and it is, in some views, the best, though it has not yet been practiced upon the government of the United States, — unless the allowance on the exportation of dried and pickled fish and salted meat could be considered as a bounty, — and though it is less favored by public opinion than some other modes. Its advantages are these: —
- 1. It is a species of encouragement more positive and direct than any other, and for that very reason has a more immediate tendency to stimulate and uphold new enterprises, increasing the chances of profit, and diminishing the risks of loss in the first attempts.
- 2. It avoids the inconvenience of a temporary aug mentation of price, which is incident to some other modes, or it produces it to a less degree, either by mak ing no addition to the charges on the rival foreign ar ticle, as in the case of protecting duties, or by making a smaller addition. The first happens when the fund for the bounty is derived from a different object (which may or may not increase the price of some other article according to the nature of that object); the second, when the fund is derived from the same or a similar object of foreign manufacture. One per cent, duty on the foreign article, converted into a bounty on the do mestic, will have an equal effect with a duty of exclusive of such bounty; and the price of the foreign commodity is liable to be raised in the one case in the proportion of 1%, in the other in that of 2%. Indeed, the bounty, when drawn from another source, is calculated to promote a reduction of price, because, without laying any new charge on the foreign article, it serves to introduce a competition with it, and to increase the total quantity of the article in the market.
- 3. Bounties have not, like high protecting duties, a tendency to produce scarcity. An increase of price is not always the immediate, though where the progress of a domestic manufacture does not counteract a rise, it is commonly the ultimate effect of an additional duty. In the interval between the laying of the duty and a proportional increase of price, it may discourage importation by interfering with the profits to be ex pected from the sale of the article.
- 4. Bounties are sometimes not only the best, but the only proper expedient for uniting the encouragement of a new object of agriculture with that of a new object of manufacture. It is the interest of the farmer to have the production of the raw material promoted by counteracting the interference of the foreign material of the same kind. It is the interest of the manufac turer to have the material abundant and cheap. If, prior to the domestic production of the material in suffi cient quantity to supply the manufacturer on good terms, a duty be laid upon the importation of it from abroad, with a view to promote the raising of it at home, the interest both of the farmer and manufacturer will be disserved. By either destroying the requisite supply, or raising the price of the article beyond what can be afforded to be given for it by the conductor of an infant manufacture, it is abandoned or fails; and there being no domestic manufactories to create a de mand for the raw material which is raised by the farmer, it is in vain that the competition of the like foreign article may have been destroyed.
It cannot escape notice that a duty upon the importation of an article can no otherwise aid the domestic production of it than by giving the latter greater advantages in the home market. It can have no influence upon the advantageous sale of the article produced in foreign markets, no tendency, therefore, to promote its exportation.
The true way to conciliate these two interests is to lay a duty on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of that duty by way of bounty either upon the production of the material itself, or upon its manufacture at home, or upon both. In this disposition of the thing the manufacturer commences his enterprise under every advantage which is attainable as to quantity or price of the raw material. And the farmer, if the bounty be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a successful competition with the foreign material. If the bounty be to the manufacturer on so much of the domestic material as he consumes, the operation is nearly the same; he has a motive of interest to prefer the domestic commodity, if of equal quality, even at a higher price than the foreign, so long as the difference of price is anything short of the bounty which is allowed upon the article.
Except the simple and ordinary kinds of household manufacture, or those for which there are very commanding local advantages, pecuniary bounties are in most cases indispensable to the introduction of a new branch. A stimulus and a support, not less powerful and direct, is, generally speaking, essential to the overcoming of the obstacles which arise from the competitions of superior skill and maturity elsewhere. Bounties are especially essential in regard to articles upon which those foreigners, who have been accustomed, to supply a country, are in the practice of granting them.
The continuance of bounties on manufactures long established must almost always be of questionable policy, because a presumption would arise in every such case that there were.natural and inherent impediments to success. But in new undertakings they are as justifiable as they are oftentimes necessary.
There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an appearance of giving away the public money without an immediate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to enrich particular classes at the expense of the community.
But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious examination. There is no purpose to which public money can be more beneficially applied than to the acquisition of a new and useful branch of industry, no consideration more valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of productive labor.
As to the second source of objection, it equally lies against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign, article makes an addition to its price, it causes an extra expense to the community for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A bounty does no more. But it is the interest of the society in each case to submit to a temporary expense, which is more than compensated by an increase of industry and wealth, by an augmentation of resources and independence, and by the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been noticed in another place.
It would deserve attention, however, in the employment of this species of encouragement in the United States, as a reason for moderating the degree of it in the instances in which it might be deemed eligible, that the great distance of this country from Europe imposes very heavy charges on all the fabrics which are brought from thence, amounting from 15% to 30% on their value, according to their bulk.
A question has been made concerning the constitutional right of the Government of the United States to apply this species of encouragement; but there is certainly no good foundation for such a question. The national legislature has express authority “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare,” with no other qualifications than that “all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; that no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to numbers ascertained by a census, or enumeration taken on the principles prescribed in the Constitution,” and that “no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.”
These three qualifications excepted, the power to raise money is plenary and indefinite; and the objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive than the payment of the public debts, and the providing for the common defense and general welfare. The terms “general welfare “were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in those which preceded; otherwise numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a nation would have been left without a provision. The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used; because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union to appropriate its revenues should have been restricted within narrower limits than the “general welfare;” and because this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.
It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the national legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general welfare, and for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the sphere of the national councils, as far as regards an application of money.
The only qualification of the generality of the phrase in question which seems to be admissible, is this: that the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made be general and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular spot.
No objection ought to arise to this construction, from a supposition that it would imply a power to do whatever else should appear to Congress conducive to the general welfare. A power to appropriate money with this latitude which is granted too in express terms, would not carry a power to do any other thing, not authorized in the Constitution, either expressly or by fair implication.
5. Premiums.
These are of a nature allied to bounties, though distinguishable from them in some important features.
Bounties are applicable to the whole quantity of an article produced or manufactured or exported, and involve a correspondent expense. Premiums serve to reward some particular excellence or superiority, some extraordinary exertion or skill, and are dispensed only in a small number of cases. But their effect is to stimulate general effort; contrived so as to be both honorary and lucrative, they address themselves to different passions, touching the chords as well of emulation as of interest. They are, accordingly, a very economical mean of exciting the enterprise of a whole community.
There are various societies in different countries, whose object is the dispensation of premiums for the encouragement of agriculture, arts, manufactures and commerce, and though they are for the most part voluntary associations, with comparatively slender funds, their utility has been immense. Much has been done by this mean in Great Britain. Scotland in particular owes materially to it a prodigious melioration of condition. Prom a similar establishment in the United States, supplied and supported by the Government of the Union, vast benefits might reasonably be expected. Some further ideas on this head shall accordingly be submitted in the conclusion of this report.
6. The exemption of the materials of manufacture∗ from, duty.
The policy of that exemption, as a general rule, particularly in reference to new establishments, is obvious. It can hardly ever be advisable to add the obstructions of fiscal burdens to the difficulties which naturally embarrass a new manufacture; and where it is matured, and in condition to become an object of revenue, it is, generally speaking, better that the fabric, than the material, should be the subject of taxation. Ideas of proportion between the quantum of the tax and the value of the article can be more easily adjusted in the former than in the latter case. An argument for exemptions of this kind in the United States is to be derived from the practice, as far as their necessities have permitted, of those nations whom we are to meet as competitors in our own and in foreign markets.
There are, however, exceptions to it, of which some examples will be given under the next head.
The laws of the Union afford instances of the observance of the policy here recommended, but it will probably be found advisable to extend it to some other cases. Of a nature bearing some affinity to that policy is the regulation which exempts from duty the tools and implements, as well as the books, clothes and household furniture, of foreign artists who come to reside in the United States; an advantage already secured to them by the laws of the Union, and which it is in every view proper to continue.
7. Drawbacks of the duties which are imposed on the materials of manufactures.
It has already been observed as a general rule, that duties on those materials ought, with certain exceptions, to be forborne. Of these exceptions, three cases occur which may serve as examples. One, where the material is itself an object of general or extensive consumption, and a fit and productive source of revenue. Another, where a manufacture of a simpler kind, the competition of which with a like domestic article is desired to be restrained, partakes of the nature of a raw material from being capable by a further process to be converted into a manufacture of a different kind, the introduction or growth of which is desired to be encouraged. A third, where the material itself is the production of the country, and in sufficient abundance to furnish a cheap and plentiful supply to the national manufacturers.
Under the first description comes the article of molasses. It is not only a fair object of revenue, but being a sweet, it is just that the consumers of it should pay a duty as well as the consumers of sugar.
Cottons and linens in their white state fall under the second description. A duty upon such as are imported is proper to promote the domestic manufacture of similar articles in the same state; a drawback of that duty is proper to encourage the printing and staining at home of those which are brought from abroad. When the first of these manufactures has attained sufficient maturity in a country to furnish a full supply for the second, the utility of the drawback ceases.
The article of hemp either now does or may be expected soon to exemplify the third case in the United States.
Where duties on the materials of manufactures are not laid for the purpose of preventing a competition with some domestic production, the same reasons which recommend, as a general rule, the exemption of those materials from duties, would recommend, as a like general rule, the allowance of drawbacks in favor of the manufacturer. Accordingly, such drawbacks are familiar in countries which systematically pursue the business of manufactures, which furnishes an argument for the observance of a similar policy in the United States; and the idea has been adopted by the laws of the Union, in the instances of salt and molasses. It is believed that it will be found advantageous to extend it to some other articles.
8. The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at home, and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been made in other countries; particularly those which relate to machinery.
This is among the most useful and unexceptionable of the aids which can be given to manufactures. The usual means of that encouragement are pecuniary rewards, and, for a time, exclusive privileges. The first must be employed according to the occasion and the utility of the invention or discovery. For the last, so far as respects “authors and inventors,” provision has been made by law. But it is desirable, in regard to improvements and secrets of extraordinary value, to be able to extend the same benefit to introducers as well as authors and inventors; a policy which has been practiced with advantage in other countries. Here, however, as in some other cases, there is cause to regret that the competency of the authority of the national Government to the good which might be done, is not without a question. Many aids might be given to industry, many internal improvements of primary magnitude might be promoted, by an authority operating throughout the Union, which cannot be effected as well, if at all, by an authority confined within the limits of a single State.
But if the Legislature of the Union cannot do all the good that might be wished, it is at least desirable that all may be done which is practicable. Means for promoting the introduction of foreign improvements, though less efficaciously than might be accomplished with more adequate authority, wUl form a part of the plan intended to be submitted in the close of this report.
It is customary with manufacturing nations to prohibit, under severe penalties, the exportation of implements and machines which they have either invented or improved. There are already objects for a similar regulation in the United States, and others may be expected to occur from time to time. The adoption of it seems to be dictated by the principle of reciprocity. Greater liberality in such respects might better comport with the general spirit of the country; but a selfish and exclusive policy in other quarters will not always permit the free indulgence of a spirit which would place us upon an unequal footing. As far as prohibitions tend to prevent foreign competitors from deriving the benefit of the improvements made at home, they tend to increase the advantages of those by whom they have been introduced, and operate as an encouragement to exertion.
9. Judicious regulations for the inspection of manufactured commodities.
This is not among the least important of the means by which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters to, foreign countries, to improve the quality and preserve the character of the national manufactures; it cannot fail to aid the expeditious and advantageous sale of them, and to serve as a guard against successful competition from other quarters. The reputation of the flour and lumber of some States and of the potash of others has been established by an attention to this point; and the like good name might be procured for those articles, wheresoever produced, by a judicious and uniform system of inspection throughout the ports of the United States. A like system might also be extended with advantage to other commodities.
10. The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to place—
Is a point of considerable moment to trade in general and to manufactures in particular, by rendering more easy the purchase of raw materials and provisions, and the payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately established, will be a most valuable mean to this end. But much good would also accrue from some additional provisions respecting inland bills of exchange. If those drawn in one State, payable in another, were made negotiable everywhere, and interest and damages allowed in case of protest, it would greatly promote negotiations between the citizens of different States, by rendering them more secure; and with it the convenience and advantage of the merchants and manufacturers of each.
11. The facilitating of the transportation of commodities.
Improvements favoring this object intimately concern all the domestic interests of a community; but they may, without impropriety, be mentioned as having an important relation to manufactures. There is perhaps scarcely anything which has been better calculated to assist the manufactures of Great Britain than the meliorations of the public roads of that kingdom, and the great progress which has been of late made in opening canals. Of the former the United States stand much in need; for the latter they present uncommon facilities.
The symptoms of attention to the improvement of inland navigation, which have lately appeared in some quarters, must fill with pleasure every breast warmed with a true zeal for the prosperity of the country. These examples, it is to be hoped, will stimulate the exertions of the government and citizens of every State. There can certainly be no object more worthy of the cares of the local administrations; and it were to be wished that there was no doubt of the power of the national Government to lend its direct aid, on a comprehensive plan. This is one of those improvements which could be prosecuted with more efficacy by the whole than by any part or parts of the Union. There are cases in which the general interest will be in danger to be sacrificed to the collision of some supposed local interests. Jealousies in matters of this kind are as apt to exist as they are apt to be erroneous.
The following remarks are sufficiently judicious and pertinent to deserve a literal quotation: “Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, put the remote parts of a country more nearly upon a level with those in the neighborhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighborhood. They are advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce some rival commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its produce. Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be universally established, but in consequence of that free and universal competition which forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defense. It is not more than fifty years ago that some of the counties in the neighborhood of London petitioned the Parliament against the extension of the turnpike roads into the remoter counties. These remoter counties, they pretended, from the cheapness of labor would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper in the London market than themselves, and they would thereby reduce their rents and ruin their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen and their cultivation has been improved since that time.”
Specimens of a spirit similar to that which governed the counties here spoken of present themselves too frequently to the eye of an impartial observer, and render it a wish of patriotism, that the body in this country in whose councils a local or partial spirit is least likely to predominate, were at liberty to pursue and promote the general interest in those instances in which there might be danger of the interference of such a spirit.
The foregoing are the principal of the means by which the growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted. It is, however, not merely necessary that the measures of government which have a direct view to manufactures should be calculated to assist and protect them; but that those which only collaterally affect them, in the general course of the administration, should be guarded from any peculiar tendency to injure them.
There are certain species of taxes which are apt to be oppressive to different parts of the community, and, among other ill effects, have a very unfriendly aspect towards manufactures. All poll or capitation taxes are of this nature. They either proceed according to a fixed rate, which operates unequally and injuriously to the industrious poor; or they vest a discretion in certain officers to make estimates and assessments, which are necessarily vague, conjectural, and liable to abuse. They ought, therefore, to be abstained from in all but cases of distressing emergency.
All such taxes (including all taxes on occupations) which proceed according to the amount of capital supposed to be employed in a business, or of profits supposed to be made in it, are unavoidably hurtful to industry. It is in vain that the evil may be endeavored to be mitigated by leaving it, in the first instance, in the option of the party to be taxed, to declare the amount of his capital or profits.
Men engaged in any trade or business have commonly weighty reasons td avoid disclosures which would expose, with anything like accuracy, the real state of their affairs. They most frequently find it better to risk oppression, than to avail themselves of so inconvenient a refuge; and the consequence is that they often suffer oppression.
When the disclosure, too, if made, is not definitive, but controllable by the discretion, or in other words by the passions and prejudices, of the revenue officers, it is not only an ineffectual protection, but the possibility of its being so is an additional reason for not resorting to it.
Allowing to the public officers the most equitable dispositions, yet where they are to exercise a discretion without certain data, they cannot fail to be often misled by appearances. The quantity of business which seems to be going on is in a vast number of cases a very deceitful criterion of the profits which are made; yet it is, perhaps, the best they can have, and it is the one on which they will most naturally rely. A business, therefore, which may rather require aid from the government than be in a capacity to be contributory to it, may find itself crushed by the mistaken conjectures of the assessors of taxes.
Arbitrary taxes, under which denomination are comprised all those that leave the quantum of the tax to be raised on each person to the discretion of certain officers, are as contrary to the genius of liberty as to the maxims of industry. In this light they have been viewed by the most judicious observers on government, who have bestowed upon them the severest epithets of reprobation, as constituting one of the worst features usually to be met with in the practice of despotic governments.
It is certain, at least, that such taxes are particularly inimical to the success of manufacturing industry, and ought carefully to be avoided by a government which desires to promote it.
The great copiousness of the subject of this report has insensibly led to a more lengthy preliminary discussion than was originally contemplated or intended. It appeared proper to investigate principles, to consider objections, and to endeavor to establish the utility of the thing proposed to be encouraged, previous to a specification of the objects which might occur as meriting or requiring encouragement, and of the measures which might be proper in respect to each. The first purpose having been fulfilled, it remains to pursue the second.
In the selection of objects, five circumstances seem entitled to particular attention: the capacity of the country to furnish the raw material; the degree in which the nature of the manufacture admits of a substitute for manual labor in machinery; the facility of execution; the extensiveness of the uses to which the article can be applied; its subserviency to other interests, particularly the great one of national defense. There are, however, objects to which these circumstances are little applicable, which, for some special reasons, may have a claim to encouragement.
A designation of the principal raw material of which each, manufacture is composed will serve to introduce the remarks upon it; as, in the first place,
IRON
The manufactures of this article are entitled to preeminent rank. None are more essential in their kinds, nor so extensive in their uses. They constitute, in whole or in part, the implements or the materials, or both, of almost every useful occupation. Their instrumentality is everywhere conspicuous.
It is fortunate for the United States that they have peculiar advantages for deriving the full benefit of this most valuable material, and they have every motive to improve it with systematic care. It is to be found in various parts of the United States in great abundance, and of almost every quality; and fuel, the chief instrument in manufacturing it, is both cheap and plenty. This particularly applies to charcoal; but there are productive coal mines already in operation, and strong indications that the material is to be found in abundance in a variety of other places.
The inquiries to which the subject of this report has led have been answered with proofs, that manufactories of iron, though generally understood to be extensive, are far more so than is commonly supposed. The kinds in which the greatest progress has been made have been mentioned in another place, and need not be repeated; but there is little doubt that every other kind, with due cultivation, will rapidly succeed. It is worthy of remark that several of the particular trades of which it is the basis are capable of being carried on without the aid of large capitals.
Iron works have greatly increased in the United States, and are prosecuted with much more advantage than formerly. The average price before the Revolution was about $64 per ton; at present it is about $80, — a rise which is chiefly to be attributed to the increase of manufactures of the material.
The still further extension and multiplication of such manufactures will have the double effect of promoting the extraction of the metal itself, and of converting it to a greater number of profitable purposes.
Those manufactures, too, unite in a greater degree than almost any others the several requisites which have been mentioned as proper to be consulted in the selection of objects.
The only further encouragement of manufactories of this article, the propriety of which may be considered as unquestionable, seems to be an increase of the duties on foreign rival commodities.
Steel is a branch which has already made a considerable progress, and it is ascertained that some new enterprises on a more extensive scale have been lately set on foot. The facility of carrying it to an extent which will supply all internal demands, and furnish a considerable surplus for exportation, cannot be doubted. The duty upon the importation of this article, which is at present seventy-five cents per cwt., may, it is conceived, be safely and advantageously extended to one hundred cents. It is desirable, by decisive arrangements, to second the efforts which are making in so very valuable a branch.
The United States already in a great measure supply themselves with nails and spikes. They are able, and ought certainly to do it entirely. The first and most laborious operation in this manufacture is performed by water-mills; and of the persons afterwards employed, a great proportion are boys, whose early habits of industry are of importance to the community, to the present support of their families, and to their own future comfort. It is not less curious than true that, in certain parts of the country, the making of nails is an occasional family manufacture.
The expediency of an additional duty on these articles is indicated by an important fact. About 1,800,000 pounds of them were imported into the United States in the course of a year, ending the 30th of September, 1790. A duty of two cents per pound would, it is presumable, speedily put an end to so considerable an importation. And it is in every view proper that an end should be put to it.
The manufacture of these articles, like that of some others, suffers from the carelessness and dishonesty of a part of those who carry it on. An inspection, in certain cases, might tend to correct the evil. It will deserve consideration whether a regulation of this sort cannot be applied without inconvenience to the exportation of the articles either to foreign countries or from one State to another.
The implements of husbandry are made in several States in great abundance. In many places it is done by the common blacksmiths. And there is no doubt that an ample supply for the whole country can with great ease be procured among ourselves.
Various kinds of edged tools, for the use of mechanics, are also made; and a considerable quantity of hollow wares, — though the business of castings has not yet attained the perfection which might be wished. It is, however, improving, and as there are respectable capitals in good hands embarked in the prosecution of those branches of iron manufactories, which are yet in their infancy, they may all be contemplated as objects not difficult to be acquired.
To insure the end it seems equally safe and prudent to extend the duty ad valorem upon all manufactures of iron, or of which iron is the article of chief value, to 10%.
Eire-arms, and other military weapons, may, it is conceived, be placed without inconvenience in the class of articles rated at 15$. There exist already manufactories of these articles, which only require the stimulus of a certain demand to render them adequate to the supply of the United States.
It would also be a material aid to manufactures of this nature, as well as a mean of public security, if provision should be made for an annual purchase of military weapons of home manufacture, to a certain determinate extent, in order to the formation of arsenals, and to replace from time to time such as should be withdrawn for use, so as always to have in store the quantity of each kind which should be deemed a competent supply.
But it may hereafter deserve legislative consideration, whether manufactories of all the necessary weapons of war ought not to be established on account of government itself. Such establishments are agreeable to the usual practice of nations, and that practice seems founded on sufficient reason.
There appears to be an improvidence in leaving these essential instruments of national defense to the casual speculations of individual adventure, — a resource which can less be relied upon in this case than in most others, — the articles in question not being objects of ordinary and indispensable private consumption or use. As a general rule, manufactories on the immediate account of government are to be avoided; but this seems to be one of the few exceptions which that rule admits, depending on very special reasons.
Manufactures of steel generally, or of which steel is the article of chief value, may with advantage be placed in the class of goods rated at 7½. As manufactures of this kind have not yet made any considerable progress, it is a reason for not rating them as high as those of iron; but as this material is the basis of them, and as their extension is not less practicable than important, it is desirable to promote it by a somewhat higher duty than the present.
A question arises how far it might be expedient to permit the importation of iron in pigs and bars free from duty. It would certainly be favorable to manufacturers of the article, but the doubt is whether it might not interfere with its production.
Two circumstances, however, abate, if they do not remove, apprehension on this score. One is the considerable increase of price, which has already been remarked, and which renders it probable that the free admission of foreign iron would not be inconsistent with an adequate profit to the proprietors of iron works; the other is the augmentation of demand which would be likely to attend the increase of manufactures of the article in consequence of the additional encouragements proposed to be given. But caution, nevertheless, in a matter of this kind is most advisable. The measure suggested ought, perhaps, rather to be contemplated, subject to the lights of further experience, than immediately adopted.
COPPER.
The manufactures of which this article is susceptible are also of great extent and utility. Under this description, those of brass, of which it is the principal ingredient, are intended to be included.
The material is a natural production of the country. Mines of copper have actually been wrought, and with profit to the undertakers, though it is not known that any are now in this condition. And nothing is easier than the introduction of it from other countries on moderate terms and in great plenty.
Coppersmiths and brassfounders, particularly the former, are numerous in the United States, — some of whom carry on business to a respectable extent.
To multiply and extend manufactories of the materials in question is worthy of attention and effort. In order to this it is desirable to facilitate a plentiful supply of the materials. And a proper mean to this end is to place them in the class of free articles. Copper in plates and brass are already in this predicament, but copper in pigs and bars is not; neither is lapis calaminaris, which, together with copper and charcoal, constitute the component ingredients of brass. The exemption from duty by parity of reason ought to embrace all such of these articles as are objects of importation.
An additional duty on brass wares will tend to the general end in view. These now stand at 5%, while those of tin, pewter and copper are rated at 1⁁%. There appears to be a propriety, in every view, in placing brass wares upon the same level with them; and it merits consideration whether the duty upon all of them ought not to be raised to 10%.
LEAD.
There are numerous proofs that this material abounds in the United States, and requires little to unfold it to an extent more than equal to every domestic occasion. A prolific mine of it has long been open in the southwestern parts of Virginia, and under a public administration, during the late war, yielded a considerable supply for military use. This is now in the hands of individuals, who not only carry it on with spirit, but have established manufactories of it at Richmond, in the same State.
The duties already laid upon the importation of this article, either in its unmanufactured or manufactured state, insure it a decisive advantage iii tlie home market — which amounts to considerable encouragement. If the duty on pewter wares should be raised, it would afford a further encouragement. Nothing else occurs as proper to be added.
FOSSIL COAL.
This, as an important instrument of manufactures, may without impropriety be mentioned among the subjects of this report.
A copious supply of it would be of great consequence to the iron branch. As an article of household fuel, also, it is an interesting production, the utility of which must increase in proportion to the decrease of wood, by the progress of settlement and cultivation. And its importance to navigation, as an immense article of transportation coastwise, is signally exemplified in Great Britain.
It is known that there are several coal mines in Virginia, now worked; and appearances of their existence are familiar in a number of places.
The expediency of a bounty on all this species of coal of home production, and of premiums on the opening of new mines, under certain qualifications, appears to be worthy of particular examination. The great importance of the article will amply justify a reasonable expense in this way, if it shall appear to be necessary to and shall be thought likely to answer the end.
WOOD.
Several manufacturers of this article flourish in the United States. Ships are nowhere built in greater perfection, and cabinet wares generally are made little, if at all, inferior to those of Europe. Their extent is such as to have admitted of considerable exportation.
An exemption from duty of the several kinds of wood ordinarily used in these manufactures seems to be all that is requisite by way of encouragement. It is recommended by the consideration of a similar policy being pursued in other countries, and by the expediency of giving equal advantages to our own workmen in wood. The abundance of timber proper for shipbuilding in the United States does not appear to be any objection to it. The increasing scarcity and growing importance of that article in the European countries admonish the United States to commence and systematically to pursue measures for the preservation of their stock. Whatever may promote the regular establishment of magazines of ship timber is in various views desirable.
SKINS.
There are scarcely any manufactories of greater importance than of this article. Their direct and very happy influence upon agriculture, by promoting the raising of cattle of different kinds, is a very material recommendation.
It is pleasing, too, to∗ observe the extensive progress they have made in their principal branches, which are so far matured as almost to defy foreign competition. Tanneries, in particular, are not only carried on as a regular business in numerous instances, and in various parts of the country, but they constitute, in some places, a valuable item of incidental family manufactures.
Representations, however, have been made, importing the expediency of further encouragement to the leather branch in two ways: one, by increasing the duty on the manufactures of it, which are imported; the other, by prohibiting the exportation of bark. In support of the latter it is alleged that the price of bark, chiefly in consequence of large exportations, has risen within a few years from about three dollars to four and an half per cord.
These suggestions are submitted rather as intimations which merit considerations, than as matters the propriety of which is manifest. It is not clear that an increase of duty is necessary; and in regard to the prohibition desired, there is no evidence of any considerable exportation hitherto; and it is most probable that whatever augmentation of price may have taken place is to be attributed to an extension of the home demand from the increase of manufactures, and to a decrease of the supply, in consequence of the progress of settlement, rather than to the quantities which have been exported.
It is mentioned, however, as an additional reason for the prohibition, that one species of the bark usually exported is in some sort peculiar to the country; and the material of a very valuable dye, of great use in some other manufactures in which the United States have begun a competition.
There may also be this argument in favor of an increase of duty. The object is of importance enough to claim decisive encouragement; and the progress which has been made leaves no room to apprehend any inconvenience on the score of supply from such an increase.
It would be of benefit to this branch, if glue, which is now rated at 5%, were made the object of an excluding duty. It is already made in large quantities at various tanneries; and, like paper, is an entire economy of materials, which, if not manufactured, would be left to perish. It may be placed with advantage in the class of articles paying 15%.
GRAIN.
Manufactures of the several species of this article have a title to peculiar favor; not only because they are most of them immediately connected with the subsistence of the citizens, but because they enlarge the demand for the most precious products of the soil.
Though flour may with propriety be noticed as a manufacture of grain, it were useless to do it, but for the purpose of submitting the expediency of a general system of inspection throughout the ports of the United States; which, if established upon proper principles, would be likely to improve the quality of our flour everywhere, and to raise its reputation in foreign markets. There are, however, considerations which stand in the way of such an arrangement.
Ardent spirits and malt liquors are, next to flour, the two principal manufactures of grain. The first has made a very extensive, the last a considerable progress in the United States. In respect to both, an exclusive possession of the home market ought to be secured to the domestic manufacturers, as fast as circumstances will admit Nothing is more practicable, and nothing more desirable.
The existing laws of the United States have done much towards attaining this valuable object; but some additions to the present duties on foreign distilled spirits and foreign malt liquors, and perhaps an abatement of those on home-made spirits, would more effectually secure it; and there does not occur any very weighty objection to either.
An augmentation of the duties on imported spirits would favor as well the distillation of spirits from molasses as that from grain. And to secure to the nation the benefit of a manufacture, even of foreign materials, is always of great, though perhaps of secondary importance.
A strong impression prevails in the minds of those concerned in distilleries (including, too, the most candid and enlightened) that greater differences in the rates of duty on foreign and domestic spirits are necessary completely to secure the successful manufacture of the latter, and there are facts which entitle this impression to attention.
It is known that the price of molasses, for some years past, has been successively rising in the West India markets, owing partly to a competition which did not formerly exist, and partly to an extension of demand in this country; and it is evident that the late disturbances in those islands from which we draw our principal supply must so far interfere with the production of the article as to occasion a material enhancement of price. The destruction and devastation attendant on the insurrection ia Hispaniola, in particular, must not only contribute very much to that effect, but may be expected to give it some duration. These circumstances and the duty of three cents per gallon on molasses may render it difficult for the distillers of that material to maintain, with adequate profit, a competition with the rum brought from the West Indies, the quality of which is so considerably superior.
The consumption of Geneva, or gin, in this country, is extensive. It is not long since distilleries of it have grown up among us to any importance. They are now becoming of consequence, but being still in their infancy, they require protection.
It is represented that the price of some of the materials is greater here than in Holland, from which place large quantities are brought; the price of labor considerably greater; the capitals engaged in the business there much larger than those which are employed here; the rate of profits at which the undertakers can afford to carry it on much less; the prejudices in favor of imported gin, strong. These circumstances are alleged to outweigh the charges which attend the bringing of the article from Europe to the United States, and the present difference of duty, so as to obstruct the prosecution of the manufacture with due advantage.
Experiment could, perhaps, alone decide with certainty the justness of the suggestions which are made; but in relation to branches of manufacture so important, it would seem inexpedient to hazard an unfavorable issue, and better to err on the side of too great than of too small a difference in the particular in question.
It is therefore submitted, that an addition of two cents per gallon be made to the duty on imported spirits of the first class of proof, with a proportionable increase on those of higher proof; and that a deduction of one cent per gallon be made from the duty on spirits distilled within the United States, beginning with the first class of proof, and a proportionable deduction from the duty on those of higher proof.
It is ascertained, that by far the greatest part of the malt liquors consumed in the United States is the produce of domestic breweries. It is desirable, and in all likelihood attainable, that the whole consumption should be supplied by ourselves.
The malt liquors made at home, though inferior to the best, are equal to a great part of those which have been usually imported. The progress already made is an earnest of what may be accomplished. The growing competition is an assurance of improvement. This will be accelerated by measures tending to invite a greater capital into this channel of employment.
To render the encouragement of domestic breweries decisive, it may be advisable to substitute to the present rates of duty eight cents per gallon generally; and it will deserve to be considered as a guard against invasions, whether there ought not to be a prohibition of their importation except in casks of considerable capacity. It is to be hoped that such a duty would banish from the market foreign malt liquors of inferior quality; and that the best kind only would continue to be imported, till it should be supplanted by the efforts of equal skill or care at home.
Till that period the importation so qualified would be an useful stimulus to improvement; and in the mean time the payment of the increased price for the enjoyment of a luxury, in order to the encouragement of a most useful branch of domestic industry, could not reasonably be deemed a hardship.
As a further aid to manufactures of grain, though upon a smaller scale, the articles of starch, hair-powder and wafers may with great propriety be placed among those which are rated at fifteen per cent. No manufactures are more simple nor more completely within the reach of a full supply from domestic sources; and it is a policy, as common as it is obvious, to make them the objects either of prohibitory duties or of express prohibition.
FLAX AND HEMP.
Manufactures of these articles have so much affinity to each other, and they are so often blended, that they may with advantage be considered in conjunction. The importance of the linen branch to agriculture; its precious effects upon household industry; the ease with which the materials can be produced at home to any requisite extent; the great advances which have been already made in the coarser fabrics of them, especially in the family way, — constitute claims of peculiar force to the patronage of government.
This patronage may be afforded in various ways: by promoting the growth of the materials; by increasing the impediments to an advantageous competition of rival foreign articles; by direct bounties or premiums upon the home manufacture.
First. As to promoting the growth of the materials.
In respect to hemp, something has been already done by the high duty upon foreign hemp. If the facilities for domestic production were not unusually great, the policy of the duty on the foreign raw material would be highly questionable, as interfering with the growth of manufactures of it. But making the proper allowance for those facilities, and with an eye to the future and natural progress of the country, the measure does not appear upon the whole exceptionable.
A strong wish naturally suggests itself, that some method could be devised of affording a more direct encouragement to the growth both of flax and hemp; such as would be effectual and at the same time not attended with too great inconveniences. To this end, bounties and premiums offer themselves to consideration; but no modification of them has yet occurred which would not either hazard too much expense, or operate unequally in reference to the circumstances of different parts of the Union, and which would not be attended with very great difficulties in the execution.
Secondly. As to increasing the impediments to an advantageous competition of rival foreign articles.
To this purpose, an augmentation of the duties on importation is the obvious expedient; which, in regard to certain articles, appears to be recommended by sufficient reasons.
The principal of these articles is sail-cloth; one intimately connected with navigation and defense; and of which a flourishing manufactory is established at Boston, and very promising ones at several other places.
It is presumed to be both safe and advisable to place this in the class of articles rated at ten per cent. A strong reason for it results from the consideration that a bounty of two pence sterling per ell is allowed in Great Britain upon the exportation of the sail-cloth manufactured in that kingdom.
It would likewise appear to be good policy to raise the duty to 7½ % on the following articles: drillings, osnaburgh, ticklenburghs, dowlas, canvas, brown rolls, bagging, and upon all other linens the first cost of which at the place of exportation does not exceed 36 cents per yard. A bounty of 12½% upon an average, on the exportation of such or similar linens from Great Britain, encourages the manufacture of them in that country, and increases the obstacles to a successful competition in the countries to which they are sent.
The quantities of tow and other household linens manufactured in different parts of the United States, and the expectations which are derived from some late experiments, of being able to extend the use of labor-saving machines in the coarser fabrics of linen, obviate the danger of inconvenience from an increase of the duty upon such articles, and authorize a hope, of speedy and complete success to the endeavors which may be used for procuring an internal supply.
Thirdly. As to direct bounties or permiums upon the manufactured articles.
To afford more effectual encouragement to the manufacture, and at the same time to promote the cheapness of the article for the benefit of navigation, it will be of great use to allow a bounty of two cents per yard on all sail-cloth which is made in the United States from materials of their own growth. This would also assist the culture of those materials. An encouragement of this kind, if adopted, ought to be established for a moderate term of years, to invite to new undertakings, and to an extension of the old. This is an article of importance enough to warrant the employment of extraordinary means in its favor.
COTTON.
There is something in the texture of this material which adapts it in a peculiar degree to the application of machines. The signal utility of the mill for spinning of cotton, not long since invented in England, has been noticed in another place; but there are other machines scarcely inferior in utility, which, in the different manufactories of this article, are employed either exclusively or with more than ordinary effect. This very important circumstance recommends the fabrics of cotton in a more particular manner to a country in which a defect of hands constitutes the greatest obstacle to success.
The variety and extent of the uses to which the manufactures of this article are applicable is another powerful argument in their favor.
And the faculty of the United States to produce the raw material in abundance and of a quality which, though alleged to be inferior to some that is produced in other quarters, is nevertheless capable of being used with advantage in many fabrics, and is probably susceptible of being carried by a more experienced culture to much greater perfection, suggests an additional and a very cogent inducement to the vigorous pursuit of the cotton branch in its several subdivisions.
How much has been already done has been stated in a preceding part of this report.
In addition to this, it may be announced that a society is forming with a capital which is expected to be extended to at least half a million of dollars, on behalf of which measures are already in train for prosecuting, on a large scale, the making and printing of cotton goods.
These circumstances conspire to indicate the expediency of removing any obstructions which may happen to exist to the advantageous prosecution of the manufactories in question, and of adding such encouragements as may appear necessary and proper.
The present duty of three cents per pound on the foreign raw material is undoubtedly a very serious impediment to the progress of those manufactories.
The injurious tendency of similar duties, either prior to the establishment or in the infancy of the domestic manufacture of the article, as it regards the manufacture, and their worse than inutility in relation to the home production of the material itself have been anticipated, particularly in discussing the subject of pecuniary bounties.
Cotton has not the same pretensions with hemp to form an exception to the general rule.
Not being, like hemp, an universal production of the country, it affords less assurance of an adequate internal supply; but the chief objection arises from the doubts which are entertained concerning the quality of the national cotton. It is alleged that the fibre of it is considerably shorter and weaker than that of some other places; and it has been observed, as a general rule, that the nearer the place of growth to the equator, the better the quality of the cotton. That which comes from Cayenne, Surinam, and Demarara is said to be preferable, even at a material difference of price, to the cotton of the islands.
While a hope may reasonably be indulged that, with due care and attention, the national cotton may be made to approach nearer than it now does to that of regions somewhat more favored by climate; and while facts authorize an opinion that very great use may be made of it, and that it is a resource which gives greater security to the cotton fabrics of this country than can be enjoyed by any which depends wholly on external supply, it will certainly be wise in every view to let our infant manufactures have the full benefit of the best materials on the cheapest terms. It is obvious that the necessity of having such materials is proportioned to the unskillfulness and inexperience of the workmen employed, who, if inexpert, will not fail to commit great waste where the materials they are to work with are of an indifferent kind.
To secure to the national manufacturers so essential an advantage, a repeal of the present duty on imported cotton is indispensable.
A substitute for this, far more encouraging to domestic production, will be to grant a bounty on the national cotton when wrought at a home manufactory, to which a bounty on the exportation of it may be added. Either, or both, would do much more towards promoting the growth of the article than the merely nominal encouragement which it is proposed to abolish. The first would also have a direct influence in encouraging the manufacture.
The bounty which has been mentioned as existing in Great Britain upon the exportation of coarse linens not exceeding a certain value applies also to certain descriptions of cotton goods of similar value.
This furnishes an additional argument fcr allowing to the national manufacturers the species of encouragement just suggested, and indeed for adding some other aid.
One cent per yard, not less than of a given width, on all goods of cotton, or of cotton and linen mixed, which are manufactured in the United States, with the addition of one cent per pound weight of the material if made of national cotton, would amount to an aid of considerable importance both to the production and to the manufacture of that valuable article. And it is conceived that the expense would be well justified by the magnitude of the object.
The printing and staining of cotton goods is known to be a distinct business from the fabrication of them. It is one easily accomplished, and which, as it adds materially to the value of the article in its white state, and prepares it for a variety of new uses, is of importance to be promoted.
As imported cottons, equally with those which are made at home, may be the objects of this manufacture, it will merit consideration whether the whole or a part of the duty on the white goods ought not to be allowed to be drawn back in favor of those who print or stain them. This measure would certainly operate as a powerful encouragement to the business, and though it may in a degree counteract the original fabrication of the articles, it would probably more than compensate for this disadvantage in the rapid growth of a collateral branch which is of a nature sooner to attain to maturity. When a sufficient progress shall have been made, the drawback may be abrogated, and by that time the domestic supply of the articles to be printed or stained will have been extended.
If the duty of 7½% on certain kinds of cotton goods were extended to all goods of cotton, or of which it is the principal material, it would probably more than counterbalance the effect of the drawback proposed in relation to the fabrication of the article. And no material objection occurs to such an extension. The duty, then, considering all the circumstances which attend goods of this description, could not be deemed inconveniently high, and it may be inferred from various causes that the prices of them would still continue moderate.
Manufactories of cotton goods not long since established at Beverly, in Massachusetts, and at Providence, in the State of Rhode Island, and conducted with a perseverance corresponding with the patriotic motives which began them, seem to have overcome the first obstacles to success, — producing corduroys, velverets, fustians, jeans, and other similar articles, of a quality which will bear a comparison with the like articles brought from Manchester. The one at Providence has the merit of being the first in introducing into the United States the celebrated cotton mill, which not only furnishes materials for that manufactory itself but for the supply of private families for household manufacture.
Other manufactories of the same material as regular businesses hare also been begun at different places in the State of Connecticut, but all upon a smaller scale than those above mentioned. Some essays are also making in the printing and staining of cotton goods. There are several small establishments of this kind already on foot
WOOL.
In a country the climate of which partakes of so considerable a proportion of winter as that of a great part of the United States, the woollen branch cannot be regarded as inferior to any which relates to the clothing of the inhabitants.
Household manufactures of this material are carried on in different parts of the United States to a very interesting extent, but there is only one branch which as a regular business can be said to have acquired maturity. This is the making of hats.
Hats of wool, and of wool mixed with fur, are made in large quantities in different States, and nothing seems wanting but an adequate supply of materials to render the manufacture commensurate with the demand.
A promising essay towards the fabrication of cloths, cassimeres and other woollen goods, is likewise going on at Hartford, in Connecticut Specimens of the different kinds which are made, in the possession of the secretary, evince that these fabrics have attained a very considerable degree of perfection. Their quality certainly surpasses anything that could have been looked for in so short a time and under so great disadvantages, and conspires with the scantiness of the means which have been at the command of the directors to form the eulogium of that public spirit, perseverance and judgment which have been able to accomplish so much.
To cherish and bring to maturity this precious ein-bryo must engage the most ardent wishes, and proportionable regret as far as the means of doing it may appear difficult or uncertain.
Measures which should tend to promote an abundant supply of wool of good quality would probably afford the most efficacious aid that present circumstances permit.
To encourage the raising and improving the breed of sheep at home would certainly be the most desirable expedient for that purpose; but it may not be alone sufficient, especially as it is yet a problem whether our wool be capable of such a degree of improvement as to render it fit for the finer fabrics.
Premiums would probably be found the best means of promoting the domestic, and bounties the foreign supply. The first may be within the compass of the institution hereafter to be submitted; the last would require a specific legislative provision. If any bounties are granted, they ought of course to be adjusted with an eye to quality as well as quantity.
A fund for this purpose may be derived from the addition of 2½% to the present rate of duty on carpets and carpeting, — an increase to which the nature of the articles suggests no objection, and which may at the same time furnish a motive the more to the fabrication of them at home, towards which some beginnings have been made.
SILK.
The production of this article is attended with great facility in most parts of the United States. Some pleasing essays are making in Connecticut as well towards that as towards the manufacture of what is produced. Stockings, handkerchiefs, ribbons and buttons are made, though as yet but in small quantities.
A manufactory of lace, upon a scale not very extensive, has been long memorable at Ipswich, in the State of Massachusetts.
An exemption of the material from the duty which it now pays on importation, and premiums upon the production to be dispensed under the direction of the institution before alluded to, seem to be the only species of encouragement advisable at so early a stage of the thing.
GLASS.
The materials for making glass are found everywhere. In the United States there is no deficiency of them. The sands and stones called tarso, which include flinty and crystalline substances generally, and the salts of various plants, particularly of the sea-weed kali, or kelp, constitute the essential ingredients. An extraordinary abundance of fuel is a particular advantage enjoyed by this country for such manufactures. They, however, require large capitals, and involve much manual labor.
Different manufactories of glass are now on foot in the United States. The present duty of 12 J% on all imported articles of glass amounts to a considerable encouragement to those manufactories. If anything in addition is judged eligible, the most proper would appear to be a direct bounty on window-glass and black bottles.
The first recommends itself as an object of general convenience; the last adds to that character the circumstance of being an important item in breweries. A complaint is made of great deficiency in this respect.
GUM POWDER.
No small progress has been of late made in the manufacture of this very important article. It may, indeed, be considered as already established, but its high importance renders its further extension very desirable.
The encouragements which it already enjoys are a duty of 10% on the foreign rival article, and an exemption of saltpetre, one of the principal ingredients of which it is composed, from duty. A like exemption of sulphur, another chief ingredient, would appear to be equally proper. No quantity of this article has yet been produced from internal sources. The use made of it in finishing the bottoms of ships is an additional inducement to placing it in the class of free goods. Regulations for the careful inspection of the article would have a favorable tendency.
PAPER.
Manufactories of paper are among those which are arrived at the greatest maturity in the United States, and are most adequate to national supply. That of paper-hangings is a branch in which respectable progress has been made.
Nothing material seems wanting to the further success of this valuable branch, which is already protected by a competent duty on similar imported articles.
In the enumeration of the several kinds made subject to that duty, sheathing and cartridge paper have been omitted. These being the most simple manufactures of the sort, and necessary to military supply, as well as ship-building, recommend themselves equally with those of other descriptions to encouragement, and appear to be as fully within the compass of domestic exertions.
PRINTED BOOKS.
The great number of presses disseminated throughout the Union seem to afford an assurance that there is no need of being indebted to foreign countries for the printing of the books which are used in the United States. A duty of 10% instead of 5%, which is now charged upon the article, would have a tendency to aid the business internally.
It occurs, as an objection to this, that it may have an unfavorable aspect towards literature by raising the prices of books in universal use in private families, schools, and other seminaries of learning. But the difference, it is conceived, would be without effect.
As to books which usually fill the libraries of the wealthier classes, and of professional men, such an augmentation of prices as might be occasioned by an additional duty of 5% would be too little felt to be an impediment to the acquisition.
And with regard to books which may be specially imported for the use of particular seminaries of learning, and of public libraries, a total exemption from duty would be advisable, which would go towards obviating the objection just mentioned. They are now subject to a duty of 5$.
As to the books in most general family use, the constancy and universality of the demand would insure exertions to furnish them at home, and the means are completely adequate. It may also be expected ultimately, in this as in other cases, that the extension of the domestic manufacture would conduce to the cheapness of the article.
It ought not to pass unremarked, that to encourage the printing of books is to encourage the manufacture of paper.
KEFIKED SUGARS AND CHOCOLATE
Are among the number of extensive and prosperous domestic manufactures.
Drawbacks of the duties upon the materials of which they are respectively made, in cases of exportation, would have a beneficial influence upon the manufacture, and would conform to a precedent which has been already furnished in the instance of molasses on the exportation of distilled spirits.
Cocoa: — the raw material now pays a duty of one cent per pound, while chocolate, which is a prevailing and very simple manufacture, is comprised in the mass of articles rated at no more than five per cent.
There would appear to be a propriety in encouraging the manufacture by a somewhat higher duty on its foreign rival than is paid on the raw material. Two cents per pound on imported chocolate would, it is presumed, be without inconvenience.
The foregoing heads comprise the most important of the several kinds of manufactures which have occurred as requiring and at the same time as most proper for public encouragement; and such measures for affording it, as have appeared best calculated to answer the end, have been suggested.
The observations which have accompanied this delineation of objects supersede the necessity of many supplementary remarks. One or two, however, may not be altogether superfluous.
Bounties are in various instances proposed as one species of encouragement.
It is a familiar objection to them that they are difficult to be managed and liable to frauds. But neither that difficulty nor this danger seems sufficiently great to countervail the advantages of which they are productive when rightly applied. And it is presumed to have been shown that they are in some cases, particularly in the infancy of new enterprises, indispensable.
It will however be necessary to guard with extraordinary circumspection the manner of dispensing them. The requisite precautions have been thought of, but to enter into the detail would swell this report, already voluminous, to a size too inconvenient.
If the principle shall not be deemed inadmissible, the means of avoiding an abuse of it will not be likely to present insurmountable obstacles. There are useful guides from practice in other quarters.
It shall therefore only be remarked here in relation to this point, that any bounty which may be applied to the manufacture of an article cannot with safety extend beyond those manufactories at which the making of the article is a regular trade. It would be impossible to annex adequate precautions to a benefit of that nature, if extended to every private family in which the manufacture was incidentally carried on, and it being a merely incidental occupation which engages a portion of time that would otherwise be lost, it can be advantageously carried on without so special an aid.
The possibility of a diminution of the revenue may also present itself as an objection to the arrangements which have been submitted.
But there is no truth which may be more firmly relied upon than that the interests of the revenue are promoted by whatever promotes an increase of national industry and wealth.
In proportion to the degree of these is the capacity of every country to contribute to the public treasury; and where the capacity to pay is increased or even is not decreased, the only consequence of measures which diminish any particular resource is a change of the object. If by encouraging the manufacture of an article at home, the revenue which has been wont to accrue from its importation should be lessened, an indemnification can easily be found either out of the manufacture itself, or from some other object which may be deemed more convenient.
The measures, however, which have been submitted, taken aggregately, will for a long time to come rather augment than decrease the public revenue.
There is little room to hope that the progress of manufactures will so equally keep pace with the progress of population as to prevent even a gradual augmentation of the product of the duties on imported articles.
As, nevertheless, an abolition in some instances and a reduction in others of duties which have been pledged for the public debt is proposed, it is essential that it should be accompanied with a competent substitute. In order to this, it is requisite that all the additional duties which shall be laid be appropriated, in the first instance, to replace all defalcations which may proceed from any such abolition or diminution. It is evident at first glance that they will not only be adequate to this but will yield a considerable surplus. This surplus will serve,
First. To constitute a fund for paying the bounties which have been decreed.
Secondly. To constitute a fund for the operations of a board to be established for promoting aits, agriculture, manufactures and commerce. Of this institution different intimations have been given in the course of this report. An outline of a plan for it shall now be submitted.
Let a certain annual sum be set apart and placed under the management of commissioners, not less than three, to consist of certain officers of the government and their successors in office.
Let these commissioners be empowered to apply the fund confided to them to defray the expenses of the emigration of artists and manufacturers in particular branches of extraordinary importance; to induce the prosecution and introduction of useful discoveries, inventions and improvements by proportionate rewards, judiciously held out and applied; to encourage by premiums, both honorable and lucrative, the exertions of individuals and of classes in relation to the several objects they are charged with promoting; and to afford such other aids to those objects as may be generally designated by law.
The commissioners to render to the legislature an annual account of their transactions and disbursements; and all such sums as shall not have been applied to the purposes of their trust, at the end of every three years to revert to the treasury. It may also be enjoined upon them not to draw out the money but for the purpose of some specific disbursement.
It may, moreover, be of use to authorize them to receive voluntary contributions, making it their duty to apply them to the particular objects for which they may have been made, if any shall have been designated by the donors.
There is reason to believe that the progress of particular manufactures has been much retarded by the want of skillful workmen, and it often happens that the capitals employed are not equal to the purposes of bringing from abroad workmen of a superior kind. Here, in cases worthy of it, the auxiliary agency of government would in all probability be useful. There are also valuable workmen in every branch who are prevented from emigrating solely by the want of means. Occasional aids to such persons, properly administered, might be a source of valuable acquisitions to the country.
The propriety of stimulating by rewards the invention and introduction of useful improvements, is admitted without difficulty. But the success of attempts in this way must evidently depend much on the manner of conducting them. It is probable that the placing of the dispensation of those rewards under some proper discretionary direction where they may be accompanied by collateral expedients will serve to give them the surest efficacy. It seems impracticable to apportion, by general rules, specific compensations for discoveries of unknown and disproportionate utility.
The great use which may be made of a fund of this nature, to procure and import foreign improvements, is particularly obvious. Among these, the article of machines would form a most important item.
The operation and utility of premiums have been adverted to, together with the advantages which have resulted from their dispensation under the direction of certain public and private societies. Of this some experience has been had in the instance of the Pennsylvania Society for the promotion of manufactures and useful arts, but the funds of that association have been too contracted to produce more than a very small portion of the good to which the principles of it would have led. It may confidently be affirmed that there is scarcely anything which has been devised better calculated to excite a general spirit of improvement than the institutions of this nature. They are truly invaluable.
In countries where there is great private wealth, much may be effected by the voluntary contributions of patriotic individuals, but in a community situated like that of the United States, the public purse must supply the deficiency of private resource. In what can it be so useful as in promoting and improving the efforts of industry?
All of which is humbly submitted.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
Secretary of the Treasury.Albert Gallatin, Memorial of the Committee of the Free Trade Convention (January, 1832),
Held at Philadelphia in September and October, 1831, remonstrating against the existing Tariff of Duties.- New York,
23d January, 1832.
Sir: — I have the honor to inclose the memorial of the committee appointed by the convention of delegates from several States, held at Philadelphia in September and October, 1831, for the purpose of preparing and presenting to Congress a memorial setting forth the evils of the existing tariff of duties, and asking such a modification of the same as shall be consistent with the purposes of revenue, and equal, in its operation, on the different parts of the United States, and on the various interests of the same.
I pray that the said memorial may be laid before the Senate; and have the honor to be,
With great respect, sir,
Your most obedient servant,
ALBERT GALLATIN,
Chairman of the Committee.The hon. john C. calhoun,
Vice-President of the Untied Statet,
and President of the Senate.To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled: —
The memorial of the committee appointed for that purpose by the “Free Trade Convention,” held at Philadelphia in September and October, 1831,
Respectfully shows: —
That a convention of delegates appointed by public meetings in various States of the Union, for the purpose of cooperating, by constitutional and legal measures, in procuring the repeal of the restrictive system, was held at Philadelphia on the 30th of September, 1831, and continued in session till the 7th October ensuing; when a committee, consisting of one member from each State represented in the convention, was appointed for the purpose of preparing a memorial to Congress, setting forth the evils of the existing tariff of duties, and asking such a modification of the same as shall be consistent with the purposes of revenue, and equal in its operation on the different parts of the United States, and on the various interests of the same.
Acting under that appointment, your memorialists respectfully pray: —
1st. That the duties be so reduced, as to leave, after the extinguishment of the public debt, only that amount of revenue which may be necessary to meet the ordinary exigencies of Government.
2dly. That, allowing a reasonable time for a gradual reduction of the present exaggerated duties on some articles, the duties on all the imported articles not free of duty be ultimately equalized, so as that the duty on any such article shall not vary materially from the general average rate of all the duties together, or, in other words, from a uniform duty ad valorem on all imported articles subject to duty.
3dly. That wines, teas, coffee, and similar articles, be not added to the list of those now free of duty, but may, on the contrary, be subject to duties corresponding, in proportion to their respective value, with those laid on other imported articles subject to duty.
It is hoped that no essential difference of opinion exists respecting the general reduction of the revenue.
As soon after the organization of the existing Government of the United States as a sufficient revenue had been provided, and the first difficulties which they had to encounter had been surmounted, Congress adopted the most efficient measures for the reimbursement of the debt necessarily incurred in asserting and securing the national independence. An annual appropriation of $8,000,000, founded on a real excess of revenue beyond the current expenditures, had, in ten years, reduced the debt from $97,000,000 (including therein the $15,000,000 paid for Louisiana) to $45,000,000, when the prospect of extinguishing the whole within six years was frustrated by the late war with Great Britain. After the restoration of peace, the whole of the public debt, including arrears afterwards paid or funded, and the subsequent payment of the Florida claims, exceeded, on the 1st of January, 1816, $120,000,000. Congress, without delay, raised the annual appropriation for the debt to $10,000,000, and provided a revenue sufficient not only for the payment of that sum, and for discharging the current expenses of Government, but also for the gradual increase of the means of defense by land and by sea, to the providing of which the former revenue was inadequate. At the end of sixteen years, during which the same measures have been unremittingly pursued, the public debt is accordingly reduced nominally to little more than $24,000,000 — in fact, to less than $17,000,000 — an equivalent for the difference being found in the bank shares, the property of the United States, which have been paid for during the same period. The revenue which will be actually received, and that which will accrue in the course of the year 1832, will be sufficient to reimburse the whole of the $24,000,000 still due. And, even without recurring to the bank shares owned by the United States, the existing duties may be reduced near $12,000,000 from the 1st of January, 1832.
The people of the United States have constantly sustained their representatives in the measures necessary for the attainment of that great object. They have for more than thirty years cheerfully submitted to the burdens laid for that special purpose; and they are thus enabled to transmit, free of any incumbrance, to the growing generation, the glorious inheritance received from their fathers. But they have a right to expect that the burdens shall cease with the occasion for which they were laid, and that the intended reduction will be made in good faith, without reserve, and to the full extent of the sum which is no longer wanted.
The payments for the public debt have, during the ten years, 1821 to 1830, exceeded the annual appropriation of $10,000,000. Including the payment of the Florida claims, the average annual payments, during the first five years, exceeded $11,000,000; and they have, during the last five years, amounted to near $11,400,000.
The average annual amount of all the other expenses of Government (deducting the repayment to the claimants of the sum paid by Great Britain into the Treasury for claims under the first article of the treaty of Ghent) has been, for the whole ten years, about $11,600,000, viz., for the first five years less than $10,500,000, and for the last five years more than $12,600,000. Two years only, those expenses have exceeded $13,000,000; in 1826, by about $60,000, and, in 1830, by $230,000. A net revenue of $13,000,000 is therefore sufficient to meet, after the extinguishment of the debt, all the exigencies of Government, according to the present scale of expenditure.
It is strictly just that all classes of citizens, and every section of the country, should share in the benefits arising from the reduction of the public burdens. That reduction ought to apply as -well to the revenue arising from the public lands as to the duties on importation. Your memorialists do not pretend to suggest what, in their opinion, would be a proper reduction on each branch; but they had concluded, that, at all events, the necessary sum to be drawn from the impost would fall short of $13,000,000. A different disposition of the public lands has been suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury. Unprepared for that proposal, and ignorant of the views on that subject entertained by those in whose behalf your memorialists now apply to your honorable body, they will abstain from giving an opinion on that question; and, in order to meet any plan which may be adopted in that respect, they will argue as if the whole revenue was to be exclusively drawn from the duties on importation. But they beg leave earnestly to remonstrate against any attempt to provide a permanent revenue of $15,000,000, or exceeding the present rate of expenditure for other objects than the public debt.
A revenue derived from the same rate of duties on importation will in the United States gradually increase, though in a much slower ratio than the population. The average annual gross revenue on merchandise amounted, during the years 1821 to 1825, to $20,250,-000; and during the years 1826 to 1830, to $23,130,000, showing an increase of about 14% within five years. But as the rate of duties was altered by the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, a more correct criterion of the increase may perhaps be found in the comparative value of the domestic exports, with which the importations are paid, and which, during the same period, have increased about 6%, or at the rate of about 1% a year. Moderate duties will also, as they always do, produce a greater proportionate revenue than when raised to an extravagant rate. The saving alone in the expenses of collection would defray, within a short time, all the expense necessary for building custom-houses and giving adequate salaries to the officers who may not be sufficiently remunerated. For, to the tariff of 1828, and to its system of minimums alone, can be ascribed the great increase in the expenses of collection between the years 1828 and 1830. The gross revenue on customs amounted, in 1828, to $25,846,000, and those expenses to f 869,000; the gross revenue of 1830 to $23,720,000, and the expenses to $1,024,000, or to 4.31% instead of 3.38% on the revenue.
The revolutionary pensions will also be gradually diminished; and, considering the great increase of the current expenditure during the last five years, a well founded hope is entertained that this may be lessened, without any injury to the public service, by a strict adherence to the specific appropriations made by law, improved order and regularity, in the superintendence of every branch of expenditure, constant vigilance in checking abuses, and a proper discrimination between just and unfounded claims.
Your memorialists wish it to be distinctly understood that they ask only for a wise and skillful economy, and not for a retrenchment of any of the expenses necessary for the defense of the oountiy, or for any object calculated to promote its prosperity, which is embraced in the legitimate powers of the General Government. They will only observe that the average annual amount of expenses of the years 1829,1830, for all other objects than the public debt, falls short of $13,000,000; out of which the annual average expenditure for the progress and accumulation of the means of defense, including the increase of the navy, fortifications, ordnance, and materials, has amounted to $1,575,000, and that for internal improvements of every description, and in every quarter, to $1,275,000. It is obvious that the expense under the first head is, from its nature, definite; and that, after the intended fortifications and public ships shall have been completed, and the necessary stock of arms, ordnance, and every species of materials, either for the land or sea service, been provided, the expense will be reduced to that of repairs and keeping up the stock. If, in the meanwhile, the existing annual appropriations for those great objects should be deemed inadequate; if an earlier completion of any or all of them is desirable, an additional revenue for that purpose can only be wanted for a short time, and will be supplied by the surplus arising from the gradual, instead of an immediate, reduction of the high existing duties.
For the clearer understanding of the object they have in view, and of the effect of the measures which they solicit, on the several interests of the country, it is necessary in the first instance to form at least an approximate estimate of the average rate of duty, which, if levied equally on all the imports now subject to duty, would produce a nett annual revenue of $13,000,000, equivalent to a gross revenue, including the expenses of collection, of about $13,600,000.
The average annual value of foreign merchandise, subject to duty, consumed in the United States during the six years, 1825 to 1830, is, according to the official “statements of the commerce and navigation,” $54,664,-000. The reexportations of foreign articles paying specific duties are, however, overrated in those statements (probably from having been, in most cases, estimated at long prices, that is to say, including the duty) by a sum amounting to about $1,650,000 a year. And the articles paying duties ad valorem, which are imported from Great Britain and Ireland, being valued at the rate of 4s. 6d. sterling per dollar, are underrated by a sum amounting, after deducting the reexportations, to about $1,345,000 a year. The actual annual consumption for those six years may therefore be estimated at about $57,500,000. As there are goods, not entitled to drawback, exported to an amount of $800,000 or $900,000 a year, on which the duty is paid, although they are not consumed in the United States, an average duty of 25% will commonly produce $200,000 more than the estimate. Judging from analogy, the imports will, with the growth of the country, continue also gradually, though slowly, to increase. The estimate of the gross revenue at $13,500,000, and of the value of imported articles paying duty at $57,500,000, will therefore produce a net revenue exceeding $13,000,000; and that estimate gives, for the required average or uniform duty ad valorem, near 23½% actual, or less than 21½% nominal duty. For it will be recollected that, on account of the addition to the prime cost of 10% or 20%, according to the place whence imported, a nominal duty of 20% is, in fact, one of 24% on goods imported from countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and of 22% on goods imported from other places.
According to the same premises, the average duty required to produce a nett revenue of $13,000,000 would amount to near 27%, if wines, teas, coffee, cocoa, spices, and fruits were exempted from duty. A nett revenue of $15,000,000 would require, in that case, an average duty of 31% and of 27%, if those articles were subject to the same duty as every other import. The present average duty, calculated on the average revenue derived from customs, during the same period of six years, will be found to exceed 40%.
As a difference of 3% or 4% in the rate of an average duty, or of the aggregate of duties, would on near $60,000,000 of taxed imports produce a difference of $2,000,000 in the revenue, the attention of Congress will, under any modification of the tariff that may be adopted, be necessarily drawn to that subject. A thorough investigation will lead to much more correct results than those which are now presented. But this rough estimate is sufficient for our principal purpose. An error of even 5% in the rate becomes almost unimportant, when contending against duties of 60% and more than 100%.
Your memorialists are aware that, even for the purposes of revenue, a strict adherence, in every instance, to a uniform rate of duty would be attended with great inconvenience. There is propriety in taxing articles of luxury in preference to those more generally used by the less wealthy classes of society. Yet it is found necessary to lessen the duty on watches, jewelry, thread lace, and other articles, which from their great value in a small bulk may with facility be fraudulently imported.
Considerations of a higher nature may render a great reduction of the duties on spirits improper. An exception has always been admitted with respect to articles necessary for the defense of the country. When asking for a uniform duty which, whether specific or laid ad valorem, shall not exceed the rate of 20% to 25%, as sufficient for the purposes of revenue, your memorialists submit the proposition as a general principle. But, whilst admitting that duties not exceeding in the aggregate the amount thus required may be arranged as the necessary exceptions to the general rule shall require, they contend that any considerable variation from the average rate, for the purpose of favoring special branches, is injurious to American industry, attended with certain national loss, unequal and oppressive in its operation, both with regard to the several classes of society and to the several sections of the country.
We are not called upon to discuss the abstract question whether another mode of taxation would be more eligible than the impost, or whether an unrestrained intercourse between all nations, free of the payment of any duties on imports, would be best calculated to promote the industry and prosperity of all. On that subject the experience of forty years is conclusive, so far as relates to the United States. The people prefer, in time of peace, duties raised on the importation of foreign merchandise to any internal tax, direct or indirect. Whether for good or for evil, that system affords an encouragement to domestic manufactures not less efficient for being incidental. Duties on impprts, amounting on an average to about 20% on the value, appear necessary to the support of Government. Although they may, to that extent, by diverting national industry from its natural channels, render it less productive; although they may, to that extent, lay a tax on the consumers in addition to that which is paid to Government; although they operate unequally on different sections of the country; all your memorialists ask is, that the evil shall not be aggravated by an inequality in the rates of duty. The question then at issue is, simply, whether the amount wanted shall be so raised as to fall equally upon all the consumers, or, in other words, on the community, and so as to encourage equally every branch of industry, or whether certain branches shall receive special protection by high and sometimes prohibitory duties.
Whether taxes are laid on income or on consumption, it is equally the duty of a government founded in justice to lay them equally on all, in proportion, as the case may be, to the income or the consumption. Were there no taxes of the latter description, every part of the country, and every class of society, would be left at liberty to supply its wants on the cheapest terms, and to pursue that branch of industry for which each was best fitted. If a tax, equivalent to an average duty of 20% (or at any other rate) on all foreign commodities becomes necessary for the support of Government, and is laid at an equal and uniform rate on all such commodities, all the sections of the country, classes of society, and individuals, are left as far as practicable in the same relative situation as before. But any law materially varying the rate on any of the taxed articles will in some respect change that relative situation, and to an extent proportionate to the change render the burden of the tax unequal. An alteration which thus deranges the natural order of things should at least be productive of an adequate and indisputable advantage to the community. Higher duties on luxuries than on articles generally, and in some cases exclusively, used by the less wealthy classes of society, are justified by the propriety of laying a heavier burden on those who are the best able to bear it. The domestic manufacture of a sufficient stock of arms, by Government or by contract, at a much higher price than they could be procured abroad may be necessary, in order to secure at all times a supply of those indispensable means of defense. Raw materials are admitted free of duty, because they are not, in that state, immediate objects of consumption, but necessary for the production of commodities to which the national industry may be advantageously applied. The presumed advantages of the restrictive system should be equally palpable and clearly demonstrated: the burden of the proof lies altogether on its advocates.
Let it, however, be recollected that even the general benefit arising to the country at large may not always be a sufficient justification of great and important deviations from the equal and uniform system of taxation. A government which acknowledges the principle that no individual can be divested of his property for public purposes without indemnity cannot claim the right to do that indirectly which it is forbidden to do directly. A system calculated to lay permanent burdens, greatly unequal and oppressive, on some classes of society, or on a particular section of the country, would be radically unjust and altogether indefensible, even though it might be attended with some advantages to the community considered as a whole. But whether such advantages are in fact realized; whether, on any supposition, they ever can produce a profit equal to the actual national loss arising even from the indispensable duty of 20% to 25%, must be first examined.
It is self-evident that the industry of a country is most profitably employed, or, in other words, that a country acquires the greatest wealth, and its general prosperity is most advanced, in proportion as its capital and labor are most productive.
It is not less obvious that, if a given amount of capital and labor produces in the same time a less quantity of a certain commodity than could have been purchased with that quantity of another article which might have been produced in the same time by the same amount of capital and labor, there has been a misapplication of such capital and labor, and a national loss equal to the difference between the quantity produced and that which might have been purchased with the proceeds of the same capital and labor otherwise applied.
If the price at which a commodity can be afforded by the person who undertakes to produce it is higher than that at which it may be or might have been purchased from others, the difference of price is the measure of the national loss incurred by his misapplication of capital and labor to the production of that commodity.
With one thousand bushels of wheat, worth $1 a bushel, one thousand yards of cloth of a certain quality may be purchased. If the capital and labor employed, or which might be employed, in producing the thousand bushels of wheat, do, when applied to the production of similar cloth, produce in the same time one thousand yards, there is neither comparative gain or loss in that application of capital and labor. But, if thus applied, it produces only eight hundred yards, there is an actual national loss of two hundred yards, equal to $200 or to two hundred bushels of wheat, since the same labor and capital, if applied to the production of wheat, would have produced one thousand bushels, with which one thousand yards of the cloth might have been purchased.
There is not the slightest difference in the result, whether the cloth, which might have been thus purchased at $1 a yard, was manufactured in the same district where the unfortunate new undertaker resided, or whether it was imported, either from another district of the same country or from a foreign country. In either case, it is again self-evident that the national loss is precisely the same.
If the new manufacturer (making a reasonable profit) can afford to sell his cloth at $1 a yard, it is a proof that there has been no misapplication of capital and labor, and neither comparative gain or loss, in having produced cloth instead of wheat. But if he cannot afford without loss to sell the cloth for less than $1.25 a yard; if he cannot (making a reasonable profit) afford to sell eight hundred yards for less than $1,000; it is certain that the same capital and labor, which might have been applied in producing one thousand bushels of wheat, with which one thousand yards of the cloth might have been purchased, has within the same time produced but eight hundred yards, and that a national loss equivalent to $200, or to two hundred bushels of wheat, has been incurred by this misapplication of the national industry.
The difference between the price at which a manufacturer can afford to sell the whole amount of the commodities produced by him in one year, and that at which the eaine quantity of the same articles may be, or might have been, purchased from others, is therefore equal to the annual national profit or loss resulting from his application of capital and labor to that instead of any other branch of industry.
When the new manufacturer has to compete with others of the same country, or, if there is no duty on imports, with foreign manufacturers, as it is impossible for him to sell cloth of the same quality at a higher price than it can be obtained from others, the loss must necessarily fall on him. This is not the less a public loss on that account. On whomsoever this may fall, a diminution of the quantity or exchangeable value of the commodities which, with the same capital and labor otherwise applied, might have been produced is so much retrenched from what would otherwise have been an accumulation of capital or national wealth.
Although there may be occasional rash undertakings, it is also an indisputable truth, that the immense majority, even of this most enterprising nation, pursues only such branches of industry as are attended with profit. The losing manufacturer, having discovered his error, would not, if let alone, persevere in ruining himself; and such abortive attempts, abandoned in time, would on the whole produce but a comparatively small loss to the community. It happens quite otherwise when from any peculiar circumstances the legislature is unfortunately induced to interfere in the pursuits of industry, instead of confining its care to that of providing by wise laws for the security and equal protection of the personal rights and property of every individual.
If the competition is with foreign merchandise, and the legislature lays on this a duty of 25% ad valorem, the importer cannot afford the cloth which he previously sold at $1 for a price less than $1.25 a yard. The manufacturer at home is thus enabled to sell his at the same price, and by obtaining f 1,000 for the eight hundred yards, to receive the same reasonable profit as at the time may generally be derived from the application of capital and labor in similar pursuits. Since the duty in this instance is not prohibitory, the cloth of that quality which is wanted for the consumption of the country will be supplied in part by the foreign importers and partly by the home manufacturers. On the whole amount, whether foreign or domestic, the consumer will be obliged, so long as there is no general reduction of price, to pay 25% more than formerly. The amount of the additional price thus paid for the foreign cloth being paid by the importer into the Treasury, is only an additional tax, which, as it relieves from the payment of some other tax otherwise necessary, cannot be considered as an actual loss to the community. The additional price paid on the domestic clo.th is equally a burden on the consumer, but being paid not to government but to the manufacturer is an actual national loss. The same loss is incurred in the manufacture of the cloth as if the duty had not been laid; and its only effect is to transfer that loss from the manufacturer to the consumer.
The duty may not always be laid so as to be nearly equal to the difference between the price at which the domestic manufacture can be afforded and that at which a similar foreign article might have been previously purchased.
If the duty is much less than that difference, it is only a fiscal measure, and does not enable the manufacturer to carry on his business. All the cloth of the quality on which the duty is laid will still be imported from abroad, but the additional price at which it is sold is only a tax on the consumer, and being paid to the Government does not amount to a national loss.
If the duty is much greater than that difference, as the domestic article can be manufactured at a price less than the aggregate of the duty and of the price at which the same foreign article might have been purchased previous to the duty, the price will probably be reduced by domestic competition to that at which it can be manufactured and afforded with the ordinary rate of profit. The duty becomes then prohibitory; the whole amount consumed is of domestic manufacture; the consumer still pays the whole amount of the difference between that at which that manufacture can be afforded and that at which the similar foreign article might have been previously purchased, and as no portion is paid into the public Treasury, the whole of that amount is a public loss.
In every case the difference between the former price and that at which the domestic manufacture can be sold with a reasonable profit is to the whole extent of that manufacture a loss to the community. That difference is equal, or nearly equal, on each yard of cloth, to the duty laid on a yard of the similar foreign article, whenever that duty is not too high to prevent partial foreign importations: it is less per yard than the duty, when this is higher than is necessary for the encouragement of the domestic manufacture, and becomes prohibitory; but in this case, the whole amount consumed being of domestic manufacture, the aggregate public loss is greater than when the duty admitted is of foreign competition.
It may be urged that these evils are compensated by extraneous advantages which may accrue to the country from the establishment of manufactures; and as those cannot be indefinite, they should be compared with the national loss which necessarily flows from the restrictive system. It may also be asserted that the price at which the domestic manufacture may be afforded will be lessened by domestic competition, as so that it may not ultimately exceed that at which similar foreign articles might have been previously purchased; and that assertion deserves serious attention. But it cannot be denied that until the price is thus reduced, or unless there are extraneous advantages which compensa'te the difference between the former and the new artificial price, that difference is in the first instance a national loss, arising from what is for the time a misapplication of capital and labor. For, in order to disprove that position, it would be necessary to show that there is in the country a surplus amount of capital and labor which cannot be more profitably employed.
That there is a sufficient amount of capital and labor applicable to manufactures without withdrawing any that was previously actually employed in agriculture, commerce, or mechanical pursuits, is generally true. For though there may be in certain parts of the country instances of that kind, yet considered as a whole, there is not, notwithstanding the numerous recent manufacturing establishments, any diminution in the agriculture, foreign commerce, or domestic exports of the country. Nor is it necessary, in order to explain this state of things, to recur either to an imaginary dormant capital, or to a pretended creation of capitals by banks, or by legislative acts.
The five periodical enumerations of the inhabitants of the United States show a uniform, and not yet diminished increase of population at the rate of near 3% a year. That population which, eighteen months ago, amounted according to the census to 12,856,000, exceeds at this time 13,400,000 souls. The increase is already at the rate of near 400,000 a year. Every year adds 150,000 able-bodied men to the labor of the country. The whole of that population is most enterprising and intelligent, and a great majority engaged in active and profitable pursuits, and continuing to make large annual additions to the capital of the country. Their energy and skill more than compensate the losses arising from an erroneous course of policy, notwithstanding which, and not through which, the prosperity of the country is rapidly increasing. This additional capital and this additional labor are annually applied, the greater part to agriculture, the necessary portion to commerce, the residue to mechanic arts and manufacturing industry.
But the whole of that additional capital and labor would, if there was no legislative interference, be employed in remunerating pursuits; and it is not true that any portion must necessarily be applied to those particular branches which, if not sustained by artificial means, could not, it is asserted, be carried on at all. The duty which enables the manufacturer of commodities of that description to sell his eight hundred yards of cloth for $1,000 instead of $800, does not enable him to produce one thousand yards with the same capital and labor. In order to show that this difference of two hundred yards or dollars is not in the first instance a national loss, it must be demonstrated that the capital and labor thus employed could not have been more advantageously applied in any other branch open to American industry at the very time when, if applied to any unprotected branch whatever, no such loss was experienced.
A state of society may indeed exist, where, owing either to a superabundant population, to over taxation, to a great inequality in the distribution of wealth or in the means of acquiring it, or to any other natural or artificial cause, a portion of an industrious population may occasionally or at all times be in actual want of employment. Of a country thus situated, it may be said that it contains a capability of labor beyond that actually put forth. The symptoms of such a state of things are sufficiently visible; workmen discharged or with reduced wages, asking employment and food, and poor rates given to able-bodied men as a supplement to their insufficient salary. We may understand how in that case a new manufacture — some new channels opened to the national industry — would, by giving employment to the laborer, bring into action an additional amount of labor.
There may also be countries favored with a more genial climate, where the wants being few, and the absolute necessary means of subsistence earned with less labor, long continued misgovernment has created deeply rooted habits of indolence. And such countries may also be said to have a dormant power of labor which a free and wise government might stimulate and put in motion.
The situation of the United States is the very reverse in both respects. The existing rates of wages stimulate industry with a greater force than in any other country; and, as a natural consequence, there is not on the face of the globe a nation encumbered with less indolence or idleness; a population more active, industrious, and, we believe, more productive. This will continue “so long as the cheapness of unimproved land shall offer a certain employment to labor, and so long as the constitution remains free as it is.” If the restriction-ists can find a more powerful cause, some more efficient means to stimulate labor, and render American industry more productive and profitable, it will be a great and glorious discovery. For if it may perhaps be admitted that the national progress in acquiring wealth may be tested by the general rate of profits, there can be no doubt, and the most conspicuous illustration of the fact is found in the situation of the United States compared with that of every other country, that the greatest mass of comfort and happiness is always found where the remuneration of labor is the highest. Should this prove to be one of the obstacles to the establishment of some manufactures, we nevertheless pray that it may long so continue.
It is impossible that the state of the country should have been such as that its capital and labor could not have been more advantageously applied than to branches of industry which, left to themselves, were attended with actual loss, without a corresponding great and sensible diminution in the demand for capital and the wages of labor, neither of which has been felt. So long as those wages suffer no diminution, and so long as those employed in commercial and even agricultural pursuits continue to borrow large capitals at the rate of 6% a year, it is clear proof that those pursuits afford profits at least equal to that rate of interest, and that an application of capital and labor to the production of objects on which, if not artificially protected, a loss is experienced, is not at all necessary.
That by multiplying in any country the channels of domestic industry, a greater scope is given to its application, a market more diversified and less liable to be glutted procured to its products, and a larger field opened to every species of skill and talent, is undubi-tably true. But to direct that industry to unprofitable pursuits which cannot be sustained without exaggerated duties paid by the consumer, and a corresponding national loss, does not open new channels of productive industry, but only diverts it from profitable to unprofitable pursuits to the community. It is truly remarkable that the advocates of the restrictive system should pretend to consider your memorialists as wild theorists, when there cannot be a plainer matter of fact than that if a man pays two dollars more for his coat, his plough, or the implements of his trade, it is a loss to him, which he must pay out of the proceeds of his industry, and that the aggregate of those individual losses is an actual national loss.
If there are any extraneous or collateral advantages arising to the community from the extraordinary protection given to certain special branches of industry, they must be found either in the profits of those employed in those branches, or in the greater productiveness of the labor employed, or in the indirect impulse given to other branches, and in the enhanced value of other products of domestic industry.
It must, in the first place, be observed that we are now examining the loss of the community arising from the difference between the price at which the domestic commodity can be afforded and that at which the similar foreign article might have been obtained. The price at which the domestic commodity may be afforded is the final result of the whole growing or manufacturing process; and as it embraces all the profits made and the wages earned, it necessarily includes every extra profit from whatever cause arising, and particularly that which may be due to any increase of the wages earned by labor or to any diminution of expense derived from any new or more advantageous application of labor. It cannot therefore be said that any presumed collateral advantages derived from any extra profits on the capital, or from any greater productiveness of the labor actually employed in the manufacture of the domestic article, in any degree compensate the loss arising from the difference between the former and the new artificial price.
If, however, the profits of the manufacturers are, by reason of the high duties laid in their favor, greater than the average profits in other pursuits, it is a simple transfer to them of the consumer's property, a flagrant injustice which should, independent of any consideration of a general nature, be immediately corrected by a sufficient reduction of the duty. But although there are exceptions, perhaps more in the case of raw materials than in that of manufactures, it is believed that where there is no monopoly against domestic competition this will be sufficient, ultimately, to reduce the profits of any particular pursuit to its proportionate rate, as compared according to its nature with the profits of other branches of domestic industry.
We are told in reference to the labor employed that the restrictive system is intended and calculated to bring into action a quantity of labor beyond what was previously actually put forth. That immediately employed in the protected branches is shown by the result to be, on the contrary, generally less productive than if applied to other pursuits. Yet there is an exception which in some branches seems to alleviate the evil. The female labor employed in the cotton and woollen manufactures appears from the rate of their wages to be more productive than if applied to the ordinary occupation of women.
It may, therefore, be alleged that the fund out of which they were previously supported (generally the proceeds of the industry of their parents) being thus set free, a greater portion may be accumulated and annually added to the capital or wealth of the country. Or to take another view of the subject: if the labor of one hundred men was necessary to produce a given value of exchangeable commodities, and if that of twenty men and of one hundred and twenty women, whose labor was not previously more productive than that of forty men, may, in a certain manufacture, be substituted to that of the hundred men, and produce an equal value, an additional quantity of productive labor, equal to that of forty men, is put in motion by the manufacture. This additional labor may seem to require a proportionate additional capital to be rendered productive; but whilst there remains a sufficient quantity of rich uncultivated land, there never can be any difficulty in finding remunerating employment for labor.
The actual number of women thus employed cannot be ascertained; but this is less important for the purpose in view than the ratio of the additional labor thus gained by the country to the value of the products of both branches; and of this an approximate estimate may be made. Their wages vary from $2 to $3 a week; and to estimate the difference between this and what might be earned in their usual occupations at $1½a week, or $78 a year, is certainly a large allowance. It appears from an authentic statement that in a nourishing cotton manufactory at Lowell, Massachusetts, where the annual sales amount to $210,000, there are twenty men and one hundred and eighty women employed. The surplus product obtained by the labor of these, beyond what it would otherwise have been, amounts, therefore, to $14,000, or to 6½% of the annual amount of sales. The ratio as deduced in the same manner from the minutes of evidence taken in 1828 by the Committee on Manufactures of the amount of the annual sales and the number and wages of women employed in the Taft, Shepherd, Wolcott, and Pierce's woollen manufactories is 64¼on the annual sales. It does not appear, either from the rate of wages, or from any other circumstance, that the labor immediately employed in any manufacture is, in any other respect, more productive than if applied to other pursuits.
If the protecting system has had a beneficial effect on agriculture or commerce, it must be in reference either to the raw materials of domestic growth employed in the manufactures, or to the supplies for which they give a market, or to the transportation of both, as well as of the manufactured products.
It is obvious that no allowance must be made, in this view of the subject, for the impulse given to the growing of wool, hemp, flax, or any other raw material, which is itself sustained by a high protecting duty. The same reasoning applies to those as to any other protected article, whether of the growth or manufacture of the country, which, since it requires such protection, must be a losing concern if left to itself. If otherwise, the protection is useless, and the additional price arising from the bounty an unjust transfer of the property of one to another class of citizens. But it must, on the other hand, be recollected that the difference of price between the domestic cloth, for instance, and the similar foreign article free of duty, or, what is tantamount, the national loss incurred in the domestic manufacture, embraces both that on the wool or raw material and that on the manufacturing process.
It is otherwise with respect to cotton. The duty on that of foreign origin, which is about 33⅓% on the value, is purely nominal. This is always true in regard to any article of domestic growth or manufacture which is usually and extensively exported. Any commodity which can, in foreign markets where it has no protection, sustain the competition of every similar foreign article will sustain it on still better terms in the home market, and is not protected by the duty, but by its intrinsic superior cheapness or quality. Whatever impulse may have been given to the production of American cotton by the domestic manufactures of that material is therefore a clear gain to the community. This, for the very reason that the amount cannot be calculated with precision, has undoubtedly been greatly exaggerated. But it cannot be doubted that the consumption of cotton goods in the United States has, to a certain extent, been increased by the establishment of the domestic manufacture, and that the fluctuations of price are lessened by having a greater number of markets (in this case one nearer, and so considerable), even though the aggregate of sales was not materially increased.
Your memorialists must, at the same time, observe that these favorable considerations apply to that of the protected manufactures, which, owing principally to its success, receives in fact, at this time, the least protection from the restrictive system. Foreign cotton goods, the prime cost of which exceeds twenty-two cents (or, according to the true par of exchange, about eleven pence sterling) a square yard, pay at this time less than the average duty, which now exceeds 40%. When that average duty shall, by the reduction of the revenue, have been reduced to 25%, those cotton goods, the prime cost of which is less than thirty-five and more than about fifteen cents, would alone be affected by a reduction to that rate of the duty on foreign cotton manufactures. For the duty on'those, the prime cost of which is no more than fifteen cents, is purely nominal; those of domestic manufacture of corresponding prices being at least equal in quality, and in fact exported to a considerable amount.
Manufactures give also a value to certain raw materials which had little or none before; iron works to the ore, paper mills to rags, glass works to ashes; but the cost of extracting or producing most of those constitutes the greater part of the price; and the aggregate surplus value of all is so small, as compared with that of the manufactured article, that it is hardly worth consideration.
But it is principally respecting the increased consumption, by the protected manufactures, of supplies of domestic origin other than the raw materials, and, above all, of breadstuffs and other provisions, that the most exaggerated accounts have been industriously circulated. It might be supposed, from the language held on that subject, that the agricultural interest was exclusively indebted for its prosperity to the restrictive system. We are told of the “invigorated condition of our agriculture in the last three or four years, during which period the value of the labor of the farmer, and with it the value of his land, it is well known, has risen some 20% or 30%,” and that “this augmentation in the value of agricultural labor and capital can be ascribed to no other cause than to the increase of the manufacturing classes, and to the rapid growth of our home market under the protecting system.”
On hearing this, and also that what was equivalent to one million of barrels of breadstuffs was imported every year into the eastern States, we sought for proofs, and find the average price of flour at Philadelphia to have been for the eleven years, 1820 to 1830, —
1820, $4.72 1822, $6.58 1825, $5.10 1828, $5.60 1821, 4.78 1823, 6.82 1826, 4.65 1829, 6.35 1824, 5.62 1827, 5.23 1830, 4.98 —— —— —— —— Ayerage 4.75 6.34 4.99 5.64 Average for the eleven years, $5.49. If it is due to the protecting system that the average of the last three years, as compared with the three immediately preceding, rose from 5% to 5.64%, to what cause must be ascribed the still higher average of 6.34% for the years 1822 to 1824, immediately following the depressed price of 4.75% of the years 1820 to 1821, and before the country was under the magic influence of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828? Was the depression to the average price of $5, during the years 1825 to 1827, the result of the tariff of 1824, or that to the same price, in 1830, of the tariff of 1828?
The enlightened advocates of the protecting system need not be informed that all those fluctuations are exclusively due to the foreign demand; that in a country which always raises what is the equivalent of fifteen hundred thousand barrels of breadstuffs beyond its own consumption, the price depends on the proportion between that supply and the foreign demand; and that that demand will continue to govern the price of the home market, whatever may be the increase of the domestic consumption, so long as such an excess beyond that consumption shall continue to be raised. If there was no foreign demand for that surplus (or for any other article which is now extensively exported), either the quantity raised must be diminished in that proportion, or the price would fall to the very lowest rate at which the produce can be cultivated. Such has been the invariable result in every part of the country too distant from the seaports to participate in the benefit of the foreign market. The enhanced price of breadstuffs and other exportable articles, beyond that minimum, is almost exclusively due to the foreign demand, and not in any perceptible degree to the increase of manufactures. The statement of prices exhibits no other than those ordinary fluctuations in the foreign demand which have at all times occurred, and does not afford the slightest proof of that permanent improvement in the value of agricultural labor ascribed to the protecting system. For the enhanced price which the farmer obtains for any of his products which continue to be extensively exported, he continues to be solely indebted to the foreign market and to commerce.
Not only has not the price been affected, but the absolute quantity of breadstuffs raised in the United States has not been increased one single bushel by the restrictive system, otherwise than by the inducement it may have offered to some skillful artists arid operatives to emigrate. The whole quantity raised is that wanted for home consumption and exportation; that wanted for home consumption is regulated by the amount of population j and to this the protecting system, saving a few more immigrants, has not added a single individual. The uniform rate of increase, demonstrated by the several enumerations, proves, beyond controversy, that no general sensible change has been produced by the increase of manufactures, and that we are indebted to a far more powerful cause for our prosperity.
The answer of one of the advocates of protecting duties to the Committee on Manufactures, respecting the moral and pecuniary condition of laborers, is equally applicable to the unparalleled growth of the population of the United States: “This will continue to be the case so long as this country offers to labor a certain employment, in the purchase of unimproved lands, at a low price, and so long as the constitution of the government remains free as it is.” These are the bases of the true American system; of that system, free of restrictions, which, permitting every man to pursue those occupations for which he was best fitted, had in less than two centuries converted the wilderness into an earthly paradise; and out of a few persecuted emigrants, had created a prosperous, happy, and powerful nation. Under the auspices of that system of freedom, the American people, amidst all the fluctuations and vicissitudes incident to human affairs, had never ceased to make the most rapid progress in agriculture, arts, and commerce. To ascribe that unexampled and uninterrupted prosperity, which even legislative errors cannot arrest, to a tariff is one of the most strange delusions by which intelligent men have ever suffered themselves to be deceived.
But if a sober investigation of facts is substituted to those exaggerated and untenable assertions, all the benefit conferred by manufactures on the agricultural interest at large will be found to consist in having probably lessened, to some extent, the number of those who would otherwise have followed agricultural pursuits, and thereby prevented the production of a greater quantity of breadstuffs and other provisions than might be actually wanted for home consumption and profitable exportation. The effect cannot have been considerable. In many districts there is a sensible diminution of household manufactures, which lessen the apparent advantage derived from the employment, in manufacturing establishments, of female labor. And your memorialists have no doubt that the greater number of the men engaged in the unprofitable branches which have been artificially fostered would have followed some of the other mechanical pursuits which require no special protection.
Supposing, however, that all those employed in the manufacturing establishments have given a new market to the wheat-growing States; what does this amount to, and what is the benefit to the agricultural interest?
Those States have always supplied the eastern States with wheat, flour, and some other provisions; and the question is not, what is the amount now, but what has been the increase? The home consumers of the flour not used by the farmers themselves consist of the inhabitants of all the cities, towns, and villages in the United States, whether commercial, manufacturing, or of any other description. The population of the three great manufacturing eastern States — Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut — amounted, in 1790, to 679,968; in 1800, to 743,365; in 1810, to 811,113; in 1820, to 882,110; and in 1830,1,004,935 souls. The rate of increase during the three first periods was uniform, not varying more than from 8.7% to 9.3% for each ten years. The increase from 1820 to 1830 has been at the rate of 13.9%, or 5% more than the average rate of increase of the three preceding periods. This excess, which amounts to 50,000 souls, is all that can possibly be ascribed to manufactures. Taking even the whole increase during the last ten years, it amounts for the three States to less than 123,000 souls, not one half of whom are consumers of flour, or of any other imported provisions, to any extent; and from those consumers, the increase of Boston, amounting almost to 18,000 souls, and of several other commercial and not manufacturing seaports, should be deducted. Now the increase of population of New York, the inhabitants of which are all consumers of flour, for the last ten years exceeds (including Brooklyn) 84,000 souls. There cannot be the least doubt that the market afforded to the agricultural interest, by the increased population during that period, of the commercial and other non-manufacturing towns and villages of the United States, is far more extensive than that derived from all the manufacturing establishments.
But there is a still more precise mode of ascertaining the extent to which they have promoted the agricultural interest at large. Pursuing the process adopted in estimating the value of female labor, we find that, in the flourishing Lowell cotton manufactory, already alluded to, the board of all the persons employed, at the rate of $1.75 a week for the men, and of $1.25 for the women, amounts to the annual sum of $13,500, or less than 6$% on $210,000, the annual amount of sales. Mr. Pierce states the amount consumed by persons employed in his woollen factory, and their families, exclusive of $7,000 in domestic cotton goods, as followeth: —
Corn, floor, rice, angar, tobacco, and fish,.. $7,500 Other domestic provisions and fuel, ... 5,000 In all $12,500, or about 10% on his annual sales. The average ratio of the board of all the persons employed in the Taft, Shepherd, and Wolcott factories to the annual sales is 11¼%. The average of the whole does not exceed 9%, of which only about one half consists of articles imported from other States. But the benefit to the farmers and to the carriers of that produce cannot certainly amount to 20% upon it The profit of the agricultural interest derived from the cotton and woollen manufacturing establishments cannot therefore exceed, at most, 2% on the annual sales, of which at least one half must be allotted to the farmers in the immediate vicinity; and the residue to the agricultural interest at large of the United States. The manufacture of cast and bar employs, in proportion to the value of the product, a greater number of persons. Admitting, in this view of the subject, the statement of the manufactures to be correct, the gross amount of the articles purchased from farmers is about 30% of the whole value of the product: 20% profit on those articles by the farmer would give him 6% on the annual amount of American iron. In exchange, he pays from 40% to 100% more for that than he would for foreign iron, and, in this case, the benefit derived is confined to the immediate vicinity of the manufacture.
Allowance has been made in this estimate for the profit on the carriage of the provisions consumed by the manufacturing establishments. That on the freight of cotton from the places of exportation to other parts of the United States is not greater than if it had been exported to Europe. That on the carriage of the other raw materials forms but a small item. The profit on the coasting or inland carriage of manufactured articles is the same, whether they are of domestic or foreign origin. A decrease of the tonnage employed in the foreign trade must have taken place, proportionate to that of the imports excluded by the tariff, and of the exports with which those would have been paid for. Any increase which may have taken place in the coasting trade is due to the generally increased intercourse and commerce between the several parts of the United States, to which the increased amount of protected articles, with the exception of sugar, can have contributed but a very small portion, and no greater than would have been gained on the transportation of the same amount which otherwise would have been imported from abroad. There are no data from which the increase of the coasting trade of the three or four last, as compared with that of the preceding, years can be estimated. The total amount of enrolled and licensed tonnage of the United States on the 31st of December, 1828, was stated by the Treasury at 928,772 tons. But this was corrected during the year 1829 by striking out not less than 358,136 tons for vessels lost or condemned in previous years, and not before entered in the treasury books. The true amount at the end of the year 1828 was therefore only 570,636 tons, including about 24,000 tons of steamboats employed on the lakes and inland rivers. But as this enormous difference is the result of omissions accumulated during a series of years, and it is not stated whether a similar correction ever was made before, it only shows that the statements for the preceding years are all erroneous, and that there are no returns published by which to ascertain the annual progressive increase of that tonnage. The return for the year 1789 is incomplete, but that for 1790 is for the whole year, and could not be liable to any accumulated errors. The only fact, therefore, to be relied upon is, that the enrolled and licensed tonnage which at the end of the year 1790 amounted to 132,000 tons had at the end of 1828 increased to 571,000, and at the end of 1829 to 610,000 tons. This increase is by about one third greater than that of the population, and is accounted for, partly by the acquisition of Louisiana and Florida, partly by the vastly increased wealth and intercourse between the several States.
It must be recollected that in this estimate of the advantages arising from the protecting system, those only are now taken into consideration which accrue to the community considered as a whole, and that such as are exclusively enjoyed by any distinct class of society or section of the country must, in this view of the subject, be excluded. The bounty which that system gives to the growers of wool, hemp, and flax is certainly beneficial to them; but this benefit is paid for and falls on the community at large, since that bounty is founded on the admitted or presumed fact, that without it those commodities would not afford a reasonable profit to the grower.
Your memorialists have endeavored to enumerate, and from the materials accessible to them to estimate, as far as practicable those general advantages. They are aware that they have included some which may not be thought of that character, in accordance to the most approved principles of political economy. But they must repeat, that since the necessity of an average duty of 20% to 25% on imports is admitted, it is not necessary for them to discuss abstract questions, but only to show that that duty is amply sufficient to cover all the general advantages which may possibly be ascribed to the restrictive system; and admitting all those of a debatable nature, they have rejected only those which are altogether founded on error and delusion.
It has, it is believed, been satisfactorily shown that the difference between the price at which the domestic commodity protected by a restrictive duty can be afforded and that at which the similar foreign article might have been previously purchased is a national loss, and that the general advantages resulting from the system which may in part compensate for that loss are to be found in the increased productiveness of the female labor employed in some manufactures; in the nearer and perhaps more extensive market opened to the cotton grower, and substituted for one fifth part, as it is asserted, of his crop to the foreign market; and in the very inconsiderable additional home market afforded to the agricultural interest at large.
Those advantages have in every instance been estimated at a higher rate than what your memorialists consider as their real value. They are not found united in any one branch. The advantage derived from a new or better market for any unprotected raw material applies only to the cotton manufacture; that ascribed to the employment of female labor is confined to the cotton and woollen; the iron has none but a greater comparative consumption of agricultural products. They do not in any branch, the cotton perhaps exoepted, amount to 10% of the value of the annual product of the manufacture. But making the most ample allowance for errors or omissions, it is utterly impossible, on any rational and candid calculation, to swell their aggregate value to an amount approaching the national loss, arising from a difference of 20% between the respective prices of the domestic and similar foreign commodity. The duty to that amount is, therefore, more than amply sufficient to cover all those presumed advantages; any higher rate in favor of any favored commodity is, independent of every other consideration, a certain national loss so long as the difference of price corresponds with the rate of duty.
The next question to be examined is, therefore, the effect which the domestic competition arising from the tariff is said to have on prices. But your memorialists must first take notice of a general assertion which, from its nature, cannot fail to have made an erroneous impression on those who may have taken only a superficial view of the subiect.
Every nation takes a laudable pride in all that contributes to elevate its character; in every progress made in science, letters, arts, wealth, and power; in all that constitutes an advanced state of civilization. To substitute American for foreign industry whenever the substitution is advantageous is an object in which all cordially unite. But whether taking advantage of that general and patriotic feeling, or carried away by it, the advocates of restriction contend that a trade in foreign commodities which, without regard to price, might be produced by domestic industry always interferes with that industry. They denounce and would proscribe that trade altogether, and thus in reality inflict the most serious injury on that object which they pretend to protect. Laws which do not trust the common sense of the citizen, which do not permit him to seek what he thinks the best market for the products of his industry, or which compel him to receive in exchange for these a less quantity of the objects he wants than without those laws he might have obtained, are evidently destructive of domestic industry. By free trade we mean that trade which we may carry free of any restrictions imposed by our own government. It is synonymous with free industry, and it is only because, and as far as, it promotes domestic industry that we object to those restrictions. When, in order to justify that system, it is said that nations are adversary to each other, and that a free trade between them would contravene the arrangements of Providence; when it seems to be forgotten that it is commerce which unites the several nations of the civilized world, and that next to Christianity it is principally to commerce that we are indebted for modern civilization, we can but lament the extremes to which enlightened, patriotic, and philanthropic men may be carried by adhering to a favorite theory and losing sight of every other consideration.
Foreign commerce or the exchange of domestic for foreign commodities is of the same nature, and founded on the same principle, as commerce between different parts of the same country or that between individuals of the same district of country. Every individual, district of country, and country acquires wealth in proportion as, with the same capital and labor, the greatest quantity or exchangeable value of commodities is produced. Whence inevitably follows, in every case, the mutual advantage of exchanging articles produced cheaper by one individual for such as are produced cheaper by another, or of exchanging articles produced cheaper at home than abroad for those which may be produced cheaper abroad than at home. The division of labor which increases the skill of every individual in his particular branch is the foundation of the commerce or mutual exchange of commodities between individuals living in the same vicinity. That between different parts of an extensive country or between different countries has its origin in the difference of climate, of capital, of the density or nature of the population, and of long-acquired habits and corresponding skill in particular branches of industry. The causes which give rise to commerce, as well as its advantages or presumed inconveniences, are precisely the same, whether that commerce is carried between different nations or between different parts of the same country. The misapplication of capital and labor has the same effect, whatever may be the cause which enables an individual or a nation to produce a certain commodity with less capital and labor, and to sell it at a lower price than another individual or another nation.
Those truths are too obvious to be denied in direct terms, but they are disregarded; and several allegations are made, tending to show that an unrestricted intercourse between two nations is fatal to one or ruinous to both. 1. We have not been fortunate enough to discover on what principle or by what fact it can be proved that such intercourse “reduces the labor of one to the same scale of compensation with the labor of the other, to the great injury of that nation whose labor stood highest on the scale.”
Wages are one of the elements of the price of commodities; and if higher in a country which nevertheless affords certain commodities at a less price than the country where the wages are lower, there must be a difference in climate, soil, skill, or some other circumstance which produces that result. But in each country the price of labor is determined either by its productiveness or by the proportion between demand and supply in that country, and in no manner whatever by what may be that productiveness or that proportion in any other country, whether there is or is not an intercourse between the two countries. We have heard that Irish laborers, flocking in great numbers to England and Scotland, have by deranging the existing proportion between demand and supply, and by the low rate of wages to which they were used, lowered in certain seasons the price of labor in those two countries; but so long as they remained at home and did not, by transferring their labor to the spot, interfere with that of England, the long-continued intercourse between the two countries never had the slightest effect on the price of English labor, which, varying according to circumstances exclusively belonging to England, has never been reduced to the miserable pittance that hardly sustains, without remunerating, the Irish laborer. This is universally true with respect to every country; the price of labor is in each regulated exclusively by the respective proportion of supply and demand and the state of society. After two centuries of free commerce with Great Britain, and fifty years of a similar intercourse with the rest of the world, the price of labor continues without alteration to be higher in the United States than in England or any other country.
2. The circumstances which may tend to bring forth more labor in the application of capital to certain domestic manufactures than in that of the same capital to other pursuits have already been adverted to; at the same time that it has been shown that the labor employed in highly protected manufactures was nevertheless less productive than if applied to other branches of industry. But it is asserted, and the general impression intended to be made is, that because foreign trade puts in motion foreign, this is done at the expense of American industry, and that, therefore, by prescribing the first this is necessarily encouraged. This would be true if foreign merchandise or any part of the foreign imports was bestowed gratuitously on the United States, in which case the Americans might enjoy the gift without giving any labor in return; but as every article imported must be purchased and cannot be paid for by any possible means other than the product of American industry, it necessarily follows that, whatever may be the amount of imports and of foreign industry by which they may have been produced, an equal value of American products and an equal amount of corresponding American industry is employed by the foreign trade. When a domestic manufacture equally productive as any other pursuit is substituted to the foreign articles, it puts in motion precisely the same quantity of labor, the same amount of American industry, neither more nor less than that which was employed in producing the articles with which the foreign article was previously purchased; the difference consists only in the respective degree of productiveness. The change is advantageous or injurious to the country, as the domestic manufacture may be more or less productive than other pursuits to which the same capital and labor might have been applied. The error of the restrietion-ists consists in not perceiving that the foreign trade promotes two equal amounts of foreign and domestic industry, and in supposing that the American industry, which in the establishment of a new manufacture is substituted to the foreign industry, is an addition to, instead of being a deduction from, the American industry which was or might have been otherwise employed. It is obvious that a certain amount of American industry which was or might have been employed in producing $1,000,000 worth of articles intended for exportation and to be exchanged for an equal value of foreign goods, cannot, if employed in a domestic manufacture of goods of similar nature, be any longer employed in producing the exportable articles; and the only question is, whether that amount of industry is more or less profitably employed in its new than in its former employment.
3. Since the foreign imports must always be paid for with the products of American industry, there must always be a tendency in foreign trade to equalize the respective value of the imports and exports. Though varying from year to year, any debt incurred must ultimately be paid out of the same fund. The imports of the United States during the ten years, 1821 to 1830, have amounted according to the official accounts to $798,630,000, and the exports to $764,803,000. If the amount of bullion and specie imported and exported is deducted, the annual average of imports was $72,948,000, and that of exports $69,327,000. The annual average of exports of domestic produce was $63,221,000. If the re-exportations of foreign merchandise, valued at the same price as that of importation, are deducted from the imports, and about $20,000,000 added to these, on account of the difference between the rate at which British goods are valued by law and that of the exchange between the two countries, the annual average of the foreign articles consumed in the United States will be found to be about $60,000,000, which is an excess of near $7,000,000 beyond the exports of domestic produce. According to the official returns the difference is less than $3,500,000, but the corrections are obviously necessary. The amount of the earnings of American industry by sea, which cannot appear in the statement of exports, must be added to these, since they equally contribute to the payment of the imports. Those arising from the fish which from the banks is carried directly to foreign ports; of the whale and spermaceti oil, sold by the fishing vessels in South America; of the furs collected on the northwest coast and sold in China; and of the freights on the carrying trade, that is to say, on voyages from a foreign to another foreign port, cannot be estimated. But the freight on the $68,000,000 of domestic and foreign articles annually exported from the United States, calculated on the average rates according to the nature of the merchandise and to the ports of destination, exceeds $11,000,000, of which about $9,000,000 are earned by the American navigation. This result, whilst it illustrates the invariable correspondence between the value of the imports and that of the exports, shows also that so far from having been inundated during that period with foreign merchandise beyond the means of payment, the amount of exports, including freight and those items which cannot be ascertained, has certainly exceeded that of the imports. The difference has either been received in precious metals or applied to the payment of a debt previously due abroad, and it is probable that both have taken place. Independent of private remittances on foreign account, the amount of the public debt reimbursed to foreigners appears to have exceeded their investments in other American stocks; and although, according to the official returns, which in that respect are necessarily defective, the amount of precious metals exported would appear to have exceeded by near $2,400,000 that imported during those ten years, it is ascertained that the amount of specie in the banks alone on the 1st of October, 1830, exceeded by more than $7,000,000 the amount at the end of the year 1819.
But though equal or nearly equal to each other during a period of several years, the respective amounts of imports and exports vary considerably from year to year. Imports of any commodity which greatly exceed the ordinary consumption, though affording a temporary advantage to the consumer, are equally injurious to the American manufacturer and regular importer. The example of England shows that manufactures are not exempt from similar fluctuations, and are exposed to the evils of over-production, as foreign trade to that of excessive importation. This partial and occasional evil is inseparable from foreign commerce, and cannot be prevented unless that commerce be altogether proscribed. So long as the protecting duty is not prohibitory, and the corresponding foreign article is not entirely excluded, it may occasionally be imported to excess. It matters not whether the imports amount to $60,000,000, or are reduced by the restrictive system to $40,000,000. The same excess beyond the actual wants of the country will iii either case occasionally take place with respect to any commodity, the whole stock of which on hand happens to be much greater than the existing demand. But much more has been ascribed to that cause than can be sustained by the facts. Whatever may have been the cause of the fall of price of woollen goods in the years 1826 to 1827, as compared with preceding years; whatever may have been the reason why the domestic manufacture was more profitable before than after the tariff of 1824, it appears impossible that either result can have been due to excessive importations. The average annual amount of foreign woollen goods of every description consumed in the United States, amounted for the years 1822, 1823 and 1824, to $9,233,000, and for the three following years, 1825, 1826 and 1827, to $9,045,000. The principal branch of the American manufacture consisted of cloths and cassi-meres. The value of the corresponding foreign goods consumed in the United States during the nine years, 1822 to 1830, was: —
In 1822, $8,342,000 1823, 5,215,000 1824, 4,643,000 1825, $4,900,000 1826, 4,286,000 1827, 4,118,000 1828, $4,207,000 1829, 3,483,000 1830, 2,964,000 It is therefore clear that even the somewhat greater importation of 1825 could not have a greater effect on the prices of 1826 and 1827 than that of 1823 on the prices of 1824 and 1825. Yet to the representations made at the time on that subject we are indebted for the outrageous woollen tariff of 1828. As the real evil complained of arises from over-trading, and may ultimately be traced to abuse of credit, it would seem that the most natural, and the only remedy which the parties interested may have a right to claim, is that the legislature should cease to stimulate the importations at least of the articles most generally imported on foreign account by the credit now allowed for the payment of duties. The foreign manufacturer who sends goods on his own account not in proportion to the wants of the country but to his own, who is willing to run the risk of selling at a loss and on credit the merchandise with which he is encumbered, would be deterred from sending it to America if he was compelled, before he made any sale, to advance in money 25% on the value of that merchandise. According to the present system, if he sells woollen goods for cash, he receives as a loan for ten months without interest a sum equal to at least one half of their prime cost, which enables him to continue to undersell the manufacturer.
4. The laws of foreign nations which prohibit or restrain the sale of the products of American industry operate precisely in the same manner as any natural cause which confines the market of those products within certain limits. By lessening the amount of the exports or of the means of paying for foreign products, the restrictive laws enacted by any foreign nation lessen in the same proportion, not necessarily the imports from that nation, but the gross amount of the imports of the United States. No legislative measure is requisite on their part in order to avert the imaginary evil of an excess of imports over exports. The diminution of the imports is a natural and necessary consequence of the diminution of exports. Unless foreign commerce be considered as a positive evil, which must at all events be annihilated, there is no occasion for passing retaliatory laws which, by still more diminishing the imports, would necessarily have the same effect on the exports. Eetaliatory laws that had that effect would only aggravate the evil, if the restrictions imposed by the foreign laws on American products are admitted to be an eviL They would also be injurious if, by being applied particularly to those nations which had imposed the restrictions, they compelled Americans to purchase elsewhere the commodities which they want, and might have purchased cheaper from those nations. The whole amount of imports equalizes itself with the whole amount of exports. It is not at all necessary that this equality should exist; it never does exist in the trade of any country with every other country. Every one purchases what it does want from that country which affords it on the cheapest terms, and sells its products to those countries by which they are wanted and which give the highest price.
The most zealous advocates of the protecting system do not pretend that their object is to lessen the amount of the American products which, notwithstanding the restrictive laws of other nations, still find a market abroad. They do not say that the cotton of the South, and the surplus of the wheat and other provisions of the middle States beyond what is wanted for home consumption shall not be exported. They intend to give an additional and nearer market to the cotton and wheat grower, but not to deprive them of the foreign market which is still open to them; to supply growing wants for which the lessened exports can no longer pay, and not to increase those wants by preventing foreign nations from paying for the American products which they still wish to purchase. The restrictions imposed by foreign nations do not afford a single reason, though they may serve as a pretense for the adoption of restrictive measures on the part of the United States, which would not equally apply if the exports were reduced by a natural cause. The question still resolves itself into that of public utility, and whether measures intended to promote American industry fulfill that object. If, on the contrary, it is made less productive by the artificial direction given to it than if left to itself, the fact that foreign nations have imposed restrictions injurious to the foreign trade of the United States does not in the slightest degree change the state of the question, and is no reason whatever why a policy injurious to America should be adopted.
This is so true that, whatever their language may have been, the restrictionists have acted on that principle. The regulations of France respecting breadstuffs and tobacco are similar to those of England, and affect the interests of America in the same manner. In selecting for protection cotton and woollen manufactures and iron, and favoring wines and foreign silk manufactures, the sole motive was the belief that the application of American industry to the first objects would be a public benefit, and that it was not at this time adapted to the cultivation of wine and the manufacture of silk stuffs. The protecting duty has always been laid in reference to those branches of industry which were deemed advantageous and not at all to the restrictive measures of any particular foreign nation.
It may also be observed that the State which probably suffers most from the restrictions of foreign nations on its products asks for no special protection. Virginia, is a great wheat-growing and the first tobacco-growing State. The foreign restrictions operate in a far greater degree on tobacco than on any other article, without excepting breadstuffs. There can be no doubt that the consumption of tobacco in Prance and England would be double or treble of what it now is were a free trade in that article, with moderate duties, consistent with their policy. The change in that of France has been peculiarly injurious to the American product. That country before its revolution consumed annually 24,000,000 of pounds of American tobacco instead of 6,000,000, the amount of its present consumption. On the other hand, the effect of the corn laws is much less than seems to be generally apprehended. America has always supplied Great Britain with corn in years of great scarcity, and rarely at other times. Canada does it now at all times, on account of its exemption from laws which operate on the corn of every other country. When the price of wheat in England is 60s. sterling per quarter, and it is supposed that the duty of 20s. is a restriction on the sale of American breadstuffs, it is forgotten that the duty is the very reason which makes the price so high, and that if there was none, the deficiency in quantity would in common years be supplied by the countries on the Baltic, where it is one third cheaper than in the United States, and that the London market would not be much better than that of Amsterdam now is.
There is an exception to the general principle. Retaliatory measures may be resorted to with more or less success, according to circumstances, and as they may be more or less adapted to the object in view, for the purpose of inducing a nation to alter her policy and conduct. In that case such measures are of a temporary nature, and a discussion of their propriety is foreign to the question now under consideration. Had this been the motive the course pursued would have been very different. The commercial conventions would, according to the right reserved, have been abrogated, and the manufactures of the countries in question exclusively taxed or prohibited. But it is believed that the advocates of the protecting system would not hesitate to declare that it is in itself highly advantageous, and to avow that unless convinced of the utility of a modification, they will persevere in the same policy even if all the restrictions of foreign nations on the American trade were revoked.
5. When the general prevalence of the restrictive system and the experience of other nations are appealed to, the appeal is in fact only made to the result of that policy in England. For it is in England alone that the prohibitory system, and a complete success in establishing manufactures generally superior in cheapness or quality, are found united. The only legitimate inference.that can be drawn from her example is that both may subsist together. It would require a much more minute knowledge of the origin and gradual progress of the manufactures in that country than any man does possess to ascertain whether, in what branches, and how far the prohibitive system has promoted or impeded that progress. But if that system was the principal cause which has made Great Britain the first manufacturing country of the world it would have produced similar effects in all the countries where it was adopted, as well as in all the parts of the same country, whilst those which had rejected it would be found destitute of manufactures.
It is quite true that the restrictive or prohibitive system, as a branch of that of monopolies, is of ancient origin, and has been adopted and persevered in for centuries, by most European nations. The only exceptions are perhaps to be found in Holland, which, from her situation and exclusive attention to commerce, followed the opposite course, and in those countries subdivided into states or communities which, like the United States before the adoption of the present Government, could not unite in a general system. The first obvious reflection is, why the result has been so different in different countries? The system appears to have been early adopted in Spain. There is hardly a treaty concluded during the seventeenth century between that country and England, in which there is not a clause for the reduction in her favor of the exorbitant duties laid by Spain on certain manufactures. We need not state what is the situation of that country in that respect. Though of much more ancient origin, it is admitted that the system has rigorously been adhered to in France, from the time of Colbert to this moment, with the single exception of the few years which intervened between the treaty of commerce of 1786 with England, and the wars of the French revolution. France continues to enjoy the same superiority, even over England, in the silk manufacture, which she already had in the time of Colbert; but she is yet unable to compete with her in most other branches. This is evident from the statements of importations into the United States, which afford the best criterion of the manufactures in which each nation may have a real superiority. From France we import silks, objects of taste, and fancy articles, but few or no woollens, cottons, linens, cutlery, or manufactures of leather. And, as pointing out the true cause of success, it may be observed that a country may excel in certain particular branches of the same species of manufacture in which it is in general inferior to its neighbors. Thus, England, inferior to France in every other branch of the silk manufacture, maintains her superiority in that of silk stockings.
Again, the system has not produced the same effect in the different parts of the same country. Manufactures flourish in Scotland as well as in England, whilst those of Ireland continue in a still more depressed state than her agriculture. The central parts of France exhibit a nearly similar inferiority to the northern section of that country; and our southern and even western States, to New England.
Switzerland is one of the few European countries to which the restrictive system has not extended; and is, nevertheless, that which, in proportion to her population is, next to England, the first manufacturing country of Europe. Exposed, like her, to the same revulsions, and to periods of distress, when the channels of superabundant manufactured products are obstructed, Switzerland, unprotected by any duties whatever on foreign merchandise, beside certain branches belonging particularly to her, rivals England in the cotton, and France in the silk manufacture.
If these observations do not prove that the restrictive system may not, in some instances, accelerate the establishment of manufactures, they show conclusively that a tariff acts, at best, but a very secondary part, and that there are some other causes far more efficient in promoting domestic industry. A sufficient capital and a certain density of population are necessary requisites; and agriculture will, in preference to manufactures, attract labor in countries or districts where virgin land is abundant and within the reach of all. But a single glance at the map of Europe will satisfy every intelligent observer that the great superiority of some over other countries, in other respects equally fitted for manufactures, is due to the nature of the government, to. laws which at least secure to men the proceeds of their industry, to liberty, or at least comparative liberty, and to the diffusion of knowledge, and superior intelligence, skill, and activity, the infallible offspring of unrestrained industry, and of political, religious, and civil liberty.
We may also, before we dismiss this branch of the subject, and in order to rebut those general assertions of the ruin that attends all nations which rely, in any considerable degree, on foreign trade for a market, appeal to that which we know best, which we have seen and enjoyed, — to the experience of North America. Assisted only by the ordinary mechanical arts, and with hardly any manufacturing establishments, America, during two centuries, relied almost exclusively on the cultivation of her soil, and on the exportation of its products to foreign ports; and her progress during that period, in population, wealth, and all the arts of civilization, as well as in the general diffusion of knowledge and happiness through all the classes of society, stands unparalleled in the annals of mankind. A change of circumstances may induce a partial and gradual alteration in the pursuits of her citizens, and we may rest assured that, if not diverted by legislative interference, they will, as heretofore, embrace those best adapted to their situation.
Since the national loss, produced by high duties on importations, consists of the difference between the former and the new artificial price, the evil will cease whenever the product of the protected domestic manufacture can be afforded, and is sold at the same price as the similar foreign article, free of the protecting duty. The advocates of the restrictive system insist that this is the natural and necessary consequence of the protecting duty, and is produced by the domestic competition.
It must be observed, in the first place, that domestic competition can have no effect either on the wages, the price of the raw materials, or that of provisions, of machinery, or of any other article necessary for the manufacturing process. It can operate, immediately, only on the rate of profits; and, since their insufficiency is the reason for granting the protecting duty, its first effect is to raise them. Domestic competition may afterwards reduce them to a rate corresponding with those of other pursuits, but after they have been reduced to the lowest possible rate, the price of the protected commodity cannot be lessened, otherwise than by a corresponding diminution in the cost of producing it. A reduction of the price of labor, or of the raw material, are circumstances independent of the tariff, and over which the manufacturer has no control. Towards reducing the cost of producing the commodity, competition can have no effect, but in as far as it may stimulate improvements in the manufacturing process; and for this there must be a sufficient motive.
Secondly, competition does not even reduce profits to their lowest rate, unless the supply of the domestic commodity is equal to the wants of the country. Whenever, and so long as, this is not the case, a monopoly is created, which will be attended with all its usual consequences. If, instead of an elevated rate of duty, the similar foreign article is altogether prohibited, the exorbitant price of the domestic commodity is checked only by the lessened demand for it. That price is limited by that at which the foreign article can still be purchased, and by that alone, when the importation is not prohibited, but only charged with a heavy duty. Improvements, tending to lessen the cost of production, may, in that case, still be introduced by the manufacturer for his own benefit; but the price of the domestic commodity will, nevertheless, be exclusively regulated by that at which the similar foreign article may be obtained.
It is, therefore, only when the supply of the domestic manufacture is, or may within a very short time be made, equal to the full demand of the country, that domestic competition may reduce the rate of profits, and ultimately the cost of production. It cannot be doubted that, when the competition is with foreign articles, the necessity of introducing the improvements requisite for that purpose is much greater than when it is only between the American manufacturers. When the manufacture is already established at the time of laying the protecting duty, the improvements which may afterwards take place would have been introduced at least as early, if the restrictive system had not existed; and there may be instances where the duty prevents or retards the adoption of such improvements.
But a reduction of price is, in no case whatever, due to the tariff, so long as the similar foreign article can still be imported, and the price of the domestic commodity is not reduced below that at which the foreign is sold. Under those circumstances, the reduction is clearly due to a fall in the price of the foreign article, and is altogether independent of the tariff. If, in any instance, the price of the domestic article has, immediately after the tariff, fallen below the price at which the foreign article could, thenceforth, be imported, it only proves that the duty was higher than was necessary for the ostensible object in view. The price must fall as law as that at which the foreign article might have been purchased prior to the protecting duly, before the national loss caused by it ceases. It is only then that the domestic manufacture proves successful and beneficial to the consumer, and to the community at large.
Coarse cotton goods are the only protected branch which comes within that description, and the causes of the fall of price, which operated almost simultaneously in England and America, are notorious and acknowledged. They cannot be better expressed than in the words of one of the manufacturers (Mr. Dexter) examined before the Committee on Manufactures in 1828. “It is owing to the improvement in machinery, the reduced price of raw cotton, and the increased skill in the manufacture.” The reduction in the price of the raw material was solely due to the increased supply compared with the demand. The manufacture was already firmly established before the year 1816. As early as the year 1810, there were north of the Potomac fifty mills for spinning cotton in operation, and twenty-five more that went into operation the ensuing year. The weaving business had commenced, but was not so far advanced. Under those circumstances, the improvements in machinery and the gradual acquisition of skill would have infallibly taken place with the common average duty, which was, at that time, about 33% on the value. It is at least doubtful whether the favorable result was hastened by the tariff of 1816, which gave a protecting duty of six cents and a quarter per yard, amounting to 62½% actual, and equivalent to 52% nominal duty ad valorem on the prime cost of the cheapest India cotton goods at that time imported.
A similar fall of price, and owing to the same causes, took place in England notwithstanding the partial competition of East India goods. It is well known that the returns of the official value of British exports, having been fixed long ago, and never been changed, represent the quantities, as the returns of the declared show the actual value of each species of merchandise. The official value of cotton goods exported amounted, in 1814, to £16,535,528, and in 1827 to £21,445,565 ttg. The declared value for those two years, was £17,241,884, and £10,522,357, respectively; but the true value for the year 1814 was, on account of the depreciated currency, only £14,655,601. Whilst the quantity had, during that period of thirteen years, increased near 30%, the value had decreased more than 28%, or, in other words, the price of cotton goods had fallen near one half.
The suggestion that this fall in Great Britain was in any degree due to the competition with the American article, is quite groundless, since it was the result, partly, of the fall in the price of the raw material which operated at the same time on both countries, principally to improvements which originated in England, and were subsequently adopted in America. It would be still more preposterous to ascribe the fall of price in the foreign article to American competition, with respect to such as to iron and sugar, of which we export none, and import greater quantities than heretofore. Omitting the years 1813 to 1816, during which the annual average consumption of imported sugar was, by reason of the war, reduced to little more than forty millions of pounds, the annual average quantities on which the duty was actually collected appear, by the Treasury returns, to have been: —
For the seven years, 1799–1805, . . . 52,730,000 For the seven years, 1806–1812, . . . 54,450,000 For the seven years, 1817–1823, . . . 57,630,000 For the seven years, 1824–1830, . . . 64,440,000 We have imported less than if we had not had the Louisiana sugar, but actually more since than before. Louisiana has only supplied our growing wants, and has left the foreign market, so far as the United States were concerned, in the same situation as heretofore. It is the same with respect to iron, to which we will soon advert.
We will only observe here, that the decline of price in the Pittsburg iron, which cannot be ascribed to that of the foreign article, is also independent of the tariff. The iron works of west Pennsylvania were, and still continue to be, protected against foreign iron; and that made within one hundred miles of the seashore, by the expense of transportation, which is still $40, and prior to the last war amounted to $80 a ton. Considerable fortunes were made by the owners of the establishments which were directed with skill, frugality, and a sufficient capital; but there being no competition, the iron was dear, and of inferior quality. The price of transportation was greatly diminished some time after the peace, and the Juniata iron, of a superior quality, was brought to Pittsburg, at the expense of $30, and sold for $100 to $120 a ton. This, united with unfavorable circumstances under which the western country then labored, prostrated the iron works for a while. But there was no intrinsic impediment; and with more experience, by the partial application of coal and various other improvements, the iron business has been revived, and the price of iron, of much better quality than formerly, reduced to about ninety dollars. The competition of the Juniata iron operated, in this instance, in the same manner as if it had been of foreign origin. Had it not been for it, the iron of west Pennsylvania would neither have been improved in quality, or have declined in price. And this effect has been produced without the slightest assistance from the tariff, or any other cause, with the same competition to encounter, and through no other means but a judicious application of skill and enterprise.
The only effect that can possibly be ascribed to a protecting duty is that of encouraging the establishment of manufactures which would not otherwise have existed, or of inducing a greater number of persons to embark in those already existing. The propriety of the duty depends altogether on the probability of speedy success, that is to say, of the manufacture being so far adapted to the circumstances of the country that, after having been assisted by the duty in surmounting the first difficulties incident to every new undertaking, it will be able to sustain itself, and without such assistance to compete with the foreign article. It has been clearly shown that the manufacture is otherwise a losing concern, productive of national loss.
This leads to the important distinction between a permanent and a temporary protecting duty; the first imposing a perpetual tax for the purpose of perpetuating a continued public loss, the other proper only when the prospect of speedy success is nearly certain. For if necessary to be continued for a long while, the loss continued for a period of years may be greater than the object is worth; and it would have been much wiser to wait till the country was better prepared for commencing the manufacture. The question is, how the Legislature, on subjects so complex, is to decide whether there is a probability that the result will in a short time be favorable? We answer, first, that whenever the application is for a gradually increasing instead of a decreasing rate of duties, it is a complete proof that the applicants wish a permanent and not a temporary duty; secondly, that whenever the protecting duty required is exorbitant, this likewise clearly proves that there is not any expectation of a speedy favorable result. It is clear that the protection required must be proportionate to the difficulty of establishing the manufacture, and that the country is better prepared for those which require the least protection. A moderate and uniform duty will naturally encourage these, without the necessity of any special legislative interference, whilst those alone will be postponed which, for the very reason that they require a higher protection, ought not yet to be attempted. Instead of an artificial and precarious system, the progress will be natural, steady, and permanent. The charges on imported articles vary according to their nature, are seldom if ever less than 10%, and sometimes amount to 20%. A general duty of 20% added to those charges would give an actual protection of 30%, much greater than that under which all the usual mechanical arts have been firmly established in the United States; greater than is asked by several branches now suffering under the present partial system, and amply sufficient for the encouragement of any manufacture which there is any probability of establishing successfully within a reasonable time. The duty of 30% substituted in England to the entire prohibition of foreign silk stuffs has, notwithstanding the clamors of those interested, promoted, instead of injuring the British manufacture; and Mr. Hamilton, so often quoted, never proposed a protecting duty of 15% ad valorem.
It has been correctly observed that with the exception of the silk and some thread manufactures, the boasted departure by Great Britain from the restrictive system is nominal, since the former high duties on articles which she affords cheaper than any other country were entirely useless. The reduction of a prohibitory to a duty of 15% proves at least that the price of the domestic article was actually reduced to a rate that did not fear foreign competition. But there is a glaring contradiction between the assertion “that nine tenths of the American people who do not affect foreign luxuries and fashions may be clothed with woollen, cotton, fur, and leather fabrics of their own country better and cheaper than either could have been obtained abroad if the tariff had never been enacted,” and the pertinacity with which the restrictionists oppose the repeal or modification of the high duties imposed precisely on the coarsest woollen and cotton fabrics which are worn by nine tenths of th.e people.
Having examined the restrictive system in reference to the country at large, and considered as a whole, your memorialists will now call the attention of your honorable body to its effects on the various classes of society and different parts of the Union. But they will confine themselves to its most prominent features, and to the most important of the protected branches of industry; and for further details, they beg leave respectfully to refer to the expositions now prepared, or being prepared, by some amongst themselves who have undertaken to collect the facts, and will lay them before Congress.
It is not our intention to discuss the effect produced on the persons employed in large manufacturing establishments. The owners are entitled to much credit for their attention to the comfort, morals, and education of those who are placed under their care. We only contend that there is nothing in that respect which should induce the Legislature to divert the people in general from other pursuits to that of being employed in a manufacture. Operatives in America stand in the same relation towards their employers as those of similar establishments in other countries. The only difference consists in the higher rate of wages they receive; and for that they are not indebted to the manufactures, but to that great cause already often alluded to, and the effect of which is acknowledged by the advocates of the protecting system when they say “that the peculiar advantage of the United States consists in the abundance and cheapness of fertile lands, affording an easy subsistence and high remuneration to labor.” And they might have added that this is the circumstance which keeps up that high remuneration even in those parts of the Union where lands have acquired the highest value. Industry should be perfectly free and every one left at liberty to select that pursuit which in his opinion will most contribute to his happiness. A comparison might nevertheless be drawn between the respective situations, at the end of thirty years, of the working men who have availed themselves of the natural advantages offered by the facility with which the rich unimproved lands of America may be acquired, and of those who have attached themselves to a manufacturing establishment.
