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Source: This essay first appeared in the journal Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought ,
vol. V, no. 4, Winter 1982 published by the Cato Institute (1978-1979)
and the Institute for Humane Studies (1980-1982) under the editorial
direction of Leonard P. Liggio. It is republished with thanks to the
original copyright holders.
The political philosopher John Gray has written on Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill, and the liberal tradition.
F.A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism: A Bibliographical Essay by John Gray
Table of Contents
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK
Introduction: The Revival of Interest in Hayek - A Unified
Research Program in Hayek's Writings?
In the recent revival of public and scholarly interest in the values
of limited government and the market order, no one has been more
centrally significant than Friedrich A. Hayek. His works have figured
as a constant point of reference in the discussions both of the
libertarian and conservative theories of the market economy; they have
also provided a focal point of attack for interventionist and
collectivist critics of the market. Hayek's return to such a pivotal
position in intellectual life is remarkable when we recall that for
several decades his work was subjected to neglect and obscurity. It was
not until 1974 at the age of 75 that he was belatedly acknowledged by
being awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science. During the
three decades after 1945, when certain Keynesian ideas seemed to have
been vindicated by the prevailing government policies of economic
interventionism, Hayek may have seemed an intransigent and isolated
figure, whose chief importance was that of an indefatigable critic of
the spirit of the age. It was, however, during these very same years,
in which he turned from economic theory to political thought, that
Hayek made his greatest contributions thus far to the formulation of a
public philosophy, including most notably his Constitution of Liberty
(1960), surely the most powerful and profound defense of individual
freedom in our time. It is noteworthy that, in the revival of interest
in Hayek's work, his contributions to political philosophy have
attracted as much interest as have his works in economic theory.
The Unity and Coherence of Hayek's Writings: Conception of Mind & Unity of Knowledge
In
all of this revival of scholarly interest, however, Hayek's work has
rarely been viewed as a whole. In fact, it has often been suggested
that what we find in his writings is a series of unconnected episodes,
in which questions are addressed in a variety of disciplines on a
number of disparate historical occasions, rather than a coherent
research program implemented over the years. Even Hayek's friends have
sometimes discerned important tensions and conflicts in his writings,
leading them to argue that his work encompasses methodological and
political positions which are in the last resort incompatible. Against
this view, to which I once subscribed myself, I want now to submit that
Hayek's work does indeed disclose a coherent system of ideas. Hayek's
system of ideas may not perhaps be wholly stable, but in this system
positions covering a range of academic disciplines are in fact informed
and unified by a small number of fundamental philosophical conceptions.
Identifying these basic philosophical positions, and showing how they
infuse his entire work, is the chief aim of this review of Hayek's
work. It will not be my argument that Hayek's system lacks difficulties
or internal tensions. I will try, however, to show that his work is
given a cohesive and unitary character by the claims in theory of
knowledge and in theoretical psychology which inform and govern his
contributions to many specific debates.
My strategy in this
survey of Hayek's work is to seek the unifying wellspring of his
thought in his conception of the mind and in his account of the nature
and limits of human knowledge. My argument will be that Hayek's general
philosophy - a highly distinctive development of post-Kantian critical
philosophy - informs and shapes his contributions to a variety of
academic disciplines (jurisprudence and social philosophy as much as
economic theory and the history of ideas), and Hayek's philosophy does
so in ways that have been persistently neglected or misunderstood. In
particular, Hayek's account of the structure of the mind, of the nature
and limits of human knowledge, and of the use and abuse of reason in
human life pervades his writings down to their last details, and gives
to his work over the years and across many disciplinary boundaries the
character of a coherent system. We can see the structure of Hayek's
system of ideas and we can realize its capacity to yield an integrated
view of man and society only when we have adequately specified its
philosophical foundations. It is only once we have grasped these
philosophical foundations of his thought, again, that we may fully
appreciate his originality as a thinker and the measure of his
achievement as a social theorist.
Overview of Topics Covered in This Essay
I
begin my survey by examining briefly the chief claims Hayek makes in
his centrally important but sadly neglected treatise in theoretical
psychology, The Sensory Order (1952), where he most
systematically and explicitly develops his account of the mind and of
human knowledge. Having set out the principal features of Hayek's view
of the mind and of the forms of human knowledge, I shall try to show
how these conceptions inform his account of a spontaneous order in
society, and how they condition his distinction between 'economy' and
'catallaxy,' his elaboration of the argument about economic calculation
under socialism, and his distinctive position as to the appropriate
theory and methods for economics. I proceed then to examine how Hayek
applies his general philosophy to the relations of individual liberty
with the rule of law. In the course of this survey I will canvass some
of the most important criticisms of Hayek's system, concentrating
particularly on the claim that his conception of a spontaneous order in
society is unclear, and his use of it objectionable. It is often argued
that, when taken in conjunction with its twin idea of cultural
evolution by the natural selection of rival social practices, the idea
of spontaneous social order has a conservative rather than any liberal
or libertarian implication, since it appears to entail blind submission
to the result of any unplanned social process. Against this criticism,
which expresses the common view that Hayek's political thought is an
unstable compound of conservative or traditionalist and liberal or
libertarian elements, I will argue that the idea of spontaneous social
order in Hayek's work is best seen as a value-free explanatory notion
and that invoking this idea illuminates rather than undermines the
bases for the commitment to liberty. [1a]
In
developing my argument by way of an examination of the criticisms of a
number of writers in opposed intellectual traditions - Michael
Oakeshott, James Buchanan, and Irving Kristol, for example - I will
conclude that Hayek's chief achievement is in his reviving the
intellectual tradition of classical liberalism of which varied strands
in contemporary conservatism and libertarianism are quarreling
offspring. In the course of this survey I will, also, identify three
principal achievements of Hayek's social philosophy: (1) his
demonstration of the import for social theory of an erroneous Cartesian
theory of the mind and the role of this theory in inspiring modern
attempts at the rational design of social life; (2) his theory of the
liberal order, which is a synthesis of the theories of justice of
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and David Hume (1711-1776) with a devastating
critique of contemporary conceptions of distributive justice; and (3)
his proposal for a resolution of a central difficulty of classical
liberal theory in the intriguing ideas of a market in traditions.
The
upshot of my assessment of Hayek's thought will be that, whereas his
critics have identified ambiguities, tensions, and unclarities in some
of his formulations, the interest and appeal of his system remains
unimpeached. Despite (or even because of) its problematic aspects,
Hayek's system of ideas remains a powerful and compelling research
program - in my own opinion, the most promising we have at our disposal
- for classical liberal social philosophy.
Hayek's General Philosophy - The Kantian Heritage
The
entirety of Hayek's work - and, above all, his work in epistemology,
psychology, ethics, and the theory of law - is informed by a
distinctively Kantian approach. In its most fundamental aspect, Hayek's
thought is Kantian in its denial of our capacity to know things as they
are or this world as it is. It is in his denial that we can know things
as they are, and in his insistence that the order we find in our
experiences, including even our sensory experiences, is the product of
the creative activity of our minds rather than a reality given to us by
the world, that Hayek's Kantianism consists. It follows from this
skeptical Kantian standpoint that the task of philosophy cannot be that
of uncovering the necessary characters of things. The keynote of
critical philosophy, after all, is the impossibility of our attaining
any external or transcendental standpoint on human thought from which
we could develop a conception of the world that is wholly
uncontaminated by human experiences or interest. We find Kant's own
writings - above all the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) - a
case against the possibility of speculative metaphysics which Hayek
himself has always taken to be devastating and conclusive. It is a
fundamental conviction of Hayek's, and one that he has in common with
all those who stand in the tradition of post-Kantian critical
philosophy, that we cannot so step out of our human point of view as to
attain a presuppositionless perspective on the world as a whole and as
it is in itself. The traditional aspiration of western philosophy - to
develop a speculative metaphysics in terms of which human thought may
be justified and reformed - must accordingly be abandoned. The task of
philosophy, for Hayek as for Kant, is not the construction of any
metaphysical system, but the investigation of the limits of reason. It
is a reflexive rather than a constructive inquiry, since all criticism
- in ethics as much as in science - must in the end be immanent
criticism. In philosophy as in life, Hayek avers, we must take much for
granted, or else we will never get started.
Hayek's uncompromisingly skeptical Kantianism is strongly evidenced in The Sensory Order (see Hayek bibliography, B-10).
