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Buchanan: A Bibliography of His Writings

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Source: The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Foreword by Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D. Tollison, 20 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999-2002). Vol. 20 contains an Index to the set and a bibliography of Buchanan's works. It is not available online except for this bibliography but it can be purchased from Liberty Fund's online catalog.

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BOOKS

  • James M. Buchanan, C. L. Allen, and M. R. Colberg, Prices, Income, and Public Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). Second edition (1959).
  • Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958).
  • Fiscal Theory & Political Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). Translated into Turkish (1965); Japanese (1972).
  • The Public Finances (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1960). Second edition (1965); third edition (1970); fourth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1975); fifth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1980); sixth edition, with Marilyn Flowers (1986). Translated into Spanish (1968); Japanese (1972).
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Paperback edition (1965). Translated into Japanese (1979); Spanish (1980); Romanian (1996); Russian (1997); Italian (1998).
  • Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). Translated into Japanese (1971); Spanish (1973); Chinese (1993); Polish (1997).
  • The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968). Translated into Italian (1968); Japanese (1974).
  • Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969). Reprinted by University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint (1978). Translated into Japanese (1988); Portuguese (1993).
  • James M. Buchanan and Nicos Devletoglou, Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
  • James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, eds., Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972).
  • James M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirlby, eds., L.S.E. Essays on Cost (London: London School of Economics, 1973). Reprinted by New York University Press, Institute for Humane Studies (1981).
  • The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Translated into Japanese (1977); Italian, partial (1979); German (1984); Czechoslovakian (1996); Romanian (1997); Russian (1997); Italian (1998).
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (New York: Academic Press, 1977). Translated into Japanese (1979); Korean (1981); Spanish (1983).
  • Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978). Translated into Italian (1990).
  • What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979).
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Translated into German (1988).
  • James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980).
  • James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, eds., The Theory of Public Choice—II (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984).
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Translated into Japanese (1989); Italian (1991); German (1993).
  • Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986; New York: New York University Press, 1986). Translated into Chinese (1990).
  • James M. Buchanan, Charles K. Rowley, and Robert D. Tollison, eds., Deficits (New York: Blackwell, 1987). Translated into Japanese (1991).
  • Essays on the Political Economy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989).
  • The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Translated into Japanese, partial (1992); Korean (1996).
  • Better than Plowing: And Other Personal Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
  • Ethics and Economic Progress (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994). Translated into Catalan, partial (1995); Spanish, partial (1995); Korean (1996); Spanish (1996); Japanese (1997).
  • James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, eds., The Return to Increasing Returns (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
  • Post-Socialist Political Economy: Selected Essays (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997).
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton, Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Toward Nondiscriminatory Democracy (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.)