But the restrictive system is in every instance injurious to those branches of industry which do not want special protection, and often operates even against the protected manufactures. That system, when artificially enhancing the price of those commodities which are the product of such manufactures, necessarily enhances also the price of the products of every other branch of industry or depresses that of labor. It is clear that the mechanic who pays $20 more for the implements of his trade, the necessary clothing of his family, and the sugar it consumes, must either enhance the price of the products of his industry in the same proportion, or receive so much less for his labor. The nominal wages of the journeyman and of the laborer do now remain the same; whilst the true price of their labor, the compensation they actually receive, has been lessened to an amount precisely equal to the enhanced price of the necessary articles they must purchase. The evil increases as, in order to remove complaints and render the system popular, it is extended to a greater number of branches, and affects in the same manner the protected manufactures by either increasing the cost of production or lessening the real wages of the workmen.
This substitution of nominal for real wages is proved by the evidence taken in 1828 by the Committee of Manufactures. Several of these, and particularly the woollen manufacture of Steubenville, appear to have been sustained by the retail sales of foreign goods connected with the establishment; and the principal profit of the owners to have consisted in that which they made on the goods with which they paid their workmen, and the provisions and other supplies purchased from the farmers. This was a very natural and legitimate process; but it is remarkable that the means used to substitute, as is said, domestic for foreign industry, should have been a much more extensive sale of foreign commodities than would otherwise have taken place.
In trying to reconcile a majority of the people to the system, and for the purpose of obtaining still greater protection, the advocates of restrictions have altogether departed from a principle, the soundness of which is admitted by all, and by none more than by those who would sacrifice every other interest to that of certain favored manufactures. In the face of the example and of the experience of other nations, so strenuously appealed to, they have attempted to promote manufactures, by laying high and sometimes prohibitory duties on the raw materials, — in one instance on that of the very manufacture which was the particular object of their solicitude, in others with a total disregard for the branches which depended on the taxed material.
By the tariff of 1816, a duty of 6¼cents was laid on every square yard of cotton goods, the prime cost of which did not exceed 25 cents; and as the average rate of duties was then about 35%, it was only on goods under 18½cents that the average rate was exceeded. But the law at the same time recognized the principle, that a protecting duty should be temporary; and it was accordingly provided that the minimum should at the end of three years be reduced from 25 to 20 cents, or, in other words, that the duty per square yard should then be reduced to 5 cents on all goods the prime cost of which was less than 20 cents. As if to show that the object is to lay perpetual protecting duties, or a perpetual tax on the community, without any expectation that the price of the protected commodity will be reduced, the provision has in several instances been reversed, and an increasing instead of decreasing scale of duties been adopted. If a duty of $35 per ton was sufficient in order, for instance, that American might compete with foreign flax, no provision should have been made for gradually raising the duty to $60. If a duty of $60 was requisite for that purpose, there could be no expectation that the flax-grower would gratuitously lose money by raising the commodity before that duty was in force. If there was an avowed want of information on the subject, it would have been a wiser course to wait till it had been obtained.
In regard to the manufactures of cotton, it has already been observed that the minimum now raised to 35 cents, instead of being reduced to 20, according to the act of 1816, is the only objectionable provision. This is a duty of 8¾ cents on every square yard, when the prime cost is less than 35 cents. The duly is nominal in reference to most of the goods under 15 cents, which not only are afforded as cheap by the American manufacturer as the foreign article, but compete with this in foreign markets. Reduced to a duty ad valorem, it decreases on goods costing more than 15, and under 35 cents, from about 60% to 25%. We are not informed that any progress has been made since 1828, when this protecting duty was raised from 7½to 8¾cents a yard in the domestic manufacture of unmixed cotton goods within those prices. The mixed stuff called sattinett appears from its price to be protected only by the general duty of 25%, and yet no foreign article is imported that competes with it. The manufacture owes less to protection, and nourishes more than any other favored branch; and it does not affect injuriously any other manufacture, otherwise than by the beneficial substitution, in many instances, of cheaper for dearer articles. We do sincerely believe that the repeal of the minimum would not affect it, and that the average duty of 25% added to the charges on the importation would give it all the protection which the manufacturers ought to desire.
The important objects more particularly objectionable, are: —
Hemp, flax, and some of the manufactures of hemp and flax.
Iron, particularly rolled iron, and a few branches of the manufactures of iron.
Wool, particularly of species coarser than any native wool of the United States, and the woollen manufactures embraced by the system of minimums.
Sugar, salt, and coal.
The small quantities of American hemp which are brought to the Atlantic seaports are now sold at about $150 per ton. The prime cost of the best Russia hemp, delivered on board, is about $130. The subsequent charges amount to at least 18%, and it cannot be delivered in America, free of duty, under $154; the duty is now $60 per ton, or more than 46% on the value. It sells for about $220. The American hemp is fit for the manufactures of common rope and cotton bagging; but, either from the effect of climate, or rather, as is generally believed, from its being dew-rotted, it is totally unfit and is never used for cables or any species of cordage which may come in contact with sea-water. Notwithstanding the heavy duties, equivalent to more than 80% on tarred and 95% on untarred cordage, about 800 tons of that foreign article are still imported. The duty on the raw material has deeply affected the domestic manufacture, and operates as a heavy tax on the shipping interest, without affording, in that respect, any benefit to the American hemp grower.
The duty of 5 cents a yard, equivalent to 50% on the value of cotton bagging, is of the same character. Near 700,000 yards of the foreign article are still imported; substitutes made of cotton or tow have been introduced, and the domestic manufacture is seldom if ever used in the Atlantic States. Cotton bagging is exclusively used, and is absolutely necessary for the purpose of packing cotton for exportation. With respect to that which is shipped to foreign ports, the duty operates precisely as a tax on exports.
Your memorialists are averse to any duty on the importation of raw materials; but if continued, the average duty of 25% ad valorem, or the equivalent specific duty of about $32 a ton on hemp, giving, together with the charges on importation, a protection of near 45%, to the hemp grower, would enable him to compete with the foreign article in every manufacture for which it is fitted, and continue to secure to him the market for cotton bagging, in the district of cotton country adjacent to those where hemp is raised. As a matter of course, the duty on cordage should be reduced to the same rate.
The duty on flax is a still more gratuitous and unnecessary tax. That of American growth is well fitted for all the common fabrics and uses to which it has heretofore been applied; and its comparative cheapness had always prevented any foreign competition in that respect. But it is totally unfit for the manufacture of sail duck; and it was for this purpose that Russian or other foreign flax was imported. The prime cost of that of Eussia generally exceeds $133 a ton, and the charges are the same as on hemp. The duty is now $50 a ton, equivalent to 37½% ad valorem, and it is to be raised to $60, or 45% on the prime cost. The existing duty has been sufficient to reduce the importation to less than three hundred tons. Its only effect has been to affect most injuriously, the domestic manufacture of sail duck, and the shipping interest. Notwithstanding the corresponding duty of about 40% ad valorem, the value of the sail duck imported during the year 1830 amounted to near $320,000, and that of the flax to less than $40,000; and all the ships trading to foreign ports use, as far as practicable, the foreign article. The attempt to apply to that purpose the American flax has been a complete failure, and the duty confers no benefit on the grower.
The manufacture of cast and bar iron was one of the few which had been established in America, under the colonial Government. It owed its origin to the destruction of the English forests, and the abundance of wood in America. The price of bar iron is stated to have been at that time $64 a ton, and to have risen to about $80 in the year 1790. The application of bituminous coal, and other improvements in the manufacture, have produced a revolution, which has increased the annual quantity of malleable iron made in England from seventy to more than six hundred thousand tons, and has enabled her to sell the various descriptions of the species called “rolled iron” at a lower price than that at which any species whatever can be afforded anywhere else. Notwithstanding the acknowledged superiority of that of Eussia and Sweden for certain purposes, the cheapness of the British manufacture has lessened the demand for that of every other country, and seems ultimately to have affected the price of every species. Although it had not, in 1816, been yet reduced to its present rate, Congress was induced to raise, by the tariff of that year, the duty on rolled iron from 15% ad valorem, to a specific duty of $30 a ton, equivalent at that time to about 67% on the value. This was again, in 1828, raised to f 37 a ton, which on account of the progressive fall in the price of that article, is now equivalent, according to the official statement of imposts for 1830, to an average duty of 113½% on the value of the whole amount of the different qualities of that species which are imported into the United States. The specific duty of $9 a ton, laid in 1816, on hammered or Swedish and Russian iron, did not exceed the former rate of 15% ad valorem. It was raised in 1818 to $15, in 1824 to $18, and in 1828 to $22.40, which is equivalent to a duty of 40% ad valorem.
It appears that, notwithstanding those high duties, the importations either of bar iron, or of the total amount of the manufactures of which it is the principal material, instead of being lessened, have gradually increased. The imported quantity of some of the protected branches of those manufactures has diminished; but the whole quantity imported has increased in a still greater ratio than appears by the Treasury statements. These, for the articles paying duties ad valorem, and which constitute nine tenths of the whole, give only the value, which has decreased in a ratio in some degree corresponding with the fall of the price of British iron. The annexed table shows the annual average of the quantities of bar iron, and of the value of hardware, and other manufactures of iron, respectively, consumed in the United States (deducting the exportations from the importations), for each of the periods therein mentioned.
Years. Rolled Iron. Hammered Iron. Manufactures of Iron. 1The quantities for 1817–1820 are those on which the duties were paid, deducting: drawbacks. The value of the manufactures of iron for those years is not distinguished. Tons;. Tons. DoUart. 1817–1820 2.2371 16.8871 Not ascertained. 1821–1824 4,212 23,162 2,600,000 1826–1827 5,400 22,650 3,630,000 1828–1880 6,450 31,000 8,660,000 It is difficult to estimate the progress made in the domestic manufacture, during those fourteen years, and the quantity of cast and bar iron now annually made in the United States. In a statement lately made by persons interested in the manufacture, the whole amount of bar is calculated at 112,000 tons, and the aggregate value of both cast and bar at more than $13,000,000; but the quantity of bar iron, taken from actual returns, is less than 50,000 tons, and the residue is an estimate derived from the number of furnaces of which no returns had been obtained. Taking as a basis the returns of the marshals in the year 1810, by which it appears that the quantity of bar iron then made in the United States did not exceed 27,000 tons, and admitting that the increase must have been in the compound ratio of the increase of population, and of the diminution of price, the amount now made should be from 60,000 to 70,000 tons. This is, however, a question, which, from want of authentic materials, we shall not pretend to discuss. But supposing the quantity to be such as has been represented, the estimated value is too high. At the rate of $85 for the bar iron, and of $50 for the castings, the aggregate value would not exceed $11,275,000. Those who ascribe to the tariff the fall of price ought to calculate the value according to that fall, and not according to the price of iron before it took place.
Iron is a commodity too heavy to be transported-beyond a certain distance. It has already been observed that the transportation from the seaports to Pittsburg costs f>40 a ton. The country west of the Alleghany mountains is not supplied with foreign iron; and, with the exception of the small quantities brought from the nearest works on the east side, must, for that article, depend on its own resources. In examining the effect of those duties, either on the home manufacture, or on the consumer, the quantity of iron made in that section of the country, and in several other remote districts, which simply supply themselves, must be deducted. The quantity and price of the imported iron can have no effect but on those districts along the sea border, and within a certain distance from it, where it can be carried, and comes in competition with the domestic manufacture.
We have not been supplied with sufficient data to form an estimate of the quantity of American which thus competes with foreign iron. But we know with precision the amount imported; and so far as relates to quantity, the only fact fully established is, that, notwithstanding the exaggerated protecting duties which they have obtained, the Atlantic iron masters have not been able to supply the wants of the country, and that, so far from effecting this object, there has been a progressive increase in the importation of both bar iron and manufactures of iron. Whether the quantity which they do supply is equal to double or treble of that which is imported does not materially affect the result, in reference either to agriculture, commerce, or the various and important manufactures of which iron is the material. So long as large quantities of foreign iron are imported, the price of the domestic manufacture has not fallen lower than the amount of the protecting duty, added to the price at which the foreign article might be obtained if that duty had not been laid; and the difference in price, which constitutes a national loss and is paid by the consumer or manufacturer, is precisely equal to the amount of that duty. If that duty was reduced $10 per ton, the foreign iron would most undoubtedly be purchased $10 cheaper than it now is.
In order to repel that obvious fact, the parties interested have been compelled to assert that the fall of price which has taken place in foreign iron is due to the tariff. They insist that the effect of that measure was to cause a decline in the price of American iron, and that the foreign iron masters were thereby compelled to reduce the rate of their previous enormous profits, in order to be able to sell their iron in America. They go still farther, and assert that no sooner had the tidings of the tariff of 1828 reached England, than the owners of forges and furnaces determined, rather than lose the American market, to lower the price of their iron, at first $4 and then $8 per ton. The annual quantity of British bar iron imported into America during the six preceding years did not amount to 6,000 tons, worth at that time $260,000. The total amount made in Great Britain exceeded, at that time, 600,000 tons; so that the British iron masters, rather than lose the profit they might make on a sale of $260,000, must have determined, by a general reduction of $8 a ton, to incur at once a loss of near $5,000,000 a year. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. If even the decline of price had commenced in America, it is impossible that any differences affecting the sale of 6,000 tons could have any effect on the price of a mass of iron amounting to 600,000, and annually increasing. But no fact is better ascertained than that of the gradual — and, with the ordinary fluctuations incident to trade, continued — fall of the price of British iron. It must be remembered that the tariff of 1828 made no change in the rate of duty on the Swedish and Russian. We are less acquainted with the causes of the fall in their price. The most obvious is the great supply furnished by England to those nations that have not, like France and the United States, prohibited or heavily charged her iron, and which must have necessarily lessened the demand for the dearer article imported from the Baltic.
The supposition, that the decline of the price of American, instead of being the necessary result, was the cause of the fall of the price of Baltic, and even British iron, rests, besides, on another supposition, to wit, that the tariff did, immediately, and even before any new works had been erected, produce the fall in the price of American iron. This needs no elaborate refutation; but we may be permitted to ask an explanation.
In the beginning of the. year 1828, when American iron sold at $100 in our seaports, the American owners of forges and furnaces declared themselves unable to compete at least with British iron. Now the importation of neither that or any other of foreign origin had lowered for a number of years the sale of theirs below that rate; and it is evident that, in asking for further protection, their object was not to cause a fall in the price of their commodity, which, according to all their statements, they could hardly afford at that rate. It was on that account that the additional protecting duty of $7 on rolled iron was granted, although at the then existing rate of duty, the interference of that species did not amount to 6,000 tons a year. The price of the same American iron has now sunk, for near two years, in our seaports, to $85 a ton. With this diminution the iron masters are satisfied; the business, as they say, has increased 25%, and new works are being created everywhere. During that time, neither the price of labor, charcoal, provisions, or other supplies, has been diminished. To what cause, then, is the fall of price to be ascribed? We have heard of no improvement made in the manufacturing process in the charcoal country; but whether this has taken place or the profits have been reduced, it is equally clear that this might have been voluntarily done without the additional tariff, and has been done because the tariff had no effect on the importation, and was forced on the iron masters by the unexpected fall of price in the British and other foreign iron.
We need not dwell on the injustice and mischievous effects of an exaggerated duty on an article of such general use as iron. It falls upon the farmer, the mechanic, the shipping interest, and on every branch of the iron manufacture, those few excepted which have been embraced by the partial protecting system; and it operates, in the most unequal and unjust manner, on those parts of the country which have no iron of their own, and might be supplied on cheaper terms under a rational system of moderate duties. The only reason why the extravagant duty is not universally opposed is because the tax thus laid on the agriculturist and the mechanic is spread over such an extent of country, and falls upon so many, that the amount paid by each, levied as it is indirectly and in small portions at a time, is not generally understood. Those who do understand and feel it have not individually a sufficient interest in the result to induce a general and efficient combination. The law has created a monopoly in favor of the owners of beds of ore, who, unable to supply the wants of the country, will not permit it to be supplied from other quarters. They may easily combine, and their interest, when compared with that of the mechanics and scattered agriculturists, has, here as elsewhere, been found too powerful. This is so true that when an equally or more powerful interest was opposed to theirs they were obliged to yield, and the importation of iron intended for railroads was permitted under the moderate duty of 15%. We approve this measure as being founded on the best interests of the country. We only ask that the same principle be applied to the community at large. There is no other difference between this case and that of agriculture, or any other important branch of industry, than that, in one case, the amount of the tax, presented as a whole, made its pernicious effects at once visible, whilst divided, in the other, amongst 50,000 individuals, the aggregate, though equal in amount, does not attract notice.
The injurious effect which the duty has on the numerous mechanics employed in the various manufactures of iron has been so ably and forcibly exposed in their representations to your honorable body, that we have nothing to add on that subject; but, as we beg leave respectfully to refer to their memorials, we must do it with one exception. So far as we are informed, we are induced to believe that they have overrated the quantity of iron contained in the hardware imported into this country, — an error which, if it is one, does not weaken their arguments respecting the main question at issue. The leading facts are, that amongst the foreign manufactures imported into the United States, hardware, cutlery, and all others of which iron is the material, are exceeded only by those of cotton, woollen, and silk stuffs; and that the prime cost of the quantity annually consumed amounts to $3,500,000, whilst that of the bar iron imported from England, whence the manufactures of that metal are almost exclusively imported, does not amount to $240,000. Whatever may be the quantity of bar iron used in the manufacture of the hardware and other articles thus imported, it interferes equally with American bar iron, whether imported as a raw material or in its manufactured state. If the quantity thus used does not, as is asserted, exceed 9,000 tons, the prime cost of which is less than $350,000, the duty which prevents its importation arrests the progress of those branches of industry which would otherwise convert that raw material into manufactured articles, worth $3,500,000. The working men, who are able and willing to apply their labor to this highly desirable and truly profitable object, do not ask your honorable body for any extraordinary protection, but only that the impediments arising from an extravagant protecting duty on the raw material may be removed. There cannot be a stronger illustration of the effect produced by the restrictive system in arresting the natural progress of American industry, and diverting it from profitable to unprofitable pursuits. The remedy proposed by the restrictionists, like that of those legislators who never can find any other for the prevention of crimes than to multiply the number of offenses for which capital punishments shall be inflicted, is to extend what they call protection to those who suffer under the pernicious effects of their system. They simply propose to aggravate the evil and to increase the amount of the national loss, and of the tax paid by the consumers, by converting that branch of industry which can sustain itself and would prosper, were it not for their interference, into another privileged manufacture, which must be supported at the public expense, and could not then supply the wants of the country.
The average prime cost of the hammered iron imported during the year 1830 was, according to the treasury statements, $57 a ton, or $7 less than the average price of the five preceding years. The charges amount to $10, and, with a duty of 25%, it could not, at that rate, be delivered in our seaports for less than $82. Its average price in New York during that year was $91, varying from $85 to $100.
The average prime cost of the various descriptions of rolled iron imported during the same year was $32.50; the charges may not amount to more than $3.50. Its average price in New York during that year was $74.50. Under a duty of 25%, it might, at the same prime cost, be delivered in our seaports at $45 a ton, and the inferior qualities at a lower price. The principal, and, as it appears, a permanent cause of that reduced price is well known to consist in the comparative price of fuel.
In Staffordshire, seven tons and three quarters of bituminous coal, costing $8 to $9, are necessary to convert the sufficient quantity of ore into a ton of bar iron. It appears by the evidence taken by the Committee on Manufactures in 1818, that about five hundred bushels of good charcoal, costing $27, were necessary to make a ton of Juniata bar iron. The expense in New Jersey for the same object is stated at $42. The average difference of cost between charcoal and bituminous coal iron appears on that single item to amount to $24 a ton. It seems impracticable that iron made with charcoal can ever compete in cheapness with that made with bituminous coal. To persevere, therefore, in the attempt, through the means of a duty which exceeds 100% on the value, is to impose a perpetual tax on the community for that purpose. It is not a temporary duty imposed under an expectation that competition will ultimately reduce the price. After every possible improvement shall have been introduced, the utmost skill applied, and the profits been reduced to the lowest rate, the difference of price arising from that in the price of fuel will still remain. A happy application of anthracite coal to the manufacture of iron, the discovery of new beds of bituminous coal, the erection of ironworks in the vicinity of the most easterly beds now existing, and the improved means of transportation which may bring this at a reasonable rate to the sea border, may hereafter enable the American iron master to compete in cheapness with foreign rolled iron in the Atlantic districts. On those contingencies the tariff can have no effect. To persist, in the present state of the manufacture, in that particular competition, and for that purpose to proscribe the foreign rolled iron, is to compel the people to substitute for an indefinite time a dear to a cheap article.
It is said that the British imported iron is generally of an inferior quality; this is equally true of a portion of that which is made in America. In both cases, the consumer is the best judge, has an undoubted right to judge for himself, and should not be prevented by any artificial means from selecting the species he prefers. Domestic charcoal iron should confine itself to a competition with the foreign iron made with the same fuel. Since this is of a superior quality, the object here should be to improve the quality. There is no reason why, by using the proper means, American iron made with the same materials may not, for most purposes, compete with that imported from the Baltic, with a protection which, including charges, would not fall short of f 24 a ton. In order, however, to lessen the immediate effect of too great a reduction of the duties on rolled iron, your memorialists would respectfully suggest that the distinction now made, and exceptionable in other respects, between rolled and hammered iron, should be abrogated; and that an equal duty of about $14 a ton, corresponding with a duty of 25% on the value of the whole amount of both species now imported, should indiscriminately be laid on every species. This is one of the cases in which the duties may be arranged with propriety and convenience, without varying materially from the principle of a uniform duty.
Your memorialists believe that the ultimate reduction of the price of American to that of the British rolled iron can duly, and ultimately will be accomplished in that western region, which abounds with ore, and in which is found the most extensive formation of bituminous coal that has yet been discovered in any part of the globe; and this also lying so near the surface of the earth, as to render the extraction of the mineral less expensive than anywhere else. But a considerable period of time must elapse before the wants of a population that increases with such unparalleled rapidity can be fully supplied; and, in the mean while, the western country is not, in any degree, affected by the duties on that article.
The duties on hemp, flax, and iron, are all injurious to the shipping interest. Those paid on a ship of five hundred and seventy five tons, built in the city of New York in the spring of 1831, were as follows: —
Hemp, 29,288 Ibs. of tarred and untarred cordage $1,199 98 Flax, 3,337 square yards of canvas.. 333 70 Iron, 22,612 Ibs. cables... 678 36 6,121 Ibs. anchors... 122 42 Tons, 17 18 2 5 in hull and spars, near ⅓ Russian,⅔ English.... 576 77 —— 1,377 55 —— $2,911 03 The same duties on a ship of 518 tons built in Boston are rated at $2,653; adding those on bolts, spikesj lead, paint, oil, etc., which on a vessel of that class amount to about $600, the total amount is near $6.25 a ton. Reduced to a duty of $14 a ton on the iron, and of 25% on the other articles, they would amount to less than $2.25. The extra or protecting duties impose a tax of $4 a ton on all the ships intended for the foreign trade that are built in the United States. Those ships may be computed to last ten years; and the tax on the construction, with interest and insurance, is equivalent to an annual tax of forty-two cents a ton. An equal sum must be added for the extra duties paid on the purchase of new sails, and that portion of the annual expense that consists of dutied articles. This annual tax of eighty-four cents is equivalent to a tonnage duty of more than fifty-six cents a ton on each voyage, since the whole registered tonnage amounted, at the end of the year 1829, to 650,000, and the whole that entered the ports of the United States during the year 1830, to 967,000 tons. From that indirect tonnage duty, foreign vessels entering the ports of the United States are exempt in whole or in part, according to the system of duties adopted in the countries to which they belong. Those duties are much lower in England, and the vessels of the Hanse towns are not subject to any. It is only by the greatest application of skill and intelligence, as well to all the various branches of industry employed in shipbuilding as to the art of navigation, that the United States vessels are able to compete with those of every other nation. The symptoms of an unfavorable change in the proportion between American and foreign tonnage employed in the American trade, and of an actual diminution in that of America, deserve serious attention, and may be fairly ascribed to the pretended protecting system which imposes on it an annual tax of $540,000. The same protecting duties impose a similar tax on the coasting tonnage, though less in proportion, the vessels in that branch using a less quantity of taxed articles; it falls on the consumer, but does not materially interfere with the American navigation.
The laws which regulate the coasting trade have, in imitation of those of all other nations, given its monopoly to the American ship owners, without accelerating the increase of its amount. Such is the situation of the United States, in relation to all other countries, that the effect of this monopoly has ever been, and continues to be, almost nominal. It is believed that the coasting trade of the United States might be opened to all nations without sensibly affecting the American shipping interest; and it will be admitted that a protection against foreign interference not greater than that which is extended to every other branch of American industry, or a duty of 20% on the freight, would in this instance be prohibitory. But the American navigation employed in the foreign trade does not require or ask any special protection, and complains only of that inequality which is produced by the laws of the United States.
It has been asserted that the growth and prosperity of that navigation were due to the protection afforded by the former discriminating duties on foreign vessels. That protection did not exceed that which by the then existing duties had been given to every other branch of American industry; and it is notorious that its rapid increase between the years 1793 and 1811 was due much more to the general European war and to the neutrality of America than to the discriminating duties.
The first complete return of the registered tonnage is that for the year 1790, when it amounted to 346,000 tons. Those returns are generally liable to the same objection as those for the coasting tonnage. The amount of registered tonnage for the year 1828 was stated at 812,000 tons, when, in reality, according to the correction since made at the treasury, it was but 656,000 tons; and there was an actual decrease of 6,000 tons during the year 1829. In a period of thirty-nine years, while the population has more than trebled, the American navigation employed in the foreign trade has only increased 88%. If we could be tempted to argue in the same manner as some of the advocates of restrictions, we might recur to the official returns and assert that in the year 1801 the registered tonnage amounted to 718,000, and, on account of the treaties of Amiens and Luneville, fell at once, in the year 1802, to 560,000 tons; but we happen to know that the amount was corrected, and is truly stated for 1802, whilst that stated for 1801 and the immediately preceding years was erroneous and exaggerated. We have also been informed that the great apparent diminution, from the amount stated for the year 1817, at 809,000, to 606,000 tons in 1818, is owing to a similar correction, which took place in the last-mentioned year. We then find that, from 1790 to 1793, when the general European war commenced, the registered tonnage had increased from 346,000 to 367,000 tons, or at the rate of 7,000 tons a year; between 1793 and 1802, from 367,000 to 560,000 tons, or at the rate of more than 21,000 a year; and between 1818 and 1828, from 606,000 to 656,000 tons, or at the rate of 5,000 a year. The comparative rate of increase during the second of those periods sufficiently shows the much greater effect produced by the neutrality of America during a general war, than by any other cause whatever. No comparative inference can be drawn from the period extending from 1802 to 1818, as it embraces years of neutrality, of war with England and of general peace. The increase for those fourteen years was only 40,000 tons; but, notwithstanding the general incorrectness of the intermediate returns, they show, at least, that there had been a continued and great increase as late as the year 1811, the return for which was, it is believed, also corrected. A still more forcible view of the subject is exhibited in the comparative amount of American and foreign tonnage annually entered into the ports of the United States, from the year 1790 to this day, respecting which reference is made to the returns and reports already before Congress.
But the discriminating duties were not at all intended for the purpose of excluding foreign navigation from a fair and equal competition with that of the United States, in the transportation of the objects of commerce between them and foreign countries. Those duties were avowedly retaliatory, and intended for the purpose of inducing those nations to repeal the duties of a similar nature, which they had imposed on the American navigation. Their sole object was “free trade;” and the object has been attained, because, in that case, the means are adapted to the purpose, inasmuch as the retaliation operates directly on the subject of contention. Treaties or arrangements, founded on reciprocity, and establishing a perfect equality, have been substituted to the discriminating duties, by which that object was but imperfectly obtained. When the complaint is made that this happy state of things is disturbed, and that an inequality injurious to American industry is the result of the acts of our own Legislature, the restrictionists, who consider their panacea as a universal remedy, coolly answer that further protection shall, if desired, be extended to the American navigation; that is to say, that, still leaving the evil now complained of to operate, the discriminating duties which cannot remove it shall again be reinstated, and the convenient existing compacts shall be abrogated.
The duties on woollen manufactures in general, were, by the tariff of 1816, fixed at the rate of 25% for the term of three years, after which they were to be reduced to 20%; but this last limitation was, in 1818, postponed till the year 1826. Blankets, worsted or stuff goods, and unmanufactured wool, remained subject to the duty of 15% ad valorem.
By the tariff of 1824, the duty was raised to 25% on worsted stuff goods and blankets; and to 33⅓% on flannels and baizes of any price, and on all other manufactures of wool, the prime cost of which exceeded cents per square yard; those not exceeding that price remained charged with the duty of 25%. By the same law, the duty on wool, unmanufactured, was raised to 20%, increasing after two years to 30% ad valorem, but that, the prime cost of which did not exceed ten cents per pound, remained charged with the duty of 15%.
Wool had never been imported free of duty; and when that on woollen manufactures was being increased by the tariff of 1824, it was natural for the agriculturists, whose interest has, in every country, so often been sacrificed to the combinations of manufacturers, to seek an indemnity in a protecting duty on the corresponding agricultural product. That fixed by the tariff of 1824 was also below the average rate of duties, and no otherwise objectionable than as a tax on a raw material. Experience, however, soon proved that this measure was founded in error, and had depressed instead of promoting the manufacture intended to be protected.
The manufacturers, examined by the Committee on Manufactures in 1828, generally agreed in stating that their business was in a more flourishing state before than since the tariff of 1824; and that the unfavorable change was in a great degree due to the increased duty on wool. Some of them asserted that they could manufacture cloth as cheap as in England, provided they could obtain the raw material on the same terms. This should, it seems, have pointed out the true remedy. That adopted by the restrictionists was, first, to impose on the lower-priced coarse wool, which this country does not produce, and had been excepted from the provisions of the tariff of 1824, a duty varying, in inverse ratio of the prime cost, from 90% to 150%, and, of all the other species, a duty varying, in the same inverse ratio, from more than 50% to 90%; and, secondly, to raise the duties, particularly on flannels, baizes, and cloth of every description, to a rate corresponding with that on the wool, in some instances exceeding 200%, and on the uniform principle that the coarsest and cheapest articles should be charged with the highest duty in proportion to their value. It does not appear that a true and efficacious remedy can be found against that intolerable grievance, without either modifying and considerably lessening the duty on wool, or abandoning altogether the woollen manufacture.
The profit on raising sheep must depend on the cost of winter feeding, the price of the meat, and the quality of the wooL The severity of our winters gives an advantage, in the first respect, to many countries, and particularly in England. As mutton can be used only as fresh meat, its consumption and price uniformly depend on the vicinity, the number and the population of towns and villages; and that item forms, accordingly, a much less portion of the profit in the greater part of the United States than in most parts of Europe. It will, it is believed, be universally admitted that sheep cannot be profitably raised in the United States, unless the price of the most common, or what is called native wool, be at least twenty to twenty-five cents the pound. Flannels, therefore, and the coarser kinds of cloth, never can be afforded at a reasonable price by the American manufacturer, unless the low-priced wool with which those articles are made everywhere else, and which cannot be profitably raised in America, shall be imported free of, or under a very moderate duty. These are the species which now pay from 90% to 150% on the value. The prime cost of Smyrna wool is less than ten, and that of Buenos Ayres less than four cents a pound. They now pay, at those rates, nine cents and six cents, respectively.
It is evident that the only means by which the raising of sheep can be rendered truly profitable is by improving the breed, and the quality of the wool. This is what has been done in Prussia, several parts of Germany, and particularly Saxony, under a climate as severe as that of the Middle States; and, in many instances, in districts where nearly the whole profit arises from the sale of the wool. This has also been done without any special protection, and with such complete success as to rival, and in the finest kinds to supersede in foreign markets, the first-rate wools of every other country. There is no reason why the same result may not be obtained in the United States by the same means. There is no reason why the American farmers, decidedly superior in intelligence and activity, should not succeed as well as the inhabitants of a country which enjoys no superior advantage in any other respect. All that is requisite is that they should apply their skill to objects within their reach, and attend to quality rather than to quantity. When, through the artificial aid of a duty which, including the charges on importation, amounts in every instance to more than 60%, sheep are suddenly multiplied, without much regard to the quality of the wool, the superabundant quantity soon gluts the home market; and as, so long as no improvement has been made tending to reduce the cost of production, it cannot be exported with profit, a great and ruinous depression of price necessarily follows. We find, accordingly, that notwithstanding the exorbitant duty on importation, the price of American wool, as taken from the New York prices current, was lower in the years 1828 and 1829, and during the first part of the year 1830, than it had been during the preceding years.
Years. Merino. Native. 1826 33 to 62½ aver. 48 28 to38 aver. 30 1827. . . . 30 – 45 – 40 20 – 30 – 25 1828. . . . 30 – 45 – 41 18 – 30 – 24 1829. . . . 32 – 38 – 34 18 – 25 – 21½ 1830, Jan. to June 30 – 40 – 34½ 16 – 25 – 19½ — July to Dec. 35 – 60 – 46 20 – 30 – 25 1831 . . . . 35 – 70 – 54½ 20 – 35 – 27½ The late rise will not, from present appearances, last long; and frequent depressions are the necessary consequences of an illusory encouragement, and a single and limited market.
When we are told of the consumption of woollen goods in the United States amounting annually to $60,000,000 or $70,000,000, this includes not only all that is imported, but that large quantity of household manufactures with which five-sixths of the population of the United States, at least north of the Potomac and Ohio, have always been clothed. These, made of the native wool, within the families of the farmers, are in fact “so much saved,” and far more important, useful, and profitable, than all the recent factories; but they are neither affected by the price of wool, nor form any part of the home market for it. The following table shows the average annual value of the imported woollen goods, of every description, which have been consumed in the United States during the last ten years, viz.: —
Years. Flannel∗. Clothiand Cutaurei. All other. Total. 1821–1824 ——— 6,002,000 2,986,000 8,988,000 1825–1828 639,000 4,378,000 3,849,000 8,868,000 1829–1830 189,000 3,224,000 2,708,000 6,121,000 The manufacturing establishments cannot, at most, have increased their supply beyond the void occasioned by the decrease of foreign imports, or about $3,000,000 a year, and probably much less; as it is very improbable that, under highly increased prices, and with substitutes at hand, the consumption of woollen goods should not have been considerably diminished. If they have superseded any portion of the household manufactures, this has not increased the quantity of wool required! That wanted for the increased supply of $3,000,000 worth of imported goods, chiefly broadcloths and casimeres, and which the manufacturers probably sell for $1,000,000 more than the imported articles would have been sold for under the former 25% duty, cannot exceed 6,000,000 pounds; of which 1,000,000 pounds a year was still imported in the years 1829–1830; 5,000,000 pounds is, therefore, the utmost amount of the increased supply of domestic wool for which the manufacturing establishments have given a market since the year 1824.
The object of the wool-growers is, that that market should be enlarged; but this cannot be done effectually, unless the domestic manufacture is firmly established; and, for that purpose, it is necessary that the raw material should be obtained on reasonable terms. To enhance its price by persevering in the existing exorbitant duties, is not less inconsistent with sound policy than with justice. It is impossible that the present system of minimums can be sustained; and it is the true interest of all the parties concerned that the duties on wool, as well as on the manufactures of wool, should be considerably reduced. A domestic manufacture may often be advantageously prosecuted, though the raw material should at first be procured from abroad. Throstling mills are already established, which are employed on foreign silk. It is not perceived that there is any more difficulty in establishing silk than woollen manufactures; and if this was successfully attempted, it would be a most wretched policy to lay a duty on foreign, in order to encourage the cultivation of domestic silk, although every one acknowledges the practicability and high importance of adding this to our agricultural products. The value of the hides and raw skinS imported free of duty, and consumed in the United States, has for the last nine years exceeded $1,800,000 a year. It is evident that if, in order to protect the raising of American cattle by giving an additional value to the hide, a high duty had been laid on those imported, the domestic manufacture of leather in all its branches, instead of being in its present flourishing state, would have been most materially injured, and we should have been obliged either to import from Europe, or to purchase at exorbitant prices, all those articles which it now supplies at a moderate rate. The reduction in England of the duty on foreign wool to four cents a pound has caused a fall in the price of woollen goods, without injuring the wool-grower at home. The free introduction of the species not raised here would, by encouraging the manufacture generally, ultimately enlarge the market for the domestic wool. It is the only way to introduce the manufacture of blankets, and to reduce the price of home-made flannels and of the coarser species of cloth.
The manufacturers asserted, in 1828, that they were materially injured by an extraordinary influx of foreign goods, which has been shown not to have taken place, and by presumed frauds on the revenue, of the existence of which at that time no evidence has ever been given; and they declared that the domestic manufacture could not be efficiently protected unless the imported woollen goods were charged with a specific duty. The extraordinary system of minimums grew out of that suggestion. By the tariff of 1828, the duty on blankets and hosiery was raised to 35% ad valorem; worsted goods remained at 25%; a specific duty was laid on carpets, equivalent to an ad valorem duty of about 60%; and that on ready-made clothing, and on the other woollen manufactures, the prime cost of which exceeds $4 the square yard, was increased to 50% on the value. All the other manufactures of wool, or of which wool is a component part, were divided into five classes, on which, although the name of a duty of 45% ad valorem was preserved, the following specific duties per square yard were respectively laid: —
- 1. On those, except flannels and baizes, the prime cost of which does not exceed 33⅓ cents the square yard, 14 cents.
- 2. On all flannels and baizes, the prime cost of which does not exceed 50 cents, and on all other goods the prime cost of which is from 33£ to 50 cents the square yard, 22½ cents.
- 3. On all those, the prime cost of which is from 50 cents to $1 the square yard, 45 cents.
- 4. On all those, the prime cost of which is from $1 to $2.50 the square yard, $1.12½.
- 5. On all those the prime cost of which is. from $2.50 to $4 the square yard, $1.80.
Those several rates are equivalent to ad valorem duties, varying, in the first class, from about 80 to 42%, in the second, including baizes and flannels, from 200, in the third from 90, in the fourth from 112£, and in the fifth from 72 to 45%. The duty is, in each class, invariably laid in inverse ratio of the prime cost, that is to say, that, in each class respectively, the lowest priced cloth is charged with the highest duty. Flannels and baizes were excepted from the first class, in consequence of which the cheapest sorts are charged with a duty equivalent on the low priced flannels to 100, and on the cheapest baizes to more than 200%.
It is easily perceived that the true object of that outrageous system was not, as was alleged, to prevent frauds, but to give to the manufacturer the exclusive monopoly of the lower priced woollen goods in each class respectively. So far from preventing frauds on the revenue, the temptation to commit them has evidently been greatly increased by that system; and there is the same difficulty in determining by an appraisement the class to which the imported article belongs, as there was before in ascertaining the value. Specific duties can be laid only on commodities which are nearly of the same value, or between the several species of which there is an obvious and distinct difference.
The woollen tariff of 1828 is the masterpiece of the ultra restrictionists, and exhibits all the worst features of the system. The most conspicuous is the total and blind disregard for every other consideration, for any other interest but that of the privileged manufacture. After having made certain classes at random, without the least inquiry whether the manufacturer was able or prepared to supply the species in each class of which that arrangement gave him the monopoly; after having sacrificed, without mercy, the poorer classes of society, and compelled the less wealthy in each class to purchase the more expensive kinds of cloth, which, coming nearer the minimum, could alone be imported; after having blindly neutralized, by the exorbitant duty on wools, the benefits intended to be conferred on the American manufacturer, it is not astonishing that no attention should have been paid to the vexations and losses imposed on the American importer, to the comparative advantages resulting to the foreign importing manufacturer, and to the demoralizing effect of the law.
The return of a general peace necessarily gave to the subjects of foreign nations a share in the importing commerce of the United States. The British manufacturer, particularly, is anxious to send abroad, without calculating or regarding the wants of the country to which he exports, all the goods for which his home market and the regular foreign demands do not afford a vent, and which he cannot, without great injury to himself, keep beyond a certain time. This irregular trade promoted, and in its turn has been greatly encouraged by the general system of public auctions. The importations from England were, before the tariff of 1828, about equally divided between the American importer and the British manufacturer, who, though the whole amount of the woollen branch is curtailed, engrosses now more than two thirds of what is still imported. This was an unavoidable consequence, both because he pays less regard to the loss arising from an improvident importation, and on account of the strong temptation under the system of minimums to undervalue the merchandise. Under moderate duties ad valorem, frauds on the revenue of that description are rare, because a great alteration is easily detected, and the illegitimate profit made by one that may escape detection is inconsiderable. But, when by such as the most vigilant and skillful appraisers or other officers find it extremely difficult to ascertain, and respecting which they often differ, the goods are thrown into the next inferior class, and a profit of $1 made on the running yard of broadcloth, those over whom we have no control, and who may be destitute of principle, will make the attempt.
With the most earnest desire that frauds should be prevented, your memorialists will however observe, that the effect of those which have been committed, and which they have no wish to disguise, has not been to reduce the price of the goods, and in that respect to lessen the protection given by the tariff to the manufacturers. The amount ascertained is comparatively small, and the cloths fraudulently underrated have been sold at the same rate as those of similar qualities which were fairly imported. These have been sold with some profit in spite of the high duty; and no other general reduction in the price of woollen goods has taken place in the United States, than that which has been the consequence of the fall, during the two last years, in the price of the British manufacture, — a fall due to the combined effect of a lessened demand, and of the free importation of foreign wool in that country. But the existing laws are, under the protecting system, equally vexatious to the fair importer, and inefficient for the prevention of frauds.
The great revenue derived from duties on importations, had heretofore been collected with facility and the utmost fidelity. This result, almost exclusively due to the probity of the American merchants, to the sanctity of oaths, and to the moral feeling of the country, does not seem to have been sufficiently appreciated. The new regulations are general: each package must contain none but goods of the same value; but passing over this, and others of a similar nature, which can hardly be carried strictly into effect, the American importer, of the most unblemished character, is liable to the insufferable grievance of having his goods subjected to a critical and very uncertain appraisement of their presumed value abroad, after having been required to declare, under the solemnity of an oath, the price at which they were actually purchased. On the other hand, merchandise is imported on foreign account, to order as it is called, when the nominal consignee can only certify that he has no other invoice than that produced at the custom-house; and nothing is required from the owner or his real agent. It is impossible to place reliance on the valuation given by parties interested, over whom, personally, neither the laws or public opinion have any control, and who are not bound to the country by any tie of patriotism or common interest. The requirement of oaths and the system of appraisements are irreconcilable. If no other remedy can be devised, it would be preferable either to have all the imported merchandise appraised according to its value in the port of importation, provided uniformity of valuation in the several seaports can be secured; or, as is said to answer the purpose in other countries, to let the importer declare the value, with the reserved right to government to take the goods at a small advance upon it.
These difficulties might all be avoided by an abandonment of the system of high duties. Yet, frauds may be prevented by a rigorous inspection, and provision may be made against mere evasions. There can be no difficulty in preventing the importation by a merchant, of bar iron under some disguised name or form, or by a manufacturer, of ready dyed woollen yarn, which happens to pay a less duty than wool. What is only an imperfection in the system may be corrected. But there are certain limits in the rate of duties which no government ever can exceed with impunity. If fraud has been suppressed, smuggling invariably takes place, whenever the risk of seizure, added to the ordinary charges of importation, is less than the difference between the respective prices at the place whence imported and that at which the smuggled article is delivered. That risk is calculated in the same manner and with more certainty than that of capture in time of war. In all countries where the prohibitory system prevails, the business is properly subdivided and carried on as regularly as any other; and the advance paid by the importing merchant on the prime cost is known to everybody, and designated by the name of “premium on contraband.” The insular situation of Great Britain, and the “preventive service” in which a portion of her naval force is employed, have not protected her against that evil, to which no efficient remedy can be found but a reduction of the duty. We may affirm from an authentic source, that, according to the calculation of those who have the best means of information, not more than one half of the French brandy consumed in England pays the duty.
In France, the number of persons employed in the collection of the customs, consisting principally of inspectors or tide waiters, or those who perform the same duties on the land frontier, has been officially stated to amount (deducting 3,000 employed on the salt excise) to more than 23,000. The premium on smuggling generally varies according to the value of the article, from 5 to 25%. It has been repeatedly acknowledged, and its amount stated by the organs of the government, in their official communications to the legislative body. More than four fifths of the finer sorts of spun cotton used by the French fabrics of muslin are smuggled from abroad; and government, as a proof of its vigilance, asserted that the premium paid by the manufacturer had been raised on that article from 25 to 40%. It may be added that fifty years ago the number of persons employed in suppressing contraband in France amounted, as now, to 23,000; and that a minister who, so far from belonging to what is called the modern school of theorists was desirous to prevent, as far as practicable, the introduction of foreign manufactures, considered a duty of 15% ad valorem as the limit beyond which illicit importations could not be prevented. The facts are notorious, denied by no one, and occur whenever the duties are too high. If inquiry is made, why then a duty equal to the premium is not substituted, the uniform answer is, that the combination of the persons interested is too powerful: in England, the West India interest, and the Scotch distilleries; in France, the union of the various manufacturers, and sometimes of certain descriptions of landholders. Thus, when it was lately suggested by the iron-masters of the northern departments that the prohibitory duty on iron might be reduced, provided that on the coal of Belgium was repealed, this was successfully opposed by the owners of forests in the vicinity, and of distant coal mines, who declared that no measure could be more ruinous to France; whence it may be concluded that the acquisition of Belgium would have been a great misfortune to her. But if it is asked, why the manufacturers prefer the prohibition to a duty equal to the premium on smuggling, it is because they know that the amount fairly imported is, on payment of the same duty or premium, always greater than that which is smuggled; and that, callous to any other consideration than their own interest, they are careless of the effect produced on the habits of those actually employed in smuggling, and on the moral feeling of the community. Those habits may engender as many crimes as the game laws; custom-house oaths may be daily violated, and become a by-word; still the protecting system must be preserved.
The extensive land and sea frontier of the United States offers more facilities for smuggling than are found in almost any other country; and unless sustained by the community, government will find itself unable to prevent it. Public opinion and reverence for the law may, for a short time, prevent the evil from reaching its full extent; most American merchants would rather withdraw from business than receive goods on which the duties had not been paid. But their place will be filled by others less scrupulous. If cupidity could induce even Americans to engage in that most nefarious of all pursuits, the slave trade, adventurers will never be wanting to carry on an illegal trade whenever it ceases to be disgraceful in public opinion. It affords no apology to the offender; but government is responsible for the offenses which are the necessary consequences of its legislation, and that system cannot be too much reprobated which has an unavoidable tendency to corrupt the moral feeling of the community.
The cultivation of sugar in Louisiana was not due to any special protection, but grew out of that which was incidentally given by the revenue duty of two cents and a half per pound. An additional encouragement was unfortunately given in 1816 by raising it to three cents. Whatever may be the difference of opinion on that subject, the statements given by the planters and laid before Congress are perfectly fair, and give all the necessary information. It appears clearly that, with the exception perhaps of the most southerly part of the State, the climate renders that cultivation so precarious that without the assistance of a protecting duty it cannot be carried on profitably. The expenses even in seasons that were not unfavorable, are stated at three cents and a half a pound. The great value assigned to the capital laid out, and which consists almost exclusively of land and slaves, is clearly due to that particular cultivation and to the duty in which it originated. But if that value was even reduced to one half of the estimate; if the slaves, instead of $600, were only valued at $300, which was probably the price actually paid by Louisiana, it appears quite improbable that, with the exceptions already made, the profits should be sufficient to enable the planter to persevere, without the assistance of some duty, in raising sugar, during the general depression in the price of that commodity.
The annual average quantity of imported brown and clayed sugar, on which the duty was collected during the years 1826–1830, amounts, after deducting the drawbacks, to 65,000,000 pounds. The average crop of Louisiana during the same period of years, does not appear to have amounted to 60,000,000. There is not the slightest probability that the quantity wanted for the consumption of the growing population of the United States can at any time be supplied by Louisiana, and the other districts where the cultivation of the sugar cane may be forced. Should it reach that point by a temporary increase, much more rapid than that of the population, it would be but for a short period. But not even during such period, or at any other time, would the price paid by the community be reduced, since this could only be effected by a reduction in the cost of production, which is impracticable.
The question therefore is, whether, when this high duty is no longer wanted for the purpose of revenue, a tax amounting now to 100% on the value, and in the whole to more than $2,000,000 on an article of food, which as a necessary of life stands next to bread and meat, shall be laid in perpetuity on the people of the United States, in order to render the labor of twenty thousand slaves more profitable to their owners than if applied to some other species of cultivation, or than slave labor is in any other State. It must be admitted that the repeal of the duty would be ruinous to those who have made investments in lands and slaves, since the artificial rise in their value has taken place; but that is the whole extent of the evil. It bears no comparison with the national loss paid by the consumer, which a continuation of the duty would perpetuate. It would in this, as in many other cases, be much cheaper to indemnify the parties interested, than to persevere in fostering a branch of industry, in the prosecution of which, to use the expression of the planters, they are “warring against nature.” It is not, however, proposed to repeal, but to reduce the duty to a rate nearly approaching that of a general uniform duty ad valorem; and in doing this we would not take as a criterion the present depressed price of sugar, — a price which appears to be, even in the West Indies, below the cost of production.
According to the Treasury statements of commerce, the average price of imported brown sugar, at the places whence imported, was: —
In 1830 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 cents. In 1829 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5½ cents. In 1828 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 cents. Assuming six cents as the medium and remunerating price in the West Indies, an ultimate but gradual reduction to one cent and a half per pound would considerably lessen the injury to those who, relying on a continuance of the duty, have made investments at the elevated artificial prices due to it; and might probably permit the owners of the plantations most favored by soil and climate to continue the cultivation of that product.
The prime cost of both salt and coal is, according to the official statements for the year 1830, 12J cents a bushel. The duty is, therefore, for the first 160%; and for the last, near 50% on the value. Both are necessaries of life, and used in quantities nearly equal, by the poor and by the rich. Salt is essential to agriculture; the duty falls almost exclusively on the greater portion of the inhabitants of the Atlantic States, and its repeal would affect no other interest, but that of some inconsiderable establishments in a few places on the seashore. The imported bituminous coal may be applied to uses for which anthracite has been found unfit, such as several manufactures, the steamboat navigation, and iron works on or near tidewater. The duty now falls exclusively on the northern seaports, particularly New York, and is most oppressive on the most indigent class of society. The only objection to a reduction of the duty to a rate corresponding with the value of the article arises from its effect on the proprietors of the mines of anthracite coal, and on the companies which have invested large capitals in the completion of roads and canals for its transportation. A duty of 25% and the freight, which, if the importations are from Nova Scotia, or in large quantities from England, cannot be less than ten cents a bushel, would give them all the protection to which they are fairly entitled. We wish every possible success to the laudable spirit of enterprise by which they have been animated; but, $o prevent the reduction of the price of fuel to the poor in our large cities, because extensive beds of coal have been happily discovered at home, appears to us a most strange and unjust extension even of the restrictive system.
The principal commodities which have been selected for special protection, iron and all the coarser woollen articles of clothing, are, as well as salt, coal, and sugar, essentially necessary to all classes of society. The duties laid on such commodities fall therefore much more heavily, in proportion to their means, on the less wealthy classes; and it has been already seen with what singular ingenuity that on woollens has been so arranged as to make the poor pay, in every instance, considerably more than the rich, on the value of their necessary clothing. This your memorialists consider to be, in its practical application, one of the most obnoxious features of the restrictive system. And it is principally for the same reason that they pray that the duties on wines, teas, coffee, fruits, spices, silks, and other articles, not being raw materials, which it is presumed cannot, at least at this time, be produced in the United States, may be subject in proportion to their respective value to the same rate of duties as other foreign commodities.
It is truly remarkable that it should in the United States be necessary to pray, that whenever the public exigencies permit it, luxuries should be subject to duties at least as high as articles of general and equal consumption. A temporary departure from that principle can only be ascribed to that zeal which, with a single eye to a favorite object, loses sight of every other consideration. The annual average value of the wines and silks consumed in the United States amounts to about $7,000,000, or one eighth part of their whole consumption of foreign articles. It will not be denied that both are, strictly speaking, luxuries, and in this country used exclusively by the rich. Teas and coffee are, indeed, used by all classes, but as luxuries by the poor, and in very small quantities by them, or out of the towns, if compared with the consumption by the wealthier classes. Of 5,700,000 pounds of tea, the annual consumption of the years 1827–1830, less than 80,000 pounds consist of bohea and less than one fourth of the part of the whole of bohea and souchong. The whole annual consumption is little more than half a pound for each individual. Every man in easy circumstances may calculate how much greater than that proportion is the consumption of his family, and who would be relieved by taking away the duty altogether. In this view of the subject, the question is not simply whether the duties on those articles shall be repealed or reduced, but whether the reduction shall apply exclusively to them, whilst those on articles of equal consumption shall be preserved; instead of making a general reduction which shall render the duty uniform on all. If the duties on wines, silks, tea, and coffee were repealed or reduced below the common average, whilst those of 50% to 100% on iron, salt, coal, sugar, and coarse clothing were preserved, every substantial farmer or mechanic would pay more annually than men who have an income of $5,000 a year; and with respect to the poorer classes, the tax levied on each individual would increase in proportion tn his want of means. Your memorialists are a ware th.it this is not the object of the friends of the restrictive system, but the unavoidable consequence of the system itself. It is because the present tariff gives a special protection to some particular favorite branches of industry, that it is necessarily unequal in its operation, imposes burdens on the many for the benefit of the few, and is more oppressive upon the poor than upon the rich.
It is well known to your honorable body that the tariff system is believed to be unconstitutional by a numerous and respectable portion of the American people, including probably a majority of the citizens of the southern States. Your memorialists may not all unite in that opinion; but they assert that the system is at variance with that spirit of justice and mutual concession in which the Constitution was conceived and adopted, and that it operates unequally and unjustly upon those parts of the United States which supply the greater portion of the national exports, and are less adapted to the introduction of manufacturing establishments.
The restrictive system lessens the amount of the foreign products which would otherwise be imported.
It has, therefore, an immediate tendency to lessen the ever corresponding amount of exports. The avowed declaration of those who are benefited by it, and their general proscription of the trade with foreign nations, announce that such is their object. Retaliations, however unwise, may be provoked by a hostile course of legislation. It cannot be doubted that a great diminution of the exportations will be the necessary consequence of persevering in that system, to the manifest and great injury of those States which export most, and have no other resources than those exports.
The inhabited part of the United States embraces a territory more extensive and differing more in climate than the whole of western Europe. A necessary and great difference must arise between the branches of industry to which the several portions of that territory are respectively best adapted. This difference is still more increased by that in the nature of the population. The southern States have always confined themselves almost exclusively to the cultivation of the rich products of their climate. This is the only advantage they enjoy, and they owe it to nature. As they make but few, they consume a much greater proportion of manufactured articles imported from other States or other countries. That system, therefore, that enhances beyond measure the price of those objects of necessary consumption operates most unequally and unjustly upon them. They are forbidden to supply themselves on the cheapest terms consistent with the revenue necessary for the exigencies of Government. As the greatest consumers they must not only pay a greater share of the duties requisite to defray the necessary national expenditure, but they are compelled to pay the enhanced price occasioned by the protecting system. That system cannot be extended to them. They find in it no indemnity, no compensation for the injury which it inflicts upon them. They have not, they cannot in self-defense erect manufacturing establishments. The nature of their population forbids it. Whether from color or situation is immaterial; the great mass of the working population of the southern States is inferior in activity, skill, and intelligence to that of the other sections of the Union. Where such important and indelible differences do exist, each part should be permitted to enjoy its natural advantages; and that legislation is unjust, unequal, and oppressive which attempts to confer doubtful benefits on the one at the expense of the other.
It is idle to say that the southern States find a compensation in the general advantages in the increased wealth resulting to the Union from the protecting system. The fallacy of those pretended advantages has been sufficiently exposed. But, admitting their reality, they are, according to the doctrines even of the restric-tionists, derived from the losses sustained by the consumers of the South. The duties on the iron, the woollen manufactures, the sugar, the salt, and all the other privileged articles which they consume, give no additional activity or employment to their labor. The amount of their products remains the same, and their value may be lessened; they pay more and receive nothing. In order that they might be placed on an equal footing with their fellow - citizens, in order to enable them to erect manufactures, they stand in more need of a tariff against those of the eastern States than the eastern States against those of England. From that weapon of self-defense they deprived themselves in adopting the Constitution of the United States.
It cannot be deemed consistent with justice and that spirit of mutual concession in which the Constitution was conceived and adopted, to convert that complete freedom of internal trade secured by it to the several States into a weapon of oppression upon those which from uncontrollable circumstances cannot compete with others in particular branches of industry. Is there any substantial difference between the British Government forbidding its American colonies to trade with other nations, and to purchase any but British manufactures, and the adoption of that pretended American system which compels one section of the Union to resort exclusively to another section for its necessary supply of manufactured articles?
Your memorialists are aware that it may be urged that whilst the exports of the southern States have been increasing without interruption, those of the middle and northern States, though fluctuating in value, have for forty years been nearly stationary as to quantity. Whenever the demand for the articles of food which constitute by far the greater part of those exports ceased to increase in the same ratio as the population, it became not only useful but absolutely necessary to apply to new objects a portion of the industry of those States. They must otherwise have grown daily poorer, and been deprived of the comforts which they had till then enjoyed. The southern States might be asked, in that spirit of concession and compromise to which they appeal, not to oppose a course of legislation intended to encourage the establishment of manufactures, which has become a matter of necessity in the parts of the Union less favored by nature than themselves.
The facts are admitted, and the southern States did not wait for that appeal. The compromise took place, the concession was made from the time they consented that the whole, or nearly the whole amount of the public revenue should be raised by duties on importation. Unable to compete with others in manufactures, it was clearly their interest to purchase those they wanted wherever they might be obtained on the cheapest terms, and that a part at least of the revenue should be derived from other sources. They voluntarily yielded the point and submitted cheerfully to duties amounting on an average to 40% whilst they were wanted to discharge the public debt. That object could not have been effected without resorting to direct taxation, had not the foreign trade supplied the means. The taxed imports which have paid the debt have been purchased with the national exports; and of these the oppressed States have supplied two thirds. Now that the object has been accomplished, after the manufacturing districts have, during forty years, enjoyed the incidental but not less efficient benefit of that mode of taxation; when the southern States acquiesce in the continuance of the same system on a scale proportionate to the exigencies of Government, is it just, is it equitable, to aggravate instead of lightening the burden? And can this additional sacrifice be expected from them?
But no special protection beyond the ordinary revenue duties has been, or is, necessary for the introduction of the manufactures required by the wants of the country. The annual average value of the imported merchandise paying duties ad valorem in the years 1798–1801 amounted, after deducting those exported with the benefit of drawback, to $33,747,000. Deducting about $950,000 on account of articles exported that were not entitled to drawback, and of the fruits, spices, and some other minor items not then charged with specific duties, the residue, amounting to $32,000,000, is the value of the foreign manufactured commodities annually consumed at that time. The annual average value of the imported goods paying duties ad valorem during the years 1821–1824, taken from the annual statements of commerce, amounted, after deducting the reexportations, to $32,910,000. To this must be added, first, $2,700,000, being the value of the iron and manufactured articles which now pay specific duties. Secondly, $7,000,000, being the difference between the present value of the cotton goods now imported and that of the same quantity in the years 1799–1801; the increase, therefore, during that period of twenty-three years, amounts to about $10,600,000, or to about 33%; and that of the domestic exports will be found to have been 35J%. During the same period the population of the United States has more than doubled.
It will not be denied that the people of the United States were at least as well supplied in the year 1824 as in the year 1801 with clothing, furniture, and every species of manufactured commodities. A population twice as great, in order to be equally well supplied, required twice the amount of such articles. And since the value of foreign goods of that description consumed in the United States in 1824 amounted only to $42,600,000, instead of $64,000,000, the difference must necessarily have been supplied by domestic manufactures. Not only those which were established in 1801 must have increased in a ratio equal to the increase of population, but by a further quantity, amounting to $21,400,000. The annual amount of foreign manufactures had, during that period, and prior to the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, been lessened more than one third in proportion to the population.
The actual increase of domestic manufactures cannot be precisely ascertained, since the actual amount in 1801 is not known; but the limits of that increase may be correctly estimated. From the imperfect data obtained in the year 1810, it appears certain that the amount in the year 1801 did not exceed $100,000,000, or fall short of $60,000,000. The domestic manufactures formed, therefore, from two thirds to three fourths of the total amount of the manufactured commodities consumed. The total amount consumed in the years 1821–1824 amounted to $264,000,000, according to the first supposition, and to $184,000,000, according to the second. Deducting, in both cases, the amount of foreign goods annually consumed in those years, and amounting to $42,600,000, the increase of domestic manufactures would have been, in twenty-three years, 12l£% in the first case, and 136% in the second. We have a moral certainty that it was within those limits; and that the amount of foreign manufactures was in 1824 from one fifth to one sixth, while it was in 1801 from one third to one fourth, of the whole amount of manufactured commodities consumed.
Proceeding in the same manner, it will appear that, without any such special protection as that of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, the total value of the manufactures consumed in the United States in the year 1847 will probably be $450,000,000, of which the domestic manufactures will form seven eighths, and foreign merchandise no more than one eighth part. In all probability the increase of domestic manufactures will be greater, in proportion, during that period of twenty-three years, than during the next preceding; since there will be more skill and experience, a more dense population, and a greater proportionate capital.
The principle is indisputable; and if there is some error in the numbers, it will no otherwise affect the result, than that it may take place a few years sooner or later. But that result with a population so active and intelligent is certain. The question is only one of time; and admitting, for the sake of argument, that the protecting system has a tendency to accelerate the establishment of manufactures in general, all that can be gained by it is, that the same necessary result may be obtained a few years earlier.
A uniform and moderate duty does not derange the natural order of things; and instead of sustaining, by artificial means, certain manufactures for which the country may not be prepared, at the expense of the community, and particularly of the poorer classes, to the detriment of other manufactures, and to the great injury of some parts of the country, it will encourage and successively promote the various branches of industry best adapted to the state of society, and to the circumstances of the different parts of the Union. A maximum duty of 25%, added to the charges on importation, will give to the manufactures that may require it an annual protection of 35%. An efficient system that will prevent frauds, and, as far as practicable, check irregular importations on foreign account, will insure to the manufacturer the legal protection to its full extent; and, given in a true spirit of compromise and conciliation, it will have that stability indispensable to him, and on which he never can rely under the present system.
Your memorialists beg leave here to observe, that, whilst they have considered a duty of 25% as the highest that should, in any case, be allowed, they have not pretended to assert that the average duty required for the exigencies of Government should be 20% on the value. If they have adopted that rate in their calculations, it has been only in order to meet any determination that may be taken by your honorable body, on the amount of the revenue which should be provided for, and any difference of opinion respecting the probable amount of importations, and the consequent productiveness of any given percentage. In their own opinion, the average duty actually required would fall far short of 20%.
After having given the fullest consideration to this important subject, your memorialists have not been able to perceive any other objection to the immediate adoption of the plan which they have respectfully suggested, than that which arises from vested interests. These are entitled to respect only because they do exist, and not on account of any presumed legislative pledge which no legislature could give; and which, if so intended, your memorialists altogether deny to be in any degree binding upon subsequent legislatures. Your memorialists have, accordingly, been instructed to express the willingness of those in whose behalf they address your honorable body to acquiesce in such an interposition of the legislative power as shall be prospective in its operation, thereby avoiding any sudden revulsion which might operate with undue severity on the manufacturing interest, but leading to the desired result, with the least possible injury to the interests which have grown up under the existing system of protective duties.
Your memorialists trust that the temporary and doubtful advantages ascribed to the tariff system, and which may, perhaps, accrue to some particular districts, will not be permitted to outweigh considerations of a far more important character. It may justly be expected, from the patriotism of those who calculate upon such local advantages, that they will not insist on what ii manifestly unjust, and persevere in a course which disturbs the peace of the country and alienates the affections of a numerous portion of their fellow-citizens.
Let it be recollected that the system is, in itself, an infraction of an essential part of the liberty of the citizen. The necessity must be urgent and palpable, which authorizes any government to interfere in the private pursuits of individuals, to forbid them to do that which, in itself, is not criminal, and which every one would most certainly do, if not forbidden. Every individual, in every community without exception, will purchase whatever he may want, on the cheapest terms within his reach. The most enthusiastic restrictionist, the manufacturer most clamorous for special protection, will each individually pursue the same course, and prefer any foreign commodity, or material, to that of domestic origin, if the first is cheaper, and the law does not forbid him. All men ever have acted, and continue, under any system, to act on the same principle. It is impossible that they should universally act in that manner, unless it was evidently their interest so to do. The tariff system is founded upon the principle, that what is true of all men, individually, is untrue when applied to them collectively. We cannot consider the adherence of enlightened nations to regulations of that description, but as the last relic of that system of general restrictions and monopolies, which had its origin in barbarous times. If the corn laws are the most odious of those protecting monopolies, it is because they enhance the price of that which is still more essentially necessary than sugar, salt, clothing, or fuel; and we may safely predict that their repeal will be the first result of an improved representation of the people.
Your memorialists are fully aware that acquiescence in the will of the majority is the indispensable condition of a representative government. The true problem to be solved in the United States is not whether the people can govern themselves, of which not the slightest doubt can be entertained, but whether that government can be successfully applied to an extensive territory, embracing interests which must occasionally be in collision with each other; whether majorities formed by combinations of sectional interests will be so governed by a sense of justice and a spirit of conciliation as not to oppress those parts of the country, whose rights, though they may be a minority, ought, nevertheless, to be respected. The permanence of the Union and the destinies of this great and happy nation have been intrusted to your honorable body; and, with an humble hope that your deliberations may be enlightened by Him to whom the United States are indebted for all the blessings they enjoy, your memorialists, as in duty bound, will ever pray, etc.
In behalf of the Committee,
ALBERT GALLATIN, Chairman.
New York,January 23, 1832.
R.J. Walker, Report from the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, etc. (December, 1845)
Treasury department, December 3, 1845.
In obedience to the “Act supplementary to the act to establish the Treasury Department,” the undersigned respectfully submits the following report: —
The receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year ending the 30th June, 1846, were as follows: —
RECEIPTS AND MEANS. From customs $27,528.112.70 From sales of public lands 2,077,022.30 From miscellaneous sources.... 163,998.56 Total receipts $29,769,133.56 Add balance in the treasury 1st July,1844 7,857,379.64 Total means $37,626,513.20 The expenditures during the same fiscal year amounted to the sum of... 29,968,206.98 Leaving a balance in the treasury on the 1st July, 1845, of $7,658,306.22 As appears in detail by accompanying statement A.
The estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1846, are as follows: —
1The sums of $1,548,997 for supplying deficiency of revenue for postage, and also $300,000 for postages of Congress and of ezecntiTe offices, are included in the above sum of $20,627,051.90. RECEIPTS, viz.:— From customs, 1st quarter, by actual returns of the collectors $8,861,932.14 For 2d, 3d, and 4th quarters, as estimated 15,638,067.86 Total from customs $24,500,000.00 From sales of public lands 2,200,000.00 From miscellaneous and incidental sources 120,000.00 Total receipts $26,820,000.00 Add balance in the treasury on the 1st July, 1845 7,658,306.22 Total means, as estimated.... $34,478,306.22 EXPENDITURES, viz.: The actual expenditures for the first quarter ending the 30th September, 1845, amounted to the sum of.. $8,463,092.41 As appears in detail by accompanying statement B. The estimated expenditures for the public service during the other three quarters, from 1st October, 1845, to 30th June, 1846, are as follows, viz.: — Civil list, foreign intercourse, and miscellaneous purposes.... 6,739,211.06 Army proper.... $2,594,735.06 Fortifications, ordnance, arming militia, etc... 2,346,778.82 Indian department.. 1,649,791.94 Pensions 1,356,556.02 Interest on public debt and treasury notes.. 856,976.48 Redemption of the residue of the loan of 1841 29,300.00 Treasury notes which are yet outstanding, and payable when presented 687,764.18 Naval establishment.. 4,902,845.93 129,627,051.90 Which deducted from the total of means before stated, leaves in the treasury on the 1st July, 1846, an estimated balance of $4,851,254.32 But this balance is subject to be decreased by such additional appropriations as Congress shall make, to be expended during the fiscal year ending the 30th June, 1846, and to be altered by the sums which may be presented for payment of the old funded and unfunded debt and old treasury notes.
The estimated receipts, means, and expenditures for the fiscal year commencing 1st July, 1846, and ending 30th June, 1847, are as follows, viz.: —
1The sum of $121,050 of debt assumed for the cities in the District of Columbia, the sum of $1,000,000, for supplying deficiency in the revenues from postage, and $350,000 for postages for Congress and executive departments, are included in the foregoing sum of $6,925,292.62. RECEIPTS. From customs for the four quarters.. $22,500,000.00 From sales of public lands 2,400,000.00 From miscellaneous and incidental sources 100,000.00 Total revenue 25,000,000.00 Add estimated balance to be in the treasury on the 1st July, 1846 4,851,254.32 Total means for the service of the fiscal year ending the 30th June, 1847.. 29,851,254.32 EXPENDITURES. The expenditures during the same period, as estimated by the several departments of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Postmaster General, viz.:— The balances of former appropriations which will be required to be expended in this year.... $1,441,457.10 Permanent and indefinite appropriations.... 2,997,915.72 Specific appropriations asked for this year.. 21,079,440.43 Total estimated expenditure 25,518,813.25 This sum is composed of the following particulars:— For civil list, foreign intercourse, and miscellaneous . . . . . 1$5,925,292.62 For army proper... 3,364,458.92 For fortifications, ordnance, arming militia,etc 4,331,809.93 For pensions 2,507,100.00 For Indian department. 2,214,916.18 For naval establishment. 6,339,390.88 Interest on public debt. 835,844.72 25,518,813.25 Which deducted from the total of means before stated, gives an estimated balance on the 1st of July, 1847, of.. 4,332,441.07 The receipts for the first quarter of this year are less, by $2,011,885.90, than the receipts of the same quarter last year. Among the causes of decrease is the progressive diminution of the importation of many highly-protected articles, and the substitution of rival domestic products. For the nine months ending June 30, 1843, since tLe present tariff, the average of duties upon dutiable imports was equal to 37.84 1/10;% for the year ending June 30, 1844, 33.85 9/10; and for the year ending June 30, 1845, 29.90%; showing a great diminution in the average percentage, owing in part to increased importation of some articles bearing the lighter duties, and decreased importation of others bearing the higher duty.
The revenue from ad valorem duties last year exceeded that realized from specific duties, although the average of the ad valorem duties was only 23.57%, and the average of the specific duties 41.30%; presenting another strong proof that lower duties increase the revenue. Among the causes tending to augment the revenue are increased emigration and the annexation of Texas. The estimates for the expenditures of 1846 are based chiefly upon appropriations made by Congress. The estimated expenditures of 1847 are founded upon data furnished by the several departments, and are less by $4,108,238.65 than those of the preceding year.
These estimates are submitted in the full conviction that, whenever Congress, guided by an enlightened economy, can diminish the expenditures without injury to the public interest, such retrenchment will be made, so as to lighten the burden of taxation and hasten the extinguishment of the public debt, reduced on the 1st of October last to $17,075,445.52.
In suggesting improvements in the revenue laws, the following principles have been adopted: —
1st. That no more money should be collected than is necessary for the wants of the government, economically administered.
2d. That no duty be imposed on any article above the lowest rate which will yield the largest amount of revenue.
3d. That below such rate discrimination may be made, descending in the scale of duties; or for imperative reasons, the article may be placed in the list of those free from all duty.
4th. That the maximum revenue duty should be imposed on luxuries.
5th. That all minimums, and all specific duties, should be abolished, and ad valorem duties substituted in their place, — care being taken to guard against fraudulent invoices and under-valuation, and to assess the duty upon the actual market value.
6th. That the duty should be so imposed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the Union, discriminating neither for nor against any class or section.
No horizontal scale of duties is recommended; because such a scale would be a refusal to discriminate for revenue, and might sink that revenue- below the wants of the government. Some articles will yield the largest revenue at duties that would be wholly or partially prohibitory in other cases. Luxuries, as a general rule, will bear the highest revenue duties; but even some very costly luxuries, easily smuggled, will bear but a light duty for revenue; whilst other articles of great bulk and weight will bear a higher duty for revenue. There is no instance within the knowle’dge of this department of any horizontal tariff ever having been enacted by any one of the nations of the world. There must be discrimination for revenue, or the burden of taxation must be augmented, in order to bring the same amount of money into the treasury. It is difficult, also, to adopt any arbitrary maximum to which an inflexible adherence must be demanded in all cases. Thus upon brandy and spirits, a specific duty, varying as an equivalent ad valorem from 180% to 261$, yields a large revenue; yet no one would propose either of these rates as a maximum. These duties are too high for revenue, from the encouragement they present for smuggling these baneful luxuries; yet a duty of 20% upon brandy and spirits would be far below the revenue standard, would greatly diminish the income on these imports, require increased burdens upon the necessaries of life, and would revolt the moral sense of the whole community. There are many other luxuries which will bear a much higher duty for revenue than 20%; and the only true maximum is that which experience demonstrates will bring, in each case, the largest revenue at the lowest rate of duty. Nor should maximum revenue duties be imposed upon all articles; for this would yield too large an income, and would prevent all discrim-i nation within the revenue standard, and require necessaries to be taxed as high as luxuries. But, whilst it is impossible to adopt any horizontal scale of duties, or even any arbitrary maximum, experience proves that, as a general rule, a duty of 20% ad valorem will yield the largest revenue. There are, however, a few exceptions above, as well as many below this standard. Thus, whilst the lowest revenue duty on most luxuries exceeds 20%, there are many costly articles of small bulk, easily smuggled, which would bring, perhaps, no revenue at a duty as high as 20%; and even at the present rate of 7J%, they yield, in most cases, a small revenue; whilst coal, iron, sugar, and molasses, articles of great bulk and weight, yielded last year six millions of revenue, at an average rate of duty exceeding 60% ad valorem. These duties are far too high for revenue upon all these articles, and ought to be reduced to the revenue standard; but if Congress desire to obtain the largest revenue from duties on these articles, those duties, at the lowest rate for revenue, would exceed 20% ad valorem.
There are appended to this report tables, prepared with great care and labor, showing the rates of duty each year on each of these four articles, and the equivalent ad valorem from the organization of the government down to the present period, with the revenue collected every year upon each; from which tables Congress will be enabled to judge how far the present rates exceed the lowest revenue duties, and how much they must be reduced so as to yield a revenue equal to that now obtained from these articles.
It is believed that sufficient means can be obtained, at the lowest revenue duties on the articles now subjected to duty; but if Congress desire a larger revenue, it should be procured by taxing the free articles, rather than transcend, in any case, the lowest revenue duties. It is thought, however, that, without exceeding that limit in any case, an adequate revenue will still be produced, and permit the addition to the free list of salt and guano. In one of his annual messages, Mr. Jefferson recommended to Congress “the suppression of the duties on salt.” A large portion of this duty is exhausted in heavy expenses of measuring salt, and in large sums paid for fishing bounties and allowances in lieu of the drawback of the duty, both which expenditures would fall with a repeal of the duty; which repeal, therefore, can cause no considerable reduction of the revenue. Salt is a necessary of life, and should be as free from tax as air or water. It is used in large quantities by the fanner and planter; and to the poor, this tax operates most oppressively, not only.in the use of the article itself, but as combined with salted provisions. The salt made abroad by solar evaporation is also most pure and wholesome, and, as conservative of health, should be exempt from taxation.
The duty on cotton-bagging is equivalent to 55.20% ad valorem on the Scotch bagging, and to 123.11% on the gunny-bag; and yet the whole revenue from these duties has fallen to $66,064.50. Nearly the entire amount, therefore, of this enormous tax makes no addition to the revenue, but inures to the benefit of about thirty manufacturers. As five sixths of the cotton crop is exported abroad, the same proportion of the bagging around the.bale is exported, and sold abroad at a heavy loss, growing out of a deduction for tare. Now, as duties are designed to operate only on the domestic consumption, there ought to be a drawback of the whole duty on cotton-bagging reexported around the bale, on the same principles on which drawbacks are allowed in other cases. The cotton planting is the great exporting interest, and suffers from the tariff in the double capacity of consumer and exporter. Cotton is the great basis of our foreign exchange, furnishing most of the means to purchase imports and supply the revenue. It is thus the source of two thirds of the revenue, and of our foreign freight and commerce; upholding our commercial marine and maritime power. It is also a bond of peace with foreign nations, constituting a stronger preventive of war than armies or navies, forts or armaments. At present prices, our cotton crop will yield an annual product of $72,000,000, and the manufactured fabric $504,000,000, furnishing profits abroad to thousands of capitalists, and wages to hundreds of thousands of the working classes; all of whom would be deeply injured by any disturbance, growing out of a state of war, to the direct and adequate supply of the raw material. If our manufacturers consume 400,000 bales, it would cost them $12,000,000 whilst selling the manufactured fabric for $84,000,000; and they should be the last to unite in imposing heavy taxes upon that great interest which supplies them with the raw material out of which they realize such large profits. Accompanying the drawback of the duty en cotton-bagging should be the repeal of the duty on foreign cotton, which is inoperative and delusive, and not desired by the domestic producer.
The condition of our foreign relations, it is said, should suspend the reduction of the tariff. No American patriot can desire to arrest our onward career in peace and prosperity; but if, unhappily, such should be the result, it would create an increased necessity for reducing our present high duties in order to obtain sufficient revenue to meet increased expenditures. The duties for the quarter ending the 30th September, 1844, yielded $2,011,885.90 more of revenue than the quarter ending 30th September, 1845; showing a very considerable decline of the revenue, growing out of a diminished importation of the highly-protected articles and the progressive substitution of the domestic rivals. Indeed, many of the duties are becoming dead letters, except for the purpose of prohibition, and, if not reduced, will ultimately compel their advocates to resort to direct taxation to support the government. In the event of war, nearly all the high dxities would become prohibitory, from the increased risk and cost of importations; and if there be, indeed, in the opinion of any, a serious danger of such an occurrence, it appeals most strongly to their patriotism to impose the lowest revenue duties on all articles, as the only means of securing, at such a period, any considerable income from the tariff.
The whole power to collect taxes, whether direct or indirect, is conferred by the same clause of the Constitution. The words are, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” A direct tax or excise, not for revenue, but for protection, clearly would not be within the legitimate object of taxation; and yet it would be as much so as a duty imposed for a similar purpose. The power is “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” A duty must be laid only that it may be collected; and if it is so imposed that it cannot be collected, in whole or in part, it violates the declared object of the granted power. To lay all duties so high that none of them could be collected would be a prohibitory tariff. To lay a duty on any one article so high that it could not be collected would be a prohibitory tariff upon that article: If a duty of 100% were imposed upon all or upon a number of articles, so as to diminish the revenue upon all or any of them, it would operate as a partial prohibition. A partial and a total prohibition are alike in violation of the true object of the taxing power. They only differ in degree, and not in principle. If the revenue limit maybe exceeded 1%, it may be exceeded 100%. If it may be exceeded upon any one article, it may be exceeded on all; and there is no escape from this conclusion, but in contending that Congress may lay duties on all articles so high as to collect no revenue, and operate as a total prohibition.
The Constitution declares that “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.” A tariff bill, it is conceded, can only originate in the House, because it is a bill for raising revenue. That is the only proper object of such a bill. A tariff is a bill to “lay and collect taxes.” It is a bill for “raising revenue,” and whenever it departs from that object, in whole or in part, either by total or partial prohibition, it violates the purpose of the granted power.
In arranging the details of the tariff, it is believed that the maximum revenue duties should be imposed upon luxuries. It is deemed just that taxation, whether direct or indirect, should be as nearly as practicable in proportion to property. If the whole revenue were raised by a tax upon property, the poor, and especially those who live by the wages of labor, would pay but a very small portion of such tax; whereas, by the tariff, the poor, by the consumption of various imports or domestic articles enhanced in price by the duties, pay a much larger share of the taxes than if they were collected by an assessment in proportion to property. To counteract as far as possible this effect of the tariff, — to equalize its operation, and make it approximate as nearly as may be to a system of taxes in proportion to property, — the duties upon luxuries, used almost exclusively by the rich, should be fixed at the highest revenue standard. This would not be discriminating in favor of the poor, however just that might be within the revenue limit; but it would mitigate, as far as practicable, that discrimination against the poor which results from every tariff, by compelling them to pay a larger amount of taxes than if assessed and collected on all property in proportion to its value. In accordance with these principles it is believed that the largest practicable portion of the aggregate revenue should be raised by maximum revenue duties upon luxuries, whether grown, produced, or manufactured at home or abroad.
An appeal has been made to the poor, by the friends of protection, on the ground that it augments the wages of labor. In reply, it is contended that the wages of labor have not augmented since the tariff of 1842, and that in some cases they have diminished.
When the number of manufactories is not great, the power of the system to regulate the wages of labor is inconsiderable; but as the profit of capital invested in manufactures is augmented by the protective tariff, there is a corresponding increase of power, until the control of such capital over the wages of labor becomes irresistible. As this power is exercised from time to time, we find it resisted by combinations among the working classes, by turning out for higher wages, or for shorter time; by trades-union; and in some countries, unfortunately, by violence and bloodshed. But the government, by protective duties, arrays itself on the side of the manufacturing system, and by thus augmenting its wealth and power, soon terminates in its favor the struggle between man and money, — between capital and labor. When the tariff of 1842 was enacted, the maximum duty was 20%. By that act, the average of duties on the protected articles was more than double. But the wages of labor did not increase in a corresponding ratio, or in any ratio whatever. On the contrary, whilst wages in some cases have diminished, the prices of many articles used by the working classes have greatly appreciated.
A protective tariff is a question regarding the enhancement of the profits of capital. That is the object, and not to augment the wages of labor, which would reduce those profits. It is a question of percentage, and is to decide whether money vested in our manufactures shall, by special legislation, yield a profit of 10, 20, or 30%, or whether it shall remain satisfied with a dividend equal to that accruing from the same capital invested in agriculture, commerce, or navigation.
The present tariff is unjust and unequal, as well in its details as in the principles upon which it is founded. On some articles the duties are entirely prohibitory, and on others there is a partial prohibition. It discriminates in favor of manufactures and against agriculture, by imposing many higher duties upon the manufactured fabric than upon the agricultural product out of which it is made. It discriminates in favor of the manufacturer and against the mechanic, by many higher duties upon the manufacture than upon the article made out of it by the mechanic. It discriminates in favor of the manufacturer and against the merchant, by injurious restrictions upon trade and commerce; and against the ship-building and navigating interest, by heavy duties on almost every article used in building or navigating vessels. It discriminates in favor of manufactures and against exports, which are as truly the product of American industry as manufactures. It discriminates in favor of the rich and against the poor, by high duties upon nearly all the necessaries of life and by minimums and specific duties, rendering the tax upon the real value much higher on the cheaper than upon the finer article.
Minimums are a fictitious value assumed by law, instead of the real value; and the operation of all mini-mums may be illustrated by a single example. Thus, by the tariff of 1842, a duty of 30% ad valorem is levied on all manufactures of cotton; but the law further provides that cotton goods “not dyed, colored, printed, or stained, not exceeding in value twenty cents per square yard, shall be valued at twenty cents per square yard.” If, then, the real value of the cheapest cotton goods is but four cents a square yard, it is placed by the law at the false value of twenty cents per square yard, and the duty levied on the fictitious value, — raising it five times higher on the cheap article consumed by the poor, than upon the fine article purchased by the more wealthy. Indeed, by House document No. 306, of the 1st session of the 28th Congress, this difference, by actual importation, was 65% between the cheaper and the finer article of the 20% minimum, 131% on the 30% minimum, 48£% on the 35% minimum, 84% on the 60% minimum, and 84% on the 75% minimum. This difference is founded on actual importation, and shows an average discrimination against the poor on cotton imports of 82% beyond what the tax would be if assessed upon the actual value. The operation of the specific duty presents a similar discrimination against the poor and in favor of the rich. Thus, upon salt: the duty is not upon the value, but it is eight cents a bushel, whether the article be coarse or fine, — showing by the same document, from actual importation, a discrimination of 64% against the cheap and in favor of the finer article; and this, to a greater or less extent, is the effect of all specific duties. When we consider that $2,892,621.74 of the revenue last year was collected by minimum duties, and $13,311,085.46 by specific duties, the discrimination against the cheaper article must amount, by estimates founded on the same document, to a tax of $5,108,422 exacted by minimums and specific duties annually from the poorer classes, by raising thus the duties on the cheaper articles above what they would be if the duty were assessed upon the actual value. If direct taxes were made specific, they would be intolerable. Thus, if an annual tax of $30 were assessed on all houses without respect to their actual value, making the owner of the humble tenement or cabin pay a tax of $30 and the owner of the costly mansion a tax of but $30 on their respective houses, it would differ only in degree, but not in principle, from the same unvarying specific duty on cheap as on fine articles. If any discrimination should be made, it should be the reverse of the specific duty, and of the minimum principle, by establishing a maximum standard above which value the duties on the finer article should be higher, and below which they should be lower on the cheaper article. The tax upon the actual value is the most equal, and can only be accomplished by ad valorem duties. As to fraudulent invoices and under-valuations, these dangers are believed to be arrested effectually by the stringent provisions and severe penalty of the 17th section of the tariff of 1842; and now one half the revenue is collected from ad valorem duties.
At least two thirds of the taxes imposed by the present tariff are paid, not into the treasury but to the protected classes. The revenue from imports last year exceeded $27,000,000. This in itself is a heavy tax; but the whole tax imposed upon the people by the present tariff is not less than $81,000,000, — of which $27,000,000 are paid to the government upon the imports, and $54,000,000 to the protected classes, in enhanced prices of similar domestic articles.
This estimate is based upon the position that the duty is added to the price of the import, and also of its domestic rival If the import is enhanced in price by the duty, so must be the domestic rival; for, being like articles, their price must be the same in the same market The merchant advances in cash the duty on the import, and adds the duty, with a profit upon it, and other charges, to the price, — which must therefore be enhanced to that extent; unless the foreign producer had first deducted the duty from the price. But this is impossible; for such now is, and long has been, the superabundance of capital and active competition in Europe, that a profit of 6% in any business is sufficient to produce large investments of money in that business; and if, by our tariff, a duty of 40% be exacted on the products of such business, and the foreign producer deducts that duty from his previous price, he must sustain a heavy loss. This loss would also soon extend beyond the sales for our consumption to sales to our merchants of articles to be reexported by them from our ports with a drawback of the duty, which would bring down their price throughout the markets of the world. But this the foreign producer cannot afford. The duty, therefore, must be added to the price, and paid by the consumer, — the duty constituting as much a part of the price as the cost of production.
If it be true that, when a duty of 40% is imposed by our tariff, the foreign producer first deducts the duty from the previous price on the sale to our merchant, it must be equally true with a duty of 100%, which is exactly equal to the previous price, and, when deducted, would reduce the price to nothing.
The occasional fall in price of some articles after a tariff is no proof that this was the effect of the tariff; because, from improved machinery, diminished prices of the raw material, or other causes, prices may fall even after a tariff, but they would in such cases have fallen much more but for the tariff. The truest comparison is between the present price of the same article at home and abroad; and to the extent that the price is lower” in the foreign market than in our own, the duty, if equal to that difference, must to that extent enhance the price, and in the same ratio with the lower duty. The difference in price at home or abroad is generally about equal to the difference in the cost of production, and presents in a series of years the surest measure of the effect of the duty,—the enhancement in price being equal to that difference if the duty be higher than that difference or equal to it; or if the duty be lower, then the enhancement is equal to the duty;. and if the article is produced, like cotton, more cheaply here than abroad the duty is inoperative. The great argument for the tariff is that, foreign labor being cheaper than our own, the cost of foreign productions, it is said, is lessened to that extent; and that we must make up this difference by an equivalent duty, and a corresponding enhancement of price in our own market both of the foreign article and of its rival domestic product, — thus rendering the duty a tax on all consumers, for the ben-fit of the protected classes. If the marshal were sent by the federal government to collect a direct tax from the whole people, to be paid over to manufacturing capitalists to enable them to sustain their business, or realize a larger profit, it would be the same in effect as the protective duty, which, when analyzed in its simplest elements, and reduced to actual results, is a mere subtraction of so much money from the people, to increase the resources of the protected classes. Legislation for classes is against the doctrine of equal rights, repugnant to the spirit of our free institutions, and, it is apprehended by many, may become but another form for privileged orders under the name of protection instead of privilege — indicated here not by rank or title, but by profits and dividends extracted from the many by taxes upon them for the benefit of the few.
No prejudice is felt by the Secretary of the Treasury against manufacturers. His opposition is to the protective system, and not to classes or individuals. He doubts not that the manufacturers are sincerely persuaded that the system which is a source of so much profit to them is beneficial also to the country. He entertains a contrary opinion, and claims for the opponents of the system a settled conviction of its injurious effects. Whilst a due regard to the just and equal rights of all classes forbids a discrimination in favor of the manufacturers by duties above the lowest revenue limit, no disposition is felt to discriminate against them ty reducing such duties as operate in their favor below that standard. Under revenue duties, it is believed, they would still receive a reasonable profit — equal to that realized by those engaged in other pursuits; and it is thought they should desire no more, at least through the agency of governmental power. Equal rights and profits, so far as laws are made, best conform to the principles upon which the Constitution was founded, and with an undeviating regard to which all its functions should be exercised, — looking to the whole country and not to classes or sections.
Soil, climate, and other causes vary very much, in different countries, the pursuits which are most profitable in each; and the prosperity of all of them will be best promoted by leaving them unrestricted by legislation, to exchange with each other those fabrics and products which they severally raise most cheaply. This is clearly illustrated by the perfect free trade which exists among all the States of the Union, and by the acknowledged fact that any one of these States would be injured by imposing duties upon the products of the others. It is generally conceded that reciprocal free trade among nations would best advance the interest of all. But it is contended that we must meet the tariffs of other nations by countervailing restrictions. That duties upon our exports by foreign nations are prejudicial to us, is conceded; but whilst this injury is slightly felt by the manufacturers, its weight falls almost exclusively upon agriculture, commerce, and navigation. If those interests which sustain the loss do not ask countervailing restrictions, it should not be demanded by the manufacturers, who do not feel the injury, and whose fabrics, in fact, are not excluded by the foreign legislation of which they complain. That agriculture, commerce, and navigation are injured by foreign restrictions, constitutes no reason why they should be subject to still severer treatment by additional restrictions and countervailing tariffs enacted at home. Commerce, agriculture, and navigation, harassed as they may be by foreign restrictions, diminishing the amount of exchangeable products which they could otherwise purchase abroad, are burdened with heavier impositions at home. Nor will augmented duties here lead to a reduction of foreign tariffs; but the reverse, by furnishing the protected classes there with the identical argument used by the protected classes here against reduction. By countervailing restrictions we injure our own fellow citizens much more than the foreign nations at whom we propose to aim their force; and in the conflict of opposing tariffs, we sacrifice our own commerce, agriculture, and navigation. As well might we impose monarchical or aristocratic restrictions on our own government or people because that is the course of foreign legislation. Let our commerce be as free as our political institutions. Let us, with revenue duties only, open our ports to all the world, and nation after nation will soon follow our example. If we reduce our tariff, the party opposed to the corn laws of England would soon prevail, and admit all our agricultural products at all times freely iuto her ports, in exchange for her exports. And if England would now repeal her duties upon our wheat, flour, Indian corn, and other > agricultural products, our own restrictive system would certainly be doomed to overthrow. If the question is asked, who shall begin this work of reciprocal reduction? it is answered by the fact, that England has already abated her duties upon most of our exports. She has repealed the duty upon cotton, and greatly reduced the tariff upon our breadstuff s, provisions, and other articles; and her present bad harvest, if accompanied by a reduction of our tariff, would lead to the repeal of her corn laws, and the unrestricted admission, at all times, of our agricultural products. The manufacturing interest opposes reciprocal free trade with foreign nations. It opposes the Zoll-Verein treaty; and it is feared that no other treaty producing a reciprocal reduction of our own and foreign tariffs will receive its support. If that interest preferred a reciprocal exchange of our own for foreign fabrics, at revenue duties, it would not have desired a tariff operating, without exception, against all nations that adopted low as well as high tariffs; nor would it have opposed every amendment proposing, when the tariff of 1842 was under consideration, a reduction of our duties upon the exports of such nations as would receive, free of duty, our flour and other agricultural products. If that interest desired reciprocal free trade with other nations, it would have desired a very different tariff from that of 1842. It would have sought to confine the high duties to those cases where the foreign importer would sell his imports for cash only; and admitted a drawback of one half of the duty where American exports would be taken abroad in exchange, — not an actual barter of foreign imports for an equal amount in value of our products, but without any barter, where a sum equal to the value of their exports was used in purchasing here an equal amount in value of any of our products; and the shipment made abroad of these products, upon the same principle under which a drawback of duties is now allowed on the reexportation of foreign imports. This would be less simple, and is not recommended in lieu of that absolute reduction of the duties which will accomplish the same object of unrestricted exchange. But such a provision would be a self-executing reciprocity law, and should be desired by those believing in countervailing tariffs against foreign nations, but in reciprocal free trade with all, — thus enabling our farmers and planters to sell their products for cheaper foreign manufactures, getting more for what they sell, and paying less for what they purchase in exchange. It seems strange, that while the profit of agriculture varies from 1$> to 8%, that of manufactures is more than double. The reason is, that whilst the high duties secure nearly a monopoly of the home market to the manufacturer, the farmer and planter are deprived to a great extent of the foreign market by these duties. The farmer and planter are, to a great extent, forbidden to buy in the foreign market, and confined to the domestic articles enhanced in price by the duties. The tariff is thus a double benefit to the manufacturer, and a double loss to the farmer and planter, a benefit to the former in nearly a monopoly of the home market, and in enhanced prices of their fabrics; and a loss to the latter in the payment of those high prices, and a total or partial exclusion from the foreign market. The true question is, whether the fanner and planter shall, to a great extent, supply our people with cheap manufactures, purchased abroad with their agricultural products, or whether this exchange shall be forbidden by high duties on such manufactures, and their supply thrown, as a monopoly, at large prices, by high tariffs, into the hands of our own manufacturers. The number of manufacturing capitalists who derive the benefit from the heavy taxes extracted by the tariff from 20,000,000 of people does not exceed 10,000. The whole number (including the working classes engaged in our manufactures) deriving any benefit from the tariff does not exceed 400,000, of whom not more than 40,000 have been brought into this pursuit by the last tariff. But this small number of 40,000 would still have been in the country, consuming our agricultural products; and in the attempt to secure them as purchasers, so small in number, and not consuming one half the supply of many counties, the fanner and planter are asked to sacrifice the markets of the world, containing a population of 800,000,000, disabled from purchasing our products by our high duties on all they would sell in exchange. The farmer and planter have the home market without a tariff; and they would have the foreign market also to a much greater extent, but for the total or partial prohibition of the last tariff.
We have more fertile lands than any other nation, can raise a greater variety of products, and, it may be said, could feed and clothe the people of nearly all the world. The home market, of itself, is wholly inadequate for such products. They must have the foreign market, or a large surplus, accompanied by great depression in price, must be the result. The States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, if cultivated to their fullest extent, could of themselves raise more than sufficient food to supply the entire home market. Missouri or Kentucky could more than supply it with hemp; already the State of Mississippi raises more cotton than is sufficient for all the home market; Louisiana is rapidly approaching the same point as to sugar; and there are lands enough adapted to that product in Louisiana, Texas, and Florida, to supply with sugar and molasses nearly all the markets of the world. If cotton is depressed in price by the tariff, the consequence must be a comparative diminution of the product, and the raising in its place, to a great extent, hemp, wheat, corn, stock, and provisions, which otherwise would be supplied by the teeming products of the West. The growing West in a series of years must be the greatest sufferers by the tariff, in depriving them of the foreign market and that of the cotton growing States. We demand, in fact, for our agricultural products, specie from nearly all the world, by heavy taxes upon all their manufactures; and their purchases from us must therefore be limited, as well as their sales to us enhanced in price. Such a demand for specie, which we know in advance cannot be complied with, is nearly equivalent to a decree excluding most of our agricultural products from the foreign markets. Such is the rigor of our restrictions that nothing short of a famine opens freely the ports of Europe for our breadstuffs. Agriculture is our chief employment; it is best adapted to our situation; and, if not depressed by the tariff, would be the most profitable. We can raise a larger surplus of agricultural products, and a greater variety, than almost any other nation, and at cheaper rates. Remove, then, from agriculture all our restrictions, and by its own unfettered power it will break down all foreign restrictions, and, ours being removed, would feed the hungry and clothe the poor of our fellow men throughout all the densely peopled nations of the world. But now we will take nothing in exchange for these products but specie, except at very high div ties; and nothing but a famine breaks down all foreign restrictions, and opens for a time the ports of Europe to our breadstuffs. If, on a reduction of our duties, England repeals her corn laws, nearly all Europe must follow her example or give to her manufacturers advantages which cannot be successfully encountered in most of the markets of the world. The tariff did not raise the price of our breadstuffs; but a bad harvest in England does, — giving us for the time that foreign market which we would soon have at all times by that repeal of the corn laws which must follow the reduction of our duties. But whilst breadstuffs rise with a bad harvest in England, cotton almost invariably falls; because the increased sum which, in that event, England must pay for our breadstuffs, we will take, not in manufactures, but only in specie; and not having it to spare, she brings down, even to a greater extent, the price of our cotton. Hence the result that a bad harvest in England reduces the aggregate price of our exports, often turns the exchanges against us, carrying our specie abroad, and inflicting a serious blow on our prosperity. Foreign nations cannot for a series of years import more than they export; and if we close our markets against their imports by high duties, they must buy less of our exports, or give a lower price, or both.
Prior to the 30th of June, 1842, a credit was given for the payment of duties; since which date they have been collected in cash. Before the cash duties and the tariff of 1842, our trade in foreign imports reexported abroad afforded large and profitable employment to our merchants, and freight to our commercial marine, both for the inward and outward voyage; but since the last tariff this trade is being lost to the country, as is proved by the tables hereto annexed. The total amount of foreign imports reexported during the three years since the last tariff, both of free and dutiable goods, is $33,384,394, — being far less than in any three years (except during the war) since 1793, and less than was reexported in any one of eight several years. The highest aggregate of any three years was $173,108,813, and the lowest aggregate $41,315,705, — being in the years 1794,1795, and 1796. Before 1820 the free goods are not distinguished in this particular from the dutiable goods; but since that date the returns show the following result: During the three years since the tariff of 1842, the value of dutiable imports reexported was $12,590,811, — being less than in any one of seven years preceding since 1820, the lowest aggregate of any three years since that date being $14,918,444, and the highest $57,727,293. Even before the cash duties, for five years preceding the high tariff of 1828, the value of dutiable goods reexported was $94,796,241; and for the five years succeeding that tariff, $66,784,192, — showing a loss of $28,012,049 of our trade in foreign exports after the tariff of 1828. The diminution of this most valuable branch of commerce has been the combined result of cash duties and of the high tariff of 1842. If the cash duties are retained, as it is believed they should be, the only sure method of restoring this trade is the adoption of the warehousing system, by which the foreign imports may be kept in store by the government until they are required for reexportation abroad, or consumption at home — in which latter contingency, and at the time when, for that purpose, they are taken out of these stores for consumption, the duties are paid, and if reexported, they pay no duty, but only the expense of storage. Under the present system, the merchant introduces foreign imports of the value of $100,000. He must now, besides the advance for the goods, make a further advance in cash, in many cases, of $50,000 for the duties. Under such a system but a small amount of goods will be imported for drawbacks; and the higher the duty the larger must be the advance, and the smaller the imports for reëxportation.
The imports, before payment of duties, under the same regulations now applied to our imports in transit to Canada, may be taken from warehouse to warehouse — from the East to the lakes, and to Pittsburg, Cincinnati, and Louisville; from New Orleans to Natchez, Vicks-burg, Memphis, and St. Louis — and warehoused in these and other interior ports, the duties remaining Unpaid until the goods are taken out of the warehouse, and out of the original package at such ports, for consumption; thus carrying our foreign commerce into the interior, with all the advantage of augmented business, and cheaper supplies throughout the country. It will introduce into our large ports on or near the seaboard, assorted cargoes of goods to be reexported with our own, to supply the markets of the world. It will cheapen prices to the consumer, by deducting the interest and profit that are now charged upon the advance of duty, — building up the marts of our own commerce, and giving profitable employment to our own commercial marine. It will greatly increase our revenue by augmenting our imports, together with our exports; and is respectfully recommended to Congress, as an important part of the whole system now proposed for their consideration.
The act of the 3d of March last, allowing a drawback on foreign imports exported from certain of our ports to Canada, and also to Santa Fé and Chihuahua, in Mexico, has gone to some extent into effect under regulations prescribed by this department, and is beginning to produce the most happy results, especially in an augmented trade in the supply of foreign exports to Canada from our own ports. Indeed, this law must soon give to us the whole of this valuable trade during the long period when the St. Lawrence is closed by ice, and a large proportion of it at all seasons. The result would be still more beneficial, if Canada were allowed to carry all her exports to foreign nations in transitu through our own railroads, rivers, and canals, to be shipped from our own ports. Such a system, whilst it would secure to us this valuable trade, would greatly enlarge the business on our rivers, lakes, railroads, and canals, as well as augment our commerce; and would soon lead to the purchase, by Canada, not only of our foreign exports, but also, in many cases, of our domestic products and fabrics, to complete an assortment. In this manner our commercial relations with Canada would become more intimate, and more and more of her trade every year would be secured to our people.
Connected with this department and the finances is the question of the sales of the public lands. The proceeds of these sales, it is believed, should continue to constitute a portion of the revenue, diminishing to that extent the amount required to be raised by the tariff. The net proceeds of these sales paid into the treasury during the last fiscal year, was $2,077,022.30; and from the first sales in 1787 up to the 30th of September last, was $118,607,335.91. The average annual sales have been much less than 2,000,000 of acres; yet the aggregate net proceeds of the sales, in 1834; 1835, 1836, and 1837, was $51,268,617.82. Those large sales were almost exclusively for speculation; and this can only be obviated, at all times, by confining the sales to settlers and cultivators in limited quantities, sufficient for farms or plantations. The price at which the public lands should be sold is an important question to the whole country, but especially to the people of the new States, living mostly remote from the seaboard, and who have scarcely felt the presence of the government in local expenditures, but chiefly in the exhaustion of their means for purchases of public lands and for customs. The public lands are not of the same value; yet they are all fixed at one unvarying price, which is far above the value of a large portion of these lands. The quantity now subject to entry at the minimum price of $1.25 per acre is 133,307,457 acres, and 109,035,345 in addition, to which the Indian title has been extinguished, —being an aggregate of 242,342,802 acres, and requiring a century and a quarter to complete the sales at the rate they have progressed heretofore, without including any of the unsold lands of Texas or Oregon, or of the vast region besides to which the Indian titte is not yet extinguished. It is clear, then, that there is a vast and aunually-increasing surplus of public lands, very little of which will be sold within any reasonable period at the present price, and in regard to which the public interest would be promoted, and the revenue augmented by reducing the price. The reduction of the price of Che public lands in favor of settlers and cultivators would enhance the wages of labor. It is an argument urged in favor of the tariff, that we ought to protect our labor against what is called the pauper labor of Europe. But whilst the tariff does not enhance the wages of labor, the sales of the public lands at low prices, and in limited quantities, to settlers and cultivators, would accomplish this object. If those who live by the wages of labor could purchase 320 acres of land for $80, 160 acres for $40, or 80 acres for $20, or a 40 acre lot for $10, the power of the manufacturing capitalist in reducing the wages of labor would be greatly diminished; because, when these lands were thus reduced in price, those who live by the wages of labor could purchase farms at these low rates, and cultivate the soil for themselves and families, instead of working for others twelve hours a day in the manufactories. Reduce the price which the laborer must pay for the public domain; bring thus the means of purchase within his power; prevent all speculation and monopoly in the public lands; confine the sales to settlers and cultivators, in limited quantities; preserve these hundreds of millions of acres, for ages to come, as homes for the poor and oppressed; reduce the taxes, by reducing the tariff, and bringing down the prices which the poor are thus compelled to pay for all the necessaries and comforts of life, and more will be done for the benefit of American labor than if millions were added to the profits of manufacturing capital by the enactment of a protective tariff.
The Secretary of the Treasury, on coming into office, found the revenues deposited with banks. The law establishing the Independent Treasury was repealed, and the secretary had no power to reestablish that system. Congress had not only repealed that law, but, as a substitute, had adopted the present system of deposit banks, and prohibited changing any one of those for another bank, except for specified reasons. No alternative was left but to continue the existing system until Congress should think proper to change it. That change, it is hoped, will now be made by a return to the treasury of the Constitution. One of the great evils of banks is the constant expansion and contraction of the currency; and this evil is augmented by the deposits of the revenue with banks, whether State or national. The only proper course for the government is to keep its own money separate from all banks and bankers, in its own treasury, — whether in the mint, branch mints, or other government agencies, —and to use only gold and silver coin in all receipts and disbursements. The business of the country will be more safe when an adequate supply of specie is kept within our limits, and its circulation encouraged by all the means within the power of the government. If this government and the States and the people unite in suppressing the use of specie, an adequate supply, for want of a demand, cannot be kept within our limits, and the condition of the business and currency of the country will be perilous and uncertain. It will be completely within the power of the banks, whose paper will constitute the exclusive circulation of the whole community. Nor will it be useful to establish a constitutional treasury, if it is to receive or disburse the paper of banks. Separation from banks in that case would only be nominal, and no addition would be made to the circulation of gold and silver.
Various forms of paper credit have been suggested, as connected with the operations of the constitutional treasury; but they are all considered as impairing one of the great objects of such a treasury, namely, an augmented circulation of specie. If paper, in whatever form, or from whatever source it may issue, should be introduced as a circulation by the constitutional treasury, it would, precisely to that extent, diminish its use as a means of circulating gold and silver.
The constitutional treasury could be rendered a most powerful auxiliary of the mint in augmenting the specie circulation. The amount of public money which can be placed in the mint is now limited by law to $1,000,000; and to that extent it is now used as a depository, and as a means of increasing our coinage. It is suggested that this limitation may be so modified as to permit the use of our mint and branch mints for a much larger sum, in connection with the constitutional treasury. The amount of public money received at New York greatly exceeds that collected at all other points, and would of itself seem to call for a place of public deposit there; in view of which, the location of a branch of the mint of the United States at that city would be most convenient and useful. The argument used against a constitutional treasury, of the alleged insecurity of the public funds in the hands of individuals, and especially the vast amount collected at New York, will be entirely obviated by such an establishment The mint of the United States has now been in existence fifty-two years. It has had the custody of upwards of $114,000,000, and during this long period of time there never has been a loss of any of its specie in the mint by the government. The mint at Philadelphia is now conducted with great efficiency, by the able and faithful officer at the head of that establishment, whose general supervisory authority, without leaving the parent mint, might still be wisely extended to the branch at New York. Besides the utility of such a branch as a place for keeping safely and disbursing the public money, it is believed that the coinage might be greatly augmented by the existence of a branch of the mint at that great city. It is there that two thirds of the revenue is annually collected,— the whole of which, under the operation of the constitutional treasury, would be received in specie. Of that amount, a very large sum would be received in coin of other countries, and especially in foreign gold coins, — all which could be speedily converted upon the spot into our own coins of gold and silver. The amount also of such foreign coin brought by emigrants to the city of New York is very considerable; a large portion of which would find its way to the branch of the mint for re-coinage. The foreign gold coins do not, and it is feared will not, circulate generally as a currency, notwithstanding they are made a tender by lav. The rate at which these coins are fixed by law is not familiar to the people; the denomination of such coin is inconvenient; the parts into which it is divided are not decimal; the rates at which it is taken vary in different parts of the Union. It is inconvenient in the way of ready transfer in counting; it is more difficult, in common use, to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit foreign coin; and the stamp upon it is not familiar to the people, — from all which causes, a foreign gold coin does not, and will not, circulate generally as a currency among the people. In many of the banks, nearly the whole of their specie is kept in every variety of foreign gold coin; and when it is tendered by them in payment of their notes, the great body of the people, not being familiar with these coins, do not receive them; and thus the circulation of a gold currency is, to a great extent, defeated. If these coins were converted at our mint, or branch mints, into the eagle, the half eagle, and quarter eagle, we should speedily have a large supply of American gold coin, and it would very soon be brought into common use as a currency, and thus give to it greater stability, and greater security to all the business of the country. A considerable amount of foreign gold coin has, during the present year, under the directions of this department, been converted into American gold coin; but the process would be much more rapid if aided by the organization of the constitutional treasury, and the establishment of a branch of the mint at the great commercial emporium of the Union. With the mint and branch mints as depositories, the sum remaining in the hands of other receivers of public money, whether of lands or customs, would be inconsiderable, and the government could be readily protected from all losses of such sums by adequate bonds, and the power by law to convict and punish as criminals all who embezzle the public moneys.
It is believed, under such a system, that no defaults would take place, and that the public moneys would be safely kept and disbursed in gold and silver. This government is made, by the constitution, the guardian of a specie currency. That currency can only be coined, and its value regulated, by this government. It is one of its first duties to supply such a currency, by an efficient mint, and by general regulations of the coinage; but in vain will it attempt to perform that duty, if, when coin is made or regulated in value, this government dispenses with its use, and expels it from circulation, or drives it out of the country, by substituting the paper of banks in all the transactions of the government.
There is nothing which will advance so surely the prosperity of the country as an adequate supply of specie, diffused throughout every portion of the Union, and constituting, to a great extent, the ordinary circulation everywhere among the people. It is a currency that will never break nor fail; it will neither expand nor contract beyond the legitimate business of the country; it will lead to no extravagant speculations at one time, to be followed by certain depression at another; nor will labor ever be robbed of its reward by the depreciation of such currency. There is no danger that we shall have too much gold and silver in actual circulation, or too small an amount of bank paper, or that any injury ever will be inflicted upon the business of the country, by a diminution of the circulation of the paper of banks, and the substitution in its place, to that extent, of gold and silver. Even their most ardent advocates must admit that banks are -subject to periodical expansions and contractions, and that this evil would be increased by giving them the funds of the government to loan, and by receiving and disbursing nothing but their paper.
It is believed that the permanent interest of every class of the people will be advanced by the establishment of the constitutional treasury, and that the manufacturers especially will derive great benefit from its adoption. It will give stability to all their operations, and insure them, to a great extent, against those fluctuations, expansions, and contractions of the currency so prejudicial to their interests. By guarding against inflations of the currency, it will have a tendency to check periodical excesses of foreign importations purchased in fact upon credit; while loans from banks or dangerous enlargements of their business, and excessive issues of their paper will be greatly diminished. Whilst a sound and stable currency guards the manufacturer against excessive importations from abroad, it protects him from disasters at home, and from those ruinous revulsions in which so many thousands are reduced to bankruptcy. The tariff, if followed, as in the absence of adequate checks it certainly soon will be, by an inflated currency, whilst it thus enhances the expenses of manufacturing at home, will speedily and certainly raise prices up to the whole amount of the duty, so as to repeal the operation of that duty in favor of the manufacturer, and enable the foreign importer again to flood the market at the enhanced prices arising from an inflated currency. But soon the revulsion comes, and all are overwhelmed in a common ruin. The currency is reduced below the wants of the country by a sudden and ruinous contraction; and the labor and industry of years are required to repair the mischief. Stability, both in the tariff and the currency, is what the manufacturer should most desire. Let the tariff be permanently adjusted by a return to reasonable and moderate revenue duties, which, even when imposed truly and in good faith for that purpose, will yield sufficient advantage to afford reasonable profits; and let this permanent system (and none other can be permanent) be established, and accompanied by a stable <jur-rency, and the manufacturer in a series of years will derive the greatest benefits from the system. The present system cannot be permanent. It is too unequal and unjust, too exorbitant and oppressive, and too clearly in conflict with the fundamental principles of the Constitution. If the manufacturer thinks that this system can be permanent, let him look to the constant changes which have attended all attempts to establish and continue a protective tariff. The first tariff was based in part upon the principle of very moderate protection to domestic manufactures; and the result has been, as appears by the table hereto annexed, that the tariff has been changed and modified thirty times since that period, — being more than once, on an average, for every Congress since the government was founded; and one of these tariffs was in itself a system of successive biennial changes, operating through a period of ten years. Of these changes, fourteen have been general, and sixteen special. From 1816 onward, these changes have been most frequent; and it is vain to expect permanency from anything but a revenue tariff. Stability is what the manufacturer should desire, and especially that the question should be taken out of the arena of politics by a just and permanent settlement. A great number of tables illustrative of the effects of the tariff, compiled from official documents, accompany this report. Some of these tables exhibit the operation of each of our tariffs from the organization of the government to the present period. In order to enable the Secretary to comply with the direction of the acts of Congress, requiring him in his annual report to suggest “plans for improving or increasing the revenues,” and to give “information to Congress in adopting modes of raising” the revenue, two circulars were issued, published and generally distributed, propounding various questions connected with this subject, and requesting replies. Some answers have been received from friends as well as opponents of the tariff; but the Secretary regrets that the manufacturers, with very few exceptions, have declined answering these questions, or communicating any information as regards their profits and surplus, or in relation to the wages of labor. An abstract of all that is deemed useful in these replies, together with a copy of both the circulars, is appended to this report.
The coast survey is rapidly progressing, having been extended eastward to the eastern coast of Massachusetts, and southward nearly to the dividing line of Maryland and Virginia, on the Chesapeake. Two new-centres of operation have been opened under the sanction of this department, in North Carolina, and on the Gulf of Mexico, from which the work may be spread until the parts unite. Important positions for forts, navy yards, harbors, and lighthouses, present themselves along this interesting portion of the coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and the islands guarding the interior channel between Mobile and New Orleans. Great economy exists in the administration of the fund appropriated for the coast survey; and every effort is made by the superintendent to press the work onward to a completion; and his report in detail will be hereafter submitted to Congress. Three charts, resulting from the survey, have been published within the past year, and five more are nearly ready for publication. This great work is most honorable to the science of our country, most useful to our navy and commercial marine, and, in connection with our lighthouses, must decrease the cost of freight and insurance, as well as the risk of life and property. Great attention has been given by this department to the very important subject of our lighthouse system. The various improvements suggested by experience at home or abroad; the relative advantages of gas or oil, of reflectors, lenticular and revolving lights; the location and construction of the buildings, as well as the mode of keeping the lights, are all being fully and carefully investigated, and a report, it is believed, will be ready during the present session of Congress. From the Chesapeake to the capes of Florida, and thence westward, our coast is badly lighted, as well as the great lakes of the Northwest; and numerous wrecks, often accompanied with loss of life and property, seem to require the interposition of Congress.
Such portions of the charts of the exploring expedition as were placed under the charge of this department were distributed for the benefit of our whale ships. These valuable charts embrace the survey of many hitherto almost unexplored regions and islands of the Pacific, as well as a part of the coast of Oregon, and must be eminently useful for many purposes, but especially to our seamen and merchants engaged in the whale fishery. In pursuance of a resolution of Congress, a report is in progress of preparation as regards the banks and currency, and also in relation to statistics; and these, with all other reports required from this department, will be presented at the earliest practicable period of the present session.
In presenting his annual report, in obedience to the law, the Secretary of the Treasury submits his views with undissembled diffidence, consoled by the reflection that all his errors of judgment will be corrected by the superior wisdom of the two Houses of Congress, guided and directed by that overruling Providence which has blessed the unexampled progress of this great and happy Union.
E. J. WALKER,
Secretary of the Treasury.Hon. JOHN W. DAVIS,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.SPEECH OF HENRY CLAY ON AMERICAN
INDUSTRY,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 30 AND
81, 1824.The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Barbour] has embraced the occasion produced by the proposition of the gentleman from Tennessee to strike out the minimum price in the bill on cotton fabrics, to express his sentiments at large on the policy of the pending measure; and it is scarcely necessary for me to say that he has evinced his usual good temper, ability, and decorum. The parts of the bill are so intermingled and interwoven together that there can be no doubt of the fitness of this occasion to exhibit its merits or its defects. It is my intention, with the permission of the committee, to avail myself also of this opportunity, to present to its consideration those general views, as they appear to me, of the true policy of this country, which imperiously demand the passage of this bill. I am deeply sensible, Mr. Chairman, of the high responsibility of my present situation. But that responsibility inspires me with no other apprehension than that I shall be unable to fulfill my duty; with no other solicitude than that I may, at, least, in some small degree, contribute to recall my country from the pursuit of a fatal policy, which appears to me inevitably to lead to its impoverishment and ruin. I do feel most awfully this responsibility. And if it were allowable for us at the present day to imitate ancient examples, I would invoke the aid of the Most High. I would anxiously and fervently implore his divine assistance: that He would be graciously pleased to shower on my country his richest blessings; and that He would sustain, on this interesting occasion, the humble individual who stands before Him, and lend him the power, moral and physical, to perform the solemn duties which now belong to his public station.
Two classes of politicians divide the people of the United States. According to the system of one, the produce of foreign industry should be subjected to no other impost than such as may be necessary to provide a public revenue; and the produce of American industry should be left to sustain itself, if it can, with no other than that incidental protection, in its competition, at home as well as abroad, with rival foreign articles. According to the system of the other class, whilst they agree that the imposts should be mainly, and may under any modification be safely, relied on as a fit and convenient source of public revenue, they would so adjust and arrange the duties on foreign fabrics as to afford a gradual but adequate protection to American industry, and lessen our dependence on foreign nations, by securing a certain and ultimately a cheaper and better supply of our own wants from our own abundant resources. Both classes are equally sincere in their respective opinions, equally honest, equally patriotic, and desirous of advancing the prosperity of the country. In the discussion and consideration of these opposite opinions for the purpose of ascertaining which has the support of truth and reason, we should, therefore, exercise every indulgence and the greatest spirit of mutual moderation and forbearance. And in our deliberations on this great question, we should look fearlessly and truly at the actual condition of the country, retrace the causes which have brought us into it, and snatch, if possible, a view of the future. We should, above all, consult experience — the experience of other nations, as well as our own — as our truest and most unerring guide.
In casting our eyes around us, the most prominent circumstance which fixes our attention and challenges our deepest regret is the general distress which pervades the whole country. It is forced upon us by numerous facts of the most incontestable character. It is indicated by the diminished exports of native produce; by the depressed and reduced state of our foreign navigation; by our diminished commerce; by successive unthrashed crops of grain, perishing in our barns and barn-yards for the want of a market; by the alarming diminution of the circulating medium; by the numerous bankruptcies, not limited to the trading classes, but extending to all orders of society; by a universal complaint of the want of employment, and a consequent reduction of the wages of labor; by the ravenous pursuit after public situations, not for the sake of their honors and tie performance of their public duties, but as a means of private subsistence; by the reluctant resort to the perilous use of paper money; by the intervention of legislation in the delicate relation between debtor and creditor; and, above all, by the low and depressed state’ of the value of almost every description of the whole mass of the property of the nation, which has, on an average, sunk not less than about fifty per centum within a few years. This distress pervades every part of the Union, every class of society; all feel it, though it may be felt at different places, in different degrees. It is like the atmosphere which surrounds us, — all must inhale it, and none can escape it. In some places it has burst upon our people, without a single mitigating circumstance to temper its severity. In others, more fortunate, slight alleviations have been experienced in the expenditure of the public revenue, and in other favoring causes. A few years ago the planting interest consoled itself with its happy exemptions, but it has now reached this interest also, which experiences, though with less severity, the general suffering. It is most painful to me to attempt to sketch or to dwell on the gloom of this picture. But I have exaggerated nothing. Perfect fidelity to the original would have authorized me to have thrown on deeper and darker hues. And it is the duty of the statesman, no less than that of the physician, to survey, with a penetrating, steady, and undismayed eye, the actual condition of the subject on which he would operate; to probe to the bottom the diseases of the body politic, if he would apply efficacious remedies. We have not, thank God, suffered in any great degree for food. But distress resulting from the absence of a supply of the mere physical wants of our nature, is not the only nor perhaps the keenest distress to which we may be exposed. Moral and pecuniary suffering is, if possible, more poignant. It plunges its victim into hopeless despair. It poisons, it paralyzes the spring and source of all useful exertion. Its unsparing action is collateral as well as direct. It falls with inexorable force at the same time upon the wretched family of embarrassment and insolvency and upon its head. They are a faithful mirror, reflecting back upon him at once his own frightful image, and that no less appalling of the dearest objects of his affection. What is the cause of this wide-spreading distress, of this deep depression, which we behold stamped on the public countenance? We are the same people. We have the same country. We cannot arraign the bounty of Providence. The showers still fall in the same grateful abundance. The sun still casts his genial and vivifying influence upon the land; and the land, fertile and diversified in its soils as ever, yields to the industrious cultivator in boundless profusion its accustomed fruits, its richest treasures. Our vigor is unimpaired. Our industry has not relaxed. If ever the accusation of wasteful extravagance could be made against our people, it cannot now be justly preferred. They, on the contrary, for the few last years at least, have been practicing the most rigid economy. The causes, then, of our present affliction, whatever they may be, are human causes, and human causes not chargeable upon the people, in their private and individual relations.
What, again I would ask, is the cause of the unhappy condition of our country, which I have faintly depicted? It is to be found in the fact that, during almost the whole existence of this government, we have shaped our industry, our navigation, and our commerce, in reference to an extraordinary war in Europe, and to foreign markets which no longer exist; in the fact that we have depended too much upon foreign sources of supply, and excited too little the native; in the fact that, whilst we have cultivated, with assiduous care, our foreign resources, we have suffered those at home to wither in a state of neglect and abandonment. The consequence of the termination of the war of Europe has been the resumption of European commerce, European navigation, and the extension of European agriculture and European industry in all its branches. Europe, therefore, has no longer occasion, to anything like the same extent as that she had during her wars, for American commerce, American navigation, the produce of American industry. Europe, in commotion, and convulsed throughout all her members, is to America no longer the same Europe as she is now, tranquil, and watching with the most vigilant attention all her own peculiar interests without regard to the operation of her policy upon us. The effect of this altered state of Europe upon us has been, to circumscribe the employment of our marine, and greatly to reduce the value of the produce of our territorial labor. The further effect of this twofold reduction has been to decrease the value of all property, whether on the land or on the ocean, and which I suppose to be about fifty per cent. And the still further effect has been to diminish the amount of our circulating medium, in a proportion not less, by its transmission abroad, or its withdrawal by the banking institutions, from a necessity which they could not control. The quantity of money, in whatever form it may be, which a nation wants, is in proportion to the total mass of its wealth, and to the activity of that wealth. A nation that has but little wealth has but a limited want of money. In stating the fact, therefore, that the total wealth of the country has diminished, within a few years, in a ratio of about fifty per cent, we shall at once fully comprehend the inevitable reduction which must have ensued in the total quantity of the circulating medium of the country. A nation is most prosperous when there is a gradual and unteinpting addition to the aggregate of its circulating medium. It is in a condition the most adverse, when there is a rapid diminution in the quantity of the circulating medium, and a consequent depression in the value of property. In the former case the wealth of individuals insensibly increases, and income keeps ahead of expenditure. But in the latter instance, debts have been contracted, engagements made, and habits of expense established in reference to the existing state of wealth and of its representative. When these come to be greatly reduced, individuals find their debts still existing, their engagements unexecuted, and their habits inveterate. They see themselves in the possession of the same property, on which, in good faith, they had bound themselves. But that property, without their fault, possesses no longer the same value; and hence discontent, impoverishment and ruin arise. Let us suppose, Mr. Chairman, that Europe was again the theatre of such a general war as recently raged throughout all her dominions, — such a state of the war as existed in her greatest exertions and in our greatest prosperity; instantly there would arise a greedy demand for the surplus produce of our industry, for our commerce, for our navigation. The languor which now prevails in our cities and in our seaports would give way to an animated activity. Our roads and rivers would be crowded with the produce of the interior. Everywhere we should witness excited industry. The precious metals would reflow from abroad upon us. Banks which have maintained their credit would revive their business; and new banks would be established to take the place of those which have sunk beneath the general pressure. For it is a mistake to suppose that they have produced our present adversity; they may have somewhat aggravated it, but they were the effect and the evidence of our prosperity. Prices would, again get up; the former value of property would be restored. And those embarrassed persons who have not been already overwhelmed by the times would suddenly find, in the augmented value of their property, and the renewal of their business, ample means to extricate themselves from all their difficulties. The greatest want of civilized society is a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus of the produce of the labor of its members. This market may exist at home or abroad, or both; but it must exist somewhere, if society prospers; and wherever it does exist, it should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus of production. It is most desirable that there should be both a home and a foreign market. But with respect to their relative superiority, I cannot entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and paramount in importance. The object of the bill under consideration is, to create this home market, and to lay the foundations of a genuine American policy. It is opposed; and it is incumbent upon the partisans of the foreign policy (terms which I shall use without any invidious intent) to demonstrate that the foreign market is an adequate vent for the surplus produce of our labor. But is it so? First, foreign nations cannot, if they would, take our surplus produce. If the source of supply, no matter of what, increases in a greater ratio than the demand for that supply, a glut of the market is inevitable, even if we suppose both to remain perfectly unobstructed. The duplication of our population takes place in terms of about twenty-five years. The term will be more and more extended as our numbers multiply. But it will be a sufficient approximation to assume this ratio for the present. We increase, therefore, in population, at the rate of about 4% per annum. Supposing the increase of our production to be in the same ratio, we should, every succeeding year, have of surplus produce 4% more than that of the preceding year, without taking into the account the differences of seasons which neutralize each other. If, therefore, we are to rely upon the foreign market exclusively, foreign consumption ought to be shown to be increasing in the same ratio of 4% per annum, if it be an adequate vent for our surplus produce. But, as I have supposed the measure of our increasing production to be furnished by that of our increasing population, so the measure of their power of consumption must be determined by that of the increase of their population. Now, the total foreign population, who consume our surplus produce, upon an average, do not double their aggregate number in a shorter term than that of about one hundred years. Our powers of production increase, then, in a ratio four times greater than their powers of consumption. And hence their utter inability to receive from us our surplus produce.
But, secondly, if they could, they will not. The policy of all Europe is adverse to the reception of our agrieultural produce, so far as it comes into collision with its own; and under that limitation we are absolutely forbid to enter their ports, except under circumstances which deprive them of all value as a steady market. The policy of all Europe rejects those great staples of our country which consist of objects of human subsistence. The policy of all Europe refuses to receive from us anything but those raw materials of smaller value, essential to their manufactures, to which they can give a higher value, with the exception of tobacco and rice, which they cannot produce. Even Great Britain, to which we are its best customer, and from which we receive nearly one half in value of our whole imports, will not take from us articles of subsistence produced in our country cheaper than can be produced in Great Britain. In adopting this exclusive policy, the states of Europe do not inquire what is best for us, but what suits themselves respectively; they do not take jurisdiction of the question of our interests, but limit the object of their legislation to that of the conservation of their own peculiar interests, leaving us free to prosecute ours as we please. They do not guide themselves by that romantic philanthropy which we see displayed here, and which invokes us to continue to purchase the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the state or prosperity of our own, that foreigners may be pleased to purchase the few remaining articles of ours which their restricted policy has not yet absolutely excluded from their consumption. What sort of a figure would a member of the British Parliament have made, what sort of a reception would his opposition have obtained, if he had remonstrated against the passage of the corn-law, by which British consumption is limited to the bread-stuffs of British production, to the entire exclusion of American, and stated that America could not and would not buy British manufactures, if Britain did not buy American flour?