There Hayek disavows any concern as to "how things really are in the
world," affirming that ". . . a question like 'what is X?' has meaning
only within a given order, and . . . within this limit it must always
refer to the relation of one particular event to other events belonging
to the same order."[1b] Above all, the distinction between appearance and reality, which Hayek sees as best avoided in scientific discourse,[2]
is not to be identified with the distinction between the mental or
sensory order and the physical or material order. The aim of scientific
investigation is not, then, for Hayek, the discovery behind the veil of
appearance of the natures or essences of things in themselves, for,
with Kant and against Aristotelian essentialism, he stigmatizes the
notion of essence or absolute reality as useless or harmful in science
and in philosophy. The aim of science can only be the development of a
system of categories or principles, in the end organized wholly
deductively, which is adequate to the experience it seeks to order.[3]
Hayek as a Skeptical Kantian
Hayek
is a Kantian, then, in disavowing in science or in philosophy any
Aristotelian method of seeking the essences or natures of things. We
cannot know how things are in the world, but only how our mind itself
organizes the jumble of its experiences. He is Kantian, again, in
repudiating the belief, common to empiricists and positivists such as
David Hume and Ernst Mach, that there is available to us a ground of
elementary sensory impressions, untainted by conceptual thought, which
can serve as the foundation for the house of human knowledge. Against
this empiricist dogma, Hayek is emphatic that everything in the sensory
order is abstract, conceptual and theory-laden in character: "It will
be the central thesis of the theory to be outlined that it is not
merely a part but the whole of sensory qualities which is . . . an
'interpretation' based on the experience of the individual or the race.
The conception of an original pure core of sensation which is merely
modified by experience is an entirely unnecessary fiction."[4]
Again, he tells us that "the elimination of the hypothetical 'pure' or
'primary' core of sensation, supposed not to be due to earlier
experience, but either to involve some direct communication of
properties of the external objects, or to constitute irreducible mental
atoms or elements, disposes of various philosophical puzzles which
arise from the lack of meaning of these hypotheses."[5]
The map or model we form of the world, in Hayek's view, is in no
important respect grounded in a basis of sheer sense-data, themselves
supposed to be incorrigible. Rather, the picture we form of the world
emerges straight from our interaction with the world, and it is always
abstract in selecting some among the infinite aspects which the world
contains, most of which we are bound to pass by as without interest to
us.
Three Influences on Hayek's Skeptical Kantianism: Mach, Popper, and Wittgenstein
Hayek's
theory of knowledge is Kantian, we have seen, in affirming that the
order we find in the world is given to it by the organizing structure
of our own mind and in claiming that even sensory experiences are
suffused with the ordering concepts of the human mind. His view of the
mind, then, is Kantian in that it accords a very great measure of
creative power to the mind, which is neither a receptacle for the
passive absorption of fugitive sensations, nor yet a mirror in which
the world's necessities are reflected.
1. Ernst Mach and Metaphysical Neutrality
There
are a number of influences on Hayek, however, which give his Kantianism
a profoundly distinctive and original aspect. The first of these
influences is the work of Ernst Mach (1838-1916), the positivist
philosopher whose ideas dominated much of Austro-German intellectual
life in the decades of Hayek's youth. Hayek's debts to Mach are not so
much in the theory of knowledge, as in the attitude both take to
certain traditional metaphysical questions. I have observed already
that Hayek dissented radically from the Humean and Machian belief that
human knowledge could be reconstructed on the basis of elementary
sensory impressions, and throughout his writings Hayek has always
repudiated as incoherent or unworkable the reductionist projects of
phenomenalism in the theory of perception and behaviorism in the
philosophy of mind. In these areas of philosophy, then, Hayek's work
has been strongly antipathetic to distinctively positivistic ambitions
for a unified science. At the same time, while never endorsing the
dogma of the Vienna Circle that metaphysical utterances are literally
nonsensical, Hayek has often voiced the view that many traditional
metaphysical questions express "phantom-problems."
In both The Sensory Order and later in The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek affirms that the age-old controversy about the freedom of the will embodies such a phantom-problem.[6]
Hayek's 'compatibilist' standpoint in respect of freedom of the will -
his belief that the casual determination of human actions is fully
compatible with ascribing responsibility to human agents for what they
do - is analogous with his stance on the mind-body question. In both
controversies Hayek is concerned to deny any ultimate dualism in
metaphysics or ontology, while at the same time insisting that a
dualism in our practical thought and in scientific method is
unavoidable for us. Thus he says of the relations of the mental and the
physical domains that "While our theory leads us to deny any ultimate
dualism of the forces governing the realms of the mind and that of the
physical world respectively, it forces us at the same time to recognize
that for practical purposes we shall always have to adopt a dualistic
view."[7] And Hayek concludes his study of the foundations of theoretical psychology in The Sensory Order with the claim that "to us
mind must remain forever a realm of its own, which we can know only
through directly experiencing it, but which we shall never be able to
fully explain or to 'reduce' to something else."[8]
Hayek's
thought has a Machian positivist aspect, then, not in the theories of
mind or perception, but in its attitude to traditional metaphysical
questions, which is dissolutionist and deflationary. There is yet
another link with positivism. Notwithstanding Hayek's opposition to any
sort of reductionism, whether sensationalist or physicalist, he seems
to be a monist in ontology, averring that "mind is thus the order
prevailing in a particular part of the physical universe - that part of
it which is ourselves."[9]
Hayek may seem here to be qualifying or withdrawing from that stance of
metaphysical neutrality which in Machian spirit he commends, but this
appearance may be delusive. There is much to suggest that, when Hayek
denies any ultimate dualism in the nature of things, he is not lapsing
into an idiom of essences or natural kinds, but simply observing - much
in the fashion of the American pragmatist philosopher, W. V. Quine -
that nothing in our experience compels us to adopt ideas of mental or
physical substance.[10]
Though Hayek has not to my knowledge ever pronounced explicitly on the
question, the whole tenor of his thought inclines to a Quinean
pragmatist view of ontological commitments. In his skeptical and
pragmatist attitude to ultimate questions in metaphysics and ontology,
Hayek lines up with many positivists rather than with Kantian critical
philosophy - though positivists themselves sometimes claim, with some
justification, to be treading a Kantian path.
2. Karl Popper: The Growth of Knowledge
A
second influence on Hayek's general philosophy which gives it a
distinctive temper is the thought of his friend, Karl Popper (b. 1902).
I mean here, not Popper's hypothetico-deductive account of scientific
method, which there is evidence that Hayek held prior to his meeting
with Popper,[11]
nor yet Popper's proposal (which Hayek was soon to accept) that
falsifiability rather than verifiability should be adopted as a
criterion of demarcation between the scientific and the non-scientific.
Again, Hayek has under Popper's influence come to make an important
distinction between types of rationalism,[12]
such that "critical rationalism" is commended and "constructivistic
rationalism" condemned. But this is not what I have in mind. I refer
rather to certain striking affinities between Hayek's view of the
growth of knowledge and that adumbrated in Popper's later writings on
"evolutionary epistemology." As early as the manuscript which later
became The Sensory Order (published in 1952, but composed in
the twenties), Hayek made it clear that the principles of
classification embodied in the nervous system were not for him fixed
data; experience constantly forced reclassification on us. In his later
writings, Hayek is explicit that the human mind is itself an
evolutionary product and that its structure is therefore variable and
not constant. The structural principles or fundamental categories which
our minds contain ought not, then, to be interpreted in Cartesian
fashion as universal and necessary axioms, reflecting the natural
necessities of the world, but rather as constituting evolutionary
adaptations of the human organism to the world that it inhabits.
The striking similarity between Popper's later views, and those expounded by Hayek in The Sensory Order, is shown by Popper's own application of the evolutionist standpoint in epistemology to the theory of perception:
...
if we start from a critical commonsense realism ... then we shall take
man as one of the animals, and human knowledge as essentially almost as
fallible as animal knowledge. We shall suppose the animal senses to
have evolved from primitive beginnings; and we shall look therefore on
our own senses, essentially, as part of a decoding mechanism - a
mechanism which decodes, more or less successfully, the encoded
information about the world which manages to reach us by sensory means.
[13]
J.W.N. Watkins' comment on this view is as apposite in the respect of Hayek as it is of Popper:
Kant saw very clearly that the empiricist account of sense experience creates and cannot solve the problem of how the manifold and very various data which reach a man's mind from his various senses get unified into a coherent experience.
Kant's solution consisted, essentially, in leaving the old
quasimechanistic account of sense-organs intact, and endowing the mind
with a powerful set of organizing categories - free, universal and
necessary - which unify and structure what would otherwise be a mad
jumble.