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS

  • “Regional Implications of Marginal Cost Rate Making,” Southern Economic Journal 16 (July 1949): 53–61.
  • “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 57(December 1949): 496–505. In Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 8–23.
  • “Communication: Note on the Differential Controversy,” Southern Economic Journal 17 (July 1950): 59–60.
  • “Federalism and Fiscal Equity,” American Economic Review 40 (September 1950): 583–99. In Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 170–89; The Economics of Federalism, ed. B. S. Grewal, G. Brennan, and R. L. Mathews (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), 183–200; The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance, ed. Wallace E. Oates (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1998), 347–63.
  • “A Rejoinder,” Journal of Political Economy 59 (August 1951): 358–59.
  • “Knut Wicksell on Marginal Cost Pricing,” Southern Economic Journal 17 (October 1951): 173–78.
  • “Criteria for Government Expenditure: Comment,” Journal of Finance 6 (December 1951): 440–42.
  • “Federal Grants and Resource Allocation,” Journal of Political Economy 60 (June 1952): 208–17. “A Reply,” Journal of Political Economy 60 (December 1952): 536–38. In Perspectives on the Economics of Education, by G. C. S. Benson (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963).
  • “The Pricing of Highway Services,” National Tax Journal 5 (June 1952): 97–106.
  • “The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts,” Review of Economic Studies 20 (June 1953): 199–208.
  • “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 62 (April 1954): 114–23. In Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 75–89; Public Finance: Selected Readings, ed. Helen Cameron and William Henderson (New York: Random House, 1966), 158–74; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 171–83; The Aggregation of Preferences, vol. 1, Social Choice Theory, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 418–27. Translated into Italian (1972).
  • “Decisions Affecting Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 44 (May 1954): 228–31.
  • “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market,” Journal of Political Economy 62 (August 1954): 334–43. In Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 90–104; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 185–97; The Aggregation of Preferences, vol. 1, Social Choice Theory, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 428–37. Translated into Spanish (1982).
  • “Professor Maxwell and Fiscal Equity,” Journal of Finance 10 (March 1955): 70–71.
  • “Private Ownership and Common Usage: The Road Case Re-examined,” Southern Economic Journal 22 (January 1956): 305–16. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 344–58.
  • “The Capitalization and Investment Aspects of Excise Taxes under Competition: Comment,” American Economic Review 46 (December 1956): 974–77.
  • “External and Internal Public Debt,” American Economic Review 47 (December 1957): 995–1000.
  • Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology,” Southern Economic Journal 24 (January 1958): 259–70. Translated into German (1971).
  • “Saving and the Rate of Interest: A Comment,” Journal of Political Economy 67 (February 1959): 79–82.
  • “The Real Debt,” Challenge 7 (July 1959): 58–61.
  • “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy,” Journal of Law and Economics 2 (October 1959): 124–38. In Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 105–24; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 3–19.
  • James M. Buchanan and John E. Moes, “A Regional Countermeasure to National Wage Standardization,” American Economic Review 50 (June 1960): 434–38.
  • “The Methodology of Incidence Theory: A Critical Review of Some Recent Contributions,” in Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 125–50. Substantially modified version of Italian translation (1955).
  • “Politica economica, libere istituzioni e processo democratico” (Economic policy, free institutions and democratic process), Il Politico 25 (1960): 265–77; Italian translation.
  • “‘La scienza delle finanze’: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory,” in Fiscal Theory & Political Economy: Selected Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 24–74. In Public Debt and Future Generations, ed. J. M. Ferguson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 47–54; Altro Polo: Italian Economics, Past and Present, ed. Peter Groenewegen and Joseph Halevi (Sydney: Frederick May Foundation for Italian Studies, University of Sydney, 1983), 79–116; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 317–56. Translated into Italian (1980).
  • Francesco Forte and James M. Buchanan, “The Evaluation of Public Services,” Journal of Political Economy 69 (April 1961): 107–21. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 176–93. Translated into German (1969).
  • “Simple Majority Voting, Game Theory, and Resource Use,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27 (August 1961): 337–48.
  • “A Pricing Approach to Motor Vehicle Taxation,” Automobilissimo (October 1961): 1–19.
  • “Comment on Musgrave and Tiebout Papers,” in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 122–29. National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, 12.
  • Introduction to Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): xi–xiv. National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, 12.
  • “Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins,” Economica 29 (February 1962): 17–28. In Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy, ed. Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian (New York: Dunellen, 1972), 179–90; Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 169–82; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 83–95.
  • “Easy Budgets and Tight Money,” Lloyds Bank Review 64 (April 1962): 17–30. In Monetary Theory and Policy, ed. Richard Ward (Scranton: International Textbook, 1966), 164–77; Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 62–75; Readings in Macroeconomics, ed. William E. Mitchell, John H. Hand, and Ingo Walter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 235–44. Translated into Spanish (1962).
  • James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, “Externality,” Economica 29 (November 1962): 371–84. In A. E. A. Readings in Welfare Economics, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1969), 199–212; Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy, ed. Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian (New York: Dunellen, 1972), 277–90; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 97–111.
  • “The Relevance of Pareto Optimality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (December 1962): 341–54. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 215–34.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The Costs of Decision Making,” in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 97–116. In Economic Theories of International Politics, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Chicago: Markham, 1968), 455–71.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions,” in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 63–84. In The Economic Approach to Politics, ed. René Frey and Bruno Frey (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), 63–84. Translated into Italian (1972); German (1974).
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule,” in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 249–62. In Public Finance in Canada: Selected Readings, ed. A. J. Robinson and James Cutt (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), 60–73.
  • “Predictability: The Criterion for a Monetary Constitution,” in In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland B. Yeager (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 155–83; Money and Finance, ed. Deane Carson (New York: Wiley, 1966), 52–57.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables,” in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 211–31. Translated into Italian (1972).
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Simple Majority Voting,” in The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 131–45. In The Economic Approach to Politics, ed. René Frey and Bruno Frey (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), 131–45. In Economic Foundations of Property Law, ed. B. A. Ackerman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 238–47.
  • James M. Buchanan and Milton Z. Kafoglis, “A Note on Public Goods Supply,” American Economic Review 53 (June 1963): 403–14. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 194–207.
  • “The Economics of Earmarked Taxes,” Journal of Political Economy 71 (October 1963): 457–69. As “Earmarked Taxes,” in Public Finance, ed. R. W. Houghton (London: Penguin, 1970), 277–95; Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 106–22.
  • “Taxation: The Other Side of the Budget,” Newsletter, Joint Council on Economic Education (November 1963): 1–2, 6.
  • “Staatliche Souveränität, nationale Planung und wirtschaftliche Freiheit” (National sovereignty, central planning and economic freedom), ORDO Band 14 (Düsseldorf: Verlag Helmut Kupper, 1963), 249–58; German translation.
  • “What Should Economists Do?” Southern Economic Journal 30 (January 1964): 213–22. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 17–37; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 21–33; The Aggregation of Preferences, vol. 1, Social Choice Theory, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 438–47. Translated into Spanish (1984).
  • “Fiscal Institutions and Efficiency in Collective Outlay,” American Economic Review 54 (May 1964): 227–35. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 357–66.
  • James M. Buchanan and Francesco Forte, “Fiscal Choice through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation?” National Tax Journal 17 (June 1964): 144–57. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 228–45.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Economic Analogues to the Generalization Argument,” Ethics 74 (July 1964): 300–301.
  • “Confessions of a Burden Monger,” Journal of Political Economy 72 (October 1964): 486–88. The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in Economics, 68311 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill).
  • “Are Rational Economic Policies Feasible in Western Democratic Countries?” Il Politico 29 (1964): 801–8.
  • “Concerning Future Generations,” in Public Debt and Future Generations, ed. James M. Ferguson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 55–63.
  • “Public Debt, Cost Theory, and the Fiscal Illusion,” in Public Debt and Future Generations, ed. James M. Ferguson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 150–63.
  • “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica 32 (February 1965): 1–14. The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in Economics, 68155 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill). In Economic Theories of International Politics, ed. B. Russett (Chicago: Markham, 1968), 50–63; Readings in Microeconomics, 2d ed., ed. William Breit and Harold Hochman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 547–56; Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy, ed. Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian (New York: Dunellen, 1972), 321–33; Municipal Expenditures, Revenues, and Services, ed. W. Patrick Deatin (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1983), 20–30; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 207–21; The Theory of Market Failure, ed. Tyler Cowen (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1988), 193–208; The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance, ed. Wallace E. Oates (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1998), 456–69.
  • James M. Buchanan and Charles Plott, “Marshall’s Mathematical Note XIX,” Economic Journal 75 (September 1965): 618–20.
  • “Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers,” Ethics 76 (October 1965): 1–13. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 151–68. Translated into Italian (1972).
  • “A Note on Semantics,” The Exchange 26 (November 1965): 5–6.
  • “Critique of the Public Debt,” in Economic Issues and Policies, ed. A. L. Grey and J. E. Elliott (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), 185–90.
  • Foreword to The Politics of Bureaucracy, by Gordon Tullock (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 1–9. As the foreword to Tullock’s The Politics of Bureaucracy, in What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 161–73; foreword to The Politics of Bureaucracy, in Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 199–206.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Public and Private Interaction under Reciprocal Externality,” in The Public Economy and the Urban Community, ed. Julius Margolis (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1965), 52–73. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 113–39. Translated into Spanish (1982).
  • “Externality in Tax Response,” Southern Economic Journal 33 (July 1966): 35–42.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Gains-from-Trade in Votes,” Ethics 76 (July 1966): 305–6.
  • “Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (August 1966): 463–71.
  • “The Icons of Public Debt,” Journal of Finance 21 (September 1966): 544–46.
  • “Joint Supply, Externality, and Optimality,” Economica 33 (November 1966): 405–15.
  • “Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors,” in The Structure of Economic Science: Essays on Methodology, ed. Sherman Roy Krupp (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 166–83. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 115–42. Translated into German (1971); Spanish (1981).
  • “#x2018;Fiscal Policy’ and Fiscal Choice: The Effects of Unbalanced Budgets,” in Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 98–112. As “Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference,” in Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 76–84.
  • “An Individualistic Theory of Political Process,” in Varieties of Political Theory, ed. David Easton (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 25–37. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 223–35.
  • “Monetary and Fiscal Policies for Economic Growth in a Free Society,” Il Politico 31 (1966): 801–7. Translated into German (1967).
  • “Breton and Weldon on Public Goods,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 33 (February 1967): 111–15. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 208–12.
  • “Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction,” Western Economic Journal 5 (March 1967): 109–21.
  • “Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference,” Papers on Non-Market Decision Making 1 (March 1967): 1–10.
  • “Politics and Science: Reflections on Knight’s Critique of Polanyi,” Ethics 77 (July 1967): 303–10.
  • “Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Discussion,” Journal of Law and Economics 10 (October 1967): 193–97.
  • “The Optimality of Pure Competition in the Capacity Problem: Comment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81 (November 1967): 703–5.
  • “Can Federal Funds Save Our Cities?” in Our Cities in Crisis: Review and Appraisal (Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference on Economic Affairs) (Department of Economics, Georgia State College, Atlanta, Ga., May 1968), 29–36.
  • “Democracy and Duopoly: A Comparison of Analytical Models,” American Economic Review 58 (May 1968): 322–31. Translated into Spanish (1980).
  • “What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?” Economica 35 (May 1968): 185–90.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The ‘Dead Hand’ of Monopoly,” Antitrust Law and Economics Review 1 (summer 1968): 85–96. In Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 277–87.
  • “A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing,” Public Choice 5 (fall 1968): 1–17. In Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 153–66.
  • “Student Revolts, Academic Liberalism, and Constitutional Attitude,” Social Research 35 (winter 1968): 666–80. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 110–22.
  • James M. Buchanan and Marilyn Flowers, “An Analytical Setting for a Taxpayers’ Revolution,” Western Economic Journal 6 (December 1968): 349–59.
  • “A Behavioral Theory of Pollution,” Western Economic Journal 6 (December 1968): 347–48.
  • “Congestion on the Common,” Il Politico 33 (December 1968): 776–86.