Both the inability and the policy of foreign powers, then, forbid us to rely upon the foreign market, as being an adequate vent for the surplus produce of American labor. Now let us see if this general reasoning is not fortified and confirmed by the actual experience of this country. If -the foreign market may be safely relied upon, as furnishing an adequate demand for our surplus produce, then the official documents will show a progressive increase from year to year in the exports of our native produce, in proportion equal to that which I have suggested. If, on the contrary, we shall find from them that, for a long term of past years, some of our most valuable staples have retrograded, some remained stationary, and others advanced but little, if any, in amount, with the exception of cotton, the deductions of reason and the lessons of experience will alike command us to withdraw our confidence in the competency of the foreign market. The total amount of all our exports of domestic produce for the year beginning in 1795, and ending on the 30th September, 1796, was $40,764,097. Estimating the increase according to the ratio of the increase of our population, that is, at 4% per annum, the amount of the exports of the same produce, in the year ending on the 30th of September last, ought to have been $85,420,861. It was in fact only $47,155,408. Taking the average of five years, from 1803 to 1807, inclusive, the amount of native produce exported was $43,202,751 for each of those years. Estimating what it ought to have been, during the last year, applying the principle suggested to that amount, there should have been exported $77,760,751, instead of $47,155,408. If these comparative amounts of the aggregate actual exports, and what they ought to have been, be discouraging, we shall find, on descending into particulars, still less cause of satisfaction. The export of tobacco in 1791 was 112,428 hogsheads. That was the year of the largest exportation of that article; but it is the only instance in which I have selected the maximum of exportation. The amount of what we ought to have exported last year, estimated according to the scale of increase which I have used, is 266,332 hogsheads. The actual export was 99,009 hogsheads. We exported, in 1803, the quantity of 1,311,853 barrels of flour, and ought to have exported last year 2,361,333 barrels. We in fact exported only 756,702 barrels. Of that quantity we sent to South America 150,000 barrels, according to a statement furnished me by the diligence of a friend near me [Mr. Poinsett] to whose valuable mass of accurate information in regard to that interesting quarter of the world I have had occasion frequently to apply. But that demand is temporary, growing out of the existing state of war. Whenever peace is restored to it, — and I now hope that the day is not distant when its independence will be generally acknowledged, — there cannot be a doubt that it will supply its own consumption. In all parts of it, the soil, either from climate or from elevation, is well adapted to the culture of wheat; and nowhere can better wheat be produced than in some portions of Mexico and Chili. Still the market of South America is one which, on other accounts, deserves the greatest consideration. And I congratulate you, the committee, and the country on the recent adoption of a more auspicious policy towards it.
We exported, in 1803, Indian corn to the amount of 2,074,608 bushels. The quantity should have been, in 1823, 3,734,288 bushels. The actual quantity exported was 749,034 bushels, or about one fifth of what it should have been, and a little more than one third of what it was more than twenty years ago. We ought not, then, to be surprised at the extreme depression of the price of that article, of which I have heard my honorable friend (Mr. Bassett) complain, nor of the distress of the corn-growing districts adjacent to the Chesapeake Bay. We exported 77,934 barrels of beef in 1803, and last year but 61,418, instead of 140,274 barrels. In the same year (1803) we exported 96,602 barrels of pork, and last year 55,529, instead of 173,882 barrels. Bice has not advanced, by any means, in the proportion which it ought to have done. All the small articles, such as cheese, butter, candles, and so forth, too minute to detail, but important in their aggregate, have also materially diminished. Cotton alone has advanced. But whilst the quantity of it is augmented, its actual value is considerably diminished. The total quantity last year exceeded that of the preceding year by nearly 30,000,000 pounds. And yet the total value of the year of smaller exportation exceeded that of the last year by upwards of $3,500,000. If this article, the capacity of our country to produce which was scarcely known in 1790, were subtracted from the mass of our exports, the value of the residue would only be a little upwards of $27,000,000 during the last year. The distribution of the articles of our exports throughout the United States cannot fail to fix” the attention of the Committee. Of the $47,155,408 to which they amounted last year, three articles alone (cotton, rice, and tobacco) composed together $28,549,177. Now these articles are chiefly produced in the South. And if we estimate that portion of our population who are actually engaged in their culture, it would probably not exceed 2,000,000. Thus, then, less than one fifth of the whole population of the United States produced upwards of one half — nearly two thirds — of the entire value of the exports of the last year.
Is this foreign market, so incompetent at present, and which, limited as its demands are, operates so unequally upon the productive labor of our country, likely to improve in future? If I am correct in the views which I have presented to the Committee, it must become worse and worse. What can improve it? Europe will not abandon her own agriculture to foster ours. We may even anticipate that she will more and more enter into competition with us in the supply of the West India market. That of South America, for articles of subsistence, will probably soon vanish. The value of our exports for the future may remain at about what it was last year. But if we do not create some new market, if we persevere in the existing pursuits of agriculture, the inevitable consequence must be, to augment greatly the quantity of our produce, and to lessen its value in the foreign market. Can there be a doubt on this point? Take the article of cotton, for example, which is almost the only article that now remunerates labor and capital. A certain description of labor is powerfully attracted towards the cotton-growing country. The cultivation will be greatly extended, the aggregate amount annually produced will be vastly augmented. The price will fall. The more unfavorable soils will then be gradually abandoned. And I have no doubt that, in a few years, it will cease to be profitably produced, anywhere north of the thirty-fourth degree of latitude. But in the mean time, large numbers of the cotton-growers will suffer the greatest distress. And whilst this distress is brought upon our own country, foreign industry will be stimulated by the very cause which occasions our distress. For, by surcharging the markets abroad, the price of the raw material being reduced, the manufacturer will be able to supply cotton fabrics cheaper; and the consumption in his own country, and in foreign nations other than ours (where the value of the import must be limited to the value (c)f the export, which I have supposed to remain the same) being proportionally extended, there will be consequently an increased demand for the produce of his industry.
Our agricultural is our greatest interest. It ought ever to be predominant. All others should bend to it. And, in considering what is for its advantage, we should contemplate it in all its varieties, of planting, farming, and grazing. Can we do nothing to invigorate it; nothing to correct the errors of the past, and to brighten the still more unpromising prospects which lie before us? We have seen, I think, the causes of the distresses of the country. We have seen that an exclusive dependence upon the foreign market must lead to still severer distress, to impoverishment, to ruin. We must then change somewhat our course. We must give a new direction to some portion of our industry. We must speedily adopt a genuine American policy. Still cherishing the foreign market, let us create also a home market, to give further scope to the consumption of the produce of American industry. Let us counteract the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support which we now give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country. It should be a prominent object with wise legislators to multiply the vocations and extend the business of society, as far as it can be done, by the protection of our interests at home against the injurious effects of foreign legislation. Suppose we were a nation of fishermen, or of skippers, to the exclusion of every other occupation, and the legislature had the power to introduce the pursuits of agriculture and manufactures, would not our happiness be promoted by an exertion of its authority? All the existing employments of society — the learned professions, commerce, agriculture — are now overflowing. We stand in each other’s way. Hence the want of employment. Hence the eager pursuit after public stations, which I have before glanced at. I have been again and again shocked during this session by instances of solicitation for places before the vacancies existed. The pulse of incumbents who happen to be taken ill is not marked with more anxiety by the attending physicians than by those who desire to succeed them, though with very opposite feelings. Our old friend, the faithful sentinel, — who has stood so long at our door, and the gallantry of whose patriotism deserves to be noticed because it was displayed when that virtue was most rare and most wanted, on a memorable occasion in this unfortunate city, — became indisposed some weeks ago. The first intelligence which I had of his dangerous illness was by an application for his unvaeated place. I hastened to assure myself of the extent of his danger, and was happy to find that the eagerness of succession outstripped the progress of disease. By creating a new and extensive business, then, we should not only give employment to those who want it, and augment the sum of national wealth by all that this new business would create, but we should meliorate the condition of those who are now engaged in existing employments. In Europe, particularly in Great Britain, their large standing armies, large navies, large even on their peace arrangement, their established church, afford to their population employments, which, in that respect, the happier constitution of our government does not tolerate but in a very limited degree. The peace establishments of our army and our navy are extremely small, and I hope ever will be. We have no established church, and I trust never shall have. In proportion as the enterprise of our citizens in public employments is circumscribed, should we excite and invigorate it in private pursuits.
The creation of a home market is not only necessary to procure for our agriculture a just reward of its labors, but it is indispensable to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we cannot sell, we cannot buy. That portion of our population (and we have seen that it is not less than four fifths) which makes comparatively nothing that foreigners will buy, has nothing to make purchases with from foreigners. It is in vain that we are told of the amount of our exports supplied by the planting interest. They may enable the planting interest to supply all its wants; but they bring no ability to the interests not planting; unless, which cannot be pretended, the planting interest was an adequate vent for the surplus produce of the labor of all other interests. It is in vain to tantalize us with the greater cheapness of foreign fabrics. There must be an ability to purchase, if an article be obtained, whatever may be the price, high or low, at which it is sold. And a cheap article is as much beyond the grasp of him who has no means to buy, as a high one. Even if it were true that the American manufacturer would supply consumption at dearer rates, it is better to have his fabrics than the unattainable foreign fabrics; because it is better to be ill supplied than not supplied at all. A coarse coat, which will communicate warmth and cover nakedness, is better than no coat. The superiority of the home market results, first, from its steadiness and comparative certainty at all times; secondly, from the creation of reciprocal interest; thirdly, from its greater security; and, lastly, from an ultimate and not distant augmentation of consumption (and consequently of comfort) from increased quantity and reduced prices. But this home market, highly desirable as it is, can only be created and cherished by the protection of our own legislation against the inevitable prostration of our industry which must ensue from the action of foreign policy and legislation. The effect and the value of this domestic care of our own interests will be obvious from a few facts and considerations. Let us suppose that half a million of persons are now employed abroad in fabricating for our consumption those articles of which, by the operation of this bill, a supply is intended to be provided within ourselves. That half a million of persons are, in effect, subsisted by us; but their actual means of subsistence are drawn from foreign agriculture. If we could transport them to this country, and incorporate them in the mass of our own population, there would instantly arise a demand for an amount of provisions equal to that which would be requisite for their subsistence throughout the whole year. That demand, in the aiticle of flour alone, would not be less than the quantity of about 900,000 barrels, besides a proportionate quantity of beef and pork and other articles of subsistence. But 900,000 barrels of flour exceeded the entire quantity exported last year by nearly 150,000 barrels. What activity would not this give, what cheerfulness would it not communicate to our now dispirited farming interest! But if, instead of these five hundred thousand artisans emigrating from abroad, we give by this bill employment to an equal number of our own citizens now engaged in unprofitable agriculture, or idle from the want of business, the beneficial effect upon the productions of our farming labor would be nearly doubled. The quantity would be diminished by a subtraction of the produce from the labor of all those who should be diverted from its pursuits to manufacturing industry and the value of the residue would be enhanced, both by that diminution and the creation of the home market, to the extent supposed. And the honorable gentleman from Virginia may repress any apprehensions which he entertains that the plow will be abandoned and our fields remain unsown. For, under all the modifications of social industry, if you will secure to it a just reward, the greater attractions of agriculture will give to it that proud superiority which it has always maintained. If we suppose no actual abandonment of farming, but, what is most likely, a gradual and imperceptible employment of population in the business of manufacturing, instead of being compelled to resort to agriculture, the salutary effect would be nearly the same. Is any part of our common country likely to be injured by a transfer of the theatre of fabrication for our own consumption from Europe to America? All that those parts, if any there be, which will not, nor cannot engage in manufactures, should require, is, that their consumption should be well supplied; and if the objects of that consumption are produced in other parts of the Union that can manufacture, far from having on that account any just cause of complaint, their patriotism will and ought to inculcate a cheerful acquiescence in what essentially contributes, and is indispensably necessary, to the prosperity of the common family.
The great desideratum in political economy is the same as in private pursuits; that is, what is the best application of the aggregate industry of a nation that can be made honestly to produce the largest sum of national wealth? Labor is the source of all wealth; but it is not natural labor only. And the fundamental error of the gentleman from Virginia, and of the school to which he belongs, in deducing from our sparse population, our unfitness for the introduction of the arts, consists in their not sufficiently weighing the importance of the power of machinery. In former times, when but little comparative use was made of machinery, manual labor and the price of wages were circumstances of the greatest consideration. But it is far otherwise in these latter times. Such are the improvements and the perfection of machinery, that, in analyzing the compound value of many fabrics, the element of natural labor is so inconsiderable as almost to escape detection. This truth is demonstrated by many facts. Formerly Asia, in consequence of the density of her population, and the consequent lowness of wages, laid Europe under tribute for many of her fabrics. Now Europe reacts upon Asia, and Great Britain, in particular, throws back upon her countless millions of people the rich treasures produced by artificial labor, to a vast amount, infinitely cheaper than they can be manufactured by the natural exertions of that portion of the globe. But Britain is herself the most striking illustration of the immense power of machinery. Upon what other principle can you account for the enormous wealth which she has accumulated, and which she annually produces? A statistical writer of that country, several years ago, estimated the total amount of the artificial or machine labor of the nation to be equal to that of 100,000,000 of able-bodied laborers. Subsequent estimates of her artificial labor at the present day carry it to the enormous height of 200,000,000. But the population of the three kingdoms is 21,500,000. Supposing that to furnish able-bodied labor to the amount of 4,000,000, the natural labor will be but two per cent of the artificial labor. In the production of wealth she operates, therefore, by a power (including the whole population) of 221,500,000; or, in other words, by a power eleven times greater than the total of her natural power. If we suppose the machine labor of the United States to be equal to that of 10,000,000 able-bodied men, the United States will operate, in the creation of wealth, by a power (including all their population) of 20,000,000. In the creation of wealth, therefore, the power of Great Britain compared to that of the United States is as eleven to one. That these views are not imaginary, will be, I think, evinced by contrasting the wealth, the revenue, the power of the two countries. Upon what other hypothesis can we explain those almost incredible exertions which Britain made during the late wars of Europe? Look at her immense subsidies! Behold her standing unaided and alone, and breasting the storm of Napoleon’s colossal power, when all continental Europe owned and yielded to its irresistible sway; and finally, contemplate her vigorous prosecution of the war, with and without allies, to its splendid termination on the ever-memorable field of Waterloo! The British works which the gentleman from Virginia has quoted portray a state of the most wonderful prosperity in regard to wealth and resources that ever was before contemplated. Let us looks a little into the semiofficial pamphlet, written with great force, clearness, and ability, and the valuable work of Lowe, to both of which that gentleman has referred. The revenue of the United Kingdom amounted, during the latter years of the war, to £70,000,000 sterling; and one year it rose to the astonishing height of £90,000,000 sterling, equal to $400,000,000. This was actual revenue, made up of real contributions from the purses of the people. After the close of the war, ministers slowly and reluctantly reduced the military and naval establishments, and accommodated them to a state of peace. The pride of power, everywhere the same, always unwillingly surrenders any of those circumstances which display its pomp and exhibit its greatness. Contemporaneous with this reduction, Britain was enabled to lighten some of the heaviest burdens of taxation, and particularly that most onerous of all, the income tax. In this lowered state, the revenue of peace, gradually rising from the momentary depression incident to a transition from war, attained in 1822 the vast amount of £55,000,000 sterling, upwards of $240,000,000, and more than eleven times that of the United States for the same year; thus indicating the difference which I have suggested in the respective productive powers of the two countries. The excise alone (collected under twenty-five different heads) amounted to £28,000,000, more than one half of the total revenue of the kingdom. This great revenue allows Great Britain to constitute an efficient sinking fund of £5,000,000 sterling, being an excess of actual income beyond expenditure, and amounting to more than the entire revenue of the United States.
If we look at the commerce of England, we shall perceive that its prosperous condition no less denotes the immensity of her riches. The average of three years’ exports, ending in 1789, was between thirteen and fourteen millions. The average for the same term, ending in 1822, was £40,000,000. The average of the imports for three years, ending in 1789, was £17,000,000. The average for the same term, ending in 1822, was £36,-000,000, showing a favorable balance of £4,000,000. Thus, ia a period not longer than that which has elapsed since the establishment of our constitution, have the exports of that kingdom been tripled; and this has mainly been the effect of the power of machinery. The total amount of the commerce of Great Britain is greater since the peace, by one fourth, than it was during the war. The average of her tonnage, during the most flourishing period of the war, was 2,400,000 tons. Its average, during the three years, 1819, 1820, and 1821, was 2,600,000; exhibiting an increase of 200,000 tons. If we glance at some of the more prominent articles of her manufactures, we shall be assisted in comprehending the true nature of the sources of her riches. The amount of cotton fabrics exported, in the most prosperous year of the war, was £18,000,000. In the year 1820, it was £16,600,000; in 1821, £20,500,000; in 1822, £21,639,000; presenting the astonishing increase in two years of upwards of £5,000,-000. The total amount of imports in Great Britain, from all foreign parts, of the article of cotton wool, is £5,000,000. After supplying most abundantly the consumption of cotton fabrics within the country (and a people better fed and clad and housed are not to te found under the sun than the British nation) by means of her industry, she gives to this cotton wool a new value, which enables her to sell to foreign nations to the amount of £21,639,000, making a clear profit of upwards of £16,600,000! In 1821, the value of the export of woollen manufactures was £4,300,000. In 1822 it was £5,500,000. The success of her restrictive policy is strikingly illustrated in the article of silk. In the manufacture of that article she labors under great disadvantages, besides that of not producing the raw material. She has subdued them all, and the increase of the manufacture has been most rapid. Although she is still unable to maintain, in foreign countries, a successful competition with the silks of France, of India, and of Italy, and therefore exports but little, she gives to the £2,000,000 of the raw material which she imports, in various forms, a value of £10,000,000, which chiefly enter into British consumption. Let us suppose that she was dependent upon foreign nations for these £10,000.000, what an injurious effect would it not have upon her commercial relations with them? The average of the exports of British manufactures, during the peace, exceeds the average of the most productive years of the war. The amount of her wealth annually produced is £350,000,000, bearing a large proportion to all of her preexisting wealth. The agricultural portion of it is said, by the gentleman from Virginia, to be greater than that created by any other branch of her industry. But that flows mainly from a policy similar to that proposed by this bill. One third only of her population is engaged in agriculture, the other two thirds furnishing a market for the produce of that third. Withdraw this market, and what becomes of her agriculture? The power and the wealth of Great Britain cannot be more strikingly illustrated than by a comparison of her population and revenue with those of other countries and with our own. [Here Mr. Clay exhibited the following table, made out from authentic materials.]
Population. Taxes and Taxation public burdens. per capita. Russia in Europe 37,000,000 £18,000,000 £099 France, including Corsica.. 30,700,000 37,000,000 140 Great Britain, exclusive of 1 Ireland (the taxes com- I puted according to the value of money on the I European continent) 14,500,000 40,000,000 2 15 0 Great Britain and Ireland collectively 21,500,000 44,000,000 200 England alone 11,600,000 36,000,000 320 Spain 11,000,000 6,000,000 0 11 0 Ireland 7,000,000 4,000,000 0 11 0 The United States of America 10,000,000 4,500,000 090 From this exhibit we must remark, that the wealth of Great Britain, and consequently her power, is greater than that of any of the other nations with which it is compared. The amount of the contributions which she draws from the pockets of her subjects is not referred to for imitation, but as indicative of their wealth. The burden of taxation is always relative to the ability of the subjects of it. A poor nation can pay but little. And the heavier taxes of British subjects, for example, in consequence of their greater wealth, may be more easily borne than the much lighter taxes of Spanish subjects, in consequence of their extreme poverty. The object of wise governments should be, by sound legislation, so to protect the industry of their own citizens against the policy of foreign powers, as to give to it the most expansive force in the production of wealth. Great Britain has ever acted, and still acts, on this policy. She has pushed her protection of British interest further than any other, nation has fostered its industry. The result is, greater wealth among her subjects, and consequently greater ability to pay their public burdens. If their taxation is estimated by their natural labor alone, nominally it is greater than the taxation of the subjects of any other power; but if on a scale of their national and artificial labor compounded, it is less than the taxation of any other people. Estimating it on that scale, and assuming the aggregate of the natural and artificial labor of the United Kingdom to be what I have already stated, 221,-500,000, the actual taxes paid by a British subject are only about three and seven-pence sterling. Estimating our own taxes on a similar scale, — that is, supposing both descriptions of labor to be equal to that of twenty millions of able-bodied persons, — the amount of tax paid by each soul in the United States is four shillings and six-pence sterling.
The committee will observe, from that table, that the measure of the wealth of a nation is indicated by the measure of its protection of its industry; and that the measure of the poverty of a nation is marked by that of the degree in which it neglects and abandons the care of its own industry, leaving it exposed to the action of foreign powers. Great Britain protects most her industry, and the wealth of Great Britain is consequently the greatest. France is next in the degree of protection, and France is next in the order of wealth. Spain most neglects the duty of protecting the industry of her subjects, and Spain is one of the poorest of European nations. Unfortunate Ireland, disinherited or rendered in her industry subservient to England, is exactly in the same state of poverty with Spain, measured by the rule of taxation. And the United States are still poorer than either.
The views of British prosperity, which I have endeavored to present, show that her protecting policy is adapted alike to a state of war and of peace. Self-poised, resting upon her own internal resources, possessing a home market carefully cherished and guarded, she is ever prepared for any emergency. We have seen her coming out of a war of incalculable exertion, and of great duration, with her power unbroken, her means undiminished. We have seen that almost every revolving year of peace has brought along with it an increase of her manufactures, of her commerce, and, consequently, of her navigation. We have seen that, constructing her prosperity upon the solid foundation of her own protecting policy, it is unaffected by the vicissitudes of other states. What is our own condition? Depending upon the state of foreign powers, confiding exclusively in a foreign, to the culpable neglect of a domestic policy, our interests are affected by all their movements. Their wars, their misfortunes, are the only source of our prosperity. In their peace, and our peace, we behold our condition the reverse of that of Great Britain, and all our interests stationary or declining. Peace brings to us none of the blessings of peace. Our system is anomalous; alike unfitted to general tranquillity, and to a state of war or peace on the part of our own country. It can succeed only in the rare occurrence of a general state of war throughout Europe. I am no eulogist of England. I am far from recommending her systems of taxation. I have adverted to them only as manifesting her extraordinary ability. The political and foreign interests of that nation may have been, as I believe them to have been, often badly managed. Had she abstained from the wars into which she has been plunged by her ambition, or the mistaken policy of her ministers, the prosperity of England would, unquestionably, have been much greater. But it may happen that the public liberty, and the foreign relations of a nation, have been badly provided for, and yet that its political economy has been wisely managed. The alacrity or sullenness with which a people pay taxes depends upon their wealth or poverty. If the system of their rulers leads to their impoverishment, they can contribute but little to the necessities of the state; if to their wealth, they cheerfully and promptly pay the burdens imposed on them. Enormous as British taxation appears to be in comparison with that of other nations, but really lighter as it in fact is when we consider its great wealth and its powers of production, that vast amount is collected with the most astonishing regularity. [Here Mr. Clay read certain passages from Holt, showing that, in 1822, there was not a solitary prosecution arising out of the collection of the assessed taxes, which are there considered among the most burdensome, and that the prosecution for violations of the excise laws, in all its numerous branches, were sensibly and progressively decreasing.]
Having called the attention of the committee to the present adverse state of our country, and endeavored to point out the causes which have led to it; having shown that similar causes, wherever they exist in∗ other countries, lead to the same adversity in their condition; and having shown that, wherever we find opposite causes prevailing, a high and animating state of national prosperity exists, the committee will agree with me in thinking that it is the solemn duty of government to apply a remedy to the evils which afflict our country, if it can apply one. Is there no remedy within the reach of the government? Are we doomed to behold our industry languish and decay, yet more and more? But there is a remedy, and that remedy consists in modifying our foreign policy, and in adopting a genuine American system. We must naturalize the arts in our country; and we must naturalize them by the only means which the wisdom of nations has yet discovered to be effectual, — by adequate protection against the otherwise overwhelming influence of foreigners. This is only to be accomplished by the establishment of a tariff, to the consideration of which I am now brought
And what is this tariff? It seems to have been regarded as a sort of monster, huge and deformed, — a wild beast, endowed with tremendous powers of destruction, about to be let loose among our people, if not to devour them, at least to consume their substance. But let us calm our passions, and deliberately survey this alarming, this terrific being. The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign industry, with the view of promoting American industry. The tax is exclusively leveled at foreign industry. That is the avowed and the direct purpose of the tariff. If it subjects any part of American industry to burdens, that is an effect not intended, but is altogether incidental, and perfectly voluntary.
It has been treated as an imposition of burdens upon one part of the community by design, for the benefit of another; as if, in fact, money were taken from the pockets of one portion of the people and put into the pockets of another. But is that a fair representation of it? No man pays the duty assessed on the foreign article by compulsion, but voluntarily; and this voluntary duty, if paid, goes into the common exchequer, for the common benefit of alL Consumption has four objects of choice. First, it may abstain from the use of the foreign article, and thus avoid the payment of the tax. Second, it may employ the rival American fabric. Third, it may engage in the business of manufacturing, which this bill is designed to foster. Fourth, or it may supply itself from the household manufactures. But it is said, by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, that the South, owing to the character of a certain portion of its population, cannot engage in the business of manufacturing. Now, I do not agree in that opinion, to the extent in which it is asserted. The circumstance alluded to may disqualify the South from engaging in every branch of manufacture, as largely as other quarters of the Union, but to some branches of it that part of our population is well adapted. It indisputably affords great facility in the household or domestic line. But, if the gentleman’s premises were true, could his conclusion be admitted? According to him, a certain part of our population, happily much the smallest, is peculiarly situated. The circumstance of its degradation unfits it for the manufacturing arts. The well-being of the other, and the larger part of our population, requires, the introduction of those arts. What is to be done in this conflict? The gentleman would have us abstain from adopting a policy called for by the interest of the greater and freer part of our population. But is that reasonable? Can it be expected that the interests of the greater part should be made to bend to the condition of the servile part of our population? That, in effect, would be to make us the slaves of slaves. I went with great pleasure along with my Southern friends, and I am ready again to unite with them in protesting against the exercise of any legislative power, on the part of Congress, over that delicate subject, because it was my solemn conviction that Congress was interdicted, or at least not authorized, by the Constitution, to exercise any such legislative power. And I am sure that the patriotism of the South may be exclusively relied upon to reject a policy which should be dictated by considerations altogether connected with that degraded class, to the prejudice of the residue of our population. But does not a perseverance in the foreign policy, as it now exists in fact, make all parts of the Union, not planting, tributary to the planting parts? What is the argument? It is, that we must continue freely to receive the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the protection of American industry, that a market may be retained for the sale abroad of the produce of the planting portion of the country; and that, if we lessen in all parts of America — those which are not planting as well as the planting sections — the consumption of foreign manufactures, we diminish to that extent the foreign market for the planting produce. The existing state of things, indeed, presents a sort of tacit compact between the cotton-grower and the British manufacturer, the stipulations of which are, on the part of the cotton-grower, that the whole of the United States, the other portions as well as the cotton-growing, shall remain open and unrestricted in the consumption of British manufactures; and, on the part of the British manufacturer, that, in consideration thereof, he will continue to purchase the cotton of the South. Thus, then, we perceive that the proposed measure, instead of sacrificing the South to the other parts of the Union, seeks only to preserve them from being absolutely sacrificed under the operation of the tacit compact which I have described. Supposing the South to be actually incompetent, or disinclined, to embark at all in the business of manufacturing, is not its interest, nevertheless, likely to be promoted by creating a new and an American source of supply for its consumption? Now foreign powers, and Great Britain principally, have the monopoly of the supply of Southern consumption. If this bill should pass, an American competitor, in the supply of the South, would be raised up, and ultimately I cannot doubt that it will be supplied more cheaply and better. I have before had occasion to state, and will now again mention, the beneficial effects of American competition with Europe, in furnishing a supply of the article of cotton bagging. After the late war, the influx of the Scottish manufacture prostrated the American establishments. The consequence was, that the Scotch possessed the monopoly of the supply; and the price of it rose, and attained, the year before the last, a height which amounted to more than an equivalent for ten years’ protection to the American manufacture. This circumstance tempted American industry again to engage in the business, and several valuable manufactories have been established in Kentucky. They have reduced the price of the fabric very considerably; but, without the protection of government, they may again be prostrated, and then, the Scottish manufacturer engrossing the supply of our consumption, the price will probably again rise. It has been tauntingly asked if Kentucky cannot maintain herself in a competition with the two Scottish towns of Inverness and Dundee? But is that a fair statement of the case? Those two towns are cherished and sustained by the whole protecting policy of the British empire, whilst Kentucky cannot, and the general government will not, extend a like protection to the few Kentucky villages in which the article is made.
If the cotton-growing consumption could be constitutionally exempted from the operation of this bill, it might be fair to exempt it, upon the condition that foreign manufactures, the proceeds of the sale of cotton abroad, should not enter at all into the consumption of the other parts of the United States. But such an arrangement as that, if it could be made, would probably be objected to by the cotton-growing country itself.
Second. The second objection to the proposed bill is that it will diminish the amount of our exports. It can have no effect upon our exports, except those which are sent to Europe. Except tobacco and rice, we send there nothing but the raw materials. The argument is, that Europe will not buy of us if we do not buy of her. The first objection to it is that it calls upon us to look to the question, and to take care of European ability in legislating for American interests. Now if, in legislating for their interests, they would consider and provide for our ability, the principle of reciprocity would enjoin us so to regulate our intercourse with them as to leave their ability unimpaired. But I have shown that, in the adoption of their own policy, their inquiry is strictly limited to a consideration of their peculiar interests, without any regard to that of ours. The next remark I would make is that the bill only operates upon certain articles of European industry, which it is supposed our interest requires us to manufacture within ourselves; and although its effect will be to diminish the amount of our imports of those articles, it leaves them free to supply us with any other produce of their industry. And since the circle of human comforts, refinements, and luxuries is of great extent, Europe will still find herself able to purchase from us what she has hitherto done, and to discharge the debt in some of those objects. If there be any diminution in our exports to Europe, it will probably be in the article of cotton to Great Britain. I have stated that Britain buys cotton wool to the amount of about £5,000,000, and sells to foreign states to the amount of upwards of £21,500,000. Of this sum we take a little upwards of £1,500,000. The residue, of about £20,000,000, she must sell to other foreign powers than to the United States. Now their market will continue open to her as much after the passage of this bill as before. She will therefore require from us the raw material to supply their consumption. But, it is said, she may refuse to purchase it of us, and seek a supply elsewhere. There can be but little doubt that she now resorts to us, because we can supply her more cheaply and better than any other country. And it would be unreasonable to suppose that she would cease, from any pique towards us, to pursue her own interest. Suppose she was to decline purchasing from us. The consequence would be, that she would lose the market for the £20,000,000, which she now sells other foreign powers, or enter it under a disadvantageous competition with us, or with other nations, who should obtain their supplies of the raw material from us. If there should be any diminution, therefore, in the exportation of cotton, it would only be in the proportion of about one and a half to twenty; that is, a little upwards of 5%; the loss of a market for which, abroad, would be fully compensated by the market for the article created at home. Lastly, I would observe that, the new application of our industry producing new objects of exportation, and they possessing much greater value than in the raw state, we should be in the end amply indemnified by their exportation. Already the item in our foreign exports of manufactures is considerable; and we know that our cotton fabrics have been recently exported in a large amount to South America, where they maintain a successful competition with those of any other country.
Third. The third objection to the tariff is that it will diminish our navigation. This great interest deserves every encouragement, consistent with the paramount interest of agriculture. In the order of nature it is secondary to both agriculture and manufactures. Its business is the transportation of the productions of those two superior branches of industry. It cannot therefore be expected that they shall be moulded or sacrificed to suit its purposes; but, on the contrary, navi-gation must accommodate itself to the actual state of agriculture and manufactures. If, as I believe, we have nearly reached the maximum in value of our exports of raw produce to Europe, the effect hereafter will be, as it respects that branch of our trade, if we persevere in the foreign system, to retain our navigation at the point which it has now reached. By reducing, indeed, as will probably take place, the price of our raw materials, a further quantity of them could be exported, and, of course, additional employment might in that way, be given to our tonnage; but that would be at the expense of the agricultural interest. If I am right in supposing that no effect will be produced by this measure upon any other branch of our export trade but that to Europe, that with regard to that there will be no sensible diminution of our exports, and that the new direction given to a portion of our industry will produce other objects of exportation, the probability is that our foreign tonnage will be even increased under the operation of this bill. But, if I am mistaken in these views, and it should experience any reduction, the increase in our coasting tonnage, resulting from the greater activity of domestic exchanges, will more than compensate the injury. Although our navigation partakes of the general distress of the country, it is less depressed than any other of our great interests. The foreign tonnage has been gradually, though slowly, increasing since 1818. And our coasting tonnage since 1816 has increased upwards of 100,000 tons.
Fourth. It is next contended that the effect of the measure will be to diminish our foreign commerce. The objection assumes, what I have endeavored to controvert, that there will be a reduction in the value of our exports. Commerce is an exchange of commodities. Whatever will tend to augment the wealth of a nation must increase its capacity to make these exchanges. By new productions, or creating new values in the fabricated forms which shall be given to old objects of our industry, we shall give to commerce a fresh spring, a new aliment. The foreign commerce of the country, from causes some of which I have endeavored to point out, has been extended as far as it can be. And I think there can be but little doubt that the balance of trade is, and for some time past has been, against us. I was surprised to hear the learned gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Webster] rejecting, as a detected and exploded fallacy, the idea of a balance of trade. I have not time nor inclination now to discuss that topic. But I will observe that all nations act upon the supposition of the reality of its existence, and seek to avoid a trade the balance of which is unfavorable, and to foster that which presents a favorable balance. However the account be made up, whatever may be the items of a trade, commodities, fishing industry, marine labor, the carrying trade, all of which I admit should be comprehended, there can be no doubt, I think, that the totality of the exchanges of all descriptions made by one nation with another, or against the totality of the exchanges of all other nations together, may be such as to present the state of an unfavorable balance with the one or with all. It is true that, in the long run, the measures of these exchanges, that is, the totality in value of what is given and of what is received, must be equal to each other. But great distress may be felt long before the counterpoise can be effected. In the mean time there will be an export of the precious metals, to the deep injury of internal trade, an unfavorable state of exchange, an export of public securities, a resort to credit, debt, mortgages. Most of if not all these circumstances are believed now to be indicated by our country in its foreign commercial relations. What have we received, for example, for the public stocks sent to England? Goods. But those stocks are our bond, which must be paid. Although the solidity of the credit of the English public securities is not surpassed by that of our own, strong as it justly is, when have we seen English stocks sold in our market, and regularly quoted in the prices current, as American stocks are in England? An unfavorable balance with one nation may be made up by a favorable balance with other nations; but the fact of the existence of that unfavorable balance is strong presumptive evidence against the trade. Commerce will regulate itself! Yes, and the extravagance of a spendthrift heir who squanders the rich patrimony which has descended to him will regulate itself ultimately. But it will be a regulation which will exhibit him in the end safely confined within the walls of a jail. Commerce will regulate itself! But is it not the duty of wise governments to watch its course, and beforehand to provide against even distant evils, by prudent legislation stimulating the industry of their own people, and checking the policy of foreign powers as it operates on them? The supply, then, of the subjects of foreign commerce, no less than th supply of consumption at home, requires of us to give a portion of our labor such a direction as will enable us to produce them. That is the object of the measure under consideration, and I cannot doubt that, if adopted, it will accomplish its object.
Fifth. The fifth objection to the tariff is that it will diminish the public revenue, disable us from paying the public debt, and finally compel a resort to a system of excise and internal taxation. This objection is founded upon the supposition that the reduction in the importation of the subjects on which the increased duties are to operate will be such as to produce the alleged effect. All this is matter of mere conjecture, and can only be determined by experiment. I have very little doubt, with my colleague [Mr. Trimble], that the revenue will be increased considerably, for some years at least, under the operation of this bill. The diminution in the quantity imported will be compensated by the augmentation of the duty. In reference to the article of molasses, for example, if the import of it should be reduced 60%, the amount of duty collected would be the same as it now is. But it will not, in all probability, be reduced by anything like that proportion. And then there are some other articles which will continue to be introduced in as large quantities as ever, notwithstanding the increase of duty, the object in reference to them being revenue, and not the encouragement of domestic manufactures. Another cause will render the revenue of this year, in particular, much more productive than it otherwise would have been; and that is that large quantities of goods have been introduced into the country in anticipation of the adoption of this measure. The eagle does not dart a keener gaze upon his intended prey than that with which the British manufacturer and merchant watches the foreign market, and the course even of our elections as well as our legislation. The passage of this bill has been expected; and all our information is that the importations, during this spring, have been immense. But, further, the measure of our importations is that of our exportations. If I am right in supposing that in future the amount of these, in the old or new forms of the produce of our labor, will not be diminished, but probably increased, then the amount of our importations, and consequently of our revenue, will not be reduced, but may be extended. If these ideas be correct, there will be no inability on the part of government to extinguish the public debt. The payment of that debt, and the consequent liberation of the public resources from the charge of it, is extremely desirable. No one is more anxious than I am to see that important object accomplished. But I entirely concur with the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Barbonr] in thinking that no material sacrifice of any of the great interests of the nation ought to be made to effectuate it. Such is the elastic and accumulating nature of our public resources, from the silent augmentation of our population, that if, in any given state of the public revenue, we throw ourselves upon a couch and go to sleep, we may, after a short time, awake with an ability abundantly increased to redeem any reasonable amount of public debt with which ve may happen to be burdened. The public debt of the United States, though nominally larger now than it was in the year 1791, bears really no sort of discouraging comparison to its amount at that time, whatever standard we may choose to adopt to institute the comparison. It was in 1791 about $75,000,000. It is now about £90,000,000. Then we had a population of about 4,000,000. Now we have upwards of 10,000,000. Then we had a revenue short of $5,000,000. Now our revenue exceeds $20,000,000. If we select population as the standard, our present population is 150% greater than it was in 1791; if revenue, that is four times more now than at the former period; whilst the public debt has increased only in a ratio of 20%. A public debt of $300,000,000, at the present day, considering our actual ability, compounded both of the increase of population and of revenue, would not be more onerous now than the debt of $75,000,000 was at the epoch of 1791, in reference to the same circumstances. If I am right∗ in supposing that, under the operation of the proposed measure, there will not be any diminution, but a probable increase of the public revenue, there will be no difficulty in defraying the current expenses of government, and paying the principal as well as the interest of the public debt as it becomes due. Let us, for a moment, however, indulge the improbable supposition of the opponents of the tariff, that there will be a reduction of the revenue to the extent of the most extravagant calculation which has been made, that is to say, to the extent of $5,000,000. That sum deducted, we shall still have remaining a revenue of about $15,000,000. The treasury estimates of the current service of the years 1822, 1823, and 1824 exceeds, each year, $9,000,000. The lapse of revolutionary pensions, and judicious retrenchments which might be made without detriment to any of the essential establishments of the country, would probably reduce them below $9,000,000. Let us assume that sum, to which add about $5,500,000 for the interest of the public debt, and the wants of government would require a revenue of $14,500,000, leaving a surplus of revenue of $500,000 beyond the public expenditure. Thus, by a postponement of the payment of the principal of the public debt, in which the public creditors would gladly acquiesce, and confiding, for the means of redeeming it, in the necessary increase of our revenue from the natural augmentation of our population and consumption, we may safely adopt the proposed measure, even if it should be attended (which is confidently denied) with the supposed diminution of revenue. We shall not, then, have occasion to vary the existing system of taxation; we shall be under no necessity to resort either to direct taxes or to an excise. But, suppose the alternative were really forced upon us of continuing the foreign system, with its inevitable impoverishment of the country, but with the advantage of the present mode of collecting the taxes, — or of adopting the American system, with its increase of the national wealth, but with the disadvantage of an excise: could any one hesitate between them? Customs and an excise agree in the essential particulars, that they are both taxes upon consumption, and both are voluntary. They differ only in the mode of collection. The office for the collection of one is located on the frontier, and that for the other within the interior. I believe it was Mr. Jefferson, who, in reply to the boast of a citizen of New York of the amount of the public revenue paid by that city, asked who would pay it, if the collector’s office were removed to Paulus Hook, on the New Jersey shore? National wealth is the source of all taxation. And, my word for it, the people are too intelligent to be deceived by mere names, and not to give a decided preference to that system which is based upon their wealth and prosperity, rather than to that which is founded upon their impoverishment and ruin.
Sixth. But, according to the opponents of the domestic policy, the proposed system will force capital and labor into new and reluctant employments; we are not prepared, in consequence of the high price of wages, for the successful establishment of manufactures, and we must fail in the experiment. We have seen that the existing occupations of our society, those of agriculture, commerce, navigation, and the learned professions, are overflowing with competitors, and that the want of employment is severely felt. Now what does this bill propose? To open a new and extensive field of business, in which all that choose may enter. There is no compulsion upon any one to engage in it. An option only is given to industry, to continue in the present unprofitable pursuits, or to embark in a new and promising one. The effect will be to lessen the competition in the old branches of business, and to multiply our resources for increasing our comforts and augmenting the national wealth. The alleged fact of the high price of wages is not admitted. The truth is that no class of society suffers more, in the present stagnation of business, than the laboring class. That is a necessary effect of the depression of agriculture, the principal business of the community. The wages of able-bodied men vary from $5 to $ 8 per month, and such has been the want of employment, in some parts of the Union, that instances have not been unfrequent of men working merely for the means of present subsistence. If the wages for labor here and in England are compared, they will be found not to be essentially different. I agree with the honorable gentleman from Virginia, that high wages are a proof of national prosperity; we differ only in the means by which that desirable end shall be attained. But, if the fact were true, that the wages of labor are high, I deny the correctness of the argument founded upon it. The argument assumes that natural labor is the principal element in the business of manufacture. That was the ancient theory. But the valuable inventions and vast improvements in machinery, which have been made within a few past years, have produced a new era in the arts. The effect of this change, in the powers of production, may be estimated, from what I have already stated in relation to England and to the triumphs of European artificial labor over the natural labor of Asia. In considering the fitness of a nation for the establishment of manufactures, we must no longer limit our views to the state of its population and the price of wages. All circumstances must be regarded, of which that is, perhaps, the least important. Capital, ingenuity in the construction and adroitness in the use of machinery, and the possession of the raw materials, are those which deserve the greatest consideration. All these circumstances (except that of capital, of which there is no deficiency) exist in our country in an eminent degree, and more than counterbalance the disadvantage, if it really existed, of the lower wages of labor in Great Britain. The dependence upon foreign nations for the raw material of any great manufacture has been ever considered as a discouraging fact. The state of our population is peculiarly favorable to the most extensive introduction of machinery. We have no prejudices to combat, no persons to drive out of employment. The pamphlet to which we have had occasion so often to refer, in enumerating the causes which have brought in England their manufactures to such a state of perfection, and which now enable them, in the opinion of the writer, to defy all competition, does not specify, as one of them, low wages. It assigns three: first, capital; secondly, extent and costliness of machinery; and, thirdly, steady and persevering industry. Notwithstanding the concurrence of so many favorable causes in our country for the introduction of the arts, we are earnestly dissuaded from making the experiment, and our ultimate failure is confidently predicted. Why should we fail? Nations, like men, fail in nothing which they boldly attempt, when sustained by virtuous purpose and firm resolution. I am not willing to admit this depreciation of American skill and enterprise. I am not willing to strike before an effort is made. All our past history exhorts us to proceed, and inspires us with animating hopes of success. Past predictions of our incapacity have failed, and present predictions will not be realized. At the commencement of this government, we were told that the attempt would be idle to construct a marine adequate to the commerce of the country, or even to the business of its coasting trade. The founders of our government did not listen to these discouraging counsels; and — behold the fruits of their just comprehension of our resources! Our restrictive policy was denounced, and it was foretold that it would utterly disappoint all our expectations. But our restrictive policy has been eminently successful; and the share which our navigation now enjoys in the trade with France, and with the British West India islands, attests its victory. What were not the disheartening predictions of the opponents of the late war? Defeat, discomfiture, and disgrace, were to be the certain, but not the worst effect of it. Here, again, did prophecy prove false; and the energies of our country, and the valor and the patriotism of our people, carried us gloriously through the war. We are now, and ever will be, essentially an agricultural people. Without a material change in the fixed habits of the country, the friends of this measure desire to draw to it, as a powerful auxiliary to its industry, the manu factoring arts. The difference between a nation with and without the arts may be conceived by the difference between a keel-boat and a steamboat, combating the rapid torrent of the Mississippi. How slow does the former ascend, hugging the sinuosities of the shore, pushed on by her hardy and exposed crew, now throwing themselves in vigorous concert on their oars, and then seizing the pendant boughs of overhanging trees: she seems hardly to move; and her scanty cargo is scarcely worth the transportation! With what ease is she not passed by the steamboat, laden with the riches of all quarters of the world, with a crew of gay, cheerful, and protected passengers, now dashing into the midst of the current, or gliding through the eddies near the shore! Nature herself seems to survey with astonishment the passing wonder, and, in silent submission, reluctantly to own the magnificent triumphs, in her own vast dominion, of Fulton’s immortal genius.
Seventh. But it is said that, wherever there is a concurrence of favorable circumstances, manufactures will arise of themselves, without protection; and that we should not disturb the natural progress of industry, but leave things to themselves. If all nations would modify their policy on this axiom, perhaps it would be better for the common good of the whole. Even then, in consequence of natural advantages and a greater advance in civilization and in the arts, some nations would enjoy a state of much higher prosperity than others. But there is no universal legislation. The globe is divided into different communities, each seeking to appropriate to itself all the advantages it can, without reference to the prosperity of others. Whether this is right or not, it always has been, and ever will be the case. Perhaps the care of the interests of one people is sufficient for all the wisdom of one legislature; and that it is among nations as among individuals, that the happiness of the whole is best secured by each attending to its own peculiar interests. The proposition to be maintained by our adversaries is that manufactures, without protection, will in due time spring up in our country, and sustain themselves in a competition with foreign fabrics, however advanced the arts and whatever the degree of protection may be in foreign countries. Now I contend, that this proposition is refuted by all experience, ancient and modern, and in every country. If I am asked why unprotected industry should not succeed in a struggle with protected industry, I answer, the fact has ever been so, and that is sufficient; I reply that uniform experience evinces that it cannot succeed in such an unequal contest, and that is sufficient. If we speculate on the causes of this universal truth, we may differ about them. Still the indisputable fact remains. And we should be as unwise in not availing ourselves of the guide which it furnishes as a man would be who should refuse to bask in the rays of the sun, because he could not agree with Judge Woodward as to the nature of the substance of that planet to which we are indebted for heat and light. If I were to attempt to particularize the causes which prevent the success of the manufacturing arts without protection, I should say that they are, first, the obduracy of fixed habits. No nation, no individual, will easily change an established course of business, even if it be unprofitable; and least of all is an agricultural people prone to innovation. With what reluctance do they not adopt improvements in the instruments of husbandry, or in modes of cultivation! If the farmer makes a good crop and sells it badly, or makes a short crop, buoyed up by hope he perseveres, and trusts that a favorable change of the market, or of the seasons, will enable him, in the succeeding year, to repair the misfortunes of the past. Secondly, the uncertainty, fluctuation, and unsteadiness of the home market, when liable to an unrestricted influx of fabrics from all foreign nations; and, thirdly, the superior advance of skill, and amount of capital, which foreign nations have obtained by the protection of their own industry. From the latter, or from other causes, the unprotected manufactures of a country are exposed to the danger of being crushed in their infancy, either by the design or from the necessities of foreign manufacturers. Gentlemen are incredulous as to the attempts of foreign merchants and manufacturers to accomplish the destruction of ours. Why should they not make such attempts? If the Scottish manufacturer, by surcharging our market in one year with the article of cotton bagging, for example, should so reduce the price as to discourage and put down the home manufacture, he would secure to himself the monopoly of the supply. And now, having the exclusive possession of the market, perhaps for a long term of years, he might be more than indemnified for Ms first loss, in the subsequent rise in the price of the article. What have we not seen under our own eyes! The competition for the transportation of the mail, between this place and Baltimore, so excited, that to obtain it an individual offered, at great loss, to carry it a whole year for one dollar! His calculation no doubt was, that, by driving his competitor off the road, and securing to himself the carriage of the mail, he would be afterwards able to repair his original loss by new contracts with the department. But the necessities of foreign manufacturers, without imputing to them any sinister design, may oblige them to throw into our markets the fabrics which have accumulated on their hands, in consequence of obstruction in the ordinary vents, or from over-calculation; and the forced sales, at losing prices, may prostrate our establishments. From this view of the subject, it follows that, if we would place the industry of our country upon a solid and unshakable foundation, we must adopt the protecting policy, which has everywhere succeeded, and reject that which would abandon it, which has everywhere failed.
Eighth. But if the policy of protection be wise, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Barbour) has made some ingenious calculations, to prove that the measure of protection already extended has been sufficiently great. Vith some few exceptions, the existing duties, of which he has made an estimate, were laid with the object of revenue, and without reference to that of encouragement to our domestic industry; and although it is admitted that the incidental effect of duties, so laid, is to promote our manufactures, yet, if it falls short of competent protection, the duties might as well not have been imposed with reference to that purpose. A moderate addition may accomplish this desirable end; and the proposed tariff is believed to have this character.
Ninth. The prohibitory policy, it is confidently asserted, is condemned by the wisdom of Europe, and by her most enlightened statesmen. Is this the fact? We call upon gentlemen to show in what instance a nation that has enjoyed its benefits has surrendered it. [Here Mr. Barbour rose (Mr. Clay giving way) and said that England had departed from it in the China trade, in allowing us to trade with her East India possessions, and in tolerating our navigation to her West India colonies.] With respect to the trade to China, the whole amount of what England has done is, to modify the monopoly of the East India company in behalf of one and a small part of her subjects to increase the commerce of another and the greater portion of them. The abolition of the restriction, therefore, operates altogether among the subjects of England, and does not touch at all the interests of foreign powers. The toleration of our commerce to British India is for the sake of the specie with which we mainly carry on that commerce, and which, having performed its circuit, returns to Great Britain in exchange for British manufactures. The relaxation from the colonial policy, in the instance of our trade and navigation with the West Indies, is a most unfortunate example for the honorable gentleman; for in it is an illustrious proof of the success of our restrictive policy when resolutely adhered to. Great Britain had prescribed the terms on which we were to be graciously allowed to carry on that trade. The effect of her regulations was to exclude our navigation altogether, and a complete monopoly on the part of the British navigation was secured. We forbade it, unless our vessels should be allowed a perfect reciprocity. Great Britain stood out a long time, but finally yielded, and our navigation now fairly shares with hers in the trade. Have gentlemen no other to exhibit than these trivial relaxations from the prohibitory policy, which do not amount to a drop in the bucket, to prove its abandonment by Great Britain? Let them show us that her laws are repealed which prohibit the introduction of our flour and provisions; of French silks, laces, porcelain, manufactures of bronze, mirrors, woollens; and of the manufactures of all other nations; and then we may be ready to allow that Great Britain has really abolished her prohibitory policy. We find there, on the contrary, that system of policy in full and rigorous operation, and a most curiously interwoven system it is, as she enforces it. She begins by protecting all parts of her immense dominions against foreign nations. She then protects the parent country against the colonies; and, finally, one part of the parent country against another. The sagacity of Scotch industry has carried the process of distillation to a perfection which would place the art in England on a footing of disadvantageous competition, and English distillation has been protected accordingly. But suppose it were even true that Great Britain had abolished all restrictions upon trade, and allowed the freest introduction of the produce of foreign labor, would that prove it unwise for us to adopt the protecting system? The object of protection is the establishment and perfection of the arts. In England it has accomplished its purpose, fulfilled its end. If she has not carried every branch of manufacture to the same high state of perfection that any other nation has, she has succeeded in so many that she may safely challenge the most unshackled competition in exchanges. It is upon this very ground that many of her writers recommend an abandonment of the prohibitory system. It is to give greater scope to British industry and enterprise. It is upon the same selfish principle. The object of the most perfect freedom of trade with such a nation as Britain, and of the most rigorous system of prohibition with a nation whose arts are in their infancy, may both be precisely the same. In both cases it is to give greater expansion to native industry. They only differ in the theatres of their operation. The abolition of the restrictive system by Britain, if by it she could prevail upon other nations to imitate her example, would have the effect of extending the consumption of British produce in other countries where her writers boldly affirm it could maintain a fearless competition with the produce of native labor. The adoption of the restrictive system, on the part of the United States, by excluding the produce of foreign labor, would extend the consumption of American produce, unable in the infancy and unprotected state of the arts to sustain a competition with foreign fabrics. Let our arts breathe under the shade of protection; let them be perfected, as they are in England, and we shall then be ready, as England now is said to be, to put aside protection and to enter upon the freest exchanges. To what other cause than to their whole prohibitory policy can you ascribe British prosperity? It will not do to assign it to that of her antiquity, for France is no less ancient, though much less rich and powerful in proportion to the population and natural advantages of France. Hallam, a sensible and highly approved writer on the Middle Ages, assigns the revival of the prosperity of the north of Europe to the success of the woollen manufactories of Flanders, and the commerce of which their fabrics became the subject; and the commencement of that of England to the establishment of similar manufactures there under the Edwards, and to the prohibitions which began about the same time. As to the poor-rates, the theme of so much reproach without England, and of so much regret within it, among her speculative writers, the system was a strong proof, no less of her unbounded wealth than of her pauperism. What other nation can dispense, in the form of regulated charity, the enormous sum, I believe, of ten or twelve millions sterling? [Mr. Barbour stated it was reduced to six; to which Mr. Clay replied, that he entertained no doubt but that the benign operation of British protection of home industry had greatly reduced it within the last few years by the full employment of her subjects, of which her flourishing trade bore evidence.] The number of British paupers was the result of pressing the principle of population to its utmost limits by her protecting policy, in the creation of wealth, and in placing the rest of the world under tribute to her industry. Doubtless the condition of England would be better without paupers, if in other respects it remained the same. But in her actual circumstances the poor system has the salutary effect of an equalizing corrective of the tendency to the concentration of riches, produced by the genius of her political institutions and by her prohibitory system.
But is it true, that England is convinced of the impolicy of the prohibitory system, and desirous to abandon it? What proof have we to that effect? We are asked to reject the evidence deducible from the settled and steady practice of England, and to take lessons in a school of philosophical writers whose visionary theories are nowhere adopted; or if adopted, bring with them inevitable distress, impoverishment, and ruin. Let us hear the testimony of an illustrious personage, entitled to the greatest attention, because he speaks after the full experiment of the unrestrictive system made in his own empire. I hope I shall give no offense in quoting from a publication issued from “the mint of Philadelphia; “from a work of Mr. Carey, of whom I seize, with great pleasure, the occasion to say, that he merits the public gratitude for the disinterested diligence with which he has collected a large mass of highly useful facts, and for the clear and convincing reasoning with which he generally illustrates them. The Emperor of Russia, in March, 1822, after about two years’ trial of the free system, says, through Count Nesselrode:—
“To produce happy effects, the principles of commercial freedom must be generally adopted. The State which adopts, whilst others reject them, must condemn its own industry and commerce to pay a ruinous tribute to those of other nations.
“From a circulation exempt from restraint, and the facility afforded by reciprocal exchanges, almost all the governments at first resolved to seek the means of repairing the evil which Europe had been doomed to suffer; but experience and more correct calculations, because they were made from certain data, and upon the results already known of the peace that had just taken place, forced them soon to adhere to the prohibitory system.
“England preserved hers. Austria remained faithful to the rule she had laid down, to guard herself against the rivalship of foreign industry. France, with the same views, adopted the most rigorous measures of precaution. And Prussia published a new tariff in October last, which proves that she found it impossible not to follow the example of the rest of Europe.”
“In proportion as the prohibitory system is extended and rendered perfect in other countries, that State which pursues the contrary system makes from day to day sacrifices more extensive and more considerable.... It offers a continual encouragement to the manufactures of other countries, and its own manufactures perish in the struggle which they are, as yet, unable to maintain.
“It is with the most lively feelings of regret we acknowledge it is our own proper experience which enables us to trace this picture. The evils which it details have been realized in Russia and Poland, since the conclusion of the act of the 7th and 19th of December, 1818. Agriculture without a market, industry without protection, languish and decline. Specie is exported, and the most solid commercial houses are shaken. The public prosperity would soon feel the wound inflicted on private fortunes, if new regulations did not promptly change the actual state of affairs.
“Events have proved that our agriculture and our commerce, as” well as our manufacturing industry, are not only paralyzed, but brought to the brink of ruin.”
The example of Spain has been properly referred to, as affording a striking proof of the calamities which attend a State that abandons the care of its own internal industry. Her prosperity was the greatest when the arts, brought there by the Moors, flourished most in that kingdom. Then she received from England her wool, and returned it in the manufactured state; and then England was least prosperous. The two nations have reversed conditions. Spain, after the discovery of America, yielding to an inordinate passion for the gold of the Indies, sought in their mines that wealth which might have been better created at home. Can the remarkable difference in the state of the prosperity of the two countries be otherwise explained than by the opposite systems which they pursued? England, by a sedulous attention to her home industry, supplied the means of an advantageous commerce with her colonies. Spain, by an utter neglect of her domestic resources, confided altogether in those which she derived from her colonies, and presents an instance of the greatest adversity. Her colonies were infinitely more valuable than those of England; and, if she had adopted a similar policy, is it unreasonable to suppose that in wealth and power she would have surpassed that of England? I think the honorable gentleman from Virginia does great injustice to the Catholic religion, in specifying that as one of the leading causes of the decline of Spain. It is a religion entitled to great respect, and there is nothing in its character incompatible with the highest degree of national prosperity. Is not France, the most polished, in many other respects the most distinguished State of Christendom, Catholic? Is not Flanders, the most populous part of Europe, also Catholic? Are the Catholic parts of Switzerland and of Germany less prosperous than those which are Protestant?
Tenth. The next objection of the honorable gentleman from Virginia, which I shall briefly notice, is, that the manufacturing system is adverse to the genius of our government, in its tendency to the accumulation of large capitals in a few hands; in the corruption of the public morals, which is alleged to be incident to it; and in the consequent danger to the public liberty. The first part of the objection would apply to every lucrative business, to commerce, to planting, and to the learned professions. Would the gentleman introduce the system of Lycurgus? If his principle be correct, it should be extended to any and every vocation which had a similar tendency. The enormous fortunes in our country — the nabobs of the land — have been chiefly made by the profitable pursuit of that foreign commerce, in more propitious times, which the honorable gentleman would so carefully cherish. Immense estates have also been made in the South. The dependents are, perhaps, not more numerous upon that wealth which is accumulated in manufactures, than they are upon that which is acquired by commerce and by agriculture. We may safely confide in the laws of distributions, and in the absence of the rule of primogeniture, for the dissipation, perhaps too rapid, of large fortunes. What has become of those which were held two or three generations back in Virginia? Many of the descendants of the ancient aristocracy, as it was called, of that State, are now in the most indigent condition. The best security against the demoralization of society is the constant and profitable employment of its members. The greatest danger to public liberty is from idleness and vice. If manufactures form cities, so does commerce. And the disorders and violence which proceed from the contagion of the passions are as frequent in one description of those communities as in the other. There is no doubt but that the yeomanry of a country is the safest depository of public liberty. In all time to come, and under any probable direction of the labor of our population, the agricultural class must be much the most numerous and powerful, and will ever retain, as it ought to retain, a preponderating influence in our councils. The extent and the fertility of our lands constitute an adequate security against an excess in manufactures, and also against oppression, on the part of capitalists, towards the laboring portions of the community.
Eleventh. The last objection with a notice of which I shall trouble the committee is that the Constitubion does not authorize the passage of the bill. The gentleman from Virginia does not assert, indeed, that it is inconsistent with the express provisions of that instrument, but he thinks it incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution. If we attempt to provide for the internal improvement of the country, the Constitution, according to some gentlemen, stands in our way. If we attempt to protect American industry against foreign policy and the rivalry of foreign industry, the Constitution presents an insuperable obstacle. This Constitution must be a most singular instrument! It seems to be made for any other people than our own. Its action is altogether foreign. Congress has power to lay duties and imposts, under no other limitation whatever than that of their being uniform throughout the United States. But they can only be imposed, according to the honorable gentleman, for the sole purpose of revenue. This is a restriction which we do not find in the Constitution. No doubt revenue was a principal object with the framers of the Constitution in investing Congress with the power. But, in executing it, may not the duties and imposts be so laid as to secure domestic interests? Or is Congress denied all discretion as to the amount or the distribution of the duties and imposts?
The gentleman from Virginia has, however, entirely mistaken the clause of the Constitution on which we rely. It is that which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The grant is plenary, without any limitation whatever, and includes the whole power of regulation, of which the subject to be regulated is susceptible. It is as full and complete a grant of the power, as that is to declare war. What is a regulation of commerce? It implies the admission or exclusion of the object of it, and the terms. Under this power some articles, by the existing laws, are admitted freely; others are subjected to duties so high as to amount to their prohibition, and various rates of duties are applied to others. Under this power, laws of total non-intercourse with some nations, embargoes producing an entire cessation of commerce with all foreign countries, have been, from time to time, passed. These laws, I have no doubt, met with the entire approbation of the gentleman from Virginia. [Mr. Barbour said that he was not in Congress.] Wherever the gentleman was, whether on his farm or in the pursuit of that profession of which he is an ornament, I have no doubt that he gave his zealous support to the laws referred to.
The principle of the system under consideration has the sanction of some of the best and wisest men, in all ages, in foreign countries as well as in our own, — of the Edwards, of Henry the Great, of Elizabeth, of the Colberts, abroad; of our Franklin, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, at home. But it comes recommended to us by a higher authority than any of these, illustrious as they unquestionably are, — by the master-spirit of the age, that extraordinary man who has thrown the Alexanders and the Caesars infinitely further behind him than they stood in advance of the most eminent of their predecessors, that singular man, who — whether he was seated on his imperial throne, deciding the fate of nations and allotting kingdoms to the members of his family with the same composure, if not with the same affection, as that with which a Virginia father divides his plantations among his children, or on the miserable rock of St. Helena, to which he was condemned by the cruelty and the injustice of his unworthy victors — is equally an object of the most intense admiration. He appears to have comprehended, with the rapidity of intuition, the true interests of a State, and to have been able, by the turn of a single expression, to develop the secret springs of the policy of cabinets. We find that Las Casas reports him to have said:
“He opposed the principles of economists, ‘which,’ he said, ‘ were correct in theory though erroneous in their application. The political constitution of different States,’ continued he, ’ must render these principles defective; local circumstances continually call for deviations from their uniformity. Duties,’ he said, ‘ which were so severely condemned by political economists, should not, it is true, be an object to the treasury; they should be the guaranty and protection of a nation, and should correspond with the nature and the objects of its trade. Holland, which is destitute of productions and manufactures, and which has a trade only of transit and commission, should be free of all fetters and barriers. France, on the contrary, which is rich in every sort of production and manufactures, should incessantly guard against the importations of a rival, who might still continue superior to her, and also against the cupidity, egotism, and indifference, of mere brokers.
“‘I have not fallen into the error of modern system-atizers,’ said the emperor, ’ who imagine that all the wisdom of nations is centred in themselves. Experience is the true wisdom of nations. And what does all the reasoning of economists amount to? They incessantly extol the prosperity of England, and hold her up as our model; but the custom-house system is more burdensome and arbitrary in England than in any other country. They also condemn prohibitions; yet it was England set the example of prohibitions; and they are in fact necessary with regard to certain objects. Duties cannot adequately supply the place of prohibitions; there will always be found means to defeat the object of the legislator. In France we are still very far behind on these delicate points, which are still unper-ceived or ill understood by the mass of society. Yet, what advancement have we not made; what correctness of ideas has been introduced by my gradual classification of agriculture, industry, and trade; objects so distinct in themselves, and which present so great and positive a graduation!
“‘First Agriculture; the soul, the first basis of the empire.
“‘Second. Industry; the comfort and happiness of the population.
“‘Third. Foreign trade; the superabundance, the proper application of the surplus of agriculture and industry.
“‘Agriculture was continually improving during the whole course of the revolution. Foreigners thought it ruined in France. In 1814, however, the English were compelled to admit that we had little or nothing to learn from them.
“’Industry or manufactures, and internal trade, made immense progress during my reign. The application of chemistry to the manufactures caused them to advance with giant strides. I gave an impulse, the effects of which extended throughout Europe.
“‘ Foreign trade, which, in its results, is infinitely inferior to agriculture, was an object of subordinate importance in my mind. Foreign trade is made for agriculture and home industry, and not the two latter for the former. The interests of these three fundamental cases are diverging and frequently conflicting. I always promoted them in their natural gradation, but I could not and ought not to have ranked them all on an equality. Time will unfold what I have done, the national resources which I created, and the emancipation from the English which I brought about. We have now the secret of the commercial treaty of 1783. France still exclaims against its author; but the English demanded it on pain of resuming the war. They wished to do the same after the treaty of Amiens, but I was then all-powerful; I was a hundred cubits high. I replied that if they were in possession of the heights of Montinartre I would still refuse to sign the treaty. These words were echoed through Europe.
“‘The English will now impose some such treaty on France, at least, if popular clamor and the opposition of the mass of the nation do not force them to draw back. This thraldom would be an additional disgrace in the eyes of that nation, which is now beginning to acquire a just perception of her own interests.
“‘When I came to the head of the Government, the American ships, which were permitted to enter our ports on the score of their neutrality, brought us raw materials, and had the impudence to sail from France without freight, for the purpose of taking in cargoes of English goods in London. They, moreover, had the insolence to make their payments, when they had any to make, by giving bills on persons in London. Hence the vast profits reaped by the English manufacturers and brokers, entirely to our prejudice. I made a law that no American should import goods to any amount, without immediately exporting their exact equivalent. A loud outcry was raised against this; it was said that I had ruined trade. But what was the consequence? Notwithstanding the closing of my ports, and in spite of the English, who ruled the seas, the Americans returned and submitted to my regulations. What might I not have done under more favorable circumstances?
“‘Thus I naturalized in France the manufacture of cotton, which includes: —
“‘First, spun cotton. We did not previously spin it ourselves; the English supplied us with it, as a sort of favor.
“‘Secondly, the web. We did not yet make it; it came to us from abroad.
“‘Thirdly, the printing. This -was the only part of the manufacture that we performed ourselves. I wished to naturalize the two first branches; and I proposed to the Council of State that their importation should be prohibited. This excited great alarm. I sent for Ober-kamp, and I conversed with him a long time. I learned from him that this prohibition would doubtless produce a shock, but that, after a year or two of perseverance, it would prove a triumph, whence we should derive immense advantages. Then I issued my decree in spite of all; this was a true piece of statesmanship.
“‘I at first confined myself merely to prohibiting the web; then I extended the prohibition to spun cotton; and we now possess, within ourselves, the three branches of the cotton manufacture, to the great benefit of our population, and the injury and regret of the English, which proves that, in civil government, as well as in war, decision of character is often indispensable to success.’
I will trouble the Committee with only one other quotation, which I shall make from Lowe; and from hearing which the Committee must share with me in the mortification which I felt on perusing it. That author says: “It is now above forty years since the United States of America were definitely separated from us, and since, their situation has afforded a proof that the benefit of mercantile intercourse may be retained, in all its extent, without the care of governing, or the expense of defending these once regretted provinces.” Is there not too much truth in this observation? By adhering to the foreign policy which I have been discussing, do we not remain essentially British, in everything but the form of our government? Are not our interests, our industry, our commerce, so modified as to swell British pride, and to increase British power?
Mr. Chairman, our confederacy comprehends within its vast limits great diversity of interests: agricultural, planting, farming, commercial, navigating, fishing, manufacturing. No one of these interests is felt in the same degree and cherished with the same solicitude throughout all parts of the Union. Some of them are peculiar to particular sections of our common country. But all these great interests are confided to the protection of one Government, — to the fate of one ship; and a most gallant ship it is, with a noble crew. If we prosper and are happy, protection must be extended to all; it is due to all. It is the great principle on which obedience is demanded from all. If our essential interests cannot find protection from our own Government against the policy of foreign powers, where are they to get it? We did not unite for sacrifice, but for preservation. The inquiry should be, in reference to the great interests of every section of the Union (I speak not of minute subdivisions), what would be done for those interests if that section stood alone and separated from the residue of the republic? If the promotion of those interests would not injuriously affect any other section, then everything should be done for them which would be done if it termed a distinct Government. If they come into absolute collision with the interests of another section, a reconciliation, if possible, should be attempted by mutual concession, so as to avoid a sacrifice of the prosperity of either to that of the other. In such a case all should not be done for one which would be done, if it were separated and independent, but something; and in devising tho measure the good of each part and of the whole should be carefully consulted. This is the only mode by which we can preserve, in full vigor, the harmony of the whole Union. The South entertains one opinion, and imagines that a modification of the existing policy of the country for the protection of American industry involves the ruin of the South. The North, the East, the West hold the opposite opinion, and feel and contemplate, in a longer adherence to the foreign policy as it now exists, their utter destruction. Is it true that the interests of these great sections of our country are irreconcilable with each other? Are we reduced to the sad and afflicting dilemma of determining which shall fall a victim to the prosperity of the other? Happily, I think, there is no such distressing alternative. If the North, the West, and the East formed an independent State, unassociated with the South, can there be a doubt that the restrictive system would be carried to the point of prohibition of every foreign fabric of which they produce the raw material, and which they could manufacture? Such would be their policy, if they stood alone; but they are fortunately connected with the South, which believes its interests to require a free admission of foreign manufactures. Here, then, is a case for mutual concession, for fair compromise. The bill under consideration presents this compromise. It is a medium between the absolute exclusion and the unrestricted admission of the produce of foreign industry. It sacrifices the interest of neither section to that of the other; neither, it is true, gets all that it wants, nor is subject to all that it fears. But it has been said that the South obtains nothing in this compromise. Does it lose anything? is the first question. I have endeavored to prove that it does not, by showing that a mere transfer is effected in the source of the supply of its consumption from Europe to America; and that the loss, whatever it may be, of the sale of its great staple in Europe is compensated by the new market created in America. But does the South really gain nothing in this compromise? The consumption of the other sections, though somewhat restricted, is still left open by this bill, to foreign fabrics purchased by Southern staples. So far its operation is beneficial to the South, and prejudicial to the industry of the other sections, and that is the point of mutual concession. The South will also gain by the extended consumption of its great staple, produced by an increased capacity to consume it in consequence of the establishment of the home market. But the South cannot exert its industry and enterprise in the business of manufactures! Why not? The difficulties, if not exaggerated, are artificial, and may therefore be surmounted. But can the other sections embark in the planting occupations of the South? The obstructions which forbid them are natural, created by the immutable laws of God, and therefore unconquerable.
Other and animating considerations invite us to adopt the policy of this system. Its importance, in connection with the general defense in time of war, cannot fail to be duly estimated. Xeed I recall to our painful recollection the sufferings, for the want of an adequate supply of absolute necessaries, to which the defenders of their country’s rights and our entire population were subjected during the late war? Or to remind the Committee of the great advantage of a steady and unfailing source of supply, unaffected alike in war and in peace? Its importance, in reference to the stability of our Union, that paramount and greatest of all our interests, cannot fail warmly to recommend it, or at least to conciliate the forbearance of every patriot bosom. Now our people present the spectacle of a vast assemblage of jealous rivals, all eagerly rushing to the seaboard, jostling each other in their way, to hurry off to glutted foreign markets the perishable produce of their labor. The tendency of that policy, in conformity to which this bill is prepared, is to transform these competitors into friends and mutual customers; and, by the reciprocal exchanges of their respective productions, to place the confederacy upon the most solid of all foundations, the basis of common interest. And is not Government called upon, by every stimulating motive, to adapt its policy to the actual condition and extended growth of our great republic? At the commencement of our Constitution, almost the whole population of the United States was confined between the Alleghany mountains and the Atlantic ocean. Since that epoch, the western part of New York, of Pennsylvania, of Virginia, all the Western States and Territories have been principally peopled. Prior to that period we had scarcely any interior. An interior has sprung up, as it were by enchantment, and along with it new interests and new relations, requiring the parental protection of Government. Our policy should be modified accordingly, so as to comprehend all, and sacrifice none. And are we not encouraged by the success of past experience, in respect to the only article which has been adequately protected? Already have the predictions of the friends of the American system, in even a shorter time than their most sanguine hopes could have anticipated, been completely realized in regard to that article; and consumption is now better and more cheaply supplied with coarse cottons than it was under the prevalence of the foreign system.
Even if the benefits of the policy were limited to certain sections of our country, would it not be satisfactory to behold American industry, wherever situated, active, animated, and thrifty, rather than persevere in a course which renders us subservient to foreign industry? But these benefits are two-fold, direct and collateral, and in the one shape or the other they will diffuse themselves throughout the Union. All parts of the Union will participate, more or less, in both. As to the direct benefit, it is probable that the North and the East will enjoy the largest share. But the West and the South will also participate in them. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond will divide with the Northern capitals the business of manufacturing. The latter city unites more advantages for its successful prosecution than any other place I know. Zanesville in Ohio only excepted. And where the direct benefit does not accrue, that will be enjoyed of supplying the raw material and provisions for the consumption of artisans. Is it not most desirable to put at rest and prevent the annual recurrence of this unpleasant subject, so well fitted, by the various interests to which it appeals, to excite irritation and to produce discontent? Can that be effected by its rejection? Behold the mass of petitions which lie on our table, earnestly and anxiously entreating the protecting interposition of Congress against the ruinous policy which we are pursuing. Will these petitioners, comprehending all orders of society, entire States and communities, public companies and private individuals, spontaneously assembling, cease in their humble prayers by your lending a deaf ear? Can you expect that these petitioners and others, in countless numbers, that will, if you delay the passage of this bill, supplicate your mercy, should contemplate their substance gradually withdrawn to foreign countries, their ruin, slow but certain and as inevitable as death itself, without one expiring effort? You think the measure injurious to you; we believe our preservation depends upon its adoption. Our convictions, mutually honest, are equally strong. What is to be done? I invoke that saving spirit of mutual concession under which our blessed Constitution was formed, and under which alone it can be happily administered. I appeal to the South — to the high-minded, generous, and patriotic South — with which I have so often cooperated, in attempting to sustain the honor and to vindicate the rights of our country. Should it not offer, upon the altar of the public good, some sacrifice of its peculiar opinions? Of what does it complain? A possible temporary enhancement in the objects of consumption. Of what do we complain? A total incapacity, produced by the foreign policy, to purchase, at any price, necessary foreign objects of consumption. In such an alternative, inconvenient only to it, ruinous to us, can we expect too much from Southern magnanimity? The just and confident expectation of the passage of this bill has flooded the country with recent importations of foreign fabrics. If it should not pass, they will complete the work of destruction of our domestic industry. If it should pass, they will prevent any considerable rise in the price of foreign commodities, xintil our own industry shall be able to supply competent substitutes.
To the friends of the tariff I would also anxiously appeal. Every arrangement of its provisions does not suit each of you; you desire some further alterations; you would make it perfect. You want what you will never get. Nothing human is perfect. And I have seen, with great surprise, a piece signed by a member of Congress, published in the “National Intelligencer,” stating that this bill must be rejected, and a judicious tariff brought in as its substitute. A judicious tariff! No member of Congress could have signed that piece; or, if he did, the public ought not to be deceived. If this bill do not pass, unquestionably no other can pass at this session, or probably during this Congress. And who will go home and say that he rejected all the benefits of this bill, because molasses has been subjected to the enormous additional duty of five cents per gallon? I call, therefore, upon the friends of the American policy to yield somewhat of their own peculiar wishes, and not reject the practicable in the idle pursuit after the unattainable. Let us imitate the illustrious example of the frainers of the Constitution, and, always remembering that whatever springs from man partakes of his imperfections, depend upon experience to suggest, in future-, the necessary amendments.
We have had great difficulties to encounter. First, the splendid talents which are arrayed in this house against us. Second, we are opposed by the rich and powerful in the land. Third, the executive Government, if any, affords us but a cold and equivocal support. Fourth, the importing and navigating interest, I verily believe from misconception, are adverse to us. Fifth, the British factors and the British influence are inimical to our success. Sixth, long-established habits and prejudices oppose us. Seventh, the reviewers and literary speculators, foreign and domestic. And, lastly, the leading presses of the country, including the influence of that which is established in this city and sustained by the public purse.
From some of these, or other causes, the bill may be postponed, thwarted, defeated. But the cause is the cause of the country, and it must and will prevail. It is founded in the interests and affections of the people. It is as native as the granite deeply imbosomed in our mountains. And, in conclusion, I would pray God, in his infinite mercy, to avert from our country the evils which are impending over it, and, by enlightening our councils, to conduct us into that path which leads to riches, to greatness, to glory.
SPEECH OF DANIEL WEBSTER UPON THE
TARIFF,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 1 AND 2,
1824.Mr. Chairman, — I will avail myself of the present occasion to make some remarks on certain principles and opinions which have been recently advanced, and on those considerations which, in my judgment, ought to govern us in deciding upon the several and respective parts of this very important and complex measure. I can truly say that this is a painful duty. I deeply regret the necessity, which is likely to be imposed upon me, of giving a general affirmative or negative vote on the whole of the bill. I cannot but think this mode of proceeding liable to great objections. It exposes both those who support and those who oppose the measure to very unjust and injurious misapprehensions. There may be good reasons for favoring some of the provisions of the bill, and equally strong reasons for opposing others; and these provisions do not stand to each other in the relation of principal and incident. If that were the case, those who are in faror of the principal might forego their opinions upon incidental and subordinate provisions. But the bill proposes enactments entirely distinct, and different from one another in character and tendency. Some of its clauses are intended merely for revenue; and, of those which regard the protection of home manufactures, one part stands upon very different grounds from those of other parts. So that probably every gentleman who may ultimately support the bill will vote for much which his judgment does not approve; and those who oppose it will oppose something which they would very gladly support.
Being intrusted with the interests of a district highly commercial, and deeply interested in manufactures also, I wish to state my opinions on the present measure; not as on a whole, for it has no entire and homogeneous character; but as on a collection of different enactments, some of which meet my approbation and some of which do not.
And allow me, sir, in the first place, to state my regret, if indeed I ought not to express a warmer sentiment, at the names, or designations, which Mr. Speaker has seen fit to adopt, for the purpose of describing the advocates and the opposers of the present bill. It is a question, he says, between the friends of an “American policy,” and those of a “foreign policy.” This, sir, is an assumption which I take the liberty most directly to deny. Mr. Speaker certainly intended nothing invidious or derogatory to any part of the House by this mode of denominating friends and enemies. But there is power in names, and this manner of distinguishing those who favor and those who oppose particular measures may lead to inferences to which no member of the House can submit. It may imply that there is a more exclusive and peculiar regard to American interests in one class of opinions than in another. Such an implication is to be resisted and repelled. Every member has a right to the presumption that he pursues what he believes to be the interest of his country with as sincere a zeal as any other member. I claim this in my own case; and, while I shall not, for any purpose of description or convenient arrangement, use terms which may imply any disrespect to other men’s opinions, much less any imputations of other men’s motives, it is my duty to take care that the use of such terms by others be not, against the will of those who adopt them, made to produce a false impression. Indeed, sir, it is a little astonishing, if it seemed convenient to Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of distinction, to make use of the terms “American policy “and “foreign policy,” that he should not have applied them in a manner precisely the reverse of that in wliich he has in fact used them. If names are thought necessary, it would be well enough, one would think, that the name should be in some measure descriptive of the thing; and since Mr. Speaker denominates the policy which he recommends “a new policy in this country;” since he speaks of the present measure as a new era in our legislation; since he professes to invite us to depart from our accustomed course, to instruct ourselves by the wisdom of others, and to adopt the policy of the most distinguished foreign states, one is a little curious to know with what propriety of speech this imitation of other nations is denominated an “American policy,” while, on the contrary, a preference for our own established system, as it now actually exists, and always has existed, is called a “foreign policy.” This favorite American policy is what America has never tried, and this odious foreign policy is what, as we are told, foreign states have never pursued. Sir, that is the truest American policy which shall most usefully employ American capital, and American labor, and best sustain the whole population. With me it is a fundamental axiom, it is interwoven with all my opinions, that the great interests of the country are united and inseparable; that agriculture, commerce, and manufactures will prosper together, or languish together; and that all legislation is dangerous which proposes to benefit one of these without looking to consequences which may fall on the others.
Passing from this, sir, I am bound to say that Mr. Speaker began his able and impressive speech at the proper point of inquiry; I mean the present state and condition of the country; although I am so unfortunate, or rather although I am so happy, as to differ from him very widely in regard to that condition. I dissent entirely from the justice of that picture of distress which he has drawn. I have not seen the reality, and know not where it exists. Within my observation there is no cause for so gloomy and terrifying a representation. In respect to the New England States, with the condition of which I am, of course, most acquainted, the present appears to me a period of very general prosperity. Not, indeed, a time for great profits and sudden acquisition; not a day of extraordinary activity and successful speculation. There is, no doubt, a considerable depression of prices, and in some degree a stagnation of business. But the case presented by Mr. Speaker was not one of depression, but of distress; of universal, pervading, intense distress, limited to no class, and to no place. We are represented as on the very verge and brink of national ruin. So far from acquiescing in these opinions, I believe there has been no period in which the general prosperity was better secured, or rested on a more solid foundation. As applicable to the eastern States, I put this remark to their Representatives, and ask them if it is not true. When has there been a time in which the means of living have been more accessible and more abtindant? when has labor been rewarded, I do not say with a larger, but with a more certain success? Profits, indeed, are low; in some pursuits of life, which it is not proposed to benefit, but to burden by this bill, very low. But still I am unacquainted with any proofs of extraordinary distress. What, indeed, are the general indications of the state of the country? There is no famine nor pestilence in the land, nor war, nor desolation. There is no writhing under the burden of taxation. The means of subsistence are abundant; and at the very moment when the miserable condition of the country is asserted, it is admitted that the wages of labor are high in comparison with those of any other country. A country, then, enjoying a profound peace, a perfect civil liberty, with the means of subsistence cheap and abundant, with the reward of labor sure, and its wages higher than anywhere else, cannot be represented in gloom, melancholy, and distress, but by the effort of extraordinary powers of tragedy.
Even if, in judging of this question, we were to regard only those proofs to which we have been referred, we shall probably come to a conclusion somewhat different from that which has been drawn. Our exports, for example, although certainly less than in some years, were not, last year, so much below an average, formed upon the exports of a series of years, and putting those exports at a fixed value, as might be supposed. The exports of agricultural products, of animals, of the products of the forest, of the sea, together with gunpowder, spirits, and sundry unenumerated articles, amounted in the several years to the following sums, viz: —
In 1790. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,716,152 In 1804. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,842,816 In 1807. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,465,864 Coming up, now, to our own times, and taking the exports of the years 1821, 1822, and 1823, of the same articles and products, at the same prices, they stand thus:—
In 1821. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,643,175 In 1822. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,782,295 In 1823. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,863,491 Mr. Speaker has taken the very extraordinary year of 1803, and adding to the exportation of that year what he thinks ought to have been a just augmentation, in proportion to the increase of our population, he swells the result to a magnitude which, when compared with our actual exports, would exhibit a great deficiency. But is there any justice in this mode of calculation? In the first place, as before observed, the year 1803 was a year of extraordinary exportation. By reference to the accounts, that of the article of flour, for example, there was an export that year of 1,300,000 barrels; but the very next year it fell to 800,000, and the next year to 700,000. In the next place, there never was any reason to expect that the increase of our exports of agricultural products would keep pace with the increase of our population. That would be against all experience. It is, indeed, most desirable that there should be an augmented demand for the products of agriculture; but, nevertheless, the official returns of our exports do not show that absolute want of all foreign market which has been so strongly stated.
But there are other means by which to judge of the general condition of the people. The quantity of the means of subsistence consumed; or, to make use of a phraseology better suited to the condition of our own people, the quantity of the comforts of life enjoyed, is one of those means. It so happens, indeed, that it is not so easy in this country, as elsewhere, to ascertain facts of this sort with accuracy. Where most of the articles of subsistence, and most of the comforts of life are taxed, there is, of course, great facility in ascertaining, from official statements, the amount of consumption. But in this country, most fortunately, the government neither knows, nor is concerned to know, the annual consumption; and estimates can only be formed in another mode, and in reference only in a few articles. Of these articles, tea is one. Its use is not quite a luxury, and yet is something above the absolute necessaries of life. Its consumption, therefore, will be diminished in times of adversity, and augmented in times of prosperity. By deducting the annual export from the annual import, and taking a number of years together, we may arrive at a probable estimate of consumption. The average of eleven years, from 1790 to 1800 inclusive, will be found to be 2,500,000 pounds. From 1801 to 1812, inclusive, 3,700,000; and the average of the last three years, to wit: 1821,1822, and 1823, 5,500,000. Having made a just allowance for the increase in our numbers, we shall still find, I think, from these statements, that there is no distress which has limited our means of subsistence and enjoyment.
In forming an opinion of the degree of general prosperity, we may regard likewise the progress of internal improvements, — the investment of capital in roads, bridges, and canals. All these prove a balance of income over expenditure; they are evidence that there is a surplus of profits which the present generation is usefully vesting for the benefit of the next. It cannot be denied that, in this particular, the progress of the country is steady and rapid.
We may look, too, to the expenses of education. Are our colleges deserted? Do fathers find themselves less able than usual to educate their children? It will be found, I imagine, that the amount paid for the purpose of education is constantly increasing, and that the schools and colleges were never more full than at the present moment. I may add that the endowment of public charities, the contributions to objects of general benevolence, whether foreign or domestic, the munificence of individuals towards whatever promises to benefit the community, are all so many proofs of national prosperity. And, finally, there is no defalcation of revenue, no pressure of taxation.
The general result, therefore, of a fair examination of the present condition of things, seems to me to be that there is a considerable depression of prices and curtailment of profit; and, in some parts of the country, it must be admitted, there is a great degree of pecuniary embarrassment arising from the difficulty of paying debts which were contracted when prices were high. With these qualifications, the general state of the country may be said to be prosperous; and these are not sufficient to give to the whole face of affairs any appearance of general distress.
Supposing the evil, then, to be a depression of prices, and a partial pecuniary pressure, the next inquiry is into the causes of that evil; and it appears to me that there are several, — and in this respect, I think, too much has been imputed, by Mr. Speaker, to the single cause of the diminution of exports. Connected, as we are, with all the commercial nations of the world, and having observed great changes to take place elsewhere, we should consider whether the causes of those changes have not reached us, and whether we are not suffering by the operation of them in common with others. Undoubtedly there has been a great fall in the price of all commodities throughout the commercial world in consequence of the restoration of a state of peace. When the Allies entered France in 1814, prices rose astonishingly fast, and very high. Colonial produce, for instance, in the ports of this country, as well as elsewhere, sprung up suddenly from the lowest to the highest extreme. A new and vast demand was created for the commodities of trade. These were the natural consequences of the great political changes which then took place in Europe.
We are to consider, too, that our own war created new demand, and that a government expenditure of $25,000,000 or $30,000,000 a year had the usual effect of enhancing prices. We are obliged to add that the paper issues of our banks carried the same effect still further. A depreciated currency existed in a great part of the country; depreciated to such an extent as that, at one time, exchange between the centre and the north was as high as 20%. The Bank of the United States was instituted to correct this evil; but, for causes which it is not necessary now to enumerate, it did not for some years bring back the currency of the country to a sound state. This depreciation of the circulating currency was so much, of course, added to the nominal prices of commodities, and these prices thus unnaturally high, seemed, to those who looked only at the appearance, to indicate great prosperity. But such prosperity is more specious than real. It would have been better, probably, as the shock would have been less, if prices had fallen sooner. At length, however, they fell; and, as there is little doubt that certain events in Europe had an influence in determining the time at which this fall should take place, I will advert shortly to some of the principal of those events.
In May, 1819, the British House of Commons decided, by an unanimous vote, that the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England should not be deferred beyond the ensuing February. The restriction had been continued from time to time and from year to year, Parliament always professing to look to the restoration of a specie currency, whenever it should be found practicable. Having been, in July, 1818, continued to July, 1819, it was understood that, in the interim, the important question of the time at which cash payments should be resumed should be finally settled. In the latter part of the year 1818 the circulation of the bank had been greatly reduced, and a severe scarcity of money was felt in the London market. Such was the state of things in England. On the continent other important events took place. The French Indemnity Loan had been negotiated in the summer of 1818, and the propertion of it belonging to Austria, Russia, and Prussia had been sold. This created an unusual demand for gold and silver in these eastern States of Europe. It has been stated that the amount of the precious metals transmitted to Austria and Russia in that year was at least twenty millions sterling. Other large sums were sent to Prussia and to Denmark. The effect of this sudden drain of specie, felt first at Paris, was communicated to Amsterdam and Hamburg, and all other commercial places in the north of Europe.
The paper system of England had certainly communicated an artificial value to property. It had encouraged speculation and excited overtrading. When the shock therefore came, and this violent pressure for money acted at the same moment on the continent and in England, inflated and unnatural prices could be kept up no longer. A reduction took place, which has been estimated to have been at least equal to a fall of 30%, if not 40%. The depression was universal, and the change was felt in the United States severely, though not equally so in every part of them. There are those, I am aware, who maintain that the events to which I have alluded did not cause the great fall of prices, but that that fall was natural and inevitable, from the previously existing state of things, the abundance of commodities, and the want of demand. But that would only prove that the effect was produced in another way, rather than by another cause. If these great and sudden calls for money did not reduce prices, but prices fell as of themselves to their natural state, still the result is the same; for we perceive that after these new calls for money, prices could not be kept longer at their unnatural height.
About the time of these foreign events our own bank system underwent a change; and alj these causes, in my view of the subject, concurred to produce the great shock which took place in our commercial cities, and through many parts of the country. The year 1819 was a year of numerous failures and very considerable distress, and would have furnished far better grounds than exist at present for that gloomy representation of our condition which has been presented. Mr. Speaker has alluded to the strong inclination which exists, or has existed, in various parts of the country to issue paper money, as a proof of great existing difficulties. I regard it rather as a very productive cause of those difficulties; and the committee will not fail to observe that there is, at this moment, much the loudest complaint of distress precisely where there has been the greatest attempt to relieve it by systems of paper credit. And, on the other hand, content, prosperity, and happiness, are most observable in those parts of the country where there has been the least endeavor to administer relief by law. In truth, nothing is so baneful, so utterly ruinous to all true industry, as interfering with the legal value of money, or attempting to raise artificial standards to supply its place. Such remedies suit well the spirit of extravagant speculation, but they sap the very foundation of all honest acquisition. By weakening the security of property they take away all motive for exertion. Their effect is to transfer property. Whenever a debt is allowed to be paid by anything less valuable than the legal currency in respect to which it was contracted, the difference between the value of the paper given in payment and the legal currency is precisely so much property taken from one man and given to another by legislative enactment.
When we talk, therefore, of protecting industry, let us remember that the first measure for that end is to secure it in its earnings, to assure it that it shall receive its own. Before we invent new modes of raising prices, let us take care that existing prices are not rendered wholly unavailable by making them capable of being paid in depreciated paper. I regard, sir, this issue of irredeemable paper as the most prominent and deplorable cause of whatever pressure still exists in the country; and further, I would put the question to the members of this Committee, whether it is not from that part of the people who have tried this paper system, and tried it to their cost, that this bill receives the most earnest support? And I cannot forbear to ask, further, whether this support does not proceed rather from a general feeling of uneasiness under the present condition of things, than from the clear perception of any benefit which the measure itself can confer? Is not all expectation of advantage centred in a sort of vague hope that change may produce relief? Debt certainly presses hardest where prices have been longest kept up by artificial means. They find the shock lightest who take it soonest; and I fully believe that, if those parts of the country which now suffer most had not augmented the force of the blow by deferring it, they would have now been in a much better condition than they are. We may assure ourselves, once for all, sir, that there can be no such thing as payment of debts by legislation. We may abolish debts indeed; we may transfer property by visionary and violent laws. But we deceive both ourselves and our constituents if we flatter either ourselves or them with the hope that there is any relief against whatever pressure exists, but in economy and industry. The depression of prices and the stagnation of business have been in truth the necessary result of circumstances. No government could prevent them, and no government can altogether relieve the people from their effect. We had enjoyed a day of extraordinary prosperity; we had been neutral while the world was at war, and had found a great demand for our products, our navigation, and our labor. We had no right to expect that that state of things would continue always. With the return of peace foreign nations would struggle for themselves, and enter into competition with us in the great objects of pursuit.
Now, sir, what is the remedy for existing evils? what is the course of policy suited to our actual condition? Certainly it is not our wisdom to adopt any system that may be offered to us without examination, and in the blind hope that whatever changes our condition may improve it. It is better that we should
- ” Bear those ills we have,
- Than fly to others that we know not of.”
We are bound to see that there is a fitness and an aptitude in whatever measures may be recommended to relieve the evils that afflict us; and before we adopt a system that professes to make great alterations, it is our duty to look carefully to each leading interest of the community, and see how it may probably be affected by our proposed legislation.
And, in the first place, what is the condition of our commerce? Here we must clearly perceive that it is not enjoying that rich harvest which fell to its fortune during the continuance of the European wars. It has been greatly depressed, and limited to small profits. Still, it is elastic and active, and seems capable of recovering itself in some measure from its depression. The shipping interest also has suffered severely, still more severely, probably, than commerce. If anything should strike us with astonishment it is that the navigation of the United States should be able to sustain itself. Without any government protection whatever, it goes abroad to challenge competition with the whole world; and, in spite of all obstacles, it has yet been able to maintain 800,000 tons in the employment of foreign trade. How, sir, do the ship-owners and navigators accomplish this? How is it that they are able to meet, and in some measure overcome, universal competition? Not, sir, by protection and bounties, but by unwearied exertion, by extreme economy, by unshaken perseverance, by that manly and resolute spirit which relies on itself to protect itself. These causes alone enable American ships still to keep their element, and show the flag of their country in distant seas. The rates of insurance may teach us how thoroughly our ships are built, and how skillfully and safely they are navigated. Bisks are taken, as I learn, from the United States to Liverpool, at 1%, and from the United States to Canton and back as low as 3%. But when we look to the low rate of freight, and when we consider, also, that the articles entering into the composition of a ship, with the exception of wood, are dearer here than in other countries, we cannot but be utterly surprised that the shipping interest has been able to sustain itself at all. I need not say that the navigation of the country is essential to its honor and its defense. Yet, instead of proposing benefit for it in this hour of its depression, we propose by this measure to lay upon it new and heavy burdens. In the discussion, the other day, of that provision of the bill which proposes to tax tallow for the benefit of the oil merchants and whalemen, we had the pleasure of hearing eloquent eulogiums upon that portion of our shipping employed in the whale fishery, and strong statements of its importance to the public interest. But the same bill proposes a severe tax upon that interest for the benefit of the iron manufacturer and the hemp grower. So that the tallow-chandlers and soapboilers are sacrificed to the oil merchants, in order that these again may contribute to the manufacturers of iron and the growers of hemp.
If such be the state of our commerce and navigation, what is the condition of our home manufactures? How are they amidst the general depression? Do they need further protection? and if any, how much? On all these points, we have had much general statement, but little precise information. In the very elaborate speech of Mr. Speaker, we are not supplied with satisfactory grounds of judging in these various particulars. Who can tell, from anything yet before the committee, whether the proposed duty be too high or too low, on any one article? Gentlemen tell us, that they are in favor of domestic industry; so am I. They would give it protection; so would I. But then all domestic industry is not confined to manufactures. The employments of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, are all branches of the same domestic industry; they all furnish employment for American capital and American labor. And when the question is, whether new duties shall be laid, for the purpose of giving further encouragement to particular manufactures, every reasonable man must ask himself, both whether the proposed new encouragement be necessary, and whether it can be given without injustice to other branches of industry.
It is desirable to know, also, somewhat more distinctly, how the proposed means will produce the intended effect. One great object proposed, for example, is the increase of the home market for the consumption of agricultural products. This certainly is much to be desired; but what provisions of the bill are expected wholly or principally to produce this, is not stated. I would not suggest that some increase of the home market may not follow from the adoption of this bill, but all its provisions have not an equal tendency to produce this effect. Those manufactures which employ most labor create, of course, most demand for articles of consumption; and those create least, in the production of which capital and skill enter as the chief ingredients of cost. I cannot, sir, take this bill, merely because a Committee has recommended it. I cannot espouse a side, and fight under a flag. I wholly repel the idea, that we must take this law, or pass no law on the subject. What should hinder us from exercising our own judgments upon these provisions, singly and severally? Who has the power to place us, or why should we place ourselves, in a condition where we cannot give to every measure, that is distinct and separate in itself, a separate and distinct consideration? Sir, I presume no member of the Committee will withhold his assent from what he thinks right, until others will yield their assent to what they think wrong. There are many things in this bill, acceptable probably to the general sense of the House. Why should not these provisions be passed into a law, and others left to be decided upon their own merits, as a majority of the House shall see fit? To some of these provisions, I am myself decidedly favorable; to others, I have great objections; and I should have been very glad of an opportunity of giving my own vote distinctly on propositions, which are, in their own nature, essentially and substantially distinct from one another.
But, sir, before expressing my own opinion upon the several provisions of this bill, I will advert for a moment to some other general topics. We have heard much of the policy of England, and her example has been repeatedly urged upon us, as proving, not only the expediency of encouragement and protection, but of exclusion and direct prohibition also. I took occasion the other day to remark, that more liberal notions were growing prevalent on this subject; that the policy of restraints and prohibitions was getting out of repute, as the tme nature of commerce became better understood; and that, among public men, those most distinguished were most decided in their reprobation of the broad principle of exclusion and prohibition. Upon the truth of this representation, as matter of fact, I supposed there could not be two opinions among those who had observed the progress of political sentiment in other countries, and were acquainted with its present state. In this respect, however, it would seem that I was greatly mistaken. We have heard it again and again declared, that the English government still adheres, with immovable firmness, to its old doctrines of prohibition; that although journalists, theorists, and scientific writers advance other doctrines, yet the practical men, the legislators, the government of the country, are too wise to follow them. It has even been most sagaciously hinted that the promulgation of liberal opinions on these subjects is intended only for a delusion upon other nations, to cajole them into the folly of liberal ideas, while England retains to herself all the benefits of the admirable old system of prohibition. We have heard from Mr. Speaker a warm commendation of the complex mechanism of this system. The British Empire, it is said, is, in the first place, to be protected against the rest of the world; then the British isles against the colonies; next, the isles respectively against each other, — England herself, as the heart of the empire, being protected most of all, and against all.
Truly, sir, it appears to me, that Mr. Speaker’s imagination has seen system, and order, and beauty in that which is much more justly considered as the result of ignorance, partiality, or violence. This part of English legislation has resulted, partly from considering Ireland as a conquered country, partly from the want of a complete union, even with Scotland, and partly from the narrow views of colonial regulation, which in early and uninformed periods influenced the European states.
And, sir, I imagine, nothing would strike the public men of England more singularly than to find gentlemen of real information, and much weight in the councils of this country, expressing sentiments like these, in regard to the existing state of these English laws. I have never said, indeed, that prohibitory laws did not exist in England: we all know they do; but the question is, does she owe her prosperity and greatness to these laws? I venture to say, that such is not the opinion of the public men now in England, and the continuance of the laws, even without any alteration, would not be evidence that their opinion is different from what I have represented it; because the laws having existed long, and great interests having been built up on the faith of them, they cannot now be repealed without great and overwhelming inconvenience. Because a thing has been wrongly done, it does not therefore follow that it can now be undone; and this is the reason, as I understand it, upon which exclusion, prohibition and monopoly are suffered to remain in any degree in the English system; and for the same reason it will be wise in us to take our measures on all subjects of this kind with great caution. We may not be able, but at the hazard of much injury to individuals, hereafter to retrace our steps. And yet, whatever is extravagant or unreasonable is not likely to endure. There may come a moment of strong reaction; and if no moderation be shown in laying on duties, there may be little scruple in taking them off. It may here be observed that there is a broad and marked distinction between entire prohibition and reasonable encouragement. It is one thing, by duties or taxes on foreign articles, to awaken a home competition in the production of the same articles; it is another thing to remove all competition by a total exclusion of the foreign article; and it is quite another thing still, by total prohibition, to raise at home manufactures not suited to the climate, the nature of the country, or the state of the population. These are substantial distinctions, and although it may not be easy in every case to determine which of them applies to a given article, yet the distinctions themselves exist, and in most cases will be sufficiently clear to indicate the true course of policy; and, unless I have greatly mistaken the prevailing sentiment in the councils of England, it grows every day more and more favorable to the diminution of restrictions, and to the wisdom of leaving much (I do not say everything, for that would not be true) to the enterprise and the discretion of individuals. I should certainly not -have taken up the time of the Committee to state at any length the opinions of other governments, or of the public men of other countries, upon a subject like this; but an occasional remark made by me the other day having been so directly controverted, especially by Mr. Speaker, in his observations yesterday, I must take occasion to refer to some proofs of what I have stated.
What then is the state of English opinion? Everybody knows that, after the termination of the late European war, there came a time of great pressure in England. Since her example has been quoted, let it be asked in what mode her government sought relief. Did it aim to maintain artificial and unnatural prices? Did it maintain a swollen and extravagant paper circulation? Did it carry further the laws of prohibition and exclusion? Did it draw closer the cords of colonial restraint? No, sir, but precisely the reverse. Instead of relying on legislative contrivances, and artificial devices, it trusted to the enterprise and industry of the people; which it sedulously sought to excite, not by imposing restraint, but by removing it, wherever its removal was practicable. In May, 1820, the attention of the government having been much turned to the state of foreign trade, a distinguished member 1 of the House of Peers brought forward a parliamentary motion upon that subject, followed by an ample discussion, and a full statement of his own opinions. In the course of his remarks he observed “that there ought to be no prohibitory duties, as such; for that it was evident) that where a manufacture could not be carried on, or a production raised, but under the protection of a prohibitory duty, that manufacture, or that produce, could not be brought to market but at a loss. In his opinion, the name of strict prohibition might, therefore, in commerce, be got rid of altogether; but he did not see the same objection to protecting duties, which, while they admitted of the introduction of commodities from abroad similar to those which we ourselves manufactured, placed them so much on a level as to allow a competition between them.” “No axiom,” he added, “was more true than this: that it was by growing what the territory of a country could grow most cheaply, and by receiving from other countries what it could not produce except at too great an expense, that the greatest degree of happiness was to be communicated to the greatest extent of population.” In assenting to the motion, the first Minister 1 of the Crown expressed his own opinion of the great advantage resulting from unrestricted freedom of trade. “Of the soundness of that general principle,” he observed, “I can entertain no doubt. I can entertain no doubt of what would have been the great advantages to the civilized world, if the system of unrestricted trade had been acted upon by every nation, from the earliest period of its commercial intercourse with its neighbors. If to those advantages there could have been any exceptions, I am persuaded that they would have been but few; and I am also persuaded that the cases, to which they would have referred, would not have been, in themselves, connected with the trade and commerce of England. But we are now in a situation in which,—I will not say that a reference to the principle of unrestricted trade can be of no use, because such a reference may correct erroneous reasoning, — but in which it is impossible for us, or for any country in the world, but the United States of America, to act unreservedly on that principle. The commercial regulations of the European world have been long established, and cannot suddenly be departed from.” Having supposed a proposition to be made to England, by a foreign state, for free commerce and intercourse, and an unrestricted exchange of agricultural products and of manufactures, he proceeds to observe: “It would be impossible to accede to such a proposition. We have risen to our present greatness under a different system. Some suppose that we have risen in consequence of that system; others, of whom I am one, believe that we have risen in spite of that system. But, whichever of these hypotheses be true, certain it is, that we have risen under a very different system than that of free and unrestricted trade. It is utterly impossible, with our debt and taxation, even if they were but half their existing amount, that we can suddenly adopt the system of free trade.” Lord Ellenborough, in the same debate, said, “That he attributed the general distress then existing in Europe to the regulations that had taken place since the destruction of the French power. Most of the states on the continent had surrounded themselves as with walls of brass, to inhibit intercourse with other states. Intercourse was prohibited, even in districts of the same state, as was the case in Austria and Sardinia. Thus, though the taxes on the people had been lightened, the severity of their condition had been increased. He believed that the discontent which pervaded most parts of Europe, and especially Germany, was more owing to commercial restrictions than to any theoretical doctrines on government; and that a free communication among them would do more to restore tranquillity than any other step that could be adopted. He objected to all attempts to frustrate the benevolent intentions of Providence, which had given to various countries various wants, in order to bring them together. He objected to it as antisocial; he objected to it, as making commerce the means of barbarizing, instead of enlightening nations. The state of the trade with France was the most disgraceful to both countries; the two greatest civilized nations of the world, placed at a distance of scarcely twenty miles from each other, had contrived, by their artificial regulations, to reduce their commerce with each other to a mere nullity.” Every member, speaking on this occasion, agreed in the general sentiments favorable to unrestricted intercourse, which had thus been advanced; one of them remarking, at the conclusion of the debate, that “the principles of free trade, which he was happy to see so fully recognized, were of the utmost consequence; for, though, in the present circumstances of the country, a free trade was unattainable, yet their task hereafter was to approximate to it. Considering the prejudices and interests which were opposed to the recognition of that principle, it was no small indication of the firmness and liberality of government to have so fully conceded it.”
Sir, we have seen, in the course of this discussion, that several gentlemen have expressed their high admiration of the silk manufacture of England. Its commendation was begun, I think, by the honorable member from Vermont, who sits near me, who thinks that that alone gives conclusive evidence of the benefits produced by attention to manufactures, inasmuch as it is a great source of wealth to the nation, and has amply repaid all the cost of its protection. Mr. Speaker’s approbation of this part of the English example was still warmer. Now, sir, it does so happen that both these gentlemen differ very widely on this point from the opinions entertained in England by persons of the first rank, both of knowledge and of power. In the debate to which I have already referred, the proposer of the motion urged the expediency of providing for the admission of the silks of France into England. “He was aware,” he said, “that there was a poor and industrious body of manufacturers whose interests must suffer by such an arrangement, and therefore he felt that it would be the duty of parliament to provide for the present generation by a large parliamentary grant. It was conformable to every principle of sound justice to do so, when the interests of a particular class were sacrificed to the good of the whole.” In answer to these observations, Lord Liverpool said that, with reference to several branches of manufactures, time and the change of circumstances had rendered the system of protecting duties merely nominal, and that, in his opinion, if all the protecting laws which regarded both the woollen and cotton manufactures were to be repealed no injurious effects would thereby be occasioned. “But,” he observes, “with respect to silk, that manufacture in this kingdom is so completely artificial that any attempt to introduce the principles of free trade with reference to it might put an end to it altogether. I allow that the silk manufacture is not natural to this country. I wish we had never had a silk manufactory. I allow that it is natural to France; I allow that it might have been better had each country adhered exclusively to that manufacture in which each is superior, and had the silks of France been exchanged for British cottons. But I must look at things as they are; and when I consider the extent of capital, and the immense population, consisting, I believe, of about 50,000 persons engaged in our silk manufacture, I can only say that one of the few points in which I totally disagree with the proposer of the motion is the expediency, under existing circumstances, of holding out any idea that it would be possible to relinquish the silk manufacture, and to provide for those who live by it by parliamentary enactment. Whatever objections there may be to the continuance of the protecting system, I repeat that it is impossible altogether to relinquish it. I may regret that the system was ever commenced; but as I cannot recall that act, I must submit to the inconvenience by which it is attended, rather than expose the country to evils of greater magnitude.” Let it be remembered, sir, that these are not the sentiments of a theorist, nor the fancies of speculation, but the operative opinions of the first minister of England, acknowledged to be one of the ablest and most practical statesmen of his country. Sir, gentlemen could have hardly been more unfortunate than in the selection of the silk manufacture in England, as an example of the beneficial effects of that system which they would recommend. It is, in the language which I have quoted, completely artificial. It has been sustained by I know not how many laws, breaking in upon the plainest principles of general expediency. At the last session of Parliament the manufacturers petitioned for the repeal of three or four of these statutes, complaining of the vexatious restrictions which they impose on the wages of labor, setting forth that a great variety of orders has from time to time been issued by magistrates under the authority of these laws, interfering in an oppressive manner with the minutest details of the manufacture, such as limiting the number of threads to an inch, restricting the widths of many sorts of work, and determining the quantity of labor not to be exceeded without extra wages; that by the operation of these laws the rate of M’ages, instead of being left to the recognized principles of regulation, has been arbitrarily fixed by persons whose ignorance renders them incompetent to a just decision; that masters are compelled by law to pay an equal price for all work, whether well or ill performed; and that they are totally prevented the use of improved machinery, it being ordered that work, in the weaving of which machinery is employed, shall be paid precisely at the same rate as if done by hand; that these acts have frequently given rise to the most vexatious regulations, the unintentional breach of which has subjected manufacturers to ruinous penalties; and that the introduction of all machinery being prevented, by which labor might be cheapened, and the manufacturers being compelled to pay at a fixed price, under all circumstances, they are prevented from affording employment to their workmen in times of stagnation of trade, but are compelled to stop their looms. And finally, they complain that, notwithstanding these grievances under which they labor, while carrying on their manufacture in London, the law still prohibits them, while they continue to reside there, from employing any portion of their capital in the same business in any other part of the kingdom where it might be more beneficially conducted. Now, sir, absurd as these laws must appear to be to every man, the attempt to repeal them did not, as far as I recollect, altogether succeed. The weavers were too numerous, their interests too great, or their prejudices too strong; and this notable instance of protection and monopoly still exists, to be lamented in England with as much sincerity as it seems to be admired here.
In order further to show the prevailing sentiment of the English government, I would refer to a report of a select committee of the House of Commons, at the head of which was the vice-president of the board of trade (Mr. Wallace), in July, 1820. “The time,” say that committee, “when monopolies could be successfully supported, or would be patiently endured, either in respect to subjects against subjects, or particular countries against the rest of the world, seems to have passed away. Commerce, to continue undisturbed and secure, must be, as it was intended to be, a source of reciprocal amity between nations, and an interchange of productions, to promote the industry, the wealth, and the happiness of mankind.” In moving for the reappoint-ment of the committee, in February, 1823, the same gentleman said: “We must also get rid of that feeling of appropriation, which exhibited itself in a disposition to produce everything necessary for our own consumption, and to render ourselves independent of the world. No notion could be more absurd or mischievous; it led, even in peace, to an animosity and rancor greater than existed in time of war. Undoubtedly there would be great prejudices to combat, both in this country and elsewhere, in the attempt to remove the difficulties which are most obnoxious. It would be impossible to forget the attention which was in some respects due to the present system of protections, although that attention ought certainly not to be carried beyond the absolute necessity of the case.” And in a second report of the committee, drawn by the same gentleman, in that part of it which proposes a diminution of duties on timber from the north of Europe, and the policy of giving a legislative preference to the importation of such timber in the log, and a discouragement of the importation of deals, it is stated that the committee reject this policy, because, among other reasons, “it is founded on a principle of exclusion, which they are most averse to see brought into operation, in any new instance, without the warrant of some evident and great political expediency.” And on many subsequent occasions the same gentleman has taken occasion to observe that he differed from those who thought that manufactures could not flourish, without restrictions on trade; that old prejudices of that sort were dying away, and that more liberal and just sentiments were taking their place.
These sentiments appear to have been followed by important legal provisions, calculated to remove restrictions and prohibitions where they were most severely felt; that is to say, in several branches of navigation and trade. They have relaxed their colonial system, they have opened the ports of their islands, and have done away the restriction which limited the trade of the colony to the mother country. Colonial products can now be carried directly from the islands to any part of Europe; and it may not be improbable, considering our own high duties on spirits, that that article may be exchanged hereafter by the English West India colonies, directly, for the timber and deals of the Baltic. It may be added that Mr. Lowe, whom the gentleman has cited, says that nobody supposes that the three great staples of English manufactures, cotton, woollen, and hardware, are benefited by any existing protecting duties, and that one object of all these protecting laws is usually overlooked, and that is, that they have been intended to reconcile the various interests to taxation, the corn law, for example, being designed as some equivalent to the agricultural interest for the burden of tithes and of poor rates.
In fine, sir, I think it is clear that if we now embrace the system of prohibitions and restrictions we shall show an affection for what others have discarded, and be attempting to ornament ourselves with cast-off apparel.
Sir, I should not have gone into this prolix detail of opinions from any consideration of their special importance on the present occasion, but, having happened to state that such was the actual opinion of the government of England at the present time, and the accuracy of this representation having been so confidently denied, I have chosen to put the matter beyond doubt or cavil, although at the expense of these tedious citations. I shall have occasion hereafter of referring more particularly to sundry recent British enactments, by way of showing the diligence and spirit with which that government strives to sustain its navigating interest, by opening the widest possible range to the enterprise of individual adventurers. I repeat that I have not alluded to these examples of a foreign state as being fit to control our own policy. In the general principle I acquiesce. Protection, when carried to the point which is now recommended, that is, to entire prohibition, seems to me destructive of all commercial intercourse between nations. We are urged to adopt the system upon general principles; and what would be the consequence of the universal application of such a general principle, but that nations would abstain entirely from all intercoiirse with one another? I do not admit the general principle; on the contrary, I think freedom of trade to be the general principle, and restriction the exception. And it is for every state, taking into view its own condition, to judge of the propriety in any case of making an exception, constantly preferring, as I think all wise governments will, not to depart without urgent reason from the general rule.
There is another point in the existing policy of England to which I would most earnestly invite the attention of the Committee; I mean the warehouse system, or what we usually call the system of drawback. Very great prejudices appear to me to exist with us on that subject. We seem averse to the extension of the principle. The English government, on the contrary, appear to have carried it to the extreme of liberality. They have arrived, however, at their present opinions and present practice by slow degrees. The transit system was commenced about the year 1803, but the first law was partial and limited. It admitted the importation of raw materials for exportation, but it excluded almost every sort of manufactured goods. This was done for the same reason that we propose to prevent the transit of Canadian wheat through the United States, — the fear of aiding the competition of the foreign article with our own, in foreign markets. Better reflection, or more experience, has induced them to abandon that mode of reasoning, and to consider all such means of influencing foreign markets as nugatory; since, in the present active and enlightened state of the world, nations will supply themselves from the best sources, and the true policy of all producers, whether of raw materials or of manufactured articles, is, not vainly to endeavor to keep other venders out of the market, but to conquer them in it, by the quality and the cheapness of their articles. The present policy of England, therefore, is to allure the importation of commodities into England, there to be deposited in English warehouses, thence to be exported in assorted cargoes, and thus enabling her to carry on a general export trade to all quarters of the globe. Articles of all kinds, with the single exception of tea, may be brought into England from any part of the world, in foreign as well as British ships, there warehoused, and again exported, at the pleasure of the owner, without the payment of any duty or government charge whatever.
While I am upon this subject, I would take notice also of the recent proposition in the English Parliament to abolish the tax on imported wool; and it is observable that those who support this proposition give the same reasons as have been offered here within the last week, against the duty which we propose on the same article. They say that their manufacturers require a cheap and coarse wool, for the supply of the Mediterranean and Levant trade, and that, without a more free admission of the wool of the continent, that trade will all fall into the hands of the Germans and Italians, who will carry it on through Leghorn and Trieste. While there is this duty on foreign wool to protect the wool growers of England, there is on the other hand a prohibition on the exportation of the native article in aid of the manufacturers. The opinion seems to be gaining strength, that the true policy is to abolish both.
Laws have long existed in England, preventing the emigration of artisans and the exportation of machinery; but the policy of these, also, has become doubted, and an inquiry has been instituted in Parliament into the expediency of repealing them. As to the emigration of artisans, say those who disapprove the laws, if that were desirable, no law could effect it; and as to the exportation of machinery, let us fabricate and export it, as we would any other commodity. If France is determined to spin and weave her own cotton, let us, if we may, still have the benefit of furnishing the machinery.
I have stated these things, sir, to show what seems to be the general tone of thinking and reasoning on these subjects in that country, the example of which has been so much pressed upon us. Whether the present policy of England be right or wrong, wise or unwise, it cannot, as it seems clearly to me, be quoted as an authority for carrying further the restrictive and exclusive system, either in regard to manufactures or trade. To reestablish a sound currency, to meet at once the shock, tremendous as it was, of the fall of prices, to enlarge her capacity for foreign trade, to open wide the field of individual enterprise and competition, and to say, plainly and distinctly, that the country must relieve itself from the embarrassments which it felt, by economy, frugality, and renewed efforts of enterprise; these appear to be the general outline of the policy which England has pursued.
Mr. Chairman, I will now proceed to say a few words upon a topic, but for the introduction of which into this debate, I should not have given the Committee, on this occasion, the trouble of hearing me. Some days ago — I believe it was when we were settling the controversy between the oil merchants and the tallow-chandlers — the balance of trade made its appearance in debate, and I must confess, sir, that I spoke of it, or rather spoke to it, somewhat freely and irreverently. I believe I used the hard names which have been imputed to me; and I did it simply for the purpose of laying the spectre and driving it back to its tomb. Certainly, sir, when I called the old notion on this subject nonsense, I did not suppose that I should offend any one, unless the dead should happen to hear me. All the living generation, I took it for granted, would think the term very properly applied. In this, however, I was mistaken. The dead and the living rise up together to call me to account, and I must defend myself as well as I am able.
Let us inquire, then, sir, what is meant by an unfavorable balance of trade, and what the argument is, drawn from that source. By an unfavorable balance of trade, I understand, is meant that state of things in which importation exceeds exportation. To apply it to our own case, if the value of goods imported exceed the value of those exported, then the balance of trade is said to be against us, inasmuch as we have run in debt to the amount of this difference. Therefore it is said that if a nation continue long in a commerce like this, it must be rendered absolutely bankrupt. It is in the condition of a man that buys more than he sells; and how can such a traffic be maintained without ruin? Now, sir, the whole fallacy of this argument consists in supposing that, whenever the value of imports exceeds that of exports, a debt is necessarily created to the extent of the difference; whereas, ordinarily, the import is no more than the result of the export, augmented in value by the labor of transportation. The excess of imports over exports, in truth, usually shows the gains, not the losses, of trade; or, in a country that not only buys and sells goods, but employs ships in carrying goods also, it shows the profits of commerce and the earnings of navigation. Nothing is more certain than that in the usual course of things, and taking a series of years together, the value of our imports is the aggregate of our exports and our freights. If the value of commodities imported in a given case did not exceed the value of the outward cargo, with which they were purchased, then it would be clear to every man’s common sense that the voyage had not been profitable. If such commodities fell far short in value of the cost of the outward cargo, then the voyage would be a very losing one; and yet it would present exactly that state of things which, according to the notion of a balance of trade, can alone indicate a prosperous commerce. On the other hand, if the return cargo were found to be worth much more than the outward cargo, while the merchant, having paid for the goods exported, and all the expenses of the voyage, finds a handsome sum yet in his hands which he calls profits, the balance of trade is still against him, and, whatever he may think of it, he is in a very bad way. Although one individual or all individuals gain, the nation loses; while all its citizens grow rich, the country grows poor. This is the doctrine of the balance of trade. Allow me, sir, to give an instance tending to show how unaccountably individuals deceive themselves and imagine themselves to be somewhat rapidly mending their condition, while they ought to be persuaded that, by that infallible standard, the balance of trade, they are on the high road to ruin. Some years ago, in better times than the present, a ship left one of the towns of New England with 70,000 specie dollars. She proceeded to Mocha, on the Red Sea, and there laid out these dollars in coffee, drugs, spices, and other articles procured in that market. With this new cargo she proceeded to Europe; two thirds of it were sold in Holland for $130,000, which the ship brought back and placed in the same bank from the vaults of which she had taken her original outfit. The other third was sent to the ports of the Mediterranean, and produced a return of $25,000 in specie and $15,000 in Italian merchandise. These sums together make $170,000 imported, which is $100,000 more than was exported, and is therefore proof of an unfavorable balance of trade, to that amount, in this adventure. We should find no great difficulty, sir, in paying off our balances if this were the nature of them all.
The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that all these obsolete and exploded notions had their origin in very mistaken ideas of the true nature of commerce. Commerce is not a gambling among nations for a stake, to be won by some and lost by others. It has not the tendency necessarily to impoverish one of the parties to it, while it enriches the other; all parties gain, all parties make profits, all parties grow rich, by the operations of just and liberal commerce. If the world had but one clime and but one soil; if all men had the same wants and the same means on the spot of their existence to gratify those wants, — then, indeed, what one obtained from the other by exchange would injure one party in the same degree that it benefited the other; then, indeed, there would be some foundation for the balance of trade. But Providence has disposed our lot much more kindly. We inhabit a various earth. We have reciprocal wants, and reciprocal means for gratifying one another’s wants. This is the true origin of commerce, which is nothing more than an exchange of equivalents, and from the rude barter of its primitive state to the refined and complex condition in which we see it, its principle is uniformly the same; its only object being, in every stage, to produce that exchange of commodities between individuals and between nations which shall conduce to the advantage and to the happiness of both. Commerce between nations has the same essential character as commerce between individuals, or between parts of the same nation. Cannot two individuals make an interchange of commodities which shall prove beneficial to both, or in which the balance of trade shall be in favor of both? If not, the tailor and the shoemaker, the farmer and the smith have hitherto very much misunderstood their own interest. And with regard to the internal trade of a country, in which the same rule would apply as between nations, do we ever speak of such an intercourse being prejudicial to one side because it is useful to the other? Do we ever hear that, because the intercourse between New York and Albany is advantageous to one of those places, it must therefore be ruinous to the other?
May I be allowed, sir, to read a passage on this subject from the observations of a gentleman, in my opinion one of the most clear and sensible writers and speakers of the age upon subjects of this sort? 1 “There is no political question on which the prevalence of false principles is so general as in what relates to the nature of commerce and to the pretended balance of trade; and there are few which have led to a greater number of practical mistakes, attended with consequences extensively prejudicial to the happiness of mankind. In this country our parliamentary proceedings, our public documents, and the works of several able and popular writers have combined to propagate the impression that we are indebted for much of our riches to what is called the balance of trade.” “Our true policy would surely be to profess, as the object and guide of our commercial system, that which every man who has studied the subject must know to be the true principle of commerce, — the interchange of reciprocal and equivalent benefit. We may rest assured that it is not in the nature of commerce to enrich one party at the expense of the other. This is a purpose at which, if it were practicable, we ought not to aim; and which, if we aimed at, we could not accomplish.” These remarks, I believe, sir, were written some ten or twelve years ago. They are in perfect accordance with the opinions advanced in more elaborate treatises, and now that the world has returned to a state of peace, and commerce has resumed its natural channels, and different nations are enjoying, or seeking to enjoy, their respective portions of it, all see the justness of these ideas; all see that, in this day of knowledge and of peace, there can be no commerce between nations but that which shall benefit all who are parties to it.
If it were necessary, Mr. Chairman, I might ask the attention of the Committee to recur to a document before us on this subject of the balance of trade. It will be seen by reference to the accounts that, in the course of the last year, our total export to Holland exceeded $>2,500,000; our total import from the same country was but $700,000. Now can any man be wild enough to make any inference from this of the gain or loss of our trade with Holland for that year? Our trade with Russia for the same year produced a balance the other way; our import being f 2,000,000, and our export but $500,000. But this has no more tendency to show the Russian trade a losing trade, than the other statement has to show that the Dutch trade has been a gainful one. Neither of them, by itself, proves anything.
Springing out of this notion of a balance of trade, there has been another idea, which has been much dwelt upon in the course of this debate; that is, that we ought not to buy of nations who do not buy of us; for example, that the Eussian trade is a trade disadvantageous to the country, and ought to be discouraged, because in the ports of Eussia we buy more than we sell. Now allow me to observe, in the first place, sir, that we have no account showing how much we do sell in the ports of Eussia. Our official returns show us only what is the amount of our direct exports to her ports. But then we all know that the proceeds of other of our exports go to the same market, though indirectly. We send our own products, for example, to Cuba, or to Brazil; we there exchange them for the sugar and the coffee of those countries, and these articles we carry to St. Petersburg, and there sell them. Again: our exports to Holland and Hamburg are connected directly or indirectly with our imports from Eussia. What difference does it make, in sense or reason, whether a cargo of iron be bought at St. Petersburg by the exchange of a cargo of tobacco, or whether the tobacco has been sold on the way, in a better market, in a port of Holland, the money remitted to England, and the iron paid for by a bill on London? There might indeed have been an augmented freight, there might have been some saving of commissions, if tobacco had been in brisk demand in the Eussian market. But still there is nothing to show that the whole voyage may not have been highly profitable. That depends upon the original cost of the article here, the amount of freight and insurance to Holland, the price obtained there, the rate of exchange between Holland and England, the expense, then, of proceeding to St. Petersburg, the price of iron there, the rate of exchange between that place and England, the amount of freight and insurance home, and finally, the value of the iron, when brought to our own market. These are the calculations which determine the fortune of the adventure; and nothing can be judged of it, one way or the other, by the relative state of our imports or exports with Holland, England, or Russia.
I would not be understood to deny that it may often be our interest to cultivate a trade with countries that most require such commodities as we can furnish, and which are capable also of directly supplying our own wants. This is the simplest and most original form of all commerce, and is, no doubt, highly beneficial. And some countries are so situated, doubtless, that commerce, in this original form, or something near it, may be all that they can, without considerable inconvenience, carry on. Our trade, for example, with Madeira and the Western Islands, has been useful to the country as furnishing a demand for some portion of our agricultural products, which probably could not have been bought had we not received their products in return. Countries situated still farther from the great marts and highways of the commercial world may afford still stronger instances of the necessity and utility of conducting commerce on the original principle of barter, without much assistance from the operations of credit and exchange. All I would be understood to say is, that it by no means follows that that must be a losing trade with any country, from which we receive more of her products than she receives of ours. And since I was supposed the other day, in speaking upon this subject, to have advanced opinions which not only this country ought to reject, but which also other countries, and those the most distinguished for skill and success in commercial intercourse, do reject, I will ask leave to refer again to the discussion in the English Parliament, which I first mentioned, relative to the foreign trade of that country. “With regard,” says the mover 1 of the proposition, “to the argument employed against renewing our intercourse with the north of Europe, namely, that those who supplied us with timber from that quarter would not receive British manufactures in return, it appeared to him futile and ungrounded. If they did not send direct for our manufactures at home, they would send for them to Leipsic and other fairs of Germany. Were not the Russian and Polish merchants purchasers there to a great amount? But he would never admit the principle, that a trade was not profitable because we were obliged to carry it on with the precious metals, or that we ought to renounce it because our manufactures were not received by the foreign nation in return for its produce. Whatever we received must be paid for in the produce of our land and labor, directly or circu-itously, and he was glad to have the noble Earl’s 1 marked concurrence in this principle.”
Referring ourselves again, sir, to the analogies of common life, no one would say that a farmer or a mechanic should buy only where he can do so by the exchange of his own produce, or of his own manufacture. Such exchange may be often convenient; and, on the other hand, the cash purchase may be often more convenient. It is the same in the intercourse of nations. Indeed, Mr. Speaker has placed this argument on very clear grounds. It has been said, in the early part of the debate, that if we cease to import English cotton fabrics, England would no longer continue to purchase our cotton. To this, Mr. Speaker has replied, with great force and justice, that, as she must have cotton in large quantities, she will buy the article where she can find it best and cheapest; and that it would be quite ridiculous in her, manufacturing as she still would be, for her own vast consumption, and the consumption of millions in other countries, to reject our uplands because we had learned to manufacture a part of them for ourselves. And would it not be equally ridiculous in us, if the commodities of Russia were both cheaper and better suited to our wants than could be found elsewhere, to abstain from commerce with her because she will not receive in return other commodities which we have to sell, but which she has no occasion to buy?