Popper's evolutionist view modifies Kant's view at both
ends: interpretative principles lose their fixed and necessary
character, and sense organs lose their merely causal and mechanistic
character.[14]
Hayek's
account of sense perception anticipates Popper's later views in a most
striking fashion, because in both sensation is conceived as a decoding
mechanism, which transmits to us in a highly abstract fashion
information about our external environment. Again, both Hayek and
Popper share the skeptical Kantian view that the order we find in the
world is given to it by the creative activity of our own minds: as
Hayek himself puts it uncompromisingly in The Sensory Order,
"The fact that the world which we know seems wholly an orderly world
may thus be merely a result of the method by which we perceive it."[15]
One difference between Hayek and Popper is in the fact that, at any
rate in his published work to date, Hayek has not followed Popper in
his ontological speculations about a world of abstract or virtual
entities or intelligibles.[16a]
3. Wittgenstein & Hayek
A
third influence on Hayek's thought which gives his view of knowledge
and the mind a very distinctive character is that of his relative,
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899-1951).[16b] This influence runs deep, and is seen not only in the style and presentation of The Sensory Order, which parallels in an obvious way that of Wittgenstein's Tractatus,
but in many areas of Hayek's system of ideas. It is shown, for example,
in Hayek's recurrent interest in the way in which the language in which
we speak shapes our thoughts and forms our picture of the world. In
fact, Hayek's interest in language, and in a critique of language,
predates Wittgenstein's work, inasmuch as he had an early preoccupation
with the work of Fritz Mauthner, the now almost forgotten philosopher
of radical nominalism whom Wittgenstein mentions (somewhat
dismissively) in the Tractatus.[17]
There are, however, many evidences that Wittgenstein's work reinforced
Hayek's conviction that the study of language is a necessary
precondition of the study of human thought, and an indispensable
prophylactic to the principal disorders of the intellect. Examples
which may be adduced are Hayek's studies of the confusion of language
in political thought[18] and, most obviously, perhaps, of his emphasis on the role of social rules in the transmission of practical knowledge.
It is on this last point that one of the most distinctive features of Hayek's Kantianism, its pragmatist aspect, is clearest.[19a] Of course there is a recognition in Kant himself that knowledge requires judgment, a special faculty, the Urteilskraft,
which cannot be given any complete or adequate specification in
propositional terms, and whose exercise is necessary for the
application of any rule. In the sense that we must exercise this
faculty of judgment even before we can apply a rule, it is action which
is at the root of our very knowledge itself. Hayek's concern is not
with this ultimate dependency of rule following upon judgment - which
the later Wittgenstein, perhaps following Kant, emphasizes - but rather
with the way that knowledge of all sorts, but especially social
knowledge, is embodied in rules. Our perceptual processes, indeed all
our processes of thought, are governed by rules which we do not
normally articulate, which in some cases are necessarily beyond
articulation by us, but which we rely upon for the efficiency of all
our action in the world. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, for
Hayek (notwithstanding his stress on the abstract or conceptual
character of our sensory knowledge) all our knowledge is at bottom
practical or tacit knowledge: it consists, not in propositions or
theories, but in habits and dispositions to act in a rule-governed
fashion. There is here an interesting parallel with Popper's view,
which sees even our sense organs as being themselves embodied theories.[19b]
There is much in Hayek's writings to suggest that he takes what Gilbert Ryle calls "knowing how,"[20] what Michael Polanyi calls tacit knowing,[21] what Michael Oakeshott[22]
calls the traditional knowledge, to be the wellspring of all our
knowledge. It is in this sense - in holding the stuff of knowledge to
be at bottom practical - that Hayek may be said to subscribe to a
thesis of the primacy of practice in the constitution of human
knowledge. It is not indeed that Hayek disparages the enterprise of
theory-building, but he sees the theoretical reconstruction of our
practical knowledge as necessarily incomplete in its achievements.
Why
is this? Hayek argues that, not only human social life, but the life of
the mind itself is governed by rules, some of which cannot be specified
at all. Note that Hayek does not contend merely that we cannot in fact
specify all the rules which govern both social and intellectual life:
he argues that there must of necessity be an insuperable limit beyond
which we are unable to specify the rules by which our lives are
governed. As he puts it:
So far our argument has
rested solely on the uncontestable assumption that we are not in fact
able to specify all the rules which govern our perceptions and actions.
We still have to consider the question whether it is conceivable that
we should ever be in a position discursively to describe all (or at
least any one we like) of these rules, or whether mental activity must
always be guided by some rules which we are in principle not able to
specify.
If it should turn out that it is basically impossible
to state or communicate all the rules which govern our actions,
including our communications and explicit statements, this would imply
an inherent limitation of our possible explicit knowledge and, in
particular, the impossibility of ever fully explaining a mind of the
complexity of our own.
Hayek goes on to observe of
the inability of the human mind reflexively to grasp the most basic
rules which govern its operations that "this would follow from what I
understand to Georg Cantor's theorem in the theory of sets according to
which in any system of classification there are always more classes
than things to be classified, which presumably implies that no system
of classes can contain itself." Again, he remarks that "it would thus
appear that Gödel's theorem is but a special case of a more general
principle applying to all conscious and particularly all rational
processes, namely the principle that among their determinants there
must always be some rules which cannot be stated or even be conscious."
Hayek concludes this development of themes first explored in his Sensory Order
with the fascinating suggestion that conscious thought must be presumed
to be governed by "rules which cannot in turn be conscious - by a
"supraconscious mechanism," or, as Hayek prefers sometimes to call it,
a "meta-conscious mechanism" - "which operates on the contents of
consciousness but which cannot itself be conscious."[23]
The
third source of influence on Hayek's skeptical Kantianism, which I have
ascribed primarily to the work of his relative Wittgenstein, plainly
comprehends other influences as well. Hayek cites Ryle in support of
his observations that "'know how' consists in the capacity to act
according to rules which we may be able to discover but which we need
not be able to state in order to obey them," and glosses the point with
reference to Michael Polanyi.[24]
Here the insight is that all articulated or propositional knowledge
arises out of tacit or practical knowledge, the knowledge of how to do
things, which must be taken as fundamental. Nothing is said in Ryle or
Polanyi thus far about rule-governedness as a distinctive mark of human
(and, it may well be, not only human but also animal) intelligent
behavior.
It is for the insight that practical knowledge is
transmitted mimetically through the absorption of social rules that we
need to turn to Wittgenstein, from whom Hayek may have taken it. (There
are, to be sure, contrasts between Hayek's view of rule-governed
behavior and Wittgenstein's, particularly in regard to the skepticism
about rule-following expressed in Wittgenstein's On Certainty
and the dependency of social rules upon forms of life, stressed in
Wittgenstein but not discussed by Hayek; but these contrasts need not
concern us here.) What is original and novel in Hayek's account, and
(so far as I know) is nowhere to be found in Wittgenstein, is his
account, firstly, of the hierarchy of rules in perception and action,
with the most fundamental rules being meta-conscious rules beyond the
possibility of identification and articulation; and, secondly, Hayek's
systematic exploration of the selection of these rules in a process of
evolutionary adaptation.[25]
According to Hayek, in other words, the rules of action and of
perception by which both intellectual and social life are governed are
in the first place stratified or ordered in a hierarchy, with the most
fundamental rules (which shape the basic categories of our
understanding) always eluding conscious articulation. But secondly, all
of these rules, including even the most fundamental of them are
products of a process of evolutionary selection, by which they may be
further altered or eliminated. Systems of rules conferring successful
behavior are adopted by others without conscious reflection. It is this
disposition to emulate or copy successful behaviors which explains the
cultural evolution of which Hayek speaks, and which (though he
recognizes its primitive beginnings in the social lives of animals)
Hayek regards as the distinguishing mark of human life.
Hayek on Knowledge and Mind: Implications for Social Theory
Hayek's Kantian Philosophy of Mind
I
began by noting the striking Kantian attributes of Hayek's epistemology
and philosophy of mind - aspects which Hayek himself does not stress,
perhaps because he conceives the formative influence of Kantian
philosophy on his thought to be self-evident. As he puts it himself in
a footnote to his discussion in a recent volume of the government of
conscious intellectual life by super-conscious abstract rules: "I did
not mention . . . the obvious relation of all this to Kant's conception
of the categories that govern our thinking - which I took rather for
granted."[26]
Hayek's
Kantianism is seen, first in his repudiation of the empiricist view
that knowledge may be constructed from a basis of raw sensory data and,
second, in his uncompromising assertion of the view that the order we
find in the world is a product of the creative activity of the human
mind (rather than a recognition of natural necessity). His Kantian view
is distinctive in that it anticipates Popper in affirming that our
mental frameworks by which we categorize the world are neither
universal nor invariant, but alterable in an evolutionary fashion; his
Kantian view also follows Wittgenstein in grasping the role of social
rules in the transmission of practical knowledge. Hayek's Kantian view
is original, finally, in recognizing a hierarchy in the rules that
govern our perceptions and actions, and in insisting that the most
fundamental of these rules are "super-conscious" and beyond any
possibility of specification or articulation.