  • “Social Insurance in a Growing Economy: A Proposal for Radical Reform,” National Tax Journal 21 (December 1968): 386–95. Exerpts in Poverty, Inequality and the Law, ed. B. Brudno (St. Paul: West, 1976), 557–58.
  • “Debt, Public,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4 (London and New York: Macmillan, 1968), 28–34. In The Reference Shelf, vol. 57 (no. 4), The Federal Deficit, ed. Andrew C. Kimmens (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1985), 11–23.
  • “An Economist’s Approach to ‘Scientific Politics’,” in Perspectives in the Study of Politics, ed. Malcolm B. Parsons (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), 77–88. In Coursebook for Economics: Private and Public Choice, ed. Richard Stroup, A. Studenmand, and James Gwartney (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 34–36; What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 143–59. Translated into Spanish (1987).
  • “Knight, Frank H.,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 17, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 424–28.
  • James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro, “Pragmatic Reform and Constitutional Revolution,” Ethics 79 (January 1969): 95–104. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 271–86.
  • “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure,” American Economic Review 59 (March 1969): 174–77. In Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy, ed. Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian (New York: Dunellen, 1972), 269–72.
  • “An Outside Economist’s Defense of Pesek and Saving,” Journal of Economic Literature 7 (September 1969): 812–14. Translated into German (1974).
  • “A Future of Agricultural Economics,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 51 (December 1969): 1027–36.
  • “The Calculus of Consent,” in Law and the Behavioral Sciences, ed. Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 56–75.
  • “Financing a Viable Federalism,” in State and Local Tax Problems, ed. H. Johnson (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 3–19.
  • “In Defense of Advertising Cartels,” in Pubblicita e Televisione (Rome: RAI, 1969), 84–93; Italian translation.
  • “Internal and External Borrowing,” in Public Finances, ed. R. W. Houghton (London: Penguin, 1969), 338–45.
  • “Is Economics a Science of Choice?” in Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek, ed. Erich Streissler (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 47–64. As “Is Economics the Science of Choice?” in What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 39–63; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 35–50.
  • “Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism,” Public Choice 8 (spring 1970): 29–43. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 238–50.
  • James M. Buchanan and Mark V. Pauly, “On the Incidence of Tax Deductibility,” National Tax Journal 23 (June 1970): 157–67. In Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 288–301.
  • “In Defense of Caveat Emptor,” University of Chicago Law Review 38 (fall 1970): 64–73.
  • “The ‘Social’ Efficiency of Education,” Il Politico 25 (fall 1970): 653–62. Translated into German (1971).
  • “Political Economy and National Priorities,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11 (November 1970): 486–92.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The Democratic Calculus,” in Frontiers of Democratic Theory, ed. Henry S. Kariel (New York: Random House, 1970), 78–80.
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, “An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization,” in The Analysis of Public Output, ed. Julius Margolis (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970), 139–58. In The Economics of Federalism, ed. B. S. Grewal, G. Brennan, and R. L. Mathews (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981), 235–53.
  • James M. Buchanan and C. M. Lindsay, “The Organization and Financing of Medical Care in the United States,” in Health Service Financing (London: British Medical Association, 1970), 535–85.
  • “Public Goods and Public Bads,” in Financing the Metropolis: Public Policy in Urban Economies, vol. 4, ed. John P. Crecine (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1970), 51–71.
  • “Taxpayer Constraints in Educational Finance,” in Economic Factors Affecting the Financing of Education, vol. 2, ed. Roe L. Johns and others (Gainesville, Fla.: National Educational Finance Project, 1970), 265–90.
  • “Equality as Fact and Norm,” Ethics 81 (April 1971): 228–40. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 231–52.
  • “The Backbending Supply Curve of Labor: An Example of Doctrinal Retrogression?” History of Political Economy 3 (fall 1971): 383–90. “The Backbending Supply Curve of Labor: Comment on Buchanan, with His Reply,” History of Political Economy 5 (spring 1973): 266–67. In Pioneers in Economics: Harold Hotelling, Lionel Robbins, Clark Warburton, John Bates Clark, Ludwig von Mises, vol. 40., ed. Mark Blaug (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 1–8.
  • “Principles of Urban-Fiscal Strategy,” Public Choice 11 (fall 1971): 1–16.
  • “Violence, Law, and Equilibrium in the University,” Public Policy 19 (winter 1971): 1–18.
  • Charles J. Goetz and James M. Buchanan, “External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply,” American Economic Review 61 (December 1971): 883–90. “External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply: Reply,” American Economic Review 63 (September 1973): 745–48. Translated into Japanese (1972).
  • “Economists, Government, and the Economy,” in Economic Policies in the 1970’s, ed. A. K. Ho, Michigan Business Papers, No. 57 (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Business Research, 1971), 1–14.
  • “How ‘Should’ Common-Access Facilities Be Financed?” in Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises on the Occasion of His 90th Birthday, September 29, 1971, vol. 2, ed. F. A. Hayek and others (Menlo Park: Institute for Humane Studies, 1971), 75–87.
  • “Public Finance and Academic Freedom,” AGB Reports 14 (January 1972): 9–18. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 253–70.
  • James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, “Pareto Optimality, Trade and Gains-from-Trade: A Comment,” Economica 39 (May 1972): 203–4.
  • “Rawls on Justice as Fairness,” Public Choice 13 (fall 1972): 123–28. In Social Justice and Classical Liberal Goals, vol. 3, Social Choice Theory, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 75–80.
  • “Wicksell on Fiscal Reform,” American Economic Review 42 (September 1972): 599–602.
  • “Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternate Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene,Journal of Law and Economics 15 (October 1972): 439–52. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 94–109; The Economic Foundations of Property Rights: Selected Readings, ed. Svetozar Pejovich (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), 66–79.
  • “Before Public Choice,” in Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, ed. Gordon Tullock (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1972), 27–37. In The Economics of Legal Relationships, ed. H. B. Manne (St. Paul: West, 1975), 67–77; Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 81–93.
  • “Comment on Shoup,” in Public Expenditures and Taxation (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), 62–66.
  • James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz, “Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model,” Journal of Public Economics 1 (1972): 25–43. In The Economics of Federalism, ed. B. S. Grewal, G. Brennan, and R. L. Mathews (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), 71–88.
  • “Laissez-Faire, Locational Patterns, Local Public Finance, and National Policy,” in The Family and Rural Community Development, ed. S. J. Richey (American Home Economics Association, 1972), 13–22.
  • “Notes on Irrelevant Externalities, Enforcement Costs and the Atrophy of Property Rights,” in Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, ed. Gordon Tullock (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1972), 77–86.
  • “Preliminary Notes on the Samaritan’s Dilemma,” in Economic Freedom, Growth, and Stability (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University Press, 1972), 15–23.
  • “Scelta sociale, democrazia e mercati,” in Economia del benessere e democrazia, ed. F. Forte and G. F. Mossetto (Milan: Franco Angeli Editore, 1972), 285–300.
  • “Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems,” in Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 11–23.
  • “Who ‘Should’ Pay for Common-Access Facilities?” Public Finance/Finance Publiques 27 (no. 1, 1972): 1–9.
  • “The Institutional Structure of Externality,” Public Choice 14 (spring 1973): 69–82.
  • “Reply to Leijonhufvud,” History of Political Economy 5 (spring 1973): 266–67.
  • “The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State,” Natural Resources Journal 13 (October 1973): 579–94. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 159–73.
  • “America’s Third Century in Perspective,” Atlantic Economic Journal 1 (November 1973): 3–12.
  • “A Defense of Organized Crime?” in The Economics of Crime and Punishment, ed. Simon Rottenberg (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973), 119–32.
  • “Inflation, Progression and Politics,” in The Impact of Economic Growth on Taxation (Madrid: International Institute of Public Finance, 1973), 45–56.
  • “Introduction: L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect,” in L.S.E. Essays on Cost, ed. J. M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirlby (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1973), 1–16.
  • “Social Choice and Freedom of Inquiry: The Internal and External Institutions for Decision Making in Higher Education,” in Grenzen der Demokratie? Probleme und Konsequenzen der Demokratisierung von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. L. Erhard, K. Bruss and B. Hagemeyer (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag GmbH, 1973), 387–406.
  • “Hegel on the Calculus of Voting,” Public Choice 17 (spring 1974): 99–101.
  • James M. Buchanan and Winston C. Bush, “Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution,” American Economic Review 64 (May 1974): 153–57. In Essays on Unorthodox Economic Strategies: A Memorial Volume in Honor of Winston C. Bush, ed. A. T. Denzau and R. J. Mackay (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1976), 57–64. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 186–93.
  • James M. Buchanan and T. Nicholaus Tideman, “Gasoline Rationing and Market Pricing: Public Choice in Political Economy,” Atlantic Economic Journal 2 (November 1974): 15–26.
  • “Federalne podatki akcyzowe i transfedowe,” in Politische Okonomie Kapitalizmie, ed. J. Gluchowski (Toru’n, Poland: 1974), 116–21.
  • “Podatki od zatrudnienia i system ubezoieczen spoleczhych,” in Polityka Finansowa w Kapitalizmie, ed. J. Gluchowski (Toru’n, Poland: 1974), 122–29.
  • “Public Choice and Public Policy,” in Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and Policies (Chicago: Farm Foundation, 1974), 131–36.
  • “Who Should Distribute What in a Federal System?” in Redistribution through Public Choice, ed. H. Hochman and G. Peterson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 20–42.
  • James M. Buchanan and Warren J. Samuels, “On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence,” Journal of Economic Issues 9 (March 1975): 15–35. In The Methodology of Economic Thought, ed. Warren Samuels (New Brunswick: Transactions Books, 1980), 517–40.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes,” American Economic Review 65 (March 1975): 139–47. “Reply,” American Economic Review 66 (December 1976): 983–84. In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence, ed. Roger D. Congleton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 31–42.
  • “A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory,” American Economic Review 65 (May 1975): 225–30. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 235–42; Social Choice Theory, vol. 2, Utilitarian and Contractarian Goals, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 267–72. Translated into Spanish (1984).
  • “Boundaries on Social Contract,” Reason Papers 2 (fall 1975): 15–28.
  • “Utopia, The Minimal State, and Entitlement,” Public Choice 23 (fall 1975): 121–26. In Social Choice Theory, vol. 3, Social Justice and Classical Liberal Goals, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 550–55.
  • “Public Finance and Public Choice,” National Tax Journal 28 (December 1975): 383–94. Translated into Turkish (1990).
  • “The Bases for Freedom in Society,” in The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 17–34. Translated into Yugoslavian (1989).
  • “Consumerism and Public Utility Regulation,” in Telecommunications, Regulation, and Public Choice, ed. Charles F. Phillips, Jr. (Lexington, Va.: Washington and Lee University Press, 1975), 1–22.
  • James M. Buchanan and T. Nicolaus Tideman, “Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority,” in Gold, Money and the Law, ed. Henry G. Manne and Roger Leroy Miller (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), 9–70.
  • James M. Buchanan and James Dean, “Inflation and Real Rates of Income Tax,” in Proceedings of the 67th Conference on Taxation, St. Louis, October 14–17, 1974 (Columbus, Ohio: National Tax Association, 1975), 343–49.
  • James M. Buchanan and Marilyn Flowers, “Local Government Expenditures: An Overview,” in Management Policies in Local Government Finance, ed. J. R. Aronson and E. Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: 1975), 25–41. In Local Government Finance, ed. J. Richard Aranson and Eli Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1981), 25–43.
  • “The Political Economy of Franchise in the Welfare State,” in Capitalism and Freedom: Problems and Prospects, ed. Richard T. Selden (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), 52–77. In The Economics of Legal Relationships, ed. H. B. Manne (St. Paul: West, 1975), 78–97. As “The Political Economy of the Welfare State,” in The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 174–93.
  • James M. Buchanan and T. Nicolaus Tideman, “Response to Comment,” in Gold, Money and the Law, ed. Henry G. Manne and Roger L. Miller (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), 125–30.
  • “The Samaritan’s Dilemma,” in Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, ed. E. S. Phelps (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), 71–85. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 169–85.
  • “The Justice of Natural Liberty,” Journal of Legal Studies 5 (January 1976): 1–16. In Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations: Bicentennial Essays 1776–1976, ed. Fred Glahe (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1978), 61–81; Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy, ed. Gerald O’Driscoll (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), 117–31; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 253–68.
  • “Adam Smith on Public Choice,” Public Choice 25 (spring 1976): 81–82.
  • “Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 84 (April 1976): 337–42. In The International Library of Macroeconomic and Financial History, vol. 3, Debt and Deficits: Debt Neutrality and the Theory of Fiscal Policy 1970s to 1990s, ed. Lakis C. Kaounides and Geoffrey E. Wood (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 74–87. Translated into Spanish (1982).
  • “Taxation in Fiscal Exchange,” Journal of Public Economics 6 (July–August 1976): 17–29. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 254–70. Translated into Spanish (1979).
  • “Government Transfer Spending,” in Government Controls and the Free Market: The U.S. Economy in the 1970s, ed. Svetozar Pejovich (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1976), 122–40.
  • “A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle,” Kyklos 29, fasc. 1 (1976): 5–25. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 194–211; Economics and Social Institutions, ed. Karl Brunner (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 59–78; Social Choice Theory, vol. 3, Social Justice and Classical Liberal Goals, ed. Charles K. Rowley (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 127–46.
  • “Methods and Morals in Economics: The Ayres-Knight Discussion,” in Science and Ceremony: The Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres, ed. William Breit and William Patton Culbertson, Jr. (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1976), 163–74. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 202–17.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The Politics and Bureaucracy of Planning,” in The Politics of Planning: A Review and Critique of Centralized Economic Planning, ed. A. Lawrence Chickering (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976), 255–73.