Intimately connected, sir, with this topic, is another, which has been brought into the debate; I mean, the evil so much complained of, — the exportation of specie. We hear gentlemen imputing the loss of market at home to a want of money, and this want of money to the exportation of the precious metals. We hear the India and China trade denounced as a commerce conducted on our side, in a great measure, with gold and silver. These opinions, sir, are clearly void of all just foundation, and we cannot too soon get rid of them. There are no shallower reasoners than those political and commercial writers who would represent it to be the only true and gainful end of commerce to accumulate the precious metals. These are articles of use, and articles of merchandise, with this additional circumstance belonging to them, that they are made, by the general consent of nations, the standard by which the value of all other merchandise is to be estimated. In regard to weights and measures, something drawn from external nature is made a common standard, for the purposes of general convenience; and this is precisely the office performed by the precious metals, in addition to those uses to which, as metals, they are capable of being applied. There may be of these too much or too little in a country at a particular time, as there may be of any other articles. When the market is overstocked with them, as it often is, their exportation becomes as proper and as useful as that of other commodities under similar circumstances. We need no more repine, when the dollars which have been brought here from South America are despatched to other countries, than when coffee and sugar take the same direction. We often deceive ourselves by attributing to a scarcity of money that which is the result of other causes. In the course of this debate, the honorable member from Pennsylvania has represented the country as full of everything but money. But this I take to be a mistake. The agricultural products so abundant in Pennsylvania will not, he says, sell for money; but they will sell for money as quick as for any other article which happens to be in demand. They will sell for money, for example, as easily as for coffee, or for tea, at the prices which properly belong to those articles. The mistake lies in imputing that to want of money which arises from want of demand. Men do not buy wheat because they have money, but because they want wheat. To decide whether money be plenty or not, that is, whether there be a large portion of capital unemployed or not, when the currency of a country is metallic, we must look, not only to the prices of commodities, but also to the rate of interest. A low rate of interest, a facility of obtaining money on loans, a disposition to invest in permanent stocks, all of which are proofs that money is plenty, may nevertheless often denote a state not of the highest prosperity. They may, and often do, show a want of employment for capital; and the accumulation of specie shows the same thing. We have no occasion for the precious metals as money, except for the purposes of circulation, or rather of sustaining a safe paper circulation. And whenever there be a prospect of a profitable investment abroad, all the gold and silver, except what these purposes require, will be exported. For the same reason, if a demand exist abroad for sugar and coffee, whatever amount of those articles might exist in the country beyond the wants of its own consumption would be sent abroad to meet that demand.
Besides, sir, how should it ever occur to anybody that we should continue to export gold and silver, if we did not continue to import them also? If a vessel take our own products to the Havana, or elsewhere, exchange them for dollars, proceed to China, exchange them for silks and teas, bring these last to the ports of the Mediterranean, sell them there for dollars, and return to the United States; this would be a voyage resulting in the importation of the precious metals. But if she had returned from Cuba, and the dollars obtained there had been shipped direct from the United States to China, the China goods sold in Holland, and the proceeds brought home in the hemp and iron of Russia, this would be a voyage in which they were exported. Yet everybody sees that both might be equally beneficial to the individuals and to the public. I believe, sir, that in point of fact, we have enjoyed great benefit in our trade with India and China from the liberty of going from place to place all over the world, without being obliged in the meantime to return home, a liberty not heretofore enjoyed by the private traders of England in regard to India and China. Suppose the American ship to be at Brazil, for example; she could proceed with her dollars direct to India, and in return could distribute her cargo in all the various ports of Europe or America; while an English ship, if a private trader, being at Brazil, must first return to England, and then could only proceed in the direct line from England to India. This advantage our countrymen have not been backward to improve; and in the debate to which I have already so often referred, it was stated, not without some complaint of the inconvenience of exclusion, and the natural sluggishness of monopoly, that American ships were at that moment fitting out in the Thames, to supply France, Holland, and other countries on the continent with tea; while the East India Company would not do this of themselves, nor allow any of their fellow countrymen to do it for them.
There is yet another subject, Mr. Chairman, upon which I would wish to say something, if I might presume upon the continued patience of the Committee. We hear, sometimes, in the House, and continually out of it, of the rate of exchange, as being one proof that we are on the downward road to ruin. Mr. Speaker himself has adverted to that topic, and I am afraid that his authority may give credit to opinions clearly unfounded, and which lead to very false and erroneous conclusions. Sir, let us see what the facts are. Exchange on England has recently risen 1% or 1½% partly owing, perhaps, to the introduction of this bill into Congress. Before this recent rise, and for the last six months, I understand its average may have been about 7½% advance: Now, supposing this to be the real, and not merely, as it is, the nominal par of exchange, between us and England, what would it prove? Nothing, except that funds were wanted in England for commercial operations, to be carried on either in England or elsewhere. It would not necessarily show that we were indebted to England, for, if we had occasion to pay debts in Bussia or Holland, funds in England would naturally enough be required for such a purpose. And even if it did prove that a balance was due England at the moment, it would have no tendency to explain to us whether our commerce with England had been profitable or unprofitable.
But it is not true, in point of fact, that the real price of exchange is 1½% advance, nor, indeed, that there is at the present moment any advance at all. That is to say, it is not true that merchants will give such an advance, or any advance, for money in England, more than they would give for the same amount, in the same currency, here. It will strike every one who reflects upon it, that, if there were a real difference 7½% of money would be immediately shipped to England; because the expense of transportation would be far less than that difference. Or commodities of trade would be shipped to Europe and the proceeds remitted to England. If it could so happen, that American merchants should be willing to pay 10% premium for money in England, or, in other words, that a real difference to that amount, in the exchange, should exist, its effects would be immediately seen in new shipments of our own commodities to Europe, because this state of things would create new motives. A cargo of tobacco, for example, might sell at Amsterdam for the same price as before; but if its proceeds when remitted to London were advanced, as they would be in such case, ten per cent by the state of exchange, this would be so much added to the price, and would operate, therefore, as a motive for the exportation; and in this way, national balances are, and always will be, adjusted.
To form any accurate idea of the true state of exchange between two countries, we must look at their currencies, and compare the quantities of gold and silver which they may respectively represent. This usually explains the state of the exchanges; and this will satisfactorily account for the apparent advance now existing on bills drawn on England. The English standard of value is gold; with us, that office is performed by gold, and by silver also, at a fixed relation to each other. But our estimate of silver is rather higher, in proportion to gold, than most nations give it; it is higher, especially, than in England, at the present moment. The consequence is, that silver, which remains a legal currency with us, stays here, while the gold has gone abroad; verifying the universal truth, that, if two currencies be allowed to exist, of different values, that which is cheapest will fill up the whole circulation. For as much gold as will suffice to pay here a debt of a given amount, we can buy in England more silver than would be necessary to pay the same debt here; and from this difference in the value of silver arises wholly, or in a great measure, the present apparent difference in exchange. Spanish dollars sell now, in England, for 4s. 9d. stg. per ounce; equal to 01.06. By our standard, the same ounce is worth $1.16; being a difference of about 9%. The true par of exchange, therefore, is 9%. If a merchant here pay 100 Spanish dollars for a bill on England, at nominal par, in sterling money, that is, for a bill of £22 10s., the proceeds of this bill, when paid in England, in the legal currency, will there purchase, at the present price of silver, 109 Spanish dollars. Therefore, if the nominal advance on English bills do not exceed 9%, the real exchange is not against this country; in other words, it does not show that there is any pressing or particular occasion for the remittance of funds to England.
As little can be inferred from the occasional transfer of United States stock to England. Considering the interest paid on our stocks, the entire stability of our credit, and the accumulation of capital in England, it is not at all wonderful that investments should occasionally be made in our funds. As a sort of countervailing fact, it may be stated that English stocks are now actually holden in this country, though probably not to any considerable amount.
I will now proceed, sir, to state some objections which I feel, of a more general nature, to the course of Mr. Speaker’s observations.
He seems to me to argue the question as if all domestic industry were confined to the production of manufactured articles; as if the employment of our own capital, and our own labor, in the occupations of commerce and navigation, were not as emphatically domestic industry as any other occupation. Some other gentlemen, in the course of the debate, have spoken of the price paid for every foreign manufactured article as so much given for the encouragement of foreign labor, to the prejudice of our own. But is not every such article the product of our own labor as truly as if we had manufactured it ourselves? Our labor has earned it, and paid the price for it. It is so much added to the stock of national wealth. If the commodity were dollars, nobody would doubt the truth of this remark; and it is precisely as correct in its application to any other commodity as to silver. One man makes a yard of cloth at home; another raises agricultural products, and buys a yard of imported cloth. Both these are equally the earnings of domestic industry, and the only questions that arise in the case are two: the first is, which is the best mode, under all the circumstances, of obtaining the article; the second is, how far this question is proper to be decided by government, and how far it is proper to be left to individual discretion. There is no foundation for the distinction which attributes to certain employments the peculiar appellation of American industry; and it is, in my judgment, extremely unwise to attempt such discriminations.
We are asked, what nations have ever attained eminent prosperity without encouraging manufactures? I may ask, what nation ever reached the like prosperity without promoting foreign trade? I regard these interests as closely connected, and am of opinion that it should be our aim to cause them to flourish together. I know it would be very easy to promote manufactures, at least for a time, but probably only for a short time, if we might act in disregard of other interests. We could cause a sudden transfer of capital, and a violent change in the pursuits of men. We could exceedingly benefit some classes by these means. But what, then, becomes of the interests of others? The power of collecting revenue by duties on imports, and the habit of the government of collecting almost its whole revenue in that mode, will enable us, without exceeding the bounds of moderation, to give great advantages to those classes of manufactures which we may think most useful to promote at home. What I object to is the immoderate use of the power, — exclusions and prohibitions; all of which, as I think, not only interrupt the pursuits of individuals, with great injury to themselves, and little or no benefit to the country, but also often divert our own labor, or, as it may very properly be called, our own domestic industry, from those occupations in which it is well employed and well paid, to others in which it will be worse employed and worse paid. For my part, I see very little relief to those who are likely to be deprived of their employments, or who find the prices of the commodities which they need, raised, in any of the alternatives which Mr. Speaker has presented. It is nothing to say that they may, if they choose, continue to buy the foreign article j the answer is, the price is augmented: nor that they may use the domestic article; the price of that also is increased. Nor can they supply themselves by the substitution of their own fabric. How can the agriculturist make his own iron? How can the shipowner grow his own hemp?
But I have a yet stronger objection to the course of Mr. Speaker’s reasoning; which is, that he leaves out of the case all that has been already done for the protection of manufactures, and argues the question as if those interests were now, for the first time, to receive aid from duties on imports. I can hardly express the surprise I feel that Mr. Speaker should fall into the common modes of expression used elsewhere, and ask if we will give our manufacturers no protection. Sir, look to the history of our laws; look to the present state of our laws. Consider that our whole revenue, with a trifling exception, is collected at the customhouse, and always has been; and then say what propriety there is in calling on the government for protection, as if no protection had heretofore been afforded. The real question before us, in regard to all the important clauses of the bill, is not whether we will lay duties, but whether we will augment duties. The demand is for something more than exists, and yet it is pressed as if nothing existed. It is wholly forgotten that iron and hemp, for example, already pay a very heavy and burdensome duty; and, in short, from the general tenor of Mr. Speaker’s observations, one would infer that, hitherto, we had rather taxed our own manufactures than fostered them by taxes on those of other countries. We hear of the fatal policy of the tariff of 1816; and yet the law of 1816 was passed avowedly for the benefit of manufacturers, and, with very few exceptions, imposed on imported articles very great additions of tax; in some important instances, indeed, amounting to a prohibition.
Sir, on this subject it becomes us at least to understand the real posture of the question. Let us not suppose that we are beginning the protection of manufactures, by duties on imports. What we are asked to do is, to render those duties much higher, and therefore, instead of dealing in general commendations of the benefits of protection, the friends of the bill, I think, are bound to make out a fair case for each of the manufactures which they propose to benefit. The government has already done much for their protection, and it ought to ∼be presumed to have done enough, unless it be shown, by the facts and considerations applicable to each, that there is a necessity for doing more.
On the general question, sir, allow me to ask if the doctrine of prohibition, as a general doctrine, be not preposterous? Suppose all nations to act upon it; they would be prosperous, then, according to the argument, precisely in the proportion in which they abolished intercourse with one another. The less of mutual commerce the better, upon this hypothesis. Protection and encouragement may be, and are, doubtless, sometimes, wise and beneficial, if kept within proper limits; but, when carried to an extravagant height, or the point of prohibition, the absurd character of the system manifests itself. Mr. Speaker has referred to the late Emperor Napoleon, as having attempted to naturalize the manufacture of cotton in France. He did not cite a more extravagant part of the projects of that ruler, that is, his attempt to naturalize the growth of that plant itself in France; whereas, we have understood that considerable districts in the south of France, and in Italy, of rich and productive lands, were at one time withdrawn from profitable uses, and devoted to raising, at great expense, a little bad cotton. Nor have we been referred to the attempts, under the same system, to make sugar and coffee from common culinary vegetables; attempts which served to fill the print shops of Europe, and to show us how easy is the transition from what some think sublime, to that which all admit to be ridiculous. The folly of some of these projects has not been surpassed, nor hardly equaled, unless it be by the philosopher in one of the satires of Swift, who so long labored to extract sunbeams from cucumbers.
The poverty and unhappiness of Spain have been attributed to the want of protection to her own industry. If by this it be meant that the poverty of Spain is owing to bad government and bad laws, the remark is, in a great measure, just. But these very laws are bad because they are restrictive, partial, and prohibitory. If prohibition were protection, Spain would seem to have had enough of it. Nothing can exceed the barbarous rigidity of her colonial system, or the folly of her early commercial regulations. Unenlightened and bigoted legislation, the multitude of holidays, miserable roads, monopolies on the part of government, restrictive laws, that ought long since to have been abrogated, are generally, and I believe truly, reckoned the principal causes of the bad state of the productive industry of Spain. Any partial improvement in her condition, or increase of her prosperity, has been, in all cases, the result of relaxation, and the abolition of what was intended for favor and protection.
In short, sir, the general sense of this age sets, with a strong current, in favor of freedom of commercial intercourse, and unrestrained individual action. Men yield up their notions of monopoly and restriction, as they yield up other prejudices, slowly and reluctantly; but they cannot withstand the general tide of opinion.
Let me now ask, sir, what relief this bill proposes to some of those great and essential interests of the country, the condition of which has been referred to as proof of national distress; and which condition, although I do not think it makes out a case of distress, yet does indicate depression.
And first, sir, as to our foreign trade. Mr. Speaker has stated that there has been a considerable falling off in the tonnage employed in that trade. This is true, lamentably true. In my opinion, it is one of those occurrences which ought to arrest our immediate, our deep, our most earnest attention. What does this bill propose for its relief? Sir, it proposes nothing but new burdens. It proposes to diminish its employment, and it proposes, at the same time, to augment its expense, by subjecting it to heavier taxation. Sir, there is no interest in regard to which a stronger case for protection can be made out than the navigating interest. Whether we look at its present condition, which is admitted to be depressed; the number of persons connected with it, and dependent upon it for their daily bread; or its importance to the country in a political point of view, it has claims upon our attention which cannot be exceeded. But what do we propose to do for it? I repeat, sir, simply to burden and to tax it. By a statement which I have already submitted to the Committee, it appears that the shipping interest pays, annually, more than half a million dollars in duties on articles used in the construction of ships. We propose to add nearly, or quite, fifty per cent to this amount, at the very moment that we bring forth the languishing state of this interest as a proof of national distress. Let it be remembered that our shipping employed in foreign commerce has, at this moment, not the shadow of government protection. It goes abroad upon the wide sea to make its own way, and earn its own bread, in a professed competition with the whole world. Its resources are its own frugality, its own skill, its own enterprise. It hopes to succeed, if it shall succeed at all, not by extraordinary aid of government, but by patience, vigilance, and toil. This right arm of the nation’s safety strengthens its own muscle by its own efforts, and by unwearied exertion in its own defense becomes strong for the defense of the country.
No one acquainted with this interest can deny that its situation at this moment is extremely critical. We have left it hitherto to maintain itself or perish, to swim if it can, and to sink if it cannot. But at this moment of its apparent struggle can we, as men, can we, as patriots, add another stone to the weight that threatens to carry it down? Sir, there is a limit to human power and to human effort. I know the commercial marine of this country can do almost everything, and bear almost everything. Yet some things are impossible to be done, and some burdens may be impossible to be borne; and as it was the last ounce that broke the back of the camel, so the last tax, although it were even a small one, may be decisive as to the power of our marine to sustain the conflict in which it is now engaged with all the commercial nations on the globe.
Again, Mr. Chairman, the failures and the bankruptcies which have taken place in our large cities have been mentioned as proving the little success attending commerce, and its general decline. But this bill has no balm for those wounds. It is very remarkable that, when losses and disasters of certain manufacturers — those of iron, for instance — are mentioned, it is done for the purpose of invoking aid for the distressed. Not so with the losses and disasters of commerce; these last are narrated, and not unfrequently much exaggerated, to prove the ruinous nature of the employment, and to show that it ought to be abandoned, and the capital engaged in it turned to other objects.
It has been often said, sir, that our manufactures have to contend, not only against the natural advantages of those who produce similar articles in foreign countries, but also against the action of foreign governments, who have great political interest in aiding their own manufactures to suppress ours. But have not these governments as great an interest to cripple our marine, by preventing the growth of our commerce and navigation? What is it that makes us the object of the highest respect> or the most suspicious jealousy, to foreign states? What is it that most enables us to take high relative rank among the nations? I need not say that this results, more than from anything else, from that quantity of military power which we can cause to be water borne, and of that extent of commerce which we are able to maintain throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, I am conscious of having detained the Committee much too long with these observations. My apology for now proceeding to some remarks upon the particular clauses of the bill is that, representing a district at once commercial and highly manufacturing, and being called upon to vote upon a bill containing provisions so numerous and so various, I am naturally desirous to state as well what I approve as what I would reject.
The first section proposes an augmented duty upon woollen manufactures. This, if it were unqualified, would no doubt be desirable to those who are engaged in that business. I have myself presented a petition from the woollen manufacturers of Massachusetts, praying an augmented ad valorem duty upon imported woollen cloths, and I am prepared to accede to that proposition to a reasonable extent. But then this bill proposes, also, a very high duty upon imported wool; and, as far as I can learn, a majority of the manufacturers are at least extremely doubtful whether, taking these two provisions together, the state of the law is not better for them now than it would be if this bill should pass. It is said this tax on raw wool will benefit the agriculturist; but I know it to be the opinion of some of the best informed of that class that it will do them more hurt than good. They fear it will check the manufacturer, and consequently check his demand for their article. The argument is, that a certain quantity of coarse wool, cheaper than we can possibly furnish, is necessary to enable the manufacturer to carry on the general business, and that if this cannot be had the consequence will be not a greater, but a less, manufacture of our own wool. I am aware that very intelligent persons differ upon this point; but, if we may safely infer from that difference of opinion that the proposed benefit is at least doubtful, it would be prudent perhaps to abstain from the experiment. Certain it is that the same course of reasoning has occurred, as I have before stated, on the same subject, when a renewed application was made to the English Parliament to repeal the duty on imported wool, I believe scarcely two months ago; those who support the application pressing urgently the necessity of an unrestricted use of the cheap, imported raw material, with a view to supply with coarse cloths the markets of warm climates, such as those of Egypt and Turkey, and especially a vast new created demand in the South American states.
As to the manufactures of cotton, it is agreed, I believe, that they are generally successful. It is understood that the present existing duty operates pretty much as a prohibition over those descriptions of fabrics to which it applies. The proposed alteration would probably enable the American manufacturer to commence competition with higher-priced fabrics; and so would, perhaps, an augmentation less than is here proposed. I consider the cotton manufactures not only to have reached, but to have passed, the point of competition. I regard their success as certain, and their growth as rapid as the most impatient could well expect. If, however, a provision of the nature of that recommended here were thought necessary to commence new operations in the same line of manufacture, I should cheerfully agree to it, if it were not at the cost of sacrificing other great interests of the country. I need hardly say that whatever promotes the cotton and woollen manufactures promotes most important interests of my constituents. They have a great stake in the success of those establishments, and as far as those manufactures are concerned, would be as much benefited by the provisions of this bill as any part of the community. It is obvious, too, I should think, that for some considerable time manufactures of this sort, to whatever magnitude they may rise, will be principally established in those parts of the country where population is most dense, capital most abundant, and where the most successful beginnings have been already made.
But if these be thought to be advantages, they are greatly counterbalanced by other advantages enjoyed by other portions of the country. I cannot but regard the situation of the West as highly favorable to human happiness. It offers, in the abundance of its new and fertile lands, such assurances of permanent property and respectability to the industrious, it enables them to lay such sure foundations for a competent provision for their families, it makes such a nation of freeholders, that it need not envy the happiest and most prosperous of the manufacturing communities. We may talk as we will of well-fed and well-clothed day-laborers or journeymen; they are not, after all, to be compared, either for happiness or respectability, with him who sleeps under his own roof and cultivates his own fee-simple inheritance.
With respect to the proposed duty on glass I would observe that, upon the best means of judging which I possess, I am of opinion that the chairman of the committee is right in stating that there is in effect a bounty upon the exportation of the British article. I think it entirely proper, therefore, to raise our own duty by such an amount as shall be equivalent to that bounty.
And here, Mr. Chairman, before proceeding to those parts of the bill to which I most strenuously object, I will be so presumptuous as to take up a challenge which Mr. Speaker has thrown down. He has asked us, in a tone of interrogatory indicative of the feeling of anticipated triumph, to mention any country in which manufactures have flourished without the aid of prohibitory laws. He has demanded if it be not policy, protection, ay, and prohibition, that have carried other states to the height of their prosperity, and whether any one has succeeded with such tame and inert legislation as ours. Sir, I am ready to answer this inquiry.
There is a country not undistinguished among the nations, in which the progress of manufactures has been far more rapid than in any other, and yet unaided by prohibitions or unnatural restrictions. That country, the happiest which the sun shines on, is our own.
The woollen manufactures of England have existed from the early ages of the monarchy. Provisions, designed to aid and foster them, are in the blackletter statutes of the Edwards and the Henrys. Ours, on the contrary, are but of yesterday; and yet, with no more than the protection of existing laws, they are already at the point of close and promising competition. Sir, nothing is more unphilosophical than to refer us, on these subjects, to the policy adopted by other nations in a very different state of society, or to infer that what was judged expedient by them, in their early history, must also be expedient for us in this early part of our own. This would be reckoning our age chronologically, and estimating our advance by our number of years, when, in truth, we should regard only the state of society, the knowledge, the skill, the capital, the enterprise, which belong to our times. We have been transferred from the stock of Europe, in a comparatively enlightened age, and our civilization and improvement date back as early as her own. Her original history is also our original history; and if, since the moment of separation, she has gone ahead of us in some respects, it may be said, without violating truth, that we have kept up in others, and in others again are ahead ourselves. We are to legislate, then, with regard to the present actual state of society; and our own experience shows us that commencing manufactures at the present highly enlightened and emulous moment, we need not imitate the clumsy helps with which, in less auspicious times, governments have sought to enable the ingenuity and industry of their people to hobble along.
The English cotton manufactures began about the commencement of the last reign. Ours can hardly be said to have commenced, with any earnestness, until the application of the power loom, in 1814, not more than ten years ago. Now, sir, I hardly need again speak of its progress, its present extent, or its assurance of future enlargement. In some sorts of fabrics we are already exporters, and the products of our factories are at this moment in the South American markets. We see, then, what can be done without prohibition or extraordinary protection, because we see what has been done; and I venture to predict that in a few years it will be thought wonderful that these branches of manufactures at least should have been thought to require additional aid from government.
Mr. Chairman, the best apology for laws of prohibition and laws of monopoly will be found in that state of society, not only unenlightened but sluggish, in which they are most generally established. Private industry in those days required strong provocatives, which governments were seeking to administer by these means. Something was wanted to actuate and stimulate men, and the prospects of such profits as would, in our times, excite unbounded competition, would hardly move the sloth of former ages. In some instances, no doubt, these laws produced an effect which, in that period, would not have taken place without them. But our age is wholly of a different character, and its legislation takes another turn. Society is full of excitement; competition comes in place of monopoly, and intelligence and industry ask only for fair play and an open field. Profits, indeed, in such a state of things will be small, but they will be extensively diffused, prices will be low, and the great body of the people prosperous and happy. It is worthy of remark that from the operation of these causes commercial wealth, while it is increased beyond calculation in its general aggregate, is, at the same time, broken and diminished in its subdivisions. Commercial prosperity should be judged of therefore rather from the extent of trade than from the magnitude of its apparent profits. It has been remarked that Spain, certainly one of the poorest nations, made very great profits on the amount of her trade, but with little other benefit than the enriching of a few individuals and companies. Profits to the English merchants engaged in the Levant and Turkey trade were formerly very great, and there were richer merchants in England some centuries ago, considering the comparative value of money, than at the present highly commercial period. When the diminution of profits arises from the extent of competition, it indicates rather a salutary than an injurious change.1
The true course then, sir, for us to pursue is, in my opinion, to consider what our situation is, what our means are, and how they can be best applied. What amount of population have we in comparison with our extent of soil, what amount of capital, and labor at what price? As to skill, knowledge, and enterprise, we may safely take it for granted that, in these particulars, we are on an equality with others. Keeping these considerations in view, allow me to examine two or three of those provisions of the bill to which I feel the strongest objections.
To begin with the article of iron. Our whole annual consumption of this article is supposed by the Chairman of the Committee to be 48,000 or 50,000 tons. Let us suppose the latter. The amount of our own manufacture he estimates, I think, at 17,000 tons. The present duty on the imported article is $15 per ton, and as this duty causes of course an equivalent augmentation of the price of the home manufacture, the whole increase of price is equal to $750,000 annually. This sum we pay on a raw material, and on an absolute necessary of life. The bill proposes to raise the duty from $15 to $22.50 per ton, which would be equal to $1,125,000 on the whole annual consumption. So that, suppose the point of prohibition which is aimed at by some gentlemen to be attained, the consumers of the article would pay this last mentioned sum every year to the producers of it, over and above the price at which they could supply themselves with the same article from other sources. There would be no mitigation of this burden, except from the prospect, whatever that might be, that iron would fall in value by domestic competition after the importation should be prohibited. It will be easy, I think, to show that it cannot fall; and supposing for the present that it shall not, the result will be that we shall pay annually a sum of $1,125,000, constantly augmented, too, by increased consumption of the article, to support a business that cannot support itself.
It is of no consequence to the argument that this sum is expended at home; so it would be if we taxed the people to support any other useless and expensive establishment — to build another Capitol, for example, or incur an unnecessary expense of any sort. The question still is, are the money, time, and labor well laid out in these cases? The present price of iron at Stockholm, I am assured by importers, is $53 per ton on board, $48 in the yard before loading, and probably not far from $40 at the mines. Freight, insurance, etc., may be fairly estimated at $15, to which add our present duty of $15 more, and these two last sums, together with the cost on board at Stockholm, give $83 as the cost of Swedes iron in our market. In fact, it is said to have been sold last year at $81.50 to $82 per ton. We perceive by this statement that the cost of the iron is doubled in reaching us from the mine in which it is produced. In other words, our present duty, with the expense of transportation, gives an advantage to the American, over the foreign manufacturer, of 100%. Why then cannot the iron be manufactured at home? Our ore is said to be as good, and some of it better. It is under our feet, and the Chairman of the Committee tells us that it might be wrought by persons who otherwise will not be employed. Why then is it not wrought? Nothing could be more sure of constant sale. It is not an article of changeable fashion, but of absolute, permanent necessity, and such, therefore, as would always meet a steady demand. Sir, I think it would be well for the Chairman of the Committee to revise his premises, for I am persuaded that there is an ingredient properly belonging to the calculation which he has misstated or omitted. Swedes iron in England pays a duty, I think, of about $27 per ton; yet it is imported in considerable quantities, notwithstanding the vast capital, the excellent coal, and, more important than all perhaps, the highly improved state of inland navigation in England; although I am aware that the English use of Swedes iron may be thought to be owing in some degree to its superior quality.
Sir, the true explanation of this appears to me to lie in the different prices of labor; and here I apprehend is the grand mistake in the argument of the Chairman of the Committee. He says it would cost the nation, as a nation, nothing to make our ore into iron. Now, I think it would cost us precisely that which we can worst afford; that is, great labor. Although bar iron is very properly considered a raw material in respect to its various future uses, yet, as bar iron, the principal ingredient in its cost is labor. Of manual labor, no nation has more than a certain quantity, nor can it be increased at will. As to some operations, indeed, its place may be supplied by machinery; but there are other services which machinery cannot perform for it, and which it must perform for itself. A most important question for every nation, as well as for every individual, to propose to itself, is, how it can best apply that quantity of labor which it is able to perform? Labor is the great producer of wealth; it moves all other causes. If it call machinery to its aid, it is still employed not only in using the machinery, but in making it. Now, with respect to the quantity of labor, as we all know, different nations are differently circumstanced. Some need, more than anything, work for hands, others require hands for work; and if we ourselves are not absolutely in the latter class, we are still, most fortunately, very near it I cannot find that we have those idle hands of which the Chairman of the Committee speaks. The price of labor is a conclusive and unanswerable refutation of that idea; it is known to be higher with us than in any other civilized state, and this is the greatest of all proofs of general happiness. Labor in this country is independent and proud. It has not to ask the patronage of capital, but capital solicits the aid of labor. This is the general truth in regard to the condition of our whole population, although in the large cities there are, doubtless, many exceptions. The mere capacity to labor in common agricultural employments gives to our young men the assurance of independence. We have been asked, sir, by the Chairman of the Committee, in a tone of some pathos, whether we will allow to the serfs of Russia and Sweden the benefit of making iron for us? Let me inform the gentleman, sir, that those same serfs do not earn more than seven cents a day, and that they work in these mines for that compensation because they are serfs. And let me ask the gentleman further, whether we have any labor in this country that cannot be better employed than in a business which does not yield the laborer more than seven cents a day? This, it appears to me, is the true question for our consideration. There is no reason for saying that we will work iron because we have mountains that contain the ore. We might for the same reason dig among our rocks for the scattered grains of gold and silver which might be found there. The true inquiry is, can we produce the article in a useful state at the same cost, or nearly at the same cost, or at any reasonable approximation towards the same cost, at which we can import it.
Some general estimates of the price and profits of labor in those countries from which we import our iron might be formed by comparing the reputed products of different mines and their prices with the number of hands employed. The mines of Danemora are said to yield about 4,000 tons, and to employ in the mines 1,200 workmen. Suppose this to be worth f 50 per ton; any one will find by computation that the whole product would not pay in this country for one quarter part of the necessary labor. The whole export of Sweden was estimated, a few years ago, at 400,000 ship-pounds, or about 54,000 tons. Comparing this product with the number of workmen usually supposed to be employed in the mines which produce iron for exportation, the result will not greatly differ from the foregoing. These estimates are general, and might not conduct us to a precise result; but we know, from intelligent travelers and eye-witnesses, that the price of labor in the Swedish mines does not exceed seven cents a day. 1
The true reason, sir, why it is not our policy to compel our citizens to manufacture our own iron is, that they are far better employed. It is an unproductive business, and they are not poor enough to be obliged to follow it. If we had more of poverty, more of misery, and something of servitude, if we had an ignorant, idle, starving population, we might set up for iron makers against the world.
The committee will take notice, Mr. Chairman, that, under our present duty, together with the expense of transportation, our manufacturers are able to supply their own immediate neighborhood; and this proves the magnitude of that substantial encouragement which these two causes concur to give. There is little or no foreign iron, I presume, used in the county of Lancaster. This is owing to the heavy expense of land carriage; and as we recede farther from the coast, the manufacturers are still more completely secured, as to their own immediate market, against the competition of the imported article. But what they ask is to be allowed to supply the seacoast, at such a price as shall be formed by adding to the cost at the mines the expense of land carriage to the sea; and this appears to me most unreasonable. The effect of it would be to compel the consumer to pay the cost of two land transportations; for, in the first place, the price of iron, at the inland furnaces, will always be found to be at, or not much below, the price of the imported article in the seaport, and the cost of transportation to the neighborhood of the furnace; and to enable the home product to hold a competition with the imported in the seaport, the cost of another transportation downward, from the furnace to the coast, must be added. Until our means of inland commerce be improved, and the charges of transportation by that means lessened, it appears to me wholly impracticable, with such duties as any one would think of proposing, to meet the wishes of the manufacturers of this article. Suppose we were to add the duty proposed by this bill, although it would benefit the capital invested in works near the sea, and the navigable rivers, yet the benefit would not extend far in the interior. Where, then, are we to stop, or what limit is proposed to us?
The freight of iron has been afforded from Sweden to the United States as low as f>8 per ton. This is not more than the price of fifty miles’ land carriage. Stockholm, therefore, for the purpose of this argument, may be considered as within fifty miles of Philadelphia. Now, it is at once a just and a strong view of this case to consider that there are, within fifty miles of our market, vast multitudes of persons who are willing to labor in the production of this article for us, at the rate of seven cents per day, while we have no labor which will not command, upon ihe average, at least five or six times that amount. The question is, then, shall we buy this article of these manufacturers, and Suffer our own labor to earn its greater reward, or shall we employ our own labor in a similar manufacture, and make up to it by a tax on consumers the loss which it must necessarily sustain?
I proceed, sir, to the article of hemp. Of this we imported last year, in round numbers, 6,000 tons, paying a duty.of $30 a ton, or $180,000 on the whole amount; and this article, it is to be remembered, is consumed almost entirely in the uses of navigation. The whole burden may be said to fall on one interest. It is said we can produce this article if we will raise the duties. But why is it not produced now; or why, at least, have we not seen some specimens? for the present is a very high duty, when expenses of importation are added. Hemp was purchased at St. Petersburg last year at $101.67 per ton. Charges attending shipment, &c., $14.25. Freight may be stated at $30 per ton, and our existing duty is $30 more. These three last sums being the charges of transportation, amount to a protection of near 75% in favor of the home manufacturer, if there were any such. And we ought to consider, also, that the price of hemp at St. Petersburg is increased by all the expense of transportation from the place of growth to that port; so that probably the whole cost of transportation, from the place of growth to our market, including our duty, is equal to the first cost of the article; or, in other words, is a protection in favor of our own product of 100%.
And since it is stated that we have great quantities of fine land for the production of hemp, of which I have no doubt, the question recurs, why is it not produced? I speak of the water rotted hemp, for it is admitted that that which is dew rotted is not sufficiently good for the requisite purposes. I cannot say whether the cause be in climate, in the process of rotting, or what else, but the fact is certain, and there is no American water rotted hemp in the market. We are acting, therefore, upon a hypothesis. Is it not reasonable that those who say that they can produce the article shall at least prove the truth of that allegation before new taxes are laid on those who use the foreign commodity? Suppose this bill passes: the price of hemp is immediately raised $14.80 per ton, and this burden falls immediately on the ship builder; and no part of it, for the present, will go for the benefit of the American grower, because he has none of the article that can be used, nor is it expected that much of it will be produced for a considerable time. Still the tax takes effect upon the imported article; and the ship owners, to enable the Kentucky farmer to receive an additional $14.00 on his ton of hemp, whenever he may be able to raise and manufacture it, pay, in the mean time, an equal sum per ton into the Treasury on all the imported hemp which they are still obliged to use; and this is called “protection! “Is this pist or fair? A particular interest is here burdened, not only for the benefit of another particular interest, but burdened also beyond that, for the benefit of the Treasury. It is said to be important for the country that this article should be raised in it; then let the country bear the expense, and pay the bounty. If it be for the good of the whole, let the sacrifice be made by the whole, and not by a part. If it be thought useful and necessary, from political considerations, to encourage the growth and manufacture of hemp, government has abundant means of doing it. It might give a direct bounty, and such a measure would, at least, distribute the burden equally; or, as government itself is a great consumer of this article, it might stipulate to confine its own purchases to the home product, so soon as it should be shown to be of the proper quality. I see no objection to this proceeding, if it be thought to be an object to encourage the production. It might easily, and perhaps properly, be provided by law that the navy should be supplied with American hemp, the quality being good, at any price not exceeding, by more than a given amount, the current price of foreign hemp in our market. Everything conspires to render some such course preferable to the one now proposed. The encouragement in that way would be ample, and, if the experiment should succeed, the whole object would be gained; and if it should fail, no considerable loss or evil would be felt by any one.
I stated, some days ago, and I wish to renew the statement, what was the amount of the proposed augmentation of the duties on iron and hemp, in the cost of a vessel. Take the case of a common ship, of 300 tons, not coppered, nor copper-fastened. It would stand thus, by the present duties:—
14½ tons of Iron, for hull, rigging, and anchors, at $15 per ton. . . . . $217.50 10 tons of Hemp, at $30. . . . . 300.00 40 bolts Russia Duck, at $2. . . . . 80.00 20 bolts Ravens Duck, at $1.25. . . . . 25.00 On articles of ship chandlery, cabin furniture, hardware, etc. . . . . 40.00 $662.50 The bill proposes to add: —
$7.40 per ton on Iron, which will be. . . . $107.30 $14.80 per ton on Hemp, equal to. . . . 148.00 And on Duck, by the late amendment of the bill, say 25 per cent 25.00 $280.30 But to the duties on iron and hemp should be added those paid on copper, whenever that article is used. By the statement which I furnished the other day, it appeared that the duties received by government, on articles used in the construction of a vessel of 359 tons, with copper fastenings, amounted to $1,056. With the augmentations of this bill, they would be equal to $1,400. Now, I cannot but flatter myself, Mr. Chairman, that, before the committee will consent to this new burden upon the shipping interest, it will very deliberately weigh the probable consequences. I would again urgently solicit its attention to the condition of that interest. We are told that Government has protected it, by discriminating duties, and by an exclusive right to the coasting trade. But it would retain the coasting trade, by its own natural efforts, in like manner, and with more certainty, than it now retains any portion of foreign trade. The discriminating duties are now abolished, and while they existed they were nothing more than countervailing measures, not so much designed to give our navigation an advantage over that of other nations as to put it upon an equality; and we have, accordingly, abolished ours, when they have been willing to abolish theirs. Look to the rate of freights. Were they ever lower, or even so low? I ask gentlemen who know, whether the harbor of Charleston, and the river of Savannah, be not crowded with ships seeking employment, and finding none? I would ask the gentlemen from New Orleans if their magnificent Mississippi does not exhibit, for furlongs, a forest of masts? The condition, sir, of the shipping interest is not that of those who are insisting on high profits, or struggling for monopoly; but it is the condition of men content with the smallest earnings, and anxious for their bread. The freight of cotton has formerly been three pence sterling from Charleston to Liverpool in time of peace. It is now I know not what, or how many, fractions of a penny; I think, however, it is stated at five eighths. The producers, then of this great staple, are able, by means of this navigation, to send it, for a cent a pound, from their own doors to the best market in the world.
Mr. Chairman, I will now only remind the committee that, while we are proposing to add new -burdens to the shipping interest, a very different line of policy is followed by our great commercial and maritime rival. It seems to be announced as the sentiment of the Government of England, and undoubtedly it is its real sentiment, that the first of all manufactures is the manufacture of ships. A constant and wakeful attention is paid to this interest, and very important regulations, favorable to it, have been adopted within the last year, some of which I will beg leave to refer to, with the hope of exciting the notice, not only of the committee, but of all others who may feel, as I do, a deep interest in this subject. In the first place, a general amendment has taken place in the register acts, introducing many new provisions, and, among others, the following: —
A direct mortgage of the interest of a ship is allowed, without subjecting the mortgagee to the responsibility of an owner.
The proportion of interest held by each owner is exhibited in the register, thereby facilitating both sales and mortgages, and giving a new value to shipping among the moneyed classes.
Shares, in the ships of copartnerships, may be registered as joint property, and subject to the same rules as other partnership effects.
Ships may be registered in the name of trustees, for the benefit of joint stock companies; and many other regulations are adopted with the same general view of rendering the mode of holding the property as convenient and as favorable as possible.
By another act, British registered vessels, of every description, are allowed to enter into the general and the coasting trade in the India seas, and may now trade to and from India, with any part of the world, except China.
By a third, all limitations and restrictions, as to latitude and longitude, are removed from ships engaged in the Southern whale fishery. These regulations, I presume, have not been made without first obtaining the consent of the East India Company; so true is it found, that real encouragement of enterprise oftener consists, in our days, in restraining or buying off monopolies and prohibitions, than in imposing or extending them.
The trade with Ireland is turned into a free coasting trade; light duties have been reduced, and various other beneficial arrangements made, and still others proposed. I might add, that, in favor of general commerce, and as showing their confidence in the principles of liberal intercourse, the British government has perfected the warehouse system, and authorized a reciprocity of duties with foreign states, at the discretion of the Privy Council.
This, sir, is the attention which our great rival is paying to these important subjects, and we may assure ourselves that, if we do not keep alive a proper sense of our own interests, she will not only beat us, but will deserve to beat us.
Sir, I will detain you no longer. There are some parts of this bill which I highly approve; there are others in which I should acquiesce; but those to which I have now stated my objections appear to me so destitute of all justice, so burdensome and so dangerous to that interest which has steadily enriched, gallantly defended, and proudly distinguished us, that nothing can prevail upon me to give it my support.
[1]See Adams's Life of Gallatin, p. 641.
[1]Lord Liverpool.
[1]Lord Liverpool.
[1]Mr. Huskisson, President of the English Board of Trade.
[1]The Marquis of Lansdowne.
[1]Lord Liverpool.
[1]“The present equable diffusion of moderate -wealth cannot be better illustrated than by remarking that in this age many palaces and superb mansions have been pulled down or converted to other purposes, while none have been erected on a like scale. The numberless baronial castles and mansions in all parts of England, now in ruins, may all be adduced as examples of the decrease of inordinate wealth. On the other hand, the multiplication of commodious dwellings for the upper and middle classes of society, and the increased comforts of all ranks, exhibit a picture of individual happiness unknown in any other age.” — Sir G. Blane’s Letter to Lord Spencerd in 1800.
[1]The price of labor in Russia may be pretty well collected from Tooke’s View of the Russian Empire.” The workmen in the mines and the founderies are, indeed, all called master-people; but they distinguish themselves into masters, undermasters, apprentices, delvers, servants, carriers, washers, and separators. In proportion to their ability their wages are regulated, which proceed from 15 to upwards of 30 roubles per annum. The provisions which they receive from the magazines are deducted from this pay.” The value of the rouble at that time (1799) was about 24 pence sterling, or 45 cents of our money.
“By the edict of 1799,” it is added, “a laborer with a hone shall receive, daily, in summer 20 and in winter 12 copecks; a laborer without a horse, in surnmar 10, in winter 8 copecks.”
A copeck is the hundredth part of a rouble, or about half a cent of our money. The price of labor may have risen, in some degree, since that period, but probably not much.2: Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade, 2 vols. [1808]
Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament, 2 vols. (London: L. Taylor, 1808).
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/1869 on 2008-02-12
The text is in the public domain.
3: John C. Calhoun, Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun [1811]
John C. Calhoun, Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lence (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992).
Accessed from oll.libertyfund.org/title/683 on 2008-02-12
The text is in the public domain.
John C. Calhoun
FOREWORD
Much time and energy has been devoted to the rise of American constitutionalism and the nature of the American Union in the eighteenth century. Far less attention has been paid to the interpretation and implementation of the U.S. Constitution during the nineteenth century. Faced with largely unanticipated problems attendant upon economic change, a major influx of new people, and westward expansion, the generation of Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun struggled to sustain what was commonly believed to have been the original intention of the framers. In the absence of an appreciation of the work of those prodigious thinkers of the nineteenth century, no real understanding of the American constitutional tradition is possible.
John C. Calhoun stands out among the leading figures of this era renowned for its great orators and public statesmen. He and the others of this new generation found themselves in a period marked by an increasing degree of uncertainty about the future. Continual controversy over such constitutional issues as executive prerogative, the extent of federal, or state, power, the proper disposition of suffrage, and the need to protect minority rights against the dangers of majority tyranny did little to assuage their apprehension. Added to this uncertainty was the momentous question of defining the nature of the American Union, a seemingly unresolved conundrum exacerbated by repeated congressional failures after 1819 to administer the admission of new states to the satisfaction of all parties. Thus was there an urgency that suffused Calhoun’s speeches, letters, and philosophical writings. Along with many of his contemporaries, north and south, he realized the fragility of the American experiment and the importance of his own agency in the development of constitutional government.
A mere enumeration of his political offices is sufficient to establish his national stature during this critical early period. After serving briefly in the South Carolina legislature, Calhoun was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1810. He served as secretary of war under President Monroe from 1817 to 1825; as vice-president under John Quincy Adams and then Andrew Jackson from 1825 to 1832; as senator from South Carolina from 1832 to 1844; as secretary of state under John Tyler from 1844 to 1845; and again as a member of the Senate from 1845 until his death in 1850. He was first nominated for president in 1821—at the age of thirty-nine—and was considered a serious candidate for that office in every election from 1824 until 1848.
Calhoun’s larger substantive and philosophical contributions to American constitutional thought have been in large measure a casualty of history. The lingering doubts and haunting images of the Civil War, compounded by Calhoun’s defense of slavery and his unwavering commitment to the doctrine of State Rights, have distracted historians and political scientists from serious consideration of his ideas.
Calhoun’s political and philosophical thought evolved over a forty-year period of public office. The combination of practical politics and a noted preference for metaphysical discourse gave his speeches and writings a distinct tone. In general language he sought political solutions designed to alleviate the tensions under which the American system labored. His systematic theory about the nature of man and government, as well as his rigorous analysis of the presumptions and convictions of The Federalist Papers, deserves careful attention for his part in the ongoing discussion of the uneasy, but critical, relationship between liberty and union.
John Caldwell Calhoun was born to pioneer parents on March 18, 1782. Over a period covering two generations, the family, part of the Scots-Irish immigration into Pennsylvania during the first third of the eighteenth century, was drawn to the western frontier of South Carolina. His father had defended America’s decision to renounce the King, fought the local battle to increase the representation of his up-country section of South Carolina against the tidewater minority that controlled the state legislature, and cast a vote against the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. From Calhoun’s earliest days, then, he encountered the real-life dynamics of democratic politics—the struggle between the majority and the minority over the distribution of the rewards and burdens of government.
His education in New England provided the intellectual seeds for his subsequent development of a theory of nullification and secession. In 1802, at the age of twenty, Calhoun entered Yale University as a junior. Small-town, localist, antinational sentiment, combined with skepticism of numerical majorities, was then popular in certain parts of New England. Yale University had become the intellectual center for these ideas since the defeat of the Federalists in the election of 1800. Among the most noted of the New England Federalists was Timothy Dwight, the president of Yale College, one of the most influential men in Calhoun’s education. After graduating Phi Beta Kappa from Yale in 1804, Calhoun studied law in Litchfield, Connecticut. Among the faculty with whom Calhoun studied at Litchfield were Judge Tapping Reeve (Aaron Burr’s brother-in-law) and Judge James Gould. These two staunch Federalists reinforced Timothy Dwight’s condemnation of the Jeffersonian majority.
Despite his exposure to these ideas, during his tenure in the House of Representatives from 1811 to 1817 as a representative of South Carolina, Calhoun was an ardent nationalist: He was more concerned about national strength and unity than about curbing majorities to protect intense minority interests. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, Calhoun was a vocal supporter of the War of 1812. He did not waver in his commitment to a strong foreign policy, even in the face of bitter protests from the New England states, which claimed that the Jeffersonian embargo and the War of 1812 were inequitably ruinous to their commerce and shipping interests. Throughout the early years of his career, he consistently favored extensive federal assistance for internal improvements in an effort to encourage domestic commerce and farming. And most noted of all, he supported the tariff of 1816 as a temporary measure to raise the money necessary to eliminate the national debt incurred during the War of 1812 and to protect America’s fledgling industries. The issue of the tariff was to become a much more incendiary issue in the years to come.
Calhoun’s views coincided with many opinions prevalent in the nation in the early 1820s. This harmony combined with his political talents so well that some people began to advance his name as a possible candidate for president. In the presidential campaign of 1824, he decided to limit his obvious ambitions for the time being and settled into the vice-presidency under the administration of John Quincy Adams. From the very beginning, their relationship was a troubled one. Personalities were at odds; political ambitions clashed. When serious wrangling erupted between Adams and Calhoun (who as vice-president was also the presiding officer of the Senate) over the respective powers of the executive and the legislature, the controversy spilled over into a series of public letters. In his six letters, Calhoun argued against the prerogatives claimed by Adams. He declared that republican government required the diffusion of political power. Liberty would be sacrificed if Americans allowed the abuse of presidential patronage that was threatening to destroy the delicate balance between liberty and power established by the Constitution.
At the same time, the tariff issue was looming ever larger in the ongoing debate in the United States about the locus of political power, significantly exacerbating smoldering sectional confrontations within the young Union. Many Southerners, in particular, thought the tariff had stopped being a means of raising revenue for national defense and was becoming a permanent means of protecting and subsidizing manufacturing interests at the expense of the South and agricultural interests. The tariff issue strained Calhoun’s nationalist sentiments. His own state and southern predilections, the agitation of supporters and friends in the South, as well as his concern about balancing sectional interests, led Calhoun to change his earlier nationalist support for the tariff and embrace the South Carolina position on this matter.
This issue became an important practical and symbolic matter when an exceptionally high tariff was proposed in Congress early in 1828. The proposed tariff was seen by many as a political maneuver by opponents intended to turn popular sentiment against Adams and the tariff. Much to the dismay of the Southern strategists, their schemes to defeat the tariff came to naught. President Adams approved the bill, which became widely known as the Tariff of Abominations. Calhoun found himself in the dilemma of privately opposing a measure supported by the administration he was a part of. Even more troubling to him, opponents in the South, and especially in South Carolina, now began to debate openly the prospect of disunion.
Seeking a means by which such a desperate response could be avoided, Calhoun turned to the doctrine of interposition, which defended the right of a state to interpose its authority and overrule federal legislation. The seeds of this doctrine were introduced by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. Calhoun first advanced it anonymously, in the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, penned during the summer and fall of 1828 for a committee of the South Carolina legislature. It is Calhoun’s articulation and development of the doctrine of interposition or nullification for which he was, and is, so well known.
When Andrew Jackson was elected president in November 1828, Calhoun remained as vice-president. He had played an instrumental role in forging the alliance of Westerners, Southerners, and anti-Adams forces in the Northeast to elect the new president. Calhoun was suspicious of the political aspirations of many of the supporters of his new political ally. Nevertheless, as vice-president in the new administration, he hoped to influence Jackson’s policies. His experience with Jackson, however, proved even less successful than his experience with John Quincy Adams had been.
Calhoun’s efforts to defuse sectional tension and controversy within a constitutional framework met with little success. The divisions over the tariff and protectionism were intractable. The ultimate logic of his own doctrine of nullification, secession, was taken up as a solution by many in the South. After the election of Jackson and Calhoun, the South Carolina legislature had circulated the Exposition widely. Calhoun’s hand in writing the document was widely speculated. In an effort to prevent further alienation of the Northern states and to exhume his possible candidacy for president, Calhoun attempted a public clarification of his position in his 1831 Fort Hill Address. His measured words were noted by virtually everyone. By the closing months of 1832, Calhoun’s responsibility for the drafting of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest had become common knowledge. Now it was evident for all to see that the reintroduction of the doctrine of nullification—the right of a single state to negate the laws of the federal government within its jurisdiction—was the work of none other than the Vice-President of the United States.
Throughout this turbulent period, Calhoun was increasingly called upon to defend the South’s peculiar institution—slavery—which came progressively to the fore as a defining characteristic of the South and became connected to the debate over states’ rights. With one notable exception, Calhoun’s remarks concerning this subject were always couched in the general language of history, economics, and philosophy. That one exception is his 1837 address to the Senate in which he goes so far as to declare slavery “a positive good” —a statement which he immediately protested was taken out of context. Calhoun’s own inner thoughts on slavery may never be known with certainty, for the ravages of civil war and the fate of the Southern cause have only compounded the engima of how a free people could endorse and defend that pernicious institution.
Calhoun resigned his office as vice-president in December 1832 and took a seat as a senator from South Carolina, which he held until 1844. The brilliance of his mind and the power of his rhetoric made him the natural and unchallenged spokesman for South Carolina and many elements in the South. This was especially apparent in his speech on the Revenue Collection Bill, commonly known as the Force Bill, in February 1833. In this speech, which spanned two days, he argued that recourse to violence to compel obedience to the dictates of the federal government could never be constitutional or legitimate, even if undertaken to preserve the union.
Calhoun’s rhetorical strengths in arguing the Southern cause and his opposition to Jackson diminished his national stature. In the succeeding years he gradually regained his standing and was appointed secretary of state by President John Tyler in 1844. He remained firm in his commitment to a national union of states and continued to worry that Southern states would become a minority in the Congress. As secretary of state, he advocated the annexation of Texas as a means of balancing the South and the expanding North. He exerted his efforts on behalf of the Union in its dispute with Great Britain over the territory that later became Oregon.
Upon Polk’s election as president in 1845, Calhoun reentered the Senate, where he continued to be active until his death. He used his position as senator to assail the highly popular Mexican-American War. He attempted to develop various public projects in South Carolina and for the South generally, including plans for a railroad connecting the South and the West. Much of his energy in his last years was devoted to writing what was to become the Disquisition and the Discourse.
On March 4, 1850, a sick and frail Calhoun sat in the Senate and watched as a colleague read what was to be his last major address. He was too weak to deliver it himself. In his prepared text, an obviously despondent Calhoun opposed the admission of California as a free state. Little more could be done, he heard Senator Mason say for him; compromise was no longer possible. This pessimistic speech was his final contribution to the larger debate on the nature of Union and the relations of the North and the South. Within the month, on March 31, 1850, Calhoun died in Washington, D.C.
Although aware of the limited capability of reasoned discourse to resolve the tensions and centrifugal forces of nineteenth century America, Calhoun turned increasingly in the last few years of his life to questions of philosophy. He devoted his time and energy to the writing of A Disquisition on Government and A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, which were completed just before his death.
They are complementary texts: The practical American political experience as advanced in the lengthy Discourse makes sense only in the context of the political theory articulated and developed in the less voluminous Disquisition. The Disquisition expounds his doctrine of the concurrent majority—the right of significant interests to have a veto over either the enactment or the implementation of a public law—and discusses historical instances in which it had worked. The Discourse traces the constitutional foundation for the concurrent majority in the American political tradition and argues for its restoration as the only means to resolve the constitutional and political crisis facing the Union. Both works reveal a philosopher whose preference for metaphysical discourse is unmistakable. Both works reveal a seasoned politician who had been an active participant in the nineteenth century politics of nationalism, sectionalism, and secession. Reading these two works together, one cannot help but sense that this man understood the impending crisis all too well.
While Calhoun’s Disquisition usually is viewed as an elaborate defense of his doctrine of the concurrent majority, it is also a deep look at the nature of man and government. It begins with the nature of society and the nature of the consent of the governed. Calhoun tries to develop a view of government that avoids the pitfalls he experienced in the U.S. Constitution. Beneath the surface of his treatise is a systematic analysis and critique of the founding principles as set forth by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in The Federalist Papers. The Disquisition explicitly rejects several of the fundamental maxims advanced by Publius, including the presumption that governmental institutions can be a product of reflection and choice, rather than accident and force (Federalist ;ns1), the theory of the extended, compound republic (Federalist ;ns10), the doctrine of the numerical majority (Federalist ;ns22), and the theory of limiting governmental power through the separation of powers (Federalist ;ns51). In essence, Calhoun suggests that the theory of The Federalist Papers makes inadequate safeguards for the maintenance of limited government. In the absence of such provisions, Publius’s extended republic not only fails to prevent majority tyranny, but actually encourages it by allowing a numerical majority to make laws on any subject it declares to be the legitimate business of government. Given the nature of man, argues Calhoun, it is not long before such majorities become overbearing: They begin to enact laws to their own advantage and to the disadvantage and abuse of minority interests.
Calhoun’s Discourse clearly places the arguments of the Disquisition within the context of the American political tradition. Calhoun elaborates upon his discussion of the concepts of limited government, separation of powers, judicial review, and the theory of the extended, compound republic. He provides a rigorous analysis of virtually all of the major individuals, events, and documents of the founding and subsequent development of the federal government. He offers a detailed critique of Federalist ;ns39, accusing the celebrated Publius of duplicity and deceit. He challenges the doctrine of judicial review expounded in Federalist ;ns78, arguing that this extra-constitutional practice is incompatible with true federalist principles. He calls for the restoration of the concurrent majority through the operation of the amendment process provided for in the U.S. Constitution. In short, the Discourse offers a critique of the major presumptions and convictions upon which the American political order was founded, including consent of the governed, equality, liberty, community, public virtue and private vice, reflection and choice, accident and force. In Calhoun’s Discourse, each of these receives a bold, precise reformulation.
Calhoun’s extended discussion of liberty and union turns on his doctrine of the concurrent majority. Who will be entrusted with the veto power? Who will decide, and on what desiderata, which groups are significant enough to be given a veto or a negative power over the making or executing of the laws? When would this power be exercised? What would prevent these vested groups from favoring the status quo and limiting the progress and development of society? In a Union such as the United States, would the several states exercise the veto power of the concurrent majority? If Calhoun intended the states to exercise such a power, why did he not say so explicitly? On what grounds could one argue that the states constitute organic units, while the federal government does not? How would the rights of a minority within each state be protected against an overbearing majority within that state? Why would a numerical minority in each state not be subject to the whims of an overbearing numerical majority in that state? If the rights of the individual constitute the ultimate test of minority rights, how can a concurrent majority system, which vests power in a few, great interests, be an adequate safeguard for the rights of the individual in society? Questions like these, and many others raised by Calhoun in his Disquisition and Discourse, represent a legacy of continuing relevance in the ongoing debate in American constitutional thought.
In the present volume, every effort has been made to present as representative a picture of Calhoun’s political and philosophical thought as is possible within the confines of a single volume covering Calhoun’s some forty years of public service. All selections are complete and unabridged. The reasons for including the Disquisition and Discourse are obvious. In addition to these larger works, this volume includes twelve speeches, letters, or political essays taken from the literally thousands of pages of Calhoun’s speeches and writings. The documents which follow the Disquisition and Discourse proceed in chronological order. The “Speech on the Resolution of the Committee on Foreign Relations” was Calhoun’s first major address to the U.S. House of Representatives and establishes his early credentials as an ardent nationalist. This nationalist theme can also be seen in his 1816 “Speech on the Tariff Bill.” For more about the nature and scope of Calhoun’s nationalism, the reader may consult his “Speech on United States Bill ... February 26, 1816” and his “Speech on the Internal Improvement Bill ... February 4, 1817,” not reprinted here.
Following these speeches from Calhoun’s days in the House of Representatives, this volume focuses upon three of Calhoun’s statements on the great controversy over the tariff, which was triggered by the Tariff of Abominations and culminated in the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, the Compromise Tariff of 1833, and President Jackson’s Force Bill. The “Exposition and Protest,” drafted by Calhoun and promulgated by the South Carolina legislature, articulates the right of the several states to interpose their authority between the federal government and the people of the states. Calhoun’s public remarks on the doctrine of interposition are found in his “Address on the Relations of the States and the Federal Government,” more commonly known as the “Fort Hill Address.” The “Speech on the Revenue Collection [Force] Bill” rigorously applies the principles of the Fort Hill Address to the particular issue of the tariff. Few, if any, of Calhoun’s speeches can rival his remarks on the Force Bill for clarity and powers of rhetoric. The language is direct; the style provocative and bold; the analysis rigorous and precise. Those interested in pursuing in greater detail Calhoun’s position on interposition, nullification, and the tariff should also consult his rather lengthy letter to General Hamilton not reproduced here.
The next document, Calhoun’s 1837 “Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions,” focuses on one of the most controversial issues of Calhoun’s political career, his defense of slavery. Because Calhoun’s reputation is so often linked to his remarks on this subject, both the first report and the revised report have been included here.
The highly volatile issue of the national bank is addressed in the “Edgefield Letter.” Although this letter is not, strictly speaking, a public address or speech, it received such widespread, public circulation that it seems appropriate to include it in a volume of this nature. This letter offers us the additional advantage of being able to hear, in a very few pages, Calhoun’s own justification for his return to the ranks of the Democratic Party and his defense against the charges of political inconsistency on the question of a national bank.
The remaining five speeches in this volume focus on those issues and concerns that came to dominate the conversation between the North and the South in the critical years from 1840 to 1850. All of the elements of that conversation are in place: the tyranny of a numerical majority and the abuse of legislative power (“Speech on the Veto Power”); the nature of compromise in the foundation of constitutional government and in the doctrine of the concurrent majority (“Speech on the Introduction of His Resolutions on the Slave Question”); the need for a Southern party to counteract the corruptive nature of partisan politics (“Speech at the Meeting of the Citizens of Charleston”); the inevitable conflict between liberty and equality (“Speech on the Oregon Bill”); and Calhoun’s final assessment of the nature and limits of the Union and the requisites for its preservation (“Speech on the Admission of California—and the General State of the Union”). These five documents also allow us a unique opportunity to see Calhoun’s political and philosophical arguments in the years preceding their final articulation in the Disquisition and the Discourse.
The question arises at this point as to whether it is better to begin one’s reading of Calhoun in chronological order, so as to trace the development of his thinking, or whether it is better to begin with the Disquisition and Discourse, which reveal the philosophical commitments and beliefs on which Calhoun’s political discourse and action are founded. Obviously the two approaches are inextricably tied: There can be no real grasp of the development of Calhoun’s political philosophy without an understanding of the historical development of nineteenth century America, and no real grasp of Calhoun’s political experience in the absence of an understanding of his general theory of government and society. The fact that the Disquisition and the Discourse are placed at the beginning of this volume is not meant to settle the question of what is the best approach to Calhoun’s works.
The noted biographer of Calhoun, Charles M. Wiltse, best summarized the dramatic and controversy-ridden image of John C. Calhoun that prevailed in his time and still does in ours when he observed that the “Senate, the Congress, and the country itself” were “divided over the character and motives of one man.”
There was no middle ground, no compromise, no no-man’s land. He attracted, or repelled; he convinced, or he antagonized; he was loved, or he was hated. He was the pure and unsullied patriot, ready to sacrifice position, honors, life itself for the liberties of his country; or he was the very image of Lucifer—the archangel fallen, damned forever to the bottomless pit by his own overmastering ambition. Toward Calhoun indifference was impossible.*
The power of Calhoun’s eloquence is undeniable. He had an enormous political influence in the period immediately following the founding of the American system. He understood liberty; he ardently defended it; and he spoke of it in a language and within a culture that are genuinely American. The defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority, the cause to which he untiringly devoted himself, has rejoined constitutional discourse as a tenet of contemporary American politics. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of neglect, John Caldwell Calhoun calls upon us to renew our inquiry into the founding principles of the American system of government.
- University of Houston
EDITOR’S NOTE
Many of the documents reprinted in this volume (including Calhoun’s A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States) have not been available to the general reader since the initial publication of Richard K. Crallé ’s six-volume Works of John C. Calhoun in 1851–1856. For some fifty years following the publication of Crallé ’s Works, these volumes remained the only source of primary Calhoun materials. In 1900, Calhoun scholarship was renewed when J. Franklin Jameson published a selected edition of Calhoun’s correspondence as the fourth annum report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission under the title Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Washington, D.C., 1900). A second volume of Calhoun’s correspondence appeared some thirty years later under the editorship of Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks entitled Correspondence Addressed to John C. Calhoun, 1837–1849: Sixteenth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission (Washington, D.C., 1930). Probably the most circulated of Calhoun’s works was his A Disquisition on Government, which appeared in two separate editions: John M. Anderson’s Calhoun: Basic Documents (Bald Eagle Press, 1952) and C. Gordon Post’s A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse (Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).
At the present time, the University of South Carolina is engaged in a massive effort to reproduce the entire corpus of Calhoun’s works. That collection, entitled The Papers of John C. Calhoun (Columbia, S.C., 1959–), under the able editorship of W. Edwin Hemphill, Robert L. Meriwether, and Clyde Wilson, is expected to take several more years to complete. To date, twenty volumes of Calhoun’s works have been published by the University of South Carolina Press, covering the period of Calhoun’s political life through December 1844. When that project is completed, it will represent the single most comprehensive source of Calhoun scholarship, bringing together literally thousands of documents and writings of John Calhoun.
Note on Sources
The primary source of Calhoun’s political essays, speeches, and letters that appear in this volume is the Works of John C. Calhoun (New York, 1851–1856), edited by Calhoun’s friend and confidant, Richard K. Crallé. Whenever possible, the text of Crallé has been carefully compared to other printed copies of the speeches and writings of Calhoun. The primary bases of comparison were the Annals of Congress (a report of the congressional proceedings of the 1st through 12th Congress compiled by Gales and Seaton from newspapers, magazines, and other sources), the Register of Debates (a direct report of the congressional proceedings from 1824 to 1837 published by Gales and Seaton), and The Congressional Globe (a report of the 23rd through 42nd Congress published by Blair and Rives; F. and J. Rives; F. and J. Rives and George A. Bailey).
There are many reasons for using Crallé ’s Works as the primary text, not the least of which is that Crallé had available to him many manuscripts which are no longer extant. Furthermore, a rigorous comparison of Crallé ’s text with contemporary reports of Calhoun’s remarks seems to confirm Crallé ’s claim in his advertisement to the first volume of his Works that in it is reprinted, with very few exceptions, “the Work ... as it came from the hands of the author.” In those few instances where Crallé seems to alter the text of Calhoun’s remarks, for whatever reason, the changes in the text were always minor. Upon reflection, I could find no justification for substituting my own interpretation of the passages in question for those of Crallé, and such a practice would deny Crallé ’s text its rightful place in the history of Calhoun scholarship.
Those familiar with the Annals of Congress, the Register of Debates, and The Congressional Globe (all forerunners of the Congressional Record, which first made its appearance on December 1, 1873) are cognizant of the enormous variance in both the style and language of the speeches reported. Indeed, that variance is evident in the two versions of Calhoun’s remarks in his “Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions” reprinted in this volume, and in the third-person presentation of some of his speeches. Much of the variance is due to editorial practices of the newspapers of the day, rather than to the vagaries of Calhoun’s speech and thought. Calhoun hardly ever reviewed or revised his remarks owing to the press of daily business, and he had almost no concern for questions of style per se.
Again, Crallé ’s remarks in his advertisement to the first volume of his Works are instructive:
In preparing the manuscripts for the press, the editor has sedulously endeavored to preserve, not only the peculiar modes of expression, but the very words of the author—without regard to ornaments of style or rules of criticism. They who knew him well, need not to be told that, to these, he paid but slight respect. Absorbed by his subject, and earnest in his efforts to present the truth to others, as it appeared to himself, he regarded neither the arts nor the ornaments of meretricious elocution. He wrote as he spoke, sometimes negligently, yet always plainly and forcibly, and it is due to his own character, as well as to the public expectation, that his views should be presented in the plain and simple garb in which he left them.
My general editorial procedure has been, in short, to keep as close as possible to the text of Crallé. Indeed, every effort has been made to be as nonintrusive as possible. Like Crallé, however, I have sometimes found it necessary to correct for minor typographical errors and punctuation, especially where a careful reading of the speeches as reported in other sources suggests that Calhoun intended a different emphasis to these remarks. In no instance have any changes been made without at least one or more primary documents to support such an alteration.
In the few cases where Crallé does not include the entire speech or address, another source was used:
- The first two paragraphs of the Fort Hill Address are taken from Niles Weekly Register, Vol. XL, no. 25 (August 20, 1831).
- The First Report of the Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions is taken from the Register of Debates, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., Cols. 710-719.
- The Edgefield Letter is taken from the Niles National Register, Vol. LIII, no. 14 (December 2, 1837), pp. 217–218.
- The words Calhoun used when introducing Mr. Mason, who read the Speech on the Admission of California and the General State of the Union, are taken from The Congressional Globe, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1850, p. 541.
The reader will find within the text occasional commentary describing the reading of resolutions, remarks by other speakers, and other events that occurred during Calhoun’s speeches. These explanatory remarks, which often are in brackets, are contained in the version of the speech reproduced in this edition. (The one exception is the First Report on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, as indicated there.)
Acknowledgments
Among the greatest sins in the world must be those of pettiness and ingratitude. I sincerely hope that I am guilty of neither of these in the production of this volume. I would like to thank the late Professor Charles S. Hyneman, Distinguished Service Professor of Indiana University, who first brought John Calhoun to my attention. I still remember his advice to me so many years ago: “Son, if you want to understand America, you don’t want to miss this guy Calhoun.” I also would like to thank George Carey, Charles McCall, Michael and Caron Jackson, Bill Burrow, Dan Palazzolo, John Leech, and James Gladden, who in one way or another have provided the intellectual stimulation for this project. I am especially appreciative of the research support of Judy Bundy for her work on Calhoun, and of Glenn Gadbois, whose service in the last stages of this manuscript have been invaluable; the patience of countless unnamed students whose long-delayed papers have made it possible for me to find the needed time to work on this project; and last, but by no means least, the moral support of my best friend and mother, whose innumerable hours of cutting and pasting have finally come to fruition.
I hope it will not be thought presumptuous to borrow here the words of Niccolo Machiavelli: A’ quali ordini io al tutto mi rimetto.*
A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT
Of all John C. Calhoun’s works, none has been more widely read or cited than his Disquisition on Government, a posthumous work that marked the culmination of Calhoun’s political reflections and thought after some forty years of public service. Within the confines of this short, theoretical text, Calhoun offers more than an analysis of the foundation of constitutional government in America: He reveals a bold new understanding of the science of politics. As Calhoun himself noted in his letter of June 15, 1849, from Fort Hill:
I devote all the time left me, to finishing the work I commenced three years ago, or more ... I finished, yesterday, the preliminary work [ A Disquisition ], which treats of the elementary principles of the Science of Government.... I am pretty well satisfied with its execution. It will be nearly throughout new territory; and, I hope, to lay a solid foundation for political Science. I have written, just as I thought, and told the truth without fear, favor, or affection.*
In the course of the Disquisition, Calhoun argues that the principles of government are as certain and as unquestionable as the laws of gravitation or astronomy. Beginning with the two incontestable facts that man is a social animal and that society cannot exist without government, Calhoun immediately announces a third fact, that man feels what affects him directly more intensely than what affects him indirectly through others. From these three facts, Calhoun then constructs all of his other arguments and theories, including his doctrine of the concurrent majority, which guarantees every significant interest in the community a concurrent voice either in the enactment or in the enforcement of public policy. This concurrent majority not only serves as a necessary check on the dictates of the numerical majority, but is also the negative principle that distinguishes constitutional from absolute governments.
In order to have a clear and just conception of the nature and object of government, it is indispensable to understand correctly what that constitution or law of our nature is, in which government originates; or, to express it more fully and accurately—that law, without which government would not, and with which, it must necessarily exist. Without this, it is as impossible to lay any solid foundation for the science of government, as it would be to lay one for that of astronomy, without a like understanding of that constitution or law of the material world, according to which the several bodies composing the solar system mutually act on each other, and by which they are kept in their respective spheres. The first question, accordingly, to be considered is—What is that constitution or law of our nature, without which government would not exist, and with which its existence is necessary?
In considering this, I assume, as an incontestable fact, that man is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist; and in no other—were it possible for him to exist—could he attain to a full development of his moral and intellectual faculties, or raise himself, in the scale of being, much above the level of the brute creation.
I next assume, also, as a fact not less incontestable, that, while man is so constituted as to make the social state necessary to his existence and the full development of his faculties, this state itself cannot exist without government. The assumption rests on universal experience. In no age or country has any society or community ever been found, whether enlightened or savage, without government of some description.
Having assumed these, as unquestionable phenomena of our nature, I shall, without further remark, proceed to the investigation of the primary and important question—What is that constitution of our nature, which, while it impels man to associate with his kind, renders it impossible for society to exist without government?
The answer will be found in the fact (not less incontestable than either of the others) that, while man is created for the social state, and is accordingly so formed as to feel what affects others, as well as what affects himself, he is, at the same time, so constituted as to feel more intensely what affects him directly, than what affects him indirectly though others; or, to express it differently, he is so constituted, that his direct or individual affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings. I intentionally avoid the expression, selfish feelings, as applicable to the former; because, as commonly used, it implies an unusual excess of the individual over the social feelings, in the person to whom it is applied; and, consequently, something depraved and vicious. My object is, to exclude such inference, and to restrict the inquiry exclusively to facts in their bearings on the subject under consideration, viewed as mere phenomena appertaining to our nature—constituted as it is; and which are as unquestionable as is that of gravitation, or any other phenomenon of the material world.
In asserting that our individual are stronger than our social feelings, it is not intended to deny that there are instances, growing out of peculiar relations—as that of a mother and her infant—or resulting from the force of education and habit over peculiar constitutions, in which the latter have overpowered the former; but these instances are few, and always regarded as something extraordinary. The deep impression they make, whenever they occur, is the strongest proof that they are regarded as exceptions to some general and well understood law of our nature; just as some of the minor powers of the material world are apparently to gravitation.
I might go farther, and assert this to be a phenomenon, not of our nature only, but of all animated existence, throughout its entire range, so far as our knowledge extends. It would, indeed, seem to be essentially connected with the great law of self-preservation which pervades all that feels, from man down to the lowest and most insignificant reptile or insect. In none is it stronger than in man. His social feelings may, indeed, in a state of safety and abundance, combined with high intellectual and moral culture, acquire great expansion and force; but not so great as to overpower this all-pervading and essential law of animated existence.
But that constitution of our nature which makes us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict between individuals. Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness, than for the safety or happiness of others; and, where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own. And hence, the tendency to a universal state of conflict, between individual and individual; accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger and revenge—followed by insolence, fraud and cruelty—and, if not prevented by some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion, destructive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained. This controlling power, wherever vested, or by whomsoever exercised, is government.
It follows, then, that man is so constituted, that government is necessary to the existence of society, and society to his existence, and the perfection of his faculties. It follows, also, that government has its origin in this twofold constitution of his nature; the sympathetic or social feelings constituting the remote—and the individual or direct, the proximate cause.
If man had been differently constituted in either particular—if, instead of being social in his nature, he had been created without sympathy for his kind, and independent of others for his safety and existence; or if, on the other hand, he had been so created, as to feel more intensely what affected others than what affected himself (if that were possible) or, even, had this supposed interest been equal—it is manifest that, in either case, there would have been no necessity for government, and that none would ever have existed. But, although society and government are thus intimately connected with and dependent on each other—of the two society is the greater. It is the first in the order of things, and in the dignity of its object; that of society being primary—to preserve and perfect our race; and that of government secondary and subordinate, to preserve and perfect society. Both are, however, necessary to the existence and well-being of our race, and equally of Divine ordination.
I have said—if it were possible for man to be so constituted, as to feel what affects others more strongly than what affects himself, or even as strongly—because, it may be well doubted, whether the stronger feeling or affection of individuals for themselves, combined with a feebler and subordinate feeling or affection for others, is not, in beings of limited reason and faculties, a constitution necessary to their preservation and existence. If reversed—if their feelings and affections were stronger for others than for themselves, or even as strong, the necessary result would seem to be, that all individuality would be lost; and boundless and remediless disorder and confusion would ensue. For each, at the same moment, intensely participating in all the conflicting emotions of those around him, would, of course, forget himself and all that concerned him immediately, in his officious intermeddling with the affairs of all others; which, from his limited reason and faculties, he could neither properly understand nor manage. Such a state of things would, as far as we can see, lead to endless disorder and confusion, not less destructive to our race than a state of anarchy. It would, besides, be remediless—for government would be impossible; or, if it could by possibility exist, its object would be reversed. Selfishness would have to be encouraged, and benevolence discouraged. Individuals would have to be encouraged, by rewards, to become more selfish, and deterred, by punishments, from being too benevolent; and this, too, by a government, administered by those who, on the supposition, would have the greatest aversion for selfishness and the highest admiration for benevolence.
To the Infinite Being, the Creator of all, belongs exclusively the care and superintendence of the whole. He, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, has allotted to every class of animated beings its condition and appropriate functions; and has endowed each with feelings, instincts, capacities, and faculties, best adapted to its allotted condition. To man, he has assigned the social and political state, as best adapted to develop the great capacities and faculties, intellectual and moral, with which he has endowed him; and has, accordingly, constituted him so as not only to impel him into the social state, but to make government necessary for his preservation and well-being.
But government, although intended to protect and preserve society, has itself a strong tendency to disorder and abuse of its powers, as all experience and almost every page of history testify. The cause is to be found in the same constitution of our nature which makes government indispensable. The powers which it is necessary for government to possess, in order to repress violence and preserve order, cannot execute themselves. They must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence, the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That, by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to government.
Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands to government, as government stands to society; and, as the end for which society is ordained, would be defeated without government, so that for which government is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution. But they differ in this striking particular. There is no difficulty in forming government. It is not even a matter of choice, whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is not permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force it on all communities in some one form or another. Very different is the case as to constitution. Instead of a matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult tasks imposed on man to form a constitution worthy of the name; while, to form a perfect one—one that would completely counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse, and hold it strictly to the great ends for which it is ordained—has thus far exceeded human wisdom, and possibly ever will. From this, another striking difference results. Constitution is the contrivance of man, while government is of Divine ordination. Man is left to perfect what the wisdom of the Infinite ordained, as necessary to preserve the race.
With these remarks, I proceed to the consideration of the important and difficult question: How is this tendency of government to be counteracted? Or, to express it more fully—How can those who are invested with the powers of government be prevented from employing them, as the means of aggrandizing themselves, instead of using them to protect and preserve society? It cannot be done by instituting a higher power to control the government, and those who administer it. This would be but to change the seat of authority, and to make this bigger power, in reality, the government; with the same tendency, on the part of those who might control its powers, to pervert them into instruments of aggrandizement. Nor can it be done by limiting the powers of government, so as to make it too feeble to be made an instrument of abuse; for, passing by the difficulty of so limiting its powers, without creating a power higher than the government itself to enforce the observance of the limitations, it is a sufficient objection that it would, if practicable, defeat the end for which government is ordained, by making it too feeble to protect and preserve society. The powers necessary for this purpose will ever prove sufficient to aggrandize those who control it, at the expense of the rest of the community.
In estimating what amount of power would be requisite to secure the objects of government, we must take into the reckoning, what would be necessary to defend the community against external, as well as internal dangers. Government must be able to repel assaults from abroad, as well as to repress violence and disorders within. It must not be overlooked, that the human race is not comprehended in a single society or community. The limited reason and faculties of man, the great diversity of language, customs, pursuits, situation and complexion, and the difficulty of intercourse, with various other causes, have, by their operation, formed a great many separate communities, acting independently of each other. Between these there is the same tendency to conflict—and from the same constitution of our nature—as between men individually; and even stronger—because the sympathetic or social feelings are not so strong between different communities, as between individuals of the same community. So powerful, indeed, is this tendency, that it has led to almost incessant wars between contiguous communities for plunder and conquest, or to avenge injuries, real or supposed.
So long as this state of things continues, exigencies will occur, in which the entire powers and resources of the community will be needed to defend its existence. When this is at stake, every other consideration must yield to it. Self-preservation is the supreme law, as well with communities as individuals. And hence the danger of withholding from government the full command of the power and resources of the state; and the great difficulty of limiting its powers consistently with the protection and preservation of the community. And hence the question recurs—By what means can government, without being divested of the full command of the resources of the community, be prevented from abusing its powers?
The question involves difficulties which, from the earliest ages, wise and good men have attempted to overcome—but hitherto with but partial success. For this purpose many devices have been resorted to, suited to the various stages of intelligence and civilization through which our race has passed, and to the different forms of government to which they have been applied. The aid of superstition, ceremonies, education, religion, organic arrangements, both of the government and the community, has been, from time to time, appealed to. Some of the most remarkable of these devices, whether regarded in reference to their wisdom and the skill displayed in their application, or to the permanency of their effects, are to be found in the early dawn of civilization—in the institutions of the Egyptians, the Hindoos, the Chinese, and the Jews. The only materials which that early age afforded for the construction of constitutions, when intelligence was so partially diffused, were applied with consummate wisdom and skill. To their successful application may be fairly traced the subsequent advance of our race in civilization and intelligence, of which we now enjoy the benefits. For, without a constitution—something to counteract the strong tendency of government to disorder and abuse, and to give stability to political institutions—there can be little progress or permanent improvement.
In answering the important question under consideration, it is not necessary to enter into an examination of the various contrivances adopted by these celebrated governments to counteract this tendency to disorder and abuse, nor to undertake to treat of constitution in its most comprehensive sense. What I propose is far more limited—to explain on what principles government must be formed, in order to resist, by its own interior structure—or, to use a single term, organism —the tendency to abuse of power. This structure, or organism, is what is meant by constitution, in its strict and more usual sense; and it is this which distinguishes, what are called, constitutional governments from absolute. It is in this strict and more usual sense that I propose to use the term hereafter.
How government, then, must be constructed, in order to counteract, through its organism, this tendency on the part of those who make and execute the laws to oppress those subject to their operation, is the next question which claims attention.
There is but one way in which this can possibly be done; and that is, by such an organism as will furnish the ruled with the means of resisting successfully this tendency on the part of the rulers to oppression and abuse. Power can only be resisted by power—and tendency by tendency. Those who exercise power and those subject to its exercise—the rulers and the ruled—stand in antagonistic relations to each other. The same constitution of our nature which leads rulers to oppress the ruled—regardless of the object for which government is ordained—will, with equal strength, lead the ruled to resist, when possessed of the means of making peaceable and effective resistance. Such an organism, then, as will furnish the means by which resistance may be systematically and peaceably made on the part of the ruled, to oppression and abuse of power on the part of the rulers, is the first and indispensable step towards forming a constitutional government. And as this can only be effected by or through the right of suffrage—(the right on the part of the ruled to choose their rulers at proper intervals, and to hold them thereby responsible for their conduct)—the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, through the right of suffrage, is the indispensable and primary principle in the foundation of a constitutional government. When this right is properly guarded, and the people sufficiently enlightened to understand their own rights and the interests of the community, and duly to appreciate the motives and conduct of those appointed to make and execute the laws, it is all-sufficient to give to those who elect, effective control over those they have elected.
I call the right of suffrage the indispensable and primary principle; for it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, as many do, that it is, of itself, sufficient to form constitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may be traced one of the causes, why so few attempts to form constitutional governments have succeeded; and why, of the few which have, so small a number have had durable existence. It has led, not only to mistakes in the attempts to form such governments, but to their overthrow, when they have, by some good fortune, been correctly formed. So far from being, of itself, sufficient—however well guarded it might be, and however enlightened the people—it would, unaided by other provisions, leave the government as absolute, as it would be in the hands of irresponsible rulers; and with a tendency, at least as strong, towards oppression and abuse of its powers; as I shall next proceed to explain.
The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than give complete control to those who elect, over the conduct of those they have elected. In doing this, it accomplishes all it possibly can accomplish. This is its aim—and when this is attained, its end is fulfilled. It can do no more, however enlightened the people, or however widely extended or well guarded the right may be. The sum total, then, of its effects, when most successful, is, to make those elected, the true and faithful representatives of those who elected them—instead of irresponsible rulers—as they would be without it; and thus, by converting it into an agency, and the rulers into agents, to divest government of all claims to sovereignty, and to retain it unimpaired to the community. But it is manifest that the right of suffrage, in making these changes, transfers, in reality, the actual control over the government, from those who make and execute the laws, to the body of the community; and, thereby, places the powers of the government as fully in the mass of the community, as they would be if they, in fact, had assembled, made, and executed the laws themselves, without the intervention of representatives or agents. The more perfectly it does this, the more perfectly it accomplishes its ends; but in doing so, it only changes the seat of authority, without counteracting, in the least, the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers.
If the whole community had the same interests, so that the interests of each and every portion would be so affected by the action of the government, that the laws which oppressed or impoverished one portion, would necessarily oppress and impoverish all others—or the reverse—then the right of suffrage, of itself, would be all-sufficient to counteract the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers; and, of course, would form, of itself, a perfect constitutional government. The interest of all being the same, by supposition, as far as the action of the government was concerned, all would have like interests as to what laws should be made, and how they should be executed. All strife and struggle would cease as to who should be elected to make and execute them. The only question would be, who was most fit; who the wisest and most capable of understanding the common interest of the whole. This decided, the election would pass off quietly, and without party discord; as no one portion could advance its own peculiar interest without regard to the rest, by electing a favorite candidate.
But such is not the case. On the contrary, nothing is more difficult than to equalize the action of the government, in reference to the various and diversified interests of the community; and nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into instruments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests by oppressing and impoverishing the others; and this too, under the operation of laws, couched in general terms—and which, on their face, appear fair and equal. Nor is this the case in some particular communities only. It is so in all; the small and the great—the poor and the rich—irrespective of pursuits, productions, or degrees of civilization—with, however, this difference, that the more extensive and populous the country, the more diversified the condition and pursuits of its population, and the richer, more luxurious, and dissimilar the people, the more difficult is it to equalize the action of the government—and the more easy for one portion of the community to pervert its powers to oppress, and plunder the other.
Such being the case, it necessarily results, that the right of suffrage, by placing the control of the government in the community must, from the same constitution of our nature which makes government necessary to preserve society, lead to conflict among its different interests—each striving to obtain possession of its powers, as the means of protecting itself against the others—or of advancing its respective interests, regardless of the interests of others. For this purpose, a struggle will take place between the various interests to obtain a majority, in order to control the government. If no one interest be strong enough, of itself, to obtain it, a combination will be formed between those whose interests are most alike—each conceding something to the others, until a sufficient number is obtained to make a majority. The process may be slow, and much time may be required before a compact, organized majority can be thus formed; but formed it will be in time, even without preconcert or design, by the sure workings of that principle or constitution of our nature in which government itself originates. When once formed, the community will be divided into two great parties—a major and minor—between which there will be incessant struggles on the one side to retain, and on the other to obtain the majority—and, thereby, the control of the government and the advantages it confers.
So deeply seated, indeed, is this tendency to conflict between the different interests or portions of the community, that it would result from the action of the government itself, even though it were possible to find a community, where the people were all of the same pursuits, placed in the same condition of life, and in every respect, so situated, as to be without inequality of condition or diversity of interests. The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the government, and, thereby, of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide even such a community into two great hostile parties.
In order to form a just estimate of the full force of these advantages—without reference to any other consideration—it must be remembered, that government—to fulfill the ends for which it is ordained, and more especially that of protection against external dangers—must, in the present condition of the world, be clothed with powers sufficient to call forth the resources of the community, and be prepared, at all times, to command them promptly in every emergency which may possibly arise. For this purpose large establishments are necessary, both civil and military (including naval, where, from situation, that description of force may be required) with all the means necessary for prompt and effective action—such as fortifications, fleets, armories, arsenals, magazines, arms of all descriptions, with well-trained forces, in sufficient numbers to wield them with skill and energy, whenever the occasion requires it. The administration and management of a government with such vast establishments must necessarily require a host of employees, agents, and officers—of whom many must be vested with high and responsible trusts, and occupy exalted stations, accompanied with much influence and patronage. To meet the necessary expenses, large sums must be collected and disbursed; and, for this purpose, heavy taxes must be imposed, requiring a multitude of officers for their collection and disbursement. The whole united must necessarily place under the control of government an amount of honors and emoluments, sufficient to excite profoundly the ambition of the aspiring and the cupidity of the avaricious; and to lead to the formation of hostile parties, and violent party conflicts and struggles to obtain the control of the government. And what makes this evil remediless, through the right of suffrage of itself, however modified or carefully guarded, or however enlightened the people, is the fact that, as far as the honors and emoluments of the government and its fiscal action are concerned, it is impossible to equalize it. The reason is obvious. Its honors and emoluments, however great, can fall to the lot of but a few, compared to the entire number of the community, and the multitude who will seek to participate in them. But, without this, there is a reason which renders it impossible to equalize the action of the government, so far as its fiscal operation extends—which I shall next explain.
Few, comparatively, as they are, the agents and employees of the government constitute that portion of the community who are the exclusive recipients of the proceeds of the taxes. Whatever amount is taken from the community, in the form of taxes, if not lost, goes to them in the shape of expenditures or disbursements. The two—disbursement and taxation—constitute the fiscal action of the government. They are correlatives. What the one takes from the community, under the name of taxes, is transferred to the portion of the community who are the recipients, under that of disbursements. But, as the recipients constitute only a portion of the community, it follows, taking the two parts of the fiscal process together, that its action must be unequal between the payers of the taxes and the recipients of their proceeds. Nor can it be otherwise, unless what is collected from each individual in the shape of taxes, shall be returned to him, in that of disbursements; which would make the process nugatory and absurd. Taxation may, indeed, be made equal, regarded separately from disbursement. Even this is no easy task; but the two united cannot possibly be made equal.
Such being the case, it must necessarily follow, that some one portion of the community must pay in taxes more than it receives back in disbursements; while another receives in disbursements more than it pays in taxes. It is, then, manifest, taking the whole process together, that taxes must be, in effect, bounties to that portion of the community which receives more in disbursements than it pays in taxes; while, to the other which pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements, they are taxes in reality—burthens, instead of bounties. This consequence is unavoidable. It results from the nature of the process, be the taxes ever so equally laid, and the disbursements ever so fairly made, in reference to the public service.
It is assumed, in coming to this conclusion, that the disbursements are made within the community. The reasons assigned would not be applicable if the proceeds of the taxes were paid in tribute, or expended in foreign countries. In either of these cases, the burthen would fall on all, in proportion to the amount of taxes they respectively paid.
Nor would it be less a bounty to the portion of the community which received back in disbursements more than it paid in taxes, because received as salaries for official services; or payments to persons employed in executing the works required by the government; or furnishing it with its various supplies; or any other description of public employment—instead of being bestowed gratuitously. It is the disbursements which give additional, and, usually, very profitable and honorable employments to the portion of the community where they are made. But to create such employments, by disbursements, is to bestow on the portion of the community to whose lot the disbursements may fall, a far more durable and lasting benefit—one that would add much more to its wealth and population—than would the bestowal of an equal sum gratuitously: and hence, to the extent that the disbursements exceed the taxes, it may be fairly regarded as a bounty. The very reverse is the case in reference to the portion which pays in taxes more than it receives in disbursements. With them, profitable employments are diminished to the same extent, and population and wealth correspondingly decreased.
The necessary result, then, of the unequal fiscal action of the government is, to divide the community into two great classes; one consisting of those who, in reality, pay the taxes, and, of course, bear exclusively the burthen of supporting the government; and the other, of those who are the recipients of their proceeds, through disbursements, and who are, in fact, supported by the government; or, in fewer words, to divide it into tax-payers and tax-consumers.
But the effect of this is to place them in antagonistic relations, in reference to the fiscal action of the government, and the entire course of policy therewith connected. For, the greater the taxes and disbursements, the greater the gain of the one and the loss of the other—and vice versa; and consequently, the more the policy of the government is calculated to increase taxes and disbursements, the more it will be favored by the one and opposed by the other.
The effect, then, of every increase is, to enrich and strengthen the one, and impoverish and weaken the other. This, indeed, may be carried to such an extent, that one class or portion of the community may be elevated to wealth and power, and the other depressed to abject poverty and dependence, simply by the fiscal action of the government; and this too, through disbursements only—even under a system of equal taxes imposed for revenue only. If such may be the effect of taxes and disbursements, when confined to their legitimate objects—that of raising revenue for the public service—some conception may be formed, how one portion of the community may be crushed, and another elevated on its ruins, by systematically perverting the power of taxation and disbursement, for the purpose of aggrandizing and building up one portion of the community at the expense of the other. That it will be so used, unless prevented, is, from the constitution of man, just as certain as that it can be so used; and that, if not prevented, it must give rise to two parties, and to violent conflicts and struggles between them, to obtain the control of the government, is, for the same reason, not less certain.
Nor is it less certain, from the operation of all these causes, that the dominant majority, for the time, would have the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power, which, without the right of suffrage, irresponsible rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned, why the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply, with equal force, to the former. The dominant majority, for the time, would, in reality, through the right of suffrage, be the rulers—the controlling, governing, and irresponsible power; and those who make and execute the laws would, for the time, be, in reality, but their representatives and agents.
Nor would the fact that the former would constitute a majority of the community, counteract a tendency originating in the constitution of man; and which, as such, cannot depend on the number by whom the powers of the government may be wielded. Be it greater or smaller, a majority or minority, it must equally partake of an attribute inherent in each individual composing it; and, as in each the individual is stronger than the social feelings, the one would have the same tendency as the other to oppression and abuse of power. The reason applies to government in all its forms—whether it be that of the one, the few, or the many. In each there must, of necessity, be a governing and governed—a ruling and a subject portion. The one implies the other; and in all, the two bear the same relation to each other—and have, on the part of the governing portion, the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power. Where the majority is that portion, it matters not how its powers may be exercised—whether directly by themselves, or indirectly, through representatives or agents. Be it which it may, the minority, for the time, will be as much the governed or subject portion, as are the people in an aristocracy, or the subjects in a monarchy. The only difference in this respect is, that in the government of a majority, the minority may become the majority, and the majority the minority, through the right of suffrage; and thereby change their relative positions, without the intervention of force and revolution. But the duration, or uncertainty of the tenure, by which power is held, cannot, of itself, counteract the tendency inherent in government to oppression and abuse of power. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of the tenure, combined with the violent party warfare which must ever precede a change of parties under such governments, would rather tend to increase than diminish the tendency to oppression.
As, then, the right of suffrage, without some other provision, cannot counteract this tendency of government, the next question for consideration is—What is that other provision? This demands the most serious consideration; for of all the questions embraced in the science of government, it involves a principle, the most important, and the least understood; and when understood, the most difficult of application in practice. It is, indeed, emphatically, that principle which makes the constitution, in its strict and limited sense.
From what has been said, it is manifest, that this provision must be of a character calculated to prevent any one interest, or combination of interests, from using the powers of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of the others. Here lies the evil: and just in proportion as it shall prevent, or fail to prevent it, in the same degree it will effect, or fail to effect the end intended to be accomplished. There is but one certain mode in which this result can be secured; and that is, by the adoption of some restriction or limitation, which shall so effectually prevent any one interest, or combination of interests, from obtaining the exclusive control of the government, as to render hopeless all attempts directed to that end. There is, again, but one mode in which this can be effected; and that is, by taking the sense of each interest or portion of the community, which may be unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the government, separately, through its own majority, or in some other way by which its voice may be fairly expressed; and to require the consent of each interest, either to put or to keep the government in action. This, too, can be accomplished only in one way—and that is, by such an organism of the government—and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also—as will, by dividing and distributing the powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution. It is only by such an organism, that the assent of each can be made necessary to put the government in motion; or the power made effectual to arrest its action, when put in motion—and it is only by the one or the other that the different interests, orders, classes, or portions, into which the community may be divided, can be protected, and all conflict and struggle between them prevented—by rendering it impossible to put or to keep it in action, without the concurrent consent of all.
Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, constitutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional government. The one, by rendering those who make and execute the laws responsible to those on whom they operate, prevents the rulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by making it impossible for any one interest or combination of interests or class, or order, or portion of the community, to obtain exclusive control, prevents any one of them from oppressing the other. It is clear, that oppression and abuse of power must come, if at all, from the one or the other quarter. From no other can they come. It follows, that the two, suffrage and proper organism combined, are sufficient to counteract the tendency of government to oppression and abuse of power; and to restrict it to the fulfilment of the great ends for which it is ordained.
In coming to this conclusion, I have assumed the organism to be perfect, and the different interests, portions, or classes of the community, to be sufficiently enlightened to understand its character and object, and to exercise, with due intelligence, the right of suffrage. To the extent that either may be defective, to the same extent the government would fall short of fulfilling its end. But this does not impeach the truth of the principles on which it rests. In reducing them to proper form, in applying them to practical uses, all elementary principles are liable to difficulties; but they are not, on this account, the less true, or valuable. Where the organism is perfect, every interest will be truly and fully represented, and of course the whole community must be so. It may be difficult, or even impossible, to make a perfect organism—but, although this be true, yet even when, instead of the sense of each and of all, it takes that of a few great and prominent interests only, it would still, in a great measure, if not altogether, fulfil the end intended by a constitution. For, in such case, it would require so large a portion of the community, compared with the whole, to concur, or acquiesce in the action of the government, that the number to be plundered would be too few, and the number to be aggrandized too many, to afford adequate motives to oppression and the abuse of its powers. Indeed, however imperfect the organism, it must have more or less effect in diminishing such tendency.
It may be readily inferred, from what has been stated, that the effect of organism is neither to supersede nor diminish the importance of the right of suffrage; but to aid and perfect it. The object of the latter is, to collect the sense of the community. The more fully and perfectly it accomplishes this, the more fully and perfectly it fulfils its end. But the most it can do, of itself, is to collect the sense of the greater number; that is, of the stronger interests, or combination of interests; and to assume this to be the sense of the community. It is only when aided by a proper organism, that it can collect the sense of the entire community—of each and all its interests; of each, through its appropriate organ, and of the whole, through all of them united. This would truly be the sense of the entire community; for whatever diversity each interest might have within itself—as all would have the same interest in reference to the action of the government, the individuals composing each would be fully and truly represented by its own majority or appropriate organ, regarded in reference to the other interests. In brief, every individual of every interest might trust, with confidence, its majority or appropriate organ, against that of every other interest.
It results, from what has been said, that there are two different modes in which the sense of the community may be taken; one, simply by the right of suffrage, unaided; the other, by the right through a proper organism. Each collects the sense of the majority. But one regards numbers only, and considers the whole community as a unit, having but one common interest throughout; and collects the sense of the greater number of the whole, as that of the community. The other, on the contrary, regards interests as well as numbers—considering the community as made up of different and conflicting interests, as far as the action of the government is concerned; and takes the sense of each, through its majority or appropriate organ, and the united sense of all, as the sense of the entire community. The former of these I shall call the numerical, or absolute majority; and the latter, the concurrent, or constitutional majority. I call it the constitutional majority, because it is an essential element in every constitutional government—be its form what it may. So great is the difference, politically speaking, between the two majorities, that they cannot be confounded, without leading to great and fatal errors; and yet the distinction between them has been so entirely overlooked, that when the term majority is used in political discussions, it is applied exclusively to designate the numerical—as if there were no other. Until this distinction is recognized, and better understood, there will continue to be great liability to error in properly constructing constitutional governments, especially of the popular form, and of preserving them when properly constructed. Until then, the latter will have a strong tendency to slide, first, into the government of the numerical majority, and, finally, into absolute government of some other form. To show that such must be the case, and at the same time to mark more strongly the difference between the two, in order to guard against the danger of overlooking it, I propose to consider the subject more at length.
The first and leading error which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction referred to, is, to confound the numerical majority with the people; and this so completely as to regard them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily results from considering the numerical as the only majority. All admit, that a popular government, or democracy, is the government of the people; for the terms imply this. A perfect government of the kind would be one which would embrace the consent of every citizen or member of the community; but as this is impracticable, in the opinion of those who regard the numerical as the only majority, and who can perceive no other way by which the sense of the people can be taken—they are compelled to adopt this as the only true basis of popular government, in contradistinction to governments of the aristocratical or monarchical form.
Being thus constrained, they are, in the next place, forced to regard the numerical majority, as, in effect, the entire people; that is, the greater part as the whole; and the government of the greater part as the government of the whole. It is thus the two come to be confounded, and a part made identical with the whole. And it is thus, also that all the rights, powers, and immunities of the whole people come to be attributed to the numerical majority; and, among others, the supreme, sovereign authority of establishing and abolishing governments at pleasure.
This radical error, the consequence of confounding the two, and of regarding the numerical as the only majority, has contributed more than any other cause, to prevent the formation of popular constitutional governments—and to destroy them even when they have been formed. It leads to the conclusion that, in their formation and establishment nothing more is necessary than the right of suffrage—and the allotment to each division of the community a representation in the government, in proportion to numbers. If the numerical majority were really the people; and if, to take its sense truly, were to take the sense of the people truly, a government so constituted would be a true and perfect model of a popular constitutional government; and every departure from it would detract from its excellence. But, as such is not the case—as the numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a portion of them—such a government, instead of being a true and perfect model of the people’s government, that is, a people self-governed, is but the government of a part, over a part—the major over the minor portion.
But this misconception of the true elements of constitutional government does not stop here. It leads to others equally false and fatal, in reference to the best means of preserving and perpetuating them, when, from some fortunate combination of circumstances, they are correctly formed. For they who fall into these errors regard the restrictions which organism imposes on the will of the numerical majority as restrictions on the will of the people, and, therefore, as not only useless, but wrongful and mischievous. And hence they endeavor to destroy organism, under the delusive hope of making government more democratic.
Such are some of the consequences of confounding the two, and of regarding the numerical as the only majority. And in this may be found the reason why so few popular governments have been properly constructed, and why, of these few, so small a number have proved durable. Such must continue to be the result, so long as these errors continue to be prevalent.
There is another error, of a kindred character, whose influence contributes much to the same results: I refer to the prevalent opinion, that a written constitution, containing suitable restrictions on the powers of government, is sufficient, of itself, without the aid of any organism—except such as is necessary to separate its several departments, and render them independent of each other—to counteract the tendency of the numerical majority to oppression and the abuse of power.
A written constitution certainly has many and considerable advantages; but it is a great mistake to suppose, that the mere insertion of provisions to restrict and limit the powers of the government, without investing those for whose protection they are inserted with the means of enforcing their observance, will be sufficient to prevent the major and dominant party from abusing its powers. Being the party in possession of the government, they will, from the same constitution of man which makes government necessary to protect society, be in favor of the powers granted by the constitution, and opposed to the restrictions intended to limit them. As the major and dominant party, they will have no need of these restrictions for their protection. The ballot box, of itself, would be ample protection to them. Needing no other, they would come, in time, to regard these limitations as unnecessary and improper restraints—and endeavor to elude them, with the view of increasing their power and influence.
The minor, or weaker party, on the contrary, would take the opposite direction—and regard them as essential to their protection against the dominant party. And, hence, they would endeavor to defend and enlarge the restrictions, and to limit and contract the powers. But where there are no means by which they could compel the major party to observe the restrictions, the only resort left them would be, a strict construction of the constitution, that is, a construction which would confine these powers to the narrowest limits which the meaning of the words used in the grant would admit.
To this the major party would oppose a liberal construction—one which would give to the words of the grant the broadest meaning of which they were susceptible. It would then be construction against construction; the one to contract, and the other to enlarge the powers of the government to the utmost. But of what possible avail could the strict construction of the minor party be, against the liberal interpretation of the major, when the one would have all the powers of the government to carry its construction into effect—and the other be deprived of all means of enforcing its construction? In a contest so unequal, the result would not be doubtful. The party in favor of the restrictions would be overpowered. At first, they might command some respect, and do something to stay the march of encroachment; but they would, in the progress of the contest, be regarded as mere abstractionists; and, indeed, deservedly, if they should indulge the folly of supposing that the party in possession of the ballot box and the physical force of the country, could be successfully resisted by an appeal to reason, truth, justice, or the obligations imposed by the constitution. For when these, of themselves, shall exert sufficient influence to stay the hand of power, then government will be no longer necessary to protect society, nor constitutions needed to prevent government from abusing its powers. The end of the contest would be the subversion of the constitution, either by the undermining process of construction—where its meaning would admit of possible doubt—or by substituting in practice what is called party-usage, in place of its provisions—or, finally, when no other contrivance would subserve the purpose, by openly and boldly setting them aside. By the one or the other, the restrictions would ultimately be annulled, and the government be converted into one of unlimited powers.
Nor would the division of government into separate, and, as it regards each other, independent departments, prevent this result. Such a division may do much to facilitate its operations, and to secure to its administration greater caution and deliberation; but as each and all the departments—and, of course, the entire government—would be under the control of the numerical majority, it is too clear to require explanation, that a mere distribution of its powers among its agents or representatives, could do little or nothing to counteract its tendency to oppression and abuse of power. To effect this, it would be necessary to go one step further, and make the several departments the organs of the distinct interests or portions of the community; and to clothe each with a negative on the others. But the effect of this would be to change the government from the numerical into the concurrent majority.
Having now explained the reasons why it is so difficult to form and preserve popular constitutional government, so long as the distinction between the two majorities is overlooked, and the opinion prevails that a written constitution, with suitable restrictions and a proper division of its powers, is sufficient to counteract the tendency of the numerical majority to the abuse of its power—I shall next proceed to explain, more fully, why the concurrent majority is an indispensable element in forming constitutional governments; and why the numerical majority, of itself, must, in all cases, make governments absolute.
The necessary consequence of taking the sense of the community by the concurrent majority is, as has been explained, to give to each interest or portion of the community a negative on the others. It is this mutual negative among its various conflicting interests, which invests each with the power of protecting itself—and places the rights and safety of each, where only they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship. Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the others: and without this there can be no constitution. It is this negative power—the power of preventing or arresting the action of the government—be it called by what term it may—veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance of power—which, in fact, forms the constitution. They are all but different names for the negative power. In all its forms, and under all its names, it results from the concurrent majority. Without this there can be no negative; and, without a negative, no constitution. The assertion is true in reference to all constitutional governments, be their forms what they may. It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution—and the positive which makes the government. The one is the power of acting—and the other the power of preventing or arresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional governments.
But, as there can be no constitution without the negative power, and no negative power without the concurrent majority—it follows, necessarily, that where the numerical majority has the sole control of the government, there can be no constitution; as constitution implies limitation or restriction—and, of course, is inconsistent with the idea of sole or exclusive power. And hence, the numerical, unmixed with the concurrent majority, necessarily forms, in all cases, absolute government.
It is, indeed, the single, or one power, which excludes the negative, and constitutes absolute government; and not the number in whom the power is vested. The numerical majority is as truly a single power, and excludes the negative as completely as the absolute government of one, or of the few. The former is as much the absolute government of the democratic, or popular form, as the latter of the monarchical or aristocratical. It has, accordingly, in common with them, the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power.
Constitutional governments, of whatever form, are, indeed, much more similar to each other, in their structure and character, than they are, respectively, to the absolute governments, even of their own class. All constitutional governments, of whatever class they may be, take the sense of the community by its parts—each through its appropriate organ; and regard the sense of all its parts, as the sense of the whole. They all rest on the right of suffrage, and the responsibility of rulers, directly or indirectly. On the contrary, all absolute governments, of whatever form, concentrate power in one uncontrolled and irresponsible individual or body, whose will is regarded as the sense of the community. And, hence, the great and broad distinction between governments is—not that of the one, the few, or the many—but of the constitutional and the absolute.
From this there results another distinction, which, although secondary in its character, very strongly marks the difference between these forms of government. I refer to their respective conservative principle—that is, the principle by which they are upheld and preserved. This principle, in constitutional governments, is compromise —and in absolute governments, is force —as will be next explained.
It has been already shown, that the same constitution of man which leads those who govern to oppress the governed—if not prevented—will, with equal force and certainty, lead the latter to resist oppression, when possessed of the means of doing so peaceably and successfully. But absolute governments, of all forms, exclude all other means of resistance to their authority, than that of force; and, of course, leave no other alternative to the governed, but to acquiesce in oppression, however great it may be, or to resort to force to put down the government. But the dread of such a resort must necessarily lead the government to prepare to meet force in order to protect itself; and hence, of necessity, force becomes the conservative principle of all such governments.
On the contrary, the government of the concurrent majority, where the organism is perfect, excludes the possibility of oppression, by giving to each interest, or portion, or order—where there are established classes—the means of protecting itself, by its negative, against all measures calculated to advance the peculiar interests of others at its expense. Its effect, then, is, to cause the different interests, portions, or orders—as the case may be—to desist from attempting to adopt any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one, or more, by sacrificing that of others; and thus to force them to unite in such measures only as would promote the prosperity of all, as the only means to prevent the suspension of the action of the government—and, thereby, to avoid anarchy, the greatest of all evils. It is by means of such authorized and effectual resistance, that oppression is prevented, and the necessity of resorting to force superseded, in governments of the concurrent majority—and, hence, compromise, instead of force, becomes their conservative principle.
It would, perhaps, be more strictly correct to trace the conservative principle of constitutional governments to the necessity which compels the different interests, or portions, or orders, to compromise—as the only way to promote their respective prosperity, and to avoid anarchy—rather than to the compromise itself. No necessity can be more urgent and imperious, than that of avoiding anarchy. It is the same as that which makes government indispensable to preserve society; and is not less imperative than that which compels obedience to superior force. Traced to this source, the voice of a people—uttered under the necessity of avoiding the greatest of calamities, through the organs of a government so constructed as to suppress the expression of all partial and selfish interests, and to give a full and faithful utterance to the sense of the whole community, in reference to its common welfare—may, without impiety, be called the voice of God. To call any other so, would be impious.
In stating that force is the conservative principle of absolute, and compromise of constitutional governments, I have assumed both to be perfect in their kind; but not without bearing in mind, that few or none, in fact, have ever been so absolute as not to be under some restraint, and none so perfectly organized as to represent fully and perfectly the voice of the whole community. Such being the case, all must, in practice, depart more or less from the principles by which they are respectively upheld and preserved; and depend more or less for support, on force, or compromise, as the absolute or the constitutional form predominates in their respective organizations.
Nor, in stating that absolute governments exclude all other means of resistance to its authority than that of force, have I overlooked the case of governments of the numerical majority, which form, apparently, an exception. It is true that, in such governments, the minor and subject party, for the time, have the right to oppose and resist the major and dominant party, for the time, through the ballot box; and may turn them out, and take their place, if they can obtain a majority of votes. But, it is no less true, that this would be a mere change in the relations of the two parties. The minor and subject party would become the major and dominant party, with the same absolute authority and tendency to abuse power; and the major and dominant party would become the minor and subject party, with the same right to resist through the ballot box; and, if successful, again to change relations, with like effect. But such a state of things must necessarily be temporary. The conflict between the two parties must be transferred, sooner or later, from an appeal to the ballot-box to an appeal to force—as I shall next proceed to explain.
The conflict between the two parties, in the government of the numerical majority, tends necessarily to settle down into a struggle for the honors and emoluments of the government; and each, in order to obtain an object so ardently desired, will, in the process of the struggle, resort to whatever measure may seem best calculated to effect this purpose. The adoption, by the one, of any measure, however objectionable, which might give it an advantage, would compel the other to follow its example. In such case, it would be indispensable to success to avoid division and keep united—and hence, from a necessity inherent in the nature of such governments, each party must be alternately forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to measures to concentrate the control over its movements in fewer and fewer hands, as the struggle became more and more violent. This, in process of time, must lead to party organization, and party caucuses and discipline; and these, to the conversion of the honors and emoluments of the government into means of rewarding partisan services, in order to secure the fidelity and increase the zeal of the members of the party. The effect of the whole combined, even in the earlier stages of the process, when they exert the least pernicious influence, would be to place the control of the two parties in the hands of their respective majorities; and the government itself, virtually, under the control of the majority of the dominant party, for the time, instead of the majority of the whole community—where the theory of this form of government vests it. Thus, in the very first stage of the process, the government becomes the government of a minority instead of a majority—a minority, usually, and under the most favorable circumstances, of not much more than one-fourth of the whole community.
But the process, as regards the concentration of power, would not stop at this stage. The government would gradually pass from the hands of the majority of the party into those of its leaders; as the struggle became more intense, and the honors and emoluments of the government the all-absorbing objects. At this stage, principles and policy would lose all influence in the elections; and cunning, falsehood, deception, slander, fraud, and gross appeals to the appetites of the lowest and most worthless portions of the community, would take the place of sound reason and wise debate. After these have thoroughly debased and corrupted the community, and all the arts and devices of party have been exhausted, the government would vibrate between the two factions (for such will parties have become) at each successive election. Neither would be able to retain power beyond some fixed term; for those seeking office and patronage would become too numerous to be rewarded by the offices and patronage at the disposal of the government; and these being the sole objects of pursuit, the disappointed would, at the next succeeding election, throw their weight into the opposite scale, in the hope of better success at the next turn of the wheel. These vibrations would continue until confusion, corruption, disorder, and anarchy, would lead to an appeal to force—to be followed by a revolution in the form of the government. Such must be the end of the government of the numerical majority; and such, in brief, the process through which it must pass, in the regular course of events, before it can reach it.
This transition would be more or less rapid, according to circumstances. The more numerous the population, the more extensive the country, the more diversified the climate, productions, pursuits and character of the people, the more wealthy, refined, and artificial their condition—and the greater the amount of revenues and disbursements—the more unsuited would the community be to such a government, and the more rapid would be the passage. On the other hand, it might be slow in its progress amongst small communities, during the early stages of their existence, with inconsiderable revenues and disbursements, and a population of simple habits; provided the people are sufficiently intelligent to exercise properly, the right of suffrage, and sufficiently conversant with the rules necessary to govern the deliberations of legislative bodies. It is, perhaps, the only form of popular government suited to a people, while they remain in such a condition. Any other would be not only too complex and cumbersome, but unnecessary to guard against oppression, where the motive to use power for that purpose would be so feeble. And hence, colonies, from countries having constitutional governments, if left to themselves, usually adopt governments based on the numerical majority. But as population increases, wealth accumulates, and, above all, the revenues and expenditures become large—governments of this form must become less and less suited to the condition of society; until, if not in the mean time changed into governments of the concurrent majority, they must end in an appeal to force, to be followed by a radical change in its structure and character; and, most probably, into monarchy in its absolute form—as will be next explained.
Such, indeed, is the repugnance between popular governments and force—or, to be more specific—military power—that the almost necessary consequence of a resort to force, by such governments, in order to maintain their authority, is, not only a change of their form, but a change into the most opposite—that of absolute monarchy. The two are the opposites of each other. From the nature of popular governments, the control of its powers is vested in the many; while military power, to be efficient, must be vested in a single individual. When, then, the two parties, in governments of the numerical majority, resort to force, in their struggle for supremacy, he who commands the successful party will have the control of the government itself. And, hence, in such contests, the party which may prevail, will usually find, in the commander of its forces, a master, under whom the great body of the community will be glad to find protection against the incessant agitation and violent struggles of two corrupt factions—looking only to power as the means of securing to themselves the honors and emoluments of the government.
From the same cause, there is a like tendency in aristocratical to terminate in absolute governments of the monarchical form; but by no means as strong, because there is less repugnance between military power and aristocratical, than between it and democratical governments.
A broader position may, indeed, be taken; viz., that there is a tendency, in constitutional governments of every form, to degenerate into their respective absolute forms; and, in all absolute governments, into that of the monarchical form. But the tendency is much stronger in constitutional governments of the democratic form to degenerate into their respective absolute forms, than in either of the others; because, among other reasons, the distinction between the constitutional and absolute forms of aristocratical and monarchical governments, is far more strongly marked than in democratic governments. The effect of this is, to make the different orders or classes in an aristocracy, or monarchy, far more jealous and watchful of encroachment on their respective rights; and more resolute and persevering in resisting attempts to concentrate power in any one class or order. On the contrary, the line between the two forms, in popular governments, is so imperfectly understood, that honest and sincere friends of the constitutional form not unfrequently, instead of jealously watching and arresting their tendency to degenerate into their absolute forms, not only regard it with approbation, but employ all their powers to add to its strength and to increase its impetus, in the vain hope of making the government more perfect and popular. The numerical majority, perhaps, should usually be one of the elements of a constitutional democracy; but to make it the sole element, in order to perfect the constitution and make the government more popular, is one of the greatest and most fatal of political errors.
Among the other advantages which governments of the concurrent have over those of the numerical majority—and which strongly illustrates their more popular character, is—that they admit, with safety, a much greater extension of the right of suffrage. It may be safely extended in such governments to universal suffrage: that is—to every male citizen of mature age, with few ordinary exceptions; but it cannot be so far extended in those of the numerical majority, without placing them ultimately under the control of the more ignorant and dependent portions of the community. For, as the community becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly civilized, the difference between the rich and the poor will become more strongly marked; and the number of the ignorant and dependent greater in proportion to the rest of the community. With the increase of this difference, the tendency to conflict between them will become stronger; and, as the poor and dependent become more numerous in proportion, there will be, in governments of the numerical majority, no want of leaders among the wealthy and ambitious, to excite and direct them in their efforts to obtain the control.
The case is different in governments of the concurrent majority. There, mere numbers have not the absolute control; and the wealthy and intelligent being identified in interest with the poor and ignorant of their respective portions or interests of the community, become their leaders and protectors. And hence, as the latter would have neither hope nor inducement to rally the former in order to obtain the control, the right of suffrage, under such a government, may be safely enlarged to the extent stated, without incurring the hazard to which such enlargement would expose governments of the numerical majority.
In another particular, governments of the concurrent majority have greatly the advantage. I allude to the difference in their respective tendency, in reference to dividing or uniting the community. That of the concurrent, as has been shown, is to unite the community, let its interests be ever so diversified or opposed; while that of the numerical is to divide it into two conflicting portions, let its interests be, naturally, ever so united and identified.
That the numerical majority will divide the community, let it be ever so homogeneous, into two great parties, which will be engaged in perpetual struggles to obtain the control of the government, has already been established. The great importance of the object at stake, must necessarily form strong party attachments and party antipathies—attachments on the part of the members of each to their respective parties, through whose efforts they hope to accomplish an object dear to all; and antipathies to the opposite party, as presenting the only obstacle to success.
In order to have a just conception of their force, it must be taken into consideration, that the object to be won or lost appeals to the strongest passions of the human heart—avarice, ambition, and rivalry. It is not then wonderful, that a form of government, which periodically stakes all its honors and emoluments, as prizes to be contended for, should divide the community into two great hostile parties; or that party attachments, in the progress of the strife, should become so strong among the members of each respectively, as to absorb almost every feeling of our nature, both social and individual; or that their mutual antipathies should be carried to such an excess as to destroy, almost entirely, all sympathy between them, and to substitute in its place the strongest aversion. Nor is it surprising, that under their joint influence, the community should cease to be the common centre of attachment, or that each party should find that centre only in itself. It is thus, that, in such governments, devotion to party becomes stronger than devotion to country—the promotion of the interests of party more important than the promotion of the common good of the whole, and its triumph and ascendency, objects of far greater solicitude, than the safety and prosperity of the community. It is thus, also, that the numerical majority, by regarding the community as a unit, and having, as such, the same interests throughout all its parts, must, by its necessary operation, divide it into two hostile parts, waging, under the forms of law, incessant hostilities against each other.
The concurrent majority, on the other hand, tends to unite the most opposite and conflicting interests, and to blend the whole in one common attachment to the country. By giving to each interest, or portion, the power of self-protection, all strife and struggle between them for ascendency, is prevented; and, thereby, not only every feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed, but the individual and the social feelings are made to unite in one common devotion to country. Each sees and feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the goodwill, and promoting the prosperity of the others. And hence, there will be diffused throughout the whole community kind feelings between its different portions; and, instead of antipathy, a rivalry amongst them to promote the interests of each other, as far as this can be done consistently with the interest of all. Under the combined influence of these causes, the interests of each would be merged in the common interests of the whole; and thus, the community would become a unit, by becoming the common centre of attachment of all its parts. And hence, instead of faction, strife, and struggle for party ascendency, there would be patriotism, nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy in promoting the common good of the whole.
But the difference in their operation, in this respect, would not end here. Its effects would be as great in a moral, as I have attempted to show they would be in a political point of view. Indeed, public and private morals are so nearly allied, that it would be difficult for it to be otherwise. That which corrupts and debases the community, politically, must also corrupt and debase it morally. The same cause, which, in governments of the numerical majority, gives to party attachments and antipathies such force, as to place party triumph and ascendency above the safety and prosperity of the community, will just as certainly give them sufficient force to overpower all regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obligations of every description. It is, accordingly, found that in the violent strifes between parties for the high and glittering prize of governmental honors and emoluments—falsehood, injustice, fraud, artifice, slander, and breach of faith, are freely resorted to, as legitimate weapons—followed by all their corrupting and debasing influences.
In the government of the concurrent majority, on the contrary, the same cause which prevents such strife, as the means of obtaining power, and which makes it the interest of each portion to conciliate and promote the interests of the others, would exert a powerful influence towards purifying and elevating the character of the government and the people, morally, as well as politically. The means of acquiring power—or, more correctly, influence—in such governments, would be the reverse. Instead of the vices, by which it is acquired in that of the numerical majority, the opposite virtues—truth, justice, integrity, fidelity, and all others, by which respect and confidence are inspired, would be the most certain and effectual means of acquiring it.
Nor would the good effects resulting thence be confined to those who take an active part in political affairs. They would extend to the whole community. For of all the causes which contribute to form the character of a people, those by which power, influence, and standing in the government are most certainly and readily obtained, are, by far, the most powerful. These are the objects most eagerly sought of all others by the talented and aspiring; and the possession of which commands the greatest respect and admiration. But, just in proportion to this respect and admiration will be their appreciation by those, whose energy, intellect, and position in society, are calculated to exert the greatest influence in forming the character of a people. If knowledge, wisdom, patriotism, and virtue, be the most certain means of acquiring them, they will be most highly appreciated and assiduously cultivated; and this would cause them to become prominent traits in the character of the people. But if, on the contrary, cunning, fraud, treachery, and party devotion be the most certain, they will be the most highly prized, and become marked features in their character. So powerful, indeed, is the operation of the concurrent majority, in this respect, that, if it were possible for a corrupt and degenerate community to establish and maintain a well-organized government of the kind, it would of itself purify and regenerate them; while, on the other hand, a government based wholly on the numerical majority, would just as certainly corrupt and debase the most patriotic and virtuous people. So great is their difference in this respect, that, just as the one or the other element predominates in the construction of any government, in the same proportion will the character of the government and the people rise or sink in the scale of patriotism and virtue. Neither religion nor education can counteract the strong tendency of the numerical majority to corrupt and debase the people.
If the two be compared, in reference to the ends for which government is ordained, the superiority of the government of the concurrent majority will not be less striking. These, as has been stated, are twofold; to protect, and to perfect society. But to preserve society, it is necessary to guard the community against injustice, violence, and anarchy within, and against attacks from without. If it fail in either, it would fail in the primary end of government, and would not deserve the name.
To perfect society, it is necessary to develop the faculties, intellectual and moral, with which man is endowed. But the main spring to their development, and, through this, to progress, improvement and civilization, with all their blessings, is the desire of individuals to better their condition. For this purpose, liberty and security are indispensable. Liberty leaves each free to pursue the course he may deem best to promote his interest and happiness, as far as it may be compatible with the primary end for which government is ordained—while security gives assurance to each, that he shall not be deprived of the fruits of his exertions to better his condition. These combined, give to this desire the strongest impulse of which it is susceptible. For, to extend liberty beyond the limits assigned, would be to weaken the government and to render it incompetent to fulfil its primary end—the protection of society against dangers, internal and external. The effect of this would be, insecurity; and, of insecurity—to weaken the impulse of individuals to better their condition, and thereby retard progress and improvement. On the other hand, to extend the powers of the government, so as to contract the sphere assigned to liberty, would have the same effect, by disabling individuals in their efforts to better their condition.
Herein is to be found the principle which assigns to power and liberty their proper spheres, and reconciles each to the other under all circumstances. For, if power be necessary to secure to liberty the fruits of its exertions, liberty, in turn, repays power with interest, by increased population, wealth, and other advantages, which progress and improvement bestow on the community. By thus assigning to each its appropriate sphere, all conflicts between them cease; and each is made to co-operate with and assist the other, in fulfilling the great ends for which government is ordained.
But the principle, applied to different communities, will assign to them different limits. It will assign a larger sphere to power and a more contracted one to liberty, or the reverse, according to circumstances. To the former, there must ever be allotted, under all circumstances, a sphere sufficiently large to protect the community against danger from without and violence and anarchy within. The residuum belongs to liberty. More cannot be safely or rightly allotted to it.
But some communities require a far greater amount of power than others to protect them against anarchy and external dangers; and, of course, the sphere of liberty in such, must be proportionally contracted. The causes calculated to enlarge the one and contract the other, are numerous and various. Some are physical—such as open and exposed frontiers, surrounded by powerful and hostile neighbors. Others are moral—such as the different degrees of intelligence, patriotism, and virtue among the mass of the community, and their experience and proficiency in the art of self-government. Of these, the moral are, by far, the most influential. A community may possess all the necessary moral qualifications, in so high a degree, as to be capable of self-government under the most adverse circumstances; while, on the other hand, another may be so sunk in ignorance and vice, as to be incapable of forming a conception of liberty, or of living, even when most favored by circumstances, under any other than an absolute and despotic government.
The principle, in all communities, according to these numerous and various causes, assigns to power and liberty their proper spheres. To allow to liberty, in any case, a sphere of action more extended than this assigns, would lead to anarchy; and this, probably, in the end, to a contraction instead of an enlargement of its sphere. Liberty, then, when forced on a people unfit for it, would, instead of a blessing, be a curse; as it would, in its reaction, lead directly to anarchy—the greatest of all curses. No people, indeed, can long enjoy more liberty than that to which their situation and advanced intelligence and morals fairly entitle them. If more than this be allowed, they must soon fall into confusion and disorder—to be followed, if not by anarchy and despotism, by a change to a form of government more simple and absolute; and, therefore, better suited to their condition. And hence, although it may be true, that a people may not have as much liberty as they are fairly entitled to, and are capable of enjoying—yet the reverse is questionably true—that no people can long possess more than they are fairly entitled to.
Liberty, indeed, though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that of protection; inasmuch, as the end of the former is the progress and improvement of the race—while that of the latter is its preservation and perpetuation. And hence, when the two come into conflict, liberty must, and ever ought, to yield to protection; as the existence of the race is of greater moment than its improvement.
It follows, from what has been stated, that it is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike—a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous and deserving—and not a boon to be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded and vicious, to be capable either of appreciating or of enjoying it. Nor is it any disparagement to liberty, that such is, and ought to be the case. On the contrary, its greatest praise—its proudest distinction is, that an all-wise Providence has reserved it, as the noblest and highest reward for the development of our faculties, moral and intellectual. A reward more appropriate than liberty could not be conferred on the deserving—nor a punishment inflicted on the undeserving more just, than to be subject to lawless and despotic rule. This dispensation seems to be the result of some fixed law—and every effort to disturb or defeat it, by attempting to elevate a people in the scale of liberty, above the point to which they are entitled to rise, must ever prove abortive, and end in disappointment. The progress of a people rising from a lower to a higher point in the scale of liberty, is necessarily slow—and by attempting to precipitate, we either retard, or permanently defeat it.
There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the one which has just been considered. I refer to the opinion, that liberty and equality are so intimately united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality.
That they are united to a certain extent—and that equality of citizens, in the eyes of the law, is essential to liberty in a popular government, is conceded. But to go further, and make equality of condition essential to liberty, would be to destroy both liberty and progress. The reason is, that inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is, at the same time, indispensable to progress. In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to bear in mind, that the main spring to progress is, the desire of individuals to better their condition; and that the strongest impulse which can be given to it is, to leave individuals free to exert themselves in the manner they may deem best for that purpose, as far at least as it can be done consistently with the ends for which government is ordained—and to secure to all the fruits of their exertions. Now, as individuals differ greatly from each other, in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habit of industry and economy, physical power, position and opportunity—the necessary effect of leaving all free to exert themselves to better their condition, must be a corresponding inequality between those who may possess these qualities and advantages in a high degree, and those who may be deficient in them. The only means by which this result can be prevented are, either to impose such restrictions on the exertions of those who may possess them in a high degree, as will place them on a level with those who do not; or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions. But to impose such restrictions on them would be destructive of liberty—while, to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions, would be to destroy the desire of bettering their condition. It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank back to the rear, or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of the government, would put an end to the impulse, and effectually arrest the march of progress.
These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion that all men are born free and equal—than which nothing can be more unfounded and false. It rests upon the assumption of a fact, which is contrary to universal observation, in whatever light it may be regarded. It is, indeed, difficult to explain how an opinion so destitute of all sound reason, ever could have been so extensively entertained, unless we regard it as being confounded with another, which has some semblance of truth—but which, when properly understood, is not less false and dangerous. I refer to the assertion, that all men are equal in the state of nature; meaning, by a state of nature, a state of individuality, supposed to have existed prior to the social and political state; and in which men lived apart and independent of each other. If such a state ever did exist, all men would have been, indeed, free and equal in it; that is, free to do as they pleased, and exempt from the authority or control of others—as, by supposition, it existed anterior to society and government. But such a state is purely hypothetical. It never did, nor can exist; as it is inconsistent with the preservation and perpetuation of the race. It is, therefore, a great misnomer to call it the state of nature. Instead of being the natural state of man, it is, of all conceivable states, the most opposed to his nature—most repugnant to his feelings, and most incompatible with his wants. His natural state is, the social and political—the one for which his Creator made him, and the only one in which he can preserve and perfect his race. As, then, there never was such a state as the, so called, state of nature, and never can be, it follows, that men, instead of being born in it, are born in the social and political state; and of course, instead of being born free and equal, are born subject, not only to parental authority, but to the laws and institutions of the country where born, and under whose protection they draw their first breath. With these remarks, I return from this digression, to resume the thread of the discourse.
It follows, from all that has been said, that the more perfectly a government combines power and liberty—that is, the greater its power and the more enlarged and secure the liberty of individuals, the more perfectly it fulfils the ends for which government is ordained. To show, then, that the government of the concurrent majority is better calculated to fulfil them than that of the numerical, it is only necessary to explain why the former is better suited to combine a higher degree of power and a wider scope of liberty than the latter. I shall begin with the former.