Hayek's Philosophy of Mind & His Social Theory: Beyond Kantianism
Hayek
himself is emphatic that these insights in the theories of mind and
knowledge have the largest consequences for social theory. The
inaccessability to reflexive inquiry of the rules that govern conscious
thought entails the bankruptcy of the Cartesian rationalist project and
implies that the human mind can never fully understand itself, still
less can it ever be governed by any process of conscious thought. The
considerations adduced earlier, then, establish the autonomy of the mind,
without ever endorsing any mentalistic thesis of mind's independence of
the material order. Where Hayek deviates from Descartes' conception of
mind, however, is not primarily in his denying ontological independence
to mind, but in his demonstration that complete intellectual
self-understanding is an impossibility.
Hayek's conception of
mind is a notion whose implications for social theory are even more
radical than are those of Hayek's Kantianism. It is the chief burden of
the latter, let us recall, that no external or transcendental
standpoint on human thought is achievable, in terms of which it may be
supported or reformed. In social theory, this Kantian perspective
implies the impossibility of any Archimedean point from which a
synoptic view can be gained of society as a whole and in terms of which
social life may be understood and, it may be, redesigned. As Hayek puts
it trenchantly: "Particular aspects of a culture can be critically
examined only within the context of that culture. We can never reduce a
system of rules or all values as a whole to a purposive construction,
but must always stop with our criticism of something that has no better
grounds for existence than that it is the accepted basis of the
particular tradition."[27]
This is a useful statement, since it brings out the Kantian implication
for social theory: that all criticism of social life must be immanent
criticism, just as in all philosophy inquiry can only be reflexive and
never transcendental.
Hayek goes beyond Kantianism, however, in
his recognition that, just as in the theory of mind we must break off
when we come to the region of unknowable ultimate rules, so in social
theory we come to a stop with the basic constitutive traditions of
social life. These latter, like Wittgenstein's forms of life, cannot be
the objects of further criticism, since they are at the terminus of
criticism and justification: they are simply given to us, and must be
accepted by us. But this is not to say that these traditions are
unchanging, nor that we cannot understand how it is that they do change.
In
social theory, Hayek's devastating critique of Cartesian rationalism
entails that, whatever else it might be, social order cannot be the
product of a directing intelligence. It is not just that too many
concrete details of social life would always escape such an
intelligence, which could never, therefore, know enough. Nor (though we
are nearer the nub of the matter here) is it that society is not a
static object of knowledge which could survive unchanged the
investigations of such an intelligence. No, the impossibility of total
social planning does not rest for Hayek on such Popperian
considerations,[28] or, at any rate, not primarily on them.
Such
an impossibility of central social planning rests, firstly, on the
primordially practical character of most of the knowledge on which
social life depends. Such knowledge cannot be concentrated in a single
brain, natural or mechanical, not because it is very complicated, but
rather because it is embodied in habits and dispositions and governs
our conduct via rules which are often inarticulable. But, secondly, the
impossibility of total social planning arises from the fact that, since
we are all of us governed by rules of which we have no knowledge, even
the directing intelligence itself would be subject to such government.
It is naive and almost incoherent[29]
to suppose that a society could lift itself up by its bootstraps and
reconstruct itself, in part at least because the idea that any
individual mind - or any collectivity of selected minds - could do
that, is no less absurd.
The Idea of a Spontaneous Social Order
If
the order we discover in society is in no important respect the product
of a directing intelligence, and if the human mind itself is a product
of cultural evolution, then it follows that social order cannot be the
product of anything resembling conscious control or rational design. As
Hayek puts it:
The errors of constructivist
rationalism are closely connected with Cartesian dualism, that is, with
the conception of an independently existing mind substance which stands
outside the cosmos of nature and which enabled man, endowed with such a
mind from the beginning, to design the institutions of society and
culture among which he lives ... The conception of an already fully
developed mind designing the institutions which made life possible is
contrary to all we know about the evolution of man.[30]
The master error of Cartesian rationalism[31]
lies in its anthropomorphic transposition of mentalist categories to
social processes. But a Cartesian rationalist view of mind cannot
explain even the order of mind itself. Hayek himself makes this point
when he remarks on "the difference between an order which is brought
about by the direction of a central organ such as the brain, and the
formation of an order determined by the regularity of the actions
towards each other of the elements of a structure." He goes on:
Michael
Polanyi has usefully described this distinction as that between a
monocentric and a polycentric order. The first point which it is in
this connection important to note is that the brain of an organism
which acts as the directing centre for the organism is in turn a
polycentric order, that is, that its actions are determined by the
relation and mutual adjustment to each other of the elements of which
it consists.[32]
Hayek
states his conception of social theory, and of the central importance
in it of undesigned or spontaneous orders, programmatically and with
unsurpassable lucidity:
It is evident that this
interplay of the rules of conduct of the individuals with the actions
of other individuals and the external circumstances in producing an
overall order may be a highly complex affair. The whole task of social
theory consists in little else but an effort to reconstruct the overall
orders which are thus formed . . . It will also be clear that such a
distinct theory of social structures can provide only an explanation of
certain general and highly abstract features of the different types of
structures . . . Of theories of this type economic theory, the theory
of the market order of free human societies, is so far the only one
which has been developed over a long period . . . [33]
Because
it is undesigned and not the product of conscious reflection, the
spontaneous order that emerges of itself in social life can cope with
the radical ignorance we all share of the countless facts on knowledge
of which society depends. This is to say, to begin with, that a
spontaneous social order can utilize fragmented knowledge,
knowledge dispersed among millions of people, in a way a holistically
planned order (if such there could be) cannot. "This structure of human
activities" as Hayek puts it "consistently adapts itself, and functions
through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety
are not known to everybody. The significance of this process is most
obvious and was at first stressed in the economic field."[34]
It is to say, also, that a spontaneous social order can use the
practical knowledge preserved in men's habits and dispositions and that
society always depends on such practical knowledge and cannot do
without it.
Examples abound in Hayek's writings of spontaneous
orders apart from the market order. The thesis of spontaneous order is
stated at its broadest when Hayek says of Bernard Mandeville
(1670-1733) that "for the first time [he] developed all the classical
paradigmata of the spontaneous growth of orderly social structures: of
law and morals, of language, the market and money, and also the growth
of technological knowledge."[35]
Note that whereas Hayek acknowledges that spontaneous order emerges in
natural processes - it may be observed, he tells us, not only in the
population biology of animal species, but in the formation of crystals
and even galaxies[36]
- it is the role of spontaneous order in human society that Hayek is
most concerned to stress. For applying what Hayek illuminatingly terms
"the twin ideas of evolution and of the spontaneous formation of an
order"[37]
to the study of human society enables us to transcend the view,
inherited from Greek, and, above all, from Sophist philosophy, that all
social phenomena can be comprehended within the crude dichotomy of the
natural (physis) and the conventional (nomos). Hayek wishes to focus
attention on the third domain of social phenomena and objects, neither
instinctual in origin nor yet the result of conscious contrivance or
purposive construction, the domain of evolved and self-regulating
social structures. It is the emergence of such self-regulating
structures in society via the natural selection of rules of action and
perception that is systematically neglected in much current sociology
(though not, it may be noted, in the writings of Herbert Spencer,[38]
one of sociology's founding fathers). It is because he thinks that the
sociobiologists view social order as being a mixture of instinctive
behavior and conscious control, and so neglect the cultural selection
of systems of rules, that Hayek has subjected this recent strain of
speculation to a sharp criticism.[39]
It may be noted, finally, that Hayek's repudiation of the Sophistic
nature-convention dichotomy sets him in opposition to Popper and his
talk of the critical dualism of facts and decisions and brings him
close to the Wittgensteinian philosopher, Peter Winch, for whom the
distinction is essentially misconceived.[40]
The Application of Spontaneous Order in Economic Life: The Catallaxy
The
central claim of Hayek's philosophy, as we have expounded it so far, is
that knowledge is, at its base, at once practical and abstract. It is
abstract inasmuch as even sensory perception gives us a model of our
environment which is highly selective and picks out only certain
classes of events, and it is practical inasmuch as most knowledge is
irretrievably stored or embodied in rules of action and perception.
These rules, in turn, are in Hayek's conception the subject of
continuing natural selection in cultural competition. The mechanism of
this selection, best described in Hayek's fascinating "Notes on the
Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct,"[41]
is in the emulation by others of rules which secure successful
behavior. It is by a mimetic contagion that rules conferring success -
where success means, in the last resort, the growth of human numbers[42]
- come to supplant those rules which are maladapted to the environment.
Finally, the convergence of many rule-following creatures on a single
system of rules creates those social objects - language, money,
markets, the law - which are the paradigms of spontaneous social order.