  • Preface to Essays on Unorthodox Economic Strategies: A Memorial Volume in Honor of Winston C. Bush, ed. Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1976), vi.
  • “Public Goods and Natural Liberty,” in The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam Smith, ed. Thomas Wilson and Andrew S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 271–86.
  • “School User Taxes and Economic Efficiency,” in Non-Public School Aid, ed. E. G. West (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), 116–20.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “The Expanding Public Sector: Wagner Squared,” Public Choice 31 (fall 1977): 147–50.
  • “Tax Reform in ‘Constitutional’ Perspective,” Invited Essay (September 1977): 1–5. In Congressional Record, vol. 197, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 December 1977), S–19929–19933; Law and Economics, ed. G. Skogh (Lund: Juridiska Foreningen, 1978), 103–20.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan,” Journal of Public Economics 8 (December 1977): 255–73. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 71–89; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 367–87; The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 2, Modern Public Finance, ed. A. B. Atkinson (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 353–60. Translated into Spanish (1979).
  • “Commentary,” in Income Redistribution, ed. Colin D. Campbell (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 99–101.
  • “A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy,” in Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 11–24; Anarchism, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 28–42; Schools of Thought in Politics 3, vol. 1, The State and Its Critics, ed. Andrew Levine (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 3–16.
  • “Law and the Invisible Hand,” in The Interaction of Economics and Law, ed. Bernard H. Siegan (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), 127–38. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 25–39.
  • “Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox,” in Markets and Morals, ed. Gerald Dworkin, Gordon Bermant, and Peter Brown (Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere, 1977), 69–84.
  • “Politics and Science,” in Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 64–77.
  • “Die Verfassung der Freiheit” (The constitution of freedom), in Zu den Grenzen der Freiheit, ed. Otto Molden (Vienna: Fritz Molden, 1977), 57–67; German translation.
  • “Why Does Government Grow?” Budgets and Bureaucrats, ed. Thomas Borcherding (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), 3–18.
  • “Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals,” American Economic Review 68 (May 1978): 364–78. In What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 219–29; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 269–75.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues,” Journal of Public Economics 9 (June 1978): 301–18. Translated into Spanish (1979).
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, “Dialogues concerning Fiscal Religion,” Journal of Monetary Economics 4 (August 1978): 627–36. Translated into Spanish (1984).
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, “Contemporary Democracy and the Prospect for Fiscal Control,” in Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, ed. James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 1–9.
  • “From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice,” in The Economics of Politics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), 1–20. In Constitutional Economics, IEA Masters of Modern Economics Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 29–45. Translated into Spanish (1980); Italian (1984).
  • Introduction to The Anatomy of Public Failure, by William Mitchell (Los Angeles: International Institute for Economic Research, 1978), 1–3.
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard Wagner, “The Political Biases of Keynesian Economics,” in Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy, ed. James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978). In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 309–408. Translated into Spanish (1984).
  • “Summing Up,” in The Economics of Politics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), 155–58.
  • “The Potential for Taxpayer Revolt in American Democracy,” Social Science Quarterly 59 (March 1979): 691–96.
  • “Constitutional Design and Construction: An Economic Approach,” Economia 3 (May 1979): 293–314.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax,” National Tax Journal 32 (June 1979): 11–22. In Municipal Expenditures, Revenues, and Services, ed. W. Patrick Deatin (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1983), 91–111.
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith, “Trying Again to Value a Life,” Journal of Public Economics 12 (October 1979): 245–48.
  • “Commentaries,” in Financing Social Security, ed. Colin Campbell (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 208–12.
  • “Constitutional Constraints on Governmental Taxing Power,” ORDO Band 30 (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1979), 334–59. In Wirtschaftspolitische Blatter, Heft 2 (Vienna, Austria, 1989), 183–93.
  • “The Economic Constitution and the New Deal: Lessons for Late Learners,” in Regulatory Change in an Atmosphere of Crisis: Current Implications of the Roosevelt Years, ed. Gary Walton (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 13–26.
  • “Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications,” Inaugural Lecture, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, IHS-Journal, Zeitschrift des Instituts für Höhere Studien, Wien 3 (1979): B1–B11. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 11–22. Translated into Turkish (1990).
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger Congleton, “Proportional and Progressive Income Taxation with Utility-Maximizing Governments,” Public Choice 34 (1979): 217–30.
  • “Public Choice and Public Finance,” in What Should Economists Do? (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979), 183–97. In Public Choice and Public Finance, Proceedings of 34th Congress, International Institute of Public Finance, Hamburg, 1978, ed. Karl W. Roskamp (Paris: Editions CUJAS, 1980), 11–18. Translated into Turkish (1989).
  • “Sector Publico versus Sector Privado” (The public sector versus the private sector in a market economy), in El Sector Publico en Las Economias de Mercado (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1979), 88–100; Spanish translation.
  • James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro, “Uncertainty, Subjective Probabilities, and Choice,” in Studi e Richerche, Scuola Superiore “Enrico Mattei” (Torino: Gialichelli, 1979).
  • James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro, “Cognition, Choice, and Entrepreneurship,” Southern Economic Journal 46 (January 1980): 693–701.
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith, “Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Agreement on Distributional Rules,” Economic Inquiry 18 (January 1980): 23–38.
  • “Comment on Lindsay and McKean Papers,” in Research in Law and Economics, Supplement No. 1, The Economics of Non-Proprietary Organizations, ed. R. O. Zerbe, Jr. (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1980), 234–37.
  • James M. Buchanan and António S. Pinto Barbosa, “Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory,” Kyklos 33, fasc. 1 (1980): 63–75.
  • Foreword to The Birth of the Transfer Society, by Terry L. Anderson and P. J. Hill (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1980).
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem,” Finanzarchiv 38, no. 1 (1980): 4–16. In Deficits, ed. James M. Buchanan, Charles K. Rowley, and Robert D. Tollison (New York: Blackwell, 1987), 79–92; The International Library of Macroeconomic and Financial History, vol. 3, Debt and Deficits: Debt Neutrality and the Theory of Fiscal Policy 1970s to 1990s, ed. Lakis C. Kaounides and Geoffrey E. Wood (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 74–87.
  • “Procedural and Quantitative Constitutional Constraints on Fiscal Authority,” in The Constitution and the Budget: Are Constitutional Limits on Tax, Spending, and Budget Powers Desirable at the Federal Level? ed. W. S. Moore and Rudolf G. Penner (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 80–84.
  • “Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society,” in Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 359–67. Translated into German (1987).
  • “Resource Allocation and Entrepreneurship,” The Arne Ryde Symposium on the Economic Theory of Institutions, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift (The Swedish Journal of Political Science) 5 (1980): 285–92.
  • James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan, “Tax Reform without Tears,” in The Economics of Taxation, ed. Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), 33–53.
  • James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, “The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs,” American Economic Review 71 (March 1981): 28–38. “The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs: Reply,” American Economic Review 74 (September 1984): 808.
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger Faith, “Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities,” Journal of Law and Economics (April 1981): 95–111.
  • “Revenue Implications of Money Creation under Leviathan,” American Economic Review 71 (May 1981): 347–51.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “The Normative Purpose of Economic ‘Science’: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method,” International Review of Law and Economics 1 (December 1981): 155–66. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 382–94; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 51–65.
  • James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, “An American Perspective: From ‘Markets Work’ to Public Choice,” in The Emerging Consensus? Essays on the Interplay between Ideas, Interests and Circumstances in the First 25 Years of the IEA (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1981), 79–97. In Constitutional Economics, IEA Masters of Modern Economics Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 17–28. As “L’Europe attend son James Madison,” Le libéral européen, 14 (July–August 1990): 32–36; modified French translation.
  • “Democracy and Keynesian Constitutions: Political Biases and Economic Consequences,” in Solutions to Unemployment, ed. David C. Colander (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), 27–31; Constitutional Economics, IEA Masters of Modern Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 91–112; The Politics of American Economic Policy Making, 2d ed., ed. Paul Peretz (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 249–61. Translated into Italian (1979, 1984).
  • “Equal Treatment and Reverse Discrimination,” in Social Justice, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 79–94. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 277–88.
  • “A Governable Country?” in Japan Speaks (Osaka, Japan: Suntory Foundation, 1981), 1–12.
  • “Möglichkeiten institutioneller Reformen im Rahmen kulturell geformter abstrakter Verhaltensregeln” (Prospects of institutional reform through changes in behavioral rules), in Evolutionismus oder vertragstheoretischer Konstitutionalismus? by Viktor Vanberg (Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr, 1981), 45–48; German translation.
  • Roger L. Faith and James M. Buchanan, “Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting,” Public Choice 37 (1981): 231–45. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 90–104. Translated into Japanese (1982).
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Der verteilende Staat: Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Umverteilung” (The transfer state: toward a theory of redistribution), Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 30 (1981): 103–28; German translation.
  • “What If There Is No Majority Motion?” in Toward a Science of Politics: Papers in Honor of Duncan Black, ed. Gordon Tullock (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1981), 79–90.
  • “The Related but Distinct ‘Sciences’ of Economics and of Political Economy,” special issue, Social Psychology and Economics, ed. Wolfgang Stroebe and Willi Meyer, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 21, pt. 2 (June 1982): 175–83. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 29–39.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics,” Economic Inquiry 20 (July 1982): 344–54. In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 194–205.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve,” Journal of Political Economy 90 (August 1982): 816–19. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 409–13.
  • “The Political Ambiguity of Reagan Economics: Marginal Adjustments or Structural Shift?” Journal of Monetary Economics 10 (November 1982): 287–96.
  • “Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence,” Literature of Liberty 5 (winter 1982): 5. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 73–74.
  • “Democracia Limitada o Ilimitada” (Limited or unlimited democracy), Conferencia Mont Pelerin, Estudios Publicos 6 (Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios Publicos, 1982), 37–52.
  • “The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy,” in Method, Process, and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises, ed. Israel M. Kirzner (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath, 1982), 7–20. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 67–80.
  • Foreword to Demain le capitalisme by Henri LePage (Lasalle: Open Court, 1982), vii–xi. Translated into Chinese.
  • Foreword to Freedom and Reform by Frank H. Knight (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), ix–xiv.
  • “Kommentar” (Commentary), in Ethik des Kapitalismus, ed. Peter Koslowski (Tübingen: Mohr, 1982), 69–80; German translation. Reprinted (1991). Translated into Chinese (1996); English (1996); Japanese (1996); Russian (1996).
  • “The Limits of Taxation,” in The Constitutional Challenge, ed. Michael James (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Centre for Independent Studies, 1982), 113–30. In Taxation: An International Perspective, ed. Walter Block and Michael Walker (Vancouver, Canada: Fraser Institute, 1984), 41–54.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Where Are We on the Laffer Curve? Some Political Considerations,” in Supply-Side Economics in the 1980’s (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, for Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Emory University Law and Economics Center, 1982), 193–96.
  • “The Public Choice Perspective,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 1 (January–April 1983): 7–15. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 19–27; Essays on the Political Economy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), 13–24.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes,” Economic Journal 93 (March 1983): 89–105.
  • “Monetary Research, Monetary Rules, and Monetary Regimes,” Cato Journal 3 (spring 1983): 143–46.
  • “Rent Seeking, Non-Compensated Transfers, and Laws of Secession,” Journal of Law and Economics 26 (April 1983): 71–85.
  • “Social Security Survival: A Public-Choice Perspective,” Cato Journal 3 (fall 1983): 339–54.
  • “The Achievement and the Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform,” in Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, ed. Horst Hanusch (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983), 15–25.
  • “Constitutional Contract in Capitalism,” in Philosophical and Ethical Foundations of Capitalism, ed. Svetozar Pejovich (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), 65–69.
  • “Fairness, Hope, and Justice,” in New Directions in Economic Justice, ed. Roger Skurski (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 53–89. (“Justice and Equal Treatment,” in Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s [Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986], 140–58, and “Rules for a Fair Game: Contractarian Notes on Distributive Justice,” in Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s [Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986], 140–58. Both papers originally part of “Fairness, Hope, and Justice.”)