The concurrent majority, then, is better suited to enlarge and secure the bounds of liberty, because it is better suited to prevent government from passing beyond its proper limits, and to restrict it to its primary end—the protection of the community. But in doing this, it leaves, necessarily, all beyond it open and free to individual exertions; and thus enlarges and secures the sphere of liberty to the greatest extent which the condition of the community will admit, as has been explained. The tendency of government to pass beyond its proper limits is what exposes liberty to danger, and renders it insecure; and it is the strong counteraction of governments of the concurrent majority to this tendency which makes them so favorable to liberty. On the contrary, those of the numerical, instead of opposing and counteracting this tendency, add to it increased strength, in consequence of the violent party struggles incident to them, as has been fully explained. And hence their encroachments on liberty, and the danger to which it is exposed under such governments.
So great, indeed, is the difference between the two in this respect, that liberty is little more than a name under all governments of the absolute form, including that of the numerical majority; and can only have a secure and durable existence under those of the concurrent or constitutional form.
The latter, by giving to each portion of the community which may be unequally affected by its action, a negative on the others, prevents all partial or local legislation, and restricts its action to such measures as are designed for the protection and the good of the whole. In doing this, it secures, at the same time, the rights and liberty of the people, regarded individually; as each portion consists of those who, whatever may be the diversity of interests among themselves, have the same interest in reference to the action of the government.
Such being the case, the interest of each individual may be safely confided to the majority, or voice of his portion, against that of all others, and, of course, the government itself. It is only through an organism which vests each with a negative, in some one form or another, that those who have like interests in preventing the government from passing beyond its proper sphere, and encroaching on the rights and liberty of individuals, can cooperate peaceably and effectually in resisting the encroachments of power, and thereby preserve their rights and liberty. Individual resistance is too feeble, and the difficulty of concert and cooperation too great, unaided by such an organism, to oppose, successfully, the organized power of government, with all the means of the community at its disposal; especially in populous countries of great extent, where concert and co-operation are almost impossible. Even when the oppression of the government comes to be too great to be borne, and force is resorted to in order to overthrow it, the result is rarely ever followed by the establishment of liberty. The force sufficient to overthrow an oppressive government is usually sufficient to establish one equally, or more, oppressive in its place. And hence, in no governments, except those that rest on the principle of the concurrent or constitutional majority, can the people guard their liberty against power; and hence, also, when lost, the great difficulty and uncertainty of regaining it by force.
It may be further affirmed, that, being more favorable to the enlargement and security of liberty, governments of the concurrent, must necessarily be more favorable to progress, development, improvement, and civilization—and, of course, to the increase of power which results from, and depends on these, than those of the numerical majority. That it is liberty which gives to them their greatest impulse, has already been shown; and it now remains to show, that these, in turn, contribute greatly to the increase of power.
In the earlier stages of society, numbers and individual prowess constituted the principal elements of power. In a more advanced stage, when communities had passed from the barbarous to the civilized state, discipline, strategy, weapons of increased power, and money—as the means of meeting increased expense—became additional and important elements. In this stage, the effects of progress and improvement on the increase of power, began to be disclosed; but still numbers and personal prowess were sufficient, for a long period, to enable barbarous nations to contend successfully with the civilized—and, in the end, to overpower them—as the pages of history abundantly testify. But a more advanced progress, with its numerous inventions and improvements, has furnished new and far more powerful and destructive implements of offence and defence, and greatly increased the intelligence and wealth, necessary to engage the skill and meet the increased expense required for their construction and application to purposes of war. The discovery of gunpowder, and the use of steam as an impelling force, and their application to military purposes, have for ever settled the question of ascendency between civilized and barbarous communities, in favor of the former. Indeed, these, with other improvements, belonging to the present state of progress, have given to communities the most advanced, a superiority over those the least so, almost as great as that of the latter over the brute creation. And among the civilized, the same causes have decided the question of superiority, where other circumstances are nearly equal, in favor of those whose governments have given the greatest impulse to development, progress, and improvement; that is, to those whose liberty is the largest and best secured. Among these, England and the United States afford striking examples, not only of the effects of liberty in increasing power, but of the more perfect adaptation of governments founded on the principle of the concurrent, or constitutional majority, to enlarge and secure liberty. They are both governments of this description, as will be shown hereafter.
But in estimating the power of a community, moral, as well as physical causes, must be taken into the calculation; and in estimating the effects of liberty on power, it must not be overlooked, that it is, in itself, an important agent in augmenting the force of moral, as well as of physical power. It bestows on a people elevation, self-reliance, energy, and enthusiasm; and these combined, give to physical power a vastly augmented and almost irresistible impetus.
These, however, are not the only elements of moral power. There are others, and among them harmony, unanimity, devotion to country, and a disposition to elevate to places of trust and power, those who are distinguished for wisdom and experience. These, when the occasion requires it, will, without compulsion, and from their very nature, unite and put forth the entire force of the community in the most efficient manner, without hazard to its institutions or its liberty.
All these causes combined, give to a community its maximum of power. Either of them, without the other, would leave it comparatively feeble. But it cannot be necessary, after what has been stated, to enter into any further explanation or argument in order to establish the superiority of governments of the concurrent majority over the numerical, in developing the great elements of moral power. So vast is this superiority, that the one, by its operation, necessarily leads to their development, while the other as necessarily prevents it—as has been fully shown.
Such are the many and striking advantages of the concurrent over the numerical majority. Against the former but two objections can be made. The one is, that it is difficult of construction, which has already been sufficiently noticed; and the other, that it would be impracticable to obtain the concurrence of conflicting interests, where they were numerous and diversified; or, if not, that the process for this purpose, would be too tardy to meet, with sufficient promptness, the many and dangerous emergencies, to which all communities are exposed. This objection is plausible; and deserves a fuller notice than it has yet received.
The diversity of opinion is usually so great, on almost all questions of policy, that it is not surprising, on a slight view of the subject, it should be thought impracticable to bring the various conflicting interests of a community to unite on any one line of policy—or, that a government, founded on such a principle, would be too slow in its movements and too weak in its foundation to succeed in practice. But, plausible as it may seem at the first glance, a more deliberate view will show, that this opinion is erroneous. It is true, that, when there is no urgent necessity, it is difficult to bring those who differ, to agree on any one line of action. Each will naturally insist on taking the course he may think best—and, from pride of opinion, will be unwilling to yield to others. But the case is different when there is an urgent necessity to unite on some common course of action, as reason and experience both prove. When something must be done—and when it can be done only by the united consent of all—the necessity of the case will force to a compromise—be the cause of that necessity what it may. On all questions of acting, necessity, where it exists, is the overruling motive; and where, in such cases, compromise among the parties is an indispensable condition to acting, it exerts an overruling influence in predisposing them to acquiesce in some one opinion or course of action. Experience furnishes many examples in confirmation of this important truth. Among these, the trial by jury is the most familiar, and on that account, will be selected for illustration.
In these, twelve individuals, selected without discrimination, must unanimously concur in opinion—under the obligations of an oath to find a true verdict, according to law and evidence; and this, too, not unfrequently under such great difficulty and doubt, that the ablest and most experienced judges and advocates differ in opinion, after careful examination. And yet, as impracticable as this mode of trial would seem to a superficial observer, it is found, in practice, not only to succeed, but to be the safest, the wisest and the best that human ingenuity has ever devised. When closely investigated, the cause will be found in the necessity, under which the jury is placed, to agree unanimously, in order to find a verdict. This necessity acts as the predisposing cause of concurrence in some common opinion; and with such efficacy, that a jury rarely fails to find a verdict.
Under its potent influence, the jurors take their seats with the disposition to give a fair and impartial hearing to the arguments on both sides—meet together in the jury-room—not as disputants, but calmly to hear the opinions of each other, and to compare and weigh the arguments on which they are founded—and, finally, to adopt that which, on the whole, is thought to be true. Under the influence of this disposition to harmonize, one after another falls into the same opinion, until unanimity is obtained. Hence its practicability—and hence, also, its peculiar excellence. Nothing, indeed, can be more favorable to the success of truth and justice, than this predisposing influence caused by the necessity of being unanimous. It is so much so, as to compensate for the defect of legal knowledge, and a high degree of intelligence on the part of those who usually compose juries. If the necessity of unanimity were dispensed with, and the finding of a jury made to depend on a bare majority, jury trial, instead of being one of the greatest improvements in the judicial department of government, would be one of the greatest evils that could be inflicted on the community. It would be, in such case, the conduit through which all the factious feelings of the day would enter and contaminate justice at its source.
But the same cause would act with still greater force in predisposing the various interests of the community to agree in a well-organized government, founded on the concurrent majority. The necessity for unanimity, in order to keep the government in motion, would be far more urgent, and would act under circumstances still more favorable to secure it. It would be superfluous, after what has been stated, to add other reasons in order to show that no necessity, physical or moral, can be more imperious than that of government. It is so much so that, to suspend its action altogether, even for an inconsiderable period, would subject the community to convulsions and anarchy. But in governments of the concurrent majority such fatal consequences can only be avoided by the unanimous concurrence or acquiescence of the various portions of the community. Such is the imperious character of the necessity which impels to compromise under governments of this description.
But to have a just conception of the overpowering influence it would exert, the circumstances under which it would act must be taken into consideration. These will be found, on comparison, much more favorable than those under which juries act. In the latter case there is nothing besides the necessity of unanimity in finding a verdict, and the inconvenience to which they might be subjected in the event of division, to induce juries to agree, except the love of truth and justice, which, when not counteracted by some improper motive or bias, more or less influences all, not excepting the most depraved. In the case of governments of the concurrent majority, there is, besides these, the love of country, than which, if not counteracted by the unequal and oppressive action of government, or other causes, few motives exert a greater sway. It comprehends, indeed, within itself, a large portion both of our individual and social feelings; and, hence, its almost boundless control when left free to act. But the government of the concurrent majority leaves it free, by preventing abuse and oppression, and, with them, the whole train of feelings and passions which lead to discord and conflict between different portions of the community. Impelled by the imperious necessity of preventing the suspension of the action of government, with the fatal consequences to which it would lead, and by the strong additional impulse derived from an ardent love of country, each portion would regard the sacrifice it might have to make by yielding its peculiar interest to secure the common interest and safety of all, including its own, as nothing compared to the evils that would be inflicted on all, including its own, by pertinaciously adhering to a different line of action. So powerful, indeed, would be the motives for concurring, and, under such circumstances, so weak would be those opposed to it, the wonder would be, not that there should, but that there should not be a compromise.
But to form a juster estimate of the full force of this impulse to compromise, there must be added that, in governments of the concurrent majority, each portion, in order to advance its own peculiar interests, would have to conciliate all others, by showing a disposition to advance theirs; and, for this purpose, each would select those to represent it, whose wisdom, patriotism, and weight of character, would command the confidence of the others. Under its influence—and with representatives so well qualified to accomplish the object for which they were selected—the prevailing desire would be, to promote the common interests of the whole; and, hence, the competition would be, not which should yield the least to promote the common good, but which should yield the most. It is thus, that concession would cease to be considered a sacrifice—would become a free-will offering on the altar of the country, and lose the name of compromise. And herein is to be found the feature, which distinguishes governments of the concurrent majority so strikingly from those of the numerical. In the latter, each faction, in the struggle to obtain the control of the government, elevates to power the designing, the artful, and unscrupulous, who, in their devotion to party—instead of aiming at the good of the whole—aim exclusively at securing the ascendency of party.
When traced to its source, this difference will be found to originate in the fact, that, in governments of the concurrent majority, individual feelings are, from its organism, necessarily enlisted on the side of the social, and made to unite with them in promoting the interests of the whole, as the best way of promoting the separate interests of each; while, in those of the numerical majority, the social are necessarily enlisted on the side of the individual, and made to contribute to the interest of parties, regardless of that of the whole. To effect the former—to enlist the individual on the side of the social feelings to promote the good of the whole, is the greatest possible achievement of the science of government; while, to enlist the social on the side of the individual to promote the interest of parties at the expense of the good of the whole, is the greatest blunder which ignorance can possibly commit.
To this, also, may be referred the greater solidity of foundation on which governments of the concurrent majority repose. Both, ultimately, rest on necessity; for force, by which those of the numerical majority are upheld, is only acquiesced in from necessity; a necessity not more imperious, however, than that which compels the different portions, in governments of the concurrent majority, to acquiesce in compromise. There is, however, a great difference in the motive, the feeling, the aim, which characterize the act in the two cases. In the one, it is done with that reluctance and hostility ever incident to enforced submission to what is regarded as injustice and oppression; accompanied by the desire and purpose to seize on the first favorable opportunity for resistance—but in the other, willingly and cheerfully, under the impulse of an exalted patriotism, impelling all to acquiesce in whatever the common good requires.
It is, then, a great error to suppose that the government of the concurrent majority is impracticable—or that it rests on a feeble foundation. History furnishes many examples of such governments—and among them, one, in which the principle was carried to an extreme that would be thought impracticable, had it never existed. I refer to that of Poland. In this it was carried to such an extreme that, in the election of her kings, the concurrence or acquiescence of every individual of the nobles and gentry present, in an assembly numbering usually from one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand, was required to make a choice; thus giving to each individual a veto on his election. So, likewise, every member of her Diet (the supreme legislative body) consisting of the king, the senate, bishops and deputies of the nobility and gentry of the palatinates, possessed a veto on all its proceedings—thus making an unanimous vote necessary to enact a law, or to adopt any measure whatever. And, as if to carry the principle to the utmost extent, the veto of a single member not only defeated the particular bill or measure in question, but prevented all others, passed during the session, from taking effect. Further, the principle could not be carried. It, in fact, made every individual of the nobility and gentry, a distinct element in the organism—or, to vary the expression, made him an Estate of the kingdom. And yet this government lasted, in this form, more than two centuries; embracing the period of Poland’s greatest power and renown. Twice, during its existence, she protected Christendom, when in great danger, by defeating the Turks under the walls of Vienna, and permanently arresting thereby the tide of their conquests westward.
It is true her government was finally subverted, and the people subjugated, in consequence of the extreme to which the principle was carried; not, however, because of its tendency to dissolution from weakness, but from the facility it afforded to powerful and unscrupulous neighbors to control, by their intrigues, the election of her kings. But the fact, that a government, in which the principle was carried to the utmost extreme, not only existed, but existed for so long a period, in great power and splendor, is proof conclusive both of its practicability and its compatibility with the power and permanency of government.
Another example, not so striking indeed, but yet deserving notice, is furnished by the government of a portion of the aborigines of our own country. I refer to the Confederacy of the Six Nations, who inhabited what now is called the western portion of the State of New York. One chief delegate, chosen by each nation—associated with six others of his own selection—and making, in all, forty-two members—constituted their federal, or general government. When met, they formed the council of the union—and discussed and decided all questions relating to the common welfare. As in the Polish Diet, each member possessed a veto on its decision; so that nothing could be done without the united consent of all. But this, instead of making the Confederacy weak, or impracticable, had the opposite effect. It secured harmony in council and action, and with them a great increase of power. The Six Nations, in consequence, became the most powerful of all the Indian tribes within the limits of our country. They carried their conquest and authority far beyond the country they originally occupied.
I pass by, for the present, the most distinguished of all these examples—the Roman Republic—where the veto, or negative power, was carried, not indeed to the same extreme as in the Polish government, but very far, and with great increase of power and stability—as I shall show more at large hereafter.
It may be thought—and doubtless many have supposed, that the defects inherent in the government of the numerical majority may be remedied by a free press, as the organ of public opinion—especially in the more advanced stage of society—so as to supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority to counteract its tendency to oppression and abuse of power. It is not my aim to detract from the importance of the press, nor to underestimate the great power and influence which it has given to public opinion. On the contrary, I admit these are so great, as to entitle it to be considered a new and important political element. Its influence is, at the present day, on the increase; and it is highly probable that it may, in combination with the causes which have contributed to raise it to its present importance, effect, in time, great changes—social and political. But, however important its present influence may be, or may hereafter become—or, however great and beneficial the changes to which it may ultimately lead, it can never counteract the tendency of the numerical majority to the abuse of power—nor supersede the necessity of the concurrent, as an essential element in the formation of constitutional governments. These it cannot effect for two reasons, either of which is conclusive.
The one is, that it cannot change that principle of our nature, which makes constitutions necessary to prevent government from abusing its powers—and government necessary to protect and perfect society.
Constituting, as this principle does, an essential part of our nature—no increase of knowledge and intelligence, no enlargement of our sympathetic feelings, no influence of education, or modification of the condition of society can change it. But so long as it shall continue to be an essential part of our nature, so long will government be necessary; and so long as this continues to be necessary, so long will constitutions, also, be necessary to counteract its tendency to the abuse of power—and so long must the concurrent majority remain an essential element in the formation of constitutions. The press may do much—by giving impulse to the progress of knowledge and intelligence, to aid the cause of education, and to bring about salutary changes in the condition of society. These, in turn, may do much to explode political errors—to teach how governments should be constructed in order to fulfil their ends; and by what means they can be best preserved, when so constructed. They may, also, do much to enlarge the social, and to restrain the individual feelings—and thereby to bring about a state of things, when far less power will be required by governments to guard against internal disorder and violence, and external danger; and when, of course, the sphere of power may be greatly contracted and that of liberty proportionally enlarged. But all this would not change the nature of man; nor supersede the necessity of government. For so long as government exists, the possession of its control, as the means of directing its action and dispensing its honors and emoluments, will be an object of desire. While this continues to be the case, it must, in governments of the numerical majority, lead to party struggles; and, as has been shown, to all the consequences, which necessarily follow in their train, and, against which, the only remedy is the concurrent majority.
The other reason is to be found in the nature of the influence, which the press politically exercises.
It is similar, in most respects, to that of suffrage. They are, indeed, both organs of public opinion. The principal difference is, that the one has much more agency in forming public opinion, while the other gives a more authentic and authoritative expression to it. Regarded in either light, the press cannot, of itself, guard any more against the abuse of power, than suffrage; and for the same reason.
If what is called public opinion were always the opinion of the whole community, the press would, as its organ, be an effective guard against the abuse of power, and supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority; just as the right of suffrage would do, where the community, in reference to the action of government, had but one interest. But such is not the case. On the contrary, what is called public opinion, instead of being the united opinion of the whole community, is, usually, nothing more than the opinion or voice of the strongest interest, or combination of interests; and, not unfrequently, of a small, but energetic and active portion of the whole. Public opinion, in relation to government and its policy, is as much divided and diversified, as are the interests of the community; and the press, instead of being the organ of the whole, is usually but the organ of these various and diversified interests respectively; or, rather, of the parties growing out of them. It is used by them as the means of controlling public opinion, and of so moulding it, as to promote their peculiar interests, and to aid in carrying on the warfare of party. But as the organ and instrument of parties, in governments of the numerical majority, it is as incompetent as suffrage itself, to counteract the tendency to oppression and abuse of power—and can, no more than that, supersede the necessity of the concurrent majority. On the contrary, as the instrument of party warfare, it contributes greatly to increase party excitement, and the violence and virulence of party struggles; and, in the same degree, the tendency to oppression and abuse of power. Instead, then, of superseding the necessity of the concurrent majority, it increases it, by increasing the violence and force of party feelings—in like manner as party caucuses and party machinery; of the latter of which, indeed, it forms an important part.
In one respect, and only one, the government of the numerical majority has the advantage over that of the concurrent, if, indeed, it can be called an advantage. I refer to its simplicity and facility of construction. It is simple indeed, wielded, as it is, by a single power—the will of the greater number—and very easy of construction. For this purpose, nothing more is necessary than universal suffrage, and the regulation of the manner of voting, so as to give to the greater number the supreme control over every department of government.
But, whatever advantages simplicity and facility of construction may give it, the other forms of absolute government possess them in a still higher degree. The construction of the government of the numerical majority, simple as it is, requires some preliminary measures and arrangements; while the others, especially the monarchical, will, in its absence, or where it proves incompetent, force themselves on the community. And hence, among other reasons, the tendency of all governments is, from the more complex and difficult of construction, to the more simple and easily constructed; and, finally, to absolute monarchy, as the most simple of all. Complexity and difficulty of construction, as far as they form objections, apply, not only to governments of the concurrent majority of the popular form, but to constitutional governments of every form. The least complex, and the most easily constructed of them, are much more complex and difficult of construction than any one of the absolute forms. Indeed, so great has been this difficulty, that their construction has been the result, not so much of wisdom and patriotism, as of favorable combinations of circumstances. They have, for the most part, grown out of the struggles between conflicting interests, which, from some fortunate turn, have ended in a compromise, by which both parties have been admitted, in some one way or another, to have a separate and distinct voice in the government. Where this has not been the case, they have been the product of fortunate circumstances, acting in conjunction with some pressing danger, which forced their adoption, as the only means by which it could be avoided. It would seem that it has exceeded human sagacity deliberately to plan and construct constitutional governments, with a full knowledge of the principles on which they were formed; or to reduce them to practice without the pressure of some immediate and urgent necessity. Nor is it surprising that such should be the case; for it would seem almost impossible for any man, or body of men, to be so profoundly and thoroughly acquainted with the people of any community which has made any considerable progress in civilization and wealth, with all the diversified interests ever accompanying them, as to be able to organize constitutional governments suited to their condition. But, even were this possible, it would be difficult to find any community sufficiently enlightened and patriotic to adopt such a government, without the compulsion of some pressing necessity. A constitution, to succeed, must spring from the bosom of the community, and be adapted to the intelligence and character of the people, and all the multifarious relations, internal and external, which distinguish one people from another. If it do not, it will prove, in practice, to be, not a constitution, but a cumbrous and useless machine, which must be speedily superseded and laid aside, for some other more simple, and better suited to their condition.
It would thus seem almost necessary that governments should commence in some one of the simple and absolute forms, which, however well suited to the community in its earlier stages, must, in its progress, lead to oppression and abuse of power, and, finally, to an appeal to force—to be succeeded by a military despotism—unless the conflicts to which it leads should be fortunately adjusted by a compromise, which will give to the respective parties a participation in the control of the government; and thereby lay the foundation of a constitutional government, to be afterwards matured and perfected. Such governments have been, emphatically, the product of circumstances. And hence, the difficulty of one people imitating the government of another. And hence, also, the importance of terminating all civil conflicts by a compromise, which shall prevent either party from obtaining complete control, and thus subjecting the other.
Of the different forms of constitutional governments, the popular is the most complex and difficult of construction. It is, indeed, so difficult, that ours, it is believed, may with truth be said to be the only one of a purely popular character, of any considerable importance, that ever existed. The cause is to be found in the fact, that, in the other two forms, society is arranged in artificial orders or classes. Where these exist, the line of distinction between them is so strongly marked as to throw into shade, or, otherwise, to absorb all interests which are foreign to them respectively. Hence, in an aristocracy, all interests are, politically, reduced to two—the nobles and the people; and in a monarchy, with a nobility, into three—the monarch, the nobles, and the people. In either case, they are so few that the sense of each may be taken separately, through its appropriate organ, so as to give to each a concurrent voice, and a negative on the other, through the usual departments of the government, without making it too complex, or too tardy in its movements to perform, with promptness and energy, all the necessary functions of government.
The case is different in constitutional governments of the popular form. In consequence of the absence of these artificial distinctions, the various natural interests, resulting from diversity of pursuits, condition, situation and character of different portions of the people—and from the action of the government itself—-rise into prominence, and struggle to obtain the ascendency. They will, it is true, in governments of the numerical majority, ultimately coalesce, and form two great parties; but not so closely as to lose entirely their separate character and existence. These they will ever be ready to re-assume, when the objects for which they coalesced are accomplished. To overcome the difficulties occasioned by so great a diversity of interests, an organism far more complex is necessary.
Another obstacle, difficult to be overcome, opposes the formation of popular constitutional governments. It is much more difficult to terminate the struggles between conflicting interests, by compromise, in absolute popular governments, than in an aristocracy or monarchy.
In an aristocracy, the object of the people, in the ordinary struggle between them and the nobles, is not, at least in its early stages, to overthrow the nobility and revolutionize the government—but to participate in its powers. Notwithstanding the oppression to which they may be subjected, under this form of government, the people commonly feel no small degree of respect for the descendants of a long line of distinguished ancestors; and do not usually aspire to more—in opposing the authority of the nobles—than to obtain such a participation in the powers of the government, as will enable them to correct its abuses and to lighten their burdens. Among the nobility, on the other hand, it sometimes happens that there are individuals of great influence with both sides, who have the good sense and patriotism to interpose, in order to effect a compromise by yielding to the reasonable demands of the people; and, thereby, to avoid the hazard of a final and decisive appeal to force. It is thus, by a judicious and timely compromise, the people, in such governments, may be raised to a participation in the administration sufficient for their protection, without the loss of authority on the part of the nobles.
In the case of a monarchy, the process is somewhat different. Where it is a military despotism, the people rarely have the spirit or intelligence to attempt resistance; or, if otherwise, their resistance must almost necessarily terminate in defeat, or in a mere change of dynasty—by the elevation of their leader to the throne. It is different, where the monarch is surrounded by an hereditary nobility. In a struggle between him and them, both (but especially the monarch) are usually disposed to court the people, in order to enlist them on their respective sides—a state of things highly favorable to their elevation. In this case, the struggle, if it should be long continued without decisive results, would almost necessarily raise them to political importance, and to a participation in the powers of the government.
The case is different in an absolute Democracy. Party conflicts between the majority and minority, in such governments, can hardly ever terminate in compromise—The object of the opposing minority is to expel the majority from power; and of the majority to maintain their hold upon it. It is, on both sides, a struggle for the whole—a struggle that must determine which shall be the governing, and which the subject party—and, in character, object and result, not unlike that between competitors for the sceptre in absolute monarchies. Its regular course, as has been shown, is, excessive violence—an appeal to force—followed by revolution—and terminating at last, in the elevation to supreme power of the general of the successful party. And hence, among other reasons, aristocracies and monarchies more readily assume the constitutional form than absolute popular governments.
Of the three different forms, the monarchical has heretofore been much the most prevalent, and, generally, the most powerful and durable. This result is doubtless to be attributed principally to the fact that, in its absolute form, it is the most simple and easily constructed. And hence, as government is indispensable, communities having too little intelligence to form or preserve the others, naturally fall into this. It may also, in part, be attributed to another cause, already alluded to; that, in its organism and character, it is much more closely assimilated than either of the other two, to military power; on which all absolute governments depend for support. And hence, also, the tendency of the others, and of constitutional governments which have been so badly constructed or become so disorganized as to require force to support them—to pass into military despotism—that is, into monarchy in its most absolute and simple form. And hence, again, the fact, that revolutions in absolute monarchies, end, almost invariably, in a change of dynasty—and not of the forms of the government; as is almost universally the case in the other systems.
But there are, besides these, other causes of a higher character, which contribute much to make monarchies the most prevalent, and, usually, the most durable governments. Among them, the leading one is, they are the most susceptible of improvement—that is, they can be more easily and readily modified, so as to prevent, to a limited extent, oppression and abuse of power, without assuming the constitutional form, in its strict sense. It slides, almost naturally, into one of the most important modifications. I refer to hereditary descent. When this becomes well defined and firmly established, the community or kingdom, comes to be regarded by the sovereign as the hereditary possession of his family—a circumstance which tends strongly to identify his interests with those of his subjects, and thereby, to mitigate the rigor of the government. It gives, besides, great additional security to his person; and prevents, in the same degree, not only the suspicion and hostile feelings incident to insecurity—but invites all those kindly feelings which naturally spring up on both sides, between those whose interests are identified—when there is nothing to prevent it. And hence the strong feelings of paternity on the side of the sovereign—and of loyalty on that of his subjects, which are often exhibited in such governments.
There is another improvement of which it is readily susceptible, nearly allied to the preceding. The hereditary principle not unfrequently extends to other families—especially to those of the distinguished chieftains, by whose aid the monarchy was established, when it originates in conquest. When this is the case—and a powerful body of hereditary nobles surround the sovereign, they oppose a strong resistance to his authority, and he to theirs—tending to the advantage and security of the people. Even when they do not succeed in obtaining a participation in the powers of the government, they usually acquire sufficient weight to be felt and respected. From this state of things, such governments usually, in time, settle down on some fixed rules of action, which the sovereign is compelled to respect, and by which increased protection and security are acquired by all. It was thus the enlightened monarchies of Europe were formed, under which the people of that portion of the globe have made such great advances in power, intelligence, and civilization.
To these may be added the greater capacity, which governments of the monarchical form have exhibited, to hold under subjection a large extent of territory, and a numerous population; and which has made them more powerful than others of a different form, to the extent, that these constitute an element of power. All these causes combined, have given such great and decisive advantages, as to enable them, heretofore, to absorb, in the progress of events, the few governments which have, from time to time, assumed different forms—not excepting even the mighty Roman Republic, which, after attaining the highest point of power, passed, seemingly under the operation of irresistible causes, into a military despotism. I say, heretofore—for it remains to be seen whether they will continue to retain their advantages, in these respects, over the others, under the great and growing influence of public opinion, and the new and imposing form which popular government has assumed with us.
These have already effected great changes, and will probably effect still greater—adverse to the monarchical form; but, as yet, these changes have tended rather to the absolute, than to the constitutional form of popular government—for reasons which have been explained. If this tendency should continue permanently in the same direction, the monarchical form must still retain its advantages, and continue to be the most prevalent. Should this be the case, the alternative will be between monarchy and popular government, in the form of the numerical majority—or absolute democracy; which, as has been shown, is not only the most fugitive of all the forms, but has the strongest tendency of all others to the monarchical. If, on the contrary, this tendency, or the changes referred to, should incline to the constitutional form of popular government—and a proper organism come to be regarded as not less indispensable than the right of suffrage to the establishment of such governments—in such case, it is not improbable that, in the progress of events, the monarchical will cease to be the prevalent form of government. Whether they will take this direction, at least for a long time, will depend on the success of our government—and a correct understanding of the principles on which it is constructed.
To comprehend more fully the force and bearing of public opinion, and to form a just estimate of the changes to which, aided by the press, it will probably lead, politically and socially—it will be necessary to consider it in connection with the causes that have given it an influence so great, as to entitle it to be regarded as a new political element. They will, upon investigation, be found in the many discoveries and inventions made in the last few centuries.
Among the more prominent of those of an earlier date, stand the practical application of the magnetic power to the purposes of navigation, by the invention of the mariner’s compass; the discovery of the mode of making gunpowder, and its application to the art of war; and the invention of the art of printing. Among the more recent are, the numerous chemical and mechanical discoveries and inventions, and their application to the various arts of production; the application of steam to machinery of almost every description, especially to such as is designed to facilitate transportation and travel by land and water; and, finally, the invention of the magnetic telegraph.
All these have led to important results. Through the invention of the mariner’s compass, the globe has been circumnavigated and explored, and all who inhabit it, with but few exceptions, brought within the sphere of an all-pervading commerce, which is daily diffusing over its surface the light and blessings of civilization. Through that of the art of printing, the fruits of observation and reflection, of discoveries and inventions, with all the accumulated stores of previously acquired knowledge, are preserved and widely diffused. The application of gunpowder to the art of war, has forever settled the long conflict for ascendency between civilization and barbarism, in favor of the former, and thereby guarantied that, whatever knowledge is now accumulated, or may hereafter be added, shall never again be lost. The numerous discoveries and inventions, chemical and mechanical, and the application of steam to machinery, have increased, many-fold, the productive powers of labor and capital; and have, thereby, greatly increased the number, who may devote themselves to study and improvement—and the amount of means necessary for commercial exchanges—especially between the more and the less advanced and civilized portions of the globe—to the great advantage of both, but particularly of the latter. The application of steam to the purposes of travel and transportation, by land and water, has vastly increased the facility, cheapness and rapidity of both—diffusing, with them, information and intelligence almost as quickly and as freely as if borne by the winds; while the electrical wires outstrip them, in velocity—rivalling, in rapidity, even thought itself.
The joint effect of all has been, a great increase and diffusion of knowledge; and, with this, an impulse to progress and civilization heretofore unexampled in the history of the world—accompanied by a mental energy and activity unprecedented.
To all these causes, public opinion, and its organ, the press, owe their origin and great influence. Already they have attained a force in the more civilized portions of the globe sufficient to be felt by all governments, even the most absolute and despotic. But, as great as they now are, they have as yet attained nothing like their maximum force. It is probable, that not one of the causes, which have contributed to their formation and influence, has yet produced its full effect; while several of the most powerful have just begun to operate; and many others, probably of equal or even greater force, yet remain to be brought to light.
When the causes now in operation have produced their full effect, and inventions and discoveries shall have been exhausted—if that may ever be—they will give a force to public opinion, and cause changes, political and social, difficult to be anticipated. What will be their final beating, time only can decide with any certainty. That they will, however, greatly improve the condition of man ultimately—it would be impious to doubt. It would be to suppose, that the all-wise and beneficent Being—the Creator of all—had so constituted man, as that the employment of the high intellectual faculties, with which He has been pleased to endow him, in order that he might develop the laws that control the great agents of the material world, and make them subservient to his use—would prove to him the cause of permanent evil—and not of permanent good. If, then, such a supposition be inadmissible, they must, in their orderly and full development, end in his permanent good. But this cannot be, unless the ultimate effect of their action, politically, shall be, to give ascendency to that form of government best calculated to fulfil the ends for which government is ordained. For, so completely does the well-being of our race depend on good government, that it is hardly possible any change, the ultimate effect of which should be otherwise, could prove to be a permanent good.
It is, however, not improbable, that many and great, but temporary evils, will follow the changes they have effected, and are destined to effect. It seems to be a law in the political, as well as in the material world, that great changes cannot be made, except very gradually, without convulsions and revolutions; to be followed by calamities, in the beginning, however beneficial they may prove to be in the end. The first effect of such changes, on long established governments, will be, to unsettle the opinions and principles in which they originated—and which have guided their policy—before those, which the changes are calculated to form and establish, are fairly developed and understood. The interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the new, constitutes a period of transition, which must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism.
The governments of the more advanced and civilized portions of the world are now in the midst of this period. It has proved, and will continue to prove a severe trial to existing political institutions of every form. Those governments which have not the sagacity to perceive what is truly public opinion—to distinguish between it and the mere clamor of faction, or shouts of fanaticism—and the good sense and firmness to yield, timely and cautiously, to the claims of the one—and to resist, promptly and decidedly, the demands of the other—are doomed to fall. Few will be able successfully to pass through this period of transition; and these, not without shocks and modifications, more or less considerable. It will endure until the governing and the governed shall better understand the ends for which government is ordained, and the form best adapted to accomplish them, under all the circumstances in which communities may be respectively placed.
I shall, in conclusion, proceed to exemplify the elementary principles, which have been established, by giving a brief account of the origin and character of the governments of Rome and Great Britain; the two most remarkable and perfect of their respective forms of constitutional governments. The object is to show how these principles were applied, in the more simple forms of such governments; preparatory to an exposition of the mode in which they have been applied in our own more complex system. It will appear that, in each, the principles are the same; and that the difference in their application resulted from the different situation and social condition of the respective communities. They were modified, in each, so as to conform to these; and, hence, their remarkable success. They were applied to communities in which hereditary rank had long prevailed. Their respective constitutions originated in concession to the people; and, through them, they acquired a participation in the powers of government. But with us, they were applied to communities where all political rank and distinction between citizens were excluded; and where government had its origin in the will of the people.
But, however different their origin and character, it will be found that the object in each was the same—to blend and harmonize the conflicting interests of the community; and the means the same—taking the sense of each class or portion through its appropriate organ, and considering the concurrent sense of all as the sense of the whole community. Such being the fact, an accurate and clear conception how this was effected, in their more simple forms, will enable us better to understand how it was accomplished in our far more refined, artificial, and complex form.
It is well known to all, the least conversant with their history, that the Roman people consisted of two distinct orders, or classes—the patricians and the plebeians; and that the line of distinction was so strongly drawn, that, for a long time, the right of intermarriage between them was prohibited. After the overthrow of the monarchy and the expulsion of the Tarquins, the government fell exclusively under the control of the patricians, who, with their clients and dependents, formed, at the time, a very numerous and powerful body. At first, while there was danger of the return of the exiled family, they treated the plebeians with kindness; but, after it had passed away, with oppression and cruelty.
It is not necessary, with the object in view, to enter into a minute account of the various acts of oppression and cruelty to which they were subjected. It is sufficient to state, that, according to the usages of war at the time, the territory of a conquered people became the property of the conquerors; and that the plebeians were harassed and oppressed by incessant wars, in which the danger and toil were theirs, while all the fruits of victory (the lands of the vanquished, and the spoils of war) accrued to the benefit of their oppressors. The result was such as might be expected. They were impoverished, and forced, from necessity, to borrow from the patricians, at usurious and exorbitant interest, funds with which they had been enriched through their blood and toil; and to pledge their all for repayment at stipulated periods. In case of default, the pledge became forfeited; and, under the provisions of law in such cases, the debtors were liable to be seized, and sold or imprisoned by their creditors in private jails prepared and kept for the purpose. These savage provisions were enforced with the utmost rigor against the indebted and impoverished plebeians. They constituted, indeed, an essential part of the system through which they were plundered and oppressed by the patricians.
A system so oppressive could not be endured. The natural consequences followed. Deep hatred was engendered between the orders, accompanied by factions, violence, and corruption, which distracted and weakened the government. At length, an incident occurred which roused the indignation of the plebeians to the utmost pitch, and which ended in a open rupture between the two orders.
An old soldier, who had long served the country, and had fought with bravery in twenty-eight battles, made his escape from the prison of his creditor—squalid, pale, and famished. He implored the protection of the plebeians. A crowd surrounded him; and his tale of service to the country, and the cruelty with which he had been treated by his creditor, kindled a flame, which continued to rage until it extended to the army. It refused to continue any longer in service—crossed the Anio, and took possession of the sacred mount. The patricians divided in opinion as to the course which should be pursued. The more violent insisted on an appeal to arms, but, fortunately, the counsel of the moderate, which recommended concession and compromise, prevailed. Commissioners were appointed to treat with the army; and a formal compact was entered into between the orders, and ratified by the oaths of each, which conceded to the plebeians the right to elect two tribunes, as the protectors of their order, and made their persons sacred. The number was afterwards increased to ten, and their election by centuries changed to election by tribes—a mode by which the plebeians secured a decided preponderance.
Such was the origin of the tribunate—which, in process of time, opened all the honors of the government to the plebeians. They acquired the right, not only of vetoing the passage of all laws, but also their execution; and thus obtained, through their tribunes, a negative on the entire action of the government, without divesting the patricians of their control over the Senate. By this arrangement, the government was placed under the concurrent and joint voice of the two orders, expressed through separate and appropriate organs; the one possessing the positive, and the other the negative powers of the government. This simple change converted it from an absolute, into a constitutional government—from a government of the patricians only, to that of the whole Roman people—and from an aristocracy into a republic. In doing this, it laid the solid foundation of Roman liberty and greatness.
A superficial observer would pronounce a government, so organized, as that one order should have the power of making and executing the laws, and another, or the representatives of another, the unlimited authority of preventing their enactment and execution—if not wholly impracticable, at least, too feeble to stand the shocks to which all governments are subject; and would, therefore, predict its speedy dissolution, after a distracted and inglorious career.
How different from the result! Instead of distraction, it proved to be the bond of concord and harmony; instead of weakness, of unequalled strength—and, instead of a short and inglorious career, one of great length and immortal glory. It moderated the conflicts between the orders; harmonized their interests, and blended them into one; substituted devotion to country in the place of devotion to particular orders; called forth the united strength and energy of the whole, in the hour of danger; raised to power, the wise and patriotic; elevated the Roman name above all others; extended her authority and dominion over the greater part of the then known world, and transmitted the influence of her laws and institutions to the present day. Had the opposite counsel prevailed at this critical juncture; had an appeal been made to arms instead of to concession and compromise, Rome, instead of being what she afterwards became, would, in all probability, have been as inglorious, and as little known to posterity as the insignificant states which surrounded her, whose names and existence would have been long since consigned to oblivion, had they not been preserved in the history of her conquests of them. But for the wise course then adopted, it is not improbable—whichever order might have prevailed—that she would have fallen under some cruel and petty tyrant—and, finally, been conquered by some of the neighboring states—or by the Carthaginians, or the Gauls. To the fortunate turn which events then took, she owed her unbounded sway and imperishable renown.
It is true, that the tribunate, after raising her to a height of power and prosperity never before equalled, finally became one of the instruments by which her liberty was overthrown—but it was not until she became exposed to new dangers, growing out of increase of wealth and the great extent of her dominions, against which the tribunate furnished no guards. Its original object was the protection of the plebeians against oppression and abuse of power on the part of the patricians. This, it thoroughly accomplished; but it had no power to protect the people of the numerous and wealthy conquered countries from being plundered by consuls and proconsuls. Nor could it prevent the plunderers from using the enormous wealth, which they extorted from the impoverished and ruined provinces, to corrupt and debase the people; nor arrest the formation of parties (irrespective of the old division of patricians and plebeians) having no other object than to obtain the control of the government for the purpose of plunder. Against these formidable evils, her constitution furnished no adequate security. Under their baneful influence, the possession of the government became the object of the most violent conflicts; not between patricians and plebeians—but between profligate and corrupt factions. They continued with increasing violence, until, finally, Rome sunk, as must every community under similar circumstances, beneath the strong grasp, the despotic rule of the chieftain of the successful party—the sad, but only alternative which remained to prevent universal violence, confusion and anarchy. The Republic had, in reality, ceased to exist long before the establishment of the Empire. The interval was filled by the rule of ferocious, corrupt and bloody factions. There was, indeed, a small but patriotic body of eminent individuals, who struggled, in vain, to correct abuses, and to restore the government to its primitive character and purity—and who sacrificed their lives in their endeavors to accomplish an object so virtuous and noble. But it can be no disparagement to the tribunate, that the great powers conferred on it for wise purposes, and which it had so fully accomplished, should be seized upon, during this violent and corrupt interval, to overthrow the liberty it had established, and so long nourished and supported.
In assigning such consequence to the tribunate, I must not overlook other important provisions of the Constitution of the Roman government. The Senate, as far as we are informed, seems to have been admirably constituted to secure consistency and steadiness of action. The power—when the Republic was exposed to imminent danger—to appoint a dictator—vested, for a limited period, with almost boundless authority; the two consuls, and the manner of electing them; the auguries; the sibylline books; the priesthood, and the censorship—all of which appertained to the patricians—were, perhaps indispensable to withstand the vast and apparently irregular power of the tribunate—while the possession of such great powers by the patricians, made it necessary to give proportionate strength to the only organ through which the plebeians could act on the government with effect. The government was, indeed, powerfully constituted; and, apparently, well proportioned both in its positive and negative organs. It was truly an iron government. Without the tribunate, it proved to be one of the most oppressive and cruel that ever existed; but with it, one of the strongest and best.
The origin and character of the British government are so well known, that a very brief sketch, with the object in view, will suffice.
The causes which ultimately moulded it into its present form, commenced with the Norman Conquest. This introduced the feudal system, with its necessary appendages, a hereditary monarchy and nobility; the former in the line of the chief, who led the invading army—and the latter in that of his distinguished followers. They became his feudatories. The country—both land and people (the latter as serfs)—was divided between them. Conflicts soon followed between the monarch and the nobles—as must ever be the case under such systems. They were followed, in the progress of events, by efforts, on the part both of monarchs and nobles, to conciliate the favor of the people. They, in consequence, gradually rose to power. At every step of their ascent, they became more important—and were more and more courted—until at length their influence was so sensibly felt, that they were summoned to attend the meeting of parliament by delegates; not, however, as an estate of the realm, or constituent member of the body politic. The first summons came from the nobles; and was designed to conciliate their good feelings and secure their cooperation in the war against the king. This was followed by one from him; but his object was simply to have them present at the meeting of parliament, in order to be consulted by the crown, on questions relating to taxes and supplies; not, indeed, to discuss the right to lay the one, and to raise the other—for the King claimed the arbitrary authority to do both—but with a view to facilitate their collection, and to reconcile them to their imposition.
From this humble beginning, they, after a long struggle, accompanied by many vicissitudes, raised themselves to be considered one of the estates of the realm; and, finally, in their efforts to enlarge and secure what they had gained, overpowered, for a time, the other two estates; and thus concentrated all power in a single estate or body. This, in effect, made the government absolute, and led to consequences which, as by a fixed law, must ever result in popular governments of this form—namely—to organized parties, or, rather, factions, contending violently to obtain or retain the control of the government; and this, again, by laws almost as uniform, to the concentration of all the powers of government in the hands of the military commander of the successful party.
His heir was too feeble to hold the sceptre he had grasped; and the general discontent with the result of the revolution, led to the restoration of the old dynasty; without defining the limits between the powers of the respective estates.
After a short interval, another revolution followed, in which the lords and commons united against the king. This terminated in his overthrow; and the transfer of the crown to a collateral branch of the family, accompanied by a declaration of rights, which defined the powers of the several estates of the realm; and, finally, perfected and established the constitution. Thus, a feudal monarchy was converted, through a slow but steady process of many centuries, into a highly refined constitutional monarchy, without changing the basis of the original government.
As it now stands, the realm consists of three estates; the king; the lords temporal and spiritual; and the commons. The parliament is the grand council. It possesses the supreme power. It enacts laws, by the concurring assent of the lords and commons—subject to the approval of the king. The executive power is vested in the monarch, who is regarded as constituting the first estate. Although irresponsible himself, he can only act through responsible ministers and agents. They are responsible to the other estates; to the lords, as constituting the high court before whom all the servants of the crown may be tried for malpractices, and crimes against the realm, or official delinquencies—and to the commons, as possessing the impeaching power, and constituting the grand inquest of the kingdom. These provisions, with their legislative powers—especially that of withholding supplies—give them a controlling influence on the executive department, and, virtually, a participation in its powers—so that the acts of the government, throughout its entire range, may be fairly considered as the result of the concurrent and joint action of the three estates—and, as these embrace all the orders—of the concurrent and joint action of the estates of the realm.
He would take an imperfect and false view of the subject who should consider the king, in his mere individual character, or even as the head of the royal family—as constituting an estate. Regarded in either light, so far from deserving to be considered as the First Estate—and the head of the realm, as he is—he would represent an interest too inconsiderable to be an object of special protection. Instead of this, he represents what in reality is, habitually and naturally, the most powerful interest, all things considered, under every form of government in all civilized communities— the tax-consuming interest; or, more broadly, the great interest which necessarily grows out of the action of the government, be its form what it may—the interest that lives by the government. It is composed of the recipients of its honors and emoluments; and may be properly called, the government interest, or party—in contradistinction to the rest of the community—or (as they may be properly called) the people or commons. The one comprehends all who are supported by the government—and the other all who support the government—and it is only because the former are strongest, all things being considered, that they are enabled to retain, for any considerable time, advantages so great and commanding.
This great and predominant interest is naturally represented by a single head. For it is impossible, without being so represented, to distribute the honors and emoluments of the government among those who compose it, without producing discord and conflict—and it is only by preventing these, that advantages so tempting can be long retained. And, hence, the strong tendency of this great interest to the monarchical form—that is, to be represented by a single individual. On the contrary, the antagonistic interest—that which supports the government, has the opposite tendency—a tendency to be represented by many; because a large assembly can better judge, than one individual or a few, what burdens the community can bear—and how it can be most equally distributed, and easily collected.
In the British government, the king constitutes an Estate, because he is the head and representative of this great interest. He is the conduit through which, all the honors and emoluments of the government flow—while the House of Commons, according to the theory of the government, is the head and representative of the opposite—the great tax-paying interest, by which the government is supported.
Between these great interests, there is necessarily a constant and strong tendency to conflict; which, if not counteracted, must end in violence and an appeal to force—to be followed by revolution, as has been explained. To prevent this, the House of Lords, as one of the estates of the realm, is interposed; and constitutes the conservative power of the government. It consists, in fact, of that portion of the community who are the principal recipients of the honors, emoluments, and other advantages derived from the government; and whose condition cannot be improved, but must be made worse by the triumph of either of the conflicting estates over the other; and, hence, it is opposed to the ascendency of either—and in favor of preserving the equilibrium between them.
This sketch, brief as it is, is sufficient to show, that these two constitutional governments—by far the most illustrious of their respective kinds—conform to the principles that have been established, alike in their origin and in their construction. The constitutions of both originated in a pressure, occasioned by conflicts of interests between hostile classes or orders, and were intended to meet the pressing exigencies of the occasion; neither party, it would seem, having any conception of the principles involved, or the consequences to follow, beyond the immediate objects in contemplation. It would, indeed, seem almost impossible for constitutional governments, founded on orders or classes, to originate in any other manner. It is difficult to conceive that any people, among whom they did not exist, would, or could voluntarily institute them, in order to establish such governments; while it is not at all wonderful, that they should grow out of conflicts between different orders or classes when aided by a favorable combination of circumstances.
The constitutions of both rest on the same principle—an organism by which the voice of each order or class is taken through its appropriate organ; and which requires the concurring voice of all to constitute that of the whole community. The effects, too, were the same in both—to unite and harmonize conflicting interests—to strengthen attachments to the whole community, and to moderate that to the respective orders or classes; to rally all, in the hour of danger, around the standard of their country; to elevate the feeling of nationality, and to develop power, moral and physical, to an extraordinary extent. Yet each has its distinguishing features, resulting from the difference of their organisms, and the circumstances in which they respectively originated.
In the government of Great Britain, the three orders are blended in the legislative department; so that the separate and concurring act of each is necessary to make laws; while, on the contrary, in the Roman, one order had the power of making laws, and another of annulling them, or arresting their execution. Each had its peculiar advantages. The Roman developed more fully the love of country and the feelings of nationality. “I am a Roman citizen,” was pronounced with a pride and elevation of sentiment, never, perhaps, felt before or since, by any citizen or subject of any community, in announcing the country to which he belonged.
It also developed more fully the power of the community. Taking into consideration their respective population, and the state of the arts at the different periods, Rome developed more power, comparatively, than Great Britain ever has—vast as that is, and has been—or, perhaps, than any other community ever did. Hence, the mighty control she acquired from a beginning so humble. But the British government is far superior to that of Rome, in its adaptation and capacity to embrace under its control extensive dominions, without subverting its constitution. In this respect, the Roman constitution was defective—and, in consequence, soon began to exhibit marks of decay, after Rome had extended her dominions beyond Italy; while the British holds under its sway, without apparently impairing either, an empire equal to that, under the weight of which the constitution and liberty of Rome were crushed. This great advantage it derives from its different structure, especially that of the executive department; and the character of its conservative principle. The former is so constructed as to prevent, in consequence of its unity and hereditary character, the violent and factious struggles to obtain the control of the government—and, with it, the vast patronage which distracted, corrupted, and finally subverted the Roman Republic. Against this fatal disease, the latter had no security whatever; while the British government—besides the advantages it possesses, in this respect, from the structure of its executive department—has, in the character of its conservative principle, another and powerful security against it. Its character is such, that patronage, instead of weakening, strengthens it—for, the greater the patronage of the government, the greater will be the share which falls to the estate constituting the conservative department of the government; and the more eligible its condition, the greater its opposition to any radical change in its form. The two causes combined, give to the government a greater capacity of holding under subjection extensive dominions, without subverting the constitution or destroying liberty, than has ever been possessed by any other. It is difficult, indeed, to assign any limit to its capacity in this respect. The most probable which can be assigned is, its ability to bear increased burdens—the taxation necessary to meet the expenses incident to the acquisition and government of such vast dominions, may prove, in the end, so heavy as to crush, under its weight, the laboring and productive portions of the population.
I have now finished the brief sketch I proposed, of the origin and character of these two renowned governments; and shall next proceed to consider the character, origin and structure of the Government of the United States. It differs from the Roman and British, more than they differ from each other; and, although an existing government of recent origin, its character and structure are perhaps less understood than those of either.
A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Immediately following the completion of his Disquisition, Calhoun turned his attention to a second major work, a project that he anticipated would “be more than twice as voluminous as the elementary work, but not near so difficult of execution.” * That extended essay is in his Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, an essay which offers a detailed and practical application of his theory of the concurrent majority to the government and constitution of the United States. Although Calhoun’s Discourse follows an elaborate outline, the subject matter can be divided into three general categories: (1) the original intentions of the founders concerning the formation and ratification of the Constitution; (2) the dangers inherent in the encroachment of the federal government upon the reserved powers of the states; and (3) the call for the restoration of the doctrine of the concurrent majority, if consolidation and disunion are to be avoided. Within this general framework, Calhoun provides a critical analysis of each of the articles of the Constitution, as well as all of the major agencies of the general government. Also included is an analysis and critical reading of many of the founding documents, especially Federalist ;ns10, ;ns39, ;ns51, and ;ns78.
Ours is a system of governments, compounded of the separate governments of the several States composing the Union, and of one common government of all its members, called the Government of the United States. The former preceded the latter, which was created by their agency. Each was framed by written constitutions; those of the several States by the people of each, acting separately, and in their sovereign character; and that of the United States, by the same, acting in the same character—but jointly instead of separately. All were formed on the same model. They all divide the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial; and are founded on the great principle of the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled. The entire powers of government are divided between the two; those of a more general character being specifically delegated to the United States; and all others not delegated, being reserved to the several States in their separate character. Each, within its appropriate sphere, possesses all the attributes, and performs all the functions of government. Neither is perfect without the other. The two combined, form one entire and perfect government. With these preliminary remarks, I shall proceed to the consideration of the immediate subject of this discourse.
The Government of the United States was formed by the Constitution of the United States—and ours is a democratic, federal republic.
It is democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy. It excludes classes, orders, and all artificial distinctions. To guard against their introduction, the constitution prohibits the granting of any title of nobility by the United States, or by any State.1 The whole system is, indeed, democratic throughout. It has for its fundamental principle, the great cardinal maxim, that the people are the source of all power; that the governments of the several States and of the United States were created by them, and for them; that the powers conferred on them are not surrendered, but delegated; and, as such, are held in trust, and not absolutely; and can be rightfully exercised only in furtherance of the objects for which they were delegated.
It is federal as well as democratic. Federal, on the one hand, in contradistinction to national, and, on the other, to a confederacy. In showing this, I shall begin with the former.
It is federal, because it is the government of States united in political union, in contradistinction to a government of individuals socially united; that is, by what is usually called, a social compact. To express it more concisely, it is federal and not national, because it is the government of a community of States, and not the government of a single State or nation.
That it is federal and not national, we have the high authority of the convention which framed it. General Washington, as its organ, in his letter submitting the plan to the consideration of the Congress of the then confederacy, calls it, in one place—"the general government of the Union"—and in another—"the federal government of these States.” Taken together, the plain meaning is, that the government proposed would be, if adopted, the government of the States adopting it, in their united character as members of a common Union; and, as such, would be a federal government. These expressions were not used without due consideration, and an accurate and full knowledge of their true import. The subject was not a novel one. The convention was familiar with it. It was much agitated in their deliberations. They divided, in reference to it, in the early stages of their proceedings. At first, one party was in favor of a national and the other of a federal government. The former, in the beginning, prevailed; and in the plans which they proposed, the constitution and government are styled “National.” But, finally, the latter gained the ascendency, when the term “National” was superseded, and “United States” substituted in its place. The constitution was accordingly styled— “The constitution of the United States of America” —and the government— “The government of the United States” leaving out “America,” for the sake of brevity. It cannot admit of a doubt, that the Convention, by the expression “United States,” meant the States united in a federal Union; for in no other sense could they, with propriety, call the government, “the federal government of these States” —and “the general government of the Union” —as they did in the letter referred to. It is thus clear, that the Convention regarded the different expressions— “the federal government of the United States” — “the general government of the Union” —and— “government of the United States” —as meaning the same thing—a federal, in contradistinction to a national government.
Assuming it then, as established, that they are the same, it is only necessary, in order to ascertain with precision, what they meant by “federal government” —to ascertain what they meant by “the government of the United States.” For this purpose it will be necessary to trace the expression to its origin.
It was, at that time, as our history shows, an old and familiar phrase—having a known and well-defined meaning. Its use commenced with the political birth of these States; and it has been applied to them, in all the forms of government through which they have passed, without alteration. The style of the present constitution and government is precisely the style by which the confederacy that existed when it was adopted, and which it superseded, was designated. The instrument that formed the latter was called— “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.” Its first article declares that the style of this confederacy shall be, “The United States of America;” and the second, in order to leave no doubt as to the relation in which the States should stand to each other in the confederacy about to be formed, declared— “Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence; and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” If we go one step further back, the style of the confederacy will be found to be the same with that of the revolutionary government, which existed when it was adopted, and which it superseded. It dates its origin with the Declaration of Independence. That act is styled— “The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America.” And here again, that there might be no doubt how these States would stand to each other in the new condition in which they were about to be placed, it concluded by declaring— “that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States;” “and that, as free and independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.” The “United States” is, then, the baptismal name of these States—received at their birth—by which they have ever since continued to call themselves; by which they have characterized their constitution, government and laws—and by which they are known to the rest of the world.
The retention of the same style, throughout every stage of their existence, affords strong, if not conclusive evidence that the political relation between these States, under their present constitution and government, is substantially the same as under the confederacy and revolutionary government; and what that relation was, we are not left to doubt; as they are declared expressly to be “ free, independent and sovereign States.” They, then, are now united, and have been, throughout, simply as confederated States. If it had been intended by the members of the convention which framed the present constitution and government, to make any essential change, either in the relation of the States to each other, or the basis of their union, they would, by retaining the style which designated them under the preceding governments, have practised a deception, utterly unworthy of their character, as sincere and honest men and patriots. It may, therefore, be fairly inferred, that, retaining the same style, they intended to attach to the expression— “the United States,” the same meaning, substantially, which it previously had; and, of course, in calling the present government— “the federal government of these States,” they meant by “federal,” that they stood in the same relation to each other—that their union rested, without material change, on the same basis—as under the confederacy and the revolutionary government; and that federal, and confederated States, meant substantially the same thing. It follows, also, that the changes made by the present constitution were not in the foundation, but in the superstructure of the system. We accordingly find, in confirmation of this conclusion, that the convention, in their letter to Congress, stating the reasons for the changes that had been made, refer only to the necessity which required a different “organization” of the government, without making any allusion whatever to any change in the relations of the States towards each other—or the basis of the system. They state that, “the friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and treaties; that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the Government of the Union: but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trusts to one body of men is evident; hence results the necessity of a different organization. ” Comment is unnecessary.
We thus have the authority of the convention itself for asserting that the expression, “United States,” has essentially the same meaning, when applied to the present constitution and government, as it had previously; and, of course, that the States have retained their separate existence, as independent and sovereign communities, in all the forms of political existence, through which they have passed. Such, indeed, is the literal import of the expression— “the United States” —and the sense in which it is ever used, when it is applied politically—I say, politically —because it is often applied, geographically, to designate the portion of this continent occupied by the States composing the Union, including territories belonging to them. This application arose from the fact, that there was no appropriate term for that portion of this continent; and thus, not unnaturally, the name by which these States are politically designated, was employed to designate the region they occupy and possess. The distinction is important, and cannot be overlooked in discussing questions involving the character and nature of the government, without causing great confusion and dangerous misconceptions.
But as conclusive as these reasons are to prove that the government of the United States is federal, in contradistinction to national, it would seem, that they have not been sufficient to prevent the opposite opinion from being entertained. Indeed, this last seems to have become the prevailing one; if we may judge from the general use of the term “national,” and the almost entire disuse of that of “federal.” National, is now commonly applied to “the general government of the Union” —and “the federal government of these States” —and all that appertains to them or to the Union. It seems to be forgotten that the term was repudiated by the convention, after full consideration; and that it was carefully excluded from the constitution, and the letter laying it before Congress. Even those who know all this—and, of course, how falsely the term is applied—have, for the most part, slided into its use without reflection. But there are not a few who so apply it, because they believe it to be a national government in fact; and among these are men of distinguished talents and standing, who have put forth all their powers of reason and eloquence, in support of the theory. The question involved is one of the first magnitude, and deserves to be investigated thoroughly in all its aspects. With this impression, I deem it proper—clear and conclusive as I regard the reasons already assigned to prove its federal character—to confirm them by historical references; and to repel the arguments adduced to prove it to be a national government. I shall begin with the formation and ratification of the constitution.
That the States, when they formed and ratified the constitution, were distinct, independent, and sovereign communities, has already been established. That the people of the several States, acting in their separate, independent, and sovereign character, adopted their separate State constitutions, is a fact uncontested and incontestable; but it is not more certain than that, acting in the same character, they ratified and adopted the constitution of the United States; with this difference only, that in making and adopting the one, they acted without concert or agreement; but, in the other, with concert in making, and mutual agreement in adopting it. That the delegates who constituted the convention which framed the constitution, were appointed by the several States, each on its own authority; that they voted in the convention by States; and that their votes were counted by States—are recorded and unquestionable facts. So, also, the facts that the constitution, when framed, was submitted to the people of the several States for their respective ratification; that it was ratified by them, each for itself; and that it was binding on each, only in consequence of its being so ratified by it. Until then, it was but the plan of a constitution, without any binding force. It was the act of ratification which established it as a constitution between the States ratifying it; and only between them, on the condition that not less than nine of the then thirteen States should concur in the ratification—as is expressly provided by its seventh and last article. It is in the following words: “The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the States so ratifying the same.” If additional proof be needed to show that it was only binding between the States that ratified it, it may be found in the fact, that two States, North Carolina and Rhode Island, refused, at first, to ratify; and were, in consequence, regarded in the interval as foreign States, without obligation, on their parts, to respect it, or, on the part of their citizens, to obey it. Thus far, there can be no difference of opinion. The facts are too recent and too well established—and the provision of the constitution too explicit, to admit of doubt.
That the States, then, retained, after the ratification of the constitution, the distinct, independent, and sovereign character in which they formed and ratified it, is certain; unless they divested themselves of it by the act of ratification, or by some provision of the constitution. If they have not, the constitution must be federal, and not national; for it would have, in that case, every attribute necessary to constitute it federal, and not one to make it national. On the other hand, if they have divested themselves, then it would necessarily lose its federal character, and become national. Whether, then, the government is federal or national, is reduced to a single question; whether the act of ratification, of itself, or the constitution, by some one, or all of its provisions, did, or did not, divest the several States of their character of separate, independent, and sovereign communities, and merge them all in one great community or nation, called the American people?
Before entering on the consideration of this important question, it is proper to remark, that, on its decision, the character of the government, as well as the constitution, depends. The former must, necessarily, partake of the character of the latter, as it is but its agent, created by it, to carry its powers into effect. Accordingly, then, as the constitution is federal or national, so must the government be; and I shall, therefore, use them indiscriminately in discussing the subject.
Of all the questions which can arise under our system of government, this is by far the most important. It involves many others of great magnitude; and among them, that of the allegiance of the citizen; or, in other words, the question to whom allegiance and obedience are ultimately due. What is the true relation between the two governments—that of the United States and those of the several States? and what is the relation between the individuals respectively composing them? For it is clear, if the States still retain their sovereignty as separate and independent communities, the allegiance and obedience of the citizens of each would be due to their respective States; and that the government of the United States and those of the several States would stand as equals and co-ordinates in their respective spheres; and, instead of being united socially, their citizens would be politically connected through their respective States. On the contrary, if they have, by ratifying the constitution, divested themselves of their individuality and sovereignty, and merged themselves into one great community or nation, it is equally clear, that the sovereignty would reside in the whole—or what is called the American people; and that allegiance and obedience would be due to them. Nor is it less so, that the government of the several States would, in such case, stand to that of the United States, in the relation of inferior and subordinate, to superior and paramount; and that the individuals of the several States, thus fused, as it were, into one general mass, would be united socially, and not politically. So great a change of condition would have involved a thorough and radical revolution, both socially and politically—a revolution much more radical, indeed, than that which followed the Declaration of Independence.
They who maintain that the ratification of the constitution effected so mighty a change, are bound to establish it by the most demonstrative proof. The presumption is strongly opposed to it. It has already been shown, that the authority of the convention which formed the constitution is clearly against it; and that the history of its ratification, instead of supplying evidence in its favor, furnishes strong testimony in opposition to it. To these, others may be added; and, among them, the presumption drawn from the history of these States, in all the stages of their existence down to the time of the ratification of the constitution. In all, they formed separate, and, as it respects each other, independent communities; and were ever remarkable for the tenacity with which they adhered to their rights as such. It constituted, during the whole period, one of the most striking traits in their character—as a very brief sketch will show.
During their colonial condition, they formed distinct communities—each with its separate charter and government—and in no way connected with each other, except as dependent members of a common empire. Their first union amongst themselves was, in resistance to the encroachments of the parent country on their chartered rights—when they adopted the title of— “the United Colonies.” Under that name they acted, until they declared their independence—always, in their joint councils, voting and acting as separate and distinct communities—and not in the aggregate, as composing one community or nation. They acted in the same character in declaring independence; by which act they passed from their dependent, colonial condition, into that of free and sovereign States. The declaration was made by delegates appointed by the several colonies, each for itself, and on its own authority. The vote making the declaration was taken by delegations, each counting one. The declaration was announced to be unanimous, not because every delegate voted for it, but because the majority of each delegation did; showing clearly, that the body itself, regarded it as the united act of the several colonies, and not the act of the whole as one community. To leave no doubt on a point so important, and in reference to which the several colonies were so tenacious, the declaration was made in the name, and by the authority of the people of the colonies, represented in Congress; and that was followed by declaring them to be— “free and independent States.” The act was, in fact, but a formal and solemn annunciation to the world, that the colonies had ceased to be dependent communities, and had become free and independent States; without involving any other change in their relations with each other, than those necessarily incident to a separation from the parent country. So far were they from supposing, or intending that it should have the effect of merging their existence, as separate communities, into one nation, that they had appointed a committee—which was actually sitting, while the declaration was under discussion—to prepare a plan of a confederacy of the States, preparatory to entering into their new condition. In fulfilment of their appointment, this committee prepared the draft of the articles of confederation and perpetual union, which afterwards was adopted by the governments of the several States. That it instituted a mere confederacy and union of the States has already been shown. That, in forming and assenting to it, the States were exceedingly jealous and watchful in delegating power, even to a confederacy; that they granted the powers delegated most reluctantly and sparingly; that several of them long stood out, under all the pressure of the revolutionary war, before they acceded to it; and that, during the interval which elapsed between its adoption and that of the present constitution, they evinced, under the most urgent necessity, the same reluctance and jealousy, in delegating power—are facts which cannot be disputed.
To this may be added another circumstance of no little weight, drawn from the preliminary steps taken for the ratification of the constitution. The plan was laid, by the convention, before the Congress of the confederacy, for its consideration and action, as has been stated. It was the sole organ and representative of these States in their confederated character. By submitting it, the convention recognized and acknowledged its authority over it, as the organ of distinct, independent, and sovereign States. It had the right to dispose of it as it pleased; and, if it had thought proper, it might have defeated the plan by simply omitting to act on it. But it thought proper to act, and to adopt the course recommended by the convention—which was, to submit it— “to a convention of delegates, chosen in each State, by the people thereof, for their assent and adoption.” All this was in strict accord with the federal character of the constitution, but wholly repugnant to the idea of its being national. It received the assent of the States in all the possible modes in which it could be obtained: first—in their confederated character, through its only appropriate organ, the Congress; next, in their individual character, as separate States, through their respective State governments, to which the Congress referred it; and finally, in their high character of independent and sovereign communities, through a convention of the people, called in each State, by the authority of its government. The States acting in these various capacities, might, at every stage, have defeated it or not, at their option, by giving or withholding their consent.
With this weight of presumptive evidence, to use no stronger expression, in favor of its federal, in contradistinction to its national character, I shall next proceed to show, that the ratification of the constitution, instead of furnishing proof against, contains additional and conclusive evidence in its favor.
We are not left to conjecture, as to what was meant by the ratification of the constitution, or its effects. The expressions used by the conventions of the States, in ratifying it, and those used by the constitution in connection with it, afford ample means of ascertaining with accuracy, both its meaning and effect. The usual form of expression used by the former is: “We, the delegates of the State,” (naming the State) “do, in behalf of the people of the State, assent to, and ratify the said constitution.” All use, “ratify” —and all, except North Carolina, use, “assent to.” The delegates of that State use, “adopt,” instead of “assent to;” a variance merely in the form of expression, without, in any degree, affecting the meaning. Ratification was, then, the act of the several States in their separate capacity. It was performed by delegates appointed expressly for the purpose. Each appointed its own delegates; and the delegates of each, acted in the name of, and for the State appointing them. Their act consisted in, “assenting to,” or, what is the same thing, “adopting and ratifying” the constitution.
By turning to the seventh article of the constitution, and to the preamble, it will be found what was the effect of ratifying. The article expressly provides, that, “the ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution, between the States so ratifying the same.” The preamble of the constitution is in the following words— “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.” The effect, then, of its ratification was, to ordain and establish the constitution—and, thereby, to make, what was before but a plan— “The constitution of the United States of America.” All this is clear.
It remains now to show, by whom, it was ordained and established; for whom, it was ordained and established; for what, it was ordained and established; and over whom, it was ordained and established. These will be considered in the order in which they stand.
Nothing more is necessary, in order to show by whom it was ordained and established, than to ascertain who are meant by— “We, the people of the United States;” for, by their authority, it was done. To this there can be but one answer—it meant the people who ratified the instrument; for it was the act of ratification which ordained and established it. Who they were, admits of no doubt. The process preparatory to ratification, and the acts by which it was done, prove, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that it was ratified by the several States, through conventions of delegates, chosen in each State by the people thereof; and acting, each in the name and by the authority of its State: and, as all the States ratified it— “We, the people of the United States” —mean,—We, the people of the several States of the Union. The inference is irresistible. And when it is considered that the States of the Union were then members of the confederacy—and that, by the express provision of one of its articles, “each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,” the proof is demonstrative, that— “We, the people of the United States of America,” mean the people of the several States of the Union, acting as free, independent, and sovereign States. This strikingly confirms what has been already stated; to wit, that the convention which formed the constitution, meant the same thing by the terms— “United States” —and, “federal” —when applied to the constitution or government—and that the former, when used politically, always mean—these States united as independent and sovereign communities.
Having shown, by whom, it was ordained, there will be no difficulty in determining, for whom, it was ordained. The preamble is explicit—it was ordained and established for— “The United States of America;” adding, “America,” in conformity to the style of the then confederacy, and the Declaration of Independence. Assuming, then, that the “United States” bears the same meaning in the conclusion of the preamble, as it does in its commencement (and no reason can be assigned why it should not) it follows, necessarily, that the constitution was ordained and established for the people of the several States, by whom it was ordained and established.
Nor will there be any difficulty in showing, for what, it was ordained and established. The preamble enumerates the objects. They are— “to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” To effect these objects, they ordained and established, to use their own language— “the constitution for the United States of America” —clearly meaning by “for,” that it was intended to be their constitution; and that the objects of ordaining and establishing it were, to perfect their union, to establish justice among them —to insure their domestic tranquillity, to provide for their common defense and general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty to them and their posterity. Taken all together, it follows, from what has been stated, that the constitution was ordained and established by the several States, as distinct, sovereign communities; and that it was ordained and established by them for themselves —for their common welfare and safety, as distinct and sovereign communities.
It remains to be shown, over whom, it was ordained and established. That it was not over the several States, is settled by the seventh article beyond controversy. It declares, that the ratification by nine States shall be sufficient to establish the constitution between the States so ratifying. “Between,” necessarily excludes “over” —as that which is between States cannot be over them. Reason itself, if the constitution had been silent, would have led, with equal certainty, to the same conclusion. For it was the several States, or, what is the same thing, their people, in their sovereign capacity, who ordained and established the constitution. But the authority which ordains and establishes, is higher than that which is ordained and established; and, of course, the latter must be subordinate to the former—and cannot, therefore, be over it. “Between,” always means more than “over” —and implies in this case, that the authority which ordained and established the constitution, was the joint and united authority of the States ratifying it; and that, among the effects of their ratification, it became a contract between them; and, as a compact, binding on them—but only as such. In that sense the term, “between,” is appropriately applied. In no other, can it be. It was, doubtless, used in that sense in this instance; but the question still remains, over whom, was it ordained and established? After what has been stated, the answer may be readily given. It was over the government which it created, and all its functionaries in their official character—and the individuals composing and inhabiting the several States, as far as they might come within the sphere of the powers delegated to the United States.
I have now shown, conclusively, by arguments drawn from the act of ratification, and the constitution itself, that the several States of the Union, acting in their confederated character, ordained and established the constitution; that they ordained and established it for themselves, in the same character; that they ordained and established it for their welfare and safety, in the like character; that they established it as a compact between them, and not as a constitution over them; and that, as a compact, they are parties to it, in the same character. I have thus established, conclusively, that these States, in ratifying the constitution, did not lose the confederated character which they possessed when they ratified it, as well as in all the preceding stages of their existence; but, on the contrary, still retained it to the full.
Those who oppose this conclusion, and maintain the national character of the government, rely, in support of their views, mainly on the expressions, “we, the people of the United States,” used in the first part of the preamble; and, “do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America,” used in its conclusion. Taken together, they insist, in the first place, that, “we, the people,” mean, the people in their individual character, as forming a single community; and that, “the United States of America,” designates them in their aggregate character, as the American people. In maintaining this construction, they rely on the omission to enumerate the States by name, after the word “people,” (so as to make it read, “We, the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c.,” as was done in the articles of the confederation, and, also, in signing the Declaration of Independence)—and, instead of this, the simple use of the general term “United States.”
However plausible this may appear, an explanation perfectly satisfactory may be given, why the expression, as it now stands, was used by the framers of the constitution; and why it should not receive the meaning attempted to be placed upon it. It is conceded that, if the enumeration of the States after the word, “people,” had been made, the expression would have been freed from all ambiguity; and the inference and argument founded on the failure to do so, left without pretext or support. The omission is certainly striking, but it can be readily explained. It was made intentionally, and solely from the necessity of the case. The first draft of the constitution contained an enumeration of the States, by name, after the word “people;” but it became impossible to retain it after the adoption of the seventh and last article, which provided, that the ratification by nine States should be sufficient to establish the constitution as between them; and for the plain reason, that it was impossible to determine, whether all the States would ratify—or, if any failed, which, and how many of the number; or, if nine should ratify, how to designate them. No alternative was thus left but to omit the enumeration, and to insert the “United States of America,” in its place. And yet, an omission, so readily and so satisfactorily explained, has been seized on, as furnishing strong proof that the government was ordained and established by the American people, in the aggregate—and is therefore national.
But the omission, of itself, would have caused no difficulty, had there not been connected with it a two-fold ambiguity in the expression as it now stands. The term “United States,” which always means, in constitutional language, the several States in their confederated character, means also, as has been shown, when applied geographically, the country occupied and possessed by them. While the term “people,” has, in the English language, no plural, and is necessarily used in the singular number, even when applied to many communities or states confederated in a common union—as is the case with the United States. Availing themselves of this double ambiguity, and the omission to enumerate the States by name, the advocates of the national theory of the government, assuming that, “we, the people,” meant individuals generally, and not people as forming States; and that “United States” was used in a geographical and not a political sense, made out an argument of some plausibility, in favor of the conclusion that, “we, the people of the United States of America,” meant the aggregate population of the States regarded en masse, and not in their distinctive character as forming separate political communities. But in this gratuitous assumption, and the conclusion drawn from it, they overlooked the stubborn fact, that the very people who ordained and established the constitution, are identically the same who ratified it; for it was by the act of ratification alone, that it was ordained and established—as has been conclusively shown. This fact, of itself, sweeps away every vestige of the argument drawn from the ambiguity of those terms, as used in the preamble.
They next rely, in support of their theory, on the expression— “ordained and established this constitution.” They admit that the constitution, in its incipient state, assumed the form of a compact; but contend that, “ordained and established,” as applied to the constitution and government, are incompatible with the idea of compact; that, consequently, the instrument or plan lost its federative character when it was ordained and established as a constitution; and, thus, the States ceased to be parties to a compact, and members of a confederated union, and became fused into one common community, or nation, as subordinate and dependent divisions or corporations.
I do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether there is any incompatibility between the terms— “ordained and established” —and that of “compact,” on which the whole argument rests; although it would be no difficult task to show that it is a gratuitous assumption, without any foundation whatever for its support. It is sufficient for my purpose, to show, that the assumption is wholly inconsistent with the constitution itself—as much so, as the conclusion drawn from it has been shown to be inconsistent with the opinion of the convention which formed it. Very little will be required, after what has been already stated, to establish what I propose.
That the constitution regards itself in the light of a compact, still existing between the States, after it was ordained and established; that it regards the union, then existing, as still existing; and the several States, of course, still members of it, in their original character of confederated States, is clear. Its seventh article, so often referred to, in connection with the arguments drawn from the preamble, sufficiently establishes all these points, without adducing others; except that which relates to the continuance of the union. To establish this, it will not be necessary to travel out of the preamble and the letter of the convention, laying the plan of the constitution before the Congress of the confederation. In enumerating the objects for which the constitution was ordained and established, the preamble places at the head of the rest, as its leading object— “to form a more perfect union.” So far, then, are the terms— “ordained and established,” from being incompatible with the union, or having the effect of destroying it, the constitution itself declares that it was intended, “to form a more perfect union.” This, of itself, is sufficient to refute the assertion of their incompatibility. But it is proper here to remark, that it could not have been intended, by the expression in the preamble— “to form a more perfect union” —to declare, that the old was abolished, and a new and more perfect union established in its place: for we have the authority of the convention which formed the constitution, to prove that their object was to continue the then existing union. In their letter, laying it before Congress, they say— “In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us, the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our union.” “Our union,” can refer to no other than the then existing union—the old union of the confederacy, and of the revolutionary government which preceded it—of which these States were confederated members. This must, of course, have been the union to which the framers referred in the preamble. It was this, accordingly, which the constitution intended to make more perfect; just as the confederacy made more perfect, that of the revolutionary government. Nor is there any thing in the term, “consolidation,” used by the convention, calculated to weaken the conclusion. It is a strong expression; but as strong as it is, it certainly was not intended to imply the destruction of the union, as it is supposed to do by the advocates of a national government; for that would have been incompatible with the context, as well as with the continuance of the union—which the sentence and the entire letter imply. Interpreted, then, in conjunction with the expression used in the preamble— “to form a more perfect union” —although it may more strongly intimate closeness of connection; it can imply nothing incompatible with the professed object of perfecting the union—still less a meaning and effect wholly inconsistent with the nature of a confederated community. For to adopt the interpretation contended for, to its full extent, would be to destroy the union, and not to consolidate and perfect it.
If we turn from the preamble and the ratifications, to the body of the constitution, we shall find that it furnishes most conclusive proof that the government is federal, and not national. I can discover nothing, in any portion of it, which gives the least countenance to the opposite conclusion. On the contrary, the instrument, in all its parts, repels it. It is, throughout, federal. It every where recognizes the existence of the States, and invokes their aid to carry its powers into execution. In one of the two houses of Congress, the members are elected by the legislatures of their respective States; and in the other, by the people of the several States, not as composing mere districts of one great community, but as distinct and independent communities. General Washington vetoed the first act apportioning the members of the House of Representatives among the several States, under the first census, expressly on the ground, that the act assumed as its basis, the former, and not the latter construction. The President and Vice-President are chosen by electors, appointed by their respective States; and, finally, the Judges are appointed by the President and the Senate; and, of course, as these are elected by the States, they are appointed through their agency.
But, however strong be the proofs of its federal character derived from this source, that portion which provides for the amendment of the constitution, furnishes, if possible, still stronger. It shows, conclusively, that the people of the several States still retain that supreme ultimate power, called sovereignty—the power by which they ordained and established the constitution; and which can rightfully create, modify, amend, or abolish it, at its pleasure. Wherever this power resides, there the sovereignty is to be found. That it still continues to exist in the several States, in a modified form, is clearly shown by the fifth article of the constitution, which provides for its amendment. By its provisions, Congress may propose amendments, on its own authority, by the vote of two-thirds of both houses; or it may be compelled to call a convention to propose them, by two-thirds of the legislatures of the several States: but, in either case, they remain, when thus made, mere proposals of no validity, until adopted by three-fourths of the States, through their respective legislatures; or by conventions, called by them, for the purpose. Thus far, the several States, in ordaining and establishing the constitution, agreed, for their mutual convenience and advantage, to modify, by compact, their high sovereign power of creating and establishing constitutions, as far as it related to the constitution and government of the United States. I say, for their mutual convenience and advantage; for without the modification, it would have required the separate consent of all the States of the Union to alter or amend their constitutional compact; in like manner as it required the consent of all to establish it between them; and to obviate the almost insuperable difficulty of making such amendments as time and experience might prove to be necessary, by the unanimous consent of all, they agreed to make the modification. But that they did not intend, by this, to divest themselves of the high sovereign right (a right which they still retain, notwithstanding the modification) to change or abolish the present constitution and government at their pleasure, cannot be doubted. It is an acknowledged principle, that sovereigns may, by compact, modify or qualify the exercise of their power, without impairing their sovereignty; of which, the confederacy existing at the time, furnishes a striking illustration. It must reside, unimpaired and in its plentitude, somewhere. And if it do not reside in the people of the several States, in their confederated character, where—so far as it relates to the constitution and government of the United States—can it be found? Not, certainly, in the government; for, according to our theory, sovereignty resides in the people, and not in the government. That it cannot be found in the people, taken in the aggregate, as forming one community or nation, is equally certain. But as certain as it cannot, just so certain is it, that it must reside in the people of the several States: and if it reside in them at all, it must reside in them as separate and distinct communities; for it has been shown, that it does not reside in them in the aggregate, as forming one community or nation. These are the only aspects under which it is possible to regard the people; and, just as certain as it resides in them, in that character, so certain is it that ours is a federal, and not a national government.
The theory of the nationality of the government, is, in fact, founded on fiction. It is of recent origin. Few, even yet, venture to avow it to its full extent; while they entertain doctrines, which spring from, and must necessarily terminate in it. They admit that the people of the several States form separate, independent, and sovereign communities—and that, to this extent, the constitution is federal; but beyond this, and to the extent of the delegated powers—regarding them as forming one people or nation, they maintain that the constitution is national.
Now, unreasonable as is the theory that it is wholly national, this, if possible, is still more so; for the one, although against reason and recorded evidence, is possible; but the other, while equally against both, is absolutely impossible. It involves the absurdity of making the constitution federal in reference to a class of powers, which are expressly excluded from it; and, by consequence, from the compact itself, into which the several States entered when they established it. The term, “federal,” implies a league—and this, a compact between sovereign communities; and, of course, it is impossible for the States to be federal, in reference to powers expressly reserved to them in their character of separate States, and not included in the compact. If the States are national at all—or, to express it more definitely—if they form a nation at all, it must be in reference to the delegated, and not the reserved powers. But it has already been established that, as to these, they have no such character—no such existence. It is, however, proper to remark, that while it is impossible for them to be federal, as to their reserved powers, they could not be federal without them. For had all the powers of government been delegated, the separate constitutions and governments of the several States would have been superseded and destroyed; and what is now called the constitution and government of the United States, would have become the sole constitution and government of the whole—the effect of which, would have been to supersede and destroy the States themselves. The people respectively composing them, instead of constituting political communities, having appropriate organs to will and to act—which is indispensable to the existence of a State—would, in such case, be divested of all such organs; and, by consequence, reduced into an unorganized mass of individuals—as far as related to the respective States—and merged into one community or nation, having but one constitution and government as the organ, through which to will and to act. The idea, indeed, of a federal constitution and government, necessarily implies reserved and delegated powers—powers reserved in part, to be exercised exclusively by the States in their original separate character—and powers delegated, by mutual agreement, to be exercised jointly by a common council or government. And hence, consolidation and disunion are, equally, destructive of such government—one by merging the States composing the Union into one community or nation; and the other, by resolving them into their original elements, as separate and disconnected States.
It is difficult to imagine how a doctrine so perfectly absurd, as that the States are federal as to the reserved, and national as to the delegated powers, could have originated; except through a misconception of the meaning of certain terms, sometimes used to designate the latter. They are sometimes called granted powers; and at others, are said to be powers surrendered by the States. When these expressions are used without reference to the fact, that all powers, under our system of government, are trust powers, they imply that the States have parted with such as are said to be granted or surrendered, absolutely and irrecoverably. The case is different when applied to them as trust powers. They then become identical, in their meaning, with delegated powers; for to grant a power in trust, is what is meant by delegating it. It is not, therefore, surprising, that they who do not bear in mind that all powers of government are, with us, trust powers, should conclude that the powers said to be granted and surrendered by the States, are absolutely transferred from them to the government of the United States—as is sometimes alleged—or to the people as constituting one nation, as is more usually understood—and, thence, to infer that the government is national to the extent of the granted powers.
But that such inference and conclusion are utterly unwarrantable—that the powers in the constitution called granted powers, are, in fact, delegated powers—powers granted in trust—and not absolutely transferred—we have, in addition to the reasons just stated, the clear and decisive authority of the constitution itself. Its tenth amended article provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
In order to understand the full force of this provision, it is necessary to state that this is one of the amended articles, adopted at the recommendation of several of the conventions of the States, contemporaneously with the ratification of the constitution—in order to supply what were thought to be its defects—and to guard against misconceptions of its meaning. It is admitted, that its principal object was to prevent the reserved from being drawn within the sphere of the granted powers, by the force of construction—a danger, which, at the time, excited great, and, as experience has proved, just apprehension. But in guarding against this danger, care was also taken to guard against others—and among them, against mistakes, as to whom powers were granted, and to whom they were reserved. The former was done by using the expression, “the powers not delegated to the United States,” which, by necessary implication means, that the powers granted are delegated to them in their confederated character—and the latter, by the remaining portion of the article, which provides that such powers “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"—meaning clearly by, “respectively,” that the reservation was to the several States and people in their separate character, and not to the whole, as formin gone people or nation. They thus repudiate nationality, applied either to the delegated or to reserved powers.
But it may be asked—why was the reservation made both to the States and to the people? The answer is to be found in the fact, that, what are called, “reserved powers,” in the constitution of the United States, include all powers not delegated to Congress by it—or prohibited by it to the States. The powers thus designated are divided into two distinct classes—those delegated by the people of the several States to their separate State governments, and those which they still retain—not having delegated them to either government. Among them is included the high sovereign power, by which they ordained and established both; and by which they can modify, change or abolish them at pleasure. This, with others not delegated, are those which are reserved to the people of the several States respectively.
But the article in its precaution, goes further—and takes care to guard against the term, “granted,” used in the first article and first section of the constitution, which provides that, “all legislative powers herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” —as well as against other terms of like import used in other parts of the instrument. It guarded against it, indirectly, by substituting, “delegated,” in the place of “granted” —and instead of declaring that the powers not “granted,” are reserved, it declares that the powers not “delegated,” are reserved. Both terms— “granted,” used in the constitution as it came from its framers, and “delegated,” used in the amendments—evidently refer to the same class of powers; and no reason can be assigned, why the amendment substituted “delegated,” in the place of “granted,” but to free it from its ambiguity, and to provide against misconstruction.
It is only by considering the granted powers, in their true character of trust or delegated powers, that all the various parts of our complicated system of government can be harmonized and explained. Thus regarded, it will be easy to perceive how the people of the several States could grant certain powers to a joint—or, as its framers called it—a general government, in trust, to be exercised for their common benefit, without an absolute surrender of them—or without impairing their independence and sovereignty. Regarding them in the opposite light, as powers absolutely surrendered and irrevocably transferred, inexplicable difficulties present themselves. Among the first, is that which springs from the idea of divided sovereignty; involving the perplexing question—how the people of the several States can be partly sovereign, and partly, not sovereign—sovereign as to the reserved—and not sovereign, as to the delegated powers? There is no difficulty in understanding how powers, appertaining to sovereignty, may be divided; and the exercise of one portion delegated to one set of agents, and another portion to another: or how sovereignty may be vested in one man, or in a few, or in many. But how sovereignty itself—the supreme power—can be divided—how the people of the several States can be partly sovereign, and partly not sovereign—partly supreme, and partly not supreme, it is impossible to conceive. Sovereignty is an entire thing—to divide, is—to destroy it.
But suppose this difficulty surmounted—another not less perplexing remains. If sovereignty be surrendered and transferred, in part or entirely, by the several States, it must be transferred to somebody; and the question is, to whom? Not, certainly, to the government—as has been thoughtlessly asserted by some; for that would subvert the fundamental principle of our system—that sovereignty resides in the people. But if not to the government, it must be transferred—if at all—to the people, regarded in the aggregate, as a nation. But this is opposed, not only by a force of reason which cannot be resisted, but by the preamble and tenth amended article of the constitution, as has just been shown. If then it be transferred neither to the one nor the other, it cannot be transferred at all; as it is impossible to conceive to whom else the transfer could have been made. It must, therefore, and of course, remain unsurrendered and unimpaired in the people of the several States—to whom, it is admitted, it appertained when the constitution was adopted.
Having now established that the powers delegated to the United States, were delegated to them in their confederated character, it remains to be explained in what sense they were thus delegated. The constitution here, as in almost all cases, where it is fairly interpreted, furnishes the explanation necessary to expel doubt. Its first article, already cited, affords it in this case. It declares that “all legislative power herein granted (delegated), shall be vested in the Congress of the United States;” that is, in the Congress for the time being. It also declares, that “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the United States” —and that “the judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, and such inferior courts, as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.” They are then delegated to the United States, by vesting them in the respective departments of the government, to which they appropriately belong; to be exercised by the government of the United States, as their joint agent and representative, in their confederated character. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive how else it could be delegated to them—or in what other way they could mutually participate in the exercise of the powers delegated. It has, indeed, been construed by some to mean, that each State, reciprocally and mutually, delegated to each other, the portion of its sovereignty embracing the delegated powers. But besides the difficulty of a divided sovereignty, which it would involve, the expression, “delegated powers,” repels that construction. If, however, there should still remain a doubt, the articles of confederation would furnish conclusive proof of the truth of that construction which I have placed upon the constitution; and, also, that not a particle of sovereignty was intended to be transferred, by delegating the powers conferred on the different departments of the government of the United States. I refer to its second article—so often referred to already. It declares, as will be remembered, that—"each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence; and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” The powers delegated by it were, therefore, delegated, like those of the present constitution, to the United States. The only difference is, that “the United States,” is followed, in the articles of confederation, by the words— “in Congress assembled” —which are omitted in the parallel expression in the amended article of the constitution. But this omission is supplied in it, by the first article, and by others of a similar character, already referred to; and by vesting the powers delegated to the United States, in the respective appropriate departments of the government. The reason of the difference is plain. The constitution could not vest them in Congress alone—because there were portions of the delegated powers vested also in the other departments of the government: while the articles of confederation could, with propriety, vest them in Congress—as it was the sole representative of the confederacy. Nor could it vest them in the government of the United States; for that would imply that the powers were vested in the whole, as a unit—and not, as the fact is, in its separate departments. The constitution, therefore, in borrowing this provision from the articles of confederation, adopted the mode best calculated to express the same thing that was expressed in the latter, by the words— “in Congress assembled.” That the articles of confederation, in delegating powers to the United States, did not intend to declare that the several States had parted with any portion of their sovereignty, is placed beyond doubt by the declaration contained in them, that—"each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence;” and it may be fairly inferred, that the framers of the constitution, in borrowing this expression, did not design that it should bear a different interpretation.
If it be possible still to doubt that the several States retained their sovereignty and independence unimpaired, strong additional arguments might be drawn from various other portions of the instrument—especially from the third article, section third, which declares, that— “treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.” It might be easily shown that— “the United States” —mean here—as they do everywhere in the constitution—the several States in their confederated character—that treason against them, is treason against their joint sovereignty—and, of course, as much treason against each State, as the act would be against any one of them, in its individual and separate character. But I forbear. Enough has already been said to place the question beyond controversy.
Having now established that the constitution is federal throughout, in contradistinction to national; and that the several States still retain their sovereignty and independence unimpaired, one would suppose that the conclusion would follow, irresistibly, in the judgment of all, that the government is also federal. But such is not the case. There are those, who admit the constitution to be entirely federal, but insist that the government is partly federal, and partly national. They rest their opinion on the authority of the “Federalist.” That celebrated work comes to this conclusion, after explicitly admitting that the constitution was ratified and adopted by the people of the several States, and not by them as individuals composing one entire nation—that the act establishing the constitution is, itself, a federal, and not a national act—that it resulted neither from the act of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from a majority of the States; but from the unanimous assent of the several States—differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than as being given, not by their legislatures, but by the people themselves—that they are parties to it—that each State, in ratifying it, was considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and is bound only by its own voluntary act—that, in consequence, the constitution itself is federal and not national—that, if it had been formed by the people as one nation or community, the will of the majority of the whole people of the Union would have bound the minority—that the idea of a national government involves in it, not only authority over individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government—that among the people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the government; that State governments, and all local authorities, are subordinate to it, and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure—and, finally, that the States are regarded, by the constitution, as distinct, independent, and sovereign.2
How strange, after all these admissions, is the conclusion that the government is partly federal and partly national! It is the constitution which determines the character of the government. It is impossible to conceive how the constitution can be exclusively federal (as it is admitted, and has been clearly proved to be) and the government partly federal and partly national. It would be just as easy to conceive how a constitution can be exclusively monarchical, and the government partly monarchical, and partly aristocratic or popular; and vice versa. Monarchy is not more strongly distinguished from either, than a federal is from a national government. Indeed, these are even more adverse to each other; for the other forms may be blended in the constitution and the government; while, as has been shown, and as is indirectly admitted by the work referred to, the one of these so excludes the other, that it is impossible to blend them in the same constitution, and, of course, in the same government. I say, indirectly admitted, for it admits, that a federal government is one to which States are parties, in their distinct, independent, and sovereign character; and that— “the idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government” —and, “that it is one, in which all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme, and may be controlled, directed, and abolished by it at pleasure.” How, then, is it possible for institutions, admitted to be so utterly repugnant in their nature as to be directly destructive of each other, to be so blended as to form a government partly federal and partly national? What can be more contradictious? This, of itself, is sufficient to destroy the authority of the work on this point—as celebrated as it is—without showing, as might be done, that the admissions it makes throughout, are, in like manner, in direct contradiction to the conclusions, to which it comes.
But, strange as such a conclusion is, after such admissions, it is not more strange than the reasons assigned for it. The first, and leading one—that on which it mainly relies—is drawn from the source whence, as it alleges, the powers of the government are derived. It states, that the House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of “America;” and adds, by way of confirmation, “The people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislatures of each particular State” —and hence concludes that it would be national and not federal. Is the fact so? Does the House of Representatives really derive its powers from the people of America?—that is, from the people in the aggregate, as forming one nation; for such must be the meaning—to give the least force, or even plausibility, to the assertion. Is it not a fundamental principle, and universally admitted—admitted even by the authors themselves—that all the powers of the government are derived from the constitution—including those of the House of Representatives, as well as others? And does not this celebrated work admit—most explicitly, and in the fullest manner—that the constitution derives all its powers and authority from the people of the several States, acting, each for itself, in their independent and sovereign character as States? that they still retain the same character, and, as such, are parties to it? and that it is a federal, and not a national, constitution? How, then, can it assert, in the face of such admissions, that the House of Representatives derives its authority from the American people, in the aggregate, as forming one people or nation? To give color to the assertion, it affirms, that the people will be represented on the same principle, and in the same proportion, as they are in the legislature of each particular State. Are either of these propositions true? On the contrary, is it not universally known and admitted, that they are represented in the legislature of every State of the Union, as mere individuals—and, by election districts, entirely subordinate to the government of the State—while the members of the House of Representatives are elected—be the mode of election what it may—as delegates of the several States, in their distinct, independent, and sovereign character, as members of the Union—and not as delegates from the States, considered as mere election districts? It was on this ground, as has been stated, that President Washington vetoed the act to apportion the members, under the first census, among the several States; and his opinion has, ever since, been acquiesced in.
Neither is it true that the people of each State are represented in the House of Representatives in the same proportion as in their respective legislatures. On the contrary, they are represented in the former according to one uniform ratio proportion among the several States, fixed by the constitution itself;3 while in each State legislature, the ratio, fixed by its separate State constitution, is different in different States—and in scarcely any are they represented in the same proportion in the legislature, as in the House of Representatives. The only point of uniformity in this respect is, that “the electors of the House of Representatives shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures;4 a rule which favors the federal, and not the national character of the government.
The authors of the work conclude, on the same affirmation—and by a similar course of reasoning—that the executive department of the government is partly national, and partly federal— federal, so far as the number of electors of each State, in the election of President, depends on its Senatorial representation—and so far as the final election (when no choice is made by the electoral college) depends on the House of Representatives—because they vote and count by the States—and national, so far as the number of its electors depends on its representation in the Lower House. As the argument in support of this proposition is the same as that relied on to prove that the House of Representatives is national, I shall pass it by with a single remark. It overlooks the fact that the electors, by an express provision of the constitution, are appointed by the several States;5 and, of course, derive their powers from them. It would, therefore, seem, according to their course of reasoning, that the executive department, when the election is made by the colleges, ought to be regarded as federal —while, on the other hand, when it is made by the House of Representatives, in the event of a failure on the part of the electors to make a choice, it ought to be regarded as national, and not federal, as they contend. It would, indeed, seem to involve a strange confusion of ideas to make the same department partly federal and partly national, on such a process of reasoning. It indicates a deep and radical error somewhere in the conception of the able authors of the work, in reference to a question the most vital that can arise under our system of government.
The next reason assigned is, that the government will operate on individuals composing the several States, and not on the States themselves. This, however, is very little relied on. It admits that even a confederacy may operate on individuals without losing its character as such—and cites the articles of confederation in illustration; and it might have added, that mere treaties, in some instances, operate in the same way. It is readily conceded that one of the strongest characteristics of a confederacy is, that it usually operates on the states or communities which compose it, in their corporate capacity. When it operates on individuals, it departs, to that extent, from its appropriate sphere. But this is not the case with a federal government—as will be shown when I come to draw the line of distinction between it and a confederacy. The argument, then, might be appropriate to prove that the government is not a confederacy—but not that it is a national government.
It next relies on the amending power to prove that it is partly national and partly federal. It states that— “were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in a majority of the people of the whole Union; and this authority would be competent, at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to any alteration, that would be binding on all.” It is remarkable how often this celebrated work changes its ground, as to what constitutes a national, and what a federal government—and this, too, after defining them in the clearest and most precise manner. It tells us, in this instance, that were the government wholly national—the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the people of the Union; and, of course, such a government must derive its authority from that source. It tells us, elsewhere, that a federal government is one, to which the States, in their distinct, independent and sovereign character, are parties—and, of course, such a government must derive its authority from them as its source. A government, then, to be partly one, and partly the other, ought, accordingly, to derive its authority partly from the one, and partly from the other; and no government could be so, which did not—and yet we are told, at one time, that the constitution is federal, because it derived its authority, neither from the majority of the people of the Union, nor a majority of the States—implying, of course, that a government, which derived its authority from a majority of the States, would be national; as well as that which derived it from a majority of the people—and, at another, that the election of the President by the House of Representatives would be a federal act—although the House, itself, is national, because it derived its authority from the American people. And now we are told, that the amending power is partly national, because three-fourths of the States, voting as States, without regard to population, can, instead of the whole, amend the constitution; although the vote of a majority of the House of Representatives, taken by States, made the election of the President, to that extent, federal. If we turn from this confusion of ideas, to its own clear conceptions of what makes a federal, and what a national government, nothing is more evident than that the amending power is not derived from, nor exercised under the authority of the people of the Union, regarded in the aggregate—but from the several States, in their original, distinct and sovereign character; and that it is but a modification of the original creating power, by which the constitution was ordained and established—and which required the consent of each State to make it a party to it—and not a negation or inhibition of that power—as has been shown. In support of these views, it endeavors to show, by reasons equally unsatisfactory and inconclusive, that the object of the convention which framed the constitution was, to establish, “a firm national government.” To ascertain the powers and objects of the convention, reference ought to be made, one would suppose, to the commissions given to their respective delegates, by the several States, which were represented in it. If that had been done, it would have been found that no State gave the slightest authority to its delegates to form a national government, or made the least allusion to such government as one of its objects. The word, National, is not even used in any one of the commissions. On the contrary, they designate the objects to be, to revise the federal constitution, and to make it adequate to the exigencies of the Union. But, instead of to these, the authors of this work resort to the act of Congress referring the proposition for calling a convention, to the several States, in conformity with the recommendation of the Annapolis convention—which, of itself, could give no authority. And further—even in this reference, they obviously rely, rather on the preamble of the act, than on the resolution adopted by Congress, submitting the proposition to the State governments. The preamble and resolution are in the following words— “Whereas, there is a provision, in the articles of confederation and perpetual union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States and of the legislatures of the several States—and, whereas, experience has evinced that there are defects in the present confederation—as a mean to the remedy of which, several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by express instruction to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purpose expressed in the following resolution, and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing, in the States, a firm National Government,
Resolved, That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient that, on the second Monday of May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held in Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation; and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein as shall render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the government and the preservation of the Union. ”
Now, assuming that the mere opinion of Congress, and not the commissions of the delegates from the several States, ought to determine the object of the convention—is it not manifest, that it is clearly in favor, not of establishing a firm national government, but of simply revising the articles of confederation for the purposes specified? Can any expression be more explicit than the declaration contained in the resolution, that the convention shall be held, “for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of confederation?” If to this it be added, that the commissions of the delegates of the several States, accord with the resolution, there can be no doubt that the real object of the convention was—(to use the language of the resolution)— “to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the government and the preservation of the Union;” and not to establish a national constitution and government in its place—and, that such was the impression of the convention itself, the fact (admitted by the work) that they did establish a federal, and not a national constitution, conclusively proves.
How the distinguished and patriotic authors of this celebrated work fell—against their own clear and explicit admissions—into an error so radical and dangerous—one which has contributed, more than all others combined, to cast a mist over our system of government, and to confound and lead astray the minds of the community as to a true conception of its real character, cannot be accounted for, without adverting to their history and opinions as connected with the formation of the constitution. The two principal writers were prominent members of the convention; and leaders, in that body, of the party, which supported the plan for a national government. The other, although not a member, is known to have belonged to the same party. They all acquiesced in the decision, which overruled their favorite plan, and determined, patriotically, to give that adopted by the convention, a fair trial; without, however, surrendering their preference for their own scheme of a national government. It was in this state of mind, which could not fail to exercise a strong influence over their judgments, that they wrote the Federalist: and, on all questions connected with the character of the government, due allowance should be made for the force of the bias, under which their opinions were formed.
From all that has been stated, the inference follows, irresistibly, that the government is a federal, in contradistinction to a national government—a government formed by the States; ordained and established by the States, and for the States—without any participation or agency whatever, on the part of the people, regarded in the aggregate as forming a nation; that it is throughout, in whole, and in every part, simply and purely federal— “the federal government of these States” —as is accurately and concisely expressed by General Washington, the organ of the convention, in his letter laying it before the old Congress—words carefully selected, and with a full and accurate knowledge of their import. There is, indeed, no such community, politically speaking, as the people of the United States, regarded in the light of, and as constituting one people or nation. There never has been any such, in any stage of their existence; and, of course, they neither could, nor ever can exercise any agency—or have any participation, in the formation of our system of government, or its administration. In all its parts—including the federal as well as the separate State governments, it emanated from the same source—the people of the several States. The whole, taken together, form a federal community—a community composed of States united by a political compact—and not a nation composed of individuals united by, what is called, a social compact.
I shall next proceed to show that it is federal, in contradistinction to a confederacy.
It differs and agrees, but in opposite respects, with a national government, and a confederacy. It differs from the former, inasmuch as it has, for its basis, a confederacy, and not a nation; and agrees with it in being a government: while it agrees with the latter, to the extent of having a confederacy for its basis, and differs from it, inasmuch as the powers delegated to it are carried into execution by a government—and not by a mere congress of delegates, as is the case in a confederacy. To be more full and explicit—a federal government, though based on a confederacy, is, to the extent of the powers delegated, as much a government as a national government itself. It possesses, to this extent, all the authorities possessed by the latter, and as fully and perfectly. The case is different with a confederacy; for, although it is sometimes called a government —its Congress, or Council, or the body representing it, by whatever name it may be called, is much more nearly allied to an assembly of diplomatists, convened to deliberate and determine how a league or treaty between their several sovereigns, for certain defined purposes, shall be carried into execution; leaving to the parties themselves, to furnish their quota of means, and to cooperate in carrying out what may have been determined on. Such was the character of the Congress of our confederacy; and such, substantially, was that of similar bodies in all confederated communities, which preceded our present government. Our system is the first that ever substituted a government in lieu of such bodies. This, in fact, constitutes its peculiar characteristic. It is new, peculiar, and unprecedented.
In asserting that such is the difference between our present government and the confederacy, which it superseded, I am supported by the authority of the convention which framed the constitution. It is to be found in the second paragraph of their letter, already cited. After stating the great extent of powers, which it was deemed necessary to delegate to the United States—or as they expressed it— “the general government of the Union” —the paragraph concludes in the following words: “But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trusts to one body of men (the Congress of the confederacy) is evident; and hence results the necessity of a different organization.” This “different organization,” consisted in substituting a government in place of the Congress of the confederation; and was, in fact, the great and essential change made by the convention. All others were, relatively, of little importance—consisting rather in the modification of its language, and the mode of executing its powers, made necessary by it—than in the powers themselves. The restrictions and limitations imposed on the powers delegated, and on the several States, are much the same in both. The change, though the only essential one, was, of itself, important, viewed in relation to the structure of the system; but it was much more so, when considered in its consequences as necessarily implying and involving others of great magnitude; as I shall next proceed to show.
It involved, in the first place, an important change in the source whence it became necessary to derive the delegated powers, and the authority by which the instrument delegating them should be ratified. Those of the confederacy were derived from the governments of the several States. They delegated them, and ratified the instrument by which they were delegated, through their representatives in Congress assembled, and duly authorized for the purpose. It was, then, their work throughout; and their powers were fully competent to it. They possessed, as a confederate council, the power of making compacts and treaties, and of constituting the necessary agency to superintend their execution. The articles of confederation and union constituted, indeed, a solemn league or compact, entered into for the purposes specified; and Congress was but the joint agent or representative appointed to superintend its execution. But the governments of the several States could go no further, and were wholly deficient in the requisite power to form a constitution and government in their stead. That could only be done by the sovereign power; and that power, according to the fundamental principles of our system, resides, not in the government, but exclusively in the people—who, with us, mean the people of the several States—and hence, the powers delegated to the government had to be derived from them—and the constitution to be ratified, and ordained and established by them. How this was done has already been fully explained.
It involved, in the next place, an important change in the character of the system. It had previously been, in reality, a league between the governments of the several States; or to express it more fully and accurately, between the States, through the organs of their respective governments; but it became a union, in consequence of being ordained and established between the people of the several States, by themselves, and for themselves, in their character of sovereign and independent communities. It was this important change which (to use the language of the preamble of the constitution) “formed a more perfect union.” It, in fact, perfected it. It could not be extended further, or be made more intimate. To have gone a step beyond, would have been to consolidate the States, and not the Union—and thereby to have destroyed the latter.
It involved another change, growing out of the division of the powers of government, between the United States and the separate States—requiring that those delegated to the former should be carefully enumerated and specified, in order to prevent collision between them and the powers reserved to the several States respectively. There was no necessity for such great caution under the confederacy, as its Congress could exercise little power, except through the States, and with their co-operation. Hence the care, circumspection and precision, with which the grants of powers are made in the one, and the comparatively loose, general, and more indefinite manner in which they are made in the other.
It involved another, intimately connected with the preceding, and of great importance. It entirely changed the relation which the separate governments of the States sustained to the body, which represented them in their confederated character, under the confederacy; for this was essentially different from that which they now sustain to the government of the United States, their present representative. The governments of the States sustained, to the former, the relation of superior to subordinate—of the creator to the creature; while they now sustain, to the latter, the relation of equals and co-ordinates. Both governments—that of the United States and those of the separate States, derive their powers from the same source, and were ordained and established by the same authority—the only difference being, that in ordaining and establishing the one, the people of several States acted with concert or mutual understanding—while, in ordaining and establishing the others, the people of each State acted separately, and without concert or mutual understanding—as has been fully explained. Deriving their respective powers, then, from the same source, and being ordained and established by the same authority—the two governments, State and Federal, must, of necessity, be equal in their respective spheres; and both being ordained and established by the people of the States, respectively—each for itself, and by its own separate authority—the constitution and government of the United States must, of necessity, be the constitution and government of each—as much so as its own separate and individual constitution and government; and, therefore, they must stand, in each State, in the relation of co-ordinate constitutions and governments. It is on this ground only, that the former is the constitution and government of all the States—not because it is the constitution and government of the whole, considered in the aggregate as constituting one nation, but because it is the constitution and government of each respectively: for to suppose that they are the constitution and government of each, because of the whole, would be to assume, what is not true, that they were ordained and established by the American people in the aggregate, as forming one nation. This would be to reduce the several States to subordinate and local divisions; and to convert their separate constitutions and governments into mere charters and subordinate corporations: when, in truth and fact, they are equals and co-ordinates.
It, finally, involved a great change in the manner of carrying into execution the delegated powers. As a government, it was necessary to clothe it with the attribute of deciding, in the first instance, on the extent of its powers—and of acting on individuals, directly, in carrying them into execution; instead of appealing to the agency of the governments of the States—as was the case with the Congress of the confederacy.
Such are the essential distinctions between a federal government and a confederacy—and such, in part, the important changes necessarily involved, in substituting a government, in the place of the Congress of the confederacy.
It now remains to be shown, that the government is a republic—a republic—or (if the expression be preferred) a constitutional democracy, in contradistinction to an absolute democracy.
It is not an uncommon impression, that the government of the United States is a government based simply on population; that numbers are its only element, and a numerical majority its only controlling power. In brief, that it is an absolute democracy. No opinion can be more erroneous. So far from being true, it is, in all the aspects in which it can be regarded, preeminently a government of the concurrent majority: with an organization, more complex and refined, indeed, but far better calculated to express the sense of the whole (in the only mode by which this can be fully and truly done—to wit, by ascertaining the sense of all its parts) than any government ever formed, ancient or modern. Instead of population, mere numbers, being the sole element, the numerical majority is, strictly speaking, excluded, even as one of its elements; as I shall proceed to establish, by an appeal to figures; beginning with the formation of the constitution, regarded as the fundamental law which ordained and established the government; and closing with the organization of the government itself, regarded as the agent or trustee to carry its powers into effect.
I shall pass by the Annapolis convention, on whose application, the convention which framed the constitution, was called; because it was a partial and informal meeting of delegates from a few States; and commence with the Congress of the confederation, by whom it was authoritatively called. That Congress derived its authority from the articles of confederation; and these, from the unanimous agreement of all the States—and not from the numerical majority, either of the several States, or of their population. It voted, as has been stated, by delegations; each counting one. A majority of each delegation, with a few important exceptions, decided the vote of its respective State. Each State, without regard to population, had thus an equal vote. The confederacy consisted of thirteen States; and, of course, it was in the power of any seven of the smallest, as well as the largest, to defeat the call of the convention; and, by consequence, the formation of the constitution.
By the first census, taken in 1790—three years after the call—the population of the United States amounted to 3,394,563, estimated in federal numbers. Assuming this to have been the whole amount of its population at the time of the call (which can cause no material error) the population of the seven smallest States was 959,801; or less than one-third of the whole: so that, less than one-third of the population could have defeated the call of the convention.
The convention voted, in like manner, by States; and it required the votes of a majority of the delegations present, to adopt the measure. There were twelve States represented—Rhode Island being absent—so that the votes of seven delegations were required; and, of course, less than one-third of the population of the whole, could have defeated the formation of the constitution.
The plan, when adopted by the convention, had again to be submitted to Congress—and to receive its sanction, before it could be submitted to the several States for their approval—a necessary preliminary to its final reference to the conventions of the people of the several States for their ratification. It had thus, of course, to pass again the ordeal of Congress; when the delegations of seven of the smallest States, representing less than one-third of the population, could again have defeated, by refusing to submit it for their consideration. And, stronger still—when submitted, it required, by an express provision, the concurrence of nine of the thirteen, to establish it, between the States ratifying it; which put it in the power of any four States, the smallest as well as the largest, to reject it. The four smallest, to wit: Delaware, Rhode Island, Georgia, and New Hampshire, contained, by the census of 1790, a federal population of only 336,948—but a little more than one-eleventh of the whole: but, as inconsiderable as was their population, they could have defeated it, by preventing its ratification. It thus appears, that the numerical majority of the population, had no agency whatever in the process of forming and adopting the constitution; and that neither this, nor a majority of the States, constituted an element in its ratification and adoption.
In the provision for its amendment, it prescribes, as has been stated, two modes—one, by two-thirds of both houses of Congress; and the other, by a convention of delegates from the States, called by Congress, on the application of two-thirds of their respective legislatures. But, in neither case can the proposed amendment become a part of the constitution, unless ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, or by conventions of the people of three-fourths—as Congress may prescribe; so that, in the one, it requires the consent of two-thirds of the States to propose amendments—and, in both cases, of three-fourths to adopt and ratify them, before they can become a part of the constitution. As there are, at present, thirty States in the Union, it will take twenty to propose, and, of course, would require but eleven to defeat, a proposition to amend the constitution; or, nineteen votes in the Senate—if it should originate in Congress—and the votes of eleven legislatures, if it should be to call a convention. By the census of 1840, the federal population of all the States—including the three, which were then territories, but which have since become States—was 16,077,604. To this add Texas, since admitted, say 110,000—making the aggregate, 16,187,604. Of this amount, the eleven smallest States (Vermont being the largest of the number) contained a federal population of but 1,638,521: and yet they can prevent the other nineteen States, with a federal population of 14,549,082, from even proposing amendments to the constitution: while the twenty smallest (of which Maine is the largest) with a federal population of 3,526,811, can compel Congress to call a convention to propose amendments, against the united votes of the other ten, with a federal population of 12,660,793. Thus, while less than one-eighth of the population, may, in the one case, prevent the adoption of a proposition to amend the constitution—less than one-fourth can, in the other, adopt it.
But, striking as are these results, the process, when examined with reference to the ratification of proposals to amend, will present others still more so. Here the consent of three-fourths of the States is required; which, with the present number, would make the concurrence of twenty-three States necessary to give effect to the act of ratification; and, of course, puts it in the power of any eight States to defeat a proposal to amend. The federal population of the eight smallest is but 776,969; and yet, small as this is, they can prevent amendments, against the united votes of the other twenty-two, with a federal population of 15,410,635; or nearly twenty times their number. But while so small a portion of the entire population can prevent an amendment, twenty-three of the smallest States—with a federal population of only 7,254,400—can amend the constitution, against the united votes of the other seven, with a federal population of 8,933,204. So that a numerical minority of the population can amend the constitution, against a decided numerical majority; when, at the same time, one-nineteenth of the population can prevent the other eighteen-nineteenths from amending it. And more than this: any one State—Delaware, for instance, with a federal population of only 77,043—can prevent the other twenty-nine States, with a federal population of 16,110,561, from so amending the constitution as to deprive the States of an equality of representation in the Senate. To complete the picture: Sixteen of the smallest States—that is, a majority of them, with a population of only 3,411,672—a little more than one-fifth of the whole—can, in effect, destroy the government and dissolve the Union, by simply declining to appoint Senators; against the united voice of the other fourteen States, with a population of 12,775,932—being but little less than four-fifths of the whole.
These results, resting on calculations, which exclude doubt, incontestably prove—not only that the authority which formed, ratified, and even amended the constitution, regulates entirely the numerical majority, as one of its elements—but furnish additional and conclusive proof, if additional were needed, that ours is a federal government—a government made by the several States; and that States, and not individuals, are its constituents. The States, throughout, in forming, ratifying and amending the constitution, act as equals, without reference to population.
Regarding the Government, apart from the Constitution, and simply as the trustee or agent to carry its powers into execution, the case is somewhat different. It is composed of two elements: One, the States, regarded in their corporate character—and the other, their representative population—estimated in, what is called, “federal numbers” —which is ascertained, “by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years—and excluding Indians not taxed—three-fifths of all others.” 6 These elements, in different proportions, enter into, and constitute all the departments of the government; as will be made apparent by a brief sketch of its organization.
The government is divided into three separate departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The legislative consists of two bodies—the Senate, and the House of Representatives. The two are called the Congress of the United States: and all the legislative powers delegated to the government, are vested in it. The Senate is composed of two members from each State, elected by the legislature thereof, for the term of six years; and the whole number is divided into three classes; of which one goes out at the expiration of every two years. It is the representative of the States, in their corporate character. The members vote per capita, and a majority decides all questions of a legislative character. It has equal power with the House, on all such questions—except that it cannot originate “bills for raising revenue.” In addition to its legislative powers, it participates in the powers of the other two departments. Its advice and consent are necessary to make treaties and appointments; and it constitutes the high tribunal, before which impeachments are tried. In advising and consenting to treaties, and in trials of impeachments, two-thirds are necessary to decide. In case the electoral college fails to choose a Vice-President, the power devolves on the Senate to make the selection from the two candidates having the highest number of votes. In selecting, the members vote by States, and a majority of the States decide. In such cases, two-thirds of the whole number of Senators are necessary to form a quorum.
The House of Representatives is composed of members elected by the people of the several States, for the term of two years. The right of voting for them, in each State, is confined to those who are qualified to vote for the members of the most numerous branch of its own legislature. The number of members is fixed by law, under each census—which is taken every ten years. They are apportioned among the several States, according to their population, estimated in federal numbers; but each State is entitled to have one. The House, in addition to its legislative powers, has the sole power of impeachment; as well as of choosing the President (in case of a failure to elect by the electoral college) from the three candidates, having the greatest number of votes. The members, in such case, vote by States—the vote of each delegation, if not equally divided, counts one, and a majority decides. In all other cases they vote per capita, and the majority decides; except only on a proposition to amend the constitution.
The executive powers are vested in the President of United States. He and the Vice-President, are chosen for the term of four years, by electors, appointed in such manner as the several States may direct. Each State is entitled to a number, equal to the whole number of its Senators and Representatives for the time. The electors vote per capita, in their respective States, on the same day throughout the Union; and a majority of the votes of all the electors is requisite to a choice. In case of a failure to elect, either in reference to the President or Vice-President, the House or the Senate, as the case may be, make the choice, in the manner before stated. If the House fail to choose before the fourth day of March next ensuing—or in case of the removal from office, death, resignation, or inability of the President—the Vice-President acts as President. In addition to the ordinary executive powers, the President has the authority to make treaties and appointments, by, and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and to approve or disapprove all bills before they become laws; as well as all orders, resolutions or votes, to which the concurrence of both houses of Congress is necessary—except on questions of adjournment—before they can take effect. In case of his disapproval, the votes of two-thirds of both houses are necessary to pass them. He is allowed ten days (Sundays not counted) to approve or disapprove; and if he fail to act within that period, the bill, order, resolution or vote (as the case may be) becomes as valid, to all intents and purposes, as if he had signed it; unless Congress, by its adjournment, prevent its return.
The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts, as Congress may establish. The Judges of both are appointed by the President in the manner above stated; and hold their office during good behavior.
The President, Vice-President, Judges, and all the civil officers, are liable to be impeached for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.
From this brief sketch, it is apparent that the States, regarded in their corporate character, and the population of the States, estimated in federal numbers, are the two elements, of which the government is exclusively composed; and that they enter, in different proportions, into the formation of all its departments. In the legislative they enter in equal proportions, and in their most distinct and simple form. Each, in that department, has its appropriate organ; and each acts by its respective majorities—as far as legislation is concerned. No bill, resolution, order, or vote, partaking of the nature of a law, can be adopted without their concurring assent: so that each house has a veto on the other, in all matters of legislation. In the executive they are differently blended. The powers of this department are vested in a single functionary; which made it impossible to give to them separate organs, and concurrent action. In lieu of this, the two elements are blended in the constitution of the college of electors, which chooses the President: but as this gave a decided preponderance to the element of population—because of the greater number of which it was composed—in order to combat and to compensate this advantage—and to preserve, as far as possible, the equipoise between the two, the power was vested in the House, voting by States, to choose him from the three candidates, having the largest number of votes, in case of a failure of choice by the college; and in case of a failure to select by the House, or of removal, death, resignation, or inability, the Vice-President was authorized to act as President. These provisions gave a preponderance, even more decided, to the other element, in the eventual choice. This was still more striking as the constitution stood at its adoption. It originally provided that each elector should vote for two candidates, without designating which should be the President, or which the Vice-President; the person having the highest number of votes to be the President, if it should be a majority of the whole number given. If there should be more than one having such majority—and an equal number of votes—the House, voting by States, should choose between them, which should be President—but if none should have a majority, the House, voting in the same way, should choose the President from the five having the greatest number of votes; the person having the greatest number of votes, after the choice of the President, to be the Vice-President. But in case of two or more having an equal number, the Senate should elect from among them the Vice-President.
Had these provisions been left unaltered, and not superseded, in practice, by caucuses and party conventions, their effect would have been to give to the majority of the people of the several States, the right of nominating five candidates; and to the majority of the States, acting in their corporate character, the right of choosing from them, which should be President, and which Vice-President. The President and Vice-President would, virtually, have been elected by the concurrent majority of the several States, and of their population, estimated in federal numbers; and, in this important respect, the executive would have been assimilated to the legislative department. But the Senate, in addition to its legislative, is vested also with supervisory powers in respect to treaties and appointments, which give it a participation in executive powers, to that extent; and a corresponding weight in the exercise of two of its most important functions. The treaty-making power is, in reality, a branch of the law-making power; and we accordingly find that treaties as well as the constitution itself, and the acts of Congress, are declared to be the supreme law of the land. This important branch of the law-making power includes all questions between the United States and foreign nations, which may become the subjects of negotiation and treaty; while the appointing power is intimately connected with the performance of all its functions.
In the Judiciary the two elements are blended, in proportions different from either of the others. The President, in the election of whom they are both united, nominates the judges; and the Senate, which consists exclusively of one of the elements, confirms or rejects: so that they are, to a certain extent, concurrent in this department; though the States, considered in their corporate capacity, may be said to be its predominant element.
In the impeaching power, by which it was intended to make the executive and judiciary responsible, the two elements exist and act separately, as in the legislative department—the one, constituting the impeaching power, resides in the House of Representatives; and the other, the power that tries and pronounces judgment, in the Senate: and thus, although existing separately in their respective bodies, their joint and concurrent action is necessary to give effect to the power.
It thus appears, on a view of the whole, that it was the object of the framers of the constitution, in organizing the government, to give to the two elements, of which it is composed, separate, but concurrent action; and, consequently, a veto on each other, whenever the organization of the department, or the nature of the power would admit: and when this could not be done, so to blend the two, as to make as near an approach to it, in effect, as possible. It is, also, apparent, that the government, regarded apart from the constitution, is the government of the concurrent, and not of the numerical majority. But to have an accurate conception how it is calculated to act in practice; and to establish, beyond doubt, that it was neither intended to be, nor is, in fact, the government of the numerical majority, it will be necessary again to appeal to figures.
That, in organizing a government with different departments, in each of which the States are represented in a twofold aspect, in the manner stated, it was the object of the framers of the constitution, to make it more, instead of less popular than it would have been as a government of the mere numerical majority—that is, as requiring a more numerous, instead of a less numerous constituency to carry its powers into execution—may be inferred from the fact, that such actually is the effect. Indeed, the necessary effect of the concurrent majority is, to make the government more popular—that is, to require more wills to put it in action, than if any one of the majorities, of which it is composed, were its sole element—as will be apparent by reference to figures.
If the House, which represents population, estimated in federal numbers, had been invested with the sole power of legislation, then six of the larger States, to wit, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, Massachusetts and Tennessee, with a federal population of 8,216,279, would have had the power of making laws for the other twenty-four, with a federal population of 7,971,325. On the other hand, if the Senate had been invested with the sole power, sixteen of the smallest States—embracing Maryland as the largest—with a federal population of 3,411,672, would have had the power of legislating for the other fourteen, with a population of 12,775,932. But the constitution, in giving each body a negative on the other, in all matters of legislation, makes it necessary that a majority of each should concur to pass a bill, before it becomes an act; and the smallest number of States and population, by which this can be effected, is six of the larger voting for it in the House of Representatives—and ten of the smaller, uniting with them in their vote, in the Senate. The ten smaller, including New Hampshire as the largest, have a federal population of 1,346,575; which, added to that of the six larger, would make 9,572,852. So that no bill can become a law, with less than the united vote of sixteen States, representing a constituency containing a federal population of 9,572,852, against fourteen States, representing a like population of 6,614,752.
But, when passed, the bill is subject to the President’s approval or disapproval. If he disapprove, or, as it is usually termed, vetoes it, it cannot become a law unless passed by two-thirds of the members of both bodies. The House of Representatives consists of 228—two-thirds of which is 152—which, therefore, is the smallest number that can overcome his veto. It would take ten of the larger States, of which Georgia is the smallest, to make up that number—the federal population of which is 10,853,175: and, in the Senate, it would require the votes of twenty States to overrule it—and, of course, ten of the larger united with ten of the smaller. But the ten smaller States have a federal population of only 1,346,575—as has been stated—which added to that of the ten larger, would give 12,199,748, as the smallest population by which his veto can be overruled, and the act become a law. Even then, it is liable to be pronounced unconstitutional by the judges, should it, in any case before them, come in conflict with their views of the constitution—a decision which, in respect to individuals, operates as an absolute veto, which can only be overruled by an amendment of the constitution. In all these calculations, I assume a full House, and full votes—and that members vote according to the will of their constituents.
If the election of the President, by the electoral college, be compared with the passage of a bill by Congress, it will be found that it requires a smaller federal number to elect, than to pass a bill—resulting from the fact that the two majorities, in the one case, are united and blended together, instead of acting concurrently, as in the other. There are, at present, 288 members of Congress, of which 60 are Senators, and the others, members of the House of Representatives; and, as each State is entitled to appoint as many electors as it has members of Congress, there is, of course, the same number of electors. One hundred and forty-five constitute a majority of the whole; and, of course, are necessary to a choice. Seven of the States of the largest class, say, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, Tennessee, Kentucky and Indiana, combined with one of a medium size, say, New Hampshire, are entitled to that number—and, with a federal population of 9,125,936, may overrule the vote of the other twenty-two, with a population of 7,061,668: so that a small minority of States, with not a large majority of population, can elect a President by the electoral college—against a very large majority of the States, with a population not greatly under a majority. It follows, therefore, that the choice of a President, when made by the electoral college, may be less popular in its character than when made by Congress—which cannot elect without a concurrence of a federal population of upwards of nine and a half millions. But to compensate this great preponderance of the majority based on population, over that based on the States, regarded in their corporate character, in an election by the college of electors, the provision giving to the House of Representatives, voting by States, the eventual choice, in case the college fail to elect, was adopted. Under its operation, sixteen of the smallest States, with a federal population of 3,411,672, may elect the President, against the remaining fourteen, with a federal population of 12,775,932—which gives a preponderance equally great to the States, without reference to population, in the contingency mentioned.
From what has been stated, the conclusion follows, irresistibly, that the constitution and the government, regarding the latter apart from the former, rest, throughout, on the principle of the concurrent majority; and that it is, of course, a Republic—a constitutional democracy, in contradistinction to an absolute democracy; and that, the theory which regards it as a government of the mere numerical majority, rests on a gross and groundless misconception. So far is this from being the case, the numerical majority was entirely excluded as an element, throughout the whole process of forming and ratifying the constitution: and, although admitted as one of the two elements, in the organization of the government, it was with the important qualification, that it should be the numerical majority of the population of the several States, regarded in their corporate character, and not of the whole Union, regarded as one community. And further than this—it was to be the numerical majority, not of their entire population, but of their federal population; which, as has been shown, is estimated artificially—by excluding two-fifths of a large portion of the population of many of the States of the Union. Even with these important qualifications, it was admitted as the less prominent of the two. With the exception of the impeaching power, it has no direct participation in the functions of any department of the government, except the legislative; while the other element participates in some of the most important functions of the executive; and, in the constitution of the Senate, as a court to try impeachments, in the highest of the judicial functions. It was, in fact, admitted, not because it was the numerical majority, nor on the ground, that, as such, it ought, of right, to constitute one of its elements—much less the only one—but for a very different reason. In the federal constitution, the equality of the States, without regard to population, size, wealth, institutions, or any other consideration, is a fundamental principle; as much so as is the equality of their citizens, in the governments of the several States, without regard to property, influence, or superiority of any description. As, in the one, the citizens form the constituent body—so, in the other, the States. But the latter, in forming a government for their mutual protection and welfare, deemed it proper, as a matter of fairness and sound policy, and not of right, to assign to it an increased weight, bearing some reasonable proportion to the different amount of means which the several States might, respectively, contribute to the accomplishment of the ends, for which they were about to enter into a federal union. For this purpose they admitted, what is called federal numbers, as one of the elements of the government about to be established; while they were, at the same time, so jealous of the effects of admitting it, with all its restrictions—that, in order to guard effectually the other element, they provided that no State, without its consent, should be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate; so as to place their equality, in that important body, beyond the reach even of the amending power.