It
is a general implication of this conception that, since social order is
not a purposive construction, it will not in general serve any specific
purpose. Social order facilitates the achievement of human purposes:
taken in itself, it must be seen as having no purpose. Just as human
actions acquire their meaning by occurring in a framework that can
itself have no meaning,[43]
so social order will allow for the achievement of human purposes only
to the extent that it is itself purposeless. Nowhere has this general
implication of Hayek's conception been so neglected as in economic
life. In the history and theory of science, to be sure, where the idea
of spontaneous order was (as Hayek acknowledges) put to work by Michael
Polanyi, false conceptions were spawned by the erroneous notion that
scientific progress could be planned, whereas, on the contrary, any
limitation of scientific inquiry to the contents of explicit or
theoretical knowledge would inevitably stifle further progress.[44]
In economics, however, the canard that order is the result of conscious
control had more fateful consequences. It supported the illusion that
the whole realm of human exchange was to be understood after the
fashion of a household or an hierarchical organization, with limited
and commensurable purposes ranked in order of agreed importance.
This confusion of a genuine hierarchical 'economy' - such as that of an army, a school or a business corporation - with the whole realm of social exchange, the catallaxy,
informs many aspects of welfare economics and motivates its
interventionist projects via the fiction of a total social product.
This confusion between 'catallaxy' and 'economy' is, at bottom, the
result of an inability to acknowledge that the order which is the
product of conscious direction - the order of a management hierarchy in
a business corporation, for example - itself always depends upon a
larger spontaneous order. The demand that the domain of human exchange
taken as a whole should be subject to purposive planning is therefore,
the demand that social life be reconstructed in the character of a
factory, an army, or a business corporation - in the character, in
other words, of an authoritarian organization. Apart from the fateful
consequences for individual liberty that implementing such a demand
inexorably entails, it springs in great measure from an inability or
unwillingness to grasp how in the market process itself there is a
constant tendency to self-regulation by spontaneous order. When it is
unhampered, the process of exchange between competitive firms itself
yields a coordination of men's activities more intricate and balanced
than any that could be enforced (or even conceived) by a central
planner.
The Catallactic Order, Practical Knowledge, and the Calculation Debate
The
relevance of these considerations to Hayek's contributions to the
question of the allocation of resources in a socialist economic order
is central, but often neglected. It is, of course, widely recognized[45]
that one of Hayek's principal contributions in economic theory is the
refinement of the thesis of his teacher, Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973),
that the attempt to supplant market relations by public planning cannot
avoid yielding calculational chaos. Hayek's account of the mechanism
whereby this occurs has, however, some entirely distinctive and
original features. For Hayek is at great pains to point out that the
dispersed knowledge which brings about a tendency to equilibrium in
economic life and so facilitates an integration of different plans of
life, is precisely not theoretical or technical knowledge, but
practical knowledge of concrete situations - "knowledge of people, of
local conditions, and of special circumstances." As Hayek puts it: "The
skipper who earns his living from using otherwise empty or half-filled
journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge
is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the
arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices - are
all performing eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of
circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others." Hayek goes
to comment: "It is a curious fact that this sort of knowledge should
today be regarded with a kind of contempt and that anyone who by such
knowledge gains an advantage over somebody better equipped with
theoretical or technical knowledge is thought to have acted almost
disreputably."[46]
The "problem of the division of knowledge," which Hayek describes as
"the really central problem of economics as a social science,"[47]
is therefore not just a problem of specific data, articulable in
explicit terms, being dispersed in millions of heads: it is the far
more fundamental problem of the practical knowledge on which economic
life depends being embodied in skills and habits, which change as
society changes and which are rarely expressible in theoretical or
technical terms.
One way of putting Hayek's point, a way we owe
to Israel Kirzner rather than to Hayek himself but which is wholly
compatible with all that Hayek has said on these questions, is to
remark as follows: if men's economic activities really do show a
tendency to coordinate with one another, this is due in large part to
the activity of entrepreneurship. The neglect of the
entrepreneur in much standard economic theorizing, the inability to
grasp his functions in the market process, may be accounted for in part
by reference to Hayek's description above of the sort of knowledge used
by the entrepreneur. As Kirzner puts it, "Ultimately, then, the kind of
'knowledge' required for entrepreneurship is 'knowing' where to look
for 'knowledge' rather than knowledge of substantive market
information."[48]
It is hard to avoid the impression that the entrepreneurial knowledge
of which Kirzner speaks here is precisely that practical or
dispositional knowledge which Hayek describes.
It is the neglect
of how all economic life depends on this practical knowledge which
allowed the brilliant but, in this respect, fatally misguided Joseph
Schumpeter (1883-1950) to put a whole generation of economists on the
wrong track, when he stated in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) that the problem of calculation under socialism was essentially solved.[49]
It is the neglect of the same truth that Hayek expounded which explains
the inevitable failure in Soviet-style economies of attempts to
simulate market processes in computer modeling. All such efforts are
bound to fail, if only because the practical knowledge of which Hayek
speaks cannot be programmed into a mechanical device. They are bound to
fail, also, because they neglect the knowledge-gathering role of market
pricing. Here we must recall that, according to Hayek, knowledge is
dispersed throughout society and, further, it is embodied in habits and
dispositions of countless men and women. The knowledge yielded by
market pricing is knowledge which all men can use, but which none of
them would possess in the absence of the market process; in a sense,
the knowledge embodied or expressed in the market price is systemic or
holistic knowledge, knowledge unknown and unknowable to any of the
elements of the market system, but given to them all by the operation
of the system itself. No sort of market simulation or shadow pricing
can rival the operation of the market order itself in producing this
knowledge, because only the actual operation of the market itself can
draw on the fund of practical knowledge which market participants
exploit in their activities.
Hayek's Refinements of the Misesian Calculation Debate
Three
further points may be worth noting in respect of Hayek's refinements of
the Misesian calculation debate. First, when Hayek speaks of economic
calculations under socialism as a practical impossibility, he is not
identifying specific obstacles in the way of the socialist enterprise
which might someday be removed. Socialist planning could supplant
market processes only if practical knowledge could be replaced by
theoretical or technical knowledge at the level of society as a whole -
and that is a supposition which is barely conceivable. The kind of
omniscience demanded of a socialist planner could be possessed only by
a single mind, entirely self-aware, existing in an unchanging
environment - a supposition so bizarre that we realize we have moved
from any imaginable social world to a metaphysical fantasy in which men
and women have disappeared altogether, and all that remain are
Leibnizian monads, featureless and unhistorical ciphers.
Fortunately,
such a transformation is possible, if at all, only as a
thought-experiment. In practice, all supposedly socialist economies
depend upon precisely that practical knowledge of which Hayek speaks,
and which though dispersed through society is transmitted via the price
mechanism. It is widely acknowledged that socialist economies depend
crucially in their planning policies on price data gleaned from
historic and world markets. Less often recognized, and dealt with in
detail only, so far as I know, in Paul Craig Roberts' important Alienation in the Soviet Economy,[50]
is that planning policies in socialist economies are only shadows cast
by market processes distorted by episodes of authoritarian
intervention. The consequence of the Hayekian and Polanyian critiques
of socialist planning is not inefficiency of such planning but rather
its impossibility: we cannot analyze the "socialist" economies of the
world properly, unless we penetrate the ideological veil they secrete
themselves behind, and examine the mixture of market processes with
command structures which is all that can ever exist in such a complex
society.
The third and final implication of Hayek's contribution
to the calculation question is his clear statement of the truth that
the impossibility of socialism is an epistemological
impossibility. It is not a question of motivation or volition, of the
egoism or limited sympathies of men and women, but of the inability of
any social order in which the market is suppressed or distorted to
utilize effectively the practical knowledge possessed by its citizens.
Calculational chaos would ensue, and a barbarization of social life
result, from the attempt to socialize production, even if men possessed
only altruistic and conformist motives. For, in the absence of the
signals transmitted via the price mechanism, they would be at a loss
how to direct their activities for the social good, and the common
stock of practical knowledge would begin to decay. Only the
inventiveness of human beings as expressed in the emergence of black
and gray markets could then prevent a speedy regression to the
subsistence economy. The impossibility of socialism, then, derives from
its neglect of the epistemological functions of market
institutions and processes. Hayek's argument here is the most important
application of his fundamental insight into the epistemological role of
social institutions - an insight I will need to take up again in the
context of certain similarities between Hayek's conception of liberty
under law and Robert Nozick's meta-utopian framework.
Theory and Method in Economic Science
Prediction vs. 'Complex Phenomena'
Hayek's
conception of knowledge, when taken in conjunction with the idea of a
spontaneous social order, has important implications for the proper
method for the practice of social science. To begin with, Hayek's
affirmation of "the primacy of the abstract" in all human knowledge
means that social science is always a theory-laden activity and can
never aspire to an exhaustive description of concrete social facts.
More, the predictive aspirations of social science must be qualified:
not even the most developed of the social sciences, economics, can ever
do more than predict the occurrence of general classes of events.