  • “The Flat-Rate Tax and the Fiscal Appetite,” in New Directions in Federal Tax Policy for the 1980’s, ed. Charles Walker and Mark Bloomfield (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Capital Formation, 1983), 314–16.
  • “I limiti alla fiscalita” (Limits of fiscal authority), in La costituzione fiscale, ed. A. Martino (Rome: CREA, 1983), 17–34; Italian translation.
  • “Moral Community and Moral Order: The Intensive and Extensive Limits of Interaction,” in Ethics and Animals, ed. Harlan B. Miller and Willilam H. Williams (Clifton, N.J.: Humana Press, 1983), 95–102.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Normative Tax Theory for a Federal Polity,” in Tax Assignment in Federal Countries, ed. C. McLure (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1983), 52–65.
  • Geoffrey Brennan, James Buchanan, and Dwight Lee, “On Monopoly Price,” Kyklos 36, fasc. 4 (1983): 531–47. “On Monopoly Price: Reply,” Kyklos 38 (1985): 274–75.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital: A Constitutional Perspective on Fiscal Norms,” in Public Finance and Economic Growth, Proceedings of the 37th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Tokyo, 1981, ed. Dieter Biehl, Karl Roskamp, and Wolfgang F. Stolper (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 41–54.
  • “Verschuldung, Demos, und Wohlfahrtsstaat” (Debt, demos, and the welfare state), in Chancen und Grenzen des Sozialstäts, ed. Peter Koslowski, Philipp Kreuzer and Reinhard Löw (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983), 117–32; German translation. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 210–22.
  • “Alternative Perspectives on Economics and Public Policy,” Policy Report 6 (January 1984): 1–5.
  • “The Ethical Limits of Taxation,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 86 (April 1984): 102–14. In Limits and Problems of Taxation, ed. Finn R. Forsund and Seppo Honkapahya (London: Macmillan, 1985), 4–16; Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 165–77.
  • James M. Buchanan and Loren E. Lomasky, “The Matrix of Contractarian Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (autumn 1984): 12–32.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, “Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives,” American Behavioral Scientist 28 (November–December 1984): 185–201.
  • “Democracy in Deficit,” Manhattan Report 4 (1984): 6–9.
  • “La ricerca di rendite parassitazie e la ricezca dei profitti” (Rent seeking and profit seeking), in Scelte Pubbliche, ed. S. Carrubba and Domenico Da Empoli (Florence: L. Monnier, 1984), 245–60; Italian translation.
  • “Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transactions Cost,” in Ansprüche, Eigentum und Verfügungsrechte (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1984), 9–24. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 92–107; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 153–68.
  • “Schumpeter as Precursor to Non-Constitutional Public Choice,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 1 (1984): 51–53.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight Lee, “Some Simple Analytics of the Laffer Curve,” in Public Finance and the Quest for Efficiency, Proceedings of the 38th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Copenhagen, 1982 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1984), 281–95.
  • “Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform,” in Constitutional Economics: Containing the Economic Powers of Government, ed. Richard B. McKenzie (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1984), 21–34. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 55–69.
  • “The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing,” Economic Inquiry 23 (January 1985): 1–6. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 189–94; A Nation in Debt, ed. Richard Fink and Jack High (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), 102–7.
  • “Constitutional Democracy, Individual Liberty, and Political Equality,” Jahrbuch für neue politische ökonomie Band 4 (1985): 35–47. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 248–60. Translated into German (1987).
  • “Political Economy and Social Philosophy,” in Economics and Philosophy, ed. Peter Koslowski (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1985), 19–36. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 261–74.
  • “Politics and Meddlesome Preferences,” in Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment, ed. Robert D. Tollison (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), 335–42. In Clearing the Air, ed. Robert D. Tollison (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1988), 107–16.
  • Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, “Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2 (fall 1986): 215–27.
  • “The Relevance of Constitutional Strategy,” Cato Journal 6 (fall 1986): 513–17.
  • “Better than Plowing,” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 159 (December 1986): 359–75. In Recollections of Eminent Economists, vol. 2, ed. J. A. Kregel (London: Macmillan, 1989), 279–96; Essays on the Political Economy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), 67–85; Better than Plowing: And Other Personal Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1–18.
  • “Bibliography,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 4 (December 1986): 125–48; Scandinavian Journal of Economics 89 (1987): 17–38.
  • “Can Policy Activism Succeed? A Public Choice Perspective,” in The Monetary versus Fiscal Policy Debate: Lessons from Two Decades, ed. R. W. Hafer (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1986), 139–50.
  • “The Constitution of Economic Policy,” in Les Prix Nobel (Stockholm: Almquist and Wicksell International, 1986), 334–43. In Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 303–14; Science 236 (June 1987): 1433–39; American Economic Review 77 (June 1987): 243–50; Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, ed. James Gwartney and Richard Wagner (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), 103–14; The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 2, Modern Public Finance, ed. A. B. Atkinson (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 353–60. Translated into Japanese (1988); Russian (1997).
  • “The Economic Consequences of the Deficit,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 3 (1986): 149–56. In Symposium on Budget Balance, ed. Carol Cox (Washington, D.C.: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 1986), 11–18.
  • “First, the Academic Scribblers—Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes,” in The Reference Shelf, vol. 57 (no. 4), The Federal Deficit, ed. Andrew C. Kimmins (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1986), 42–54.
  • “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment,” in Real Business Cycles, Real Exchange Rates and Actual Policies, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 25, ed. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986), 245–57.
  • “La imposicion coativa en fase constitutiva” (Coercive taxation in constitutional contract), Hacienda Publica Espanola 100 (1986), 41–55; Spanish translation. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 309–28.
  • “Liberty, Market and State,” in Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 3–7. Translated into Polish (1987).
  • “Our Times: Past, Present, and Future,” in The Unfinished Agenda (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1986), 29–38.
  • “Political Economy: 1957–1982,” in Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 8–18. In Ideas, Their Origins, and Their Consequences: Lectures to Commemorate the Life and Work of G. Warren Nutter (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), 119–30.
  • “Public Debt and Capital Formation,” in Taxation and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States, ed. Dwight Lee (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1986), 177–94. In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 195–209.
  • James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, “A Theory of Truth in Autobiography,” Kyklos 39, fasc. 4 (1986): 507–17.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting,” Public Choice 49 (1986): 3–16.
  • “Peut-on apprivoiser la democratie?” (Is social democracy possible?), Commentaire 9 (1986–87): 673–76; French translation.
  • “The Deficit and Obligations to Future Generations,” Imprimis 16 (January 1987): 1–6. In Champions of Freedom, vol. 13, The Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series, The Federal Budget: The Economic, Political, and Moral Implications for a Free Society, ed. Joseph S. McNamara and Lynne Morris (Hillsdale, Mich.: Hillsdale College Press, 1987), 103–21.
  • James M. Buchanan and Jennifer Roback, “The Incidence and Effects of Public Debt in the Absence of Fiscal Illusion,” Public Finance Quarterly 15 (January 1987): 5–25.
  • “Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis,” Kyklos 40, fasc. 1 (January 1987): 3–20.
  • “Debt: An Economic and Moral Crisis,” IPA Review (May–July 1987): 56–57.
  • “The Political Economy of the Deficit,” Florida Policy Review 3 (summer 1987): 5–10.
  • “Tax Reform as Political Choice,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 (summer 1987): 29–35.
  • “Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect,” Cato Journal 7 (fall 1987): 305–12. In Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, ed. J. Gwartney and R. Wagner (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), 131–38. As “Retrospective on The Calculus of Consent,Citation Classics 11 (January 1988); “The Justification of the Compound Republic: A Retrospective Interpretation of The Calculus of Consent,” in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 43–49.
  • “The Economizing Element in Knight’s Ethical Critique of Capitalist Order,” Ethics 98 (October 1987): 61–75.
  • “Some Remarks on Privatization,” Virginia Law Weekly 40 (October 1987): 1–6.
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith, “Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit,” American Economic Review 77 (December 1987): 1023–31.
  • “Im Wandel begriffene Idee vom Staat” (The changing idea of the state), Neue Züricher Zeitung 29 (December 1987). In Wo Regeln Bremsen, ed. G. Schwarz (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1988), 115–19; German translation.
  • “Comment: Constitutional Strategy and the Monetary Regime,” in The Search for Stable Money, ed. J. Dorn and A. Schwartz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 119–27.
  • “A Commentary: Liberty, Market and State,” Economic Impact 58 (1987): 36–40.
  • “Constitutional Economics,” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 1, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987), 585–88. Translated into Turkish (1989).
  • “Constructivism, Cognition, and Value,” in Erkenntnis und Entscheidung: die Wertproblematik in Wissenschaft und Praxis, Europäisches Forum Alpbach, 1987, ed. Otto Molden (Vienna: österreichisches College, 1988), 36–48. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 231–38.
  • “The Fiscal Constitution,” in The Politics of American Economic Policy Making, ed. Paul Peretz (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 225–28.
  • “Keynesian Follies,” in The Legacy of Keynes, Nobel Conference XII, ed. David A. Reese (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 130–45.
  • “Man and the State,” in International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol. 14, Socialism: Institutional, Philosophical and Economic Issues, ed. Svetozar Pejovich (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1987), 3–9. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 51–56.
  • “Market Failure and Political Failure,” in Individual Liberty and Democratic Decision-Making: The Ethics, Economics and Politics of Democracy, ed. Peter Koslowski (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), 41–52. In Explorations into Constitutional Economics, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 418–29; Cato Journal 8 (summer 1988): 1–14. Translated into German (1989).
  • “Opportunity Cost,” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 3, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987), 718–21.
  • (Public choice and fiscal theory), in Collected Works of Nobel Prize Winners, vol. 16 (Seoul: Korea Economic Daily, 1987); Korean translation.
  • “The Qualities of a Natural Economist,” in Democracy and Public Choice: Essays in Honor of Gordon Tullock, ed. Charles Rowley (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 9–19.
  • “Return to Constitutional Budgetary Reform,” introduction to The Constitutional Convention, ed. James Bond, David Engdahl, and Henry Butler (Washington, D.C.: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1987), v–vi.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the ‘Nobel’ Lie,” Virginia Law Review 74 (March 1988): 179–89.
  • “The Economic Theory of Politics Reborn,” Challenge 31 (March–April 1988): 4–10.
  • “The Gauthier Enterprise,” Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (spring 1988): 75–94. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 195–213.
  • “Reining in the Deficit,” The Owen Manager 9 (spring 1988): 27–31.
  • “Consecuencias economicas del estado benefactor” (Economic consequences of the welfare state), Libertas 8 (May 1988): 3–14; Spanish translation.
  • “Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation,” American Economic Review 78 (May 1988): 135–39. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 81–87.
  • James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg, “The Politicization of Market Failure,” Public Choice 57 (May 1988): 101–13. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 67–79. Translated into Galician (1990).
  • “Prolegomena for a Strategy of Constitutional Reform,” Economic Education Bulletin 28 (June 1988): 7–17.
  • “Post-Reagan Political Economy,” Christian Perspectives in Business and Government 2 (summer 1988): 1–13. In Reaganomics and After, ed. Cento Veljanovski (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989), 1–16; Constitutional Economics, IEA Masters of Modern Economics Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 1–16.
  • “The Ethics of Work,” Scholar and Educator 12 (fall 1988): 48–51.
  • “Economists and the Gains from Trade,” Managerial and Decision Economics, special issue (winter 1988): 5–12. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 109–23.
  • “Hayek and the Forces of History,” Humane Studies Review (winter 1988–89): 3–4. Translated into French (1989).
  • Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, “Rational Choice and Moral Order,” Analyse & Kritik 10 (December 1988): 138–60. In From Political Economy to Economics: And Back? ed. James H. Nichols, Jr., and Colin Wright (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990), 175–237.
  • “Constitutional Imperatives for the 1990s: The Legal Order for a Free and Productive Economy,” in Thinking About America: The United States in the 1990s, ed. Annelise Anderson and Dennis L. Bark (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1988), 253–64.
  • “The Simple Logic of Free Trade,” Proceedings of the First Annual Symposium of the Institute for International Competitiveness (Radford, Va.: Radford University, 1988), iii–x.
  • “The Work Ethic,” Competing through Productivity and Quality, ed. Y. K. Shetty and V. M. Buehler (Cambridge, Mass.: Productivity Press, 1988), 55–62.
  • “Camelot Will Not Return,” Reason 20 (January 1989): 36–38.
  • Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, “Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (January 1989): 49–62. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 51–64.
  • “On the Structure of an Economy: A Re-emphasis of Some Classical Foundations,” Business Economics 24 (January 1989): 6–12. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 19–28.
  • “Shackle and a Lecture in Pittsburgh,” Market Process 7 (spring 1989): 2–4. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 217–20.
  • James M. Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg, “A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction,” Public Choice 61 (April 1989): 15–27. As “Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction,” in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 137–50.
  • “A Tale of Two Economies,” Durrell Journal of Money and Banking 1 (August 1989): 12–15.
  • “Reductionist Reflections on the Monetary Constitution,” Cato Journal 9 (fall 1989): 295–99.