I have now established, as proposed at the outset, that the government of the United States is a democratic federal Republic—democratic in contradistinction to aristocratic, and monarchical—federal, in contradistinction to national, on the one hand—and to a confederacy, on the other; and a Republic—a government of the concurrent majority, in contradistinction to an absolute democracy—or a government of the numerical majority.
But the government of the United States, with all its complication and refinement of organization, is but a part of a system of governments. It is the representative and organ of the States, only to the extent of the powers delegated to it. Beyond this, each State has its own separate government, which is its exclusive representative and organ, as to all the other powers of government—or, as they are usually called, the reserved powers. However correct, then, our conception of the character of the government of the United States viewed by itself, may be, it must be very imperfect, unless viewed at the same time, in connection with the complicated system, of which it forms but a part. In order to present this more perfect view, it will be essential, first, to present the outlines of the entire system, so far as it may be necessary to show the nature and character of the relation between the two—the government of the United States and the separate State governments. For this purpose, it will be expedient to trace, historically, the origin and formation of the system itself, of which they constitute the parts.
I have already shown, that the present government of the United States was reared on the foundation of the articles of confederation and perpetual union; that these last did but little more than define the powers and the extent of the government and the union, which had grown out of the exigencies of the revolution; and that these, again, had but enlarged and strengthened the powers and the union which the exigencies of a common defence against the aggression of the parent country, had forced the colonies to assume and form. What I now propose is, to trace briefly downwards, from the beginning, the causes and circumstances which led to the formation, in all its parts, of our present peculiar, complicated, and remarkable system of governments. This may be readily done—for we have the advantage (possessed by few people, who, in past times, have formed and flourished under remarkable political institutions) of historical accounts, so full and accurate, of the origin, rise, and formation of our institutions, throughout all their stages—as to leave nothing relating to either, to vague and uncertain conjecture.
It is known to all, in any degree familiar with our history, that the region embraced by the original States of the Union appertained to the crown of Great Britain, at the time of its colonization; and that different portions of it were granted to certain companies or individuals, for the purpose of settlement and colonization. It is also known, that the thirteen colonies, which afterwards declared their independence, were established under charters which, while they left the sovereignty in the crown, and reserved the general power of supervision to the parent country, secured to the several colonies popular representation in their respective governments, or in one branch, at least, of their legislatures—with the general rights of British subjects. Although the colonies had no political connection with each other, except as dependent provinces of the same crown—they were closely bound together by the ties of a common origin, identity of language, similarity of religion, laws, customs, manners, commercial and social intercourse—and by a sense of common danger—exposed, as they were, to the incursions of a savage foe, acting under the influence of a powerful and hostile nation.
In this embryo state of our political existence, are to be found all the elements which subsequently led to the formation of our peculiar system of governments. The revolution, as it is called, produced no other changes than those which were necessarily caused by the declaration of independence. These were, indeed, very important. Its first and necessary effect was, to cut the cord which had bound the colonies to the parent country—to extinguish all the authority of the latter—and, by consequence, to convert them into thirteen independent and sovereign States. I say, “independent and sovereign,” because, as the colonies were, politically and in respect to each other, wholly independent—the sovereignty of each, regarded as distinct and separate communities, being vested in the British crown—the necessary effect of severing the tie which bound them to it was, to devolve the sovereignty on each respectively, and, thereby, to convert them from dependent colonies, into independent and sovereign States. Thus, the region occupied by them, came to be divided into as many States as there were colonies, each independent of the others—as they were expressly declared to be; and only united to the extent necessary to defend their independence, and meet the exigencies of the occasion—and hence that great and, I might say, providential territorial division of the country, into independent and sovereign States, on which our entire system of government rests.
Its next effect was, to transfer the sovereignty which had, heretofore, resided in the British crown, not to the governments of, but to the people composing the several States. It could only devolve on them. The declaration of independence, by extinguishing the British authority in the several colonies, necessarily destroyed every department of their governments, except such as derived their authority from, and represented their respective people. Nothing, then, remained of their several governments, but the popular and representative branches of them. But a representative government, even when entire, cannot possibly be the seat of sovereignty—the supreme and ultimate power of a State. The very term, “representative,” implies a superior in the individual or body represented. Fortunately for us, the people of the several colonies constituted, not a mere mass of individuals, without any organic arrangements to express their sovereign will, or carry it into effect. On the contrary, they constituted organized communities—in the full possession and constant exercise of the right of suffrage, under their colonial governments. Had they constituted a mere mass of individuals—without organization, and unaccustomed to the exercise of the right of suffrage, it would have been impossible to have prevented those internal convulsions, which almost ever attend the change of the seat of sovereignty—and which so frequently render the change rather a curse than a blessing. But in their situation, and under its circumstances, the change was made without the least convulsion, or the slightest disturbance. The mere will of the sovereign communities, aided by the remaining fragments—the popular branches of their several colonial governments, speedily ordained and established governments, each for itself; and thus passed, without anarchy—without a shock, from their dependent condition under the colonial governments, to that of independence under those established by their own authority.
Thus commenced the division between the constitution-making and the law-making powers—between the power which ordains and establishes the fundamental laws—which creates, organizes and invests government with its authority, and subjects it to restrictions—and the power that passes acts to carry into execution, the powers thus delegated to government. The one, emanating from the people, as forming a sovereign community, creates the government—the other, as a representative appointed to execute its powers, enacts laws to regulate and control the conduct of the people, regarded as individuals. This division between the two powers—thus necessarily incident to the separation from the parent country—constitutes an element in our political system as essential to its formation, as the great and primary territorial division of independent and sovereign States. Between them, it was our good fortune never to have been left, for a moment, in doubt, as to where the sovereign authority was to be found; or how, and by whom it should be exercised: and, hence, the facility, the promptitude and safety, with which we passed from one state to the other, as far as internal causes were concerned. Our only difficulty and danger lay in the effort to resist the immense power of the parent country.
The governments of the several States were thus rightfully and regularly constituted. They, in the course of a few years, by entering into articles of confederation and perpetual union, established and made more perfect the union which had been informally constituted, in consequence of the exigencies growing out of the contest with a powerful enemy. But experience soon proved that the confederacy was wholly inadequate to effect the objects for which it was formed. It was then, and not until then, that the causes which had their origin in our embryo state, and which had, thus far, led to such happy results, fully developed themselves. The failure of the confederacy was so glaring, as to make it appear to all, that something must be done to meet the exigencies of the occasion—and the great question which presented itself to all was—what should, or could be done?
To dissolve the Union was too abhorrent to be named. In addition to the causes which had connected them by such strong cords of affection while colonies, there were superadded others, still more powerful—resulting from the common dangers to which they had been exposed, and the common glory they had acquired, in passing successfully through the war of the revolution. Besides, all saw that the hope of reaping the rich rewards of their successful resistance to the encroachment of the parent country, depended on preserving the Union.
But, if disunion was out of the question, consolidation was not less repugnant to their feelings and opinions. The attachments of all to their respective States and institutions, were strong, and of long standing—since they were identified with their respective colonies; and, for the most part, had survived the separation from the parent country. Nor were they unaware of the danger to their liberty and property, to be apprehended from a surrender of their sovereignty and existence, as separate and independent States, and a consolidation of the whole into one nation. They regarded disunion and consolidation as equally dangerous; and were, therefore, equally opposed to both.
To change the form of government to an aristocracy or monarchy, was not to be thought of. The deepest feelings of the common heart were in opposition to them, and in favor of popular government.
These changes or alterations being out of the question, what other remained to be considered? Men of the greatest talents and experience were at a loss for an answer. To meet the exigencies of the occasion, a convention of the States was called. When it met, the only alternative, in the opinion of the larger portion of its most distinguished members, was, the establishment of a national government; which was but another name, in reality, for consolidation. But where wisdom and experience proved incompetent to provide a remedy, the necessity of doing something, combined with the force of those causes, which had thus far shaped our destiny, carried us successfully through the perilous juncture. In the hour of trial, we realized the precious advantages we possessed in the two great and prime elements that distinguish our system of governments—the division of the country, territorially, into independent and sovereign States—and the division of the powers of government into constitution- and law-making powers. Of the materials which they jointly furnished, the convention was enabled to construct the present system—the only alternative left, by which we could escape the dire consequences attendant on the others; and which has so long preserved peace among ourselves, and protected us against danger from abroad. Each contributed essential aid towards the accomplishment of this great work.
To the former, we owe the mode of constituting the convention—as well as that of voting, in the formation and adoption of the constitution—and, finally, in the ratification of it by the States: and to them, jointly, are we exclusively indebted for that peculiar form which the constitution and government finally assumed. It is impossible to read the proceedings of the convention, without perceiving that, if the delegates had been appointed by the people at large, and in proportion to population, nothing like the present constitution could have been adopted. It would have assumed the form best suited to the views and interests of the more populous and wealthy portions; and, for that purpose, been made paramount to the existing State governments: in brief, a consolidated, national government would have been formed. But as the convention was composed of delegates from separate independent and sovereign States, it involved the necessity of voting by States, in framing and adopting the constitution; and—what is of far more importance—the necessity of submitting it to the States for their respective ratifications; so that each should be bound by its own act, and not by that of a majority of the States, nor of their united population. It was this necessity of obtaining the consent of a majority of the States in convention, as, also, in the intermediate process—and, finally, the unanimous approval of all, in order to make it obligatory on all, which rendered it indispensable for the convention to consult the feelings and interests of all. This, united with the absolute necessity of doing something, in order to avert impending calamities of the most fearful character, impressed all with feelings of moderation, forbearance, mutual respect, concession, and compromise, as indispensable to secure the adoption of some measure of security. It was the prevalence of these impressions, that stamped their work with so much fairness, equity, and justice—as to receive, finally, the unanimous ratification of the States; and which has caused it to continue ever since, the object of the admiration and attachment of the reflecting and patriotic.
But the moderation, forbearance, mutual respect, concession, and compromise, superinduced by the causes referred to, could, of themselves, have effected nothing, without the aid of the division between the constitution- and the law-making powers. Feebleness and a tendency to disorder are inherent in confederacies; and cannot be remedied, simply by the employment or modification of their powers. But as governments, according to our conceptions, cannot ordain and establish constitutions—and as those of the States had already gone as far as they rightfully could, in framing and adopting the articles of confederation and perpetual union, it would have been impossible to have called the present constitution and government into being, without invoking the high creating power, which ordained and established those of the several States. There was none other competent to the task. It was, therefore, invoked; and formed a constitution and government for the United States, as it had formed and modelled those of the several States. The first step was—the division of the powers of government—which was effected, by leaving subject to the exclusive control of the several States in their separate and individual character, all powers which, it was believed, they could advantageously exercise for themselves respectively—without incurring the hazard of bringing them in conflict with each other—and by delegating, specifically, others to the United States, in the manner explained. It is this division of the powers of the government into such as are delegated, specifically, to the common and joint government of all the States—to be exercised for the benefit and safety of each and all—and the reservation of all others to the States respectively—to be exercised through the separate government of each, which makes ours, a system of governments, as has been stated.
It is obvious, from this sketch, brief as it is—taken in connection with what has been previously established—that the two governments, General and State, stand to each other, in the first place, in the relation of parts to the whole; not, indeed, in reference to their organization or functions—for in this respect both are perfect—but in reference to their powers. As they divide between them the delegated powers appertaining to government— and as, of course, each is divested of what the other possesses—it necessarily requires the two united to constitute one entire government. That they are both paramount and supreme within the sphere of their respective powers—that they stand, within these limits, as equals—and sustain the relation of co-ordinate governments, has already been fully established. As co-ordinates, they sustain to each other the same relation which subsists between the different departments of the government—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial—and for the same reason. These are co-ordinates; because each, in the sphere of its powers, is equal to, and independent of the others; and because the three united make the government. The only difference is that, in the illustration, each department, by itself, is not a government—since it takes the whole in connection to form one; while the governments of the several States respectively, and that of the United States, although perfect governments in themselves, and in their respective spheres, require to be united in order to constitute one entire government. They, in this respect, stand as principal and supplemental—while the co-departments of each stand in the relation of parts to the whole. The opposite theory, which would make the constitution and government of the United States the government of the whole—and the government of each, because the government of the whole—and not that of all, because of each —besides the objection already stated, would involve the absurdity of each State having only half a constitution, and half a government; and this, too, while possessed of the supreme sovereign power. Taking all the parts together, the people of thirty independent and sovereign States, confederated by a solemn constitutional compact into one great federal community, with a system of government, in all of which, powers are separated into the great primary divisions of the constitution-making and the law-making powers; those of the latter class being divided between the common and joint government of all the States, and the separate and local governments of each State respectively—and, finally, the powers of both distributed among three separate and independent departments, legislative, executive, and judicial—presents, in the whole, a political system as remarkable for its grandeur as it is for its novelty and refinement of organization. For the structure of such a system—so wise, just, and beneficent—we are far more indebted to a superintending Providence, that so disposed events as to lead, as if by an invisible hand, to its formation, than to those who erected it. Intelligent, experienced, and patriotic as they were, they were but builders under its superintending direction.
Having shown in what relation the government of the United States and those of the separate States stand to each other, I shall next proceed to trace the line which divides their respective powers; or, to express it in constitutional language—which distinguishes between the powers delegated to the United States, and those reserved to the States respectively—with the restrictions imposed on each. In doing this, I propose to group the former under general heads, accompanied by such remarks as may be deemed necessary, in reference to the object in view.
In deciding what powers ought, and what ought not to be granted, the leading principle undoubtedly was, to delegate those only which could be more safely, or effectually, or beneficially exercised for the common good of all the States, by the joint or general government of all, than by the separate government of each State; leaving all others to the several States respectively. The object was, not to supersede the separate governments of the States—but to establish a joint supplemental government; in order to do that, which either could not be done at all, or as safely and well done by them, as by a joint government of all. This leading principle embraced two great divisions of power, which may be said to comprehend all, or nearly all the delegated powers; either directly, or as a means to carry them into execution. One of them embraces all the powers appertaining to the relations of the States with the rest of the world, called their foreign relations; and the other, of an internal character, embraces such as appertain to the exterior relations of the States with each other. It is clear that both come within the leading principle; as each is of a description which the States, in their separate character, are either incompetent to exercise at all, or if competent, to exercise consistently with their mutual peace, safety, and prosperity. Indeed, so strong and universal has this opinion been, in reference to the powers appertaining to their foreign relations, that, from the Declaration of Independence to the present time, in all the changes through which they have passed, the Union has had exclusive charge of this great division of powers. To the rest of the world, the States composing this Union are now, and ever have been known in no other than their united, confederated character. Abroad—to the rest of the world—they are but one. It is only at home, in their interior relations, that they are many; and it is to this twofold aspect that their motto, “E pluribus unum,” appropriately and emphatically applies. So imperious was the necessity of union, and a common government to take charge of their foreign relations, that it may be safely affirmed, not only that it led to their formation, but that, without it, the States never would have been united. The same necessity still continues to be one of the strongest bonds of their union. But, strong as was, and still is, the inducement to union, in order to preserve their mutual peace and safety within, it was not, of itself, sufficiently strong to unite the parts composing this vast federal fabric; nor, probably, is it, of itself, sufficiently strong to hold them together.
This great division of authority appertains to the treaty-making power; and is vested in the President and Senate. The power of negotiating treaties belongs exclusively to the former; but he cannot make them without the advice and consent of the latter. When made, they are declared to be the supreme law of the land. The reason for vesting this branch of the law-making power exclusively in the President and Senate, to the exclusion of the House of Representatives, is to be traced to the necessity of secrecy in conducting negotiations and making treaties—as they often involve considerations calculated to have great weight—but which cannot be disclosed without hazarding their success. Hence the objection to so numerous a body as the House of Representatives participating in the exercise of the power. But to guard against the dangers which might result from confiding the power to so small a body, the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present was required.
There is a very striking difference between the manner in which the treaty-making and the law-making power, in its strict sense, are delegated, which deserves notice. The former is vested in the President and Senate by a few general words, without enumerating or specifying, particularly, the power delegated. The constitution simply provides that, “he shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties; provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur” —while the legislative powers vested in Congress, are, one by one, carefully enumerated and specified. The reason is to be found in the fact, that the treaty-making power is vested, exclusively, in the government of the United States; and, therefore, nothing more was necessary in delegating it, than to specify, as is done, the portion or department of the government in which it is vested. It was, then, not only unnecessary, but it would have been absurd to enumerate, specially, the powers embraced in the grant. Very different is the case in regard to legislative powers. They are divided between the Federal government and the State governments; which made it absolutely necessary, in order to draw the line between the delegated and reserved powers, that the one or the other should be carefully enumerated and specified; and, as the former was intended to be but supplemental to the latter—and to embrace the comparatively few powers which could not be either exercised at all—or, if at all, could not be so well and safely exercised by the separate governments of the several States—it was proper that the former, and not the latter, should be enumerated and specified. But, although the treaty-making power is exclusively vested, and without enumeration or specification, in the government of the United States, it is nevertheless subject to several important limitations.
It is, in the first place, strictly limited to questions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation to adjust them. All such clearly appertain to it. But to extend the power beyond these, be the pretext what it may, would be to extend it beyond its allotted sphere; and, thus, a palpable violation of the constitution. It is, in the next place, limited by all the provisions of the constitution which inhibit certain acts from being done by the government, or any of its departments—of which description there are many. It is also limited by such provisions of the constitution as direct certain acts to be done in a particular way, and which prohibit the contrary; of which a striking example is to be found in that which declares that, “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations to be made by law.” This not only imposes an important restriction on the power, but gives to Congress, as the law-making power, and to the House of Representatives as a portion of Congress, the right to withhold appropriations; and, thereby, an important control over the treaty-making power, whenever money is required to carry a treaty into effect—which is usually the case, especially in reference to those of much importance. There still remains another, and more important limitation; but of a more general and indefinite character. It can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the character of the government; or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making power; or which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the government—or the objects for which it was formed. Among which, it seems to be settled, that it cannot change or alter the boundary of a State—or cede any portion of its territory without its consent. Within these limits, all questions which may arise between us and other powers, be the subject matter what it may, fall within the limits of the treaty-making power, and may be adjusted by it.
The greater part of the powers delegated to Congress, relate, directly or indirectly, to one or the other of these two great divisions; that is, to those appertaining to the foreign relations of the States, or their exterior relations with each other. The former embraces the power to declare war; grant letters of marque and reprisals; make rules concerning captures on land and water; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the Indian tribes; and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all places purchased, with the consent of the States, for forts, magazines, dockyards, &c.
There are only two which apply directly to the exterior relations of the States with each other; the power to regulate commerce between them—and to establish post offices and post roads. But there are two others intimately connected with these relations—the one, to establish uniform rules of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States—and the other, to secure, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
In addition, there is a class which relates to both. They consist of “the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins, and to fix the standard of weights and measures—to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; to provide for calling forth the militia, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” The two first relate to the power of regulating commerce; and the others, principally, to the war power. Indeed, far the greater part of the powers vested in Congress relate to them.
These embrace all the powers expressly delegated to Congress—except, “the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States—to establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union; to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such district—not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States; and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” It is apparent, that all these powers relate to the other powers, and are intended to aid in carrying them into execution; and as the others are embraced in the two great divisions of powers, of which the one relates to their foreign relations, and the other to their exterior relations with each other, it may be clearly inferred that the regulation of these relations constituted the great, if not the exclusive objects for which the government was ordained and established.
If additional proof be required to sustain this inference, it may be found in the prohibitory and miscellaneous provisions of the constitution. A large portion of them are intended, directly, to regulate the exterior relations of the States with each other, which would have required treaty stipulations between them, had they been separate communities, instead of being united in a federal union. They are, indeed, treaty stipulations of the most solemn character, inserted in the compact of union. And here it is proper to remark, that there is a material difference between the modes in which these two great divisions of power are regulated. The powers embraced by, or appertaining to foreign relations, are left to be regulated by the treaty-making power, or by Congress; and, if by the latter, are enumerated and specifically delegated. They embrace a large portion of its powers. But those relating to the exterior relations of the States among themselves, with few exceptions, are regulated by provisions inserted in the constitution itself. To this extent, it is, in fact, a treaty—under the form of a constitutional compact—of the highest and most sacred character. It provides that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or of revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall any vessel bound to, or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another; that no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts—that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any import or export duties, except what may be absolutely necessary for the execution of its inspection laws; and that the net proceeds of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress; no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage; keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace; enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay; that full faith and credit shall be given, in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other State; that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; that a person charged in any State, with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime; that no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation thereof, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor may be due; that the United States shall guarantee to each State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion—and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.
The other prohibitory provisions, and those of a miscellaneous character, contained in the constitution as ratified, provide against Congress prohibiting the emigration or importation of such persons as any of the States may choose to admit, prior to the year 1808; against the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus; against passing bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws; against laying a capitation or other direct tax, unless in proportion to population, to be ascertained by the census; against drawing money out of the treasury, except in consequence of appropriations made by law; against granting titles of nobility; against persons holding office under the United States, accepting any present or emolument, office or title, from any foreign power, without the consent of Congress; for defining and punishing treason against the United States; for the admission of new States into the Union; for disposing of, and making rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States; for the amendment of the constitution; for the validity of existing debts and engagements against the United States under the constitution; for the supremacy of the constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States; that the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; and that members of Congress and of the State legislatures, and the executive and judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath, or affirmation, to support the constitution; but that no religious test shall be required to hold office under the United States.
Twelve amendments, or, as they are commonly called, amended articles, have been added since its adoption. They provide against passing laws respecting the establishment of religion, or abridging its free exercise; for the freedom of speech and of the press; for the right of petition; for the right of the people to bear arms; and against quartering soldiers in any house against the consent of the owner; against unreasonable searches, or seizures of persons, papers, and effects; against issuing warrants, but on oath or affirmation; against holding persons to answer for a capital, or other infamous crime, except on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; for a public and speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions, by an impartial jury of the State and district where the offence is charged to have been committed; for the right of jury trial in controversies exceeding twenty dollars; against excessive bail and fines, and against cruel and unusual punishments; against so construing the constitution as that the enumeration of certain powers should be made to disparage or deny those not enumerated; against extending the judicial power of the United States to any suit, in law or equity, against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or citizens or subjects of a foreign state; and for the amendment of the constitution in reference to the election of the President and Vice-President. In addition, the amended article, already cited, provides that the powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.
It will be manifest, on a review of all the provisions, including those embraced by the amendments, that none of them have any direct relation to the immediate objects for which the union was formed; and that, with few exceptions, they are intended to guard against improper constructions of the constitution, or the abuse of the delegated powers by the government—or, to protect the government itself in the exercise of its proper functions.
In delegating power to the other two departments, the same general principle prevails. Indeed, in their very nature they are restricted, in a great measure, to the execution, each in its appropriate sphere, of the acts, and, of course, the powers vested in the legislative department; and, in this respect, their powers are consequently limited to the two great divisions which appertain to this department. But where either of them have other vested powers, beyond what is necessary for this purpose, it will be found, when I come to enumerate them, that, if they have any reference at all to the division of power between the general government and those of the several States, they directly relate to those appertaining to one or the other of these divisions.
The executive powers are vested in the President. They embrace the powers belonging to him, as commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States—the right of requiring the opinion, in writing, of the principal officers in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; of granting reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States—except in cases of impeachment; of making treaties, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate—provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; of nominating and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointing ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments have not been otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law—reserving to Congress the right to invest, by law, the appointment of such inferior officers as they may think proper—in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments; of receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; of convening, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of Congress, or either of them; and, in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, of adjourning them to such time as he may think proper; of commissioning all the officers of the United States. In addition, it is made his duty to give to Congress information of the state of the Union; and to recommend to their consideration, such measures as he may deem necessary and expedient; to take care that the laws are faithfully executed; and, finally, he is vested with the power of approving or disapproving bills passed by Congress, before they become laws—which is called his veto. By far the greater part of these powers and duties appertain to him as chief of the executive department. The principal exception is, the treaty-making power; which appertains exclusively to the foreign relations of the States—and, consequently, is embraced in that division of the delegated powers; as does, also, the appointment of ambassadors, other ministers and consuls, and the reception of the two former. The other exceptions are merely organic, without reference to any one class or division of powers between the two co-ordinate governments.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in the Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges hold their offices during good behavior; and have a fixed salary which can neither be increased nor diminished during their continuance in office. Their power extends to all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and marine jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to those between two or more States; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. The fact that, in all cases, where the judicial power is extended beyond what may be regarded its appropriate sphere, it contemplates matters connected directly with the foreign or external relations of the States, rather than those connected with their exterior relations with each other—strikingly illustrates the position—that the powers appertaining to the one or the other of these relations, and those necessary to carry them into execution, embrace almost all that have been delegated to the United States. Indeed, on a review of the whole, it may be safely asserted, not only that they embrace almost all of the powers delegated, but that all of the general and miscellaneous provisions (excluding those, of course, belonging to the organism of government, whether they prohibit certain acts, or impose certain duties—as well as those intended to protect the government, and guard against its abuse of power) appertain, with few exceptions, to the one or the other of these divisions. For, if the principle which governed in the original division or distribution of powers between the two co-ordinate governments, be that already stated; that is, to delegate such powers only as could not be exercised at all, or as well, or safely exercised by the governments of the States acting separately, and to reserve the residue—it would be difficult to conceive what others could be embraced in them; since there are none delegated to either, which do not appertain to the States in their relations with each other, or in their relations with the rest of the world. As to all other purposes, the separate governments of the several States were far more competent and safe, than the general government of all the States. Their knowledge of the local interests and domestic institutions of these respectively, must be much more accurate, and the responsibility of each to their respective people much more perfect. This is so obvious, as to render it incredible, that they would have admitted the interference of a general government in their interior and local concerns, farther than was absolutely necessary to the regulation of their exterior relations with each other and the rest of the world—or that a general government should have been adopted for any other purpose. To this extent, it was manifestly necessary—but beyond this, it was not only not necessary, but clearly calculated to jeopard, in part, the ends for which the constitution was adopted— “to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty.”
Having, now, enumerated the delegated powers, and laid down the principle which guided in drawing the line between them and the reserved powers, the next question which offers itself for consideration is; what provisions does the constitution of the United States, or the system itself, furnish, to preserve this, and its other divisions of power? and whether they are sufficient for the purpose?
The great, original, and primary division, as has been stated, is that of distinct, independent, and sovereign States. It is the basis of the whole system. The next in order is, the division into the constitution-making and the law-making powers. The next separates the delegated and the reserved powers, by vesting the one in the government of the United States, and the other in the separate governments of the respective States, as co-ordinate governments; and the last, distributes the powers of government between the several departments of each. These divisions constitute the elements of which the organism of the whole system is formed. On their preservation depend its duration and success, and the mighty interests involved in both. I propose to take the divisions in the reverse order to that stated, by beginning with the last, and ending with the first.
The question, then, is—what provision has the constitution of the United States made to preserve the division of powers among the several departments of the government? And this involves another; whether the departments are so constituted, that each has, within itself, the power of self-protection; the power, by which, it may prevent the others from encroaching on, and absorbing the portion vested in it, by the constitution? Without such power, the strongest would, in the end, inevitably absorb and concentrate the powers of the others in itself, as has been fully shown in the preliminary discourse—where, also, it is shown that there is but one mode in which this can be prevented; and that is, by investing each division of power, or the representative and organ of each, with a veto, or something tantamount, in some one form or another. To answer, then, the question proposed, it is necessary to ascertain what provisions the constitution, or the system itself, has made for the exercise of this important power. I shall begin with the legislative department, which, in all popular governments, must be the most prominent, and, at least in theory, the strongest.
Its powers are vested in Congress. To it, all the functionaries of the other two departments are responsible, through the impeaching power; while its members are responsible only to the people of their respective States—those of the Senate to them in their corporate character as States; and those of the House of Representatives, in their individual character as citizens of the several States. To guard its members more effectually against the control of the other two departments, they are privileged from arrest in all cases, except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace—during their attendance on the session of their respective houses—and in going to and returning from the same; and from being questioned, in any other place, for any speech or debate in either house. It possesses besides, by an express provision of the constitution, all the discretionary powers vested in the government, whether the same appertain to the legislative, executive, or judicial departments. It is to be found in the 1st Art., 8th Sec., 18th clause; which declares that Congress shall have power “to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers” (those vested in Congress), “and all other powers vested, by the constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” This clause is explicit. It includes all that are usually called “implied powers;” that is—powers to carry into effect those expressly delegated; and vests them expressly in Congress, so clearly, as to exclude the possibility of doubt. Neither the judicial department, nor any officer of the government can exercise any power not expressly, and by name, vested in them, either by the constitution, or by an act of Congress: nor can they exercise any implied power, in carrying them into execution, without the express sanction of law. The effect of this is, to place the powers vested in the legislative department, beyond the reach of the undermining process of insidious construction, on the part of any of the other departments, or of any of the officers of government. With all these provisions, backed by its widely extended and appropriate powers—its security, resulting from freedom of speech in debate—and its close connection and immediate intercourse with its constituents, the legislative department is possessed of ample means to protect itself against the encroachment on, and absorption of its powers, by the other two departments. It remains to be seen, whether these, in their turn, have adequate means of protecting themselves, respectively, against the encroachments of each other—as well as of the legislative department. I shall begin with the executive.
Its powers are vested in the President. To protect them, the constitution, in the first place, makes him independent of Congress, by providing, that he “shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall be neither increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and that he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the United States, or any one of them.” 7
He is, in the next place, vested with the power to veto, not only all acts of Congress—but it is also expressly provided that, “every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the President of the United States; and, before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him; or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.” 8
He is vested, in the next place, with the power of nominating and appointing, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all the officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the constitution; except such inferior officers as may be authorized, by Congress, to be appointed by the President alone, or by the courts of law, or heads of departments. I do not add the power of removing officers, the tenure of whose office is not fixed by the constitution, which has grown into practice; because it is not a power vested in the President by the constitution, but belongs to the class of implied powers; and as such, can only be rightfully exercised and carried into effect by the authority of Congress.
He has, in the next place, the exclusive control of the administration of the government, with the vast patronage and influence appertaining to the distribution of its honors and emoluments; a patronage so great as to make the election of the President the rallying point of the two great parties that divide the country; and the successful candidate, the leader of the dominant party in power, for the time.
He is, besides, commander in chief of the army and navy; and of the militia, when called into the service of the United States. These, combined with his extensive powers, make his veto (which requires the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses to overrule it) almost as absolute as it would be without any qualification—during the term for which he is elected. The whole combined, vests the executive with ample means to protect its powers from being encroached on, or absorbed by the other departments.
Nor are those of the judiciary less ample, for the same purpose, against the two other departments. Its powers are vested in the courts of the United States. To secure the independence of the judges, they are appointed to hold their offices during good behavior; and to receive for their services, a compensation which cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. Besides these means for securing their independence, they have, virtually, a negative on the acts of the other departments—resulting from the nature of our system of government. This requires particular explanation. According to it, constitutions are of paramount authority to laws or acts of the government, or of any of its departments; so that, when the latter come in conflict with the former, they are null and void, and of no binding effect whatever. From this fact it results, that, when a case comes before the courts of the United States, in which a question of conflict between the acts of Congress or any department may arise, the judges are bound, from the necessity of the case, to determine whether, in fact, there is any conflict or not; and if, in their opinion, there be such conflict, to decide in favor of the constitution; and thereby, virtually, to annul or veto the act, as far as it relates to the department or government, and the parties to the suit or controversy. This, with the provisions to secure their independence, gives, not only means of self-protection, but a weight and dignity to the judicial department never before possessed by the judges in any other government of which we have any certain knowledge.
But, however ample may be the means possessed by the several departments to protect themselves against the encroachments of each other, regarded as independent and irresponsible bodies, it by no means follows, that the equilibrium of power, established between them by the constitution, will, necessarily, remain undisturbed. For they are, in fact, neither independent nor irresponsible bodies. They are all representatives of the several States, either in their organized character of governments, or of their people, estimated in federal numbers; and are under the control of their joint majority—blended, however, in unequal proportions, in the several departments. In order, then, to preserve the equilibrium between the departments, it is indispensable to preserve that between the two majorities which have the power to control them, and to which they are all responsible, directly or indirectly. For it is manifest that if this equilibrium, established by the constitution, be so disturbed, as to give the ascendency to either, it must disturb, or would be calculated to disturb, in turn, the equilibrium between the departments themselves; inasmuch as the weight of the majority which might gain it, would be thrown in favor of the one or the other, as the means of increasing its influence over the government. In order, then, to determine whether the equilibrium between the departments is liable to be disturbed, it is necessary to ascertain what provisions the constitution has made to preserve it between the two majorities, in reference to the several departments; and to determine whether they are sufficient for the purpose intended. I shall, again, commence with the legislative.
In this department the two majorities or elements, of which the government is composed, act separately. Each has its own organ; one the Senate, and the other the House of Representatives: and each has, through its respective organ, a negative on the other, in all acts of legislation, which require their joint action. This gives to each complete and perfect means to guard against the encroachments of the other. The same is the case in the judiciary. There, the judges, in whom the powers of the department are vested, are nominated by the President, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed by him; which gives each element also a negative on the other; and, of course, like means of preserving the equilibrium established by the constitution between them. But the case is different in reference to the executive department.
The two elements in this department are blended into one, when the choice of a President is made by the electoral college—which, as has been stated, gives a great preponderance to the element representing the federal population of the several States, over that which represents them in their organized character as governments. To compensate this, a still greater preponderance is given to the latter, in the eventual choice by the House of Representatives. But they have, in neither case, a veto upon the acts of each other; nor any equivalent means to prevent encroachments, in choosing the individual to be vested, for the time, with the powers of the department; and, hence, no means of preserving the equilibrium, as established between them by the constitution. The result has been—as it ever must be in such cases—the ascendency of the stronger element over the weaker. The incipient measure to effect this was adopted at an early period. The first step was, to diminish the number of candidates, from which the selection should be made, from the five, to the three highest on the list; and—in order to lessen the chances of a failure to choose by the electoral college—to provide that the electors, instead of voting for two, without discriminating the offices, should designate which was for the President, and which for the Vice-President. This was effected in the regular way, by an amendment of the constitution. Since then, the constitution, as amended, has been, in practice, superseded, by what is called, the usage of parties; that is, by each selecting, informally, persons to meet at some central point, to nominate candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency—with the avowed object of preventing the election from going into the House of Representatives; and, of course, by superseding the eventual choice on the part of this body, to abolish, in effect, one of the two elements of which the government is constituted, so far, at least, as the executive department is concerned. As it now stands, the complex and refined machinery provided by the constitution for the election of the President and Vice-President, is virtually superseded. The nomination of the successful party, by irresponsible individuals makes, in reality, the choice. It is in this way that the provisions of the constitution, which intended to give equal weight to the two elements in the executive department of the government, have been defeated; and an overwhelming preponderance given to that which is represented in the House of Representatives, over that which is represented in the Senate.
But the decided preponderance of this element in the executive department, cannot fail greatly to disturb the equilibrium between it and the other two departments, as established by the constitution. It cannot but throw the weight of the more populous States and sections on the side of that department, over which their control is the most decisive; and place the President, in whom its powers are vested for the time, more completely under their control. This, in turn, must place the honors and emoluments of the government, also, more under their control; and, of course, give a corresponding influence over all who aspire to participate in them; and especially over the members, for the time, of the legislative department. Even those, composing the judiciary, for the time, will not be unaffected by an influence so great and pervading.
I come now to examine, what means the constitution of the United States, or the system itself provides, for preserving the division between the delegated and reserved powers. The former are vested in the government of the United States; and the latter, where they have not been reserved to the people of the several States respectively, are vested in their respective State governments. The two, as has been established, stand in the relation of co-ordinate governments; that is, the government of the United States is, in each State, the co-ordinate of its separate government; and taken together, the two make the entire government of each, and of all the States. On the preservation of this peculiar and important division of power, depend the preservation of all the others, and the equilibrium of the entire system. It cannot be disturbed, without, at the same time, disturbing the whole, with all its parts.
The only means which the constitution of the United States contains or provides for its preservation, consists, in the first place, in the enumeration and specification of the powers delegated to the United States, and the express reservation to the States of all powers not delegated; in the next, in imposing such limitations on both governments, and on the States themselves, in their separate character, as were thought best calculated to prevent the abuse of power, or the disturbance of the equilibrium between the two co-ordinate governments; and, finally, in prescribing that the members of Congress, and of the legislatures of the several States, and all executive and judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support the constitution of the United States. These were, undoubtedly, proper and indispensable means; but that they were, of themselves, deemed insufficient to preserve, undisturbed, this new and important partition of power between co-ordinate governments, is clearly inferrible from the proceedings of the convention, and the writings and speeches of eminent individuals, pending the ratification of the constitution. No question connected with the formation and adoption of the constitution of the United States, excited deeper solicitude—or caused more discussion, than this important partition of power. The ablest men divided in reference to it, during these discussions. One side maintained that the danger was, that the delegated would absorb the reserved; while the other not less strenuously contended, that the reserved would absorb the delegated powers. So widely extended was this diversity of opinion, and so deep the excitement it produced, that it contributed more than all other questions combined, to the organization of the two great parties, which arose with the formation of the constitution; and which, finally, assumed the names of “Federal” and “Republican.” In all these discussions, neither side relied on the provisions of the constitution of the United States, just referred to, as the means of preserving the partition of power between the co-ordinate governments; and thereby, of preventing either from encroaching on, and absorbing the powers of the other. Both looked to the co-ordinate governments, to control each other; and by their mutual action and reaction, to keep each other in their proper spheres. The doubt, on one side, was, whether the delegated, were not too strong for the reserved powers; and, on the other, whether the latter were not too strong for the former. One apprehended that the end would be, consolidation; and the other, dissolution. Both parties, to make out their case, appealed to the respective powers of the two; compared their relative force, and decided accordingly, as the one or the other appeared the stronger. Both, in the discussion, assumed, that those who might administer the two co-ordinate governments, for the time, would stand in antagonistic relations to each other, and be ready to seize every opportunity to enlarge their own at the expense of the powers of the other; and rather hoped than believed, that this reciprocal action and reaction would prove so well balanced as to be sufficient to preserve the equilibrium, and keep each in its respective sphere.
Such were the views taken, and the apprehensions felt, on both sides, at the time. They were both right, in looking to the co-ordinate governments for the means of preserving the equilibrium between these two important classes of powers; but time and experience have proved, that both mistook the source and the character of the danger to be apprehended, and the means of counteracting it; and, thereby, of preserving the equilibrium, which both believed to be essential to the preservation of the complex system of government about to be established. Nor is it a subject of wonder, that statesmen, as able and experienced as the leaders of the two sides were, should both fall into error, as to what would be the working of political elements, wholly untried; and which made so great an innovation in governments of the class to which ours belonged. It is clear, from the references so frequently made to previous confederacies, in order to determine how the government about to be established, would operate, that the framers of the constitution themselves, as well as those who took an active part in discussing the question of its adoption, were far from realizing the magnitude of the change which was made by it in governments of that form. Had this been fully realized, they would never have assumed that those who administered the government of the United States, and those of the separate States, would stand in hostile relations to each other; or have believed that it would depend on the relative force of the powers delegated and the powers reserved, whether either would encroach on, and absorb the other—an assumption and belief which experience has proved to be utterly unfounded. The conflict took, from the first, and has continued ever since to move in, a very different direction. Instead of a contest for power between the government of the United States, on the one side, and the separate governments of the several States, on the other—the real struggle has been to obtain the control of the former—a struggle in which both States and people have united: And the result has shown that, instead of depending on the relative force of the delegated and reserved powers, the latter, in all contests, have been brought in aid of the former, by the States on the side of the party in the possession and control of the government of the United States—and by the States on the side of the party in the opposition, in their efforts to expel those in possession, and to take their place. There must then be at all times—except in a state of transition of parties, or from some accidental cause—a majority of the several States, and of their people, estimated in federal numbers, on the side of those in power; and, of course, on the side of the delegated powers and the government of the United States. Its real authority, therefore, instead of being limited to the delegated powers alone, must, habitually, consist of these, united with the reserved powers of the joint majority of the States, and of their population, estimated in federal numbers. Their united strength must necessarily give to the government of the United States, a power vastly greater than that of all the co-ordinate governments of the States on the side of the party in opposition. It is their united strength, which makes it one of the strongest ever established; greatly stronger than it could possibly be as a national government. And, hence, all conclusions, drawn from a supposed antagonism between the delegated powers, on the one hand, and the reserved powers, on the other, have proved, and must ever prove utterly fallacious. Had it, in fact, existed, there can now be no doubt, that the apprehensions of those, who feared that the reserved powers would encroach on and absorb the delegated, would have been realized, and dissolution, long since, been the fate of the system: for it was this very antagonism which caused the weakness of the confederation, and threatened the dissolution of the Union. The difference between it and the present government, in this respect, results from the fact, that the States, in the confederation, had but few and feeble motives to form combinations, in order to obtain the control of its powers; because neither the State governments, nor the citizens of the several States were subject to its control. Hence, they were more disposed to elude its requisitions, and reserve their means for their own control and use, than to enter into combinations to control its councils. But very different is the case in their existing confederated character. The present government possesses extensive and important powers; among others, that of carrying its acts into execution by its own authority, without the intermediate agency of the States. And, hence, the principal motives to get the control of the government, with all its powers and vast patronage; and for this purpose, to form combinations as the only means by which it can be accomplished. Hence, also, the fact, that the present danger is directly the reverse of that of the confederacy. The one tended to dissolution—the other tends to consolidation. But there is this difference between these tendencies. In the former, they were far more rapid—not because they were stronger, but because there were few or no impediments in their way; while in the latter, many and powerful obstacles are presented. In the case of the confederacy, the antagonistic position which the States occupied in respect to it—and their indifference to its acts, after the acknowledgment of their independence, led to a non-compliance with its requisitions—and this, without any active measure on their parts, was sufficient, if left to itself, to have brought about a dissolution of the Union, from its weakness, at no distant day. But such is not the case under the present system of government. To form combinations in order to get the control of the government, in a country of such vast extent—and consisting of so many States, having so great a variety of interests, must necessarily be a slow process, and require much time, before they can be firmly united, and settle down into two organized and compact parties. But the motives to obtain this control are sufficiently powerful to overcome all these impediments; and the formation of such parties is just as certain to result from the action of political affinities and antipathies, as the formation of bodies, where different elements in the material world, having mutual attraction and repulsion, are brought in contact. Nor is the organization of the government of the United States, which requires the concurrence of the two majorities to control it—though intended for the purpose—sufficient, of itself, to prevent it. The same constitution of man, which would, in time, lead to the organization of a party, consisting of a simple majority—if such had the power of control—will, just as certainly, in time, form one, consisting of the two combined. The only difference is, that the one would be formed more easily, and in a shorter time than the other. The motives are sufficiently strong to overcome the impediments in either case.
In forming these combinations, which, in fact, constitute the two parties, circumstances must, of course, exert a powerful influence. Similarity of origin, language, institutions, political principles, customs, pursuits, interests, color, and contiguity of situations—all contribute to facilitate them: while their opposites necessarily tend to repel them, and, thus, to form an antagonistic combination and party. In a community of so great an extent as ours, contiguity becomes one of the strongest elements in forming party combinations, and distance one of the strongest elements in repelling them. The reason is, that nothing tends more powerfully to weaken the social or sympathetic feelings, than remoteness; and, in the absence of causes calculated to create aversion, nothing to strengthen them more, than contiguity. We feel intensely the sufferings endured under our immediate observation—when we would be almost indifferent, were they removed to a great distance from us. Besides, contiguity of situation usually involves a similarity of interests—especially, when considered in reference to those more remote—which greatly facilitates the formation of local combinations and parties in a country of extensive limits. If to this, we add other diversities—of pursuits, of institutions, origin, and the like, which not unusually exist in such cases, parties must almost necessarily partake, from the first, more or less, of a local character: and, by an almost necessary operation, growing out of the unequal fiscal action of the government, as explained in the preliminary discourse, must become entirely so, in the end, if not prevented by the resistance of powerful causes. We accordingly find, that such has been the case with us, under the operation of the present government. From the first, they assumed, in some degree, this character; and have since been gradually tending more and more to this form, until they have become, almost entirely, sectional. When they shall have become so entirely—(which must inevitably be the case, if not prevented)—when the stronger shall concentrate in itself both the majorities which form the elements of the government of the United States—(and this, it must shortly do)—every barrier, which the constitution, and the organism of the government oppose to one overruling combination of interests, will have been broken down, and the government become as absolute, as would be that of the mere numerical majority; unless, indeed, the system itself, shall be found to furnish some means sufficiently powerful to resist this strong tendency, inherent in governments like ours, to absorb and consolidate all power in its own hands.
What has been stated is sufficient to show, that no such means are to be found in the constitution of the United States, or in the organism of the government. Nor can they be found in the right of suffrage; for it is through its instrumentality that the party combinations are formed. Neither can they be found in the fact, that the constitution of the United States is a written instrument; for this, of itself, cannot possibly enforce the limitations and restrictions which it imposes, as has been fully shown in the preliminary discourse. Nor can they be enforced, and the government held strictly to the sphere assigned, by resorting to a strict construction of the constitution—for the plain reason, that the stronger party will be in favor of a liberal construction; and the strict construction of the minority can be of no avail against the liberal construction of the majority—as has also been shown in the same discourse. Nor can they be found in the force of public opinion—operating through the Press; for it has been, therein, also shown, that its operation is similar to that of the right of suffrage; and that its tendency, with all its good effects in other respects, is to increase party excitement, and to strengthen the force of party attachments and party combinations, in consequence of its having become a party organ and the instrument of party warfare. Nor can the veto power of the President, or the power of the Judges to decide on the constitutionality of the acts of the other departments, furnish adequate means to resist it—however important they may be, in other respects, and in particular instances—for the plain reason, that the party combinations which are sufficient to control the two majorities constituting the elements of the government of the United States, must, habitually, control all the departments—and make them all, in the end, the instruments of encroaching on, and absorbing the reserved powers; especially the executive department—since the provisions of the constitution, in reference to the election of the President and Vice-President, have been superseded, and their election placed, substantially, under the control of the single element of federal numbers. But if none of these can furnish the means of effective resistance, it would be a waste of time to undertake to show, that freedom of speech, or the trial by jury, or any guards of the kind, however indispensable as auxiliary means, can, of themselves, furnish them.
If, then, neither the constitution, nor any thing appertaining to it, furnishes means adequate to prevent the encroachment of the delegated on the reserved powers, they must be found in some other part of the system, if they are to be found in it at all. And, further—if they are to be found there, it must be in the powers not delegated; since it has been shown that they are not to be found in those delegated, nor in any thing appertaining to them—and the two necessarily embrace all the powers of the whole system. But, if they are to be found in the reserved powers, it must be in those vested in the separate governments of the several States, or in those retained by the people of the several States, in their sovereign character—that character in which they ordained and established the constitution and government; and, in which, they can amend or abolish it—since all the powers, not delegated, are expressly reserved, by the 10th Article of Amendments, to the one or the other. In one, then, or the other of these, or in both, the means of resisting the encroachments of the powers delegated to the United States, on those reserved to the States respectively, or to the people thereof—and thereby to preserve the equilibrium between them, must be found, if found in the system at all. Indeed, in one constituted as ours, it would seem neither reasonable nor philosophical to look to the government of the United States, in which the delegated powers are vested, for the means of resisting encroachments on the reserved powers. It would not be reasonable; because it would be to look for protection against danger, to the quarter from which it was apprehended, and from which only it could possibly come. It would not be philosophical; because it would be against universal analogy. All organic action, as far as our knowledge extends—whether it appertain to the material or political world, or be of human or divine mechanism—is the result of the reciprocal action and reaction of the parts of which it consists. It is this which confines the parts to their appropriate spheres, and compels them to perform their proper functions. Indeed, it would seem impossible to produce organic action by a single power—and that it must ever be the result of two or more powers, mutually acting and reacting on each other. And hence the political axiom—that there can be no constitution, without a division of power, and no liberty without a constitution. To this a kindred axiom may be added—that there can be no division of power, without a self-protecting power in each of the parts into which it may be divided; or in a superior power to protect each against the others. Without a division of power there can be no organism; and without the power of self-protection, or a superior power to restrict each to its appropriate sphere, the stronger will absorb the weaker, and concentrate all power in itself.
The members, then, of the convention, which framed the constitution, and those who took an active part in the question of its adoption, were not wrong in looking to this reciprocal action and reaction, between the delegated and the reserved powers—between the government of the United States and the separate governments of the several States—as furnishing the means of resisting the encroachments of the one or the other—however much they may have erred as to the mode in which they would mutually act. No one, indeed, seems, at the time, to have formed any clear or definite conception of the manner in which, a division so novel, would act, when put into operation. All seem to have agreed that there would be conflict between the two governments. They differed only as to which would prove the stronger; yet indulging the hope that their respective powers were so well adjusted, that neither would be able to prevail over the other. Under the influence of this hope, and the diversity of opinion entertained, the framers of the constitution contented themselves with drawing, as strongly as possible, the line of separation between the two powers—leaving it to time and experience to determine where the danger lay; to develop whatever remedy the system might furnish to guard against it—and, if it furnished none, they left it to those, who should come after them, to supply the defect. We now have the benefit of these: Time and Experience have shown fully, where the danger lies, and what is its nature and character. They have established, beyond all doubt, that the antagonism relied on—as existing in theory, between the government of the United States, on the one hand, and all the separate State governments, on the other, has proved to be, in practice, between the former, supported by a majority of the latter, and of their population, estimated in federal numbers—and a minority of the States and of their population, estimated in the same manner. And, consequently, that the government of the United States, instead of being the weaker, as was believed by many, has proved to be immeasurably the stronger; especially, since the two majorities constituting the elements of which it is composed, have centred in one of the two great sections which divide the Union. The effect has been, to give to this section entire and absolute control over the government of the United States; and through it, over the other section, on all questions, in which their interests or views of policy may come in conflict. The system, in consequence of this, instead of tending towards dissolution from weakness, tends strongly towards consolidation from exuberance of strength—so strongly, that, if not opposed by a resistance proportionally powerful, the end must be its destruction—either by the bursting asunder of its parts, in consequence of the intense conflict of interest, produced by being too closely pressed together, or by consolidating all the powers of the system in the government of the United States, or in some one of its departments—to be wielded with despotic force and oppression. The present system must be preserved in its integrity and full vigor; for there can be no other means—no other form of government, save that of absolute power, which can govern and keep the whole together. Disregarding this, the only alternatives are—a government in form and in action, absolute and irresponsible—a consolidation of the system under the existing form, with powers equally despotic and oppressive—or a dissolution.
With these preliminary remarks, I shall next proceed to consider the question—whether the reserved powers, if fully developed and brought into action, are sufficient to resist this powerful and dangerous tendency of the delegated, to encroach on them? or, to express the same thing in a different form—whether the separate government of a State, and its people in their sovereign character, to whom all powers, not delegated to the United States, appertain, can—one or both—rightfully oppose sufficient resistance to the strong tendency on the part of the government of the latter, to prevent its encroachment. I use the expression—"a State and its people"—because the powers not delegated to the United States, are reserved to each State respectively, or to its people; and, of course, it results that, whatever resistance the reserved powers can oppose to the delegated, must, to be within constitutional limits, proceed from the government and the people of the several States, in their separate and individual character.
The question is one of the first magnitude—and deserves the most serious and deliberate consideration. I shall begin with considering—what means the government of a State possesses, to prevent the government of the United States from encroaching on its reserved powers? I shall, however, pass over the right of remonstrating against its encroachments; of adopting resolutions against them, as unconstitutional; of addressing the governments of its co-States, and calling on them to unite and co-operate in opposition to them; and of instructing its Senators in Congress, and requesting its members of the House of Representatives, to oppose them—and other means of a like character; not because they are of no avail, but because they are utterly impotent to arrest the strong and steady tendency of the government of the United States to encroach on the reserved powers; however much they may avail, in particular instances. To rely on them to counteract a tendency so strong and steady, would be as idle as to rely on reason and justice, as the means to prevent oppression and abuse of power on the part of government, without the aid of constitutional provisions. Nothing short of a negative, absolute or in effect, on the part of the government of a State, can possibly protect it against the encroachments of the government of the United States, whenever their powers come in conflict That there is, in effect, a mutual negative on the part of each, in such cases, is what I next propose to show.
It results from their nature; from the relations which subsist between them; and from a law universally applicable to a division of power. I will consider each in the order stated.
That they are both governments, and, as such, possess all the powers appertaining to government, within the sphere of their respective powers—the one as fully as the other—cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that, among the other attributes of government, they possess the right to judge of the extent of their respective powers, as it regards each other. In addition to this, it may be affirmed as true, that governments, in full possession of all the powers appertaining to government, have the right to enforce their decisions as to the extent of their powers, against all opposition. But the case is different in a system of governments like ours—where the powers appertaining to government are divided—a portion being delegated to one government, and a portion to another—and the residue retained by those who ordained and established both. In such case, neither can have the right to enforce its decisions, as to the extent of its powers, when a conflict occurs between them in reference to it; because it would be, in the first place, inconsistent with the relation in which they stand to each other as coordinates. The idea of co-ordinates, excludes that of superior and subordinate, and, necessarily, implies that of equality. But to give either the right, not only to judge of the extent of its own powers, but, also, of that of its coordinate, and to enforce its decision against it, would be, not only to destroy the equality between them, but to deprive one of an attribute—appertaining to all governments—to judge, in the first instance, of the extent of its powers. The effect would be to raise one from an equal to a superior—and to reduce the other from an equal to a subordinate; and, by divesting it of an attribute appertaining to government, to sink it into a dependent corporation. In the next place, it would be inconsistent with what is meant by a division of power; as this necessarily implies, that each of the parties, among whom it may be partitioned, has an equal right to its respective share, be it greater or smaller; and to judge as to its extent, and to maintain its decision against its copartners. This is what constitutes, and what is meant by, a division of power. Without it, there could be no division. To allot a portion of power to one, and another portion to another, and to give either the exclusive right to say, how much was allotted to each, would be no division at all. The one would hold as a mere tenant at will—to be deprived of its portion whenever the other should choose to assume the whole. And, finally, because, no reason can be assigned, why one should possess the right to judge of the extent of its powers, and to enforce its decision, which would not equally apply to the other co-ordinate government. If one, then, possess the right to enforce its decision, so, also, must the other. But to assume that both possess it, would be to leave the umpirage, in case of conflict, to mere brute force; and thus to destroy the equality, clearly implied by the relation of coordinates, and the division between the two governments. In such case, force alone would determine which should be the superior, and which the subordinate; which should have the exclusive right of judging, both as to the extent of its own powers and that of its co-ordinates—and which should be deprived of the right of judging as to the extent of those of either—which should, and which should not possess any other power than that which its coordinate—now raised to its superior—might choose to permit it to exercise. As the one or the other might prove the stronger, consolidation or disunion would, inevitably, be the consequence; and which of the twain, no one who has paid any attention to the working of our system, can doubt. An assumption, therefore, which would necessarily lead to the destruction of the whole system in the end, and the substitution of another, of an entirely different character, in its place—must be false.
But, if neither has the exclusive right, the effect, where they disagree as to the extent of their respective powers, would be, a mutual negative on the acts of each, when they come into conflict. And the effect of this again, would be, to vest in each the power to protect the portion of authority allotted to it, against the encroachment of its co-ordinate government. Nothing short of this can possibly preserve this important division of power, on which rests the equilibrium of the entire system.
The party, in the convention, which favored a national government, clearly saw that the separate governments of the several States would have the right of judging of the extent of their powers, as between the two governments, unless some provision should be adopted to prevent it. This is manifest from the many and strenuous efforts which they made to deprive them of the right, by vesting the government of the United States with the power to veto or overrule their acts, when they might be thought to come in conflict with its powers. These efforts were made in every stage of the proceedings of the convention, and in every conceivable form—as its journals will show.
The very first project of a constitution submitted to the convention, (Gov. Randolph’s) contained a provision, “to grant power to negative all acts contrary, in the opinion of the national legislature, to the articles—or any treaty, subsisting under the power of the Union; and to call forth the force of the Union, against any member of the Union, failing to fulfill its duties, under the articles thereof.”
The next plan submitted (Mr. Charles Pinckney’s) contained a provision that— “the legislature of the United States shall have power to revise the laws that may be supposed to impinge the powers exclusively delegated, by this constitution, to Congress; and to negative and annul such as do.” The next submitted (Mr. Paterson’s) provided that, “if any State, or body of men in any State, shall oppose, or prevent the carrying into execution, such acts, or treaties” (of the Union), “the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the forces of the confederated States, or so much thereof, as shall be necessary, to enforce or compel obedience to such acts, or the observance of such treaties.” The committee of the whole, to whom was referred Mr. Randolph’s project, reported a provision, that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary should extend to all “questions, which involved the national peace and harmony.” The next project, (Mr. Hamilton’s)—after declaring all the laws of the several States, which were contrary to the constitution and the laws of the United States, to be null and void—provides, that, “the better to prevent such laws from being passed, the Governor, or President of each State, shall be appointed by the general government; and shall have a negative upon the laws, about to be passed in the State of which he is Governor or President.” This was followed by a motion, made by Mr. C. Pinckney, to vest in the legislature of the United States the power, “to negative all laws, passed by the several States, interfering, in the opinion of the legislature, with the general interest and harmony of the Union; provided that two thirds of each house assent to the same.”
It is not deemed necessary to trace, through the journals of the convention, the history and the fate of these various propositions. It is sufficient to say—that they were all made, and not one adopted; although perseveringly urged by some of the most talented and influential members of the body, as indispensable to protect the government of the United States, against the apprehended encroachments of the governments of the several States. The fact that they were proposed and so urged, proves, conclusively, that it was believed, even by the most distinguished members of the national party, that the former had no right to enforce its measures against the latter, where they disagreed as to the extent of their respective powers—without some express provision to that effect; while the refusal of the convention to adopt any such provision, under such circumstances, proves, equally conclusively, that it was opposed to the delegation of such powers to the government, or any of its departments, legislative, executive, or judicial, in any form whatever.
But, if it be possible for doubt still to remain, the ratification of the constitution by the convention of Virginia, and the 10th amended article, furnish proofs in confirmation so strong, that the most skeptical will find it difficult to resist them.
It is well known, that there was a powerful opposition to the adoption of the constitution of the United States. It originated in the apprehension, that it would lead to the consolidation of all power in the government of the United States—notwithstanding the defeat of the national party, in the convention—and the refusal to adopt any of the proposals to vest it with the power to negative the acts of the governments of the separate States. This apprehension excited a wide and deep distrust, lest the scheme of the national party might ultimately prevail, through the influence of its leaders, over the government about to be established. The alarm became so great as to threaten the defeat of the ratification by nine States—the number necessary to make the constitution binding between the States ratifying it. It was particularly great in Virginia—on whose act, all sides believed the fate of the instrument depended. Before the meeting of her convention, seven States had ratified. It was generally believed that, of the remaining States, North Carolina and Rhode Island would not ratify; and New York was regarded so doubtful, that her course would, in all probability, depend on the action of Virginia. Her refusal, together with that of Virginia, would have defeated the adoption of the constitution. The struggle, accordingly, between the two parties in her convention, was long and ardent. The magnitude of the question at issue, called out the ablest and most influential of her citizens on both sides; and elicited the highest efforts of their talents. The discussion turned, mainly, on the danger of consolidation from construction; and was conducted with such ability and force of argument, by the opponents of ratification, that it became necessary, in order to obtain a majority for it, to guard against such construction, by incorporating in the act of ratification itself, provisions to prevent it. The act is in the following words: “We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the general assembly, and now met in convention, having fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the federal convention, and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us to decide thereon, do, in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under the constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression; and that every power not granted thereby, remains with them and at their will: that, therefore, no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate, or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President or any department, or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the constitution for those purposes; and that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.
“With these impressions—with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction, that, whatsoever imperfections may exist in the constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union into danger by delay, with the hope of obtaining amendments, previous to the ratification: We, the said delegates, in the name and behalf of the people of Virginia, do by these presents, assent to and ratify the constitution, &c.” —concluding in the usual form.
Such is the recorded construction, which that great and leading State placed on the constitution, in her act of ratification. That her object was to guard against the abuse of construction, the act itself, on its face, and the discussions in her convention abundantly prove. It was done effectually, as far as it depended on words. It declares that all powers granted by the constitution, are derived from the people of the United States; and may be resumed by them when perverted to their injury or oppression; and, that every power not granted, remains with them, and at their will; and that no right of any description can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by Congress, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, or any department, or officer of the United States. Language cannot be stronger. It guards the reserved powers against the government as a whole, and against all its departments and officers; and in every mode by which they might be impaired; showing, clearly, that the intention was to place the reserved powers beyond the possible interference and control of the government of the United States. Now, when it is taken into consideration, that the right of the separate governments of the several States is as full and perfect to protect their own powers, as is that of the government of the United States to protect those which are delegated to it; and, of course, that it belongs to their reserved powers; that all the attempts made in the convention which framed the constitution, to deprive them of it, by vesting the latter with the power to overrule the right, equally failed; that Virginia could not be induced to ratify without incorporating the true construction she placed on it in her act of ratification; that, without her ratification, it would not, in all probability, have been adopted; and that it was accepted by the other States, subject to this avowed construction, without objection on their part—it is difficult to resist the inference, that their acceptance, under all these circumstances, was an implied admission of the truth of her construction; and that it makes it as binding on them as if it had been inserted in the constitution itself.
But her convention took the further precaution of having it inserted, in substance, in that instrument. Those who composed it were wise, experienced, and patriotic men; and knew full well, how difficult it is to guard against the abuses of construction. They accordingly proposed, as an amendment of the constitution, the substance of her construction. It is in the following words: “That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by the constitution, delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the federal government.” This was modified and proposed, as an amendment, in the regular constitutional form; and was ratified by the States. It constitutes the 10th amendment article, which has already been quoted at length. It is worthy of note, that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, proposed, when they ratified the constitution, amendments similar in substance, and with the same object—clearly showing how extensively the alarm felt by Virginia, had extended; and how strong the desire was to guard against the evil apprehended.
Such, and so convincing are the arguments going to show, that the government of the United States has no more right to enforce its decisions against those of the separate governments of the several States, where they disagree as to the extent of their respective powers, than the latter have of enforcing their decisions in like cases. They both stand on equal grounds, in this respect. But as convincing as are these arguments, there are many, who entertain a different opinion—and still affirm that the government of the United States possesses the right, fully, absolutely, and exclusively.
In support of this opinion, they rely, in the first place, on the second section of the sixth article, which provides that— “This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land: and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
It is sufficient, in reply, to state, that the clause is declaratory; that it vests no new power whatever in the government, or in any of its departments. Without it, the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the treaties made under its authority, would have been the supreme law of the land, as fully and perfectly as they now are; and the judges in every State would have been bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of a State, to the contrary notwithstanding. Their supremacy results from the nature of the relation between the federal government, and those of the several States, and their respective constitutions and laws. Where two or more States form a common constitution and government, the authority of these, within the limits of the delegated powers, must, of necessity, be supreme, in reference to their respective separate constitutions and governments. Without this, there would be neither a common constitution and government, nor even a confederacy. The whole would be, in fact, a mere nullity. But this supremacy is not an absolute supremacy. It is limited in extent and degree. It does not extend beyond the delegated powers—all others being reserved to the States and the people of the States. Beyond these the constitution is as destitute of authority, and as powerless as a blank piece of paper; and the measures of the government mere acts of assumption. And, hence, the supremacy of laws and treaties is expressly restricted to such as are made in pursuance of the constitution, or under the authority of the United States; which can, in no case, extend beyond the delegated powers. There is, indeed, no power of the government without restriction; not even that, which is called the discretionary power of Congress. I refer to the grant which authorizes it to pass laws to carry into effect the powers expressly vested in it—or in the government of the United States—or in any of its departments, or officers. This power, comprehensive as it is, is, nevertheless, subject to two important restrictions; one, that the law must be necessary—and the other, that it must be proper.
To understand the import of the former, it must be borne in mind, that no power can execute itself. They all require means, and the agency of government, to apply them. The means themselves may, indeed, be regarded as auxiliary powers. Of these, some are so intimately connected with the principal power, that, without the aid of one, or all of them, it could not be carried into execution—and, of course, without them, the power itself would be nugatory. Hence, they are called implied powers; and it is to this description of incidental or auxiliary powers, that Congress is restricted, in passing laws, necessary to carry into execution the powers expressly delegated.
But the law must, also, be proper as well as necessary, in order to bring it within its competency. To understand the true import of the term in this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind, that even the implied powers themselves are subject to important conditions, when used as means to carry powers or rights into execution. Among these the most prominent and important is, that they must be so carried into execution as not to injure others; and, as connected with, and subordinate to this—that, where the implied powers, or means used, come in conflict with the implied powers, or means used by another, in the execution of the powers or rights vested in it, the less important should yield to the more important—the convenient, to the useful; and both to health and safety—because it is proper they should do so. Both rules are universal, and rest on the fundamental principles of morals.
Such is the true import of the term “proper,” superadded to “necessary,” when applied to this important question. And hence, when a law of Congress, carrying into execution one of the delegated powers, comes into conflict with a law of one of the States, carrying its reserved powers into execution, it does not necessarily follow that the latter must yield to the former, because the laws made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be the supreme law of the land: for the restriction imposed by the term “proper,” takes it out of the power of Congress, even where the implied power is necessary, and brings it under the operation of those fundamental rules of universal acceptation, to determine which shall yield. Without this restriction, most of the reserved powers of the States—and, among them, those relating to their internal police, including the health, tranquillity, and safety of their people—might be made abortive, by the laws passed by Congress, to carry into effect the delegated powers; especially in regard to those regulating commerce, and establishing post offices and post roads.
The alterations finally made in this clause of the constitution, compared with it as originally reported by the committee on detail, deserve notice—as shedding considerable light on its phraseology and objects. As reported by that committee, it was in the following words: “The acts of the legislature of the United States, made in pursuance of this constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the Judges of the several States shall be bound thereby, in their decisions; any thing in the constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.” After a long discussion of the plan of the constitution, as reported by this committee; and after many alterations were made, the whole, as amended, was referred to the committee of revision, or “style,” as it was also called. This particular clause had received no amendment; and, of course, was referred as reported by the committee on detail. The committee of revision, or style, reported it back as it now stands. On comparing the two, it will be found, that the word “constitution,” which was omitted in the plan of the committee on detail, is added, as a part of the supreme law of the land; that the expression, “the acts of the legislature of the United States,” is changed into “laws of Congress,” and “land” substituted in lieu of, “several States and of their citizens and inhabitants.” These modifications of phraseology were, doubtless, introduced to make the clause conform to what was believed to be the views of the convention, as disclosed in the discussion on the plan reported by the committee on detail, and to improve the manner of expression; for such were plainly the objects of referring the plan, as amended, to the committee of revision and style. “Constitution” was doubtless added, because, although a compact as between the States, it is a law—and the highest law—in reference to the citizens and inhabitants of the several States, regarded individually. The substitution of “Congress” for “the legislature of the United States,” requires no explanation. It is a mere change of phraseology. For the substitution of “land,” in place of the “several States and their citizens and inhabitants,” no reason is assigned, so far as I can discover; but one will readily suggest itself on a little reflection. As the expression stood in the plan reported by the committee on detail, the supremacy of the acts of the legislature of the United States, and of treaties made under their authority, was limited to the “several States, and their citizens and inhabitants;” and, of course, would not have extended over the territorial possessions of the United States; or, as far as their authority might otherwise extend. It became necessary, therefore, to give them a wider scope; especially after the word, “constitution,” was introduced in connection with, “laws of the United States;” as their authority never can extend beyond the limits, to which it is carried by the constitution. As far as this extends, their authority extends; but no further. To give to the constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, a supremacy coextensive with these limits, it became necessary to adopt a more comprehensive expression than that reported by the committee on detail; and, hence, in all probability, the adoption of that substituted by the committee of revision and style—"the supreme law of the land,” being deemed the more appropriate.
Such are the limitations imposed on the authority of the constitution, and laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority, regarded as the supreme law of the land. To carry their supremacy beyond this—and to extend it over the reserved powers, in any form or shape, or through any channel—be it the government itself or any of its departments—would finally destroy the system by consolidating all its powers in the hands of the one or the other.
The limitation of their supremacy, in degree, is not less strongly marked, than it is in extent. While they are supreme, within their sphere, over the constitutions and laws of the several States—the constitution of the United States, and all that appertains to it, are subordinate to the power which ordained and established it—as much so, as are the constitutions of the several States, and all which appertains to them, to the same creative power. In this respect, as well as their supremacy in regard to each other, in their respective spheres, they stand on the same level. Neither has any advantage, in either particular, over the other.
Those who maintain that the government of the United States has the right to enforce its decisions as to the extent of the powers delegated to it, against the decisions of the separate governments of the several States as to the extent of the reserved powers, in case of conflict between the two—next rely, in support of their opinion, on the 2d Sec. 3d Art. of the constitution—which is in the following words: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction—to controversies, to which the United States shall be a party—to controversies between two or more States—between a State and the citizens of another State—between citizens of different States—between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.”
It will be sufficient, in reply, to show, that this section contains no provisions whatever, which would authorize the judiciary to enforce the determination of the government, against that of the government of a State, in such cases.
It may be divided into two parts; that which gives jurisdiction to the judicial power, in reference to the subject matter, and that which gives it jurisdiction, in reference to the parties litigant. The first clause, which extends it, “to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority,” embraces the former; and the residue of the section, the latter.
It is clear on its face, that the object of the clause was, to make the jurisdiction of the judicial power, commensurate with the authority of the constitution and the several departments of the government, as far as it related to cases arising under them—and no further. Nor is it less manifest that the word “cases,” being a well-defined technical term, is used in its proper legal sense—and embraces only such questions as are of a judicial character—that is, questions in which the parties litigant are amenable to the process of the courts. Now, as there is nothing in the constitution which vests authority in the government of the United States, or any of its departments, to enforce its decision against that of the separate government of a State; and nothing in this clause which makes the several States amenable to its process, it is manifest that there is nothing in it, which can possibly give the judicial power authority to enforce the decision of the government of the United States, against that of a separate State, where their respective decisions come into conflict. If, then, there be any thing that authorizes it, it must be contained in the remainder of the section, which vests jurisdiction with reference to the parties litigant. But this contains no provision which extends the jurisdiction of the judicial power to questions involving such conflict between the two co-ordinate governments—either express or implied—as I shall next proceed to show.
It will not be contended that either the government of the United States, or those of the separate States are amenable to the process of the courts; unless made so by their consent respectively; for no legal principle is better established than that, a government, though it may be plaintiff in a case, or controversy, cannot be made defendant, or, in any way, amenable to the process of the courts, without its consent. That there is no express provision in the section, by which, either of the co-ordinate governments can be made defendants, or amenable to the process of the courts, in a question between them, is manifest.
If, then, there be any, it must be implied in some one of its provisions: and it is, accordingly, contended, that it is implied in the clause, which provides that the judicial power shall extend, “to controversies to which the United States shall be a party.” This clause, it is admitted, clearly extends the jurisdiction of the judiciary to all controversies to which the United States are a party, as plaintiff or defendant, by their consent. So far, it is not a matter of implication, but of express provision. But the inquiry is, does it go further, and, by implication, authorize them to make a State a defendant without its consent, in a question or controversy between it and them? It contains not a word or syllable that would warrant such an implication; and any construction which could warrant it, would authorize a State, or an individual, to make the United States a party defendant, in a controversy between them, without their consent.
There is, not only nothing to warrant such construction, but much to show that it is utterly unwarrantable. Nothing, in the first place, short of the strongest implication, is sufficient to authorize a construction, that would deprive a State of a right so important to its sovereignty, as that of not being held amenable to the process of the courts; or to be made a defendant, in any case or controversy whatever, without its consent—more especially, in one between it and a coequal government, where the effect would necessarily be, to reduce it from an equal to a subordinate station.
It would, in the next place, be contrary to the construction placed on a similar clause in the same section, by an authority higher than that of the judicial, or of any other, or of all the departments of the government taken together. I refer to the last clause, which provides that the judicial power shall extend to controversies, “between a State or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” It would be much more easy to make out something like a plausible argument in support of the position, that a State might be made defendant and amenable to the process of the courts of the United States, under this clause, than under that in question. In the former, the States are not even named. They can be brought in only by implication, and then, by another implication, divested of a high sovereign right: and this, too, without any assignable reason for either. Here they are not only named, but the other parties to the controversies are also named; without stating which shall be plaintiff, or which defendant. This was left undefined; and, of course, the question, whether the several States might not be made defendants as well as plaintiffs, in controversies between the parties, left open to construction—and in favor of the implication, a very plausible reason may be assigned. The clause puts a State and its citizens on the same ground. In the controversies, to which it extends the judicial power, the State and its citizens stand on one side, and foreign states, citizens and subjects, on the other. Now as foreign states, citizens, or subjects may, under its provisions, make the citizens of a State defendants, in a controversy between them, it would not be an unnatural inference, that the State might also be included. Under this construction, an action was, in fact, commenced in the courts of the United States, against one of the States. The States took the alarm; and, in the high sovereign character, in which they ordained and established the constitution, declared that it should “not be so construed, as to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” 9
If additional reasons could be thought necessary to sustain a conclusion supported by arguments so convincing, they might be found in the fact, that as long as the government has existed—and as numerous as have been the questions between the United States and many of the several States—the former never have attempted, in any of them, to bring the latter into the courts of the United States. If to this it be added, that all attempts made in the convention, to extend the judicial power, “to all questions, which involved the national peace and harmony"—or which might have the effect of subjecting the several States to its jurisdiction, failed—the conclusion against all constructive efforts, having the same objects in view, and based on any one of the clauses of this section, is irresistible.
It is, in the last place, contended—that the Supreme Court of the United States has the right to decide on the constitutionality of all laws; and, in virtue of this, to decide, in the last resort, all questions involving a conflict between the constitution of the United States and laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, on the one side, and the constitutions and laws of the several States, on the other.
It is admitted, that the court has the right, in all questions of a judicial character which may come before it, where the laws and treaties of the United States, and the constitution and laws of a State are in conflict or brought in question, to decide which is, or is not consistent with the constitution of the United States. But it is denied that this power is peculiar to it; or that its decision, in the last resort, is binding on any but the parties to it, and its co-departments. So far from being peculiar to it, the right appertains, not only to the Supreme Court of the United States, but to all the courts of the several States, superior and inferior; and even to foreign courts—should a question be brought before them involving such conflict. It results, necessarily, from our system of government; where power is not only divided, but where constitutions and laws emanate from different authorities. Where this is the fact, it is the duty of the court to pronounce what is the law in the case before it—and, of course—where there is conflict between different laws—to pronounce which is paramount. Now, as the constitution of the United States is, within its sphere, supreme over all others appertaining to the system, it necessarily results, that where any law conflicts with it, it is the duty of the court, before which the question arises, to pronounce the constitution to be paramount. If it be the Supreme Court of the United States, its decision—being that of the highest judicial tribunal, in the last resort, of the parties to the case or controversy—is, of course, final as it respects them—but only as it respects them. It results, that its decision is not binding as between the United States and the several States, as neither can make the other defendant in any controversy between them.
Others, who are forced by the strength of the argument to admit, that the judicial power does not extend to them, contend that Congress, the great organ of the government, has the right to decide, in the last resort, in all such controversies—or in all questions involving the extent of their respective powers. They do not pretend to derive this high power from any specific provision of the constitution; they claim it to be a right incident to all governments, to decide as to the extent of its powers; and to enforce its decision by its own proper authority.
It is manifest, that they who contend for this right to its full extent, overlook the distinction, in this respect, between single governments, vested with all the powers appertaining to government, and co-ordinate governments, in a system where the powers of government are divided between two or more, as is the case with us. If it be admitted that the right belongs to both, and that co-ordinate governments, in this respect, stand on the same ground as single governments—whatever right or power in such case, belongs to the one, must necessarily belong to the other: and, if so, the result must be, where they differ as to the extent of their respective powers, either a mutual negative on the acts of each other—or the right of each to enforce its decision on the other. But it has already been established, that they have not the latter; and hence, under any aspect in which the question can be viewed, the same conclusion follows—that where the two governments differ as to the extent of their respective powers, a mutual negative is the consequence.
The effect of this is, to make each, as against the other, the guardian and protector of the powers allotted to it, and of which it is the organ and representative. By no other device, could the separate governments of the several States, as the weaker of the two, prevent the government of the United States, as the stronger, from encroaching on that portion of the reserved powers allotted to them, and finally absorbing the whole; except, indeed, by so organizing the former, as to give to each of the States a concurrent voice in making and administering the laws; and, of course, a veto on its action. The powers not delegated are expressly reserved to the respective States or the people; that is, to the governments of the respective States and the people thereof; and by them only can they be protected and preserved. The reason has been fully explained in the discourse on the elementary principles of government. But the several States, as weaker parties, can protect the portion not delegated, only in one of two ways; either by having a concurrent voice in the action of the government of the United States; or a negative on its acts, when they disagree as to the extent of their respective powers. One or the other is indispensable to the preservation of the reserved rights—and to prevent the consolidation of all power in the government of the United States, as the stronger. Why the latter was preferred by the convention which formed the constitution, may, probably, be attributed to the great number of States, and the belief that it was impossible so to organize the government, as to give to each a concurrent voice in its action, without rendering it too feeble and tardy to fulfil the ends for which it was intended. But, be this as it may, not having adopted it, no device remained, by which the reserved powers could be protected and preserved, but the one which they, in effect, did adopt—by refusing to vest the government of the United States with a veto on the acts of the separate governments of the several States, in any form or manner whatever.
But it may be alleged, that the effect of a mutual negative on the part of the two co-ordinate governments, where they disagree as to the extent of their respective powers, will, while it guards against consolidation on one side—lead to collision and conflict between them on the other—and, finally, to disunion.
That the division of the powers of government between the two, without some means to prevent such result, would necessarily lead to collision and conflict, will not be denied. They are incident to every division of powers, of every description; whether it be that of co-ordinate departments, co-ordinate estates or classes, co-ordinate governments, or any other division of power appertaining to our system, or to that of any other constitutional government. It is impossible to construct one without dividing the powers of government. But wherever, and however power may be divided, collision and conflict are necessary consequences, if not prevented. The more numerous and complex the divisions, the stronger the tendency to both, and the greater the necessity for powerful and effectual guards to prevent them. It is one of the evils incident to constitutional governments of every form. But we must take things as they are, with all their incidents, bad or good. The choice between constitutional and absolute governments, lies between the good and evil, incident to each. If the former be exposed to collision and conflict between its various parts, the latter is exposed to all the oppressions and abuses, ever incident to uncontrolled and irresponsible power, in all its forms. With us the choice lies between a national, consolidated and irresponsible government of a dominant portion, or section of the country—and a federal, constitutional and responsible government, with all the divisions of powers indispensable to form and preserve such a government, in a country of such vast extent, and so great a diversity of interest and institutions as ours. The advantages of both, without the evils incident to either, we cannot have. Their nature and character are too opposite and hostile to be blended in the same system.
But while it is admitted that collision and conflict may be necessarily incident to a division of powers, it is utterly denied, that the effects of the mutual negative between the two co-ordinate governments would contribute to either, or necessarily lead to disunion. On the contrary, its effects would be the very reverse. Instead of leading to either, it is an indispensable means to prevent the collision and conflict, which must necessarily arise between the delegated and reserved powers; and which, if not prevented, would, in the end, destroy the system, either by consolidation or dissolution. Its aim and end is to prevent the encroachment of either of the co-ordinate governments on the other. For this purpose it is the effectual, and the only effectual means that can be devised. By preventing such encroachments, it prevents collision and conflict between them. These are their natural offspring: collision follows encroachment—and conflict, collision, in the order of events—unless encroachment be acquiesced in. In that case, the weaker would be absorbed, and all power concentrated in the stronger.
But it may be alleged, that, in preventing these, it would lead to consequences not less to be dreaded—that a negative on the part of the governments of so many States, where either might disagree with that of the United States, as to the extent of their respective powers, would lead to such embarrassment and confusion, and interpose so many impediments in its way, as to render it incompetent to fulfil the ends for which it was established. The objection is plausible; but it will be found, on investigation, that strong as the remedy is, it is not stronger than is required by the disease; and that the system furnishes ample means to correct whatever disorder it may occasion.
It may be laid down as a fundamental principle in constructing constitutional governments, that a strong government requires a negative proportionally strong, to restrict it to its appropriate sphere; and that, the stronger the government—if the negative be proportionally strong, the better the government. It is only by making it proportionally strong, that an equilibrium can be established between the positive and negative powers—the power of acting, and the power of restricting action to its assigned limits. It is difficult to form a conception of a constitutional government stronger than that of the United States; and, consequently, of one requiring a stronger negative to keep it within its appropriate sphere. Combining, habitually, as it necessarily does, the united power and patronage of a majority of the States and of their population estimated in federal numbers, in opposition to a minority of each, with nothing but their separate and divided power and patronage, it is, to the full as strong, if not stronger, than was the government of Rome—with its powerfully constituted Senate, including its control of the auspices, the censorship, and the dictatorship. It will, of course, require, in order to keep it within its proper bounds, a negative fully as strong in proportion, as the tribuneship; which, in its prime, consisted of ten members, elected by the Plebeians, each of whom (as has been supposed by some—but a majority of whom, all admit) had a negative, not only on the acts of the Senate, but on their execution. As powerful as was this negative, experiment proved that it was not too strong for the positive power of the government. If the circumstances be considered, under which the negative of the several States will be brought into action, it will be found, on comparison, to be weaker in proportion, than the negative possessed by the tribuneship; and far more effectually guarded in its possible tendencies to disorder, or the derangement of the system.
In the first place, the negative of the tribunes extended to all the acts of the Senate, and to their execution; and—as it was a single government without limitation on its authority—to all the acts of government. On the other hand, the negative of the governments of the several States extends only to the execution of such acts of the government of the United States, as may present a question involving their respective powers; which, relatively, are very few, compared to the whole. In the next place, every tribune, or, at least, the majority of the college, possessed the power; and was ordinarily disposed to exercise it, as they all represented the portion of the Roman people, which their veto was intended to protect against oppression and abuse of power on the part of the Senate. On the contrary, the habitual relation between the governments of the several States and the government of the United States for the time, is such, as to identify the majority of them, in power and interest, with the latter; and to dispose them rather to enlarge and sustain its authority, than to resist its encroachments—which, from their position, they regard as extending—and not as contracting their powers. This limits the negative power of the governments of the several States to the minority, for the time: and even that minority will have, as experience proves, a minority in its own limits, almost always opposed to its will, and nearly of equal numbers with itself, identified in views and party feelings, with the majority in possession of the control of the government of the United States; and ever ready to counteract any opposition to its encroachments on the reserved powers. To this it may be added, that even the majority in this minority of the States, will, for the most part, be averse to making a stand against its encroachments; as they, themselves, hope, in their turn, to gain the ascendency; and are, therefore, naturally disinclined to weaken their party connections with the minority in the States possessing, for the time, the control of the government—and whose interest and feelings, aside from party ties, would be with the majority of their respective States. Such being the case, it is apparent that there will be far less disposition on the part of the governments of the several States to resist the encroachments of the government of the United States on their reserved rights—or to make an issue with it, when they disagree as to the extent of their respective powers—than there was in the tribunate of the Roman republic to oppose acts, or the execution of acts, calculated to oppress, or deprive their order of its rights.
If to this it be further added, that the federal constitution provides—not only that all the functionaries of the United States, but also those of the several States, including, expressly, the members of their legislatures, and all their executive and judicial officers—shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support the constitution—and that the decision of the highest tribunal of the judicial power is final, as between the parties to a case or controversy—the danger of any serious derangement or disorder from the effects of the negative on the parts of the separate governments of the several States, must appear, not only much less than that from the Roman tribunate, but very inconsiderable. The danger is, indeed, the other way—that the disposition on the part of the governments of the several States, to acquiesce in the encroachments of the government of the United States, will prove stronger than the disposition to resist; and the negative, compared with the positive power, will be found to be too feeble to preserve the equilibrium between them. But if it should prove otherwise—and if, in consequence, any serious derangement of the system should ensue, there will be found, in the earliest and highest division of power, which I shall next proceed to consider, ample and safe means of correcting them.
I refer to that resulting from, and inseparably connected with the primitive territorial division of the country itself—coeval with its settlement into separate and distinct communities; and which, though dependent at the first on the parent country, became, by a successful resistance to its encroachments on their chartered rights, independent and sovereign States. In them severally—or to express it more precisely, in the people composing them, regarded as independent and sovereign communities, the ultimate power of the whole system resided, and from them the whole system emanated. Their first act was, to ordain and establish their respective separate constitutions and governments—each by itself, and for itself—without concert or agreement with the others; and their next, after the failure of the confederacy, was to ordain and establish the constitution and government of the United States, in the same way in every respect, as has been shown; except that it was done by concert and agreement with each other. That this high, this supreme power, has never been either delegated to, or vested in the separate governments of the States, or the federal government—and that it is, therefore, one of the powers declared, by the 10th Art. of amendments, to be reserved to the people of the respective States; and that, of course, it still resides with them, will hardly be questioned. It must reside somewhere. No one will assert that it is extinguished. But, according to the fundamental principles of our system, sovereignty resides in the people, and not in the government; and if in them, it must be in them, as the people of the several States; for, politically speaking, there is no other known to the system. It not only resides in them, but resides in its plenitude, unexhausted and unimpaired. If proof be required, it will be found in the fact—which cannot be controverted, so far as the United States are concerned—that the people of the several States, acting in the same capacity and in the same way, in which they ordained and established the federal constitution, can, by their concurrent and united voice, change or abolish it, and establish another in its place; or dissolve the Union, and resolve themselves into separate and disconnected States. A power which can rightfully do all this, must exist in full plenitude, unexhausted and unimpaired; for no higher act of sovereignty can be conceived.
But it does not follow from this, that the people of the several States, in ordaining and establishing the constitution of the United States, imposed no restriction on the exercise of sovereign power; for a sovereign may voluntarily impose restrictions on his acts, without, in any degree, exhausting or impairing his sovereignty; as is admitted by all writers on the subject. In the act of ordaining and establishing it, they have, accordingly, imposed several important restrictions on the exercise of their sovereign power. In order to ascertain what these are, and how far they extend, it will be necessary to ascertain, in what relation they stand to the constitution; and to each other in reference to it.
They stand then, as to the one, in the relation of superior to subordinate—the creator to the created. The people of the several States called it into existence, and conferred, by it, on the government, whatever power or authority it possesses. Regarded simply as a constitution, it is as subordinate to them, as are their respective State constitutions; and it imposes no more restrictions on the exercise of any of their sovereign rights, than they do. The case however is different as to the relations which the people of the several States bear to each other, in reference to it. Having ratified and adopted it, by mutual agreement, they stand to it in the relation of parties to a constitutional compact; and, of course, it is binding between them as a compact, and not on, or over them, as a constitution. Of all compacts that can exist between independent and sovereign communities, it is the most intimate, solemn, and sacred—whether regarded in reference to the closeness of connection, the importance of the objects to be effected, or to the obligations imposed. Laying aside all intermediate agencies, the people of the several States, in their sovereign capacity, agreed to unite themselves together, in the closest possible connection that could be formed, without merging their respective sovereignties into one common sovereignty—to establish one common government, for certain specific objects, which, regarding the mutual interest and security of each, and of all, they supposed could be more certainly, safely, and effectually promoted by it, than by their several separate governments; pledging their faith, in the most solemn manner possible, to support the compact thus formed, by respecting its provisions, obeying all acts of the government made in conformity with them, and preserving it, as far as in them lay, against all infractions. But, as solemn and sacred as it is, and as high as the obligations may be which it imposes—still it is but a compact and not a constitution—regarded in reference to the people of the several States, in their sovereign capacity. To use the language of the constitution itself, it was ordained as a “constitution for the United States” —not over them; and established, not over, but “ between the States ratifying it:” and hence, a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, and in the same manner in which it ratified and adopted the constitution, may be guilty of violating it as a compact, but cannot be guilty of violating it as a law. The case is the reverse, as to the action of its citizens, regarding them in their individual capacity. To them it is a law—the supreme law within its sphere. They may be guilty of violating it as a law, or of violating the laws and treaties made in pursuance of, or under its authority, regarded as laws or treaties; but cannot be guilty of violating it as a compact. The constitution was ordained and established over them by their respective States, to whom they owed allegiance; and they are under the same obligation to respect and obey its authority, within its proper sphere, as they are to respect and obey their respective State constitutions; and for the same reason, viz.: that the State to which they owe allegiance, commanded it in both cases.
It follows, from what has been stated, that the people of the several States, regarded as parties to the constitutional compact, have imposed restrictions on the exercise of their sovereign power, by entering into a solemn obligation to do no act inconsistent with its provisions, and to uphold and support it within their respective limits. To this extent the restrictions go—but no further. As parties to the constitutional compact, they retain the right, unrestricted, which appertains to such a relation in all cases where it is not surrendered, to judge as to the extent of the obligation imposed by the agreement or compact—in the fast instance, where there is a higher authority; and, in the last resort, where there is none. The principle on which this assertion rests, is essential to the nature of contracts; and is in accord with universal practice. But the right to judge as to the extent of the obligation imposed, necessarily involves the right of pronouncing whether an act of the federal government, or any of its departments, be, or be not, in conformity to the provisions of the constitutional compact; and, if decided to be inconsistent, of pronouncing it to be unauthorized by the constitution, and, therefore, null, void, and of no effect. If the constitution be a compact, and the several States, regarded in their sovereign character, be parties to it, all the rest follow as necessary consequences. It would be puerile to suppose the right of judging existed, without the right of pronouncing whether an act of the government violated the provisions of the constitution or not; and equally so to suppose, that the right of judging existed, without the authority of declaring the consequence, to wit; that, as such, it is null, void, and of no effect. And hence, those who are unwilling to admit the consequences, have been found to deny that the constitution is a compact; in the face of facts as well established as any in our political history, and in utter disregard of that provision of the constitution, which expressly declares, that the ratification of nine States shall be sufficient to establish it “between the States so ratifying the same.”
But the right, with all these consequences, is not more certain than that possessed by the several States, as parties to the compact, of interposing for the purpose of arresting, within their respective limits, an act of the federal government in violation of the constitution; and thereby of preventing the delegated from encroaching on the reserved powers. Without such right, all the others would be barren and useless abstractions—and just as puerile as the right of judging, without the right of pronouncing an act to be unconstitutional, and, as such, null and void. Nor is this right more certain, than that of the States, in the same character and capacity, to decide on the mode and measure to be adopted to arrest the act, and prevent the encroachment on the reserved powers. It is a right indispensable to all the others, and, without which, they would be valueless.
These conclusions follow irresistibly from incontestable facts and well-established principles. But the possession of a right is one thing, and the exercise of it another. Rights, themselves, must be exercised with prudence and propriety: when otherwise exercised, they often cease to be rights, and become wrongs. The more important the right, and the more delicate its character, the higher the obligation to observe, strictly, the rules of prudence and propriety. But, of all the rights appertaining to the people of the several States, as members of a common Union, the one in question, is by far the most important and delicate; and, of course, requires, in its exercise, the greatest caution and forbearance. As parties to the compact which constitutes the Union, they are under obligations to observe its provisions, and prevent their infraction. In exercising the right in question, they are bound to take special care that they do not themselves, violate this, the most sacred of obligations. To avoid this, prudence and propriety require that they should abstain from interposing their authority, to arrest an act of their common government, unless the case, in their opinion, involve a clear and palpable infraction of the instrument. They are bound to go further—and to forbear from interposing, even when it is clear and palpable, unless it be, at the same time, highly dangerous in its character, and apparently admitting of no other remedy; and for the plain reason, that prudence and propriety require, that a right so high and delicate should be called into exercise, only in cases of great magnitude and extreme urgency. But even when, in the opinion of the people of a State, such a case has occurred—that nothing, short of the interposition of their authority, can arrest the danger and preserve the constitution, they ought to interpose in good faith—not to weaken or destroy the Union, but to uphold and preserve it, by causing the instrument on which it rests, to be observed and respected; and to this end, the mode and measure of redress ought to be exclusively directed and limited. In such a case, a State not only has the right, but is, in duty to itself and the Union, bound to interpose—as the last resort, to arrest the dangerous infraction of the constitution—and to prevent the powers reserved to itself, from being absorbed by those delegated to the United States.
That the right, so exercised, would be, in itself, a safe and effectual security against so great an evil, few will doubt. But the question arises—Will prudence and propriety be sufficient to prevent the wanton abuse of a right, so high and delicate, by the thirty parties to the compact—and the many others hereafter to be added to the number?
I answer, no. Nor can any one, in the least acquainted with that constitution of our nature which makes governments necessary, give any other answer. The highest moral obligations—truth, justice, and plighted faith—much less, prudence and propriety—oppose, of themselves, but feeble resistance to the abuse of power. But what they, of themselves, cannot effect, may be effected by other influences of a far less elevated character. Of these, many are powerful, and well calculated to prevent the abuse of this high and delicate right. Among them may be ranked, as most prominent and powerful, that which springs from the habitual action of a majority of the States and of their population, estimated in federal numbers, on the side of the federal government—a majority naturally prone, and ever ready—in all questions between it and a State, involving an infraction of the constitution, to throw its weight in the scale of the former. To this, may be added another, of no small force. I refer to that of party ties. Experience, as well as reason shows, that a government, operating as ours does, must give rise to two great political parties—which, although partaking, from the first, more or less of a sectional character, extend themselves, in unequal proportions, over the whole Union—carrying with them, notwithstanding their sectional tendency, party sympathy and party attachment of such strength, that few are willing to break or weaken them, by resisting, even an acknowledged infraction of the constitution, of a nature alike oppressive and dangerous to their section. Both of these tend powerfully to resist the abuse of the right, by preventing it from being exercised imprudently and improperly. But I will not dwell on them, as they have been already considered in another connection. There are others, more especially connected with the subject at present before us, which I shall next consider.
The first may be traced to a fact, disclosed by experience, that, in most of the States, the preponderance of neither party is so decisive, that the minority may not hope to become the majority; and that, with this hope, it stands always ready to seize on any act of the majority, of doubtful propriety, as the means of turning it out of power and taking its place. Should the majority in any State, where the balance thus vibrates, venture to take a stand, and to interpose its authority, against the encroachment of the federal government on its reserved powers, it would be difficult to conceive a case, however clear and palpable the encroachment, or dangerous its character, in which the minority would not resist its action, and array itself on the side of the federal government. And there are very few, in which, with the aid of its power and patronage, backed by the numerous presses in its support, the minority would not succeed in overcoming the majority—taking their place, and, thereby, placing the State at the foot of the federal government. To this, another of great force may be added. The dominant party of the State, for the time, although it may be in a minority in the Union for the time, looks forward, of course, to the period when it will be in a majority of the Union; and have at its disposal all the honors and emoluments of the federal government. The leaders of such party, therefore, would not be insensible to the advantage, which their position, as such, would give them, to share largely in the distribution. This advantage they would not readily jeopard, by taking a stand which would render them, not only odious to the majority of the Union, at the time, but unpopular with their own party in the other States—as putting in hazard their chance to become the majority. Under such circumstances, it would require, not only a clear and palpable case of infraction, and one of urgent necessity, but high virtue, patriotism and courage to exercise the right of interposition—even if it were admitted to be clear and unquestionable. And hence, it is to be feared that, even this high right, combined with the mutual negative of the two co-ordinate governments, will be scarcely sufficient to counteract the vast and preponderating power of the federal government, and to prevent the absorption of the reserved by the delegated powers.
Indeed the negative power is always far weaker, in proportion to its appearance, than the positive. The latter having the control of the government, with all its honors and emoluments, has the means of acting on and influencing those who exercise the negative power, and of enlisting them on its side, unless it be effectually guarded: while, on the other hand, those who exercise the negative, have nothing but the simple power, and possess no means of influencing those who exercise the positive power.
But, suppose it should prove otherwise; and that the negative power should become so strong as to cause dangerous derangements and disorders in the system—the constitution makes ample provisions for their correction—whether produced by the interposition of a State, or the mutual negative, or conflict of power between the two co-ordinate governments. I refer to the amending power. Why it was necessary to provide for such a power—what is its nature and character—why it was modified as it is—and whether it be safe, and sufficient to effect the objects intended—are the questions, which I propose next to consider.
It is, as has already been explained, a fundamental principle, in forming such a federal community of States, and establishing such a federal constitution and government as ours, that no State could be bound but by its separate ratification and adoption. The principle is essentially connected with the independence and sovereignty of the several States. As the several States, in such a community, with such a constitution and government, still retained their separate independence and sovereignty, it followed, that the compact into which they entered, could not be altered or changed, in any way, but by the unanimous assent of all the parties, without some express provision authorizing it. But there were strong objections to requiring the consent of all to make alterations or changes in the constitution. Those who formed it were not so vain as to suppose that they had made a perfect instrument; nor so ignorant as not to see, however perfect it might be, that derangements and disorders, resulting from time, circumstances, and the conflicting elements of the system itself, would make amendments necessary. But to leave it, without making some special provision for the purpose, would have been, in effect, to leave it to any one of the States to prevent amendments; which, in practice, would have been almost tantamount to leaving it without any power to amend—notwithstanding its necessity. And, hence, the subject of making some special provision for amending the constitution, was forced on the attention of the convention.
There was diversity of opinion as to what the nature and character of the amending power should be. All agreed that it should be a modification of the original creative power, which ordained and established the separate constitutions and governments of the several States; and, by which alone, the proposed constitution and government could be ordained and established; or, to express it differently and more explicitly—that amendments should be the acts of the several States, voting as States—each counting one—and not the act of the government. But there was great diversity of opinion as to what number of States should be required to concur, or agree, in order to make an amendment. It was first moved to require the consent of all the States. This was followed by a motion to amend, requiring two-thirds; which was overruled by a considerable majority. It was then moved to require the concurrence of three-fourths, which was agreed to, and finally adopted without dissent.
To understand fully the reasons for so modifying the original creative power, as to require the concurrence of three-fourths to make an amendment, it will be necessary to advert to another portion of the proceedings of the convention, intimately connected with the present question. I refer to that which contains a history of its action in regard to the number of States required to ratify the constitution, before it should become binding between those so ratifying it. It is material to state, that although the article in respect to ratifications, which grew out of these proceedings, stands last in the constitution, it was finally agreed on and adopted before the article in regard to amendments—and had, doubtless, no inconsiderable influence in determining the number of States required for that purpose.
There was, in reference to both, great diversity of opinion as to the requisite number of States. With the exception of one State, all agreed that entire unanimity should not be required; but the majority divided as to the number which should be required. One of the most prominent leaders of the party, originally in favor of a national government, was in favor of requiring only a bare majority of the States. Another, not less distinguished, was in favor of the same proposition; but so modified as to require such majority to contain, also, a majority of the entire population of all the States; and, in default of this, as many additional States as would be necessary to supply the deficiency. On the other hand, the more prominent members of the party in favor of a federal government, inclined to a larger number. One of the most influential of these, moved to require ten States; on which motion the convention was nearly equally divided. Finally, the number nine was agreed on—constituting three-fourths of all the States represented in the convention—and, as nearly as might be, of all the States at that time in the Union.
Why the first propositions were rejected, and the last finally agreed on, requires explanation. The first proposition, requiring the ratification of all the States, before the constitution should become binding between those so ratifying the same, was rejected, doubtless, because it was deemed unreasonable that the fate of the others should be made dependent on the will of a single State. The convention acted under the pressure of very trying exigencies. The confederacy had failed; and it was absolutely necessary that something should be done to save the credit of the Union, and to guard against confusion and anarchy. The plan of the constitution and government adopted, was the only one that could be agreed on; and the fate of the country apparently rested on its ratification by the States. In such a state of things, it seemed to be too hazardous to put it in the power of a single State to defeat it. Nothing short of so great a pressure could justify an act which made so great a change in the articles of confederation—which expressly provided that no alteration should be made in any of them, “unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”
The rejection of the other proposition, which required a mere majority of the States to make it binding as between the States so ratifying it, will scarcely require explanation. It exposed the States to the hazard of forming, not one, but two Unions; or, if this should be avoided—by forcing the other States to come in reluctantly, under the force of circumstances, it endangered the harmony and duration of the Union, and the proposed constitution and government. It would, besides, have evinced too great an indifference to the stipulation contained in the articles of the confederation just cited.
It remains now to be explained why the particular number, between these two extremes, was finally agreed on. Among other reasons, one, doubtless, is to be found in the fact, that the articles of the then existing confederation, required the consent of nine States to give validity to many of the acts of their Congress—among which, were the acts declaring war—granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, and emitting bills, or borrowing money on the credit of the United States. The object of requiring so great a number was, to guard against the abuses of these and the other great and delicate powers contained in the provision. A mere majority of the States, was too few to be intrusted with such powers; and, to make the trust more safe, the consent of nine States was required; which was within a small fraction of three-fourths of the whole number at the time. The precedent—and the same consideration which induced the legislatures of all the States to assent to it, in adopting the articles of confederation, must have had, undoubtedly, much weight in determining what number of States should ratify the constitution, before it should become binding between them. If the legislatures of all the States should have unanimously deemed it not unreasonable, that the highest and most delicate acts of the old Congress, when agreed to by nine or more States, should be acquiesced in by the others, it was very natural that the members of the convention should think it not unreasonable to require an equal number to give validity to the constitution, as between them—leaving it to the others to say whether they would ratify or not. Nine, or three-fourths of the whole, were, unquestionably, regarded as a safe and sufficient guaranty against oppression and abuse, both in the highest acts of the confederacy, and in establishing the constitution between the States ratifying it. And it is equally certain that a smaller number was not regarded either as safe, or sufficient.
The force of these precedents, combined with the reasons for adopting them, must have had great weight in determining the proportional number which should be required to amend the constitution. Indeed, after determining the proportion in the provision for the ratification of the constitution, it would seem to follow, as a matter of course, that the same proportion should be required in the provision for amending it. It would be difficult to assign a reason, why the proportion should be different in the two cases; and why, if three-fourths should be required in the one, it should not also be required in the other. If it would have been unreasonable and improper in the one, that a few States in proportion should, by their obstinacy, prevent the others from forming a constitution—it would have been equally so, and for the same reason, that the like proportion should have the power to prevent amendments, however necessary they might be to the well working and safety of the system. So, again, if it would have been dangerous and improper, to permit a bare majority of the States, or any proportion less than that required to make the constitution binding as between the States ratifying—it would have been no less so to permit such number or proportion to amend it. The two are, indeed, nearly allied, and involve, throughout, the same principle—and hence, the same diversity of opinion between the two parties in the convention, in reference to both, and the adoption of the same proportion of States in each. I say the same proportion—for although nine States were rather less than three-fourths of the whole number when the constitution was ratified—this proportion of the States was required in order to amend it (without regard to an inconsiderable fraction) because of the facility of its application.
But independently of these considerations, there were strong reasons for adopting that proportion in providing a power to amend. It was, at least, as necessary to guard against too much facility as too much difficulty, in amending it. If, to require the consent of all the States for that purpose would be, in effect, to prevent amendments which time should disclose to be—or change of circumstances make necessary—so, on the other hand, to require a bare majority only, or but a small number in proportion to the whole, would expose the constitution to hasty, inconsiderate, and even sinister amendments, on the part of the party dominant for the time. If the one would give it too much fixedness, the other would deprive it of all stability. Of the two, the latter would be more dangerous than the former. It would defeat the very ends of a constitution, regarded as a fundamental law. Indeed, it would involve a glaring absurdity to require the separate ratification of nine States to make the constitution binding as between them—and to provide that a mere majority of States, or even a small one, when compared with the whole number, should have the power, as soon as it went into operation, to amend it as they pleased. It would be difficult to find any other proportion better calculated to avoid this absurdity, and, at the same time, the difficulties attending the other extreme, than that adopted by the convention. While it affords sufficient facility, it guards against too much, in amending the constitution—and thereby unites stability with the capacity of adjusting itself to all such changes as may become necessary; and thus combines all the requisites that are necessary in the amending power. It hardly admits of a doubt, that these combined reasons—the conviction that it possessed all the requisites for such a power, in a higher degree than any other proportion—with the force of the two precedents above explained, induced the convention to adopt it.
Possessing these, it possesses all the requisites, of course, to render the power at once safe in itself, and sufficient to effect the objects for which it was intended. It is safe; because the proportion is sufficiently large to prevent a dominant portion of the Union, or combination of the States, from using the amending power as an instrument to make changes in the constitution, adverse to the interests and rights of the weaker portion of the Union, or a minority of the States. It may not, in this respect, be as perfectly safe as it would be in the unmodified state in which it ordained and established the constitution; but, for all practical purposes, it is believed to be safe as an amending power. It is difficult to conceive a case, where so large a portion as three-fourths of the States would undertake to insert a power, by way of amendment, which, instead of improving and perfecting the constitution, would deprive the remaining fourth of any right, essentially belonging to them as members of the Union, or clearly intended to oppress them. There are many powers, which a dominant combination of States would assume by construction, and use for the purpose of aggrandizement, which they would not dare to propose to insert as amendments. But should an attempt be successfully made to engraft an amendment for such a purpose, the case would not be without remedy, as will be shown in the proper place.
I say, as large a proportion as three-fourths —for the larger the proportion required to do an act, the less is the danger of the power being used for the purpose of oppression and aggrandizement. The reason is plain. With the increase of the proportion, the difficulty of so using it, is increased—while the inducement is diminished in the same proportion. The former is increased—because the difficulty of forming combinations for such purpose is increased with the increase of the number required to combine; and the latter decreased, because the greater the number to be aggrandized, and the less the number, by whose oppression this can be effected, the less the inducement to oppression. And hence, by increasing the proportion, the number to be aggrandized may be made so large, and the number to be oppressed so small, as to make the effort bootless—when the motive to oppress, as well as to abuse power will, of course, cease.
But, while three-fourths furnish a safe proportion against making changes in the constitution, under the color of amendments, by the dominant portion of the Union, with a view to oppress the weaker for its aggrandizement, the proportion is equally safe, in view of the opposite danger—as it furnishes a sufficient protection against the combination of a few States to prevent the rest from making such amendments as may become necessary to preserve or perfect it. It thus guards against the dangers, to which a less, or greater proportion might expose the system.
It is not less sufficient than safe to effect the object intended. As a modification of the power which ordained and established the system, its authority is above all others, except itself in its simple and absolute form. Within its appropriate sphere—that of amending the constitution—all others are subject to its control, and may be modified, changed and altered at its pleasure. Within that sphere it truly represents the intention of the power, of which it is a modification, when it ordained and established the constitution—as to the limits to which the system might be safely and properly extended, and beyond which it could not. The same wisdom, which saw the necessity of having as much harmony as possible, in ratifying the constitution, saw, also, the necessity of preserving it, after it went into operation; and therefore required the same proportion of States to make an amendment, as to ratify the instrument, before it could become binding between the States ratifying. It saw, that, if there was danger from too little, there was also danger from too much union (if I may be allowed so to express myself)—and that, while one led to weakness, the other led to discord and alienation. To guard against each, it so modified the amending power as to avoid both extremes—and thus to preserve the equilibrium of the powers of the system as originally established, so far as human contrivance could.
Thus the power which, in its simple and absolute form, was the creator, becomes, in its modified form, the preserver of the system. By no other device, nor in any other form, could the high functions appertaining to this character, be safely and efficiently discharged—and by none other could the system be preserved. It is, when properly understood, the vis medicatrix of the system—its great repairing, healing, and conservative power—intended to remedy its disorders, in whatever cause or causes originating; whether in the original errors or defects of the constitution itself—or the operation of time and change of circumstances, or in conflicts between its parts—including those between the co-ordinate governments. By it alone, can the equilibrium of the various powers and divisions of the system be preserved; as by it alone, can the stronger be prevented from encroaching on, and finally absorbing the weaker. For this purpose, it is, as has been shown, entirely safe and all-sufficient. In performing its high functions, it acts, not as a judicial power, but in the far more elevated and authoritative character of an amending power—the only one in which it can be called into action at all. In this character, it can amend the constitution, by modifying its existing provisions—or, in case of a disputed power, whether it be between the federal government and one of its co-ordinates—or between the former and an interposing State—by declaring, authoritatively, what is the constitution.
Having now explained the nature and object of the amending power, and shown its safety and sufficiency, in respect to the object for which it was provided—I shall next proceed to show, that it is the duty of the federal government to invoke its aid, should any dangerous derangement or disorder result from the mutual negative of the two co-ordinate governments, or from the interposition of a State, in its sovereign character, to arrest one of its acts—in case all other remedies should fail to adjust the difficulty.
In order to form a clear conception of the true ground and reason of this duty, it is necessary to premise, that it is difficult to conceive of a case, where a conflict of power could take place between the government of a State, or the State itself in its sovereign character, and the federal government, in which the former would not be in a minority of the States and of their population, estimated in federal numbers; and, of course, the latter in a majority of both. The reason is obvious. If it were otherwise, the remedy would at once be applied through the federal government—by a repeal of the act asserting the power—and the question settled by yielding it to the State. Such being the case, the conflict, whenever it takes place, must be between the reserved and delegated powers; the latter, supported by a majority both of the States and of their population, claiming the right to exercise the power—and the former, by a State constituting one of the minority—(at least as far as it relates to the power in controversy)—denying the claim.
Now it is a clear and well-established principle, that the party who claims the right to exercise a power, is bound to make it good, against the party denying the right; and that, if there should be an authority higher than either provided, by which the question between them can be adjusted, he, in such case, has no right to assert his claim on his own authority—but is bound to appeal to the tribunal appointed, according to the forms prescribed, and to establish and assert his right through its authority.
If a principle, so clear and well established, should, in a case like the one supposed, require confirmation—it may be found in the fact, that the powers of the federal government are all enumerated and specified in the constitution—while those belonging to the States embrace the whole residuary mass of powers, not enumerated and specified. Hence, in a conflict of power between the two, the presumption is in favor of the latter, and against the former; and, therefore, it is doubly bound to establish the power in controversy, through the appointed authority, before it can rightfully undertake to exercise it.
But as conclusive as these reasons are, there are others not less so. Among these, it may be stated, that the federal government, being of the party of the majority in such conflicts, may, at pleasure, make the appeal to the amending power; while the State, being of the party of the minority, cannot possibly do so. The reason is plain. To make it, requires, on the part of the State, more than a bare majority. It would then be absurd, to transfer the duty from the party of the majority, which has the power, to that of the minority, which has it not—and this, too, when, with such a majority, the question of power could be settled in its favor, more easily and promptly, through the federal government itself.
There is also another reason—if not more conclusive, yet of deeper import. The federal government never will make an appeal to the amending power, in case of conflict, unless compelled—nor, indeed, willingly in any case, except with a view to enlarge the powers it has usurped by construction. The only means, by which it can be compelled to make an appeal, are the negative powers of the constitution—and especially, so far as the reserved powers are concerned—by that of its co-ordinates—and State interposition. But to transfer the duty from itself to the States, would, necessarily, have the effect, so far as they are concerned, of leaving it in the full and quiet exercise of the contested power, until the appeal was made and finally acted on—instead of suspending the exercise of the power, until the decision was pronounced—as would be the case, if the duty were not transferred. In the latter case, it would have every motive to exert itself to make the appeal, and to obtain a speedy and final action in its favor, if possible; but in the former, it would be the reverse. The motive would be to use every effort to prevent a successful appeal, and to defeat action on it; as, in the mean time, it would be left in full possession of the power in question. Nor would it have any difficulty in effecting what it desired; as it would be impossible for the State, even without opposition, to succeed in making an appeal, for the reason already assigned.
Its effect would be a revolution in the character of the system. It would virtually destroy the relation of co-ordinates between the federal government and those of the several States, by rendering the negative of the latter, in case of conflict with it, of no effect. It would supersede and render substantially obsolete, not only the amending power, but the original sovereign power of the several States, as parties to the constitutional compact—by making them, also, of no effect; and, thereby, elevate the federal government to the absolute and supreme authority of the system, with liberty to assume, by construction, whatever power the cupidity or ambition of a dominant party or section might crave.
It would, in a word, practically transform the federal, into a consolidated national government, against the avowed intention of its framers—the plain meaning of the constitution itself—and the understanding of the people of the States, when they ratified and adopted it. Such a result is, itself, the strongest, the most conclusive argument against the position. If there were none other, this, of itself, would be ample to prove, that it is the duty of the federal government to invoke the action of the amending power, by proposing a declaratory amendment affirming the power it claims, according to the forms prescribed in the constitution; and, if it fail, to abandon the power.
On the other hand, should it succeed in obtaining the amendment, the act of the government of the separate State which caused the conflict, and operated as a negative on the act of the federal government, would, in all cases, be overruled; and the latter become operative within its limits. But the result is, in some respects, different—where a State, acting in her sovereign character, and as a party to the constitutional compact, has interposed, and declared an act of the federal government to be unauthorized by the constitution—and, therefore, null and void. In this case, if the act of the latter be predicated on a power consistent with the character of the constitution, the ends for which it was established, and the nature of our system of government—or, more briefly, if it come fairly within the scope of the amending power, the State is bound to acquiesce, by the solemn obligation which it contracted, in ratifying the constitution. But if it transcends the limits of the amending power—be inconsistent with the character of the constitution and the ends for which it was established—or with the nature of the system—the result is different. In such case, the State is not bound to acquiesce. It may choose whether it will, or whether it will not secede from the Union. One or the other course it must take. To refuse acquiescence, would be tantamount to secession; and place it as entirely in the relation of a foreign State to the other States, as would a positive act of secession. That a State, as a party to the constitutional compact, has the right to secede—acting in the same capacity in which it ratified the constitution—cannot, with any show of reason, be denied by any one who regards the constitution as a compact—if a power should be inserted by the amending power, which would radically change the character of the constitution, or the nature of the system; or if the former should fail to fulfil the ends for which it was established. This results, necessarily, from the nature of a compact—where the parties to it are sovereign; and, of course, have no higher authority to which to appeal. That the effect of secession would be to place her in the relation of a foreign State to the others, is equally clear. Nor is it less so, that it would make her (not her citizens individually) responsible to them, in that character. All this results, necessarily, from the nature of a compact between sovereign parties.
In case the State acquiesces, whether it be where the power claimed is within or beyond the scope of the amending power, it must be done, by rescinding the act, by which, she interposed her authority and declared the act of the federal government to be unauthorized by the constitution—and, therefore, null and void; and this too by the same authority which passed it. The reason is, that, until this is done, the act making the declaration continues binding on her citizens. As far as they are concerned, the State, as a party to the constitutional compact, has the right to decide, in the last resort—and, acting in the same character in which it ratified the constitution, to determine to what limits its powers extend, and how far they are bound to respect and obey it, and the acts made under its authority. They are bound to obey them, only, because the State, to which they owe allegiance, by ratifying, ordained and established it as its own constitution and government; just in the same way, in which it ordained and established its own separate constitution and government—and by precisely the same authority. They owe obedience to both; because their State commanded them to obey; but they owe allegiance to neither; since sovereignty, by a fundamental principle of our system, resides in the people, and not in the government. The same authority which commanded obedience, has the right, in both cases, to determine, as far as they are concerned, the extent to which they were bound to obey; and this determination remains binding until rescinded by the authority which pronounced and declared it.
I have now finished the discussion of the question—What means does the constitution, or the system itself furnish, to preserve the division between the delegated and reserved powers? In its progress, I have shown, that the federal government contains, within itself, or in its organization, no provisions, by which, the powers delegated could be prevented from encroaching on the powers reserved to the several States; and that, the only means furnished by the system itself, to resist encroachments, are, the mutual negative between the two co-ordinate governments, where their acts come into conflict as to the extent of their respective powers; and the interposition of a State in its sovereign character, as a party to the constitutional compact, against an unconstitutional act of the federal government. It has also been shown, that these are sufficient to restrict the action of the federal government to its appropriate sphere; and that, if they should lead to any dangerous derangements or disorders, the amending power makes ample and safe provision for their correction. It now remains to be considered, what must be the result, if the federal government is left to operate without these exterior means of restraint.
That the federal government, as the representative of the delegated powers, supported, as it must habitually be, by a majority of the States and of their population, estimated in federal numbers, is vastly stronger than the opposing States and their population, has been shown. But the fact of its greater strength is not more certain than the consequence—that it will encroach, if left to decide in the last resort, on the extent of its own powers, and to enforce its own decisions, without some adequate means to restrict it to its allotted sphere. It would encroach; because the dominant combination of States and population, which, for the time, may control it, would have every inducement to do so; since it would increase their power and the means of aggrandizement. Nor would their encroachments cease until all the reserved powers—those reserved to the people of the several States in their sovereign character, as well as those delegated to their respective separate governments, should be absorbed: because, the same powerful motives which induced the first step towards it, would continue, until the whole was concentrated in the federal government. The written restrictions and limitations of the constitution, would oppose no effectual resistance. They would all be gradually undermined by the slow and certain process of construction; which would be continued until the instrument itself, would be of no more force or validity than an ordinary act of Congress—nor would it be more respected. The opposing construction of the minority would become the subject of ridicule and scorn—as mere abstractions—until all encroachments would cease to be opposed. Nor would the effects end with the absorption of the reserved powers.
While the process was going on, it would react on the division of the powers of the federal government itself, and disturb its own equilibrium. The legislative department would be the first to feel its influence, and to cumulate authority, by encroachments; since Congress, as the organ of the delegated powers, possesses, by an express provision of the constitution, all the discretionary powers of the government. Neither of the other two can constitutionally exercise any power, which is not either expressly delegated by the constitution, or provided for by law. So long, then, as Congress remained faithful to its trust, neither of the others could encroach; since the officers of both are responsible to it, through the impeaching power; and hence the work of aggression must commence with it, or by its permission. But whatever encroachments it might make, the benefit, in the end, would accrue, not to itself, but to the President—as the head of the executive department. Every enlargement of the powers of the government which may be made, every measure which may be adopted to aggrandize the dominant combination which may control the government for the time, must necessarily enlarge, in a greater or less degree, his patronage and influence. With their enlargement, his power to control the other departments of the government, and the organs of public opinion, and through them, the community at large, must increase, and in the same degree. With their increase, the motive to obtain possession of the control of the government, in order to enjoy its honors and emoluments, regardless of all considerations of principle or policy, would become stronger and stronger, until it would stand alone, the paramount and all-absorbing motive. And—to trace further the fatal progress—just in proportion as this motive should become stronger, the election of the President would be, more and more, the all-important question—until every other would be regarded as subordinate to it. But as this became more and more paramount to all others, party combinations, and party organization and discipline, would become more concentrated and stringent—their control over individual opinion and action more and more decisive; and, with it, the control of the President, as the head of the dominant party. When this should be increased to such a degree, that he, as its head, could, through party organs and party machinery, wield sufficient influence over the constituents of the members of Congress, belonging to his party, as to make their election dependent, not on their fidelity to the constitution or to the country, but on their devotion and submission to party and party interest—his power would become absolute. They then would cease, virtually, to represent the people. Their responsibility would be, not to them, but to him; or to those who might control and use him as an instrument. The Executive, at this stage, would become absolute, so far as the party in power was concerned. It would control the action of the dominant party as effectually as would an hereditary chief-magistrate, if in possession of its powers—if not more so; and the time would not be distant, when the President would cease to be elective; when a contested election, or the paid corruption and violence attending an election, would be made a pretext, by the occupant, or his party, for holding over after the expiration of his term.
Such must be the result, if the process of absorption should be permitted to progress regularly, through all its stages. The causes which would control the event, are as fixed and certain as any in the physical world. But it is not probable that they would be permitted to take their regular course, undisturbed. In a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours, parties, in all their stages, must partake, as I have already shown, more or less of a sectional character. The laws which control their formation, necessarily lead to this. Distance, as has been stated, always weakens, and proximity—where there is no counteracting cause—always strengthens the social and sympathetic feelings. Sameness of interests and similarity of habits and character, make it more easy for those who are contiguous, to associate together and form a party than for those who are remote. In the early stages of the government, when principles bore a stronger sway, the effects of these causes were not so perceptible, or their influence so great. But as party violence increases, and party efforts sink down into a mere struggle to obtain the honors and emoluments of government, the tendency to appeal to local feelings, local interests, and local prejudices will become stronger and stronger—until, ultimately, parties must assume a decidedly sectional character. When it comes to this—and when the two majorities which control the federal government, come to centre in the same section, and all the powers of the entire system, virtually to unite in the executive department, the dominant section will become the governing, and the other the subordinate section; as much so as if it were a dependent province, without any real participation in the government. Its condition will be even worse; for its nominal participation in the acts of government would afford it no means of protecting itself, where the interests of the dominant and governing section should come into conflict with its own—whilst it would serve as a covering to disguise its subjection, and, thereby, induce it to bear wrongs, which it would not otherwise tolerate. In this state of things, discontent, alienation, and hostility of feelings would be engendered between the sections; to be followed by discord, disorder, convulsions, and, not improbably, a disruption of the system.
In one or the other of these results, it must terminate, if the federal government be left to decide, definitively and in the last resort, as to the extent of its powers. Having no sufficient counteraction, exterior to itself, it must necessarily move in the direction marked out by the inherent tendency belonging to its character and position. As a constitutional, popular government, its tendency will be, in the first place, to an absolute form, under the control of the numerical majority; and, finally, to the most simple of these forms, that of a single, irresponsible individual. As a federal government, extending over a vast territory, the tendency will be, in the first place, to the formation of sectional parties, and the concentration of all power in the stronger section; and, in the next, to conflict between the sections, and disrupture of the whole system. One or the other must be the end, in the case supposed. The laws that would govern are fixed and certain. The only question would be, as to which end, and at what time. All the rest is as certain as the future, if not disturbed by causes exterior to the system.
So strong indeed is the tendency of the government in the direction assigned—if left to itself—that nothing short of the most powerful negatives, exterior to itself, can effectually counteract and arrest it. These, from the nature of the system, can only be found in the mutual negative of the two co-ordinate governments, and the interposition of a State, as has been explained—the one to protect the powers which the people of the several States delegated to their respective separate State governments—and the other, to protect the powers which the people of the several States, in delegating powers to both of their co-ordinate governments, expressly reserved to themselves respectively. The object of the negative power is, to protect the several portions or interests of the community against each other. Ours is a federal community, of which States form the constituent parts. They reserved the powers not delegated to the federal or common government to themselves individually—but in a twofold character, as embracing separate governments, and as a several people in their sovereign capacity. But where the powers of government are divided, nothing short of a negative—either positive, or in effect—can protect those allotted to the weaker, against the stronger—or the parts of the community against each other. The party to whom the power belongs, is the only party interested in protecting it; and to such party only, can its defence be safely trusted. To intrust it, in this case, to the party interested in absorbing it, and possessed of ample power to do so, is, as has been shown, to trust the lamb to the custody of the wolf.
Nor can any other, so appropriate, so safe or efficient, be devised, as the twofold negative provided by the system. They are appropriate to the twofold character of the State, to which, the powers not delegated, are reserved. That they are safe and sufficient, if called into action, has been shown. All other provisions, without them, would be of little avail—such as the right of suffrage—written constitutions—the division of the powers of the government into three separate and independent departments—the formation of the people into individual and independent States, and the freedom of the press and of speech. These all have their value. They may retard the progress of the government towards its final termination—but without the two negative powers, cannot arrest it—nor can any thing, short of these, preserve the equilibrium of the system. Without them, every other power would be gradually absorbed by the federal government, or be superseded or rendered obsolete. It would remain the only vital power, and the sole organ of a consolidated community.
If we turn now from this to the other aspect of the subject, where these negative powers are brought into full action in order to counteract the tendency of the federal government to supersede and absorb the powers of the system, the contrast will be striking. Instead of weakening the government by counteracting its tendencies, and restricting it to its proper sphere, they would render it far more powerful. A strong government, instead of being weakened, is greatly strengthened, by a correspondingly strong negative. It may lose something in promptitude of action, in calling out the physical force of the country, but would gain vastly in moral power. The security it would afford to all the different parts and interests of the country—the assurance that the powers confided to it, would not be abused—and the harmony and unanimity resulting from the conviction that no one section or interest could oppress another, would, in an emergency, put the whole resources of the Union, moral and physical, at the disposal of the government—and give it a strength which never could be acquired by the enlargement of its powers beyond the limits assigned to it. It is, indeed, only by such confidence and unanimity, that a government can, with certainty, breast the billows and ride through the storms which the vessel of State must often encounter in its progress. The stronger the pressure of the steam, if the boiler be but proportionally strong, the more securely the bark buffets the wave, and defies the tempest.
Nor is there any just ground to apprehend that the federal government would lose any power which properly belongs to it, or which it should desire to retain, by being compelled to resort to the amending power, when this becomes necessary in consequence of a conflict between itself and one of its co-ordinates; or, in case of the interposition of a State. There can certainly be no danger of this, so long as the same feelings and motives which induced them voluntarily to ratify and adopt the constitution unanimously, shall continue to actuate them. While these remain, there can be no hazard in placing what all freely and unanimously adopted, in the charge of three-fourths of the States to protect and preserve. Nor can there be any just ground to apprehend that these feelings and motives will undergo any change, so long as the constitution shall fulfil the ends for which it was ordained and established; to wit: that each and all might enjoy, more perfectly and securely, liberty, peace, tranquillity, security from danger, both internal and external, and all other blessings connected with their respective rights and advantages. It was a great mistake to suppose that the States would naturally stand in antagonistic relations to the federal government; or that there would be any disposition, on their part, to diminish its power or to weaken its influence. They naturally stand in a reverse relation—pledged to cherish, uphold, and support it. They freely and voluntarily created it, for the common good of each and of all—and will cherish and defend it so long as it fulfills these objects. If its safe-keeping cannot be intrusted to its creators, it can be safely placed in the custody of no other hands.
But it cannot be confined to its proper sphere, and its various powers kept in a state of equilibrium, as originally established, but by the counteracting resistance of the States, acting in their twofold character, as has been explained and established. Nor can it fulfil its end without confining it to its proper sphere, and preserving the equilibrium of its various powers. Without this, the federal government would concentrate all the powers of the system in itself, and become an instrument in the hands of the dominant portion of the States, to aggrandize itself at the expense of the rest—as has also been fully explained and established. With the defeat of the ends for which it was established, the feelings and motives which induced the States to establish it, would gradually change; and, finally, give place to others of a very different character. The weaker and oppressed portion would regard it with distrust, jealousy, and, in the end, aversion and hostility; while the stronger and more favored, would look upon it, not as the means of promoting the common good and safety of each and all, but as an instrument to control the weaker, and to aggrandize itself at its expense.