Indeed, in his strong emphasis on the primacy of the abstract, Hayek
goes so far as to question the adequacy of the nomothetic or
nomological model of science (i.e. exact prediction through 'laws'),
including social science. At least in respect of complex phenomena, all
science can aim at is an "explanation of the principle," or the
recognition of a pattern - "the explanation not of the individual
events but merely of the appearance of certain patterns or orders.
Whether we call these mere explanations of the principle or mere
pattern predictions or higher level theories does not matter."[51]
Such recognitions of orders or pattern predictions are, Hayek observes,
fully theoretical claims, testable and falsifiable: but they correspond
badly with the usual cause-effect structure of nomothetic or
law-governed explanation.
In his most important later statement on these questions, "The Theory of Complex Phenomena," [bibliography, A-109],
Hayek tells us that, because social life is made up of complex
phenomena, "economic theory is confined to describing kinds of patterns
which will appear if certain general conditions are satisfied, but can
rarely if ever derive from this knowledge any predictions of specific
phenomena."[52]
If we ask why it is that social phenomena are complex phenomena, part
of the reason at any rate lies in what Hayek earlier characterized[53]
as the subjectivity of the data of the social sciences: social objects
are not like natural objects whose properties are highly invariant
relatively to our beliefs and perceptions; rather, social objects are
in large measure actually constituted by our beliefs and judgments.
Social phenomena are non-physical, and Hayek has stated that
"Non-physical phenomena are more complex because we call physical
phenomena what can be described by relatively simple formulae."[54] And, because of the subjectivity of its data, social life always eludes such simple formulae.
Hayek's Opposition to Apriori Science
A
number of points may be made briefly about Hayek's conception of method
in social and economic theory. First, whereas he follows his great
teachers in the Austrian tradition in emphasizing the subjective
aspects of social phenomena, Hayek's methodology of social and economic
science does not belong to that Austrian tradition in which social
theory is conceived as an enterprise yielding apodictic truths.
Specifically - contrary to T. W. Hutchinson, who periodizes Hayek's
work into an Austrian praxeological and a post-Austrian Popperian
period, and also contrary to Norman P. Barry who sees both trends
running right through Hayek's writings - Hayek never accepted the
Misesian conception of a praxeological science of human action which
would take as its point of departure a few axioms about the distinctive
features of purposeful behavior over time. In the Introduction to Collectivist Economic Planning [E-5,
1935] and elsewhere in his early writings, Hayek had (as Hutchinson
notes) insisted that economics yields "'general laws,' that is,
'inherent necessities determined by the permanent nature of the
constituent elements.'"[55] As Hutchinson himself acknowledges in passing, however, such laws or necessities function in Hayek's writings as postulates
(rather than as axioms), and they continue to do so even in his later
writings, in which (as I have already noted) a suspicion of the
nomothetic paradigm of social science is expressed. It is clear from
the context of the quotations cited by Hutchinson that, in speaking of
the general laws or inherent necessities of social and economic life,
Hayek meant to controvert the excessive voluntarism of historicism,
which insinuates that social life contains no unalterable necessities
of any sort, rather than to embrace the view that there can be an
apriori science of society or human action. To this extent Barry is
right in his observation that, "there is a basic continuity in Hayek's
writings on methodology."[56]
Certainly there seems little substance in a periodization of Hayek's
methodological writings by reference to the supposedly Popperian paper
of 1937 on "Economics and Knowledge" (A-34).
At
the same time, there seems little warrant for Barry's claim that
throughout his work Hayek tries "to combine two rather different
philosophies of social science; the Austrian praxeological school with
its subjectivism and rejection of testability in favour of axiomatic
reasoning, and the hypothetico-deductive approach of contemporary
science with its emphasis on falsifiability and empirical content."[57]
For there is no evidence, so far as I know, that Hayek ever endorsed
the Misesian conception of an axiomatic or apriori science of human
action grounded in apodictic certainties. Again, as we have seen,
Hayek's view that the social sciences are throughout deductive in form
antedates Popper's influence and is evidenced in the Introduction to Collectivist Economic Planning [E-5, 1935].
Popperian 'Conjectures & Refutations'
Hayek's
real debts to Popper are, I think, different from those attributed to
him by Hutchinson and Barry. It is not that Hayek under Popper's
influence abandoned an apodictic-deductive method that was endorsed (in
different versions, Kantian and Aristotelian) by Mises and Menger, but
rather that he came to adopt Popper's proposal that falsifiability be
treated as a demarcation criterion of science from non-science.[58]
Again, Hayek follows Popper in abandoning his earlier Austrian
conviction that there is a radical dualism of method as between natural
and social science: this conviction, he tells us, depended on an
erroneous conception of method in the natural sciences: as a result of
what Popper has taught him, Hayek says, "the differences between the
two groups of disciplines has thereby been greatly narrowed."[59]
Hayek's debts to Popper are, then, in his seeing that it is the
falsifiability of an hypothesis rather than its verifiability which
makes it testable and empirical, and, secondly, in his acknowledging
the unity of method in all the sciences, natural and social, where this
method is seen clearly to be hypothetico-deductive.
Even in
these Popperian influences, it is to be noted, there are differences of
emphasis from Popper himself. Hayek anticipates Lakatos in perceiving
that the theoretical sciences may contain a "hard core" of hypotheses,
well-confirmed and valuable in promoting understanding of the phenomena
under investigation, which are highly resistant to testing and
refutation.[60]
And Hayek explicitly states that in some fields Popper's ideas of
maximum empirical content and falsifiability may be inappropriate:
It
is undoubtedly a drawback to have to work with theories which can be
refuted only by statements of a high degree of complexity, because
anything below that degree of complexity is on that ground alone
permitted by our theory. Yet it is still possible that in some fields
the more generic theories are the more useful ones . . . Where only the
most general patterns can be observed in a considerable number of
instances, the endeavour to become more 'scientific' by further
narrowing down our formulae may well be a waste of effort . . . [61]
In
general, then, it seems fair to hold that Hayek acknowledges that the
proper method in social and economic studies, as elsewhere, is the
hypothetico-deductive method of conjectures and refutations set out by
Popper. On the other hand, he continues to recognize that in respect of
complex phenomena such as are found in the social studies, testability
may be a somewhat high-level and protracted process, and the ideal of
high empirical content captured in a nomothetic framework - a demanding
and sometimes unattainable ideal.
Some Applications of Hayek's Methodological Views: Keynes, Friedman, and Shackle on Economic Policy
Hayek's
view that we can at best attain abstract models of social processes,
whereas the concrete details of social life will always largely elude
theoretical formulation, has large and radical implications in the
field of public policy. In brief, it entails that the object of public
policy should be confined to the design or reform of institutions
within which unknown individuals make and execute their own, largely
unpredictable plans of life. In a free society, in fact, whereas there
may be a legal policy in respect of economic institutions, there cannot
be such a thing as economic policy as it is presently understood, for
adherence to the rule of law precludes anything resembling
macroeconomic management. Here I do not wish to take up this point,
which I will consider later, but rather to spell out the connection
between Hayek's methodological views and his belief that most, if not
all economic policy as practiced in the postwar world has had a
self-defeating effect.
Hayek contra Constructivism & Social Engineering
We
have seen that, for Hayek, the most we can hope for in understanding
social life is that we will recognize recurring patterns. Hayek goes on
to observe:
Predictions of a pattern are . . . both
testable and valuable. Since the theory tells us under which general
conditions a pattern of this sort will form itself, it will enable us
to create such conditions and to observe whether a pattern of the kind
predicted will appear. And since the theory tells us that this pattern
assures a maximisation of output in a certain sense, it also enables us
to create the general conditions which will assure such a maximisation,
though we are ignorant of many of the particular circumstances which
will determine the pattern that will appear.[62]
Hayek's
view stands in sharp opposition to any idea of a policy science or a
political technology aimed at producing specific desired effects. Such
a policy science demands the impossible of its practitioners, a
detailed knowledge of a changing and complex order in society. Even
Popper's conception of "piecemeal social engineering," Hayek tells us,
"suggests to me too much a technological problem of reconstruction on
the basis of the total knowledge of the physical facts, while the
essential point about the practical improvement is an experimental
attempt to improve the functioning of some part without a full
comprehension of the structure of the whole."[63]
Indeed Hayek's central point is that understanding the primacy of the
abstract in human knowledge means that we must altogether renounce the
modern ideal of consciously controlling social life: a better ideal is
that of cultivating the general conditions in which beneficial results may be expected to emerge.
Hayek's
critique of the constructivistic or engineering approach to social life
parallels in an intriguing way that of Michael Oakeshott and of the
Wittgensteinian philosopher Rush Rhees. Consider Oakeshott's statement:
"The assimilation of politics to engineering is, indeed, what may be
called the myth of rationalist politics."[64]
Or Rhees' observation (made in criticism of Popper): "There is nothing
about human societies which makes it reasonable to speak of the
application of engineering to them. Even the most important 'problems
of production' are not problems in engineering."[65]
The conception of social life which talk of social engineering
expresses is at fault not only because it presupposes an agreement on
goals or ends which nowhere exists but also because it promotes the
illusion that political life may become subject to a sort of technical
or theoretical control.