  • “Nobelity,” Eastern Economic Journal 15 (October–December 1989): 339–48. In Better than Plowing: And Other Personal Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 158–73.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee (Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics), Public Choice Studies 13 (1989): 5–20; Japanese translation. Constitutional Political Economy 2 (1991): 139–61.
  • “Une chance unique pour l’Europe” (Europe’s unique opportunity), Le Figaro, ed. W. Sichel (Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Economic Research, 1989), 79–96.
  • “Contractarian Presuppositions and Democratic Governance,” in Politics and Process, ed. Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 174–82.
  • “The Ethics of Constitutional Order,” in Essays on the Political Economy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), 25–31. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 153–57.
  • “Free Trade and Producer-Interest Politics,” in Essays on the Political Economy (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), 52–66. As “Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics,” James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, Constitutional Political Economy 2 (1991): 139–61. Translated into Japanese (1989).
  • “Message to the Young People,” in Nobel Laureates Forum in Japan, 1988 (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1989): 130–31.
  • “The Potential and the Limits of Socially Organized Humankind,” in Nobel Laureates Forum in Japan, 1988 (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1989), 85–94. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 239–51; Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 16 (no. 2, 1991): 168–74.
  • “The Simple Economics of the Work Ethic,” in Mt. Pelerin Special Meeting in Taiwan, 31 August–2 September 1988, Conference Series, No. 9 (Taipei: Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Studies, 1989), 34–47.
  • Untitled, in The State of Economic Science: Views of Six Nobel Laureates, ed. Werner Sichel (Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Economic Research, 1989), 78–95. As “The Economy as a Constitutional Order,” in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 29–41.
  • “Constitutional Manifesto,” Monetary Notes I (May 1990): 2–5.
  • “Democrazia e libero Mercato” (Democracy and free markets), Impresa e State 10 (June 1990): 8–13; Italian translation.
  • “Kein Zentralismus” (No centralism), Wirtschaftswoche 39 (21 September 1990): 174–76; German translation.
  • “Elements d’une constitution pour l’Europe” (Elements of a constitution for Europe), Liberté economique, et progres social 59 (October 1990): 2–14; French translation.
  • “Born-Again Economist,” in Lives of the Laureates: Ten Nobel Economists, ed. William Breit and Roger W. Spencer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 163–80. In Better than Plowing: And Other Personal Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 68–81.
  • “The Budgetary Politics of Social Security,” in Social Security’s Looming Surpluses: Prospects and Implications, ed. Carolyn L. Weaver (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1990), 45–56.
  • “The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism,” in Liberty, Property, and the Future of Constitutional Development, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 9–21. In The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 125–35.
  • “The Domain of Constitutional Economics,” Constitutional Political Economy 1 (1990): 1–18. In The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 2, The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics, ed. Bruce J. Caldwell (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 451–68. As “The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy,” in The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 3–18. Translated into Czechoslovakian (1992).
  • “Europe’s Constitutional Opportunity,” in Europe’s Constitutional Future (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990), 1–20. Translated into French (1990); Italian (1991).
  • “Opportunity Cost of College Education,” Shaping the Future of Higher Education, Presidential Leadership: Proceedings, AASCU’s 29th Annual Meeting, November 19–21, 1989, the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California (Washington, D.C.: American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 1990), 107–12.
  • “The Potential for Politics after Socialism,” in Geschichte end Gesetz, Europäisches Forum Alpbach, 1989, ed. Otto Molden (Vienna: österreichisches College, 1990), 240–56.
  • “Ricordo di un anno in Italia,” introduction to Italian translation Libertà nel contratto costituzionale, ed. di Paolo Martelli (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1990), xiii–xxii.
  • “Sovranita del consumatore e offerta di fattori” (Consumer sovereignty and the supply of factors), Notizie di Politeia 6 (1990): 8–9; Italian translation.
  • “Economics in the Post-Socialist Century,” Economic Journal 101 (January 1991): 15–21. In The Future of Economics, ed. John D. Hey (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 15–21.
  • “The Minimal Politics of Market Order,” special issue, From Plan to Market: The Post-Soviet Challenge, parts 1 and 2, Cato Journal 11 (fall 1991): 215–26. Translated into Russian (1993).
  • “Why the Soviets Cannot Understand the Market (and Why We Cannot Understand Why They Cannot Understand),” Journal of Private Enterprise 7 (fall 1991): 9–19. Journal of Private Enterprise, special issue, 13 (1997): 40–49.
  • James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg, “The Market as a Creative Process,” Economics and Philosophy 7 (October 1991): 167–86. In Market Process Theories, vol. 2, Heterodox Approaches, ed. Peter J. Boettke and David L. Prychitko (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1998), 579–98.
  • “An American Perspective on Europe’s Constitutional Opportunity,” Cato Journal 10 (winter 1991): 619–29. Translated into German (1991); Italian (1993).
  • “Belief, Choice and Consequences: Reflections on Economics, Science and Religion,” in Wege der Vernunft: Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Hans Albert, ed. Alfred Bohnen and Alan Musgrave (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1991), 151–63.
  • Viktor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, “Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance, and the Limits of Reason,” Jahrbuch für Neue Politische ökonomie 10 Band (1991): 61–78. In The Constitution of Good Societies, ed. Karol Edward Soltan and Stephen L. Elkin (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 39–56.
  • “The Constitutional Economics of Earmarking,” in Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice, ed. Richard E. Wagner (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 152–62.
  • “The Constitutional Moment of the 1990s,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 3 (1991): 175–85. Translated into Italian (1993).
  • “Frank H. Knight, 1885–1972,” in Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and Scholars, ed. Edward Shils (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 244–52.
  • “From the Inside Looking Out,” in Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies, ed. Michael Szenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 98–106. In Better than Plowing: And Other Personal Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 147–57.
  • “Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation,” Constitutional Political Economy 2 (1991): 1–6.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, “Konsumbesteuerung und demokratischer Prozess” (Consumption taxation and democratic process), in Konsumorientierte Neuordnung des Steuersystems, ed. Manfred Rose (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991), 51–84; German translation.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies,” Economic Inquiry 30 (April 1992): 218–24.
  • “I Did Not Call Him ‘Fritz’: Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek,” Constitutional Political Economy 3 (spring–summer 1992): 129–35.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “Open Markets in the Transfer State,” Southern Economic Journal 59 (July 1992): 1–8.
  • “Economic Science in the Future,” Eastern Economic Journal 18 (fall 1992): 401–3. Translated into German (1992).
  • “Beyond Pragmatism: Prospects for Constitutional Revolution,” in Schools of Thought in Politics 3, vol. 1, The State and Its Critics, ed. Andrew Levine (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 290–304.
  • “Public Choice after the Revolutions: 1989–91,” Economia delle scelte pubbliche 2 (1992): 93–101.
  • “The Supply of Labour and the Extent of the Market,” in Adam Smith’s Legacy: His Place in the Development of Modern Economics, ed. Michael Fry (London: Routledge, 1992), 104–16. In The Return to Increasing Returns, ed. James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 331–42.
  • “The Threat of Leviathan,” in Schools of Thought in Politics 3, vol. 1, The State and Its Critics, ed. Andrew Levine (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 271–89.
  • “Asymmetrical Reciprocity in Market Exchange: Implications for Economies in Transition,” Social Philosophy & Policy 10 (summer 1993): 51–64. In Liberalism and the Economic Order, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 51–64; Legacies of the Collapse of Marxism, ed. John H. Moore (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University Press, 1994), 149–64.
  • “How Can Constitutions Be Designed So That Politicians Who Seek to Serve ‘Public Interest’ Can Survive and Prosper?” Constitutional Political Economy 4 (winter 1993): 1–6.
  • “The Political Efficiency of General Taxation,” National Tax Journal 46 (December 1993): 401–10.
  • “The Individual as Participant in Political Exchange,” in Social Theory and Social Policy: Essays in Honor of James S. Coleman, ed. Aage B. Sørensen and Seymour Spilerman (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 11–21.
  • James M. Buchanan and David Fand, “Monetary Policy: Malpractice at the Fed,” Critical Review 6 (no. 4, 1993): 457–69. In Wall Street Journal 120 (no. 122, Monday, 21 December 1992): A8; modified version.
  • “Prólogo,” prologue to Hacia el Autogobierno: Una crítica al poder político (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1993); Spanish translation.
  • “Public Choice after Socialism,” Public Choice 77, no. 1 (1993): 67–74.
  • “The Triumph of Economic Science: Is Fukuyama Wrong and, If So, Why?” Journal of the Board of Audit 3 (no. 7, 1993): 5–14. Translated into Portuguese (1993).
  • “We Should Save More in Our Own Economic Interest,” in Justice across Generations: What Does It Mean? ed. Lee M. Cohen (Washington, D.C.: AARP, 1993), 269–82.
  • “Choosing What to Choose,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150 (March 1994): 123–44.
  • James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton, “The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators,” Public Choice 79 (April 1994): 47–60.
  • “Notes on the Liberal Constitution,” Cato Journal 14 (spring–summer 1994): 1–9.
  • James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee, “On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 5 (June–September 1994): 219–32.
  • “Pareto Superior Tax Reform: Some Simple Analytics,” Eastern Economic Journal 20 (winter 1994): 7–9.
  • “Economic Theory in the Postrevolutionary Moment of the 1990s,” in The Role of Economic Theory, ed. Philip A. Klein (Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 47–60. As “Prospects for Economic Theory in the 1990s and Beyond,” in Prospects for Economic Theory in the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Bodo B. Gemper (Siegen, Germany: Edition Ensis, 1993), 6–24.
  • Foreword to Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange, by Janet Landa (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), vii–viii.
  • “Lagged Implementation as an Element in Constitutional Strategy,” European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994): 11–26.
  • “Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform,” Publius 25 (spring 1995): 19–27.
  • “Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility,” Rationality and Society 7 (April 1995): 141–50.
  • James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, “Rational Majoritarian Taxation of the Rich: With Increasing Returns and Capital Accumulation,” Southern Economic Journal 61 (April 1995): 923–35.
  • “Clarifying Confusion about the Balanced Budget Amendment,” National Tax Journal 48 (September 1995): 347–55.
  • “Economic Science and Cultural Diversity,” Kyklos 48, fasc. 2 (1995): 193–200.
  • “Foundational Concerns: A Criticism of Public Choice Theory,” in Current Issues in Public Choice, ed. José Casas Pardo and Friedrich Schneider (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1995), 3–20.
  • “A Two-Country Parable,” in Justice in Immigration, ed. Warren F. Schwartz, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 63–66.
  • Contribution to “In Celebration of Armen Alchian’s 80th Birthday: Living and Breathing Economics,” Economic Inquiry 34 (July 1996): 416–18.
  • “Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century,” special contribution to the inaugural issue, Asian Journal of Business & Information Systems 1 (summer 1996): 5–10.
  • “An Ambiguity in Sen’s Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Libertarian,” Analyse & Kritik 18 (September 1996): 118–25.
  • “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty,” Cato Journal 15 (fall–winter 1996): 259–68.
  • (Adam Smith as inspiration), in The Academic World of James M. Buchanan, ed. Byeong-Ho Gong (Seoul: Korea Economic Research Institute, 1996); Korean translation.
  • “Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design,” in Economics and Political Institutions in Economic Policy, ed. V. A. Muscatelli (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996), 70–78.
  • “Economics as a Public Science,” in Foundations of Research in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics? ed. Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1996), 30–36. Paperback edition (1998).
  • “Europe as Social Reality,” Constitutional Political Economy, special issue, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, 7 (1996): 253–56.
  • Introduction to Economists of the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, Economic Analysis and Political Ideology: The Selected Essays of Karl Brunner, ed. Thomas Lys (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1996), xiii–xviii.
  • “Society and Democracy,” in The David Hume Institute—The First Decade, ed. Nick Kuenssberg and Gillian Lomas (Edinburgh: David Hume Institute, 1996), 25–33. Translated into Spanish (1996).
  • “The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments,” Public Choice 90 (March 1997): 117–38.
  • “Beyond Science: The Economist’s Enterprise,” in Advances in Austrian Economics, vol. 4, ed. Peter J. Boettke and Steven Horwitz (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1997), 129–31.
  • “Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare?” in The Welfare State, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 165–79. In Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (summer 1997): 165–79.
  • “Le crisi nelle democrazie del welfare” (The crises in welfare democracy), in Globallizzazione dei mercati e orizzonti del capitalismo (Rome: Editori Laterza, 1997); Italian translation.
  • “La scelta individuale nei ruoli decisionali” (Individual choice behavior in private, agency, and collective decision rules), in Individuale e collettivo: decision e razionalità, ed. Angelo M. Petroni and Riccardo Viale (Milan: Raffaello Cortina, 1997), 83–99; Italian translation.
  • “Structure-Induced Behavior in Markets and in Politics,” in Post-Socialist Political Economy: Selected Essays (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), 136–50. Translated into Italian (1994).
  • “Konstitucionalna ograni enja politi kim aktivnostima” (Constraints on political action), Ekonomska misao 31 (July–September 1998): 167–78; Yugoslavian translation.
  • “Majoritarian Logic,” Public Choice 97 (October 1998): 13–21.
  • “Agreement and Efficiency: Response to Guttman,” European Journal of Political Economy 14 (1998): 209–13.
  • “Kommentar” (Commentary), in Ethik des Kapitalismus: Mit einem Kommentar von James M. Buchanan, Peter Koslowski (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 79–90; German translation.
  • “Opportunity Cost and Legal Institutions,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol.2, ed. Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1998), 710–15.