As nothing but the counteracting resistance of the States can prevent this result, so nothing short of a full recognition of this, the only means, by which they can make such resistance, and call it freely into action—can correct the disorders, and avert the dangers which must ensue from an opposite and false conception of the system; and thus restore the feelings and motives which led to the free and unanimous adoption of the federal constitution and government. With their restoration, the amending power may be safely trusted, as the preserving, repairing, and protecting power. There would be no danger whatever, that the government, under its action, would lose any power which properly belonged to it, and which it ought to retain; for there would be no motive or interest, on any side, to divest it of any power necessary to enable it to fulfil the ends for which it was established; or to impair, unduly, the strength of the Union. Indeed, it is so modified as to afford an ample guaranty that the Union would be safe in its custody—since it was designedly so constructed as to represent, at all times, the extent to which it might be safely carried, and beyond which it ought not to go. It may, indeed, in case of conflict between it and one of its co-ordinate governments, or an interposing state, modify and restrict the power in contest, in strict conformity with the design and the spirit of the constitution. For it may be laid down as a principle, that the power and action of the Union, instead of being increased, ought to be diminished, with the increase of its extent and population. The reason is, that the greater its extent, and the more numerous and populous the members composing it, the greater will be the diversity of interests, the less the sympathy between the remote parts, the less the knowledge and regard of each, for the interests of the others, and, of course, the less closeness of union (so to speak), consistently with its safety. The same principle, according to which it was provided that there should not be more closeness of union than three-fourths should agree to, equally applies in all stages of the growth and progress of the country; to wit: that there should not be, at any time, more than the same proportion would agree to. It ought ever to be borne in mind that the Union may have too much power, and be too intimate and close; as well as too little power, intimacy, and closeness. Either is dangerous. If the latter, from weakness, exposes it to dissolution, the former, from exuberance of strength, and from the parts being too closely compressed together, exposes it, at least equally, either to consolidation and despotism, on the one hand—or to rupture and destruction, by the repulsion of its parts, on the other. The amending power, if duly called into action, would protect the Union against either extreme; and thereby guard against the dangers to which it is on either hand exposed.
It is by thus bringing all the powers of the system into active operation—and only by this means, that its equilibrium can be preserved, and adjusted to the changes, which the enlargement of the Union, and its increase of population, or other causes, may require. Thus only, can the Union be preserved; the government made permanent; the limits of the country be enlarged; the anticipations of the founders of the system, as to its future prosperity and greatness—be realized; and the revolutions and calamities, necessarily incident to the theory which would make the federal government the sole and exclusive judge of its powers, be averted.
I have now finished the portion of this discourse which relates to the character and structure of the government of the United States—its various divisions of power, as well as those of the system of which it is a part—and the means which they furnish to protect each division against the encroachment of the others. The government has now been in operation for more than sixty years; and it remains to be considered, whether it has conformed, in practice, with its true theory; and, if not, what has caused its departure; and what must be the consequence, should its aberrations remain uncorrected. I propose to consider these in the order stated.
There are few who will not admit, that the government has, in practice, departed, more or less, from its original character and structure—however great may be the diversity of opinion, as to what constitutes a departure—a diversity caused by the different views entertained in reference to its character and structure. They who believe that the government of the United States is a national, and not a federal government—or who believe that it is partly national and partly federal—will, of course, on the question—whether it has conformed to, or departed from its true theory—form very different opinions from those who believe that it is federal throughout. They who believe that it is exclusively national, very logically conclude, according to their theory, that the government has the exclusive right, in the last resort, to decide as to the extent of its powers, and to enforce its decisions against all opposition, through some one or all of its departments—while they who believe it to be exclusively federal, cannot consistently come to any other conclusion, than that the two governments—federal and State—are coequal and co-ordinate governments; and, as such, neither can possess the right to decide as to the extent of its own powers, or to enforce its own decision against that of the other. The case is different with those who believe it to be partly national, and partly federal. They seem incapable of forming any definite or distinct opinion on the subject—vital and important as it is. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how, with their views, any rational and fixed opinion can be formed on the subject: for, according to their theory, as far as it is national, it must possess the right contended for by those who believe it to be altogether national; and, on the other hand, as far as it is federal, it must possess the right, which those who believe it to be wholly federal contend for. But how the two can coexist, so that the government shall have the final right to decide on the extent of its powers, and to enforce its decisions as to one portion of its powers, and not as to the other, it is difficult to imagine. Indeed, the difficulty of realizing their views extends to the whole theory. Entertaining these different opinions, as to the true theory of the government, it follows, of course, that there must be an equal diversity of opinion, as to what constitutes a departure from it; and, that, what one considers a departure, the other must, almost necessarily, consider a conformity—and, vice versa. When compared with these different views, the course of the government will be found to have conformed, much more closely, to the national, than to the federal theory.
At its outset, during the first Congress, it received an impulse in that direction, from which it has never yet recovered. Congress, among its earliest measures, adopted one, which, in effect, destroyed the relation of coequals and co-ordinates between the federal government and the governments of the individual States; without which, it is impossible to preserve its federal character. Indeed, I might go further, and assert with truth, that without it, the former would, in effect, cease to be federal, and become national. It would be superior—and the individual governments of the several States, would become subordinate to it—a relation inconsistent with the federal, but in strict conformity to the national theory of the government.
I refer to the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, approved the 24th Sept., 1789. It provides for an appeal from, and revisal of a “final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest courts of law or equity of a State, in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States—and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty—or statute of, or commission held under, the United States, and the decision is against such title, &c., specially set up by either, &c.” The effect, so far as these cases extend, is to place the highest tribunal of the States, both of law and equity, in the same relation to the Supreme Court of the United States, which the circuit and inferior courts of the United States bear to it. To this extent, they are made equally subordinate and subject to its control; and, of course, the judicial departments of the separate governments of the several States, to the same extent, cease to stand, under these provisions, in the relation of coequal and co-ordinate departments with the federal judiciary. Nor does the effect stop here. Their other departments, the legislative and executive—to the same extent, through their respective State judiciaries, no longer continue to stand in the relation of coequals and co-ordinates with the corresponding departments of the federal government. The reason is obvious. As the laws and the acts of the government and its departments, can, if opposed, reach the people individually only through the courts—to whatever extent the judiciary of the United States is made paramount to that of the individual States, to the same extent will the legislative and executive departments of the federal government—and, thus, the entire government itself, be made paramount to the legislative and executive departments—and the entire governments of the individual States. It results, of course, that if the right of appeal from the State courts to those of the United States, should be extended as far as the government of the United States may claim that its powers and authority extend, the government of the several States would cease, in effect, to be its coequals and co-ordinates; and become, in fact, dependent upon, and subordinate to it. Such being the case, the important question presents itself for consideration—does the constitution vest Congress with the power to pass an act authorizing such appeals?
It is certain, that no such power is expressly delegated to it: and equally so, that there is none vested in it which would make such a power, as an incident, necessary and proper to carry it into execution. It would be vain to attempt to find either in the constitution. If, then, it be vested in Congress at all, it must be as a power necessary and proper to carry into execution some power vested in one of the two other departments—or in the government of the United States, or some officer thereof: for Congress, by an express provision of the constitution, is limited, in the exercise of implied powers, to the passage of such laws only, as are necessary and proper to carry into effect, the powers vested in itself, or in some other department, or in the government of the United States, or some officer thereof. But it would be vain to look for a power, either in the executive department, or in the government of the United States or any of its officers, which would make a law, containing the provisions of the section in question, necessary and proper to carry it into execution. No one has ever pretended to find, or can find any such power in either, all, or any one of them. If, then, it exist at all, it must be among the powers of the department of the judiciary itself. But there is only one of its powers which has ever been claimed, or can be claimed, as affording even a pretext for making a law, containing such provisions, necessary and proper to carry it into effect. I refer to the second and third clauses of the third article of the constitution, heretofore cited. The second extends the judicial power “to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority” —and to all cases between parties therein enumerated, without reference to the nature of the question in litigation. The third enumerates certain cases, in which the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, and then provides, that “in all others before mentioned, it shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”
The question is thus narrowed down to a single point—Has Congress the authority, in carrying this power into execution, to make a law providing for an appeal from the courts of the several States, to the Supreme Court of the United States?
There is, on the face of the two clauses, nothing whatever to authorize the making of such a law. Neither of them names or refers, in the slightest manner to the States, or to the courts of the States; or gives the least authority, apparently, to legislate over or concerning either. The object of the former of these two clauses, is simply to extend the judicial power, so as to make it commensurate with the other powers of the government; and to confer jurisdiction over certain cases, not arising under the constitution, and laws of the United States, or treaties made under their authority. While the latter simply provides, in what cases the Supreme Court of the United States shall have original, and in what, appellate jurisdiction. Appellate stands in contradistinction to original jurisdiction, and as the latter implies that the case must commence in the Supreme Court, so the former implies that the case must commence in an inferior court, not having final jurisdiction; and, therefore, liable to be carried up to a higher, for final decision. Now, as the constitution vests the judicial power of the United States, “in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts, as Congress may, from time to time ordain,” the natural and plain meaning of the clause is, that, in the cases enumerated, the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction; and in all others, originating in the inferior courts of the United States, it should have jurisdiction only on an appeal from their decisions.
Such being the plain meaning and intent of these clauses—the question is—How can Congress derive from them, authority to make a law providing for an appeal from the highest courts of the several States, in the cases specified in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, to the Supreme Court of the United States?
To this question no answer can be given, without assuming that the State Courts—even the highest—stand in the relation of the inferior courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, wherever a question touching their authority comes before them. Without such an assumption, there is not, and cannot be, a shadow of authority to warrant an appeal from the former to the latter. But does the fact sustain the assumption? Do the courts of the States stand, as to such questions, in the relation of the inferior to the Supreme Court of the United States? If so, it must, be by some provision of the constitution of the United States. It cannot be a matter of course. How can it be reconciled with the admitted principle, that the federal government and those of the several States, are each supreme in their respective spheres? Each, it is admitted, is supreme, as it regards the other, in its proper sphere; and, of course, as has been shown, coequal, and co-ordinate.10
If this be true, then the respective departments of each must be necessarily and equally so—as the whole includes the parts. The State courts are the representatives of the reserved rights, vested in the governments of the several States, as far as it relates to the judicial power. Now as these are reserved against the federal government—as the very object and intent of the reservation, was to place them beyond the reach of its control—how can the courts of the States be inferior to the Supreme Court of the United States; and, of course, subject to have their decisions re-examined and reversed by it, without, at the same time, subjecting the portion of the reserved rights of the governments of the several States, vested in it, to the control of the federal government? Still higher ground may be taken. If the State courts stand in the relation of inferiors to the Supreme Court of the United States—what reason can possibly be assigned, why the other departments of the State governments—the legislative and executive, should not stand in the same relation to the corresponding departments of the federal government? Where is there to be found any provision of the constitution which makes, in this respect, any distinction between the judiciary and the other departments? Or, on what principle can such a distinction be made? There is no such distinction; and, it must follow, that if the judicial department, or the courts of the governments of the individual States, stand in the relation of inferior courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, the other departments must stand in the same relation to the corresponding departments of the federal government. It must also follow, that the governments of the several States, instead of being coequal and co-ordinate with the federal government, are inferior and subordinate. All these are necessary consequences.
But it may be alleged that the section in question does not assume the broad principle, that the State courts stand, in all cases, in the relation of the inferior courts to the Supreme Court of the United States; that it is restricted to appeals from the final judgments of the highest courts of the several States; to suits in law and equity (excluding criminal cases) and, in such cases, to those only, where the validity of a treaty, statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States; or the construction of the constitution, or of a treaty, or law of, or commission held under the United States, are drawn in question, and the decision is adverse to the right claimed under the United States; or, where the validity of any law of, or authority exercised under a State are involved, on the ground that they are repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States—and the decision is in favor of the law or the authority of the State. It may, also, be alleged that, to this extent, it was necessary to regard the courts of the States as inferior courts; and, as such, to provide for an appeal from them to the Supreme Court of the United States, in order to preserve uniformity in decisions; and to avoid collision and conflict between the federal government and those of the several States.
If uniformity of decision be one of the objects of the section, its provisions are very illy calculated to accomplish it. They are far better suited to enlarge the powers of the government of the United States, and to contract, to the same degree, those of the governments of the individual States, than to secure uniformity of decision. They provide for appeals only in cases where the decision is adverse to the power claimed for the former, or in favor of that of the latter. They assume that the courts of the States are always right when they decide in favor of the government of the United States, and always wrong, when they decide in favor of the power of their respective States; and, hence, they provide for an appeal in the latter case, but for none in the former. The result is, that if the courts of a State should commit an error, in deciding against the State, or in favor of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the latter should, in like cases, make the reverse decisions, the want of uniformity would remain uncorrected. Uniformity, then, would seem to be of no importance, when the decision was calculated to impair the reserved powers; and only so, when calculated to impair the delegated.
But it might have been thought, that, so strong would be the leaning of the State courts towards their respective States, there would be no danger of a decision against them, and in favor of the United States; except in cases, so clear as not to admit of a doubt. This might be the case, if all the State governments stood in antagonistic relations to the federal government. But it has been established that such is not the case; and that, on the contrary, a majority of them must be, habitually, arrayed on its side; and their courts as much inclined to sustain its powers as its own courts. But if the State courts should have a strong leaning in favor of the powers of their respective States, what reason can be assigned, why the Supreme Court of the United States should not have a leaning, equally strong, in favor of the federal government? If one, in consequence, cannot be trusted in making a decision adverse to the delegated powers, on what principle can the other be trusted in making a decision adverse to the reserved powers? Is it to be supposed, that the judges of the courts of the States, who are sworn to support the constitution of the United States, are less to be trusted, in cases where the delegated powers are involved, than the federal judges, who are not bound by oath to support the constitutions of the States, are, in cases, where the reserved powers are concerned? Are not the two powers equally independent of each other? And is it not as important to protect the reserved against the encroachments of the delegated, as the delegated against those of the reserved powers? And are not the latter, being much the weaker, more in need of protection than the former? Why, then, not leave the courts of each, without the right of appeal, on either side, to guard and protect the powers confided to them respectively?
As far as uniformity of decision is concerned—the appeal was little needed; and well might the author of the section in question be so indifferent about securing it. The extension of the judicial power of the United States, so as to make it commensurate with the government itself, is sufficient, without the aid of an appeal from the courts of the States, to secure all the uniformity consistent with a federal government like ours. It gives choice to the plaintiff to institute his suit, either in the federal or State courts, at his option. If he select the latter, and its decision be adverse to him, he has no right to complain; nor has he a right to a new trial in the former court, as it would, in reality be, under the cover of an appeal. He selected his tribunal, and ought to abide the consequences. But his fate would be a warning to all other plaintiffs in similar cases. It would show that the State courts were adverse—and admonish them to commence their suits in the federal courts; and, thereby, uniformity of decision, in such cases, would be secured. Nor would the defendant, in such cases, have a right to complain, and have a new trial in the courts of the United States, if the decision of the State courts should be adverse to him. If he be a citizen of the State, he would have no right to do either, if the courts of his own State should decide against him; nor could a resident of the State or sojourner in it—since both, by voluntarily putting themselves under the protection of its laws, are bound to acquiesce in the decisions of its tribunals.
But there is another object which the appeal is well calculated to effect—and for the accomplishment of which, its provisions are aptly drawn up, as far as they go—that is—to decide all conflicts between the delegated and reserved powers, as to the extent of their respective limits, in favor of the former. For this purpose, it was necessary to provide for an appeal from the State courts, whenever their decisions were in favor of the power of the States, or adverse to the power of the United States. In no other cases was it necessary; and, hence, probably, the reason why it was limited to these, notwithstanding the alleged object. Uniformity of decision required it to embrace, not only these, but the reverse cases. As it stands, it enables the Supreme Court of the United States, in all cases of conflict between the two powers, coming within the provisions of the section, to overrule the decisions of the courts of the States, and to decide, exclusively, and in the last resort, as to the extent of the delegated powers.
The object of the section was, doubtless, to prevent collision between the federal and State governments—the delegated and reserved powers—by giving to the former (and by far the stronger), through the Supreme Court—the right, under the color of an appeal, to decide as to the extent of the former—and to enforce its decisions against the resistance of a State. The expedient may, for a time, be effectual; but must, in the end, lead to collisions of the most dangerous character. It should ever be borne in mind, that collisions are incident to a division of power—but that without division of power, there can be no organization; and without organization, no constitution; and without this no liberty. To prevent collision, then, by destroying the division of power, is, in effect, to substitute an absolute for a constitutional government, and despotism in the place of liberty—evils far greater than those intended to be remedied. It is the part of wisdom and patriotism, then, not to destroy the divisions of power in order to prevent collisions, but devise means, by which they may be prevented from leading to an appeal to force. This, as has been shown, the constitution, in a manner most safe and expedient, has provided through the amending power—a power, so constituted as to preserve in all time, and under all circumstances, an equilibrium between the various divisions of power of which the system is composed.
It is true, as has been alleged, that the provisions of the section are restricted—that they are limited to civil cases, and to appeals from the highest State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus restricted, they would not be sufficient to subject the reserved powers completely to the delegated, and to lead, at least—speedily—to all the consequences stated. But what assurance can there be, that the right, if admitted, will not be carried much further? The right of appeal itself, can only be maintained, as has been shown, on the assumption that the courts of the States stand in the relation of inferior courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. Resting on this broad assumption, no definite limits can be assigned to the right, if it exists at all. It may be extended to criminal as well as civil cases—to the circuit courts of the United States as well as to the Supreme Court; to the transfer of a case, civil or criminal, at any stage, before as well as after final decision, from the State courts to either the circuit or Supreme Court of the United States; to the exemption of all the employees and officers of the United States, when acting under the color of their authority, from civil and criminal proceedings in the courts of the State, and subjecting those of the States, acting under their respective laws, to the civil and criminal process of the United States; to authorize the judges of the United States court to grant writs of habeas corpus to persons confined under the authority of the States, on the allegation that the acts for which they were confined, were done under color of the authority of the United States; and, finally, to authorize the President to use the entire force of the Union—the militia, the army and navy—to enforce, in all such cases, the claim of power on the part of the United States. If the courts of the States, be, indeed, inferior courts—if an appeal from them to the Supreme Court of the United States can be rightfully authorized by Congress, all this may be done. May! It has already been done. All that has been stated as possible, is but a transcript of the provisions of the act approved 3d March, 1833, entitled “An act to provide for the collection of duties on imports” —as far as it relates to the matter in question.
But if such powers can be rightfully vested in the courts of the United States by Congress, for the collection of the revenue, no reason can be assigned why it may not vest like powers in them to carry into execution any power which it may choose to claim, or exercise. Take, for illustration, what is called the “guaranty section” of the constitution, which, among other things, provides that, “the United States shall guarantee to each State in this Union a republican form of government; and protect each of them, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.” Congress, of course, as the representative of the United States, in their legislative capacity, has the right to make laws to carry these guaranties into execution. This involves the right, in reference to the first, to determine what form of government is republican. To decide this important question, the government of the United States and the several State governments, at the time the constitution of the United States was adopted and the States became members of the federal Union, furnished a plain and safe standard, as they were, of course, all deemed republican. But suppose Congress, instead of being regulated by it, should undertake to fix a standard, without regard to that fixed by those who framed, or those who adopted the constitution of the United States; and suppose it should adopt, what now, it is to be feared, is the sentiment of the dominant portion of the Union, that no government is republican where universal suffrage does not prevail—where the numerical majority of the whole population is not recognized as the supreme governing power: And, suppose, acting on this false standard, that Congress should declare that the governments of certain States of the Union, a large portion of whose population are not permitted to exercise the right of suffrage, were not republican; and should undertake, in execution of its declaration, to make laws to compel all such States to adopt governments conforming to its views, by extending the right of suffrage to every description of its population, and placing the power in the hands of the mere numerical majority. What, in such case, would there be to prevent Congress from adopting the provisions of the act of 3d March, 1833, to carry such laws into execution? If it had the right to adopt them, in that case, it would have an equal right to adopt them in the case supposed, or in any other that might be. No distinction can possibly be made between them, or between it and any other case, where Congress may claim to exercise a power. If it has the right to regard the courts of the States as standing in the relation of inferiors to the courts of the United States, in any case, it has a right to consider them so in every case; and, as such, subject to the authority of the latter, whenever, and to whatever extent it may think proper. What, then, would be the effect of extending the provisions of the act to the case supposed? The officers of the State, and all in authority under her, and all her citizens, who might stand up in defence of her government and institutions, would be regarded as insurgents, for resisting the act of Congress; and, as such, liable to be arrested, tried and punished by the courts of the United States; while those who might desert the State, and join in overthrowing her government and institutions, would be protected by them against her laws and her courts. To be true to the State, would come to be regarded as treason to the United States, and punishable as the highest crime; whilst to be false to her, would come to be regarded as fidelity to them, and be a passport to the honors of the Union. More briefly, fidelity to her, would be treason to the United States, and treason to her, fidelity to them.
But the clause in question embraces the protection of the government of each State against domestic violence, as well as the guaranty of a republican form of government to each. Suppose, then, a party should be formed in any State to overthrow its government, on the ground that it was not republican—because its constitution restricted the right of suffrage, and did not recognize the right of the numerical majority to govern absolutely. Suppose that this party should apply to Congress to enforce the pledge of the United States to guarantee a republican form of government—and the State should apply to enforce the guaranty of protection against domestic violence—and Congress should side with the former and pass laws to aid them: what reason can be assigned, why the provisions of the act of the 3d March, 1833, could not be extended to such a case—and the government of the State, with all its functionaries, and all their aiders and abettors, be arrested, tried, convicted and punished as traitors, by the courts of the United States? And all, who combined to overthrow the government of the State, protected against the laws and courts of the State?
It may be objected that the supposition, in both cases, is imaginary and never can occur—that it is not even to be supposed that Congress ever will so far forget its duty, as to pervert guaranties, solemnly entered into by the States, in forming a federal Union to protect each other in their republican forms of government—and the separate government of each against domestic violence—into means of effecting ends the very opposite of those intended. The objection, if it should ever be made, would indicate very little knowledge of the barriers which constitutions and plighted faith oppose to governments, when they can be transcended with impunity. They may not be openly assailed at first. They are usually sapped and undermined by construction, preparatory to their entire demolition. But what construction may fail to accomplish, the open assaults of fanaticism, or the lust of power, or the violence of party, will, in the end, prostrate. Of the truth of this, history, both political and religious, affords abundant proofs. Already our own furnishes many examples, of which, not a few, much to the point, might be cited. The very act, which the statute of the 3d March, 1833, was intended to enforce, was a gross and palpable perversion of the taxing power; and the movement to subvert the government of Rhode Island, a few years since, threatened, at one time, to furnish, by a like perversion of the guarantee to protect its government against domestic violence, the means of subverting it.
But it may be alleged that, if Congress should so far forget its duty as to make the gross and dangerous perversion supposed, the State would find security in the independent tenure, by which the judges of the United States courts hold their office. As highly important as this tenure is to protect the judiciary against the encroachments of the other departments of the government, and to insure an upright administration of the laws, as between individuals, it would be greatly to overestimate its importance to suppose, that it secures an efficient resistance against Congress, in the case supposed; or, more generally, against the encroachment of the federal government on the reserved powers. There are many and strong reasons why it cannot.
In the first place, all cases like those supposed, where the power is perverted from the object intended to be effected by it, and made the means of effecting another of an entirely different character—are beyond the cognizance of the courts. The reason is plain. If the act be constitutional on its face; if its title be such as to indicate that the power exercised, is one which Congress is authorized by the constitution to exercise—and there be nothing on the face of the act calculated, beyond dispute, to show it did not correspond with the purpose professed—the courts cannot look beyond to ascertain the real object intended, however different it may be. It has (to illustrate by the case in question) the right to make laws to carry into execution the guaranty of a republican form of government to the several States of the Union; and, for this purpose, to determine whether the form of the government of a certain State be republican or not. But if, under the pretext of exercising this power, it should use it for the purpose of subjecting to its control any obnoxious member, or members of the Union—be it for the impulse of fanaticism, lust of power, party resentment, or any other motive, it would not be within the competency of the courts to inquire into the objects intended.
But, if it were otherwise—if the judiciary could take cognizance of this, and any other description of perversion or infraction by the other departments, it could oppose no permanent resistance to them. The reason is to be found in the fact, that, like the others, it emanates from, and is under the control of the two combined majorities—that of the States, and that of their populations, estimated in federal numbers. The independent tenure, by which the judges hold their office, may render the judiciary less easily and readily acted on by these united majorities; but as they become permanently concentrated in one of the sections of the Union, and as that section becomes permanently the dominant one, the judiciary must yield, ultimately, to its control. It would possess all the means of acting on the hopes and fears of the judges. As high as their office—or independent as their tenure of office is, it does not place them above the influences which control the other members of government. They may aspire higher. The other judges of the Supreme Court, may, will, and honorably aspire to the place of the Chief Justice—and he and all of his associates, to the highest post under the government. As far as these influences extend, they must give a leaning to the side which can control the elections, and, through them, the department which has at its disposal the patronage of the government. Nor does their office place them beyond the reach of fear. As independent as it is, they are, like all the other officers of government, liable to be impeached: and the powers of impeaching and of trying impeachments, are vested, respectively, in the House of Representatives and the Senate—both of which emanate directly from the combined majorities which control the government. But, if both hope and fear should be insufficient to overcome the independence of the judges, the appointing power, which emanates from the same source, would, in time, fill the bench with those only whose opinions and principles accord with the other departments. And hence, all reliance on the judiciary for protection, under the most favorable view that can be taken, must, in the end, prove vain and illusory.
I have now shown that the 25th section of the judiciary act is unauthorized by the constitution; and that it rests on an assumption which would give to Congress the right to enforce, through the judiciary department, whatever measures it might think proper to adopt; and to put down all resistance by force. The effect of this is to make the government of the United States the sole judge, in the last resort, as to the extent of its powers, and to place the States and their separate governments and institutions at its mercy. It would be a waste of time to undertake to show that an assumption, which would destroy the relation of co-ordinates between the government of the United States and those of the several States—which would enable the former, at pleasure, to absorb the reserved powers and to destroy the institutions, social and political, which the constitution was ordained and established to protect, is wholly inconsistent with the federal theory of the government, though in perfect accordance with the national theory. Indeed, I might go further, and assert, that it is, of itself, all sufficient to convert it into a national, consolidated government—and thus to consummate, what many of the most prominent members of the convention so long, and so perseveringly contended for. Admit the right of Congress to regard the courts of the States as inferior to those of the United States, and every other act of assumption is made easy. It is the great enforcing power to compel a State to submit to all acts, however unconstitutional, oppressive or outrageous—or to oppose them at its peril. This one departure, of which the 25th section of the judiciary act was the entering wedge, and the act of the 3d March, 1833, the consummation, may be fairly regarded as the salient point of all others—for without it, they either would not have occurred, or if they had, might have been readily remedied. Or, rather, without it, the whole course of the government would have been different—the conflict between the co-ordinate governments, in reference to the extent of their respective powers, would have been subject to the action of the amending power; and thereby the equilibrium of the system been preserved, and the practice of the government made to conform to its federal character.
It remains to be explained how, at its very outset, the government received a direction so false and dangerous. For this purpose it will be necessary to recur to the history of the formation and adoption of the constitution.
The convention which framed it, was divided, as has been stated, into two parties—one in favor of a national, and the other of a federal government. The former, consisting, for the most part, of the younger and more talented members of the body—but of the less experienced—prevailed in the early stages of its proceedings. A negative on the action of the governments of the several States, in some form or other, without a corresponding one, on their part, on the acts of the government about to be formed, was indispensable to the consummation of their plan. They, accordingly, as has been shown, attempted, at every stage of the proceedings of the convention, and in all possible forms, to insert some provision in the constitution, which would, in effect, vest it with a negative—but failed in all. The party in favor of a federal form, subsequently gained the ascendency—the national party acquiesced, but without surrendering their preference for their own favorite plan—or yielding, entirely, their confidence in the plan adopted—or the necessity of a negative on the action of the separate governments of the States. They regarded the plan as but an experiment; and determined, as honest men and good patriots, to give it a fair trial. They even assumed the name of federalists; and two of their most talented leaders, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison, after the adjournment of the convention, and while the ratification of the constitution was pending, wrote the major part of that celebrated work, “The Federalist;” the object of which was to secure its adoption. It did much to explain and define it, and to secure the object intended; but it shows, at the same time, that its authors had not abandoned their predilection in favor of the national plan.
When the government went into operation, they both filled prominent places under it: Mr. Hamilton, that of secretary of the treasury—then, by far the most influential post belonging to the executive department—if we except its head; and Mr. Madison, that of a member of the House of Representatives—at the time, a much more influential body than the Senate, which sat with closed doors, on legislative, as well as executive business. No position could be assigned, better calculated to give them control over the action of the government, or to facilitate their efforts to carry out their predilections in favor of a national form of government, as far as, in their opinion, fidelity to the constitution would permit. How far this was, may be inferred from the fact, that their joint work, The Federalist, maintained that the government was partly federal and partly national, notwithstanding it calls itself “the government of the United States” —and notwithstanding the convention repudiated the word “national,” and designated it by the name of “federal,” in their letter laying the plan before the old Congress, as has been shown. When to this it is added, that the party, originally in favor of a national plan of government, was strongly represented, and that the President and Vice-President had, as was supposed, a leaning that way, it is not surprising that it should receive from the first, an impulse in that direction much stronger than was consistent with its federal character; and that some measure should be adopted calculated to have the effect of giving it, what was universally desired by that party in the convention, a negative on the action of the separate governments of the several States. Indeed, believing as they did, that they would prove too strong for the government of the United States, and that such a negative was indispensable to secure harmony, and to avoid conflict between them, it was their duty to use their best efforts to adopt some such measure—provided that, in their opinion, there should be no constitutional objection in the way. Nor would it be difficult, under such impressions, to be satisfied with reasons in favor of the constitutionality of some such measure which, under a different, or neutral state of mind, would be rejected as having little or no weight. But there was none other, except that embraced in the 25th section of the judiciary act, which had the least show, even of plausibility in its favor—and it is even probable that it was adopted without a clear conception of the principle on which it rested, or the extent to which it might be carried.
Many are disposed to attribute a higher authority to the early acts of the government, than they are justly entitled to—not only because factions and selfish feelings had less influence at the time, but because many, who had been members of the convention, and engaged in forming the constitution, were members of Congress, or engaged in administering the government—circumstances, which were supposed to exempt them from improper influence, and to give them better means of understanding the instrument, than could be possessed by those who had not the same advantages. The purity of their motives is admitted to be above suspicion; but it is a great error to suppose that they could better understand the system they had constructed, and the dangers incident to its operation, than those who came after them. It required time and experience to make them fully known—as is admitted by Mr. Madison himself. After stating the difficulties to be encountered in forming a constitution, he asks; “Is it unreasonable to conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the convention, are such as have resulted, rather from defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than from the want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it, and, consequently, that they are such as will not be ascertained, until an actual trial will point them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the articles of confederation. It is observable, that, among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles were under consideration, not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error, which, on trial, has discovered itself!” 11 If this was true in reference to the confederacy—an old and well known form of government—how much more was actual trial necessary to point out the dangers to which the present system was exposed—a system, so novel in its character, and so vastly more complicated than the confederacy? The very opinion, so confidently entertained by Mr. Madison, Gen. Hamilton, and the national party generally (and which, in all probability led to the insertion of the 25th section of the judiciary bill), that the federal government would prove too weak to resist the State governments—strongly illustrates the truth of Mr. Madison’s remarks. No one can now doubt, that the danger is on the other side. Indeed, the public man, who has had much experience of the working of the system, and does not more clearly perceive where the danger lies, than the ablest and most sagacious member of the convention, must be a dull observer.
But this is not the only instance of a great departure, during the same session, from the principles of the constitution. Among others, a question was decided in discussing the bill to organize the treasury department, which strikingly illustrates how imperfectly, even the framers of so complex a system as ours, understood it; and how necessary time and experience were to a full knowledge of it. During the pendency of the bill, a question arose, whether the President, without the sanction of an act of Congress, had the power to remove an officer of the government, the tenure of whose office was not fixed by the constitution? It was elaborately discussed. Most of the prominent members took part in the debate. Mr. Madison, and others who agreed with him, insisted that he had the power. They rested their argument mainly on the ground, that it belonged to the class of executive powers; and that it was indispensable to the performance of the duty, “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Both parties agreed that the power was not expressly vested in him. It was, finally, decided that he had the power—both sides overlooking a portion of the constitution which expressly provides for the case. I refer to a clause, already cited, and more than once alluded to, which empowers Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry its own powers into execution; and, also, whatever power is vested in the government, or any of its departments, or officers. And what makes the fact more striking, the very argument used by those, who contended that he had the power, independently of Congress, conclusively showed that it could not be exercised without its authority, and that the latter department had the right to determine the mode and manner in which it should be executed. For, if it be not expressly vested in the President, and only results as necessary and proper to carry into execution a power vested in him, it irresistibly follows, under the provisions of the clause referred to, that it cannot be exercised without the authority of Congress. But while it effected this important object, the constitution provided means to secure the independence of the other departments; that of the executive, by requiring the approval of the President of all the acts of Congress—and that of the judiciary, by its right to decide definitively, as far as the other departments are concerned, the constitutionality of all laws involved in cases brought before it.
No decision ever made, or measure ever adopted, except the 25th section of the judiciary act, has produced so great a change in the practical operation of the government, as this. It remains, in the face of this express and important provision of the constitution, unreversed. One of its effects has been, to change, entirely, the intent of the clause, in a most important particular. Its main object, doubtless, was, to prevent collision in the action of the government, without impairing the independence of the departments, by vesting all discretionary power in the Legislature. Without this, each department would have had equal right to determine what powers were necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested in it; which could not fail to bring them into dangerous conflicts, and to increase the hazard of multiplying unconstitutional acts. Indeed, instead of a government, it would have been little less than the regime of three separate and conflicting departments—ultimately to be controlled by the executive; in consequence of its having the command of the patronage and forces of the Union. This is avoided, and unity of object and action is secured by vesting all its discretionary power in Congress; so that no department or officer of the government, can exercise any power not expressly authorized by the constitution or the laws. It is thus made a legal, as well as a constitutional government; and if there be any departure from the former, it must be either with the sanction or the permission of Congress. Such was the intent of the constitution; but it has been defeated, in practice, by the decision in question.
Another of its effects has been to engender the most corrupting, loathsome and dangerous disease, that can infect a popular government—I mean that, known by the name of “the Spoils.” It is a disease easily contracted under all forms of government—hard to prevent, and most difficult to cure, when contracted; but of all the forms of governments, it is, by far, the most fatal of those of a popular character. The decision, which left the President free to exercise this mighty power, according to his will and pleasure—uncontrolled and unregulated by Congress, scattered, broadcast, the seeds of this dangerous disease, throughout the whole system. It might be long before they would germinate—but that they would spring up in time; and, if not eradicated, that they would spread over the whole body politic a corrupting and loathsome distemper, was just as certain as any thing in the future. To expect, with its growing influence and patronage, that the honors and emoluments of the government if left to the free and unchecked will of the Executive, would not be brought, in time, to bear on the presidential election, implies profound ignorance of that constitution of our nature, which renders governments necessary, to preserve society, and constitutions, to prevent the abuses of governments.
There was another departure during the same Congress, which was followed by important consequences; and which strikingly illustrates how dangerous it is for it to permit either of the other departments to exercise any power not expressly vested in it by the constitution, or authorized by law. I refer to the order issued by the, then, Secretary of the Treasury, Gen. Hamilton, authorizing, under certain restrictions, bank notes to be received in payment of the dues of the government.
To understand the full extent of the evils consequent on this measure, it is necessary to premise, that, during the revolution, the country had been inundated by an issue of paper, on the part of the confederacy and the governments of the several States; and at the time the constitution was adopted, was suffering severely under its effects. To put an end to the evil, and to guard against its recurrence, the constitution vested Congress with the power, “to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins,” and prohibited the States from “coining money, emitting bills of credit, and making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” With the intent of carrying out the object of these provisions, Congress provided, in the act laying duties upon imports, that they should be received in gold and silver coin only. And yet, the Secretary, in the face of this provision, issued an order, authorizing the collectors to receive bank notes; and thus identified them, as far as the fiscal action of the government was concerned, with gold and silver coin, against the express provision of the act, and the intent of the constitution.
This departure led, almost necessarily, to another, which followed shortly after—the incorporation of, what was called, in the report of the Secretary recommending its establishment, a national bank —a report strongly indicating the continuance of his predilections in favor of a national government. I say, almost necessarily; for if the government has the right to receive, and actually receives and treats bank notes as money, in its receipts and payments, it would seem to follow that it had the right, and was in duty bound, to adopt all means necessary and proper to give them uniformity and stability of value, as far as practicable. Thus the one departure led to the other, and the two combined, to great and important changes in the character and the course of the government.
During the same Congress, a foundation was laid for other and great departures; the results of which, although not immediately developed, have since led to the most serious evils. I refer to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the subject of manufactures. He contended, not only that duties might be imposed to encourage manufactures, but that it belonged (to use his own language) “to the discretion of the national Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general welfare, and for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no doubt, that whatever concerns the general interests of agriculture, of manufactures and of commerce, is within the sphere of the national councils, as far as regards an application of money.” It is a bold and an unauthorized assumption, that Congress has the power to pronounce what objects belong, and what do not belong to the general welfare; and to appropriate money, at its discretion, to such as it may deem to belong to it. No such power is delegated to it—nor is any such necessary and proper to carry into execution those which are delegated. On the contrary, to pronounce on the general welfare of the States is a high constitutional power, appertaining not to Congress, but to the people of the several States, acting in their sovereign capacity. That duty they performed in ordaining and establishing the constitution. This pronounced to what limits the general welfare extended, and beyond which it did not extend. All within them, appertained to the general welfare, and all without them, to the particular welfare of the respective States. The money power, including both the taxing and appropriating powers, and all other powers of the federal government are restricted to these limits. To prove, then, that any particular object belongs to the general welfare of the States of the Union, it is necessary to show that it is included in some one of the delegated powers, or is necessary and proper to carry some one of them into effect—before a tax can be laid or money appropriated to effect it. For Congress, then, to undertake to pronounce what does, or what does not belong to the general welfare—without regard to the extent of the delegated powers—is to usurp the highest authority—one belonging exclusively to the people of the several States in their sovereign capacity. And yet, on this assumption, thus boldly put forth, in defiance of a fundamental principle of a federal system of government, most onerous duties have been laid on imports—and vast amounts of money appropriated to objects not named among the delegated powers, and not necessary or proper to carry any one of them into execution; to the great impoverishment of one portion of the country, and the corresponding aggrandizement of the other.
Such are some of the leading measures, which were adopted, or had their origin during the first Congress that assembled under the constitution. They all evince a strong predilection for a national government; so strong, indeed, that very feeble arguments were sufficient to satisfy those, who had the control of affairs at the time; provided the measure tended to give the government an impulse in that direction. Not that it was intended to change its character from a federal to a national government (for that would involve a want of good faith)—but that it was thought to be necessary to strengthen it on, what was sincerely believed to be, its weak side. But, be this as it may, the government then received an impulse adverse to its federal, and in favor of a national, consolidated character, from which it has never recovered—and which, with slight interruption and resistance, has been constantly on the increase. Indeed, to the measures then adopted and projected, almost all subsequent departures from the federal character of the government, and all encroachments on the reserved powers may be fairly traced, numerous and great as they have been.
So many measures, following in rapid succession, and strongly tending to concentrate all power in the government of the United States, could not fail to excite much alarm among those who were in favor of preserving the reserved rights; and, with them, the federal character of the government. They, accordingly, soon began to rally in opposition to the Secretary of the Treasury and his policy, under Mr. Jefferson—then Secretary of State—and in favor of the reserved powers—or, as they were called, “reserved rights,” of the States. They assumed the name of the Republican party. Its great object was to protect the reserved, against the encroachments of the delegated powers; and, with this view, to give a direction to the government of the United States, favorable to the preservation of the one, and calculated to prevent the encroachment of the other. And hence they were often called, “the State Rights party.”
Things remained in this state during the administration of General Washington—but shortly after the accession of his successor—the elder Adams, the advocates of the reserved powers, became a regularly organized party in opposition to his administration. The introduction of, what are well known as, the Alien and Sedition laws, was the immediate cause of systematic and determined resistance. The former was fiercely assailed, as wholly unauthorized by the constitution; and as vesting arbitrary and despotic power in the President, over alien friends as well as alien enemies—and the latter, not only as unauthorized, but in direct violation of the provision of the constitution, which prohibits Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.” The passage of these acts, especially the latter—caused deep and general excitement and opposition throughout the Union; being intended, as was supposed, to protect the government in its encroachment on the reserved powers.
Virginia, seconded by Kentucky, took the lead in opposition to these measures. At the meeting of her legislature, ensuing their passage, a series of resolutions were introduced and passed, early in the session, declaratory of the principles of State rights, and condemnatory of the Alien and Sedition acts, and other measures of the government having a tendency to change its character from a federal to a national government. Among other things, these resolutions affirm that, “it (the General Assembly) views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact—and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by said compact, the States who are parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them. That the general assembly doth also express its deep regret, that a spirit has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the federal government to enlarge its powers by a forced construction of the constitutional charter, which defines them; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases—(which having been copied from the very limited grant of powers, in the former articles of confederation, were the less liable to be misconstrued)—so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration, which, necessarily, explains and limits the general phrases; so as to consolidate the States by degrees into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be, to transform the present republican system of the United States into an absolute, or, at least, mixed monarchy.”
The Kentucky resolutions, which are now known to have emanated from the pen of Mr. Jefferson—then the Vice-President, and the acknowledged head of the party—are similar in objects and substance with those of Virginia; but as they are differently expressed, and, in some respects, fuller than the latter, it is proper to give the two corresponding resolutions. The former is in the following words: “That the several States, composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to the general government; but that, by a compact under the style and title of a constitution of the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes—delegated to that government, certain definite powers; reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party—its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party; that the government created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it—since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties, having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.” The other is in the following words: “That the construction applied by the general government (as evinced by sundry of their proceedings), to those parts of the constitution of the United States, which delegate to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or any department thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the constitution. That words, meant by that instrument to be subsidiary only to the execution of the limited powers, ought not to be so construed, as themselves to give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken, as to destroy the whole residue of the instrument.”
The resolutions adopted by both States were sent, by the governor of each, at the request of the general assembly of each, to the governors of the other States, to be laid before their respective legislatures.
In the mean time, Mr. Madison had retired from Congress and was elected a member of the legislature of his own State. As thoroughly in favor of a national government, as he had been in the convention; and as strong as his predilections in its favor continued to be, after the adoption of the federal plan of government, he could not, with the views he entertained of the present government, as being partly national and partly federal, go the whole length of the policy recommended and supported by General Hamilton—and, accordingly, had separated from him and allied himself with Mr. Jefferson.
All the legislatures of the New England States, and that of New York, responded unfavorably to the principles and views set forth in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, and in approbation of the course of the federal government. At the next session of the General Assembly of Virginia, these resolutions were referred to a committee, of which Mr. Madison was the chairman. The result was a report from his pen, which triumphantly vindicated and established the positions taken in the resolutions. It successfully maintained, among other things, that the people of the States—acting in their sovereign capacity, have the right “to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated;” and shows, conclusively, that, without it, and the right of the States to interfere to protect themselves and the constitution, “there would be an end to all relief from usurped powers, and a direct subversion of the rights specified or recognized under all the State constitutions, as well as a plain denial of the fundamental principle, on which our independence itself was declared.” It also successfully maintained “that the ultimate right of the parties to the constitution, to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to the violation by one delegated authority as well as another, by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or the legislative.” And that, “however true, therefore, it may be, that the judicial department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the constitution, to decide, in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authority of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trust.” It conclusively refutes the position, taken by Gen. Hamilton, that it belongs to the discretion of the national legislature to pronounce upon objects, which concern the general welfare, as far as it regards the application of money, already quoted; denies the right of Congress to use the fiscal power, either in imposing taxes, or appropriating money, to promote any objects but those specified in the constitution—shows that the effect of the right, for which he contends, would necessarily be consolidation—by superseding the sovereignty of the States, and extending the power of the federal government to all cases whatsoever; and that, the effect of consolidation would be to transform our federal system into a monarchy.
The unfavorable responses of the other States were, by the House of Representatives of the Kentucky legislature, referred to the committee of the whole—which reported a resolution containing a summary of their former resolutions, which was unanimously adopted. Among other things, it asserts, “that the several States, which formed that instrument (the constitution), being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unconstitutional acts, done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.”
The report of Mr. Madison, and the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, constituted the political creed of the State rights republican party. They were understood as being in full accord with Mr. Jefferson’s opinion, who was its acknowledged head. They made a plain and direct issue with the principles and policy maintained by Gen. Hamilton—who, although not nominally the head of the federal party, as they called themselves, was its soul and spirit. The ensuing presidential election was contested on this issue, and terminated in the defeat of Mr. Adams, the election of Mr. Jefferson as President, and the elevation of the republican party into power. To the principles and doctrines, so plainly and ably set forth in their creed, they owed their elevation, and the long retention of power under many and severe trials. They secured the confidence of the people, because they were in accord with what they believed to be the true character of the constitution, and of our federal system of government.
Mr. Jefferson came into power with an earnest desire to reform the government. He certainly did a good deal in undoing what had been done; and in arresting the progress of the government towards consolidation. His election caused the repeal, in effect, of the alien and sedition laws, and a permanent acquiescence in their unconstitutionality. They constituted the prominent questions in the issue between the parties in the contest. He did much to reduce the expenses of the government, and made ample provisions for the payment of the public debt. He took strong positions against the bank of the United States, and laid the foundation for its final overthrow. Amidst great difficulties, he preserved the peace of the country during the period of his administration. But he did nothing to arrest many great and radical evils—nothing towards elevating the judicial departments of the governments of the several States, from a state of subordination to the judicial department of the government of the United States, to their rightful, constitutional position, as co-ordinates; nothing towards maintaining the rights of the States as parties to the constitutional compact, to judge, in the last resort, as to the extent of the delegated powers; nothing towards restoring to Congress the exclusive right to adopt measures necessary and proper to carry into execution, its own, as well as all other powers vested in the government, or in any of its departments; nothing towards reversing the order of Gen. Hamilton which united the government with the banks; and nothing effectual towards restricting the money power to objects specifically enumerated and delegated by the constitution.
Why Mr. Jefferson should have failed to undo, effectually, the consolidating, national policy of Gen. Hamilton, and to restore the government to its federal character, many reasons may be assigned. In the first place, the struggle which brought him into power, was too short to make any deep and lasting impression on the great body of the community. It lasted but two or three years, and the principal excitement, as far as constitutional questions were concerned, turned on the two laws which were the immediate cause of opposition. In the next, the state of the world was such as to turn the attention of the government, mainly, to what concerned the foreign relations of the Union, and to party contests growing out of them. To these it may be added, that Gen. Hamilton had laid the foundation of his policy so deep, and with so much skill, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to reverse it; at least, until time and experience should prove it to be destructive to the federal character of the government—inconsistent with the harmony and union of the States, and fatal to the liberty of the people. It is, indeed, even possible that, not even he—much less his cabinet and party generally—had a just and full conception of the danger, and the utter impracticability of some of the leading measures of his policy.
Not longer after the expiration of his term, his successor in the presidency, Mr. Madison, was forced into a war with Great Britain, after making every effort to avoid it. This, of course, absorbed the attention of the government and the country for the time, and arrested all efforts to carry out the doctrines and policy which brought the party into power. It did more; for the war, however just and necessary, gave a strong impulse adverse to the federal, and favorable to the national line of policy. This is, indeed, one of the unavoidable consequences of war; and can be counteracted, only by bringing into full action the negatives necessary to the protection of the reserved powers. These would, of themselves, have the effect of preventing wars, so long as they could be honorably and safely avoided—and, when necessary, of arresting, to a great extent, the tendency of the government to transcend the limits of the constitution, during its prosecution; and of correcting all departures, after its termination. It was by force of the tribunitial power, that the plebeians retained, for so long a period, their liberty, in the midst of so many wars.
How strong this impulse was, was not fully realized until after its termination. It left the country nearly without any currency, except irredeemable bank notes—greatly depreciated, and of very different value in the different sections of the Union—which forced on the government the establishment of another national bank—the charter of the first having expired without a renewal. This, and the embargo, with the other restrictive measures, which preceded it, had diverted a large portion of the capital of the country from commerce and other pursuits to manufactures; which, in time, produced a strong pressure in favor of a protective tariff. The great increase, too, of the public expenditures of the government—in consequence of the war—required a corresponding increase of income; and this, of course, increased, in the same proportion, its patronage and influence. All these causes combined, could not fail to give a direction to the course of government, adverse to the federal and favorable to the national policy—or, in other words, adverse to the principles and policy which brought Mr. Jefferson and the republican party into power, and favorable to those for which Mr. Adams and the federal party had contended.
In the mean time, the latter party was steadily undergoing the process of dissolution. It never recovered from the false step it took and the unwise course it pursued, during the war. It gradually lost its party organization; and even its name became extinct. But while this process was going on, the republican party, also, was undergoing a great change. It was gradually resolving itself into two parties; one of which was gradually departing from the State rights creed, and adopting the national. It rose into power, by electing the younger Adams, as the successor of Mr. Monroe, and took the name of the “National Republican party.” It differed little, in doctrine or policy, from the old federal party; but, in tone and character, was much more popular—and much more disposed to court the favor of the people.
At the same time, the other portion of the party was undergoing a mutation, not less remarkable—and which finally led to a change of name. It took the title of the “Democratic party;” or—more emphatically— “the Democracy.” The causes, which led to this change of name, began to operate before Mr. Monroe’s administration expired. Indeed, with the end of his administration—the last of the line of Virginia Presidents—the old State rights party, ceased to exist as a party, after having held power for twenty-four years. The Democracy, certainly had much more affinity with it in feelings—but, as a party—especially its northern wing—had much less devotion to the reserved powers; and was much more inclined to regard mere numbers as the sole political element—and the numerical majority as entitled to the absolute right to govern. It was, also, much more inclined to adopt the national than the republican creed—as far as the money power of the government was concerned; and, to this extent, much more disposed to act with the advocates of the former, than the latter.
No state of things could be more adverse to carrying out the principles and policy which brought the old republican party into power, or to restoring those of the party, which they expelled from power—as events have proved. One of its first fruits was the passage of the act of 19th May, 1828, entitled, “An act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports” —called, at the time, the “Bill of Abominations” —as it truly proved to be. It was passed by the joint support and vote of both parties—National Republicans, and those who, afterwards, assumed the name of “the Democracy” —the southern wing of each excepted. The latter, indeed, took the lead both in its introduction and support.
All preceding acts imposing duties, which this purported to alter, had some reference to, and regard for revenue; however much the rate of duties might have been controlled by the desire to afford protection. But such was not the case with this. It was passed under such circumstances as conclusively proved that it was intended, wholly and exclusively for protection; without any view, whatever, to revenue. The public debt, including the remnant of that contracted in the war of the Revolution, and the whole of that incurred in the war of 1812, was on the eve of being finally discharged, under the operation of the effective sinking fund, established at the close of the latter. And so ample was the revenue, at the time, that fully one-half of the whole, was annually applied to the discharge of the principal and interest of the public debt—leaving an ample surplus, to meet the current expenses of the government on a liberal scale. It was clear, that under such circumstances, no increase of duties was required for revenue—so clear, indeed, that the advocates of the bill openly avowed that its object was protection, not revenue; although they refused to adopt an amendment, which proposed to declare its real object, in order that its constitutionality might be decided by the judicial department.
It was under such circumstances that this act was passed; which, instead of reducing the duties one-half (to take effect after the final discharge of the public debt) as, on every principle of revenue and justice—of fairness and of good faith, it ought to have done, doubled them. I say of justice, fairness, and good faith—because the duties were originally raised to meet the expenses of the war, and to discharge the public debt—with the understanding, that when these objects were effected, they would be reduced—and the burden they imposed on the tax-payers be lightened. Without this understanding, they could not have been raised.
As, then, the duties imposed by the act, were not intended for revenue—and as there is no power, specifically delegated to Congress, to lay duties except for revenue; it is obvious that it had no right to pass the bill, unless upon the principle contended for by General Hamilton—of applying the money power to accomplish whatever it might pronounce to be for the general welfare—not only by the direct appropriation of money, but by the imposition of duties and taxes. Indeed, there is no substantial difference between the two; for if Congress have the right to appropriate money, in the shape of bounties, to encourage manufactures—it may, for the same purpose, lay protective duties, to give the manufacturer a monopoly of the home market, and vice versa —and such, accordingly, was the opinion of General Hamilton.
But, although the authors of this act aimed at transferring the bounty it conferred, directly into the pockets of the manufacturers, without passing through the treasury, yet they contemplated, and were prepared to meet the contingency of its bringing into the treasury a sum beyond the wants of the government, when the public debt should be extinguished. Their scheme was, to distribute the surplus among the States—that is, to appropriate to the government of each State, a sum proportioned to its representation in Congress, as an addition to its annual revenue. They thus assumed, not only, that Congress had a right to impose duties to provide, for what it might deem the general welfare —but also, and at the same time, to appropriate the receipts derived from therm to the States, respectively—to be applied to their individual and local welfare. This last measure was urged, again and again, on Congress, and would, in all probability have been adopted, had not the act, of which it was intended to have been a supplement, been arrested. A more extravagant and gross abuse of the money power can scarcely be conceived. Its consequences were as fatal as its violation of the constitution was outrageous and palpable. The vast surplus revenue, which it threw into the treasury notwithstanding its arrest, did much to corrupt both government and people; and was the principal cause of the explosion of the banking system in 1837; and the overthrow of the party in 1840, which took the lead in introducing and supporting it.
But these were not its only evil consequences. It led to another, and, if possible, a deeper and more dangerous inroad on the principles and policy which brought Mr. Jefferson and the old State rights party into power. The act of the 3d March, 1833, already referred to—thoroughly subjecting the judicial departments of the governments of the several States to the federal judiciary, was introduced, expressly, to enforce this grossly unconstitutional and outrageous act. It received the support and votes—as did the original act—both of the national and the democratic parties (a few excepted, who still adhered to the creed of the old State rights party), the latter taking the lead and direction in both instances.
It was thus, from the identity of doctrine and of policy which distinguished both parties, in reference to the money power, that two of the most prominent articles in the creed of the republican party, by force of which Mr. Jefferson, as its leader, came into power, were set aside; and their dangerous opposites, on account of which, Mr. Adams, as the head of the federal party, was expelled, were brought into full and active operation—namely—the right claimed by the latter for Congress, to pronounce upon what appertains to the general welfare—and which is so forcibly condemned in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, and the report of Mr. Madison—and the right of the federal judiciary to decide, in the last resort, as to the extent of the reserved as well as of the delegated powers. The one authorizes Congress to do as it pleases—and the other endows the court with the power to enforce whatever it may do—if its authority should be adequate—and if not, to call in the aid of the Executive with the entire force of the country. Their joint effect is to give unlimited control to the government of the United States, not only over those of the several States, but over the States themselves; in utter subversion of the relation of co-ordinates, and in total disregard of the rights of the several States, as parties to the constitutional compact, to judge, in the last resort, as to the extent of the powers delegated—a right so conclusively established by Mr. Madison, in his report.
These measures greatly increased the power and patronage of the federal government; and with them, the desire to obtain its control; especially of the executive department—which is invested mainly with the power of disposing of its honors and emoluments. As a necessary consequence of this, the presidential election became of more absorbing interest—the struggle between the two parties more and more intense—and every means which promised success was readily resorted to, without the least regard to their bearing, morally or politically. To secure the desired object, the concentration of party action and the stringency of party discipline were deemed indispensable. And hence, contemporaneously with these measures, party conventions were, for the first time, called to nominate the candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency—and party organization established all over the Union. And hence, also, for the first time, the power of removing from office, at the discretion of the President, so unconstitutionally conceded to him by the first Congress, was brought into active and systematic operation, as the means of rewarding partisan services, and of punishing party opposition or party delinquencies. In these measures the democratic party took the lead—but were soon followed by their opponents. There is, at present, no distinction between them in this respect. The effects of the whole have been, to supersede the provision of the constitution, as far as it relates to the election of President and Vice-President, as has been shown; to give a decided control over these elections to those who hold or seek office; to stake all the powers and emoluments of the government as prizes, to be won or lost by victory or defeat; and to make success in the election paramount to every other consideration.
But there is another cause that has greatly contributed to place the control of the presidential elections in the hands of those who hold or seek office. I allude, to what is called, the general ticket system; which has become, with the exception of a single State, the universal mode of appointing electors to choose the President and Vice-President. It was adopted to prevent a division of the vote of the several States, in the choice of their highest officers; and to make the election more popular, by giving it, as was professed to be its object, to the people. The former of these ends it has effected, but it has utterly failed as to the latter. It professes to give the people, individually, a right which it was impossible to exercise, except in the very smallest class of States, and even in these, very imperfectly. To call on a hundred thousand voters, scattered over fifty or sixty thousand square miles, to make out a ticket of a dozen or more electors, is to ask them to do that which, individually, they cannot properly or successfully do. Very few would have the information necessary to make a proper selection; and even if every voter had such information, the diversity of opinion and the want of concentration on the same persons, would be so great, that it would be a matter of mere accident, who would have the majority. To avoid this, a ticket must be formed by each party. But the few of each, who form the ticket, actually make the appointment of the electors; for the people individually, have no choice, but to vote for the one or the other ticket—or otherwise, virtually, to throw away their vote—for there would be no chance of success against the concentrated votes of the two parties. Never was there a scheme better contrived to transfer power from the body of the community, to those whose occupation is to get or hold offices, and to merge the contests of party into a mere struggle for the spoils.
It is due to the Democratic party to state that, while they took the lead, and are principally responsible for bringing about this state of things, they are entitled to the credit of putting down the Bank of the United States; of checking extravagant expenditures on internal improvements; of separating the government from the banks; and, more recently, of opposing protective tariffs; and of adopting the ad valorem principle in imposing duties on imports. These are all important measures; and indicate a disposition to take a stand against the perversion of the money power. But, until the measures which led to these mischiefs—and in the adoption of which they bore so prominent a part—are entirely reversed, nothing permanent will be gained.
In the meanwhile the sectional tendency of parties has been increasing with the central tendency of the government. They are, indeed, intimately connected. The more the powers of the system are centralized in the federal government, the greater will be its power and patronage; proportionate with these, and increasing with their increase, will be the desire to possess the control over them, for the purpose of aggrandizement; and the stronger this desire, the less will be the regard for principles, and the greater the tendency to unite for sectional objects—the stronger section with a view to power and aggrandizement—the weaker, for defence and safety. Any strongly marked diversity will be sufficient to draw the line; be it diversity of pursuit, of origin, of character, of habits, or of local institutions. The latter, being more deeply and distinctly marked than any other existing in the several States composing the Union, has, at all times, been considered by the wise and patriotic, as a delicate point—and to be, with great caution, touched. The dangers connected with this, began to exhibit themselves in the old Congress of the confederation, in respect to the North-Western Territory; and continued down to the time of the formation of the present constitution. They constituted the principal difficulty in forming it; but it was fortunately overcome, and adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties.
For a long period, nothing occurred to disturb this happy state of things. But in the session of 1819–20, a question arose that exposed the latent danger. The admission of the territory of Missouri, as a State of the Union, was resisted on the ground that its constitution did not prohibit slavery. The contest, after a long and angry discussion, was finally adjusted by a compromise, which admitted her as a slaveholding State, on condition that slavery should be prohibited in all the territories belonging then to the United States, lying north of 36°30′. This compromise was acquiesced in by the people of the South; and the danger, apparently, and, as every one supposed, permanently removed. Experience, however, has proved how erroneous were their calculations. The disease lay deep. It touched a fanatical as well as a political cord. There were not a few in the northern portion of the Union, who believed that slavery was a sin, as well as a great political evil; and who remained quiet in reference to it, only because they believed that it was beyond their control—and that they were in no way responsible for it. So long as the government was regarded as a federal government with limited powers, this belief of the sinfulness of slavery remained in a dormant state—as it still does in reference to the institution in foreign countries; but when it was openly proclaimed, as it was by the passage of the act of 1833, that the government had the right to judge, in the last resort, of the extent of its powers; and to use the military and naval forces of the Union to carry its decisions into execution; and when its passage by the joint votes of both parties furnished a practical assertion of the right claimed in an outrageous case, the cord was touched which roused it into action. The effects were soon made visible. In two years thereafter, in 1835, a systematic movement was, for the first time, commenced to agitate the question of abolition, by flooding the southern States with documents calculated to produce discontent among the slaves—and Congress, with petitions to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.
The agitation was, however, at first, confined comparatively to a few; and they obscure individuals without influence. The great mass of the people viewed it with aversion. But here again, the same measure which roused it into action, mainly contributed to keep alive the agitation, and ultimately to raise a party (consisting, at first, of a few fanatics) sufficiently numerous and powerful to exercise a controlling influence over the entire northern section of the Union. By the great increase of power and patronage which it conferred on the government, it contributed vastly to increase the concentration and intensity of party struggles, and to make the election of President the all absorbing question. The effect of this was, to induce both parties to seek the votes of every faction or combination by whose aid they might hope to succeed—flattering them in return, with the prospect of establishing the doctrines they professed, or of accomplishing the objects they desired. This state of things could not fail to give importance to any fanatical party, however small, which cared more for the object that united them, than for the success of either party; especially if it should be of a character to accord, in the abstract, with the feeling of that portion of the community generally. Each of the great parties, in order to secure their support, would, in turn, endeavor to conciliate them, by professing a great respect for them, and a disposition to aid in accomplishing the objects they wished to effect. This dangerous system of electioneering could not fail to increase the party, and to give it great additional strength; to be followed, of course, by an increased anxiety on the part of those who desired its aid, to conciliate its favor; thus keeping up the action and reaction of those fatal elements, from day to day—the one, rising in importance, as its influence extended over the section—the other sinking in subserviency to its principles and purposes.
In the mean time, the same causes must needs contribute, in the other section, to a state of things well calculated to aid this process. In proportion to the power and patronage of the government, would be the importance, to party success, of concentration and intensity in party struggles: and in proportion to these, the attachment and devotion to party, where the spoils are the paramount object. In the same proportion also, would be the unwillingness of the two wings of the respective parties, in the different sections, to separate, and their desire to hold together; and, of course, the disposition on the part of that in the weaker, to excuse and palliate the steps taken by their political associates in the stronger section, to conciliate the abolition party, in order to obtain its votes. Thus the section assaulted would be prevented from taking any decided stand to arrest the danger, while it might be safely and easily done—and seduced to postpone it, until it shall have acquired—as it already has done—a magnitude, almost, if not altogether, beyond the reach of means within the constitution. The difficulty and danger have been greatly increased, since the Missouri compromise; and the other sectional measures, in reference to the recently acquired territories, now in contemplation (should they succeed), will centralize the two majorities that constitute the elements of which the government of the United States is composed, permanently in the northern section; and thereby subject the southern, on this, and on all other questions, in which their feelings or interest may come in conflict, to its control.
Such has been the practical operation of the government, and such its effects. It remains to be considered, what will be the consequence? to what will the government of the numerical majority probably lead?
On this point, we are not without some experience. The present disturbed and dangerous state of things are its first fruits. It is the legitimate result of that long series of measures (of which the acts of the 19th of May, 1828, and the 3d of March, 1833, are the most prominent), by which the powers of the whole system have been concentrated, virtually, in the government of the United States; and thereby transformed it from its original federal character, into the government of the numerical majority. To these fatal measures are to be attributed the violence of party struggles—the total disregard of the provisions of the constitution in respect to the election of the President; the predominance of the honors and emoluments of the government over every other consideration; the rise and growth of the abolition agitation; the formation of geographical parties; and the alienation and hostile feelings between the two great sections of the Union. These are all the unavoidable consequences of the government of the numerical majority, in a country of such great extent, and with such diversity of institutions and interests as distinguish ours. They will continue, with increased and increasing aggregation, until the end comes. In a country of moderate extent, and with an executive department less powerfully constituted than in ours, this termination would be in appeal to force, to decide the contest between the two hostile parties; and in a monarchy, by the commander of the successful party becoming master of both, and of the whole community, as has been stated. But there is more uncertainty in a country of such extent as ours, and where the executive department is so powerfully constituted. The only thing that is certain is, that it cannot last. But whether it will end in a monarchy, or in disunion, is uncertain. In the one or the other it will, in all probability, terminate if not prevented; but in which, time alone can decide. There are powerful influences in operation—a part impelling it towards the one, and a part towards the other.
Among those impelling it towards monarchy, the two most prominent are, the national tendency of the numerical majority to terminate in that form of government; and the structure of the executive department of the government of the United States. The former has been fully explained in the preliminary discourse, and will be passed over with the single remark—that it will add great force to the impulse of the latter in the same direction. To understand the extent of this force will require some explanation.
The vast power and patronage of the department are vested in a single officer, the President of the United States. Among these powers, the most prominent, as far as it relates to the present subject, are those which appertain to the administration of the government; to the office of commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States; to the appointment of the officers of the government, with few exceptions; and to the removal of them at his pleasure—as his authority has been interpreted by Congress. These, and especially the latter, have made his election the great and absorbing object of party struggles; and on this the appeal to force will be made, whenever the violence of the struggle and the corruption of parties will no longer submit to the decision of the ballot box. To this end it must come, if the force impelling it in the other direction should not previously prevail. If it comes to this, it will be, in all probability, in a contested election; when the question will be, Which is the President? The incumbent—if he should be one of the candidates—or, if not, the candidate of the party in possession of power? or of the party endeavoring to obtain possession? On such an issue, the appeal to force would make the candidate of the successful party, master of the whole—and not the commander, as would be the case under different circumstances.
The contest would put an end, virtually, to the elective character of the department. The form of election might, for a time, be preserved; but the ballot box would be much less relied on for the decision, than the sword and bayonet. In time, even the form would cease, and the successor be appointed by the incumbent—and thus the absolute form of a popular, would end in the absolute form of a monarchical government. Scarcely a possibility would exist of forming a constitutional monarchy. There would be no material out of which it could be formed; and if formed, it would be too feeble, with such material as would constitute it, to hold in subjection a country of such great extent and population as ours must be.
Such will be the end to which the government, as it is now operating, must, in all probability, come, should the other alternative not occur, and nothing, in the mean time, be done to prevent it. It is idle to suppose that, operating as the system now does—with the increase of the country in extent, population and wealth, and the consequent increase of the power and patronage of the government, the head of the executive department can remain elective. The future is indeed, for the most part, uncertain; but there are causes in the political world as steady and fixed in their operation, as any in the physical; and among them are those, which, subject to the above conditions, will lead to the result stated.
Those impelling the government towards disunion are, also, very powerful. They consist chiefly of two; the one, arising from the great extent of the country—the other, from its division into separate States, having local institutions and interests. The former, under the operation of the numerical majority, has necessarily given to the two great parties, in their contest for the honors and emoluments of the government, a geographical character; for reasons which have been fully stated. This contest must finally settle down in a struggle on the part of the stronger section to obtain the permanent control; and on the part of the weaker to preserve its independence and equality as members of the Union. The conflict will thus become one between the States, occupying the different sections—that is, between organized bodies on both sides; each, in the event of separation, having the means of avoiding the confusion and anarchy, to which the parts would be subject without such organization. This would contribute much to increase the power of resistance on the part of the weaker section against the stronger, in possession of the government. With these great advantages and resources, it is hardly possible that the parties occupying the weaker section, would consent, quietly, under any circumstances, to sink down from independent and equal sovereignties, into a dependent and colonial condition—and still less so, under circumstances that would revolutionize them internally, and put their very existence, as a people, at stake. Never was there an issue between independent States that involved greater calamity to the conquered, than is involved in that between the States which compose the two sections of this Union. The condition of the weaker, should it sink from a state of independence and equality to one of dependence and subjection, would be more calamitous than ever before befell a civilized people. It is vain to think that, with such consequences before them, they will not resist; especially when resistance may save them, and cannot render their condition worse. That this will take place, unless the stronger section desists from its course, may be assumed as certain: and that—if forced to resist, the weaker section would prove successful, and the system end in disunion, is, to say the least, highly probable. But if it should fail, the great increase of power and patronage which must, in consequence, accrue to the government of the United States, would but render certain, and hasten the termination in the other alternative. So that, at all events, to the one, or to the other—to monarchy, or disunion it must come, if not prevented by strenuous and timely efforts. And this brings up the question—How is it to be prevented? How can these sad alternatives be averted?
For this purpose, it is indispensable that the government of the United States should be restored to its federal character. Nothing short of a perfect restoration, as it came from the hands of its framers, can avert them. It is folly to suppose that any popular government, except one strictly federal, in practice, as well as in theory, can last, over a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests and institutions. It would not be more irrational to suppose, that it could last, without the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled. The tendency of the former to oppress the latter, is not stronger than is the tendency of the more powerful section, to oppress the weaker. Nor is the right of suffrage more indispensable to enforce the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, than a federal organization, to compel the parts to respect the rights of each other. It requires the united action of both to prevent the abuse of power and oppression; and to constitute, really and truly, a constitutional government. To supersede either, is to convert it in fact, whatever may be its theory, into an absolute government.
But it cannot be restored to its federal character without restoring the separate governments of the several States, and the States themselves, to their true position. From the latter the whole system emanated. They ordained and established all the parts; first, by their separate action, their respective State governments; and next, by their concurrent action, with the indispensable co-operation of their respective governments, they ordained and established a common government, as a supplement to their separate governments. The object was, to do that, by a common agent, which could not be as well done, or done at all, by their separate agencies. The relation, then, in which the States stand to the system, is that of the creator to the creature; and that, in which the two governments stand to each other, is of coequals and co-ordinates—as has been fully established—with the important difference, in this last respect, that the separate governments of the States were the first in the order of time, and that they exercised an active and indispensable agency in the creation of the common government of all the States; or, as it is styled, the government of the United States.
Such is their true position—a position, not only essential in theory, in the formation of a federal government—but to its preservation in practice. Without it, the system could not have been formed—and without it, it cannot be preserved. The supervision of the creating power is indispensable to the preservation of the created. But they no longer retain their true position. In the practical operation of the system, they have both been superseded and reduced to subordinate and dependent positions: and this, too, by the power last in the order of formation, and which was brought into existence, as auxiliary to the first—and through the aid of its active co-operation. It has assumed control over the whole—and thus a thorough revolution has been effected, the creature taking the place of the creator. This must be reversed, and each restored to its true position, before the federal character of the government can be perfectly restored.
For this purpose the first and indispensable step is to repeal the 25th section of the Judiciary Act—the whole of the act of the 3d of March, 1833, and all other acts containing like provisions. These, by subjecting the judiciary of the States to the control of the federal judiciary, have subjected the separate governments of the several States, including all their departments and functionaries—and, thereby, the States themselves, to a subordinate and dependent condition. It is only by their repeal, that the former can be raised to their true relation as coequals and co-ordinates—and the latter can retain their high sovereign power of deciding, in the last resort, on the extent of the delegated powers, or of interposing to prevent their encroachment on the reserved powers. It is only by restoring these to their true position, that the government of the United States can be reduced to its true position, as the coequal and co-ordinate of the separate governments of the several States, and restricted to the discharge of those auxiliary functions assigned to it by the constitution.
But this indispensable and important step will have to be followed by several others, before the work of restoration will have been completed. One of the most important will be, the repeal of all acts by which the money power is carried beyond its constitutional limits, either in laying duties, or in making appropriations. The federal character of the government may be as effectually destroyed by encroaching on, and absorbing all the reserved powers, as by subjecting the governments of the several States themselves directly to its control. Either would make it, in fact, the sole and absolute power, and virtually, the government of the numerical majority. But of all the powers ever claimed for the government of the United States, that which invests Congress with the right to determine what objects belong to the general welfare—to use the money power in the form of laying duties and taxes, and to make appropriations for the purpose of promoting such as it may deem to be of this character, is the most encroaching and comprehensive. In civilized communities, money may be said to be the universal means, by which all the operations of governments are carried on. If, then, it be admitted, that the government of the United States has the right to decide, at its discretion, what is, and what is not for the common good of the country, and to lay duties and taxes, and to appropriate their proceeds to effect whatever it may determine to be for the common good, it would be difficult to assign any limits to its authority, or to prevent it from absorbing, finally, all the reserved powers, and thereby, destroying its federal character.
But still more must be done to complete the work of restoration. The executive department must be rigidly restricted within its assigned limits, by divesting the President of all discretionary powers, and confining him strictly to those expressly conferred on him by the constitution and the acts of Congress. According to the express provisions of the former, he cannot rightfully exercise any other. Nor can he be permitted to go beyond, and to assume the exercise of whatever power he may deem necessary to carry those vested in him into execution, without finally absorbing all the powers vested in the other departments and making himself absolute. Having the disposal of the patronage of the government, and the command of all its forces, and standing at the head of the dominant party for the time, he will be able, in the event of a contest between him and either of the other departments, as to the extent of their respective powers, to make good his own, against its construction.
There is still another step, connected with this, which will be necessary to complete the work of restoration. The provisions of the constitution in reference to the election of the President and Vice-President, which has been superseded in practice, must be restored. The virtual repeal of this provision, as already stated, has resulted in placing the control of their election in the hands of the leaders of the office-seekers and office-holders; and this, with the unrestricted power of removal from office, and the vast patronage of the government, has made their election the all absorbing question; and the possession of the honors and emoluments of the government, the paramount objects in the Presidential contest. The effect has been, to increase vastly the authority of the President, and to enable him to extend his powers with impunity, under color of the right conceded him, against the express provision of the constitution, of deciding what means are necessary to carry into execution the powers vested in him. The first step in the enlargement of his authority, was to pervert the power of removal (the intent of which was, to enable him to supply the place of an incompetent or an unworthy officer, with the view of better administering the laws) into an instrument for punishing opponents and rewarding partisans. This has been followed up by other acts, which have greatly changed the relative powers of the departments, by increasing those of the executive. Even the power of making war—and the unlimited control over all conquests, during its continuance, have, it is to be apprehended, passed from Congress into the hands of the President. His powers, in consequence of all this, have accumulated to a degree little consistent with those of a chief magistrate of a federal republic; and hence, the necessity for reducing them within their strict constitutional limits, and restoring the provisions of the constitution in reference to his election, in order to restore the government completely to its federal character. Experience may, perhaps, prove, that the provisions of the constitution in this respect are imperfect—that they are too complicated and refined for practice; and that a radical change is necessary in the organization of the executive department. If such should prove to be the case, the proper remedy would be, not to supersede them in practice, as has been done, but to apply to the power which has been provided to correct all its defects and disorders.
But the restoration of the government to its federal character, however entire and perfect it may be—will not, of itself, be sufficient to avert the evil alternatives—to the one or the other of which it must tend, as it is now operating. Had its federal character been rigidly maintained in practice from the first, it would have been all sufficient, in itself, to have secured the country against the dangerous condition in which it is now placed, in consequence of a departure from it. But the means which may be sufficient to prevent diseases, are not usually sufficient to remedy them. In slight cases of recent date, they may be—but additional means are necessary to restore health, when the system has been long and deeply disordered. Such, at present, is the condition of our political system. The very causes which have occasioned its disorders, have, at the same time, led to consequences, not to be removed by the means which would have prevented them. They have destroyed the equilibrium between the two great sections, and alienated that mutual attachment between them, which led to the formation of the Union, and the establishment of a common government for the promotion of the welfare of all.
When the government of the United States was established, the two sections were nearly equal in respect to the two elements of which it is composed; a fact which, doubtless, had much influence, in determining the convention to select them as the basis of its construction. Since then, their equality in reference to both, has been destroyed, mainly through the action of the government established for their mutual benefit. The first step towards it occurred under the old Congress of the confederation. It was among its last acts. It took place while the convention, which formed the present constitution and government, was in session, and may be regarded as contemporaneous with it. I refer to the ordinance of 1787; which, among other things, contained a provision excluding slavery from the North-Western Territory; that is, from the whole region lying between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The effect of this was, to restrict the Southern States, in that quarter, to the country lying south of it; and to extend the Northern over the whole of that great and fertile region. It was literally to restrict the one and extend the other; for the whole territory belonged to Virginia, the leading State of the former section. She, with a disinterested patriotism rarely equalled, ceded the whole, gratuitously, to the Union—with the exception of a very limited portion, reserved for the payment of her officers and soldiers, for services rendered in the war of the revolution. The South received no equivalent for this magnificent cession, except a pledge inserted in the ordinance, similar to that contained in the constitution of the United States, to deliver up fugitive slaves. It is probable that there was an understanding among the parties, that it should be inserted in both instruments—as the old Congress and the convention were then in session in the same place; and that it contributed much to induce the southern members of the former to agree to the ordinance. But be this as it may, both, in practice, have turned out equally worthless. Neither have, for many years, been respected. Indeed, the act itself was unauthorized. The articles of confederation conferred not a shadow of authority on Congress to pass the ordinance—as is admitted by Mr. Madison; and yet this unauthorized, one-sided act (as it has turned out to be), passed in the last moments of the old confederacy, was relied on, as a precedent, for excluding the South from two-thirds of the territory acquired from France by the Louisiana treaty, and the whole of the Oregon territory; and is now relied on to justify her exclusion from all the territory acquired by the Mexican war—and all that may be acquired—in any manner, hereafter. The territory from which she has already been excluded, has had the effect to destroy the equilibrium between the sections as it originally stood; and to concentrate, permanently, in the northern section the two majorities of which the government of the United States is composed. Should she be excluded from the territory acquired from Mexico, it will give to the Northern States an overwhelming preponderance in the government.
In the mean time the spirit of fanaticism, which had been long lying dormant, was roused into action by the course of the government—as has been explained. It aims, openly and directly, at destroying the existing relations between the races in the southern section; on which depend its peace, prosperity and safety. To effect this, exclusion from the territories is an important step; and, hence, the union between the abolitionists and the advocates of exclusion, to effect objects so intimately connected.
All this has brought about a state of things hostile to the continuance of the Union, and the duration of the government. Alienation is succeeding to attachment, and hostile feelings to alienation; and these, in turn, will be followed by revolution, or a disruption of the Union, unless timely prevented. But this cannot be done by restoring the government to its federal character—however necessary that may be as a first step. What has been done cannot be undone. The equilibrium between the two sections has been permanently destroyed by the measures above stated. The northern section, in consequence, will ever concentrate within itself the two majorities of which the government is composed; and should the southern be excluded from all territories, now acquired, or to be hereafter acquired, it will soon have so decided a preponderance in the government and the Union, as to be able to mould the constitution to its pleasure. Against this, the restoration of the federal character of the government can furnish no remedy. So long as it continues, there can be no safety for the weaker section. It places in the hands of the stronger and hostile section, the power to crush her and her institutions; and leaves her no alternative, but to resist, or sink down into a colonial condition. This must be the consequence, if some effectual and appropriate remedy be not applied.
The nature of the disease is such, that nothing can reach it, short of some organic change—a change which shall so modify the constitution, as to give to the weaker section, in some form or another, a negative on the action of the government. Nothing short of this can protect the weaker, and restore harmony and tranquillity to the Union, by arresting, effectually, the tendency of the dominant and stronger section to oppress the weaker. When the constitution was formed, the impression was strong, that the tendency to conflict would be between the larger and smaller States; and effectual provisions were, accordingly, made to guard against it. But experience has proved this to have been a mistake; and that, instead of being, as was then supposed, the conflict is between the two great sections, which are so strongly distinguished by their institutions, geographical character, productions and pursuits. Had this been then as clearly perceived as it now is, the same jealousy which so vigilantly watched and guarded against the danger of the larger States oppressing the smaller, would have taken equal precaution to guard against the same danger between the two sections. It is for us, who see and feel it, to do, what the framers of the constitution would have done, had they possessed the knowledge, in this respect, which experience has given to us—that is—provide against the dangers which the system has practically developed; and which, had they been foreseen at the time, and left without guard, would undoubtedly have prevented the States, forming the southern section of the confederacy, from ever agreeing to the constitution; and which, under like circumstances, were they now out of, would forever prevent them from entering into, the Union.
How the constitution could best be modified, so as to effect the object, can only be authoritatively determined by the amending power. It may be done in various ways. Among others, it might be effected through a reorganization of the executive department; so that its powers, instead of being vested, as they now are, in a single officer, should be vested in two—to be so elected, as that the two should be constituted the special organs and representatives of the respective sections, in the executive department of the government; and requiring each to approve all the acts of Congress before they shall become laws. One might be charged with the administration of matters connected with the foreign relations of the country—and the other, of such as were connected with its domestic institutions; the selection to be decided by lot. It would thus effect, more simply, what was intended by the original provisions of the constitution, in giving to one of the majorities composing the government, a decided preponderance in the electoral college—and to the other majority a still more decided influence in the eventual choice—in case the college failed to elect a President. It was intended to effect an equilibrium between the larger and smaller States in this department—but which, in practice, has entirely failed; and, by its failure, done much to disturb the whole system, and to bring about the present dangerous state of things.
Indeed, it may be doubted, whether the framers of the constitution did not commit a great mistake, in constituting a single, instead of a plural executive. Nay, it may even be doubted whether a single chief magistrate—invested with all the powers properly appertaining to the executive department of the government, as is the President—is compatible with the permanence of a popular government; especially in a wealthy and populous community, with a large revenue and a numerous body of officers and employees. Certain it is, that there is no instance of a popular government so constituted, which has long endured. Even ours, thus far, furnishes no evidence in its favor, and not a little against it; for, to it, the present disturbed and dangerous state of things, which threatens the country with monarchy, or disunion, may be justly attributed. On the other hand, the two most distinguished constitutional governments of antiquity, both in respect to permanence and power, had a dual executive. I refer to those of Sparta and of Rome. The former had two hereditary, and the latter two elective chief magistrates. It is true, that England, from which ours, in this respect, is copied, has a single hereditary head of the executive department of her government—but it is not less true, that she has had many and arduous struggles, to prevent her chief magistrate from becoming absolute; and that, to guard against it effectually, she was finally compelled to divest him, substantially, of the power of administering the government, by transferring it, practically, to a cabinet of responsible ministers, who, by established custom, cannot hold office, unless supported by a majority of the two houses of Parliament. She has thus avoided the danger of the chief magistrate becoming absolute; and contrived to unite, substantially, a single with a plural executive, in constituting that department of her government. We have no such guard, and can have none such, without an entire change in the character of our government; and her example, of course, furnishes no evidence in favor of a single chief magistrate in a popular form of government like ours—while the examples of former times, and our own thus far, furnish strong evidence against it.
But it is objected that a plural executive necessarily leads to intrigue and discord among its members; and that it is inconsistent with prompt and efficient action. This may be true, when they are all elected by the same constituency; and may be a good reason, where this is the case, for preferring a single executive, with all its objections, to a plural executive. But the case is very different where they are elected by different constituencies— having conflicting and hostile interests; as would be the fact in the case under consideration. Here the two would have to act, concurringly, in approving the acts of Congress—and, separately, in the sphere of their respective departments. The effect, in the latter case, would be, to retain all the advantages of a single executive, as far as the administration of the laws were concerned; and, in the former, to insure harmony and concord between the two sections, and, through them, in the government. For as no act of Congress could become a law without the assent of the chief magistrates representing both sections, each, in the elections, would choose the candidate, who, in addition to being faithful to its interests, would best command the esteem and confidence of the other section. And thus, the presidential election, instead of dividing the Union into hostile geographical parties, the stronger struggling to enlarge its powers, and the weaker to defend its rights—as is now the case—would become the means of restoring harmony and concord to the country and the government. It would make the Union a union in truth—a bond of mutual affection and brotherhood—and not a mere connection used by the stronger as the instrument of dominion and aggrandizement—and submitted to by the weaker only from the lingering remains of former attachment, and the fading hope of being able to restore the government to what it was originally intended to be, a blessing to all.
Such is the disease—and such the character of the only remedy which can reach it. In conclusion, there remains to be considered, the practical question—Shall it be applied? Shall the only power which can apply it be invoked for the purpose?
The responsibility of answering this solemn question, rests on the States composing the stronger section. Those of the weaker are in a minority, both of the States and of population; and, of consequence, in every department of the government. They, then, cannot be responsible for an act which requires the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or two-thirds of the States to originate, and three-fourths of the latter to consummate. With such difficulties in their way, the States of the weaker section can do nothing, however disposed, to save the Union and the government, without the aid and co-operation of the States composing the stronger section: but with their aid and co-operation both may be saved. On the latter, therefore, rests the responsibility of invoking the high power, which alone can apply the remedy—and, if they fail to do so, of all the consequences which may follow.
Having now finished what I proposed to say on the constitution and government of the United States, I shall conclude with a few remarks relative to the constitution and governments of the individual States. Standing, as they do, in the relation of co-ordinates with the constitution and government of the United States, whatever may contribute to derange and disorder the one, must, necessarily contribute, more or less, to derange and disorder the other; and, thus, the whole system. And hence the importance—viewed simply in reference to the government of the United States, without taking into consideration those of the several States—that the individual governments of each, as well as the united government of all, should assume and preserve the constitutional, instead of the absolute form of popular government—that of the concurrent, instead of the numerical majority.
It is much more difficult to give to the government of the States, this constitutional form, than to the government of the United States; for the same reason that it is more easy to form a constitutional government for a community divided into classes or orders, than for one purely popular. Artificial distinctions of every description, be they of States or Estates, are more simple and strongly marked than the numerous and blended natural distinctions of a community purely popular. But difficult as it is to form such constitutional governments for the separate States, it may be affected by making the several departments, as far as it may be necessary, the organs of the more strongly marked interests of the State, from whatever causes they may have been produced—and by such other devices, whereby the sense of the State may be taken by its parts, and not as a whole—by the concurrent, and not by the numerical majority. It is only by the former that it can be truly taken. Indeed, the numerical majority often fails to accomplish that at which it professes to aim—to take truly the sense of the majority. It assumes, that by assigning to every part of the State a representative in every department of its government, in proportion to its population, it secures to each a weight in the government, in exact proportion to its population, under all circumstances. But such is not the fact. The relative weight of population depends as much on circumstances, as on numbers. The concentrated population of cities, for example, would ever have, under such a distribution, far more weight in the government, than the same number in the scattered and sparse population of the country. One hundred thousand individuals concentrated in a city two miles square, would have much more influence than the same number scattered over two hundred miles square. Concert of action and combination of means would be easy in the one, and almost impossible in the other; not to take into the estimate, the great control that cities have over the press, the great organ of public opinion. To distribute power, then, in proportion to population, would be, in fact, to give the control of the government, in the end, to the cities; and to subject the rural and agricultural population to that description of population which usually congregate in them—and ultimately, to the dregs of their population. This can only be counteracted by such a distribution of power as would give to the rural and agricultural population, in some one of the two legislative bodies or departments of the government, a decided preponderance. And this may be done, in most cases, by allotting an equal number of members in one of the legislative bodies to each election district; as a majority of the counties or election districts will usually have a decided majority of its population engaged in agricultural or other rural pursuits. If this should not be sufficient, in itself, to establish an equilibrium—a maximum of representation might be established, beyond which the number allotted to each election district or city should never extend.
Other means of a similar character might be adopted, by which, the different and strongly marked interests of the States—especially those resulting from geographical features, or the diversity of pursuits, might be prevented from coming into conflict, and the one secured against the control of the other. By these, and other contrivances suited to the peculiar condition of a State, its government might be made to assume the character of that of a concurrent majority, and have all the tranquillity and stability belonging to such a form of government; and thereby avoid the disorder and anarchy in which the government of the numerical majority must ever end. While the government of the United States continues, it will, indeed, require a much less perfect government on the part of a State, to protect it from the evils to which an imperfectly organized government would expose it, than if it formed a separate and independent community. The reason is, that the States, as members of a Union, bound to defend each other against all external dangers and domestic violence, are relieved from the necessity of collecting and disbursing large amounts of revenue, which otherwise would be required; and are, thereby, relieved from that increased tendency to conflict and disorder which ever accompanies an increase of revenue and expenditures. In order to give a practical illustration of the mode in which a State government may be organized, on the principle of the concurrent majority, I shall, in concluding this discourse, give a brief account of the constitution and government of the State of South Carolina.
Its government, like that of all the other States, is divided into three departments—the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. Its executive powers, as in all the others, are vested in a single chief magistrate. He is elected by the legislature, holds his office for two years, and is not again eligible for two years after the expiration of the term for which he was elected. His powers and patronage are very limited. The judges are, also, appointed by the legislature. They hold their office during good behavior. The legislative department is, like that of all the other States, divided into two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The members of the former are divided into two classes, of which the term of one expires every other year. The members of the House are elected for two years. The two are called, when convened, the General Assembly. In addition to the usual and appropriate power of legislative bodies, it appoints all the important officers of the State. The local officers are elected by the people of the respective districts (counties) to which they belong. The right of suffrage, with few and inconsiderable exceptions, is universal. No convention of the people can be called, but by the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses—that is—two-thirds, respectively, of the entire representative body. Nor can the constitution be amended, except by an act of the General Assembly, passed by two-thirds of both bodies of the whole representation; and passed again, in like manner, at the first session of the assembly immediately following the next election of the members of the House of Representatives. But that which is peculiar to its constitution, and which distinguishes it from those of all the other States, is, the principle on which power is distributed among the different portions of the State. It is this, indeed, which makes the constitution, in contradistinction to the government. The elements, according to which power is distributed, are taxation, property, and election districts. In order to understand why they were adopted, and how the distribution has affected the operations of government, it will be necessary to give a brief sketch of the political history of the State.
The State was first settled, on the coast, by emigrants from England and France. Charleston became the principal town; and to it the whole political power of the colony, was exclusively confined, during the government of the Lords Proprietors—although its population was spread over the whole length of its coast, and to a considerable distance inland, and the region occupied by the settlements, organized into parishes. The government of these was overthrown by the people, and the colony became a dependent on the Crown. The right of electing members to the popular branch of the legislature, was extended to the parishes. Under the more powerful protection of the Crown, the colony greatly increased, and extended still further inland, towards the falls of the great rivers—carrying with them the same organization.
About the middle of the last century, a current of population flowed in from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, to the region extending from the falls of the rivers to the mountains—now known as the upper country, in contradistinction to the section lying below. Between the two settlements there was a wide unsettled space; and for a considerable length of time no political connection, and little intercourse existed between them. The upper country had no representation in the government, and no political existence as a constituent portion of the State, until a period near the commencement of the revolution. Indeed during the revolution, and until the formation of the present constitution, in 1790, its political weight was scarcely felt in the government. Even then, although it had become the most populous section, power was so distributed under the new constitution, as to leave it in a minority in every department of the government.
Such a state of things could not long continue without leading to discontent. Accordingly, a spirited movement or agitation commenced openly in 1794, the object of which was to secure a weight in the government, proportional to its population. Once commenced, it continued to increase with the growing population of that section, until its violence, and the distraction and disorder which it occasioned, convinced the reflecting portion of both sections, that the time had arrived when a vigorous effort should be made to bring it to a close. For this purpose, a successful attempt was made in the session of 1807. The lower section was wise and patriotic enough to propose an adjustment of the controversy, by giving to each an equal participation in the government; and the upper section, as wisely and patriotically, waived its claims, and accepted the compromise. To carry it into execution, an act was passed during the session to amend the constitution, according to the form it prescribes; and again passed, in like manner, during the ensuing session—an intervening election of the members of the House of Representatives having taken place—and, thereby, became a part of the constitution as it now stands. The object intended to be effected will explain the provisions of the amendment; and why it was necessary to incorporate in the constitution the three elements above stated.
To effect this, the Senate, which consists of one member from each election district, except Charleston, which has two (one for each of its two parishes), remained unchanged. This, in consequence of the organization of the lower district into parishes, and these again into election districts, gave the lower section a decided preponderance in that branch of the legislature. To give the upper section a like preponderance in the House of Representatives, it became necessary to remodel it. For this purpose, there were assigned to this branch of the legislature, one hundred and twenty-four members—of which sixty-two were allotted to white population, and sixty-two to taxation; to be distributed according to the election districts—giving to each the number it would be entitled to under the combined ratios of the two elements. To ascertain this proportion, from time to time, a census of the population was ordered to be taken every ten years, and a calculation made, at the same time, of the amount of the tax paid by each election district during the last ten years; in order to furnish the data on which to make the distribution. These gave to the upper section a preponderance, equally decisive, in the House of Representatives. And thus an equilibrium was established between the two sections in the legislative department of the government; and, as the governor, judges, and all the important officers under the government are appointed by the legislature—an equilibrium in every department of the government. By making the election districts the element of which one branch of the legislature is constituted, it protects the agricultural and rural interests against the preponderance, which, in time, the concentrated city population might otherwise acquire—and by making taxation one of the elements of which the other branch is composed, it guards effectually against the abuse of the taxing power. The effect of such abuse would be, to give to the portion of the State which might be overtaxed, an increased weight in the government proportional to the excess—and to diminish, in the same proportion, the weight of the section which might exempt itself from an equal share of the burden of taxation.
The results which followed the introduction of these elements into the constitution, in the manner stated, were most happy. The government—instead of being, as it was under the constitution of 1790, the government of the lower section—or becoming, subsequently, as it must have become, the government of the upper section, had numbers constituted the only element—was converted into that of the concurrent majority, and made, emphatically, the government of the entire population—of the whole people of South Carolina—and not of one portion of its people over another portion. The consequence was, the almost instantaneous restoration of harmony and concord between the two sections. Party division and party violence, with the distraction and disorder attendant upon them, soon disappeared. Kind feelings, and mutual attachment between the two sections, took their place—and have continued uninterrupted for more than forty years. The State, as far as its internal affairs are concerned, may be literally said to have been, during the whole period, without a party. Party organization, party discipline, party proscription—and their offspring, the spoils principle, have been unknown to the State. Nothing of the kind is necessary to produce concentration; as our happy constitution makes an united people—with the exception of occasional, but short local dissensions, in reference to the action of the federal government—and even the most violent of these ceased, almost instantly, with the occasion which produced it.
Such are the happy fruits of a wisely constituted Republic—and such are some of the means by which it may be organized and established. Ours, like all other well-constituted constitutional governments, is the offspring of a conflict, timely and wisely compromised. May its success, as an example, lead to its imitation by others—until our whole system—the united government of all the States, as well as the individual governments of each—shall settle down in like concord and harmony.
the end
SPEECH ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
[December 12, 1811]
On November 29, 1811, the Committee on Foreign Relations submitted its report on the deteriorating relations between Britain and the United States and recommended several resolutions relating to American foreign policy. Much of the House debate focused upon the second of these resolutions:
2. Resolved, That an additional force of ten thousand regular troops ought to be immediately raised to serve for three years; and that a bounty in lands ought to be given to encourage enlistments.*
John Randolph of Virginia, an established member of the House and well known for his scintillating and discursive eloquence, had condemned the report on a number of grounds, including the dangers of a standing army and the impropriety of aiding the despotism of Napoleon Bonaparte. In his first major speech as a member of Congress, Calhoun took upon himself the task of responding to the arguments of the gentleman from Roanoke—the first of many disagreements with an opponent for whom Calhoun would come to develop the most intense admiration. In spite of his protestations about the embarrassment of a young man addressing such an audience for the first time and his wish that the task of defending this important task had fallen to abler hands, Calhoun’s address not only established his reputation as an ardent nationalist, but also adumbrated the extraordinary powers of rhetoric and analysis that would mark his later public career.
Mr. Speaker: I understood the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Relations differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that the committee recommended the measures now before the House, as a preparation for war; and such, in fact, was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member, except that gentleman. I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but consider it the effect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed, the Report could mean nothing but war or empty menace. I hope no member of this House is in favor of the latter. A bullying, menacing system, has everything to condemn and nothing to recommend it. In expense, it almost rivals war. It excites contempt abroad, and destroys confidence at home. Menaces are serious things; and ought to be resorted to with as much caution and seriousness as war itself; and should, if not successful, be invariably followed by it. It was not the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) who made this a war question. The resolve contemplates an additional regular force; a measure confessedly improper but as a preparation for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event.
Sir, I am not insensible to the weighty importance of the proposition, for the first time submitted to this House, to compel a redress of our long list of complaints against one of the belligerents. According to my mode of thinking on this subject, the more serious the question, the stronger and more unalterable ought to be our convictions before we give it our support.
War, in our country, ought never to be resorted to but when it is clearly justifiable and necessary; so much so, as not to require the aid of logic to convince our understandings, nor the ardor of eloquence to inflame our passions. There are many reasons why this country should never resort to war but for causes the most urgent and necessary. It is sufficient that, under a government like ours, none but such will justify it in the eyes of the people; and were I not satisfied that such is the present case, I certainly would be no advocate of the proposition now before the House.
Sir, I might prove the war, should it ensue, justifiable, by the express admission of the gentleman from Virginia—and necessary, by facts undoubted, and universally admitted; such as he did not pretend to controvert. The extent, duration, and character of the injuries received; the failure of those peaceful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, my proof that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen; depredations on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to regulate our trade with other nations; negotiation resorted to, again and again, till it is become hopeless; the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and in the vain expectation of returning justice? The evil still grows, and, in each succeeding year, swells in extent and pretension beyond the preceding. The question, even in the opinion and by the admission of our opponents is reduced to this single point—Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and maritime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens employed in exercising them? These rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of redress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none—unless we consider the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission as the best remedy. Sir, which alternative this House will embrace, it is not for me to say. I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority than the voice of any man. It is not for the human tongue to instil the sense of independence and honor. This is the work of nature; a generous nature that disdains tame submission to wrongs.
This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gentleman from Virginia. He dared not deny his country’s wrongs, or vindicate the conduct of her enemy.
Only one part of that gentleman’s argument had any, the most remote relation to this point. He would not say, we had not a good cause for war; but insisted, that it was our duty to define that cause. If he means that this House ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other, to specify any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all others, he prescribes a course, which neither good sense nor the usage of nations warrants. When we contend, let us contend for all our rights; the doubtful and the certain; the unimportant and essential. It is as easy to struggle, or even more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the contest, secure all that our wisdom and valor and the fortune of the war will permit. This is the dictate of common sense; such also is the usage of nations. The single instance alluded to, the endeavor of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define the object of the war against France, will not support the gentleman from Virginia in his position. That was an extraordinary war for an extraordinary purpose, and could not be governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest, or for redress of injury, but to impose a government on France, which she refused to receive; an object so detestable that an avowal dared not be made.
Sir, I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the proposition is established. I cannot but advert, however, to the complaint of the gentleman from Virginia when he was first up on this question. He said he found himself reduced to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the question, before the affirmative was established. Let me tell the gentleman, that there is no hardship in his case. It is not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I to affirm, that the House is now in session, would it be reasonable to ask for proof? He who would deny its truth, on him would be the proof of so extraordinary a negative. How then could the gentleman, after his admissions, with the facts before him and the country, complain? The causes are such as to warrant, or rather make it indispensable, in any nation not absolutely dependent, to defend its rights by force. Let him, then, show the reasons why we ought not so to defend ourselves. On him lies the burden of proof. This he has attempted; he has endeavored to support his negative. Before I proceed to answer him particularly, let me call the attention of the House to one circumstance; that is—that almost the whole of his arguments consisted of an enumeration of evils always incident to war, however just and necessary; and which, if they have any force, are calculated to produce unqualified submission to every species of insult and injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments of this description; and if I should touch on them, it will be only incidentally, and not for the purpose of serious refutation.
The first argument of the gentleman which I shall notice, is the unprepared state of the country. Whatever weight this argument might have in a question of immediate war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country is unprepared, let us remedy the evil as soon as possible. Let the gentleman submit his plan; and if a reasonable one, I doubt not it will be supported by the House. But, Sir, let us admit the fact and the whole force of the argument. I ask whose is the fault? Who has been a member, for many years past, and seen the defenceless state of his country even near home, under his own eyes, without a single endeavor to remedy so serious an evil? Let him not say, “I have acted in a minority.” It is no less the duty of the minority than a majority to endeavor to defend the country. For that purpose we are sent here, and not for that of opposition.
We are next told of the expenses of the war; and that the people will not pay taxes. Why not? Is it from want of means? What, with 1,000,000, tons of shipping; a commerce of $100,000,000 annually; manufactures yielding a yearly product of $150,000,000; and agriculture of thrice that amount, shall we be told the country wants capacity to raise and support ten thousand or fifteen thousand additional regulars? No; it has the ability; that is admitted; and will it not have the disposition? Is not the cause a just and necessary one? Shall we then utter this libel on the people? Where will proof be found of a fact so disgraceful? It is answered—in the history of the country twelve or fifteen years ago. The case is not parallel. The ability of the country is greatly increased since. The whiskey-tax was unpopular. But on this, as well as my memory serves me—the objection was not to the tax or its amount, but the mode of collection. The people were startled by the number of officers; their love of liberty shocked with the multiplicity of regulations. We, in the vile spirit of imitation, copied from the most oppressive part of European laws on the subject of taxes, and imposed on a young and virtuous people all the severe provisions made necessary by corruption and long-practised evasions. If taxes should become necessary, I do not hesitate to say the people will pay cheerfully. It is for their government and their cause, and it would be their interest and their duty to pay. But it may be, and I believe was said, that the people will not pay taxes, because the rights violated are not worth defending; or that the defence will cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my solemn protest against this low and “calculating avarice” entering this hall of legislation. It is only fit for shops and counting-houses; and ought not to disgrace the seat of sovereignty by its squalid and vile appearance. Whenever it touches sovereign power, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is a compromising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but under the shield of honor. There is, Sir, one principle necessary to make us a great people—to produce not the form, but real spirit of union—and that is, to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the government—that its arm is his arms; and will rejoice in its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. This is the way which has led nations to greatness. Sir, I am not versed in this calculating policy; and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars and cents the value of national independence, or national affection. I cannot measure in shillings and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of our impressed seamen; nor even the value of our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under the orders in council, and the British system of blockade. In thus expressing myself, I do not intend to condemn any prudent estimate of the means of a country, before it enters on a war. This is wisdom—the other folly.
The gentleman from Virginia has not failed to touch on the calamity of war, that fruitful source of declamation by which humanity is made the advocate of submission. If he desires to repress the gallant ardor of our countrymen by such topics, let me inform him, that true courage regards only the cause, that it is just and necessary; and that it contemns the sufferings and dangers of war. If he really wishes to promote the cause of humanity, let his eloquence be addressed to Lord Wellesley or Mr. Percival, and not the American Congress. Tell them if they persist in such daring insult and injury to a neutral nation, that, however inclined to peace, it will be bound in honor and safety to resist; that their patience and endurance, however great, will be exhausted; that the calamity of war will ensue, and that they, in the opinion of the world, will be answerable for all its devastation and misery. Let a regard to the interests of humanity stay the hand of injustice, and my life on it, the gentleman will not find it difficult to dissuade his country from rushing into the bloody scenes of war.
We are next told of the dangers of war. I believe we are all ready to acknowledge its hazards and misfortunes; but I cannot think we have any extraordinary danger to apprehend, at least none to warrant an acquiescence in the injuries we have received. On the contrary, I believe, no war can be less dangerous to the internal peace, or safety of the country. But we are told of the black population of the Southern States. As far as the gentleman from Virginia speaks of his own personal knowledge, I shall not question the correctness of his statement. I only regret that such is the state of apprehension in his particular part of the country. Of the Southern section, I, too, have some personal knowledge; and can say, that in South Carolina no such fears in any part are felt. But, Sir, admit the gentleman’s statement; will a war with Great Britain increase the danger? Will the country be less able to suppress insurrection? Had we anything to fear from that quarter (which I do not believe), in my opinion, the period of the greatest safety is during a war; unless, indeed, the enemy should make a lodgment in the country. Then the country is most on its guard; our militia the best prepared; and our standing army the greatest. Even in our revolution no attempts at insurrection were made by that portion of our population; and however the gentleman may alarm himself with the disorganizing effects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks have felt much of their baneful influence. I dare say more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution.
But as great as he regards the danger from our slaves, the gentleman’s fears end not there—the standing army is not less terrible to him. Sir, I think a regular force raised for a period of actual hostilities cannot properly be called a standing army. There is a just distinction between such a force, and one raised as a permanent peace establishment. Whatever would be the composition of the latter, I hope the former will consist of some of the best materials of the country. The ardent patriotism of our young men, and the reasonable bounty in land which is proposed to be given, will impel them to join their country’s standard and to fight her battles; they will not forget the citizen in the soldier, and in obeying their officers, learn to contemn their government and constitution. In our officers and soldiers we will find patriotism no less pure and ardent than in the private citizen; but if they should be depraved as represented, what have we to fear from twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand regulars? Where will be the boasted militia of the gentleman? Can one million of militia be overpowered by thirty thousand regulars? If so, how can we rely on them against a foe invading our country? Sir, I have no such contemptuous idea of our militia—their untaught bravery is sufficient to crush all foreign and internal attempts on their country’s liberties.
But we have not yet come to the end of the chapter of dangers. The gentleman’s imagination, so fruitful on this subject, conceives that our constitution is not calculated for war, and that it cannot stand its rude shock. This is rather extraordinary. If true, we must then depend upon the commiseration or contempt of other nations for our existence. The constitution, then, it seems, has failed in an essential object, “to provide for the common defence.” No, says the gentleman from Virginia, it is competent for a defensive, but not for an offensive war. It is not necessary for me to expose the error of this opinion. Why make the distinction in this instance? Will he pretend to say that this is an offensive war; a war of conquest? Yes, the gentleman has dared to make this assertion; and for reasons no less extraordinary than the assertion itself. He says our rights are violated on the ocean, and that these violations affect our shipping, and commercial rights, to which the Canadas have no relation. The doctrine of retaliation has been much abused of late by an unreasonable extension; we have now to witness a new abuse. The gentleman from Virginia has limited it down to a point. By his rule if you receive a blow on the breast, you dare not return it on the head; you are obliged to measure and return it on the precise point on which it was received. If you do not proceed with this mathematical accuracy, it ceases to be just self-defence; it becomes an unprovoked attack.
In speaking of Canada the gentleman from Virginia introduced the name of Montgomery with much feeling and interest. Sir, there is danger in that name to the gentleman’s argument. It is sacred to heroism. It is indignant of submission! It calls our memory back to the time of our revolution, to the Congress of ’74 and ’75. Suppose a member of that day had risen and urged all the arguments which we have heard on this subject; had told that Congress—your contest is about the right of laying a tax; and that the attempt on Canada had nothing to do with it; that the war would be expensive; that danger and devastation would overspread our country; and that the power of Great Britain was irresistible. With what sentiment, think you, would such doctrines have been then received? Happy for us, they had no force at that period of our country’s glory. Had such been then acted on, this hall would never have witnessed a great people convened to deliberate for the general good; a mighty empire, with prouder prospects than any nation the sun ever shone on, would not have risen in the west. No; we would have been base subjected colonies; governed by that imperious rod which Britain holds over her distant provinces.
The gentleman from Virginia attributes the preparation for war to everything but its true cause. He endeavored to find it in the probable rise in the price of hemp. He represents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge our country into war from such interested and base motives. I will not reason on this point. I see the cause of their ardor, not in such unworthy motives, but in their known patriotism and disinterestedness.
No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to the Southern States. He says that the Non-Importation Act has reduced cotton to nothing, which has produced a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of our plantations is worth but little; but not for the cause assigned by the gentleman from Virginia. The people of that section do not reason as he does; they do not attribute it to the efforts of their government to maintain the peace and independence of their country. They see, in the low price of their produce, the hand of foreign injustice; they know well without the market to the continent, the deep and steady current of supply will glut that of Great Britain; they are not prepared for the colonial state to which again that power is endeavoring to reduce us, and the manly spirit of that section of our country will not submit to be regulated by any foreign power.
The love of France and the hatred of England have also been assigned as the cause of the present measures. France has not done us justice, says the gentleman from Virginia, and how can we, without partiality, resist the aggressions of England. I know, Sir, we have still causes of complaint against France; but they are of a different character from those against England. She professes now to respect our rights, and there cannot be a reasonable doubt but that the most objectionable parts of her decrees, as far as they respect us, are repealed. We have already formally acknowledged this to be a fact. But I protest against the principle from which his conclusion is drawn. It is a novel doctrine, and nowhere avowed out of this House, that you cannot select your antagonist without being guilty of partiality. Sir, when two invade your rights, you may resist both or either at your pleasure. It is regulated by prudence and not by right. The stale imputation of partiality for France is better calculated for the columns of a newspaper, than for the walls of this House.
The gentleman from Virginia is at a loss to account for what he calls our hatred to England. He asks how can we hate the country of Locke, of Newton, Hampden, and Chatham; a country having the same language and customs with ourselves, and descending from a common ancestry. Sir, the laws of human affections are steady and uniform. If we have so much to attach us to that country, potent indeed must be the cause which has overpowered it.
Yes, there is a cause strong enough; not in that occult courtly affection which he has supposed to be entertained for France; but it is to be found in continued and unprovoked insult and injury—a cause so manifest, that the gentleman from Virginia had to exert much ingenuity to overlook it. But, the gentleman, in his eager admiration of that country, has not been sufficiently guarded in his argument. Has he reflected on the cause of that admiration? Has he examined the reasons of our high regard for her Chatham? It is his ardent patriotism, the heroic courage of his mind, that could not brook the least insult or injury offered to his country, but thought that her interest and honor ought to be vindicated at every hazard and expense. I hope, when we are called upon to admire, we shall also be asked to imitate. I hope the gentleman does not wish a monopoly of those great virtues for England.
The balance of power has also been introduced, as an argument for submission. England is said to be a barrier against the military despotism of France. There is, Sir, one great error in our legislation. We are ready, it would seem from this argument, to watch over the interests of foreign nations, while we grossly neglect our own immediate concerns. This argument of the balance of power is well calculated for the British Parliament, but not at all suited to the American Congress. Tell the former that they have to contend with a mighty power, and that if they persist in insult and injury to the American people, they will compel them to throw their whole weight into the scale of their enemy. Paint the danger to them, and if they will desist from injuring us, we, I answer for it, will not disturb the balance of power. But it is absurd for us to talk about the balance of power, while they, by their conduct, smile with contempt at what they regard our simple, good-natured policy. If, however, in the contest, it should be found that they underrate us—which I hope and believe—and that we can affect the balance of power, it will not be difficult for us to obtain such terms as our rights demand.
I, Sir, will now conclude by adverting to an argument of the gentleman from Virginia, used in debate on a preceding day. He asked, why not declare war immediately? The answer is obvious: because we are not yet prepared. But, says the gentleman, such language as is here held, will provoke Great Britain to commence hostilities. I have no such fears. She knows well that such a course would unite all parties here—a thing which, above all others, she most dreads. Besides, such has been our past conduct, that she will still calculate on our patience and submission, until war is actually commenced.
SPEECH ON THE TARIFF BILL
[April 4, 1816]
With the exception of the controversy over the national bank, no other issue proved as controversial or as divisive during the formative years of the American republic as did the tariff. The debate on the tariff of 1816 again found Calhoun and Randolph on opposite sides of an issue. Randolph argued that the proposed tariff was in fact little more than “an immense tax on one portion of the community to put money into the pockets of another.” Calhoun, on the other hand, argued that while manufacturing interests were not without moral difficulties or objections, agriculture and commerce alone were not sufficient to produce the wealth necessary to make the new nation secure. The encouragement of the manufacturing element would form a new and most powerful cement for union; and a strong union would be the greatest defense of liberty. The greatest threat to liberty, argued Calhoun, was not the tariff but a new and pressing danger—disunion.
This speech, like many of the speeches Calhoun delivered during his early years in the U.S. House of Representatives on the tariff, national bank, and internal improvements, argues for a strong federal government. In the South Carolina Exposition (1828), however, Calhoun was among those who denounced the Tariff of Abominations as an unconstitutional and tyrannical act of an overbearing, numerical majority. Calhoun addresses the question of the consistency of his position on the floor of the Senate in his remarks on the Force Bill (1833). Both the Exposition and the speech on the Force Bill are reproduced in this volume.
The debate heretofore on this subject has been on the degree of protection which ought to be afforded to our cotton and woollen manufactures: all professing to be friendly to those infant establishments, and to be willing to extend to them adequate encouragement. The present motion assumes a new aspect. It is introduced professedly on the ground that manufactures ought not to receive any encouragement; and will, in its operation, leave our cotton establishments exposed to the competition of the cotton goods of the East Indies, which, it is acknowledged on all sides, they are not capable of meeting with success, without the proviso proposed to be stricken out by the motion now under discussion. Till the debate assumed this new form, he had determined to be silent; participating, as he largely did, in that general anxiety which is felt, after so long and laborious a session, to return to the bosom of our families. But, on a subject of such vital importance, touching, as it does, the security and permanent prosperity of our country, he hoped that the House would indulge him in a few observations. He regretted much his want of preparation; he meant not a verbal preparation, for he had ever despised such, but that due and mature meditation and arrangement of thought which the House is entitled to on the part of those who occupy any portion of their time. But, whatever his arguments might want on that account in weight, he hoped might be made up in the disinterestedness of his situation. He was no manufacturer; he was not from that portion of our country supposed to be peculiarly interested. Coming, as he did, from the South; having, in common with his immediate constituents, no interest, but in the cultivation of the soil, in selling its products high, and buying cheap the wants and conveniences of life, no motives could be attributed to him but such as were disinterested.
He had asserted that the subject before them was connected with the security of the country. It would, doubtless, by some be considered a rash assertion; but he conceived it to be susceptible of the clearest proof; and he hoped, with due attention, to establish it to the satisfaction of the House.
The security of a country mainly depends on its spirit and its means; and the latter principally on its moneyed resources. Modified as the industry of this country now is, combined with our peculiar situation and want of a naval ascendency, whenever we have the misfortune to be involved in a war with a nation dominant on the ocean—and it is almost only with such we can at present be—the moneyed resources of the country to a great extent must fail. He took it for granted that it was the duty of this body to adopt those measures of prudent foresight which the event of war made necessary. We cannot, he presumed, be indifferent to dangers from abroad, unless, indeed, the House is prepared to indulge in the phantom of eternal peace, which seems to possess the dream of some of its members. Could such a state exist, no foresight or fortitude would be necessary to conduct the affairs of the republic; but as it is the mere illusion of the imagination, as every people that ever has or ever will exist, are subjected to the vicissitudes of peace and war, it must ever be considered as the plain dictate of wisdom, in peace to prepare for war. What, then, let us consider, constitute the resources of this country, and what are the effects of war on them? Commerce and agriculture, till lately almost the only, still constitute the principal sources of our wealth. So long as these remain uninterrupted, the country prospers; but war, as we are now circumstanced, is equally destructive to both. They both depend on foreign markets; and our country is placed, as it regards them, in a situation strictly insular; a wide ocean rolls between. Our commerce neither is nor can be protected by the present means of the country. What, then, are the effects of a war with a maritime power—with England? Our commerce annihilated, spreading individual misery and producing national poverty; our agriculture cut off from its accustomed markets, the surplus product of the farmer perishes on his hands, and he ceases to produce, because he cannot sell. His resources are dried up, while his expenses are greatly increased; as all manufactured articles, the necessaries as well as the conveniences of life, rise to an extravagant price. The recent war fell with peculiar pressure on the growers of cotton and tobacco, and other great staples of the country; and the same state of things will recur in the event of another, unless prevented by the foresight of this body.
If the mere statement of facts did not carry conviction to every mind, as he conceives it is calculated to do, additional arguments might be drawn from the general nature of wealth. Neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce, taken separately, is the cause of wealth; it flows from the three combined, and cannot exist without each. The wealth of any single nation or an individual, it is true, may not immediately depend on the three, but such wealth always presupposes their existence. He viewed the words in the most enlarged sense. Without commerce, industry would have no stimulus; without manufactures, it would be without the means of production; and without agriculture neither of the others can subsist. When separated entirely and permanently, they perish. War in this country produces, to a great extent, that effect; and hence the great embarrassment which follows in its train. The failure of the wealth and resources of the nation necessarily involved the ruin of its finances and its currency. It is admitted by the most strenuous advocates, on the other side, that no country ought to be dependent on another for its means of defence; that, at least, our musket and bayonet, our cannon and ball, ought to be of domestic manufacture. But what, he asked, is more necessary to the defence of a country than its currency and finance? Circumstanced as our country is, can these stand the shock of war? Behold the effect of the late war on them. When our manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will under the fostering care of Government, we will no longer experience these evils. The farmer will find a ready market for his surplus produce; and, what is almost of equal consequence, a certain and cheap supply of all his wants. His prosperity will diffuse itself to every class in the community; and, instead of that languor of industry and individual distress now incident to a state of war and suspended commerce, the wealth and vigor of the community will not be materially impaired. The arm of Government will be nerved; and taxes in the hour of danger, when essential to the independence of the nation, may be greatly increased; loans, so uncertain and hazardous, may be less relied on; thus situated, the storm may beat without, but within all will be quiet and safe.
To give perfection to this state of things, it will be necessary to add, as soon as possible, a system of internal improvements, and at least such an extension of our navy as will prevent the cutting off our coasting trade. The advantage of each is so striking as not to require illustration, especially after the experience of the recent war. It is thus the resources of this Government and people would be placed beyond the power of a foreign war materially to impair. But it may be said that the derangement then experienced, resulted, not from the cause assigned, but from the errors of the weakness of the Government. He admitted that many financial blunders were committed, for the subject was new to us; that the taxes were not laid sufficiently early, or to as great an extent as they ought to have been; and that the loans were in some instances injudiciously made; but he ventured to affirm that, had the greatest foresight and fortitude been exerted, the embarrassment would have been still very great; and that even under the best management, the total derangement which was actually felt would not have been postponed eighteen months, had the war so long continued. How could it be otherwise? A war, such as this country was then involved in, in a great measure dries up the resources of individuals, as he had already proved; and the resources of the Government are no more than the aggregate of the surplus incomes of individuals called into action by a system of taxation. It is certainly a great political evil, incident to the character of the industry of this country, that, however prosperous our situation when at peace, with an uninterrupted commerce—and nothing then could exceed it—the moment that we were involved in war the whole is reversed. When resources are most needed; when indispensable to maintain the honor; yes, the very existence of the nation, then they desert us. Our currency is also sure to experience the shock, and become so deranged as to prevent us from calling out fairly whatever of means is left to the country. The result of a war in the present state of our naval power, is the blockade of our coast, and consequent destruction of our trade. The wants and habits of the country, founded on the use of foreign articles, must be gratified; importation to a certain extent continues, through the policy of the enemy, or unlawful traffic; the exportation of our bulky articles is prevented, too; the specie of the country is drawn to pay the balance perpetually accumulating against us; and the final result is, a total derangement of our currency.
To this distressing state of things there were two remedies—and only two; one in our power immediately, the other requiring much time and exertion; but both constituting, in his opinion, the essential policy of this country: he meant the navy and domestic manufactures. By the former, we could open the way to our markets; by the latter, we bring them from beyond the ocean, and naturalize them. Had we the means of attaining an immediate naval ascendency, he acknowledged that the policy recommended by this bill would be very questionable; but as that is not the fact—as it is a period remote, with any exertion, and will be probably more so from that relaxation of exertion so natural in peace, when necessity is not felt, it becomes the duty of this House to resort, to a considerable extent, at least as far as is proposed, to the only remaining remedy.
But to this it has been objected that the country is not prepared, and that the result of our premature exertion would be to bring distress on it without effecting the intended object. Were it so, however urgent the reasons in its favor, we ought to desist, as it is folly to oppose the laws of necessity. But he could not for a moment yield to the assertion; on the contrary, he firmly believed that the country is prepared, even to maturity, for the introduction of manufactures. We have abundance of resources, and things naturally tend at this moment in that direction. A prosperous commerce has poured an immense amount of commercial capital into this country. This capital has, till lately, found occupation in commerce; but that state of the world which transferred it to this country, and gave it active employment, has passed away, never to return. Where shall we now find full employment for our prodigious amount of tonnage; where markets for the numerous and abundant products of our country? This great body of active capital, which for the moment has found sufficient employment in supplying our markets, exhausted by the war and measures preceding it, must find a new direction; it will not be idle. What channel can it take but that of manufactures? This, if things continue as they are, will be its direction. It will introduce a new era in our affairs, in many respects highly advantageous, and ought to be countenanced by the Government. Besides, we have already surmounted the greatest difficulty that has ever been found in undertakings of this kind. The cotton and woollen manufactures are not to be introduced—they are already introduced to a great extent; freeing us entirely from the hazards, and, in a great measure, the sacrifices experienced in giving the capital of the country a new direction. The restrictive measures and the war, though not intended for that purpose, have, by the necessary operation of things, turned a large amount of capital to this new branch of industry. He had often heard it said, both in and out of Congress, that this effect alone would indemnify the country for all of its losses. So high was this tone of feeling when the want of these establishments was practically felt, that he remembered, during the war, when some question was agitated respecting the introduction of foreign goods, that many then opposed it on the grounds of injuring our manufactures. He then said that war alone furnished sufficient stimulus, and perhaps too much, as it would make their growth unnaturally rapid; but that, on the return of peace, it would then be time for us to show our affection for them. He at that time did not expect an apathy and aversion to the extent which is now seen. But it will no doubt be said, if they are so far established, and if the situation of the country is so favorable to their growth, where is the necessity of affording them protection? It is to put them beyond the reach of contingency. Besides, capital is not yet, and cannot for some time be, adjusted to the new state of things. There is, in fact, from the operation of temporary causes, a great pressure on these establishments. They had extended so rapidly during the late war, that many, he feared, were without the requisite surplus capital or skill to meet the present crisis. Should such prove to be the fact, it would give a back set, and might, to a great extent, endanger their ultimate success. Should the present owners be ruined, and the workmen dispersed and turned to other pursuits, the country would sustain a great loss. Such would, no doubt, be the fact to a considerable extent, if not protected. Besides, circumstances, if we act with wisdom, are favorable to attract to our country much skill and industry. The country in Europe having the most skilful workmen is broken up. It is to us, if wisely used, more valuable than the repeal of the Edict of Nantz was to England. She had the prudence to profit by it: let us not discover less political sagacity. Afford to ingenuity and industry immediate and ample protection, and they will not fail to give a preference to this free and happy country.
It has been objected to this bill, that it will injure our marine, and consequently impair our naval strength. How far it is fairly liable to this charge, he was not prepared to say. He hoped and believed it would not, at least to any alarming extent, have that effect immediately; and he firmly believed that its lasting operation would be highly beneficial to our commerce. The trade to the East Indies would certainly be much affected; but it was stated in debate that the whole of that trade employed but six hundred sailors. But, whatever might be the loss in this, or other branches of our foreign commerce, he trusted it would be amply compensated in our coasting trade, a branch of navigation wholly in our own hands. It has at all times employed a great amount of tonnage; something more, he believed, than one-third of the whole: nor is it liable to the imputation thrown out by a member from North Carolina (Mr. Gaston), that it produced inferior sailors. It required long and dangerous voyages; and, if his information was correct, no branch of trade made better or more skilful seamen. The fact that it is wholly in our own hands is a very important one, while every branch of our foreign trade must suffer from competition with other nations.
Other objections of a political character were made to the encouragement of manufactures. It is said they destroy the moral and physical power of the people. This might formerly have been true, to a considerable extent, before the perfection of machinery, and when the success of the manufactures depended on the minute subdivision of labor. At that time it required a large portion of the population of a country to be engaged in them; and every minute subdivision of labor is undoubtedly unfavorable to the intellect; but the great perfection of machinery has in a considerable degree obviated these objections. In fact, it has been stated that the manufacturing districts in England furnish the greatest number of recruits to her army; and that, as soldiers, they are not materially inferior to the rest of her population. It has been further asserted that manufactures are the fruitful cause of pauperism; and England has been referred to as furnishing conclusive evidence of its truth. For his part, he could perceive no such tendency in them, but the exact contrary, as they furnished new stimulus and means of subsistence to the laboring classes of the community. We ought not to look to the cotton and woollen establishments of Great Britain for the prodigious numbers of poor with which her population was disgraced. Causes much more efficient exist. Her poor laws, and statutes regulating the price of labor, with heavy taxes, were the real causes. But, if it must be so—if the mere fact that England manufactured more than any other country, explained the cause of her having more beggars, it is just as reasonable to refer to it her courage, spirit, and all her masculine virtues, in which she excels all other nations, with a single exception—he meant our own—in which we might, without vanity, challenge a pre-eminence.
Another objection had been made, which, he must acknowledge, was better founded: that capital employed in manufacturing produced a greater dependence on the part of the employed, than in commerce, navigation, or agriculture. It is certainly an evil, and to be regretted; but he did not think it a decisive objection to the system; especially when it had incidental political advantages which, in his opinion, more than counterpoised it. It produced an interest strictly American—as much so as agriculture; in which it had the decided advantage of commerce or navigation. The country will from this derive much advantage. Again, it is calculated to bind together more closely our widely spread republic. It will greatly increase our mutual dependence and intercourse; and will, as a necessary consequence, excite an increased attention to Internal Improvements, a subject every way so intimately connected with the ultimate attainment of national strength and the perfection of our political institutions. He regarded the fact that it would make the parts adhere more closely; that it would form a new and most powerful cement, far outweighing any political objections that might be urged against the system. In his opinion the liberty and the union of this country were inseparably united. That, as the destruction of the latter would most certainly involve the former, so its maintenance will, with equal certainty, preserve it. He did not speak lightly. He had often and long revolved it in his mind, and he had critically examined into the causes that destroyed the liberty of other states. There are none that apply to us, or apply with a force to alarm. The basis of our republic is too broad, and its structure too strong, to be shaken by them. Its extension and organization will be found to afford effectual security against their operation; but let it be deeply impressed on the heart of this House and country, that, while they guarded against the old, they exposed us to a new and terrible danger—disunion. This single word comprehended almost the sum of our political dangers; and against it we ought to be perpetually guarded.
EXPOSITION AND PROTEST
[December 19, 1828]
Although it is common to refer to the “Exposition and Protest” as two parts of a single document, such is not the case. The “Exposition” is an essay enumerating South Carolina’s grievances against the “American System” of protective tariffs and calling for constitutional safeguards to protect the states from the abuse of federal power. The “Protest” consists of the actual formal resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of South Carolina. Both appeared anonymously.
Returning to the language of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, the “Exposition” reiterates the doctrine of interposition, which recognizes a state’s right to interpose state authority between the citizens of that state and the laws of the United States, declaring such laws null and void. This right of interposition, argues the “Exposition,” is the only possible constitutional remedy for settling disputes between the states and the federal government.
Many of the elements of Calhoun’s theories about majority tyranny, which later appear in his Disquisition and Discourse, are already evident in the pages of the “Exposition.” Concurring with Publius, Calhoun identifies this tyranny as the problem of democratic governments, but he explicitly rejects Publius’s claim that extensiveness of the republic offers a cure to the mischiefs of faction. Only through a judicious exercise of the reserved powers of the states and the amending process of the U.S. Constitution can liberty in America be preserved.
Calhoun’s draft bore the title, “Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition.” When he compiled his 1851–1856 edition of Calhoun’s Works, editor Richard K. Crallé used Calhoun’s original title, as does this volume (see page 313). While the draft of the “Exposition” is in Calhoun’s own hand, there is no such extant copy of the “Protest” that would confirm Calhoun’s contributions to that document. Following the precedent found in the sixth volume of Crallé ’s edition of Calhoun’s Works, however, both documents have been reprinted here.
ROUGH DRAFT OF WHAT IS CALLED THE SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION
The committee have bestowed on the subjects referred to them the deliberate attention which their importance demands; and the result, on full investigation, is a unanimous opinion that the act of Congress of the last session, with the whole system of legislation imposing duties on imports—not for revenue, but the protection of one branch of industry at the expense of others—is unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, and calculated to corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of the country; which propositions they propose to consider in the order stated, and then to conclude their report with the consideration of the important question of the remedy.
The committee do not propose to enter into an elaborate or refined argument on the question of the constitutionality of the Tariff system. The General Government is one of specific powers, and it can rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted, and those that may be necessary and proper to carry them into effect, all others being reserved expressly to the States or the people. It results, necessarily, that those who claim to exercise power under the Constitution, are bound to show that it is expressly granted, or that it is necessary and proper as a means to some of the granted powers. The advocates of the Tariff have offered no such proof. It is true that the third section of the first article of the Constitution authorizes Congress to lay and collect an impost duty, but it is granted as a tax power for the sole purpose of revenue—a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or prohibitory duties. Their objects are incompatible. The prohibitory system must end in destroying the revenue from imports. It has been said that the system is a violation of the spirit, and not the letter of the Constitution. The distinction is not material. The Constitution may be as grossly violated by acting against its meaning as against its letter; but it may be proper to dwell a moment on the point in order to understand more fully the real character of the acts under which the interest of this, and other States similarly situated, has been sacrificed. The facts are few and simple. The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on imports for revenue, which power is abused by being converted into an instrument of rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another. The violation, then, consists in using a power granted for one object to advance another, and that by the sacrifice of the original object. It is, in a word, a violation by perversion—the most dangerous of all, because the most insidious, and difficult to resist. Others cannot be perpetrated without the aid of the judiciary—this may be by the Executive and Legislative departments alone. The courts cannot look into the motives of legislators. They are obliged to take acts by their titles and professed objects, and if these be constitutional, they cannot interpose their power, however grossly the acts may, in reality, violate the Constitution. The proceedings of the last session sufficiently prove that the House of Representatives are aware of the distinction, and determined to avail themselves of its advantage.