Hayek contra Keynes
These
general views illuminate much of the rationale of Hayek's opposition
not only to Keynesian policies of macroeconomic demand management but
also to Friedmanite monetarism. Of course, in the great debates of the
Thirties, Hayek had argued forcefully that Keynes in no way provided a
general theory of economic discoordination. Again, Hayek always argued
that the policies Keynes suggested, depending as they did for their
success upon institutional and psychological irrationalities which
their very operation would undermine, were bound over the longer run to
be self-defeating. In particular, Hayek maintained that Keynesian
policies of deficit financing depended for their success upon a
widespread money illusion which the policies themselves could not help
but erode. Hayek's further objection to Keynesian policies is that, in
part because they depend on a defective understanding of the business
cycle (which is seen as expressing itself in aggregative variations in
total economic activity rather than in a discoordination of relative
price structures brought about by a governmental distortion of the
structure of interest rates) Keynesian policy-makers, because of their
holistic and aggregative bias, find it hard to avoid committing a sort
of fallacy of conceptual realism: statistical artefacts or logical
fictions are allowed to blot out the subtle and complex relationships
which make up the real economy.
Now there is plainly much in
Hayek's subtle account of the business cycle, and in his contributions
to capital theory, which is difficult and disputable, and to comment on
such questions is in any case beyond my expertise. Quite apart from its
technical details, however, it is clear that Hayek's critique of
Keynesian policies is of a piece with his emphasis on the primacy of
the abstract and with his insight into the indispensability of
conventions for the orderly conduct of social life. Policies of
macroeconomic demand management ask more in the way of concrete
knowledge of the real relationships which govern the economy than any
administrator could conceivably acquire, and their operation is in the
longer run self-defeating. More generally, Hayek's challenge to
Keynesian theory is a demand that Keynesians specify in detail the
mechanisms whereby an unhampered market could be expected to develop
severe discoordination. Only if such mechanisms could be clearly
described and (crucially) given a plausible historical application,
would a serious challenge to Hayek's own Austrian view - in which it is
governmental intervention in the economy which is principally
responsible for discoordination - enter the realm of critical debate.
Hayek contra Friedman
In
respect to Friedman's proposals for monetary regulation by a fixed
rule, Hayek has argued that in a modern democracy no governmental or
quasi-governmental agency can preserve the independence of action
essential if such a monetary rule is to be operated consistently. More
fundamentally, such a policy of adopting a fixed rule in the supply of
money is opposed by Hayek on methodological grounds. Such a policy
calls for an exactitude in modeling and measuring economic life, and an
unambiguity in the definition of money, which it is beyond our powers
to attain. Hayek's own objection to Friedman's monetarist proposals is,
then, most substantially that money is not the sort of social object
that we can define precisely or control comprehensively; Hayek has even
suggested that, in recognition of the elusiveness of the monetary
phenomenon, we should treat "money" as an adjectival expression,[66]
applicable to indefinitely many distinct and disparate instruments.
Hayek's proposals in this area clearly open up technical questions in
monetary theory which I am unqualified to adjudicate. It seems clear,
though, that Hayek's proposal favoring currency competition by the
private issuance of money would be found objectionable by Friedmanites
(who would argue that Hayek exaggerates the effect such competition
would have in preventing currency debasement) and by advocates of the
classical gold standard. It is clear, nonetheless, that in arguing for
the establishment of a monetary catallaxy Hayek has illuminated
questions both in monetary theory and in political economy which had
hitherto gone largely neglected, but which it is critical that
supporters of the market order now examine.
Hayek and Shackle
One
objection to Hayek's view may be worth addressing at this point. There
is much in Hayek's account of the business cycle, as in his more
general account of spontaneous social order, to suggest that he
believes economic discoordination results always from institutional
factors, so that at any rate large-scale disequilibrium would be
impossible in a catallaxy of wholly unhampered markets. Against this
view, Hayek's brilliant and largely neglected pupil, G. L. S. Shackle,
has argued[67]
that the subjectivity of expectations must infect the market process
with an ineradicable tendency to disequilibrium. It must be allowed
that, if we accept Hayek's view of equilibrium as a process in which
men's plans are coordinated by trial and error over time, there can be
nothing apodictically certain about this process: conceivably, under
some conditions of uncertainty in which hitherto reliable expectations
are repeatedly confounded, large scale discoordination could occur in
the market process.
Three counter-observations are in order,
however. First, nothing in Shackle's argument tells against the point,
defensible both on theoretical grounds and as an historical
interpretation, that in practice by far the most destabilizing factor
in the market process is provided by governmental intervention.
Secondly, and relatedly, it is unclear that the kind of disequilibrium
of which Shackle speaks - disequilibrium generated by divergency in
subjective expectations - could amount to anything resembling the
classical business cycle, which is more plausibly accounted for in
Austrian and Hayekian terms as a consequence of governmental
intervention in the interest rate structure.
And thirdly, it is unclear that Shackle's argument shows the presence in the market process of any tendency to disequilibrium.
What we have in the market process is admittedly a 'kaleidic' world, in
which expectations, tastes, and beliefs constantly and unpredictably
mutate. Yet, providing market adaptation is unhampered, what we can
expect from the market process is an uninterrupted series of monetary
equilibrium tendencies, each of them asymptotic - never quite reaching
equilibrium - and each of them soon overtaken by its successor. In this
kaleidic world there may well be no apodictic certainty that we shall
never face large-scale, endogenous discoordination, but we are
nevertheless on safe ground in preferring that the self-regulating
tendencies of the process be accorded unhampered freedom and that
governmental intervention be recognized as the major disruptive factor
in the market process. We are on safe ground, then, in discerning in
the tendency to equilibrium in the market process the formation of
spontaneous order in the economic realm.
Hayek's Constitution of Liberty: Ethical Basis of the Juridical Framework of Individual Liberty
Clarifying Hayek's Moral Theory
Given
that we recognize governmental intervention to be the greatest
subverter of spontaneous order in the realm of economic exchange, what
legal framework is to be adopted for the regulation of economic life?
Here we come to one of the most fascinating and controversial of
Hayek's contributions to social philosophy, his account of individual
liberty under the rule of law. Before we can address ourselves to some
of the problems surrounding Hayek's contribution to philosophical
jurisprudence, however, a few words must be said about Hayek's moral
theory, since few aspects of Hayek's work are so often misunderstood.
Hayek has been characterized as a moral relativist, an exponent of
evolutionary ethics and, less implausibly but nonetheless incorrectly,
as a rule-utilitarian. Let us see if we can dissipate the confusion.
In
the first place, moral life for Hayek is itself a manifestation of
spontaneous order. Like language and law, morality emerged undesigned
from the life of men with one another: it is so much bound up with
human life, indeed, as to be partly constitutive of it. The maxims of
morality, then, in no way presuppose an authority, human or divine,
from which they emanate, and they antedate the institutions of the
state. But, secondly, the detailed content of the moral conventions
which spring up unplanned in society is not immutable or invariant.
Moral conventions change, often slowly and almost imperceptibly, in
accordance with the needs and circumstances of the men who subscribe to
them. Moral conventions must (or Hayek's account of them) be seen as
part of the evolving social order itself.
Now at this point it
is likely that a charge of ethical relativism or evolutionism will at
once be levelled against Hayek, but there is little substance to such
criticisms. He has gone out of his way to distinguish his standpoint
from any sort of evolutionary ethics. As he put it in his Constitution of Liberty:
It
is a fact which we must recognize that even what we regard as good or
beautiful is changeable - if not in any recognizable manner that would
entitle us to take a relativistic position, then in the sense that in
many respects we do not know what will appear as good or beautiful to
another generation ... It is not only in his knowledge, but also in his
aims and values, that man is the creature of his civilization; in the
last resort, it is the relevance of these individual wishes to the
perpetuation of the group or the species that will determine whether
they persist or change. It is, of course, a mistake to believe that we
can draw conclusions about what our values ought to be simply because
we realize that they are a product of evolution. But we cannot
reasonably doubt that these values are created and altered by the same
evolutionary forces that have produced our intelligence.[68]
Hayek's
argument here, then, is manifestly not that we can invoke the trend of
social evolution as a standard for the resolution of moral dilemmas,
but rather that we are bound to recognize in our current moral
conventions the outcome of an evolutionary process. Admittedly,
inasmuch as nothing in the detailed content of our moral conventions is
unchanging or unalterable, this means that we are compelled to abandon
the idea that they have about them any character of universality or
fixity, but this is a long way from any doctrine of moral relativism.