PAMPHLETS

  • The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service, Occasional Paper No. 7 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1965). In Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 27–45; Constitutional Economics, IEA Masters of Modern Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 113–32. Translated into Spanish (1966).
  • James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Public Debt in Democratic Society (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1966).
  • Academia in Anarchy: A Summary (Center for Independent Education, 1970).
  • The Bases for Collective Action (New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1971). Translated into Spanish (1980).
  • Natural Liberty and Justice: Adam Smith and John Rawls, C. A. Moorman Series (Canton, Mo.: Culver-Stockton College, 1976).
  • James M. Buchanan, Richard Wagner, and John Burton, The Consequences of Mr. Keynes: An Analysis of the Misuse of Economic Theory for Political Profiteering, with Proposals for Constitutional Disciplines, Hobart Paper 78 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978).
  • Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government, The Frank M. Engle Lecture, 1981 (Bryn Mawr, Pa.: The American College, 1981). In The Theory of Public Choice—II, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 439–52.
  • Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, Monopoly in Money and Inflation: The Case for a Constitution to Discipline Government, Hobart Paper 88 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1981). Translated into Spanish (1982).
  • Moral Community, Moral Order, or Moral Anarchy, The Abbott Memorial Lecture no. 17 (Colorado Springs: Colorado College, 1981). In Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 108–20; Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, comp. Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 289–301; The Market Economy: A Reader, ed. James L. Doti and Dwight R. Lee (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 1991), 237–47.
  • Politiek Schuldbesef (Political debt consciousness), Rotterdamse Monetaire Studies, no. 16 (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 1984); Dutch translation.
  • Staatsschuld en Politiek, Rotterdamse Monetarie Studies, no. 18 (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 1984); Dutch translation.
  • Capitalism, Lectures in Social Philosophy and Policy (Bowling Green: Social Philosophy and Policy Center, 1988).
  • Socialism Is Dead, but Leviathan Lives On, the John Bonython Lecture, CIS Occasional Paper 30 (Sydney, Australia: Centre for Independent Studies, 1990). Excerpts in Wall Street Journal (18 July 1990): A8. Translated into Italian (1990).
  • Technological Determinism Despite the Reality of Scarcity: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Spending on Medical and Health Care (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Medical School, 1990). In Health Care for an Aging Population, ed. Chris Hackler (Albany: State University of New York, 1994), 57–68.
  • Analysis, Ideology and the Events of 1989 (Zürich: Bank Hofmann AG, 1991).
  • Market, Freiheit und Demokratie (Market, liberty, and democracy) (Vienna, Austria: Carl Menger Institute, 1992); German translation.
  • Consumption without Production: The Impossible Idyll of Socialism (Freiburg, Germany: Haufe, 1993), 49–75. Translated into German, (1993).
  • Property as a Guarantor of Liberty, The Shaftesbury Papers, vol. 1 (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1993). In Property Rights and the Limits of Democracy: The Shaftesbury Papers, vol. 1, ed. Charles K. Rowley (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 1–64; Nobelprizewinner James M. Buchanan in Jena, Munich and Bayreuth, 7–15 June 1994 (Munich: Herbert Quandt Stiftung, 1994).
  • Politicized Economies in Limbo: America, Europe and the World, 1994, Nobelprize winner James M. Buchanan in Jena, Munich and Bayreuth, 7–15 June 1994 (Munich: Herbert Quandt Stiftung, 1994). Translated into Italian (1994); Spanish (1995).
  • The Metamorphosis of Western Democracies at the End of the Twentieth Century, Seventh Sinclair House Debate “Is Industrial Society Disintegrating?” (Bad Homburg: Herbert Quandt Foundation, 1997).
  • “The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy,” Doctorado «Honoris Causa» del Excmo. Sr. D. James M. Buchanan (Valladolid, Spain: University of Valladolid, 1997).