In the absence of arguments, drawn from the Constitution itself, the advocates of the power have attempted to call in the aid of precedent. The committee will not waste their time in examining the instances quoted. If they were strictly in point, they would be entitled to little weight. Ours is not a Government of precedents, nor can they be admitted, except to a very limited extent, and with great caution, in the interpretation of the Constitution, without changing, in time, the entire character of the instrument. The only safe rule is the Constitution itself—or, if that be doubtful, the history of the times. In this case, if doubts existed, the journals of the Convention itself would remove them. It was moved in that body to confer on Congress the very power in question to encourage manufactures, but it was deliberately withheld, except to the extent of granting patent rights for new and useful inventions. Instead of granting the power, permission was given to the States to impose duties, with the consent of Congress, to encourage their own manufactures; and thus, in the true spirit of justice, imposing the burden on those who were to be benefited. But, giving the precedents every weight that may be claimed for them, the committee feel confident that, in this case, there are none in point previous to the adoption of the present Tariff system. Every instance which has been quoted, may fairly be referred to the legitimate power of Congress, to impose duties on imports for revenue. It is a necessary incident of such duties to act as an encouragement to manufactures, whenever imposed on articles which may be manufactured in our country. In this incidental manner, Congress has the power of encouraging manufactures; and the committee readily concede that, in the passage of an impost bill, that body may, in modifying the details, so arrange the provisions of the bill, as far as it may be done consistently with its proper object, as to aid manufactures. To this extent Congress may constitutionally go, and has gone from the commencement of the Government, which will fully explain the precedents cited from the early stages of its operation. Beyond this they never proceeded till the commencement of the present system, the inequality and oppression of which they will next proceed to consider.
On entering on this branch of the subject, the committee feel the painful character of the duty which they must perform. They would desire never to speak of our country, as far as the action of the General Government is concerned, but as one great whole, having a common interest, which all the parts ought zealously to promote. Previously to the adoption of the Tariff system, such was the unanimous feeling of this State; but in speaking of its operation, it will be impossible to avoid the discussion of sectional interest, and the use of sectional language. On its authors, and not on us, who are compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, by injustice and oppression, be the censure.
So partial are the effects of the system, that its burdens are exclusively on one side and its benefits on the other. It imposes on the agricultural interest of the South, including the South-west, and that portion of the country particularly engaged in commerce and navigation, the burden not only of sustaining the system itself, but that also of the Government. In stating the case thus strongly, it is not the intention of the committee to exaggerate. If exaggeration were not unworthy of the gravity of the subject, the reality is such as to make it unnecessary.
That the manufacturing States, even in their own opinion, bear no share of the burden of the Tariff in reality, we may infer with the greatest certainty from their conduct. The fact that they urgently demand an increase, and consider every addition as a blessing, and a failure to obtain one as a curse, is the strongest confession that, whatever burden it imposes, in reality falls, not on them, but on others. Men ask not for burdens, but benefits. The tax paid by the duties on imports, by which, with the exception of the receipts from the sale of the public lands, and a few incidental items, the Government is wholly supported, and which, in its gross amount, annually equals about $23,000,000, is then, in truth, no tax on them. Whatever portion of it they advance as consumers of the articles on which it is imposed, returns to them with usurious interest through an artfully contrived system. That such are the facts, the committee will proceed to demonstrate by other arguments besides the confession of the parties interested in these acts, as conclusive as that ought to be considered. If the duties were imposed on the exports instead of the imports, no one would doubt their partial operation, or that the duties, in that form, would fall on those engaged in producing articles for the foreign market; and as rice, tobacco, and cotton, constitute the great mass of our exports, such duties would, of necessity, mainly fall on the Southern States, where they are exclusively cultivated. To prove, then, that the burden of the Tariff falls also on them almost exclusively, it is only necessary to show that, as far as their interest is concerned, there is little or no difference between an export and an import duty. We export to import. The object is an exchange of the fruits of our labor for those of other countries. We have, from soil and climate, a facility in rearing certain great agricultural staples, while other and older countries, with dense population and capital greatly accumulated, have equal facility in manufacturing various articles suited to our use; and thus a foundation is laid for an exchange of the products of labor mutually advantageous. A duty, whether it be on the imports or exports, must fall on this exchange; and, however laid, must, in reality, be paid by the producer of the articles exchanged. Such must be the operation of all taxes on sales or exchanges. The producer, in reality, pays it, whether laid on the vendor or purchaser. It matters not in the sale of a tract of land, or any other article, if a tax be imposed, whether it be paid by him who sells or him who buys. The amount must, in both cases, be deducted from the price. Nor can it alter, in this particular, the operation of such a tax, by being imposed on the exchanges of different countries. Such exchanges are but the aggregate of sales of the individuals of the respective countries; and must, if taxed, be governed by the same rules. Nor is it material whether the exchange be barter or sale, direct or circuitous. In any case it must fall on the producer. To the growers of cotton, rice, and tobacco, it is the same, whether the Government takes one-third of what they raise, for the liberty of sending the other two-thirds abroad, or one-third of the iron, salt, sugar, coffee, cloth, and other articles they may need in exchange, for the liberty of bringing them home. In both cases he gets a third less than he ought. A third of his labor is taken; yet the one is an import duty, and the other an export. It is true that a tax on the imports, by raising the price of the articles imported, may in time produce the supply at home, and thus give a new direction to the exchanges of the country; but it is also true that a tax on the exports, by diminishing at home the price of the same material, may have the same effect, and with no greater burden to the grower. Whether the situation of the South will be materially benefited by this new direction given to its exchanges, will be considered hereafter; but whatever portion of her foreign exchanges may, in fact, remain, in any stage of this process of changing her market, must be governed by the rule laid down. Whatever duty may be imposed to bring it about, must fall on the foreign trade which remains, and be paid by the South almost exclusively—as much so, as an equal amount of duty on their exports.
Let us now trace the operation of the system in some of its prominent details, in order to understand, with greater precision, the extent of the burden it imposes on us, and the benefits which it confers, at our expense, on the manufacturing States. The committee, in the discussion of this point, will not aim at minute accuracy. They have neither the means nor the time requisite for that purpose, nor do they deem it necessary, if they had, to estimate the fractions of loss or gain on either side on subjects of such great magnitude.
The exports of domestic produce, in round numbers, may be estimated as averaging $53,000,000 annually; of which the States growing cotton, rice, and tobacco, produce about $37,000,000. In the last four years the average amount of the export of cotton, rice, and tobacco, exceeded $35,500,000; to which, if we add flour, corn, lumber, and other articles exported from the States producing the former, their exports cannot be estimated at a less sum than that stated. Taking it at that sum, the exports of the Southern or staple States, and other States, will stand as $37,000,000 to $16,000,000—or considerably more than the proportion of two to one; while their population, estimated in federal numbers, is the reverse; the former sending to the House of Representatives but 76 members, and the latter 137. It follows that about one-third of the Union exports more than two-thirds of the domestic products. Such, then, is the amount of labor which our country annually exchanges with the rest of the world—and such our proportion. The Government is supported almost exclusively by a tax on this exchange, in the shape of an impost duty, and which amounts annually to about $23,000,000, as has already been stated. Previous to the passage of the act of the last session, this tax averaged about 37½ per cent on the value of imports. What addition that has made, it is difficult, with the present data, to estimate with precision; but it may be assumed, on a very moderate calculation, to be 7½ per cent—thus making the present duty to average at least 45 per cent, which, on $37,000,000, the amount of our share of the exports, will give the sum of $16,650,000, as our share of the contribution to the general Treasury.
Let us take another, and perhaps more simple and striking view of this important point. Exports and imports, allowing for the profit and loss of trade, must be equal in a series of years. This is a principle universally conceded. Let it then be supposed, for the purpose of illustration, that the United States were organized into two separate and distinct custom-house establishments—one for the staple States, and the other for the rest of the Union; and that all commercial intercourse between the two sections were taxed in the same manner and to the same extent with the commerce of the rest of the world. The foreign commerce, under such circumstances, would be carried on from each section, direct with the rest of the world; and the imports of the Southern Custom-House, on the principle that exports and imports must be equal, would amount annually to $37,000,000; on which 45 per cent, the average amount of the impost duty, would give an annual revenue of $16,650,000, without increasing the burden already imposed on the people of those States one cent. This would be the amount of revenue on the exchanges of that portion of their products which go abroad; but if we take into the estimate the duty which would accrue on the exchange of their products with the manufacturing States, which now, in reality, is paid by the Southern States in the shape of increased prices, as a bounty to manufactures, but which, on the supposition, would constitute a part of their revenue, many millions more would have to be added.
But, it is contended, that the consumers really pay the impost—and that, as the manufacturing States consume a full share, in proportion to their population, of the articles imported, they must also contribute their full share to the Treasury of the Union. The committee will not deny the position that their consumption is in proportion to their population—nor that the consumers pay, provided they be mere consumers, without the means, through the Tariff, of indemnifying themselves in some other character. Without the qualification, no proposition can be more fallacious than that the consumers pay. That the manufacturing States do, in fact, indemnify themselves, and more than indemnify themselves for the increased price they pay on the articles they consume, we have, as has already been stated, their confession in a form which cannot deceive—we mean their own acts. Nor is it difficult to trace the operation by which this is effected. The very acts of Congress, imposing the burdens on them, as consumers, give them the means, through the monopoly which it affords their manufactures in the home market, not only of indemnifying themselves for the increased price on the imported articles which they may consume, but, in a great measure, to command the industry of the rest of the Union. The argument urged by them for the adoption of the system (and with so much success), that the price of property and products in those States must be thereby increased, clearly proves that the facts are as stated by your committee. It is by this very increased price, which must be paid by their fellow-citizens of the South, that their industry is affected, and the fruits of our toil and labor, which, on any principle of justice, ought to belong to ourselves, are transferred from us to them. The maxim, that the consumers pay, strictly applies to us. We are mere consumers, and destitute of all means of transferring the burden from ours to the shoulders of others. We may be assured that the large amount paid into the Treasury under the duties on imports, is really derived from the labor of some portion of our citizens. The Government has no mines. Someone must bear the burden of its support. This unequal lot is ours. We are the serfs of the system—out of whose labor is raised, not only the money paid into the Treasury, but the funds out of which are drawn the rich rewards of the manufacturer and his associates in interest. Their encouragement is our discouragement. The duty on imports, which is mainly paid out of our labor, gives them the means of selling to us at a higher price; while we cannot, to compensate the loss, dispose of our products at the least advance. It is then, indeed, not a subject of wonder, when understood, that our section of the country, though helped by a kind Providence with a genial sun and prolific soil, from which spring the richest products, should languish in poverty and sink into decay, while the rest of the Union, though less fortunate in natural advantages, are flourishing in unexampled prosperity.
The assertion, that the encouragement of the industry of the manufacturing States is, in fact, discouragement to ours, was not made without due deliberation. It is susceptible of the clearest proof. We cultivate certain great staples for the supply of the general market of the world: They manufacture almost exclusively for the home market. Their object in the Tariff is to keep down foreign competition, in order to obtain a monopoly of the domestic market. The effect on us is, to compel us to purchase at a higher price, both what we obtain from them and from others, without receiving a correspondent increase in the price of what we sell. The price at which we can afford to cultivate must depend on the price at which we receive our supplies. The lower the latter, the lower we may dispose of our products with profit—and the same degree our capacity of meeting competition is increased; and, on the contrary, the higher the price of our supplies, the less the profit, and the less, consequently, the capacity for meeting competition. If, for instance, cotton can be cultivated at 10 cents the pound, under an increase price of forty-five per cent on what we purchase, in return, it is clear, if the prices of what we consume were reduced forty-five per cent (the amount of the duty), we could, under such reduced prices, afford to raise the article at 5½ cents per pound, with a profit, as great as what we now obtain at 10 cents; and that our capacity of meeting the competition of foreigners in the general market of the world, would be increased in the same proportion. If we can now, with the increased price from the Tariff, contend with success, under a reduction of 45 per cent in the prices of our products, we could drive out all competition; and thus add annually to the consumption of our cotton, three or four hundred thousand bales, with a corresponding increase of profit. The case, then, fairly stated between us and the manufacturing States is, that the Tariff gives them a protection against foreign competition in our own market, by diminishing, in the same proportion, our capacity to compete with our rivals, in the general market of the world. They who say that they cannot compete with foreigners at their own doors, without an advantage of 45 per cent, expect us to meet them abroad under disadvantage equal to their encouragement.
But this oppression, as great as it is, will not stop at this point. The trade between us and Europe has, heretofore, been a mutual exchange of products. Under the existing duties, the consumption of European fabrics must, in a great measure, cease in our country; and the trade must become, on their part, a cash transaction. He must be ignorant of the principles of commerce, and the policy of Europe, particularly England, who does not see that it is impossible to carry on a trade of such vast extent on any other basis than barter; and that, if it were not so carried on, it would not long be tolerated. We already see indications of the commencement of a commercial warfare, the termination of which no one can conjecture—though our fate may easily be. The last remains of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in the conflict. In the first instance, we will be thrown on the home market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and instead of supplying the world, as we would with a free trade, we would be compelled to abandon the cultivation of three-fourths of what we now raise, and receive for the residue, whatever the manufacturers, who would then have their policy consummated by the entire possession of our market, might choose to give. Forced to abandon our ancient and favorite pursuit, to which our soil, climate, habits, and peculiar labor are adapted, at an immense sacrifice of property, we would be compelled, without capital, experience, or skill, and with a population untried in such pursuits, to attempt to become the rivals, instead of the customers of the manufacturing States. The result is not doubtful. If they, by superior capital and skill, should keep down successful competition on our part, we would be doomed to toil at our unprofitable agriculture—selling at the prices which a single and very limited market might give. But, on the contrary, if our necessity should triumph over their capital and skill—if, instead of raw cotton, we should ship to the manufacturing States cotton yarn and cotton goods, the thoughtful must see that it would inevitably bring about a state of things which could not long continue. Those who now make war on our gains, would then make it on our labor. They would not tolerate, that those, who now cultivate our plantations, and furnish them with the material, and the market for the products of their arts, should, by becoming their rivals, take bread out of the mouths of their wives and children. The committee will not pursue this painful subject; but, as they clearly see that the system, if not arrested, must bring the country to this hazardous extremity, neither prudence nor patriotism would permit them to pass it by without raising a warning voice against a danger of such menacing character.
It was conceded, in the course of the discussion, that the consumption of the manufacturing States, in proportion to population, was as great as ours. How they, with their limited means of payment, if estimated by the exports of their own products, could consume as much as we do with our ample exports, has been partially explained; but it demands a fuller consideration. Their population, in round numbers, may be estimated at about eight, and ours at four millions; while the value of their products exported, compared with ours, is as sixteen to thirty-seven millions of dollars. If to the aggregate of these sums be added the profits of our foreign trade and navigation, it will give the amount of the fund out of which is annually paid the price of foreign articles consumed in our country. This profit, at least so far as it constitutes a portion of the fund out of which the price of the foreign articles is paid, is represented by the difference between the value of the exports and imports—that of both being estimated at our own ports—and which, taking the average of the last five years, amount to about $4,000,000—and which, as the foreign trade of the country is principally in the hands of the manufacturing States, we will add to their means of consumption; which will raise theirs to $20,000,000, and will place the relative means of the consumption of the two sections, as twenty to thirty-seven millions of dollars; while, on the supposition of equal consumption in proportion to population, their consumption would amount to thirty-eight millions of dollars, and ours to nineteen millions. Their consumption would thus exceed their capacity to consume, if judged by the value of their exports, and the profits of their foreign commerce, by eighteen millions; while ours, judged the same way, would fall short by the same sum. The inquiry which naturally presents itself is, how is this great change in the relative condition of the parties, to our disadvantage, affected?—which the committee will now proceed to explain.
It obviously grows out of our connections. If we were entirely separated, without political or commercial connection, it is manifest that the consumption of the manufacturing States, of foreign articles, could not exceed twenty-two millions—the sum at which the value of their exports and profit of their foreign trade is estimated. It would, in fact, be much less; as the profits of foreign navigation and trade, which have been added to their means, depend almost exclusively on the great staples of the South, and would have to be deducted, if no connection existed, as supposed. On the contrary, it is equally manifest, that the means of the South to consume the products of other countries, would not be so materially affected in the state supposed. Let us, then, examine what are the causes growing out of this connection, by which so great a change is effected. They may be comprehended under three heads—the Custom-House, the appropriations, and the monopoly of the manufacturers; all of which are so intimately blended as to constitute one system, which its advocates, by a perversion of all that is associated with the name, call the “ American System. ” The Tariff is the soul of this system.
It has already been proved that our contribution, through the Custom-House, to the Treasury of the Union, amounts annually to $16,650,000, which leads to the inquiry—What becomes of so large an amount of the products of our labor, placed, by the operation of the system, at the disposal of Congress? One point is certain—a very small share returns to us, out of whose labor it is extracted. It would require much investigation to state, with precision, the proportion of the public revenue disbursed annually in the Southern, and other States respectively; but the committee feel a thorough conviction, on examination of the annual appropriation acts, that a sum much less than two millions of dollars falls to our share of the disbursements; and that it would be a moderate estimate to place our contribution, above what we receive back, through all of the appropriations, at $15,000,000; constituting, to that great amount, an annual, continued, and uncompensated draft on the industry of the Southern States, through the Custom-House alone. This sum, deducted from the $37,000,000—the amount of our products annually exported, and added to the $20,000,000, the amount of the exports of the other States, with the profits of foreign trade and navigation, would reduce our means of consumption to $22,000,000, and raise theirs to $35,000,000—still leaving $3,000,000 to be accounted for; and which may be readily explained, through the operation of the remaining branch of the system—the monopoly which it affords the manufacturers in our market; and which empowers them to force their goods on us at a price equal to the foreign article of the same description, with the addition of the duty—thus receiving, in exchange, our products, to be shipped, on their account—and thereby increasing their means, and diminishing ours in the same proportion. But this constitutes a part only of our loss under this branch. In addition to the thirty-five millions of our products which are shipped to foreign countries, a very large amount is annually sent to the other States, for their own use and consumption. The article of cotton alone, is estimated at 150,000 bales—which, valued at thirty dollars the bale, would amount to $4,500,000, and constitutes a part of this forced exchange.
Such is the process, and the amount, in part, of the transfer of our property annually to other sections of the country, estimated on the supposition that each section consumes of imported articles, an amount equal in proportion to its population. But the committee are aware that they have rated our share of the consumption far higher than the advocates of the system place it. Some of them rate it as low as five millions of dollars annually; not perceiving that, by thus reducing ours, and raising that of the manufacturing States, in the same proportion, they demonstratively prove how oppressive the system is to us, and how gainful to them; instead of showing, as they suppose, how little we are affected by its operation. Our complaint is, that we are not permitted to consume the fruits of our labor; but that, through an artful and complex system, in violation of every principle of justice, they are transferred from us to others. It is, indeed, wonderful that those who profit by our loss, blinded as they are by self-interest, when reducing our consumption as low as they have, never thought to inquire what became of the immense amount of the products of our industry, which are annually sent out in exchange with the rest of the world; and if we did not consume its proceeds, who did—and by what means. If, in the ardent pursuit of gain, such a thought had occurred, it would seem impossible, that all the sophistry of self-interest, deceiving as it is, could have disguised from their view our deep oppression, under the operation of the system.
Your committee do not intend to represent, that the commercial connection between us and the manufacturing States is wholly sustained by the Tariff system. A great, natural, and profitable commercial communication would exist between us, without the aid of monopoly on their part; which, with mutual advantage, would transfer a large amount of their products to us, and an equal amount of ours to them, as the means of carrying on their commercial operations with other countries. But even this legitimate commerce is greatly affected, to our disadvantage, through the Tariff system; the very object of which is, to raise the price of labor, and the profits of capital, in the manufacturing States—which, from the nature of things, cannot be done, without raising, correspondingly, the price of all products, in the same quarter, as well those protected, as those not protected. That such would be the effect, we know has been urged in argument mainly to reconcile all classes in those States to the system; and with such success, as to leave us no room to doubt its correctness; and yet, such are the strange contradictions, in which the advocates of an unjust cause must ever involve themselves, when they attempt to sustain it, that the very persons, who urge the adoption of the system in one quarter, by holding out the temptation of high prices for all they make, turn round and gravely inform us, that its tendency is to depress, and not to advance prices. The capitalist, the farmer, the wool-grower, the merchant and laborer, in the manufacturing States, are all to receive higher rates of wages and profits—while we, who consume, are to pay less for the products of their labor and capital. As contradictory and absurd as are their arguments, they, at least, conclusively establish the important fact, that those who advance them are conscious that the proof of the partial and oppressive operation of the system, is unanswerable if it be conceded that we, in consequence, pay higher prices for what we consume. Were it possible to meet this conclusion on other grounds, it could not be, that men of sense would venture to encounter such palpable contradictions. So long as the wages of labor, and the profits of capital, constitute the principal elements of price, as they ever must, the one or the other argument—that addressed to us, or that to the manufacturing States—must be false. But, in order to have a clear conception of this important point, the committee propose to consider more fully the assertion, that it is the tendency of high duties, by affording protection, to reduce, instead of to increase prices; and if they are not greatly mistaken, it will prove, on examination, to be utterly erroneous.
Before entering on the discussion, and in order to avoid misapprehension, the committee will admit, that there is a single exception. When a country is fully prepared to manufacture, that is, when wages and interest are as low, and natural advantages as great, as in the countries from which it draws its supplies, it may happen, that high duties, by starting manufactories, under such circumstances, may be followed by a permanent reduction in prices; and which, if the Government had the power, and the people possessed sufficient guarantees against abuse, might render it wise and just, in reference to the general interest, in many instances to afford protection to infant manufacturing establishments. But, where permanent support is required—which must ever be the case when a country is not ripe—such duties must ever be followed by increased prices. The temporary effect may be different, from various causes. Against this position, it is urged, that the price depends on the proportion between the supply and demand—that protection, by converting mere consumers into rival manufacturers, must increase the supply without raising the demand—and, consequently, must tend to reduce prices. If it were necessary, it might be conclusively shown, that this tendency must be more than countervailed, by subtracting, as must ever be the case when the system is forced, capital and labor from more profitable, and turning them to less profitable pursuit, by an expensive bounty, paid out of the labor of the country. But, admitting the argument to be true, the reduction of price must be in proportion to the addition made to the general supply of the commercial world, which is so great that, if we were to suppose our share of the demand to be wholly withdrawn, its tendency to reduce the general price would be small compared to the tendency to high prices, in consequence of the high duties. But the argument rests on an assumption wholly false. It proceeds on the supposition that, without the Tariff, the manufacturing States would not have become such—than which nothing can be more erroneous. They had no alternative, but to emigrate, or to manufacture. How could they otherwise obtain clothing or other articles necessary for their supply? How could they pay for them? To Europe they could ship almost nothing. Their agricultural products are nearly the same with those of that portion of the globe; and the only two articles, grain and lumber, in the production of which they have advantages, are, in that quarter, either prohibited, or subject to high duties. From us, who are purely an agricultural people, they could draw nothing but the products of the soil. The question, then, is not, whether those States should or should not manufacture—for necessity, and the policy of other nations had decided that question—but whether they should, with or without a bounty. It was our interest that they should without. It would compel them to contend with the rest of the world in our market, in free and open competition; the effects of which would have been, a reduction of prices to the lowest point; thereby enabling us to exchange the products of our labor most advantageously—giving little, and receiving much; while, on the other hand, in order to meet European competition, they would have been compelled to work at the lowest wages and profits. To avoid this, it was their interest to manufacture with a bounty; by which our situation was completely reversed. They were relieved by our depression. Thus, through our political connection, by a perversion of the powers of the Constitution, which was intended to protect the States of the Union in the enjoyment of their natural advantages, they have stripped us of the blessings bestowed by nature, and converted them to their own advantage. Restore our advantages, by giving us free trade with the world, and we would become, what they now are by our means, the most flourishing people on the globe. But these are withheld from us under the fear that, with their restoration, they would become, what we are by their loss, among the most depressed.
Having answered the argument in the abstract, the committee will not swell their report by considering the various instances which have been quoted, to show that prices have not advanced since the commencement of the system. We know that they would instantly fall nearly fifty per cent, if its burdens were removed; and that is sufficient for us to know. Many and conclusive reasons might be urged, to show why, from other causes, prices have declined since that period. The fall in the price of raw materials—the effects of the return of peace—the immense reduction in the amount of the circulating medium of the world, by the withdrawal from circulation of a vast amount of paper, both in this country and in Europe—the important improvements in the mechanical and chemical arts—and, finally, the still progressive depression arising from the great improvements which preceded that period a short time, particularly in the use of steam and the art of spinning and weaving—have all contributed to this result. The final reduction of prices, which must take place in the articles whose production is affected by such improvements, cannot be suddenly realized. Another generation will probably pass away, before they will reach that point of depression which must follow their universal introduction.
We are told, by those who pretend to understand our interest better than we do, that the excess of production, and not the Tariff, is the evil which afflicts us; and that our true remedy is, a reduction of the quantity of cotton, rice, and tobacco, which we raise, and not a repeal of the Tariff. They assert, that low prices are the necessary consequence of excess of supply, and that the only proper correction is in diminishing the quantity. We would feel more disposed to respect the spirit in which the advice is offered, if those from whom it comes accompanied it with the weight of their example. They also, occasionally, complain of low prices; but instead of diminishing the supply, as a remedy for the evil, demand an enlargement of the market, by the exclusion of all competition. Our market is the world; and as we cannot imitate their example by enlarging it for our products, through the exclusion of others, we must decline their advice—which, instead of alleviating, would increase our embarrassments. We have no monopoly in the supply of our products; one-half of the globe may produce them. Should we reduce our production, others stand ready, by increasing theirs, to take our place; and, instead of raising prices, we would only diminish our share of the supply. We are thus compelled to produce, on the penalty of losing our hold on the general market. Once lost, it may be lost forever—and lose it we must, if we continue to be constrained, as we now are, on the one hand, by the general competition of the world, to sell low; and, on the other, by the Tariff to buy high. We cannot withstand this double action. Our ruin must follow. In fact, our only permanent and safe remedy is, not from the rise in the price of what we sell, in which we can receive but little aid from our Government, but a reduction in the price of what we buy; which is prevented by the interference of the Government. Give us a free and open competition in our own market, and we fear not to encounter like competition in the general market of the world. If, under all our discouragement by the acts of our Government, we are still able to contend there against the world, can it be doubted, if this impediment were removed, we would force out all competition; and thus, also enlarge our market—not by the oppression of our fellow-citizens of other States, but by our industry, enterprise, and natural advantages. But while the system prevents this great enlargement of our foreign market, and endangers what remains to us, its advocates attempt to console us by the growth of the home market for our products, which, according to their calculation, is to compensate us amply for all our losses; though, in the leading article of our products, cotton, the home market now consumes but a sixth; and if the prohibitory system as to cotton goods were perfected by the exclusion of all importations, the entire consumption of cotton goods would not raise the home consumption of cotton above a fifth of what we raise.
In the other articles, rice and tobacco, it is much less. But brilliant prospects are held out, of our immense export trade in cotton goods, which is to consume an immense amount of the raw material—without reflecting to what countries they are to be shipped. Not to Europe, for there we will meet prohibition for prohibition—not to the Southern portions of this continent, for already they have been taught to imitate our prohibitory policy. The most sanguine will not expect extensive or profitable markets in the other portions of the globe. But, admitting that no other impediment existed, the system itself is an effectual barrier against extensive exports. The very means which secures the domestic market must lose the foreign. High wages and profits are an effectual stimulus when enforced by monopoly, as in our market, but they must be fatal to competition in the open and free market of the world. Besides, when manufactured articles are exported, they must follow the same law to which the products of the soil are subject when exported. They will be sent out in order to be exchanged for the products of other countries; and if these products be taxed on their introduction, as a back return, it has been demonstrated that, like all other taxes on exchange, it must be paid by the producer of the articles. The nature of the operation will be seen, if it be supposed, in their exchange with us, instead of receiving our products free of duty, the manufacturer had to pay forty-five per cent in the back return, on the cotton and other products which they may receive from us in exchange. If to these insuperable impediments to a large export trade it be added, that our country rears the products of almost every soil and climate, and that scarcely an article can be imported, but what may come in competition with some of the products of our arts or our soil, and consequently ought to be excluded on the principles of the system, it must be apparent, when perfected, the system itself must essentially exclude exports; unless we should charitably export for the supply of the wants of others, without expecting a return trade. The loss of the exports, and with it the imports also, must, in truth, be the end of the system. If we export, we must import; and if we exclude all imported products which come in competition with ours, unless we can invent new articles of exchange, or enlarge, tenfold, the consumption of the few which we cannot produce, with the ceasing of importation, exportation must also cease. If it did not, then neither would importation cease; and the continuance of imports must be followed, as stated, by that of exports—and this again would require—in order to complete the system by excluding competition in our own markets—new duties; and thus, an incessant and unlimited increase of duties would be the result of the competition, of which the manufacturing States complain. The evil is in the exports—and the most simple and efficient system to secure the home market, would, in fact, be, to prohibit exports; and as the Constitution only prohibits duties on exports, and as duties are not prohibitions, we may yet witness this addition to the system—the same construction of the instrument which justifies the system itself, would equally justify this, as a necessary means to perfect it.
The committee deemed it more satisfactory to present the operation of the system on the staple States generally, than its peculiar operation on this. In fact, they had not the data, had they felt the inclination, to distinguish the oppression under which this State labors, from that of the other staple States. The fate of the one must be that of the others. It may, however, be truly said, that we are among the greatest sufferers. No portion of the world, in proportion to population and wealth, ever exchanged with other countries a greater amount of its products. With the proceeds of the sales of a few great staples we purchase almost all our supplies; and that system must, indeed, act with the desolation of a famine on such a people, where the Government exacts a tax of nearly fifty per cent on so large a proportion of their exchanges, in order that a portion of their fellow citizens might, in effect, lay one as high on the residue.
The committee have, thus far, considered the question in its relative effects on the staple and manufacturing States—comprehending, under the latter, all those that support the Tariff system. It is not for them to determine whether all those States have an equal interest in its continuance. It is manifest that their situation, in respect to its operation, is very different. While, in some, the manufacturing interest wholly prevails—in others, the commercial and navigating interests—and in a third, the agricultural interest greatly predominates—as is the case in all the Western States. It is difficult to conceive what real interest the last can have in the system. They manufacture but little, and must consequently draw their supplies, principally, either from abroad, or from the real manufacturing States; and, in either case, must pay the increased price in consequence of the high duties, which, at the same time, must diminish their means with ours, from whom they are principally derived, through an extensive interior commercial intercourse. From the nature of our commercial connections, our loss must precede theirs; but theirs will with certainty follow, unless compensation for the loss of our trade can be found somewhere in the system. Its authors have informed us that it consists of two parts—of which protection is the essence of one, and appropriation of the other. In both capacities it impoverishes us—and in both it enriches the real manufacturing States. The agricultural States of the West are differently affected. As a protective system, they lose in common with us—and it will remain with them to determine, whether an adequate compensation can be found, in appropriations for internal improvements, or any other purpose, for the steady and rich returns which a free exchange of the produce of their fertile soil with the staple States must give, provided the latter be left in full possession of their natural advantages.
The question, in what manner the loss and gain of the system distribute themselves among the several classes of society, is intimately connected with that of their distribution among the several sections. Few subjects present more important points for consideration; but as it is not possible for the committee to enter fully into the discussion of them, without swelling their report beyond all reasonable bounds, they will pass them over with a few brief and general remarks.
The system has not been sufficiently long in operation with us, to display its real character in reference to the point now under discussion. To understand its ultimate tendency, in distributing the wealth of society among the several classes, we must turn our eyes to Europe, where it has been in action for centuries—and operated as one among the efficient causes of that great inequality of property which prevails in most European countries. No system can be more efficient to rear up a moneyed aristocracy. Its tendency is, to make the poor poorer, and the rich richer. Heretofore, in our country, this tendency has displayed itself principally in its effects, as regards the different sections—but the time will come when it will produce the same results between the several classes in the manufacturing States. After we are exhausted, the contest will be between the capitalists and operatives; for into these two classes it must, ultimately, divide society. The issue of the struggle here must be the same as it has been in Europe. Under the operation of the system, wages must sink more rapidly than the prices of the necessaries of life, till the operatives will be reduced to the lowest point—when the portion of the products of their labor left to them, will be barely sufficient to preserve existence. For the present, the pressure of the system is on our section. Its effects on the staple States produce almost universal suffering. In the mean time, an opposite state of things exists in the manufacturing States. For the present, every interest among them—except that of foreign trade and navigation, flourishes. Such must be the effect of a monopoly of so rich and extensive a market as that of the Southern States, till it is impoverished—as ours rapidly must be, by the operation of the system, when its natural tendencies, and effects on the several classes of the community, will unfold themselves, as has been described by the committee.
It remains to be considered, in tracing the effects of the system, whether the gain of one section of the country be equal to the loss of the other. If such were the fact—if all we lose be gained by the citizens of the other sections, we would, at least, have the satisfaction of thinking that, however unjust and oppressive, it was but a transfer of property, without diminishing the wealth of the community. Such, however, is not the fact; and to its other mischievous consequences we must add, that it destroys much more than it transfers. Industry cannot be forced out of its natural channel without loss; and this, with the injustice, constitutes the objection to the improper intermeddling of the Government with the private pursuits of individuals, who must understand their own interests better than the Government. The exact loss from such intermeddling, it may be difficult to ascertain, but it is not, therefore, the less certain. The committee will not undertake to estimate the millions, which are annually lost to our country, under the existing system; but some idea may be formed of its magnitude, by stating, that it is, at least, equal to the difference between the profits of our manufacturers, and the duties imposed for their protection, where these are not prohibitory. The lower the profit, and the higher the duty (if not, as stated, prohibitory)—the greater the loss. If, with these certain data, the evidence reported by the Committee on Manufactures at the last session of Congress, be examined, a pretty correct opinion may be formed of the extent of the loss of the country—provided the manufacturers have fairly stated their case. With a duty of about forty per cent on the leading articles of consumption (if we are to credit the testimony reported), the manufacturers did not realize, generally, a profit equal to the legal rate of interest; which would give a loss of largely upwards of thirty per cent to the country on its products. It is different with the foreign articles of the same description. On them, the country, at least, loses nothing. There, the duty passes into the Treasury—lost, indeed, to the Southern States, out of whose labor, directly or indirectly, it must, for the most part, be paid—but transferred, through appropriations in a hundred forms, to the pockets of others. It is thus the system is cherished by appropriators; and well may its advocates affirm, that they constitute an essential portion of the American System. Let this conduit, through which it is so profusely supplied, be closed, and we feel confident that scarcely a State, except a real manufacturing one, would tolerate its burden. A total prohibition of importations, by cutting off the revenue, and thereby the means of making appropriations, would, in a short period, destroy it. But the excess of its loss over its gains, leads to the consoling reflection, that its abolition would relieve us, much more than it would embarrass the manufacturing States. We have suffered too much to desire to see others afflicted, even for our relief, when it can be possibly avoided. We would rejoice to see our manufactures flourish on any constitutional principle, consistent with justice and the public liberty. It is not against them, but the means by which they have been forced, to our ruin, that we object. As far as a moderate system, founded on imposts for revenue, goes, we are willing to afford protection, though we clearly see that, even under such a system, the national revenue would be based on our labor, and be paid by our industry. With such constitutional and moderate protection, the manufacturer ought to be satisfied. His loss would not be so great as might be supposed. If low duties would be followed by low prices, they would also diminish the costs of manufacturing; and thus the reduction of profit would be less in proportion than the reduction of the prices of the manufactured article. Be this, however, as it may, the General Government cannot proceed beyond this point of protection, consistently with its powers, and justice to the whole. If the manufacturing States deem further protection necessary, it is in their power to afford it to their citizens, within their own limits, against foreign competition, to any extent they may judge expedient. The Constitution authorizes them to lay an impost duty, with the assent of Congress, which, doubtless, would be given; and if that be not sufficient, they have the additional and efficient power of giving a direct bounty for their encouragement—which the ablest writers on the subject concede to be the least burdensome and most effectual mode of encouragement. Thus, they who are to be benefited, will bear the burden, as they ought; and those who believe it is wise and just to protect manufactures, may have the satisfaction of doing it at their expense, and not at that of their fellow-citizens of the other States, who entertain precisely the opposite opinion.
The committee having presented its views on the partial and oppressive operation of the system, will proceed to discuss the next position which they proposed—its tendency to corrupt the Government, and to destroy the liberty of the country.
If there be a political proposition universally true—one which springs directly from the nature of man, and is independent of circumstances—it is, that irresponsible power is inconsistent with liberty, and must corrupt those who exercise it. On this great principle our political system rests. We consider all powers as delegated by the people, and to be controlled by them, who are interested in their just and proper exercise; and our Governments, both State and General, are but a system of judicious contrivances to bring this fundamental principle into fair, practical operation. Among the most prominent of these is, the responsibility of representatives to their constituents, through frequent periodical elections, in order to enforce a faithful performance of their delegated trust. Without such a check on their powers, however clearly they may be defined, and distinctly prescribed, our liberty would be but a mockery. The Government, instead of being directed to the general good, would speedily become but the instrument to aggrandize those who might be intrusted with its administration. On the other hand, if laws were uniform in their operation—if that which imposed a burden on one, imposed it likewise on all—or that which acted beneficially for one, acted also, in the same manner, for all—the responsibility of representatives to their constituents would alone be sufficient to guard against abuse and tyranny—provided the people be sufficiently intelligent to understand their interest, and the motives and conduct of their public agents. But, if it be supposed that, from diversity of interests in the several classes and sections of the country, the laws act differently, so that the same law, though couched in general terms and apparently fair, shall, in reality, transfer the power and property of one class or section to another—in such case, responsibility to constituents, which is but the means of enforcing fidelity of representatives to them, must prove wholly insufficient to preserve the purity of public agents, or the liberty of the country. It would, in fact, fall short of the evil. The disease would be in the community itself—in the constituents, and not their representatives. The opposing interests of the community would engender, necessarily, opposing, hostile parties—organized on this very diversity of interests—the stronger of which, if the Government provided no efficient check, would exercise unlimited and unrestrained power over the weaker. The relation of equality between the parts of the community, established by the Constitution, would be destroyed, and in its place there would be substituted the relation of sovereign and subject, between the stronger and weaker interests, in its most odious and oppressive form. That this is a possible state of society, even where the representative system prevails, we have high authority. Mr. Hamilton, in the 51st number of the Federalist, says, “It is of the greatest importance in a republic, not only to guard society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” Again— “In a society, under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may be said as truly to reign, as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger.” We have still higher authority—the unhappy existing example, of which we are the victims. The committee has labored to little purpose, if they have not demonstrated that the very case, which Mr. Hamilton so forcibly describes, does not now exist in our country, under the name of the American System —and which, if not timely arrested, must be followed by all the consequences which never fail to spring from the exercise of irresponsible power. On the great and vital point, the industry of the country—which comprehends almost every interest, the interest of the two great sections is opposed. We want free trade—they restrictions; we want moderate taxes, frugality in the Government, economy, accountability, and a rigid application of the public money to the payment of the debt, and to the objects authorized by the Constitution. In all these particulars, if we may judge by experience, their views of their interest are precisely the opposite. They feel and act, on all questions connected with the American System, as sovereigns—as men invariably do who impose burdens on others for their own benefit; and we, on the other hand, like those on whom such burdens are imposed. In a word, to the extent stated, the country is divided and organized into two great parties—the one sovereign and the other subject—bearing towards each other all the attributes which must ever accompany that relation, under whatever form it may exist. That our industry is controlled by many, instead of one—by a majority in Congress, elected by a majority in the community having a opposing interest, instead of by hereditary rulers—forms not the slightest mitigation of the evil. In fact, instead of mitigating, it aggravates. In our case, one opposing branch of industry cannot prevail without associating others; and thus, instead of a single act of oppression, we must bear many. The history of the Woollens Bill will illustrate the truth of this position. The woollen manufacturers found they were too feeble to enforce their exactions alone, and, of necessity, resorted to the expedient, which will ever be adopted in such cases, of associating other interests, till a majority be formed—and the result of which, in this case, was, that instead of increased duties on woollens alone—which would have been the fact if that interest alone governed, we have to bear equally increased duties on more than a dozen other of the leading articles of consumption. It would be weakness to attempt to disguise the fact—on a full knowledge of which, and of the danger it threatens, the hope of devising some means of security depends—that different and opposing interests do, and must ever exist in all societies, against the evil of which representation opposes not the slightest resistance. Laws, so far from being uniform in their operation, are scarcely ever so. It requires the greatest wisdom and moderation to extend over any country a system of equal laws; and it is this very diversity of interests, which is found in all associations of men for common purposes, be they private or public, that constitutes the main difficulty in forming and administering free and just governments. It is the door through which despotic power has, heretofore, ever entered, and must ever continue to enter, till some effectual barrier be provided. Without some such, it would be folly to hope for the duration of liberty—as much so as to expect it without representation itself—and for the same reason. The essence of liberty comprehends the idea of responsible power—that those who make and execute the laws should be controlled by those on whom they operate—that the governed should govern. To prevent rulers from abusing their trusts, constituents must control them through elections; and to prevent the major from oppressing the minor interests of society, the Constitution must provide (as the committee hope to prove it does) a check, founded on the same principle and equally efficacious. In fact, the abuse of delegated power, and the tyranny of the stronger over the weaker interests, are the two dangers, and the only two to be guarded against; and if this be done effectually, liberty must be eternal. Of the two, the latter is the greater and most difficult to resist. It is less perceptible. Every circumstance of life teaches us the liability of delegated power to abuse. We cannot appoint an agent without being admonished of the fact; and, therefore, it has become well understood, and is effectually guarded against in our political institutions. Not so as to the other and greater danger. Though it in fact exists in all associations, yet the law, the courts, and the Government itself, act as a check to its extreme abuse in most cases of private and subordinate companies, which prevents the full display of its real tendency. But let it be supposed that there was no paramount authority—no court, no government to control, what sober individual, who expected himself to act honestly, would place his property in joint-stock with any number of individuals, however respectable, to be disposed of by the unchecked will of the majority, whether acting in a body as stockholders, or through representation, by a direction? Who does not see that a major and a minor interest would, sooner or later, spring up, and that the result would be that, after the stronger had divested the feebler of all interest in the concern, they would, in turn, divide until the whole would centre in a single interest? It is the principle which must ever govern such associations; and what is government itself, but a great joint-stock company, which comprehends every interest, and which, as there can be no higher power to restrain its natural operation, must, if not checked within itself, follow the same law? The actual condition of our race in every country, at this and all preceding periods, attests the truth of the remark. No government, based on the naked principle that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense, and under proper restrictions, can preserve its liberty even for a single generation. The history of all has been the same—violence, injustice, and anarchy—succeeded by the government of one, or a few, under which the people seek refuge from the more oppressive despotism of the many. Those governments only which provide checks—which limit and restrain within proper bounds the power of the majority, have had a prolonged existence, and been distinguished for virtue, patriotism, power, and happiness; and, what is strikingly true, they have been thus distinguished almost in exact proportion to the number and efficacy of their checks. If arranged in relation to these, we would place them in the order of the Roman, English, Spartan, the United Provinces, the Athenian, and several of the small confederacies of antiquity; and if arranged according to the higher attributes which have been enumerated, they would stand almost precisely in the same order. That this coincidence is not accidental, we may be fully assured. The latest and most profound investigator of the Roman History and Constitution (Niebuhr) has conclusively shown that, after the expulsion of the kings, this great commonwealth continued to decline in power, and was the victim of the most violent domestic struggles, which tainted both public and private morals, till the passage of the Licinian law, which gave to the people an efficient veto through their tribunes, as a check on the predominant power of the Patricians. From that period she began to rise superior to all other States in virtue, patriotism, and power. May we profit by the example, and restore the almost lost virtue and patriotism of the Republic, by giving due efficiency, in practice, to the check which our Constitution has provided against a danger so threatening—and which constitutes the only efficient remedy against that unconstitutional and dangerous system which the committee have been considering—as they will now proceed to show.
The committee has demonstrated that the present disordered state of our political system originated in the diversity of interests which exists in the country—a diversity recognized by the Constitution itself, and to which it owes one of its most distinguished and peculiar features—the division of the delegated powers between the State and General Governments. Our short experience, before the formation of the present Government, had conclusively shown that, while there were powers which in their nature were local and peculiar, and which could not be exercised by all, without oppression to some of the parts—so, also, there were those which, in their operation, necessarily affected the whole, and could not, therefore, be exercised by any of the parts, without affecting injuriously the others. On this different character, by which powers are distinguished in their geographical operation, our political system was constructed. Viewed in relation to them, to a certain extent we have a community of interests, which can only be justly and fairly supervised by concentrating the will and authority of the several States in the General Government; while, at the same time, the States have distinct and separate interests, over which no supervision can be exercised by the general power without injustice and oppression. Hence the division in the exercise of sovereign powers. In drawing the line between the powers of the two—the General and State Governments—the great difficulty consisted in determining correctly to which of the two the various political powers ought to belong. This difficult task was, however, performed with so much success that, to this day, there is an almost entire acquiescence in the correctness with which the line was drawn. It would be extraordinary if a system, thus resting with such profound wisdom on the diversity of geographical interests among the States, should make no provision against the dangers to which its very basis might be exposed. The framers of our Constitution have not exposed themselves to the imputation of such weakness. When their work is fairly examined, it will be found that they have provided, with admirable skill, the most effective remedy; and that, if it has not prevented the danger with which the system is now threatened, the fault is not theirs, but ours, in neglecting to make its proper application. In the primary division of the sovereign powers, and in their exact and just classification, as stated, are to be found the first provisions or checks against the abuse of authority on the part of the absolute majority. The powers of the General Government are particularly enumerated and specifically delegated; and all powers not expressly delegated, or which are not necessary and proper to carry into effect those that are so granted, are reserved expressly to the States or the people. The Government is thus positively restricted to the exercise of those general powers that were supposed to act uniformly on all the parts—leaving the residue to the people of the States, by whom alone, from the very nature of these powers, they can be justly and fairly exercised, as has been stated.
Our system, then, consists of two distinct and independent Governments. The general powers, expressly delegated to the General Government, are subject to its sole and separate control; and the States cannot, without violating the constitutional compact, interpose their authority to check, or in any manner to counteract its movements, so long as they are confined to the proper sphere. So, also, the peculiar and local powers reserved to the States are subject to their exclusive control; nor can the General Government interfere, in any manner, with them, without violating the Constitution.
In order to have a full and clear conception of our institutions, it will be proper to remark that there is, in our system, a striking distinction between Government and Sovereignty. The separate governments of the several States are vested in their Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments; while the sovereignty resides in the people of the States respectively. The powers of the General Government are also vested in its Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments, while the sovereignty resides in the people of the several States who created it. But, by an express provision of the Constitution, it may be amended or changed by three-fourths of the States; and thus each State, by assenting to the Constitution with this provision, has modified its original right as a sovereign, of making its individual consent necessary to any change in its political condition; and, by becoming a member of the Union, has placed this important power in the hands of three-fourths of the States—in whom the highest power known to the Constitution actually resides. Not the least portion of this high sovereign authority resides in Congress, or any of the departments of the General Government. They are but the creatures of the Constitution, and are appointed but to execute its provisions; and, therefore, any attempt by all, or any of these departments, to exercise any power which, in its consequences, may alter the nature of the instrument, or change the condition of the parties to it, would be an act of usurpation.
It is thus that our political system, resting on the great principle involved in the recognized diversity of geographical interests in the community, has, in theory, with admirable sagacity, provided the most efficient check against their dangers. Looking to facts, the Constitution has formed the States into a community only to the extent of their common interests; leaving them distinct and independent communities as to all other interests, and drawing the line of separation with consummate skill, as before stated. It is manifest that, so long as this beautiful theory is adhered to in practice, the system, like the atmosphere, will press equally on all the parts. But reason and experience teach us that theory of itself, however excellent, is nugatory, unless there be means of efficiently enforcing it in practice—which brings under consideration the highly important question—What means are provided by the system for enforcing this fundamental provision?
If we look to the history and practical operation of the system, we shall find, on the side of the States, no means resorted to in order to protect their reserved rights against the encroachments of the General Government; while the latter has, from the beginning, adopted the most efficient to prevent the States from encroaching on those delegated to them. The 25th section of the Judiciary Act, passed in 1789—immediately after the Constitution went into operation—provides for an appeal from the State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States in all cases, in the decision of which, the construction of the Constitution—the laws of Congress, or treaties of the United States may be involved; thus giving to that high tribunal the right of final interpretation, and the power, in reality, of nullifying the acts of the State Legislatures whenever, in their opinion, they may conflict with the powers delegated to the General Government. A more ample and complete protection against the encroachments of the governments of the several States cannot be imagined; and to this extent the power may be considered as indispensable and constitutional. But, by a strange misconception of the nature of our system—and, in fact, of the nature of government—it has been regarded as the ultimate power, not only of protecting the General Government against the encroachments of the governments of the States, but also of the encroachments of the former on the latter—and as being, in fact, the only means provided by the Constitution of confining all the powers of the system to their proper constitutional spheres; and, consequently, of determining the limits assigned to each. Such a construction of its powers would, in fact, raise one of the departments of the General Government above the parties who created the constitutional compact, and virtually invest it with the authority to alter, at its pleasure, the relative powers of the General and State Governments, on the distribution of which, as established by the Constitution, our whole system rests—and which, by an express provision of the instrument, can only be altered by three-fourths of the States, as has already been shown. It would go farther. Fairly considered, it would, in effect, divest the people of the States of the sovereign authority, and clothe that department with the robe of supreme power. A position more false and fatal cannot be conceived. Fortunately, it has been so ably refuted by Mr. Madison, in his Report to the Virginia Legislature in 1800, on the Alien and Sedition Acts, as to supersede the necessity of further comments on the part of the committee. Speaking of the right of the State to interpret the Constitution for itself, in the last resort, he remarks: “It has been objected that the Judicial Authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection, it might be observed— first —that there may be instances of usurped power” (the case of the Tariff is a striking illustration of the truth), “which the forms of the Constitution could never draw within the control of the Judicial Department— secondly —that if the decision of the Judiciary be raised above the authority of the sovereign parties to the Constitution, the decision of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the Judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases in which the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers not delegated, may not only be usurped and exercised by the other departments, but that the Judicial Department also may exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the Constitution; and consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority as well as by another; by the Judiciary as well as by the Executive or the Legislative. However true, therefore, it may be that the Judicial Department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constitution, to decide in the last resort, this resort must necessarily be considered the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the Government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the Judicial and all other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this department with others in usurped powers might subvert for ever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve.”
As a substitute for the rightful remedy, in the last resort, against the encroachments of the General Government on the reserved powers, resort has been had to a rigid construction of the Constitution. A system like ours, of divided powers, must necessarily give great importance to a proper system of construction; but it is perfectly clear that no rule of construction, however perfect, can, in fact, prescribe bounds to the operation of power. All such rules constitute, in fact, but an appeal from the minority to the justice and reason of the majority; and if such appeals were sufficient of themselves to restrain the avarice or ambition of those vested with power, then may a system of technical construction be sufficient to protect against the encroachment of power; but, on such supposition, reason and justice might alone be relied on, without the aid of any constitutional or artificial restraint whatever. Universal experience, in all ages and countries, however, teaches that power can only be restrained by power, and not by reason and justice; and that all restrictions on authority, unsustained by an equal antagonist power, must forever prove wholly inefficient in practice. Such, also, has been the decisive proof of our own short experience. From the beginning, a great and powerful minority gave every force of which it was susceptible to construction, as a means of restraining the majority of Congress to the exercise of its proper powers; and though that original minority, through the force of circumstances, has had the advantage of becoming a majority, and to possess, in consequence, the administration of the General Government during the greater portion of its existence, yet we this day witness, under these most favorable circumstances, such an extension of its powers as to leave to the States scarcely a right worth the possessing. In fact, the power of construction, on which its advocates relied to preserve the rights of the States, has been wielded, as it ever must be, if not checked, to destroy those rights. If the minority has a right to prescribe its rule of construction, a majority, on its part, will exercise a similar right; but with this striking difference—that the right of the former will be a mere nullity against that of the latter. But that protection, which the minor interests must ever fail to find in any technical system of construction, may be found in the reserved rights of the States themselves, if they be properly called into action; and there only will they ever be found of sufficient efficacy. The right of protecting their powers results, necessarily, by the most simple and demonstrative arguments, from the very nature of the relation subsisting between the States and General Government.
If it be conceded, as it must be by every one who is the least conversant with our institutions, that the sovereign powers delegated are divided between the General and State Governments, and that the latter hold their portion by the same tenure as the former, it would seem impossible to deny to the States the right of deciding on the infractions of their powers, and the proper remedy to be applied for their correction. The right of judging, in such cases, is an essential attribute of sovereignty—of which the States cannot be divested without losing their sovereignty itself—and being reduced to a subordinate corporate condition. In fact, to divide power, and to give to one of the parties the exclusive right of judging of the portion allotted to each, is, in reality, not to divide it at all; and to reserve such exclusive right to the General Government (it matters not by what department to be exercised), is to convert it, in fact, into a great consolidated government, with unlimited powers, and to divest the States, in reality, of all their rights. It is impossible to understand the force of terms, and to deny so plain a conclusion. The opposite opinion can be embraced only on hasty and imperfect views of the relation existing between the States and the General Government. But the existence of the right of judging of their powers, so clearly established from the sovereignty of States, as clearly implies a veto or control, within its limits, on the action of the General Government, on contested points of authority; and this very control is the remedy which the Constitution has provided to prevent the encroachments of the General Government on the reserved rights of the States; and by which the distribution of power, between the General and State Governments, may be preserved forever inviolable, on the basis established by the Constitution. It is thus effectual protection is afforded to the minority, against the oppression of the majority. Nor does this important conclusion stand on the deduction of reason alone. It is sustained by the highest contemporary authority. Mr. Hamilton, in the number of the Federalist already cited, remarks that, “in a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against, by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.” He thus clearly affirms the control of the States over the General Government, which he traces to the division in the exercise of the sovereign powers under our political system; and by comparing this control to the veto, which the departments in most of our constitutions respectively exercise over the acts of each other, clearly indicates it as his opinion, that the control between the General and State Governments is of the same character. Mr. Madison is still more explicit. In his report, already alluded to, in speaking on this subject, he remarks: “The resolutions, having taken this view of the Federal compact, proceed to infer that, in cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose to arrest the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them. It appears to your committee to be a plain principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal superior to the rights of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges, in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the States, given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity, as well as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests on this solid foundation. The States, then, being parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated; and, consequently, as parties to it, they must themselves decide, in the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition.” To these, the no less explicit opinions of Mr. Jefferson may be added; who, in the Kentucky resolutions on the same subject, which have always been attributed to him,1 states that— “The Government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers—but, as in all other cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.”
To these authorities, which so explicitly affirm the right of the States, in their sovereign capacity, to decide, in the last resort, on the infraction of their rights and the remedy, there may be added the solemn decisions of the Legislatures of two leading States—Virginia and Kentucky—that the power in question rightfully belongs to the States—and the implied sanction which a majority of the States gave, in the important political revolution which shortly followed, and brought Mr. Jefferson into power. It is scarcely possible to add to the weight of authority by which this fundamental principle in our system is sustained.
The committee have thus arrived, by what they deem conclusive reasoning, and the highest authority, at the constitutional and appropriate remedy against the unconstitutional oppression under which this, in common with the other staple States, labors—and the menacing danger which now hangs over the liberty and happiness of our country—and this brings them to the inquiry—How is the remedy to be applied by the States? In this inquiry a question may be made—whether a State can interpose its sovereignty through the ordinary Legislature, but which the committee do not deem it necessary to investigate. It is sufficient that plausible reasons may be assigned against this mode of action, if there be one (and there is one) free from all objections. Whatever doubts may be raised as to the question—whether the respective Legislatures fully represent the sovereignty of the States for this high purpose, there can be none as to the fact that a Convention fully represents them for all purposes whatever. Its authority, therefore, must remove every objection as to form, and leave the question on the single point of the right of the States to interpose at all. When convened, it will belong to the Convention itself to determine, authoritatively, whether the acts of which we complain be unconstitutional; and, if so, whether they constitute a violation so deliberate, palpable, and dangerous, as to justify the interposition of the State to protect its rights. If this question be decided in the affirmative, the Convention will then determine in what manner they ought to be declared null and void within the limits of the State; which solemn declaration, based on her rights as a member of the Union, would be obligatory, not only on her own citizens, but on the General Government itself; and thus place the violated rights of the State under the shield of the Constitution.
The committee, having thus established the constitutional right of the States to interpose, in order to protect their reserved powers, it cannot be necessary to bestow much time or attention, in order to meet possible objections—particularly as they must be raised, not against the soundness of the arguments, by which the position is sustained, and which they deem unanswerable—but against apprehended consequences, which, even if well founded, would be an objection, not so much to the conclusions of the committee, as to the Constitution itself. They are persuaded that, whatever objection may be suggested, it will be found, on investigation, to be destitute of solidity. Under these impressions, the committee propose to discuss such as they suppose may be urged, with all possible brevity.
It may be objected, then—in the first place, that the right of the States to interpose rests on mere inference, without any express provision in the Constitution; and that it is not to be supposed—if the Constitution contemplated the exercise of powers of such high importance—that it would have been left to inference alone. In answer, the committee would ask, whether the power of the Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional is not among the very highest and most important that can be exercised by any department of the Government—and if any express provision can be found to justify its exercise? Like the power in question, it also rests on mere inference—but an inference so clear, that no express provision could render it more certain. The simple fact, that the Judges must decide according to law, and that the Constitution is paramount to the acts of Congress, imposes a necessity on the court to declare the latter void whenever, in its opinion, they come in conflict, in any particular case, with the former. So, also, in the question under consideration. The right of the States—even supposing it to rest on inference, stands on clearer and stronger grounds than that of the Court. In the distribution of powers between the General and State Governments, the Constitution professes to enumerate those assigned to the former, in whatever department they may be vested; while the powers of the latter are reserved in general terms, without attempt at enumeration. It may, therefore, constitute a presumption against the former—that the Court has no right to declare a law unconstitutional, because the power is not enumerated among those belonging to the Judiciary—while the omission to enumerate the power of the States to interpose in order to protect their rights—being strictly in accord with the principles on which its framers formed the Constitution, raises not the slightest presumption against its existence. Like all other reserved rights, it is to be inferred from the simple fact that it is not delegated —as is clearly the case in this instance.
Again—it may be objected to the power, that it is inconsistent with the necessary authority of the General Government—and, in its consequences, must lead to feebleness, anarchy, and finally disunion.
It is impossible to propose any limitation on the authority of governments, without encountering, from the supporters of power, this very objection of feebleness and anarchy: and we accordingly find, that the history of every country which has attempted to establish free institutions, proves that, on this point, the opposing parties—the advocates of power and of freedom—have ever separated. It constituted the essence of the controversy between the Patricians and Plebeians in the Roman Republic—the Tories and Whigs in England—the Ultras and Liberals in France—and, finally, the Federalists and Republicans in our own country—as illustrated by Mr. Madison’s Report—and if it were proposed to give to Russia or Austria a representation of the people, it would form the point of controversy between the Imperial and Popular parties. It is, in fact, not at all surprising that, to a people unacquainted with the nature of liberty, and inexperienced in its blessings, all limitations on supreme power should appear incompatible with its nature, and as tending to feebleness and anarchy. Nature has not permitted us to doubt the necessity of a paramount power in all institutions. All see and feel it; but it requires some effort of reason to perceive that, if not controlled, such power must necessarily lead to abuse—and still higher efforts to understand that it may be checked without destroying its efficiency. With us, however, who know from our own experience, and that of other free nations, the truth of these positions, and that power can only be rendered useful and secure by being properly checked—it is, indeed, strange that any intelligent citizen should consider limitations on the authority of government incompatible with its nature—or should fear danger from any check properly lodged, which may be necessary to guard against usurpation or abuse, and protect the great and distinct interests of the country. That there are such interests represented by the States, and that the States are the only competent powers to protect them, has been sufficiently established; and it only remains, in order to meet the objection, to prove that, for this purpose, the States may be safely vested with the right of interposition.
If the committee do not greatly mistake, the checking or veto power never has, in any country, or under any institutions, been lodged where it was less liable to abuse. The great number, by whom it must be exercised, of the people of a State—the solemnity of the mode—a Convention specially called for the purpose, and representing the State in her highest capacity—the delay—the deliberation—are all calculated to allay excitement—to impress on the people a deep and solemn tone, highly favorable to calm investigation and decision. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible for a mere party to maintain itself in the State, unless the violation of its rights be palpable, deliberate, and dangerous. The attitude in which the State would be placed in relation to the other States—the force of public opinion which would be brought to bear on her—the deep reverence for the General Government—the strong influence of all public men who aspire to office or distinction in the Union—and, above all, the local parties which must ever exist in the State, and which, in this case, must ever throw the powerful influence of the minority on the side of the General Government—constitute impediments to the exercise of this high protective right of the State, which must render it safe. So powerful, in fact, are these difficulties, that nothing but truth and a deep sense of oppression on the part of the people of the State, will ever sustain the exercise of the power—and if it should be attempted under other circumstances, it must speedily terminate in the expulsion of those in power, to be replaced by others who would make a merit of closing the controversy, by yielding the point in dispute.
But, in order to understand more fully what its operation really would be in practice, we must take into the estimate the effect which a recognition of the power would have on the tone of feeling, both of the General and State Governments. On the part of the former, it would necessarily produce, in the exercise of doubtful powers, the most marked moderation. In the discussion of measures involving such powers, the argument would be felt with decisive weight, that the State, also, had the right of judging of the constitutionality of the power; which would cause an abandonment of the measure—or, at least, lead to such modifications as would make it acceptable. On the part of the State, a feeling of conscious security, depending on herself—with the effect of moderation and kindness on the part of the General Government, would effectually put down jealousy, hatred, and animosity—and thus give scope to the natural attachment to our institutions, to expand and grow into the full maturity of patriotism. But withhold this protective power from the State, and the reverse of all these happy consequences must follow—which the committee will not undertake to describe, as the living example of discord, hatred, and jealousy—threatening anarchy and dissolution, must impress on every beholder a more vivid picture than any they could possibly draw. The continuance of this unhappy state must lead to the loss of all affection—when the Government must be sustained by force instead of patriotism. In fact, to him who will duly reflect, it must be apparent that, where there are important separate interests, there is no alternative but a veto to protect them, or the military to enforce the claims of the majority interests.
If these deductions be correct—as can scarcely be doubted—under that state of moderation and security, followed by mutual kindness, which must accompany the acknowledgment of the right, the necessity of exercising the veto would rarely exist, and the possibility of its abuse, on the part of the State, would be almost wholly removed. Its acknowledged existence would thus supersede its exercise. But suppose in this the committee should be mistaken—still there exists a sufficient security. As high as this right of interposition on the part of a State may be regarded in relation to the General Government, the constitutional compact provides a remedy against its abuse. There is a higher power—placed above all by the consent of all—the creating and preserving power of the system—to be exercised by three-fourths of the States—and which, under the character of the amending power, can modify the whole system at pleasure—and to the acts of which none can object. Admit, then, the power in question to belong to the States—and admit its liability to abuse—and what are the utmost consequences, but to create a presumption against the constitutionality of the power exercised by the General Government—which, if it be well founded, must compel them to abandon it—or, if not, to remove the difficulty by obtaining the contested power in the form of an amendment to the Constitution. If, on an appeal for this purpose, the decision be favorable to the General Government, a disputed power will be converted into an expressly granted power—but, on the other hand, if it be adverse, the refusal to grant will be tantamount to an inhibition of its exercise: and thus, in either case, the controversy will be determined. And ought not a sovereign State, as a party to the constitutional compact, and as the guardian of her citizens and her peculiar interests, to have the power in question? Without it, the amending power must become obsolete, and the Constitution, through the exercise of construction, in the end utterly subverted. Let us examine the case. The disease is, that a majority of the States, through the General Government, by construction, usurp powers not delegated, and by their exercise, increase their wealth and authority at the expense of the minority. How absurd, then, to expect the injured States to attempt a remedy by proposing an amendment to be ratified by three-fourths of the States, when, by supposition, there is a majority opposed to them? Nor would it be less absurd to expect the General Government to propose amendments, unless compelled to that course by the acts of a State. The Government can have no inducement. It has a more summary mode—the assumption of power by construction. The consequence is clear—neither would resort to the amending power—the one, because it would be useless—and the other, because it could effect its purpose without it—and thus the highest power known to the Constitution—on the salutary influence of which, on the operations of our political institutions, so much was calculated, would become, in practice, obsolete, as stated; and in lieu of it, the will of the majority, under the agency of construction, would be substituted, with unlimited and supreme power. On the contrary, giving the right to a State to compel the General Government to abandon its pretensions to a constructive power, or to obtain a positive grant of it, by an amendment to the Constitution, would call efficiently into action, on all important disputed questions, this highest power of the system—to whose controlling authority no one can object, and under whose operation all controversies between the States and General Government would be adjusted, and the Constitution gradually acquire all the perfection of which it is susceptible. It is thus that the creating becomes the preserving power; and we may rest assured it is no less true in politics than in theology, that the power which creates can alone preserve—and that preservation is perpetual creation. Such will be the operation and effect of State interposition.
But it may be objected, that the exercise of the power would have the effect of placing the majority under the control of the minority. If the objection were well founded, it would be fatal. If the majority cannot be trusted, neither can the minority: and to transfer power from the former to the latter, would be but the repetition of the old error, in taking shelter under monarchy or aristocracy, against the more oppressive tyranny of an illy constructed republic. But it is not the consequence of proper checks to change places between the majority and minority. It leaves the power controlled still independent; as is exemplified in our political institutions, by the operation of acknowledged checks. The power of the Judiciary to declare an act of Congress, or of a State Legislature, unconstitutional, is, for its appropriate purpose, a most efficient check; but who that is acquainted with the nature of our Government ever supposed that it ever really vested (when confined to its proper object) a supreme power in the Court over Congress or the State Legislatures? Such was neither the intention, nor is it the effect.
The Constitution has provided another check, which will still further illustrate the nature of their operation. Among the various interests which exist under our complex system, that of large and small States is, perhaps, the most prominent, and among the most carefully guarded in the organization of our Government. To settle the relative weight of the States in the system, and to secure to each the means of maintaining its proper political consequence in its operation, formed one of the most difficult duties in framing the Constitution. No one subject occupied greater space in the proceedings of the Convention. In its final adjustment, the large States had assigned to them a preponderating influence in the House of Representatives, by having therein a weight proportioned to their numbers; but to compensate which, and to secure their political rights against this preponderance, the small States had an equality assigned them in the Senate; while, in the constitution of the Executive branch, the two were blended. To secure the consequence allotted to each, as well as to insure due deliberation in legislating, a veto is allowed to each in the passage of bills; but it would be absurd to suppose that this veto placed either above the other: or was incompatible with the portion of the sovereign power intrusted to the House, the Senate, or the President.
It is thus that our system has provided appropriate checks between the Departments—a veto to guard the supremacy of the Constitution over the laws, and to preserve the due importance of the States, considered in reference to large and small, without creating discord or weakening the beneficent energy of the Government. And so, also, in the division of the sovereign authority between the General and State Governments—by leaving to the States an efficient power to protect, by a veto, the minor against the major interests of the community, the framers of the Constitution acted in strict conformity with the principle which invariably prevails throughout the whole system, where separate interests exist. They were, in truth, no ordinary men. They were wise and practical statesmen, enlightened by history and their own enlarged experience, acquired in conducting our country through a most important revolution—and understood profoundly the nature of man and of government. They saw and felt that there existed in our nature the necessity of government, and government of adequate powers—that the selfish predominate over the social feelings; and that, without a government of such powers, universal conflict and anarchy must prevail among the component parts of society; but they also clearly saw that, our nature remaining unchanged by change of condition, unchecked power, from this very predominance of the selfish over the social feelings, which rendered government necessary, would, of necessity, lead to corruption and oppression on the part of those vested with its exercise. Thus the necessity of government and of checks originates in the same great principle of our nature; and thus the very selfishness which impels those who have power to desire more, will also, with equal force, impel those on whom power operates to resist aggression; and on the balance of these opposing tendencies, liberty and happiness must forever depend. This great principle guided in the formation of every part of our political system. There is not one opposing interest throughout the whole that is not counterpoised. Have the rulers a separate interest from the people? To check its abuse, the relation of representative and constituent is created between them, through periodical elections, by which the fidelity of the representative to the constituent is secured. Have the States, as members of the Union, distinct political interests in reference to their magnitude? Their relative weight is carefully settled, and each has its appropriate agent, with a veto on each other, to protect its political consequence. May there be a conflict between the Constitution and the laws, whereby the rights of citizens may be affected? A remedy may be found in the power of the courts to declare the law unconstitutional in such cases as may be brought before them. Are there, among the several States, separate and peculiar geographical interests? To meet this, a particular organization is provided in the division of the sovereign powers between the State and General Governments. Is there danger, growing out of this division, that the State Legislatures may encroach on the powers of the General Government? The authority of the Supreme Court is adequate to check such encroachments. May the General Government, on the other hand, encroach on the rights reserved to the States respectively? To the States respectively—each in its sovereign capacity—is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of interposition, to arrest the encroachment. And, finally, may this power be abused by a State, so as to interfere improperly with the powers delegated to the General Government? There is provided a power, even over the Constitution itself, vested in three-fourths of the States, which Congress has the authority to invoke, and may terminate all controversies in reference to the subject, by granting or withholding the right in contest. Its authority is acknowledged by all; and to deny or resist it, would be, on the part of the State, a violation of the constitutional compact, and a dissolution of the political association, as far as it is concerned. This is the ultimate and highest power—and the basis on which the whole system rests.
That there exists a case which would justify the interposition of this State, in order to compel the General Government to abandon an unconstitutional power, or to appeal to this high authority to confer it by express grant, the committee do not in the least doubt; and they are equally clear in the necessity of its exercise, if the General Government should continue to persist in its improper assumption of powers belonging to the State—which brings them to the last point they propose to consider—viz.: When would it be proper to exercise this high power?
If the committee were to judge only by the magnitude of the interests at stake, they would, without hesitation, recommend the call of a Convention without delay. But they deeply feel the obligation of respect for the other members of the confederacy, and the necessity of great moderation and forbearance in the exercise even of the most unquestionable right, between parties who stand connected by the closest and most sacred political compact. With these sentiments, they deem it advisable, after presenting the views of the Legislature in this solemn manner (if the body concur with the committee), to allow time for further consideration and reflection, in the hope that a returning sense of justice on the part of the majority, when they come to reflect on the wrongs which this and the other staple States have suffered, and are suffering, may repeal the obnoxious and unconstitutional acts—and thereby prevent the necessity of interposing the veto of the State.
The committee are further induced, at this time, to recommend this course, under the hope that the great political revolution, which will displace from power, on the 4th of March next, those who have acquired authority by setting the will of the people at defiance—and which will bring in an eminent citizen, distinguished for his services to his country, and his justice and patriotism, may be followed up, under his influence, with a complete restoration of the pure principles of our Government. But, in thus recommending delay, the committee wish it to be distinctly understood, that neither doubts of the rightful power of the State, nor apprehension of consequences, constitute the smallest part of their motives. They would be unworthy of the name of freemen—of Americans—of Carolinians, if danger, however great, could cause them to shrink from the maintenance of their constitutional rights. But they deem it preposterous to anticipate danger under a system of laws, where a sovereign party to the compact, which formed the Government, exercises a power which, after the fullest investigation, she conscientiously believes to belong to her under the guarantee of the Constitution itself—and which is essential to the preservation of her sovereignty. The committee deem it not only the right of the State, but her duty, under the solemn sanction of an oath, to interpose, if no other remedy be applied. They interpret the oath to defend the Constitution, not simply as imposing an obligation to abstain from violation, but to prevent it on the part of others. In their opinion, he is as guilty of violating that sacred instrument, who permits an infraction, when it is in his power to prevent it, as he who actually perpetrates the violation. The one may be bolder, and the other more timid—but the sense of duty must be weak in both.
With these views the committee are solemnly of the impression—if the present usurpations and the professed doctrines of the existing system be persevered in—after due forbearance on the part of the State—that it will be her sacred duty to interpose—a duty to herself—to the Union—to the present, and to future generations—and to the cause of liberty over the world, to arrest the progress of a usurpation which, if not arrested, must, in its consequences, corrupt the public morals and destroy the liberty of the country.
[ Note:— The above is indorsed, in the handwriting of the author— “Rough draft of what is called the South Carolina Exposition.” On the concluding page is written in the same hand:
“Concluded by a few remarks on the proposition for the State to impose an excise duty on protected articles, and on her consumption of the same. The first disapproved, and the last approved.
“And, finally, with sundry resolutions.”
These “remarks” are not preserved; nor the resolutions that accompanied the report. The committee, to whom the subject was referred, reported a series of resolutions, which the reader will find below. Whether they be identical with those referred to is a matter of conjecture. Those reported and adopted are in the following words]:
PROTEST
The Senate and House of Representatives of South Carolina, now met and sitting in General Assembly, through the Hon. William Smith and the Hon. Robert Y. Hayne, their Representatives in the Senate of the United States, do, in the name and on behalf of the good people of the said Commonwealth, solemnly protest against the system of protecting duties, lately adopted by the Federal Government, for the following reasons:
1st. Because the good people of this commonwealth believe, that the powers of Congress were delegated to it, in trust for the accomplishment of certain specified objects which limit and control them, and that every exercise of them, for any other purposes, is a violation of the Constitution as unwarrantable as the undisguised assumption of substantive, independent powers not granted, or expressly withheld.
2d. Because the power to lay duties on imports is, and in its very nature can be, only a means of effecting objects specified by the Constitution; since no free government, and least of all a government of enumerated powers, can, of right, impose any tax, any more than a penalty, which is not at once justified by public necessity and clearly within the scope and purview of the social compact; and since the right of confining appropriations of the public money to such legitimate and constitutional objects is as essential to the liberties of the people, as their unquestionable privilege to be taxed only by their own consent.
3d. Because they believe that the Tariff Law passed by Congress at its last session, and all other acts of which the principal object is the protection of manufactures, or any other branch of domestic industry, if they be considered as the exercise of a supposed power in Congress to tax the people at its own good will and pleasure, and to apply the money raised to objects not specified in the Constitution, is a violation of these fundamental principles, a breach of a well-defined trust, and a perversion of the high powers vested in the Federal Government for federal purposes only.
4th. Because such acts, considered in the light of a regulation of commerce, are equally liable to objection—since, although the power to regulate commerce, may like other powers be exercised so as to protect domestic manufactures, yet it is clearly distinguishable from a power to do so, eo nomine, both in the nature of the thing and in the common acceptation of the terms; and because the confounding of them would lead to the most extravagant results, since the encouragement of domestic industry implies an absolute control over all the interests, resources, and pursuits of a people, and is inconsistent with the idea of any other than a simple, consolidated government.
5th. Because, from the contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution in the numbers of the Federalist (which is cited only because the Supreme Court has recognized its authority), it is clear that the power to regulate commerce was considered by the Convention as only incidentally connected with the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures; and because the power of laying imposts and duties on imports, was not understood to justify, in any case, a prohibition of foreign commodities, except as a means of extending commerce, by coercing foreign nations to a fair reciprocity in their intercourse with us, or for some other bona fide commercial purpose.
6th. Because, whilst the power to protect manufactures is nowhere expressly granted to Congress, nor can be considered as necessary and proper to carry into effect any specified power, it seems to be expressly reserved to the States, by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution.
7th. Because, even admitting Congress to have a constitutional right to protect manufactures by the imposition of duties or by regulations of commerce, designed principally for that purpose, yet a Tariff, of which the operation is grossly unequal and oppressive, is such an abuse of power, as is incompatible with the principles of a free government and the great ends of civil society—justice, and equality of rights and protection.
8th. Finally, because South Carolina, from her climate, situation, and peculiar institutions, is, and must ever continue to be, wholly dependent upon agriculture and commerce, not only for her prosperity, but for her very existence as a State—because the valuable products of her soil—the blessings by which Divine Providence seems to have designed to compensate for the great disadvantages under which she suffers in other respects—are among the very few that can be cultivated with any profit by slave labor—and if, by the loss of her foreign commerce, these products should be confined to an inadequate market, the fate of this fertile State would be poverty and utter desolation; her citizens, in despair, would emigrate to more fortunate regions, and the whole frame and constitution of her civil polity, be impaired and deranged, if not dissolved entirely.
Deeply impressed with these considerations, the representatives of the good people of this commonwealth, anxiously desiring to live in peace with their fellow-citizens and to do all that in them lies to preserve and perpetuate the union of the States and the liberties of which it is the surest pledge—but feeling it to be their bounden duty to expose and resist all encroachments upon the true spirit of the Constitution, lest an apparent acquiescence in the system of protecting duties should be drawn into precedent—do, in the name of the commonwealth of South Carolina, claim to enter upon the journals of the Senate, their protest against it as unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust.
Which Exposition and Protest are respectfully submitted.
J. Gregg,Chairman.
THE FORT HILL ADDRESS: ON THE RELATIONS OF THE STATES AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
[July 26, 1831]
By 1831, Calhoun’s role in the “Exposition and Protest” had become a matter of common knowledge. As Calhoun himself notes in his introductory remarks to the editor of the Pendleton Messenger, his official role as president of the Senate had afforded him no opportunity to express his own position on the matter of the proper relation between the states and the general government. Calhoun, clarifying his own position, declares: “Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice, violence, and force must ultimately prevail.” Calhoun leaves no doubt that an improper answer to the question will mean nothing less than the total destruction of liberty.
While the Fort Hill Address is a forceful articulation of the states rights position on the federal-state question, its endorsement of the natural right of interposition is much more guarded. Calhoun’s sense of propriety as vice-president of the United States, as well as his hope of forging a new national coalition, prevented a more radical statement. Calhoun himself admits the cautious nature of his remarks when he notes in his letter to General Hamilton in August 1832 that his initial discussion in the Fort Hill Address “fell far short of exhausting the subject.” Still, the Fort Hill Address remains a critical document in American history, for it is Mr. Calhoun’s first public effort to generalize the controversy between South Carolina and the federal government.
Mr. Symmes: I must request you to permit me to use your columns, as the medium to make known my sentiments on the deeply important question, of the relation, which the states and general government bear to each other, and which is at this time a subject of so much agitation.
It is one of the peculiarities of the station I occupy, that while it necessarily connects its incumbent with the politics of the day, it affords him no opportunity officially to express his sentiments, except accidentally on an equal division of the body, over which he presides. He is thus exposed, as I have often experienced, to have his opinions erroneously and variously represented. In ordinary cases I conceive the correct course to be to remain silent, leaving to time and circumstances the correction of misrepresentations; but there are occasions so vitally important, that a regard both to duty and character would seem to forbid such a course; and such I conceive, to be the present. The frequent allusion to my sentiments, will not permit me to doubt, that such also is the public conception, and that it claims the right to know, in relation to the question referred to, the opinions of those, who hold important official stations; while on my part desiring to receive neither unmerited praise, nor blame, I feel, I trust the solicitude, which every honest and independent man ought, that my sentiments should be truly known whether they be such, as may be calculated to recommend them to public favor, or not. Entertaining these impressions, I have concluded that it is my duty to make known my sentiments: and I have adopted the mode, which on reflection seemed to be the most simple, and best calculated to effect the object in view.
The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained—on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legislature—and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other States. These Resolutions and this Report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M’Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail.
As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this reference to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately connected with this deeply important subject; but as there are many who may not have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and, as it is possible, however clear they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state, summarily, the doctrines which I conceive they embrace.
The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character already described; and that the several States, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, “to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.” This right of interposition, thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may—State-right, veto, nullification, or by any other name—I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political, or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions.
I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and, so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department), the right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the States, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make “its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers;” and that, “in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.” Language cannot be more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider, but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with me; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious examination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error, who deny, what seems to be an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the States; and who attribute to the General Government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted character; an error originating principally, as I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions.
It has been well said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the object of a constitution is, to restrain the government, as that of laws is to restrain individuals. The remark is correct; nor is it less true, where the government is vested in a majority, than where it is in a single or a few individuals—in a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the maxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to objects in which every portion of the community have similar interests; but it is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right; and, therefore absolute and unlimited. By nature, every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments, whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the laws that may benefit one, will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will; and such, I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests.
That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible to doubt. They are to be found in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small or homogeneous; and they constitute, everywhere, the great difficulty of forming and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in fact, what mainly renders a constitution indispensable; to overlook which, in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing interests which renders it the most difficult work of man.
Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free States of antiquity, the rational constitutional provision is, that each should be represented in the government, as a separate estate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England, the Constitution has assumed expressly this form; while in the governments of Sparta and Rome, the same thing was effected under different, but not much less efficacious forms. The perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the constitutions of these renowned States all their celebrity, which secured their liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and separate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear, to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation of liberty than the right of suffrage itself. They, in fact, have a common object, to effect which the one is as necessary as the other to secure responsibility; that is, that those who make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on whom the laws in reality operate—the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. If, without the right of suffrage, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers; and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We have wisely exploded all such distinctions; but we are not, on that account, exempt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry, and production; but are not, therefore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision, than where the distinct interests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into conflict, and more dangerous, when in that state, than those of any other description; so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not formed, in an extensive territory, separate and independent communities, or subjected the whole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country.
So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each great and leading interest, a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of government were divided, not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One General Government was formed for the whole, to which were delegated all the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all the States, leaving others subject to the separate control of the States, being, from their local and peculiar character, such, that they could not be subject to the will of a majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subjected, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the control of the States separately, to whose custody only, they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all the States are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphatically American, without example or parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and those of the States as a whole, each in its proper sphere, sovereign and independent; each perfectly adapted to its respective objects; the States acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests; and acting jointly through one General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitution, representing and protecting the interest of the whole; and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred distribution, as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orbit, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which, the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty depends. How is this to be effected?
The question is new, when applied to our peculiar political organization, where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by distinct, but connected governments; but it is, in reality, an old question under a new form, long since perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been separately represented in any government; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be preserved—the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free—to give to each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments, the interests it particularly represents: a principle which all of our constitutions recognize in the distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to maintain the independence of each; but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers between the states and General Government. So essential is the principle, that, to withhold the right from either, where the sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to consolidate, in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right, all powers of government; for it is not possible to distinguish, practically, between a government having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized, but connected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has already been shown.
These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible; and I am at a loss to understand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history, or studied the principles of free governments to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact that, in every free State there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain the contrariety of opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract consideration of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too much, in this case, to be in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the danger is much less from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a nature may be abused by a State; but when I reflect that the States unanimously called the General Government into existence with all of its powers, which they freely delegated on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety, and prosperity required it; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollection of common suffering and common triumph in the great and splendid achievement of their independence; and that the strongest feelings of our nature, and among them the love of national power and distinction, are on the side of the Union; it does seem to me that the fear which would strip the States of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peaceable protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship when they created the General Government, is unnatural and unreasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system cannot be trusted to preserve it, what power can?
So, far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free State in which this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting interests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government and a State come into conflict, we have a higher remedy: the power which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all of its authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The States themselves may be appealed to—three-fourths of which, in fact, form a power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may compel the Government, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its infraction, to the parties who created it; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal project of giving to the General Government the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitution—thereby reversing the whole system, making that instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority which imposed it, and from which the Government itself derives its existence.
That such would be the result, were the right in question vested in the Legislative or Executive branch of the Government, is conceded by all. No one has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the right, or to deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences which I have stated would necessarily follow; but its advocates have been reconciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that there is one department of the General Government which, from its peculiar organization, affords an independent tribunal, through which the Government may exercise the high authority, which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all.
I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the Judiciary Department. I am fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it, to the fullest extent, in its constitutional powers and independence; but it is impossible for me to believe, that it was ever intended by the Constitution, that it should exercise the power in question, or that it is competent to do so; and, if it were, that it would be a safe depository of the power.
Its powers are judicial, and not political; and are expressly confined by the Constitution “to all cases in law and equality arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority;” and which I have high authority in asserting, excludes political questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the process of the court.1 Nor is its incompetency less clear than its want of constitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance. The Tariff itself is a strong case in point; and the reason applies equally to all others where Congress perverts a power from an object intended, to one not intended, the most insidious and dangerous of all infractions; and which may be extended to all of its powers, more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But, supposing it competent to take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objection still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in question.
It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to protect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents—a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the interests of the whole, may encroach on the States, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former.
In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the Government, through all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents; and that the power which really controls, ultimately, all the movements is not in the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To understand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents to this high controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compounded of the majority of the States, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the States, estimated in federal numbers. These, united, constitute the real and final power which impels and directs the movements of the General Government. The majority of the States elect the majority of the Senate; of the people of the States, that of the House of Representatives; the two united, the President; and the President and a majority of the Senate appoint the judges; a majority of whom, and a majority of the Senate and House, with the President, really exercise all of the powers of the Government, with the exception of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a majority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legislative or executive representative; and to confide “the power to the Judiciary to determine finally and conclusively, what powers are delegated, and what reserved, would be, in reality, to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways; and, of course, to subject (against the fundamental principle of our system and all sound political reasoning) the reserved powers of the States, with all of the local and peculiar interests they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority.
But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this point would have been long since settled forever by the State of Virginia. The report of her Legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says: “It has been objected” (to the right of a State to interpose for the protection of her reserved rights) “that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the Constitution could never draw within the control of the Judicial Department; secondly, that, if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the Judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases, in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the Judicial Department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the grant of the Constitution, and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by another—by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or legislative.”
Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected, that, if one of the parties has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other; and that, consequently, in cases of contested powers between a State and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts; and that, of course, it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption that the General Government is a party to the constitutional compact. The States, as has been shown, formed the compact, acting as Sovereign and independent communities. The General Government is but its creature; and though, in reality, a government, with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government, within the orbit of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact between sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and object, of the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which all are jointly concerned; but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power than if it did not exist. To deny this would be to deny the most incontestable facts, and the clearest conclusions; while to acknowledge its truth is, to destroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed. For if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of government, the final cognizance of a question of contested power would be in the States, and not in the General Government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in all similar cases of a contest between one or more of the principals and a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are the plain dictates of both reason and analogy. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cognizance, as against the principals, much less to use force against them to maintain their construction of their powers. Such a right would be monstrous; and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases.
That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the States and the General Government, we have the authority, not only of reason and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after long experience and mature reflection, says, “With respect to our State and Federal Governments, I do not think their relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former are subordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate departments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask, If the two departments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to decide between them? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground; but, if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the States must be called to ascribe the doubtful power to that department which they may think best.”
It is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode of making them, has, by a simple contrivance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes effectually the necessity, and even the pretext for force: a power to which none can fairly object; with which the interests of all are safe; which can definitively close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual, and, at the same time, consistent with what are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our Government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations; but, if not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that, where the majority rules, the minority is the subject; and that, if we should absurdly attribute to the former, the exclusive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, between the sovereign and subject, under such a government, no Constitution; or, at least, nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument.
How the States are to exercise this high power of interposition, which constitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from a federal into a consolidated Government, is a question that the States only are competent to determine. The arguments which prove that they possess the power, equally prove that they are, in the language of Jefferson, “the rightful judges of the mode and measure of redress.” But the spirit of forbearance, as well as the nature of the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of dangerous infractions of the Constitution; and then only in the last resort, when all reasonable hope of relief from the ordinary action of the Government has failed; when, if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative would be submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the other. That our system should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate point between these dire alternatives, by which the Government may be brought to a pause, and thereby an interval obtained to compromise differences, or, if impracticable, be compelled to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment, through an appeal to the States themselves, is an evidence of its high wisdom: an element not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength; not of anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recognition would of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exercise, by impressing on the movements of the Government that moderation and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours; and would, if controversy should come, turn the resentment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers (a point all-important), and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution or overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute—where the alternative would be force—tending to prevent, and, if that fails, to correct peaceably the aberrations to which all political systems are liable, and which, if permitted to accumulate without correction, must finally end in a general catastrophe.
I have now said what I intended in reference to the abstract question of the relation of the States to the General Government, and would here conclude, did I not believe that a mere general statement on an abstract question, without including that which may have caused its agitation, would be considered by many imperfect and unsatisfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the case, I am compelled, reluctantly, to touch on the Tariff, so far, at least, as may be necessary to illustrate the opinions which I have already advanced. Anxious, however, to intrude as little as possible on the public attention, I will be as brief as possible; and with that view, will, as far as may be consistent with my object, avoid all debatable topics.
Whatever diversity of opinion may exist in relation to the principle, or the effect on the productive industry of the country, of the present, or any other Tariff of protection, there are certain political consequences flowing from the present which none can doubt, and all must deplore. It would be in vain to attempt to conceal that it has divided the country into two great geographical divisions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at least, if not interests also, on some of the most vital of political subjects—on its finance, its commerce, and its industry—subjects calculated, above all others, in time of peace, to produce excitement, and in relation to which the Tariff has placed the sections in question in deep and dangerous conflict. If there be any point on which the (I was going to say, southern section, but to avoid, as far as possible, the painful feelings such discussions are calculated to excite, I shall say) weaker of the two sections is unanimous, it is, that its prosperity depends, in a great measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical, and, as far as possible, equal disbursements of the public revenue, and unshackled industry—leaving them to pursue whatever may appear most advantageous to their interests. From the Potomac to the Mississippi, there are few, indeed, however divided on other points, who would not, if dependent on their volition, and if they regarded the interest of their particular section only, remove from commerce and industry every shackle, reduce the revenue to the lowest point that the wants of the Government fairly required, and restrict the appropriations to the most moderate scale consistent with the peace, the security, and the engagements of the public; and who do not believe that the opposite system is calculated to throw on them an unequal burden, to repress their prosperity, and to encroach on their enjoyment.
On all these deeply important measures, the opposite opinion prevails, if not with equal unanimity, with at least a greatly preponderating majority, in the other and stronger section; so much so, that no two distinct nations ever entertained more opposite views of policy than these two sections do, on all the important points to which I have referred. Nor is it less certain that this unhappy conflict, flowing directly from the Tariff, has extended itself to the halls of legislation, and has converted the deliberations of Congress into an annual struggle between the two sections; the stronger to maintain and increase the superiority it has already acquired, and the other to throw off or diminish its burdens: a struggle in which all the noble and generous feelings of patriotism are gradually subsiding into sectional and selfish attachments.2 Nor has the effect of this dangerous conflict ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on the important point already stated, but on the deeper and more dangerous questions, the constitutionality of a protective Tariff, and the general principles and theory of the Constitution itself: the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority, giving a construction to the instrument which the other believes would convert the General Government into a consolidated, irresponsible government, with the total destruction of liberty; and the weaker, seeing no hope of relief with such assumption of powers, turning its eye to the reserved sovereignty of the States, as the only refuge from oppression. I shall not extend these remarks, as I might, by showing that, while the effect of the system of protection was rapidly alienating one section, it was not less rapidly, by its necessary operation, distracting and corrupting the other; and, between the two, subjecting the administration to violent and sudden changes, totally inconsistent with all stability and wisdom in the management of the affairs of the nation, of which we already see fearful symptoms. Nor do I deem it necessary to inquire whether this unhappy conflict grows out of true or mistaken views of interest on either or both sides. Regarded in either light, it ought to admonish us of the extreme danger to which our system is exposed, and the great moderation and wisdom necessary to preserve it. If it comes from mistaken views—if the interests of the two sections, as affected by the Tariff, be really the same, and the system, instead of acting unequally, in reality diffuses equal blessings, and imposes equal burdens on every part—it ought to teach us how liable those who are differently situated, and who view their interests under different aspects, are to come to different conclusions, even when their interests are strictly the same; and, consequently, with what extreme caution any system of policy ought to be adopted, and with what a spirit of moderation pursued, in a country of such great extent and diversity as ours. But if, on the contrary, the conflict springs really from contrariety of interests—if the burden be on one side, and the benefit on the other—then are we taught a lesson not less important, how little regard we have for the interests of others while in pursuit of our own; or, at least, how apt we are to consider our own interest the interest of all others; and, of course, how great the danger, in a country of such acknowledged diversity of interests, of the oppression of the feebler by the stronger interest, and, in consequence of it, of the most fatal sectional conflicts. But whichever may be the cause, the real or supposed diversity of interest, it cannot be doubted that the political consequences of the prohibitory system, be its effects in other respects beneficial or otherwise, are really such as I have stated; nor can it be doubted that a conflict between the great sections, on questions so vitally important, indicates a condition of the country so distempered and dangerous, as to demand the most serious and prompt attention. It is only when we come to consider of the remedy, that, under the aspect I am viewing the subject, there can be, among the informed and considerate, any diversity of opinion.
Those who have not duly reflected on its dangerous and inveterate character, suppose that the disease will cure itself; that events ought to be left to take their own course; and that experience, in a short time, will prove that the interest of the whole community is the same in reference to the Tariff, or, at least, whatever diversity there may now be, time will assimilate. Such has been their language from the beginning, but, unfortunately, the progress of events has been the reverse. The country is now more divided than in 1824, and then more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but the opposite sides are, beyond dispute, more determined and excited than at any preceding period. Formerly, the system was resisted mainly as inexpedient; but now, as unconstitutional, unequal, unjust, and oppressive. Then, relief was sought exclusively from the General Government; but now, many, driven to despair, are raising their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the States as the only refuge. If we turn from the past and present to the future, we shall find nothing to lessen, but much to aggravate the danger. The increasing embarrassment and distress of the staple States, the growing conviction, from experience, that they are caused by the prohibitory system principally, and that, under its continued operation, their present pursuits must become profitless, and with a conviction that their great and peculiar agricultural capital cannot be diverted from its ancient and hereditary channels without ruinous losses—all concur to increase, instead of dispelling, the gloom that hangs over the future. In fact, to those who will duly reflect on the subject, the hope that the disease will cure itself must appear perfectly illusory. The question is, in reality, one between the exporting and non-exporting interests of the country. Were there no exports, there would be no tariff. It would be perfectly useless. On the contrary, so long as there are States which raise the great agricultural staples, with the view of obtaining their supplies, and which must depend on the general market of the world for their sales, the conflict must remain, if the system should continue, and the disease become more and more inveterate. Their interest, and that of those who, by high duties, would confine the purchase of their supplies to the home market, must, from the nature of things, in reference to the Tariff, be in conflict. Till, then, we cease to raise the great staples, cotton, rice, and tobacco, for the general market, and till we can find some other profitable investment for the immense amount of capital and labor now employed in their production, the present unhappy and dangerous conflict cannot terminate, unless with the prohibitory system itself.
In the mean time, while idly waiting for its termination through its own action, the progress of events in another quarter is rapidly bringing the contest to an immediate and decisive issue. We are fast approaching a period very novel in the history of nations, and bearing directly and powerfully on the point under consideration—the final payment of a longstanding funded debt—a period that cannot be sensibly retarded, or its natural consequences eluded, without proving disastrous to those who attempt either, if not to the country itself. When it arrives, the Government will find itself in possession of a surplus revenue of $10,000,000 or $12,000,000, if not previously disposed of, which presents the important question, What previous disposition ought to be made?—a question which must press urgently for decision at the very next session of Congress. It cannot be delayed longer without the most distracting and dangerous consequences.
The honest and obvious course is, to prevent the accumulation of the surplus in the Treasury, by a timely and judicious reduction of the imposts; and thereby to leave the money in the pockets of those who made it, and from whom it cannot be honestly nor constitutionally taken, unless required by the fair and legitimate wants of the Government. If, neglecting a disposition so obvious and just, the Government should attempt to keep up the present high duties, when the money is no longer wanted, or to dispose of this immense surplus by enlarging the old, or devising new schemes of appropriations; or, finding that to be impossible, it should adopt the most dangerous, unconstitutional, and absurd project ever devised by any government, of dividing the surplus among the States—a project which, if carried into execution, would not fail to create an antagonist interest between the States and General Government on all questions of appropriations, which would certainly end in reducing the latter to a mere office of collection and distribution—either of these modes would be considered, by the section suffering under the present high duties, as a fixed determination to perpetuate forever what it considers the present unequal, unconstitutional, and oppressive burden; and from that moment it would cease to look to the General Government for relief. This deeply interesting period, which must prove so disastrous should a wrong direction be given, but so fortunate and glorious, should a right one, is just at hand. The work must commence at the next session, as I have stated, or be left undone, or, at least, be badly done. The succeeding session would be too short, and too much agitated by the presidential contest, to afford the requisite leisure and calmness; and the one succeeding would find the country in the midst of the crisis, when it would be too late to prevent an accumulation of the surplus; which I hazard nothing in saying, judging from the nature of men and government, if once permitted to accumulate, would create an interest strong enough to perpetuate itself; supported, as it would be, by others so numerous and powerful; and thus would pass away a moment, never to be quietly recalled, so precious, if properly used, to lighten the public burden; to equalize the action of the Government; to restore harmony and peace; and to present to the world the illustrious example, which could not fail to prove most favorable to the great cause of liberty everywhere, of a nation the freest, and, at the same time, the best and most cheaply governed; of the highest earthly blessing at the least possible sacrifice.
As the disease will not, then, heal itself, we are brought to the question, Can a remedy be applied? and if so, what ought it to be?
To answer in the negative would be to assert that our Union has utterly failed; and that the opinion, so common before the adoption of our Constitution, that a free government could not be practically extended over a large country, was correct; and that ours had been destroyed by giving it limits so great as to comprehend, not only dissimilar, but irreconcilable interests. I am not prepared to admit a conclusion that would cast so deep a shade on the future; and that would falsify all the glorious anticipations of our ancestors, while it would so greatly lessen their high reputation for wisdom. Nothing but the clearest demonstration, founded on actual experience, will ever force me to a conclusion so abhorrent to all my feelings. As strongly as I am impressed with the great dissimilarity, and, as I must add, as truth compels me to do, contrariety of interests in our country, resulting from the causes already indicated, and which are so great that they cannot be subjected to the unchecked will of a majority of the whole without defeating the great end of government—and without which it is a curse—justice: yet I see in the Union, as ordained by the Constitution, the means, if wisely used, not only of reconciling all diversities, but also the means, and the only effectual one, of securing to us justice, peace, and security, at home and abroad, and with them that national power and renown, the love of which Providence has implanted, for wise purposes, so deeply in the human heart; in all of which great objects every portion of our country, widely extended and diversified as it is, has a common and identical interest. If we have the wisdom to place a proper relative estimate on these more elevated and durable blessings, the present and every other conflict of like character may be readily terminated; but if, reversing the scale, each section should put a higher estimate on its immediate and peculiar gains, and, acting in that spirit, should push favorite measures of mere policy, without some regard to peace, harmony, or justice, our sectional conflicts would then, indeed, without some constitutional check, become interminable, except by the dissolution of the Union itself. That we have, in fact, so reversed the estimate, is too certain to be doubted, and the result is our present distempered and dangerous condition. The cure must commence in the correction of the error; and not to admit that we have erred would be the worst possible symptom. It would prove the disease to be incurable, through the regular and ordinary process of legislation; and would compel, finally, a resort to extraordinary, but I still trust, not only constitutional, but safe remedies.
No one would more sincerely rejoice than myself to see the remedy applied from the quarter where it could be most easily and regularly done. It is the only way by which those, who think that it is the only quarter from which it may constitutionally come, can possibly sustain their opinion. To omit the application by the General Government, would compel even them to admit the truth of the opposite opinion, or force them to abandon our political system in despair; while, on the other hand, all their enlightened and patriotic opponents would rejoice at such evidence of moderation and wisdom, on the part of the General Government, as would supersede a resort to what they believe to be the higher powers of our political system, as indicating a sounder state of public sentiment than has ever heretofore existed in any country; and thus affording the highest possible assurance of the perpetuation of our glorious institutions to the latest generation. For, as a people advance in knowledge, in the same degree they may dispense with mere artificial restrictions in their government; and we may imagine (but dare not expect to see) a state of intelligence so universal and high, that all the guards of liberty may be dispensed with, except an enlightened public opinion, acting through the right of suffrage; but it presupposes a state where every class and every section of the community are capable of estimating the effects of every measure, not only as it may affect itself, but every other class and section; and of fully realizing the sublime truth that the highest and wisest policy consists in maintaining justice, and promoting peace and harmony; and that, compared to these, schemes of mere gain are but trash and dross. I fear experience has already proved that we are far removed from such a state; and that we must, consequently, rely on the old and clumsy, but approved mode of checking power, in order to prevent or correct abuses; but I do trust that, though far from perfect, we are, at least, so much so as to be capable of remedying the present disorder in the ordinary way; and thus to prove that, with us, public opinion is so enlightened, and our political machine so perfect, as rarely to require for its preservation the intervention of the power that created it. How is this to be effected?
The application may be painful, but the remedy, I conceive, is certain and simple. There is but one effectual cure—an honest reduction of the duties to a fair system of revenue, adapted to the just and constitutional wants of the Government. Nothing short of this will restore the country to peace, harmony, and mutual affection. There is already a deep and growing conviction in a large section of the country, that the impost, even as a revenue system, is extremely unequal, and that it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of paying the foreign exchanges of the country on which it is laid; and that the ease would not be varied, taking into the estimate the entire action of the system, whether the producer or consumer pays in the first instance.
I do not propose to enter formally into the discussion of a point so complex and contested; but, as it has necessarily a strong practical bearing on the subject under consideration in all its relations, I cannot pass it without a few general and brief remarks.
If the producer, in reality, pays, none will doubt but the burden would mainly fall on the section it is supposed to do. The theory that the consumer pays, in the first instance, renders the proposition more complex, and will require, in order to understand where the burden, in reality, ultimately falls, on that supposition, to consider the protective, or, as its friends call it, the American System, under its threefold aspect of taxation, of protection, and of distribution—or as performing, at the same time, the several functions of giving a revenue to the Government, of affording protection to certain branches of domestic industry, and furnishing means to Congress of distributing large sums through its appropriations; all of which are so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to understand its true operation without taking the whole into the estimate.
Admitting, then, as supposed, that he who consumes the article pays the tax in the increased price, and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers, without affecting the producers as a class (which, by the by, is far from being true, except in the single case, if there be such a one, where the producers have a monopoly of an article, so indispensable to life, that the quantity consumed cannot be affected by any increase of price), and that, considered in the light of a tax, merely, the impost duties fall equally on every section in proportion to its population, still, when combined with its other effects, the burden it imposes as a tax may be so transferred from one section to the other as to take it from one and place it wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to its operation as a system of protection:
The tendency of the tax or duty on the imported article is, not only to raise its price, but also, in the same proportion, that of the domestic article of the same kind, for which purpose, when intended for protection, it is, in fact, laid; and, of course, in determining where the system ultimately places the burden in reality, this effect, also, must be taken into the estimate. If one of the sections exclusively produces such domestic articles and the other purchases them from it, then it is clear that, to the amount of such increased prices, the tax or duty on the consumption of foreign articles would be transferred from the section producing the domestic articles to the one that purchased and consumed them—unless the latter, in turn, be indemnified by the increased price of the objects of its industry, which none will venture to assert to be the case with the great staples of the country, which form the basis of our exports, the price of which is regulated by the foreign, and not the domestic market. To those who grow them, the increased price of the foreign and domestic articles both, in consequence of the duty on the former, is in reality, and in the strictest sense, a tax, while it is clear that the increased price of the latter acts as a bounty to the section producing them; and that, as the amount of such increased prices on what it sells to the other section is greater or less than the duty it pays on the imported articles, the system will, in fact, operate as a bounty or tax: if greater, the difference would be a bounty; if less, a tax.
Again, the operation may be equal in every other respect, and yet the pressure of the system, relatively, on the two sections, be rendered very unequal by the appropriations or distribution. If each section receives back what it paid into the treasury, the equality, if it previously existed, will continue; but if one receives back less, and the other proportionably more than is paid, then the difference in relation to the sections will be to the former a loss, and to the latter a gain; and the system, in this aspect, would operate to the amount of the difference, as a contribution from the one receiving less than it paid, to the other that receives more. Such would be incontestably its general effects, taken in all its different aspects, even on the theory supposed to be most favorable to prove the equal action of the system, that the consumer pays, in the first instance, the whole amount of the tax.
To show how, on this supposition, the burden and advantages of the system would actually distribute themselves between the sections, would carry me too far into details; but I feel assured, after full and careful examination, that they are such as to explain, what otherwise would seem inexplicable, that one section should consider its repeal a calamity, and the other a blessing; and that such opposite views should be taken by them as to place them in a state of determined conflict in relation to the great fiscal and commercial interest of the country. Indeed, were there no satisfactory explanation, the opposite views that prevail in the two sections, as to the effects of the system, ought to satisfy all of its unequal action. There can be no safer, or more certain rule, than to suppose each portion of the country equally capable of understanding their respective interests, and that each is a much better judge of the effects of any system or measures on its peculiar interests than the other can possibly be.
But, whether the opinion of its unequal action be correct or erroneous, nothing can be more certain than that the impression is widely extending itself, that the system, under all its modifications, is essentially unequal; and if to this be added, a conviction still deeper and more universal, that every duty imposed for the purpose of protection is not only unequal, but also unconstitutional, it would be a fatal error to suppose that any remedy, short of that which I have stated, can heal our political disorders.
In order to understand more fully the difficulty of adjusting this unhappy contest on any other ground, it may not be improper to present a general view of the constitutional objection, that it may be clearly seen how hopeless it is to expect that it can be yielded by those who have embraced it.
They believe that all the powers vested by the Constitution in Congress are, not only restricted by the limitations expressly imposed, but also by the nature and object of the powers themselves. Thus, though the power to impose duties on imports be granted in general terms, without any other express limitations, but that they shall be equal, and no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another, yet, as being a portion of the taxing power, given with the view of raising revenue, it is, from its nature, restricted to that object, as much so as if the Convention had expressly so limited it; and that to use it to effect any other purpose, not specified in the Constitution, is an infraction of the instrument in its most dangerous form—an infraction by perversion, more easily made, and more difficult to resist, than any other. The same view is believed to be applicable to the power of regulating commerce, as well as all the other powers. To surrender this important principle, it is conceived, would be to surrender all power, and to render the Government unlimited and despotic; and to yield it up, in relation to the particular power in question, would be, in fact, to surrender the control of the whole industry and capital of the country to the General Government, and would end in placing the weaker section in a colonial relation towards the stronger. For nothing are more dissimilar in their nature, or may be more unequally affected by the same laws, than different descriptions of labor and property; and if taxes, by increasing the amount and changing the intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of penalties and rewards, it would give all the power that could be desired to subject the labor and property of the minority to the will of the majority, to be regulated without regarding the interest of the former in subserviency to the will of the latter. Thus thinking, it would seem unreasonable to expect, that any adjustment, based on the recognition of the correctness of a construction of the Constitution which would admit the exercise of such a power, would satisfy the weaker of two sections, particularly with its peculiar industry and property, which experience has shown may be so injuriously affected by its exercise. Thus much for one side.
The just claim of the other ought to be equally respected. Whatever excitement the system has justly caused in certain portions of our country, I hope and believe all will conceive that the change should be made with the least possible detriment to the interests of those who may be liable to be affected by it; consistently, with what is justly due to others, and the principles of the Constitution. To effect this will require the kindest spirit of conciliation and the utmost skill; but, even with these, it will be impossible to make the transition without a shock, greater or less; though I trust, if judiciously effected, it will not be without many compensating advantages. That there will be some such, cannot be doubted. It will, at least, be followed by greater stability, and will tend to harmonize the manufacturing with all the other great interests of the country, and bind the whole in mutual affection. But these are not all. Another advantage of essential importance to the ultimate prosperity of our manufacturing industry will follow. It will cheapen production; and, in that view, the loss of any one branch will be nothing like in proportion to the reduction of duty on that particular branch. Every reduction will, in fact, operate as a bounty to every other branch except the one reduced; and thus the effect of a general reduction will be to cheapen, universally, the price of production, by cheapening living, wages, and material, so as to give, if not equal profits after the reduction—profits by no means reduced proportionally to the duties—an effect which, as it regards the foreign markets, is of the utmost importance. It must be apparent, on reflection, that the means adopted to secure the home market for our manufactures are precisely the opposite of those necessary to obtain the foreign. In the former, the increased expense of production, in consequence of a system of protection, may be more than compensated by the increased price at home of the article protected; but in the latter, this advantage is lost; and, as there is no other corresponding compensation, the increased cost of production must be a dead loss in the foreign market. But whether these advantages, and many others that might be mentioned, will ultimately compensate to the full extent or not the loss to the manufacturers, on the reduction of the duties, certain it is, that we have approached a point at which a great change cannot be much longer delayed; and that the more promptly it may be met, the less excitement there will be, and the greater leisure and calmness for a cautious and skilful operation in making the transition; and which it becomes those more immediately interested duly to consider. Nor ought they to overlook, in considering the question, the different character of the claims of the two sides. The one asks from Government no advantage, but simply to be let alone in the undisturbed possession of their natural advantages, and to secure which, as far as was consistent with the other objects of the Constitution, was one of their leading motives in entering into the Union; while the other side claims, for the advancement of their prosperity, the positive interference of the Government. In such cases, on every principle of fairness and justice, such interference ought to be restrained within limits strictly compatible with the natural advantages of the other. He who looks to all the causes in operation—the near approach of the final payment of the public debt—the growing disaffection and resistance to the system in so large a section of the country—the deeper principles on which opposition to it is gradually turning—must be, indeed, infatuated not to see a great change is unavoidable; and that the attempt to elude or much longer delay it must, finally, but increase the shock and disastrous consequences which may follow.
In forming the opinions I have expressed, I have not been actuated by an unkind feeling towards our manufacturing interest. I now am, and ever have been, decidedly friendly to them, though I cannot concur in all of the measures which have been adopted to advance them. I believe considerations higher than any question of mere pecuniary interest forbade their use. But subordinate to these higher views of policy, I regard the advancement of mechanical and chemical improvements in the arts with feelings little short of enthusiasm; not only as the prolific source of national and individual wealth, but as the great means of enlarging the domain of man over the material world, and thereby of laying the solid foundation of a highly improved condition of society, morally and politically. I fear not that we shall extend our power too far over the great agents of nature; but, on the contrary, I consider such enlargement of our power as tending more certainly and powerfully to better the condition of our race, than any one of the many powerful causes now operating to that result. With these impressions, I not only rejoice at the general progress of the arts in the world, but in their advancement in our own country; and as far as protection may be incidentally afforded, in the fair and honest exercise of our constitutional powers, I think now, as I have always thought, that sound policy connected with the security, independence, and peace of the country, requires it should be done; but that we cannot go a single step beyond without jeopardizing our peace, our harmony and our liberty—considerations of infinitely more importance to us than any measure of mere policy can possibly be.
In thus placing my opinions before the public, I have not been actuated by the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive, on a question so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest, would argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the human heart. To avoid, as far as possible, the imputation of either, I have confined my statement, on the many and important points on which I have been compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispensable to the full understanding of my views; and if they should, on any point, be thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from any desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustrations to maintain positions, which so abound in both, that it would require a volume to do them any thing like justice. I can only hope the truths which, I feel assured, are essentially connected with all that we ought to hold most dear, may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in which I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them.
With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have, to escape the imputation of improper motives; though I have, without reserve, freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate public favor, but the opposite; which I greatly regret, as I have ever placed a high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it may, I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have formed my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examination, with all the aids which my reason and experience could furnish; I have expressed them honestly and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which, however interesting to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken into the estimate, where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally involved.
John C. Calhoun.
SPEECH ON THE REVENUE COLLECTION [FORCE] BILL
[February 15–16, 1833]
In December 1832, Calhoun resigned his position as vice-president of the United States to begin his new career as U.S. senator from South Carolina. Although there was some fear that if Calhoun arrived in Washington, D.C., to assume his duties in the Senate, President Jackson planned to have him arrested and tried for treason, Calhoun assumed his seat on January 4, 1833, without incident. Much to the dismay of his critics, Calhoun was credited with the modification of the tariff through the passage of legislation already being considered when he arrived in the Senate.
Beginning on February 15, Calhoun delivered over a two-day period what is probably the most stunning and powerful address of his entire career. Freed from the confines of his position as president of the Senate, he applied here the principles of the Fort Hill Address to the particular issue of the tariff. He condemned both the logic and intentions of the Force Bill that would have given President Jackson the authority to coerce South Carolina into obeying the tariff measures at hand, and he addressed directly those who charged him with having reversed his stand on the question of the tariff—a reversal they claimed was motivated by the bitterness of disappointed ambition. Undaunted by the personal assault on his character, Calhoun boldly proclaimed that “Death is not the greatest calamity . . . [but] loss of liberty and honor.” The Union may indeed be preserved through force, “but such a union would be the bond between master and slave—a union of exaction on one side and of unqualified obedience on the other.”
While Calhoun’s arguments were not compelling enough to convince his contemporaries to defeat the Force Bill, from that day until the outbreak of the Civil War, Calhoun was the foremost intellectual spokesman of the South.
Mr. President: I know not which is most objectionable, the provisions of the bill, or the temper in which its adoption has been urged. If the extraordinary powers with which the bill proposes to clothe the Executive, to the utter prostration of the constitution and the rights of the States, be calculated to impress our minds with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country, the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exaggerate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy is seized on, with a view to excite hostility against her, but too plainly indicates the deep decay of that brotherly feeling which once existed between these States, and to which we are indebted for our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of which alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to advert to all these misrepresentations; but there are some so well calculated to mislead the mind as to the real character of the controversy, and to hold up the State in a light so odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed.
Among them, one of the most prominent is the false statement that the object of South Carolina is to exempt herself from her share of the public burdens, while she participates in the advantages of the Government. If the charge were true—if the State were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy motives, mother as I consider her, I would not stand up on this floor to vindicate her conduct. Among her faults—and faults I will not deny she has—no one has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices—avarice. Her conduct, on all occasions, has been marked with the very opposite quality. From the commencement of the Revolution—from its first breaking out at Boston till this hour, no State has been more profuse of its blood in the cause of the country; nor has any contributed so largely to the common treasury in proportion to her wealth and population. She has, in that proportion, contributed more to the exports of the Union—on the exchange of which with the rest of the world the greater portion of the public burden has been levied—than any other State. No: the controversy is not such as has been stated; the State does not seek to participate in the advantages of the Government without contributing her full share to the public treasury. Her object is far different. A deep constitutional question lies at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at issue is: Has this Government a right to impose burdens on the capital and industry of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to benefit another? And I must be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so strong a disposition to misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrepresentations are calculated to make, I will dwell on the point under consideration for a few moments longer.
The Federal Government has, by an express provision of the constitution, the right to lay duties on imports. The State has never denied or resisted this right, nor even thought of so doing. The Government has, however, not been contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has gone a step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but for protection. This the State considers as an unconstitutional exercise of power—highly injurious and oppressive to her and the other staple States, and has, accordingly, met it with the most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at this time, into the argument as to the unconstitutionality of the protective system. It is not necessary. It is sufficient that the power is nowhere granted; and that, from the journals of the Convention which formed the constitution, it would seem that it was refused. In support of the journals, I might cite the statement of Luther Martin, which has already been referred to, to show that the Convention, so far from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left to the State the right to impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the several States to protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress has assumed, without any warrant from the constitution, the right of exercising this most important power, and has so exercised it as to impose a ruinous burden on the labor and capital of the State, by which her resources are exhausted—the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed—the means of education contracted—and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected. We have been sneeringly told that she is a small State; that her population does not much exceed half a million of souls; and that more than one-half are not of the European race. The facts are so. I know she never can be a great State, and that the only distinction to which she can aspire must be based on the moral and intellectual acquirements of her sons. To the development of these much of her attention has been directed; but this restrictive system, which has so unjustly exacted the proceeds of her labor, to be bestowed on other sections, has so impaired the resources of the State, that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry up the means of education, and with it, deprive her of the only source through which she can aspire to distinction.
There is another misstatement, as to the nature of the controversy, so frequently made in debate, and so well calculated to mislead, that I feel bound to notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the constitution and laws of the United States; and to rebut this supposed claim, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Rives) has gravely quoted the constitution, to prove that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme laws of the land—as if the State claimed the right to act contrary to this provision of the constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous: her object is not to resist laws made in pursuance of the constitution, but those made without its authority, and which encroach on her reserved powers. She claims not even the right of judging of the delegated powers, but of those that are reserved; and to resist the former, when they encroach upon the latter. I will pause to illustrate this important point.
All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers, and that the powers reserved are reserved to the States respectively. The powers, then, of the system are divided between the General and the State Governments; and the point immediately under consideration is, whether a State has any right to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the encroachments of the General Government. Without going deeply into this point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature and origin of the Government, there is a simple view of the subject which I consider as conclusive. The very idea of a divided power implies the right on the part of the State for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical when applied to power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in the separation of the parts. But in this sense it is not applicable to power. What, then, is meant by a division of power? I cannot conceive of a division, without giving an equal right to each to judge of the extent of the power allotted to each. Such right I hold to be essential to the existence of a division; and that to give to either party the conclusive right of judging, not only of the share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other, is to annul the division, and to confer the whole power on the party vested with such right.
But it is contended that the constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court the right of judging between the States and the General Government. Those who make this objection, overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the constitution. By turning to the tenth amended article of the constitution, it will be seen that the reservation of power to the States is not only against the powers delegated to Congress, but against the United States themselves; and extends, of course, as well to the judiciary as to the other departments of the Government. The article provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, or prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. This presents the inquiry, What powers are delegated to the United States? They may be classed under four divisions: first, those that are delegated by the States to each other, by virtue of which the constitution may be altered or amended by three-fourths of the States, when, without which, it would have required the unanimous vote of all; next, the powers conferred on Congress; then those on the President; and finally, those on the judicial department—all of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the constitution which organize the respective departments. The reservation of powers to the States is, as I have said, against the whole; and is as full against the judicial as it is against the executive and legislative departments of the Government. It cannot be claimed for the one without claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact, annulling this important provision of the constitution.
Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the subject, it has been urged that this power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by that portion of the constitution which provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority. I believe the assertion to be utterly destitute of any foundation. It obviously is the intention of the constitution simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the law-making and treaty-making powers; and to vest it with the right of applying the constitution, the laws, and the treaties, to the cases which might arise under them; and not to make it the judge of the constitution, the laws, and the treaties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws to the facts of the case, and deciding upon such application, constitutes, in truth, the judicial power. The distinction between such power, and that of judging of the laws, will be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknowledged power of the court in reference to treaties or compacts between sovereigns. It is perfectly established, that the courts have no right to judge of the violation of treaties; and that, in reference to them, their power is limited to the right of judging simply of the violation of rights under them; and that the right of judging of infractions belongs exclusively to the parties themselves, and not to the courts: of which we have an example in the French treaty, which was declared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its violation by the Government of France. Without such declaration, had a French citizen sued a citizen of this country under the treaty, the court could have taken no cognizance of its infraction; nor, after such a declaration, would it have heard any argument or proof going to show that the treaty had not been violated.
The declaration, of itself, is conclusive on the court. But it will be asked how the court obtained the power to pronounce a law or treaty unconstitutional, when they come in conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it possesses the right; but I can by no means concede that it was derived from the constitution. It had its origin in the necessity of the case. Where there are two or more rules established, one from a higher, the other from a lower authority, which may come into conflict, in applying them to a particular case, the judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favor of the superior against the inferior. It is from this necessity, and this alone, that the power which is now set up to overrule the rights of the States, against an express provision of the constitution, was derived. It had no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source, will be manifest from the fact that it is a power which, so far from being conferred exclusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to every court—inferior and superior—State and General—and even to foreign courts.
But the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) relies on the journals of the Convention to prove that it was the intention of that body to confer on the Supreme Court the right of deciding, in the last resort, between a State and the General Government. I will not follow him through the journals, as I do not deem that to be necessary to refute his argument. It is sufficient for this purpose to state, that Mr. Rutledge reported a resolution, providing expressly that the United States and the States might be parties before the Supreme Court. If this proposition had been adopted, I would ask the senator whether this very controversy between the United States and South Carolina might not have been brought before the court? I would also ask him whether it can be brought before the court as the constitution now stands? If he answers the former in the affirmative, and the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his elaborate argument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the report of Mr. Rutledge was not, in substance, adopted as he contended; and that the journals, so far from supporting, are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to maintain. I might push the argument much farther against the power of the court, but I do not deem it necessary, at least in this stage of the discussion. If the views which have already been presented be correct, and I do not see how they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the reserved powers were reserved equally against every department of the Government, and as strongly against the judicial as against the other departments; and, of course, were left under the exclusive will of the States.
There still remains another misrepresentation of the conduct of the State, which has been made with the view of exciting odium. I allude to the charge, that South Carolina supported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible for the protective system. To determine the truth of this charge, it becomes necessary to ascertain the real character of that law—whether it was a tariff for revenue or for protection—and, as involved in this, to inquire, What was the condition of the country at the period? The late war with Great Britain had just terminated, which, with the restrictive system that preceded it, had diverted a large amount of capital and industry from commerce to manufacturers, particularly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was a debt, at the same time, of one hundred and thirty millions of dollars hanging over the country, and the heavy war duties were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the question was presented, as to what point the duties ought to be reduced? This question involved another—at what time the debt ought to be paid?—which was a question of policy, involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected with the then condition of the country. Among the most prominent arguments in favor of an early discharge of the debt was, that the high duties which it would require to effect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the circumstances to which I have adverted. This view of the subject had a decided influence in determining in favor of an early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was, accordingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars, with the provision to apply the surplus which might remain in the treasury as a contingent appropriation to that fund; and the duties were graduated to meet this increased expenditure. It was thus that the policy and justice of protecting the large amount of capital and industry which had been diverted by the measures of the Government into new channels, as I have stated, was combined with the fiscal action of the Government, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of the debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers which would have followed a sudden and great reduction. Still, revenue was the main object, and protection but the incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures, and it proposed a heavy reduction on the then existing rate of duties. But what of itself, without other evidence, is decisive as to the character of the bill, is the fact that it fixed a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the protected articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles only. Woollen and cotton above the value of twenty-five cents on the square yard, though they were the leading objects of protection, were subject to a permanent duty of only twenty per cent. Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a protection of not more than nine per cent as fixed by the act, and of but fifteen as reported in the bill. These rates were all below the average duties as fixed in the act, including the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I have entered into some calculation, in order to ascertain the average rate of duties under the act. There is some uncertainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than thirty per cent ad valorem: showing an excess of the average duties above that imposed on the protected articles enumerated of more than ten per cent, and thus clearly establishing the character of the measure—that it was for revenue, and not protection.
Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our experience, I perceive but two errors in the act: the one in reference to iron, and the other the minimum duty on coarse cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as reported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still farther reduced in its passage through Congress. The duty, at first, was fixed at seventy-five cents the hundredweight; but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced, by a sort of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five cents. This injustice was severely felt in Pennsylvania, the State, above all others, most productive of iron; and was the principal cause of that great reaction which has since thrown her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy. The other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty was as much too high as that on iron was too low. It introduced, besides, the obnoxious minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended; and to that extent, I am constrained in candor to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise nothing, the protective principle was recognized by the act of 1816. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my observation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject—the question of the currency, then so urgent, and with which, as chairman of the committee, I was particularly charged. With these exceptions, I again repeat, I see nothing in the bill to condemn; yet it is on the ground that the members from the State voted for the bill, that the attempt is now made to hold up South Carolina as responsible for the whole system of protection which has since followed, though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was there ever greater injustice? And how is it to be accounted for, but as forming a part of that systematic misrepresentation and calumny which has been directed for so many years, without interruption, against that gallant and generous State? And why has she thus been assailed? Merely because she abstained from taking any part in the Presidential canvass—believing that it had degenerated into a mere system of imposition on the people—controlled, almost exclusively, by those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of the Government, and that without regard to principle or policy. Standing apart from what she considered a contest in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by both parties with a fury altogether unparalleled; but which, pursuing the course which she believed liberty and duty required, she has met with a firmness equal to the fierceness of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped. With a view of inflicting a wound on the State through me, I have been held up as the author of the protective system, and one of its most strenuous advocates. It is with pain that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject as that now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves the liberty of the country. I now regret that, under the sense of injustice, which the remarks of a senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins) excited for the moment, I hastily gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which has been made in reference to my course in 1816: not that there will be any difficulty in repelling the charge, but because I feel a deep reluctance in turning the discussion, in any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of so little importance as the consistency or inconsistency of myself, or any other individual, particularly in connection with an event so long since passed. But for this hasty pledge, I would have remained silent as to my own course on this occasion; and would have borne, with patience and calmness, this, with the many other misrepresentations with which I have been so incessantly assailed for so many years.
The charge that I was the author of the protective system has no other foundation but that I, in common with the almost entire South, gave my support to the tariff of 1816. It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may rest my defence, without taking any other, on the ground that it was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection; which I have established beyond the power of controversy. But my speech on the occasion has been brought in judgment against me by the senator from Pennsylvania. I have since cast my eyes over the speech; and I will surprise, I have no doubt, the senator, by telling him that, with the exception of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract nothing I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged in reference to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which is due to the occasion: taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was delivered, and bearing in mind that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection; for reducing, and not raising the duties. But, before I explain the then condition of the country, from which my main arguments in favor of the measure were drawn, it is nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a fact in connection with my speech, that is necessary to explain what I have called hasty and unguarded expressions. My speech was an impromptu; and, as such, I apologized to the House, as appears from the speech as printed, for offering my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected on the subject. It was delivered at the request of a friend, when I had not previously the least intention of addressing the House. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham, then, and now, as I am proud to say, a personal and political friend—a man of talents and integrity—with a clear head, and firm and patriotic heart; then among the leading members of the House; in the palmy state of his political glory, though now for a moment depressed—depressed, did I say? no! it is his State which is depressed—Pennsylvania, and not Samuel D. Ingham! Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under circumstances which, instead of depressing, ought to have elevated him in her estimation. He came to me, when sitting at my desk writing, and said that the House was falling into some confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I knew how difficult it was to rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced during the late war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it deserved, he requested me to say something to prevent the confusion. I replied that I was at a loss what to say; that I had been busily engaged on the currency, which was then in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been placed particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the committee on that subject. He repeated his request; and the speech which the senator from Pennsylvania has complimented so highly was the result.
I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice, to be borne in mind by those who would hold me accountable, not only for the general scope of the speech, but for every word and sentence which it contains? But, in asking this question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech. All I ask is, that I may be judged by the rules which, in justice, belong to the case. Let it be recollected that the bill was a revenue bill; and, of course, that it was constitutional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the measure is constitutional, all arguments calculated to show its beneficial operation may be legitimately pressed into service, without taking into consideration whether the subject to which the arguments refer be within the sphere of the constitution or not. If, for instance, a question were before this body to lay a duty on Bibles, and a motion were made to reduce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free; who could doubt that the argument in favor of the motion that the increased circulation of the Bible would be in favor of the morality and religion of the country would be strictly proper? Or, who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or morals of the country under the charge of the Federal Government? Again: suppose the question to be, to raise the duty on silk, or any other article of luxury; and that it should be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly consumed by the rich and extravagant—could it be fairly inferred that in the opinion of the speaker, Congress had a right to pass sumptuary laws? I only ask that these plain rules may be applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn almost entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred on the country in time of war, and which no one could doubt. The country had recently passed through such a state. The world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which no one could tell how soon again might return. Bonaparte had but recently been overthrown; the whole southern part of this continent was in a state of revolution, and threatened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it occurred, must almost necessarily have involved this country in a most dangerous conflict. It was under these circumstances that I delivered the speech, in which I urged the House that, in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a state of war as well as peace; and that its provisions ought to be fixed on the compound views of the two periods—making some sacrifice in peace, in order that less might be made in war. Was this principle false? and, in urging it, did I commit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and which has for its object the enriching of one portion of the country at the expense of the other?
The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure is proposed, the first thing is to ascertain its constitutionality; and, that being ascertained, the next is its expediency; which last opens the whole field of argument for and against. Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or unwise: so in a bill to raise imposts. It must