REVIEWS

  • A Financial History of Tennessee since 1870, by James E. Thorogood (Nashville: Tennessee Industrial School, 1950). Southern Economic Journal 17 (January 1951): 368–69.
  • Die Belastung durch die persönliche Einkommensteuer in Deutschland, England und den Vereinigten Staaten, by Rudolf Binder (Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1950). Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1951): 78–79.
  • Creation of Income by Taxation, by Joshua C. Hubbard (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1951): 78.
  • A Reconstruction of Economics, by Kenneth E. Boulding (New York: Wiley, 1950). Journal of Marketing (July 1951): 104–5.
  • Economic Resources and Policies of the South, by C. B. Hoover and B. U. Ratchford (New York: Macmillan, 1951). Journal of Political Economy 60 (February 1952): 81–82.
  • Berühmte Denkfehler der Nationalökonomie, by Ernst Wagemann (Bern: A. Francke, 1951). Journal of Political Economy 60 (June 1952): 261–62.
  • Federal Grants and the Business Cycle, by James A. Maxwell (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952). Journal of Political Economy 60 (October 1952): 457–58.
  • The Industrial Economy: Its Technological Basis and Institutional Destiny, by C. S. Ayres (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952). Journal of Political Economy 60 (October 1952): 439–40.
  • The Tax System of Hawai’i, by R. M. Kamins (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1952). Journal of Political Economy 61 (June 1953): 266.
  • L’Autofinancement des societes en France aux Etats-Unis, by Marcel Malissen (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1953). Journal of Political Economy 62 (August 1954): 353.
  • Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation, ed. E. H. Chamberlin (New York: St. Martins Press, 1954). Journal of Political Economy 63 (February 1955): 77–78.
  • The Theory of Fiscal Economies, by E. R. Rolph (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954). Journal of Political Economy 63 (December 1955): 538–39.
  • Materiale per una logica del Movimento Economico, by Giovanni Demaria, vols. 1 and 2 (Milan: La Goliardica, 1953, 1955). American Economic Review 46 (September 1956): 692–94.
  • Economic Commentaries, by Dennis Robertson (New York: John de Graff, 1956). Southern Economic Journal 23 (April 1957): 453–54.
  • Dundee Economic Essays, ed. J. K. Eastham (London: The Economists’ Bookshop, 1955). American Economic Review 47 (June 1957): 402–3.
  • Teoria della Condotta economica dello stato, by Giuseppe Ugo Papi (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1956). Journal of Political Economy 65 (October 1957): 452.
  • Studi di scienza delle finanze e diritto finanziario, by Benvenuto Griziotti, vols. 1 and 2 (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1956). American Economic Review 47 (December 1957): 1037–38.
  • Humanist versus Economist: The Economic Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, by W. F. Kennedy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). Southern Economic Journal 25 (October 1958): 226.
  • Robert Torrens and the Evolution of Classical Economics, by Lionel Robbins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1958). Southern Economic Journal 25 (October 1958): 225–26.
  • Sales Taxation, by J. F. Due (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957). Journal of Political Economy 66 (October 1958): 458–59.
  • The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy, by Bent Hanson (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958). Economica 26 (August 1959): 266–67.
  • The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy, by Richard A. Musgrave (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). “The Theory of Public Finance,” Southern Economic Journal 26 (January 1960): 234–38.
  • Risparmio e ciclo economico, by Giancarlo Mazzocchi (Milan: Guiffr, 1957). Journal of Political Economy 68 (August 1960): 431.
  • Pareto-Walras: Da un carteggio inedito (1891–1901), introduction by Tommaso Giacalane Monaco (Padua: Cedam, 1960). Economica 27 (November 1960): 374–75.
  • The Trend in Government Activity in the United States since 1900, by Solomon Fabricant and R. E. Lipsey (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953). American Economic Review 43 (December 1960): 960–62.
  • Problemi Tributari nell’ economica del benessere, by Giorgio Stefani (Padova, 1958). Journal of Political Economy 49 (February 1961): 99.
  • The Ideologies of Taxation, by Louis Eisenstein (New York: Ronald Press, 1961). Journal of Political Economy 70 (April 1962): 106–207.
  • United States Fiscal Policy, 1945–59: Its Contribution to Economic Stability, by A. E. Holmans (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). Economic Journal 72 (June 1962): 402–4.
  • Civilian Nuclear Power: Economic Issues and Policy Formation, by Philip Mullenbach (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1963). “Industrial Organization: Government and Business; Industry Studies,” American Economic Review 53 (September 1963): 807–8.
  • Finanza Pubblica, by Celestino Arena (Torino: U.T.E.T., 1963). Economica 32 (February 1965): 118–19.
  • Nomos VII: Rational Decision, ed. C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton, 1964). Annals 359 (May 1965): 189–90.
  • Essays in the History of Economics, by George J. Stigler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). “Economists—And Economists,” National Review (7 September 1965): 77–78, 80.
  • Fiscal Neutrality toward Economic Growth, by E. S. Phelps (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). Southern Economic Journal 32 (April 1966): 492–93.
  • Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, by T. R. Dye (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). Journal of Political Economy 75 (December 1967): 896–97.
  • The Costs of Economic Growth, by E. J. Mishan (New York: Praeger, 1967). American Economic Review 58 (June 1968): 555–56.
  • Issues in Defense Economics, ed. R. N. McKean (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967). Journal of Finance (June 1968): 558–60.
  • Pollbooks: How Victorians Voted, by J. R. Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). Public Choice 1 (1968): 87–88.
  • The Fiscal Revolution in America, by Herbert Stein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). Journal of Economic Literature 7 (December 1969): 1202–4.
  • Public Finance, by Carl S. Shoup (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). Journal of Business (1969): 220–21.
  • The Quality of the Urban Environment: Essays on “New Resources” in an Urban Age, ed. H. S. Perloff (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1969). Journal of Economic Literature 8 (June 1970): 496–97.
  • The New Towns: The Answer to Megalopolis, by F. J. Osborn and A. Whittick (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969). Public Choice 10 (spring 1971): 109–10.
  • The Case for Participatory Democracy: Some Prospects for the Radical Society, ed. C. G. Benello and D. Roussopoulos (New York: Grossman, 1971). Public Choice 12 (spring 1972): 125–26.
  • Anarchism: From Theory to Practice, by Daniel Guérin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, 1970). Journal of Economic Issues 7 (March 1973): 162–64.
  • Public Expenditure, by Jesse Burkhead and Jerry Miner (Chicago: Aldine, 1971). Journal of Business (April 1973): 305–6.
  • Competition, Collusion and Game Theory, by Lester Telser (Chicago: Atherton, 1972). James M. Buchanan and Winston C. Bush, Public Choice 16 (1973): 91.
  • Economic Analysis of Law, by Richard A. Posner (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). “Good Economics–Bad Law,” Virginia Law Review 60 (spring 1974): 483–92. In Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 40–49.
  • The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, by David Friedman (London: Harper Colophon, 1973). Journal of Economic Literature 12 (September 1974): 914–15.
  • Economic Foundations of Political Power, by R. Bartlett (New York: Free Press, 1973). American Political Science Review 69 (June 1975): 702.
  • “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,” by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 875. “Comment,” Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 903–5.
  • The Governmental Habit, by J. R. T. Hughes (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Public Choice 32 (winter 1977): 160–61.
  • Economic Institutions Compared, by P. J. D. Wiles (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977). Canadian Journal of Economics 11 (February 1978): 160–62.
  • John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Society, vols. 18 and 19, Collected Works (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). Journal of Political Economy 86 (June 1978): 546–48.
  • A Time for Truth, by William Simon (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1978). Reason 10 (December 1978): 16–18.
  • Le regioni della giustizia, special issue of Biblioteca della liberta 65/66 (April–September 1977). Public Choice 33 (1978): 133.
  • Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems, by C. E. Lindblom (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Journal of Economic Issues 13 (March 1979): 215–17.
  • Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein, vol. 5 (Oxford Press, 1978). British Journal of Law and Society 6 (summer 1979): 130–33.
  • Imagination and the Nature of Choice, by G. L. S. Shackle (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1979). Austrian Economics Newsletter 3 (summer 1980): 2–3.
  • Knowledge and Decisions, by Thomas Sowell (New York: Basic Books, 1980). Public Choice 36 (1981): 199–201.
  • Social Justice in the Liberal State, by Bruce Ackerman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Public Choice 37 (1981): 611–12.
  • Filosofia sociale e metodo della scienza economica, by Tiziano Raefelli (Bari: DeDonato, 1980). History of Political Economy 14 (spring 1982): 138–39.
  • The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, by Robert Heilbroner (New York: Norton, 1985). Wall Street Journal, 16 October 1985, 30.
  • Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond, by Herbert Stein (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Public Choice 47 (1985): 531–32.
  • The State, by Anthony de Jasay (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). “From Redistributive Churning to the Plantation State,” Public Choice 51 (1986): 241–43.
  • Individual Interests and Collective Action: Studies in Rationality and Social Change, by James S. Coleman (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). American Journal of Sociology 92 (January 1987): 1024–26.
  • The Capitalist Revolution, by Peter Berger (New York: Basic Books, 1986). “The Facts Are Right, But the Facts Are Slight,” Reason (February 1987): 50.
  • Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, by Robert Higgs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Journal of Economic History 48 (March 1988): 226–27.
  • The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare, by Robert Sugden (Oxford/New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Economics and Philosophy 4 (1988): 341–43.
  • The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Macmillan, 1987). “Public Choice Is New, Negligible, and beyond Mainstream Economics,” Public Choice 59 (1988): 291–93.
  • Public Finance in a Democratic Society, by Richard A. Musgrave, vol. 1, Social Goods, Taxation, and Fiscal Policy; vol. 2, Fiscal Doctrine, Growth, and Institutions (New York: New York University Press, 1986). “Richard Musgrave, Public Finance, and Public Choice,” Public Choice 51 (June 1989): 289–92.
  • Theories of Surplus and Transfer: Parasites and Producers in Economic Thought, by Helen Boss (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Constitutional Political Economy 1 (spring–summer 1990): 92–93.
  • Constitutional Faith, by S. Levinson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Public Choice 66 (1990): 196–97.
  • The Silence of Constitutions, by Michael Foley (London: Routledge, 1989). Public Choice 73 (January 1992): 132–33.
  • The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, vol. 4, The Fortunes of Liberalism, ed. Peter G. Klein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Public Choice 75 (February 1993): 204.
  • Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, by John Gray (Routledge: London and New York, 1995). “The Metamorphosis of John Gray,” Constitutional Political Economy 6 (fall 1995): 293–35.
  • James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, by W. Brian Arthur (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). “Constitutional Implications of Alternative Models of Increasing Returns,” Constitutional Political Economy 6 (winter 1995): 193–98.
  • Value in Ethics and Economics, by Elizabeth Anderson (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1993). International Studies in Philosophy (1996): 107–8.
  • The Myth of Democratic Failure, by Donald A. Wittman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). “The Best of All Possible Worlds? New Efforts to Prove That Political Institutions Work as Well as Markets,” Times Literary Supplement, 26 January 1996, no. 4843, p. 13.
  • Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, by Michael J. Sandel (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1996). “Divided We Stand,” Reason 28 (February 1997): 59–60.
  • Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance, by Albert Breton (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Public Choice 93 (December 1997): 523–24.

TRANSLATIONS

  • Mauro Fasiani, “Di un particolare aspetto delle imposte sul consumo” (On a particular aspect of consumption taxes), International Economic Papers 6 (London: Macmillan, 1956), 34–49.
  • Knut Wicksell, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (A new principle of just taxation), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, ed. Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (London: Macmillan, 1958), 72–118.

PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND SUBMITTED PAPERS

  • “Federal Expenditure and State Functions,” in Federal Expenditure Policy for Growth and Stability: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Eighty-fifth Congress, first session, pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress, November 18–27, 1957, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 174–79.
  • “Fiscal Policy Aspects of Report of Commission on Money and Credit,” in Review of Report of the Commission on Money and Credit, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).
  • “Fiscal Policy in the Decade Ahead,” in Fiscal Policy Issues of the Coming Decade; Statements by Individual Economists and Representatives of Interested Organizations. Materials Submitted to the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 19–21.
  • “Short-Run Stabilization Tax Changes,” in The Investment Credit, the Case for Its Permanency; Statement to Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Congressional Economic Committee in Connection with Hearings on Short-Run Stabilization Tax Changes, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, Council for Technological Advancement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).
  • “Indexation and Tax Rates,” in Tax Reform: Administration and Public Witnesses: Public Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, on the Subject of Tax Reform, United States Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
  • “Sources of Government Growth,” in Fiscal Relations in the American Federal System: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, 9 July 1975, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources Subcommittee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 14–19.
  • “The Budget Balance Amendment: Statement to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, 2 April 1979,” Congressional Record, 4 April 1979, S3858.
  • “In Defense of Budget Balance,” Congressional Record, 125, 30 April 1979, no. 51, S4940–44.

MISCELLANEOUS

  • James M. Buchanan and Colin Campbell, “Voluntary Social Security,” Wall Street Journal 14, 20 December 1966, 14.
  • Interview on Hutt’s Role in Economics, Manhattan Report 3 (December 1983): 9–10.
  • Letter, Times Literary Supplement (London), 25 January 1985, 91.
  • Interview, The Margin 2 (February 1987): 9–11.
  • “Economic Priorities for the Next President,” Policy Review 44 (spring 1988): 15.
  • Interview, Revista de Occidente 83 (April 1988): 120–35.
  • “Hemmnisse und Hindernisse Marktwirtschaftlicher Reformen” (Limits of economic reform), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (27–28 January 1990): 97; German translation.
  • “Awakening the New Leviathan,” The Australian, 28 March 1990, 11.
  • Interview, American Thought Leader 7 (winter 1991): 1–10.
  • “‘Public Choice’ and Political Drives: A Talk with Professor James Buchanan,” We the People 1 (January–February 1992): 4–7, 22–23 (inaugural issue).
  • Videotape interview by National Economic Educators Club Foundation, 10 March 1992.
  • Appearance on MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, 16 March 1992.
  • Videotape interview, NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw, Mike Jensen, economic correspondent, 21 September 1992.
  • Contribution to “Books for Christmas,” The American Spectator 25 (December 1992): 21.
  • Contribution to “What Should the President Read?” Reason 24 (December 1992): 22.
  • “Interview: James Buchanan,” by Roger A. Arnold, Economics, 2d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1992), 733.
  • “L’economia elementare dell’etica: note da un viaggio in Italia” (The elementary economics of ethics: notes from an Italian journey), Giornata della LUISS, 18 dicembre 1992 e cerimonia conferimento laurea “honoris causa,” 26 gennaio 1993 (Rome: LUISS, 1993), 110–17; Italian translation.
  • “If Clinton Doesn’t Botch It, Economy Could Be Perking in ’96,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, op. ed., 14 April, 1993, A14.
  • “The National Debt,” videotape interview by Steve Lilienthal, National Educational Television, 14 August 1995.
  • “… Here’s His Take on the Flat Tax,” op. ed., Wall Street Journal 127, 30 January 1996, A18.
  • “Economist James Buchanan: Taking Off Rose-Colored Glasses to Study Government,” interview by Anna J. Bray, Investor’s Business Daily, 26 August 1996, 1–2.
  • “Everyone for Himself and Each against All,” interview by Claudio Carlone, Capital, 1 January 1997, 71–74.
  • James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, “Hong Kong’s Real Threat May Come from Within,” Investor’s Business Daily 14, 5 August 1997, A28.

Last modified April 13, 2016