As Hayek observes in his remarks on the ambiguity of relativism:
...
our present values exist only as the elements of a particular cultural
tradition and are significant only for some more or less long phase of
evolution - whether this phase includes some of our pre-human ancestors
or is confined to certain periods of human civilization. We have no
more ground to ascribe to them eternal existence than to the human race
itself. There is thus one possible sense in which we may legitimately
regard human values as relative and speak of the probability of their
further evolution.
But it is a far cry from this general insight
to the claims of the ethical, cultural or historical relativists or of
evolutionary ethics. To put it crudely, while we know that all these
values are relative to something, we do not know to what they are
relative. We may be able to indicate the general class of circumstances
which have made them what they are, but we do not know the particular
conditions to which the values we hold are due, or what our values
would be if those circumstances had been different. Most of the
illegitimate conclusions are the result of erroneous interpretation of
the theory of evolution as the empirical establishment of a trend. Once
we recognize that it gives us no more than a scheme of explanation
which might be sufficient to explain particular phenomena if we knew
all the facts which have operated in the course of history, it becomes
evident that the claims of the various kinds of relativists (and of
evolutionary ethics) are unfounded.[69]
Hume's Influence on Hayek's Social Philosophy
Hayek
does not, then subscribe to any sort of ethical relativism or
evolutionism, but it is not altogether clear from these statements if
he thinks humanity's changing moral conventions have in fact any
invariant core or constant content. In order to consider this last
question, and to attain a better general understanding of Hayek's
conception of morality, we need to look at his debts to David Hume,
whose influence upon Hayek's moral and political philosophy is
ubiquitous and profound.
Hayek follows Hume in supposing that,
in virtue of certain general facts about the human predicament, the
moral conventions which spring up spontaneously among men all have
certain features in common or (in other words) exhibit some shared
principles. Among the general facts that Hume mentions in his Treatise, and which Hayek cites in "The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume" (in B-13),
are men's limited generosity and intellectual imperfection and the
unalterable scarcity of the means of satisfying human needs. As Hayek
puts it succinctly: "It is thus the nature of the(se) circumstances,
what Hume calls 'the necessity of human society,' that gives rise to
the 'three fundamental laws of nature': those of 'the stability of
possessions, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of
promises.'" And Hayek glosses this passage with a fuller citation from
Hume's Treatise: "Though the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature;
if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if
we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species."[70]
Hume's
three rules of justice or laws of nature, then, give a constant content
to Hayek's conception of an evolving morality. They frame what the
distinguished Oxford jurist, H. L. A. Hart, was illuminatingly to call
"the minimum content of natural law."[71]
The justification of these fundamental rules of justice, and of the
detailed and changing content of the less permanent elements of
morality, is (in Hayek's view as in Hume's) that they form
indispensable conditions for the promotion of human welfare. There is
in Hayek as in Hume, accordingly, a fundamental utilitarian commitment
in their theories of morality. It is a very indirect utilitarianism
that they espouse, however, more akin to that of the late
nineteenth-century Cambridge moralist Henry Sidgwick[72]
(1838-1900) than it is to Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. The
utilitarian component of Hayek's conception of morality is indirect in
that it is never supposed by him that we ought or could invoke a
utilitarian principle in order to settle practical questions: for,
given the great partiality and fallibility of our understanding, we are
in general better advised to follow the code of behavior accepted in
our own society. That code can, in turn, Hayek believes, never properly
be the subject of a rationalist reconstruction in Benthamite fashion,
but only reformed piecemeal and slowly. In repudiating the claims that
utilitarian principles can govern specific actions and that utility may
yield new social rules, Hayek shows himself to be an indirect or system utilitarian,
for whom the proper role of utility is not prescriptive or practical
but rather as a standard of evaluation for the assessment of whole
systems of rules.
Hayek's Utilitarianism & Liberty
Again
however, Hayek's utilitarian outlook is distinctive in that he
explicitly repudiates any hedonistic conception of the content of
utility itself.[73]
How, then, does he understand utilitarian welfare? Just how are we to
assess different systems of rules in regard to their welfare-promoting
effects? Here Hayek comes close to modern preference utilitarianism,
but gives that view an original formulation, in arguing that the test
of any system of rules is whether it maximizes an anonymous
individual's chance of achieving his unknown purposes.[74]
In Hayek's conception, we are not bound to accept the historical body
of social rules just as we find it: it may be reformed in order to
improve the chances of the unknown man's achieving his goals. It will
be seen that this is a maximizing conception, but not one that
represents utility as a sort of neutral stuff, a container of intrinsic
value whose magnitude may vary. Indeed, in taking as the point of
comparison an hypothesized unknown individual, Hayek's conception (as
he recognizes[75]) parallels John Rawls' model of rational choice behind a veil of ignorance as presented in Rawls' Theory of Justice.
Mention
of Rawls' contractarian derivation of principles of justice at once
raises the question of how Hayek's indirect or system utilitarian
argument is supposed to ground the rules of justice he defends, and, in
particular, how Hayek's defense of the priority of liberty squares with
his utilitarian outlook.
Several observations are apposite
here. First, Hayek undoubtedly follows Hume in believing that, because
they constitute an indispensable condition for the promotion of general
welfare, the rules of justice are bound to take priority over any
specific claim to welfare. Again, it is to be noted that Hume's second
rule of justice, the transference of property by consent, itself frames
a protected domain and so promotes individual liberty. Finally, Hayek
argues forcefully that, if individuals are to be free to use their own
knowledge and resources to best advantage, they must do so in a context
of known and predictable rules governed by law. It is in a framework of
liberty under the rule of law, Hayek contends, that justice and general
welfare are both served. Indeed, under the rule of law, justice and the
general welfare are convergent and not conflicting goals or values.
Justice, Liberty, and the Rule of Law In Hayek's Constitution of Liberty
These
claims regarding the relations between justice, liberty, and the rule
of law encompass the most controversial and the most often attacked
portion of Hayek's social philosophy. Common to all criticisms of it is
the objection that Hayek expects too much of the rule of law itself,
which is only one of the virtues a legal order may display, and a
rather abstract notion at that. Among classical liberals and
libertarians, this objection has acquired a more specific character. It
has been argued[76]
that upholding the rule of law cannot by itself protect liberty or
secure justice, for these values will be promoted only if the
individual rights are respected. Hayek's theory is at the very least
radically incomplete, according to these critics, inasmuch as his
conception of the rule of law will have the classical liberal
implications he expects of it, only if it incorporates a conception of
individual rights, which he seems explicitly to disavow. All these
liberals and libertarians fasten upon Hayek's use of a Kantian test of
universalizability to argue that such a test is almost without
substance, in that highly oppressive and discriminatory laws will
survive it, so long as their framers are ingenious enough to avoid
mentioning particular groups or named individuals in them. The upshot
of this criticism is that, in virtue of the absence in his theory of
any strong conception of moral rights, Hayek is constrained to demand
more of the largely formal test of universalizability than it can
possibly deliver, and so to conflate the ideal of the rule of law with
other political goods and virtues.
Criticisms of Hayek's Universalizable 'Rule of Law'
This fundamental criticism of Hayek, stated powerfully by Hamowy[77] and Raz[78] and endorsed in earlier writings of my own,[79]
now seems to me to express an impoverished and mistaken view of the
nature and role of Kantian universalizability in Hayek's philosophical
jurisprudence. It embodies the error that, in Hayek or indeed in Kant,
universalizability is a wholly formal test.
In his "Principles of a Liberal Social Order," (A-115, in B-13)
Hayek tells us: "The test of the justice of a rule is usually (since
Kant) described as that of its 'universalizability,' i.e. of the
possibility of willing that rules should be applied to all instances
that correspond to the conditions stated in it (the 'categorical
imperative')."[80] As an historical gloss, Hayek observes that:
It
is sometimes suggested that Kant developed his theory of the Rechtstaat
by applying to public affairs his conception of the categorical
imperative. It was probably the other way round, and Kant developed his
theory of the categorical imperative by applying to morals the concept
of the rule of law which he found ready made (in the writings of Hume).[81]
Hayek's
own argument, that applying Kantian universalizability to the maxims
that make up the legal order yields liberal principles of justice which
confer maximum equal freedom upon all, has been found wanting by nearly
all his critics and interpreters. Thus Raz quotes Hayek as follows:
"The
conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of this
book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of
general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to
us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free. It
is because the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing the
conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the
particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men
rule ... As a true law should not name any particulars, so it should
especially not single out any specific persons or group of persons."
Raz
comments on this passage: "Then, aware of the absurdity to which this
passage leads, he modifies his line, still trying to present the rule
of law as the supreme guarantee of freedom. . ."[82]
Similarly,
discussing Hayek's criteria that laws should not mention proper names
and that the distinctions which the law makes be supported both within
and without the group which is the subject of legislation, Hamowy
comments:
That no proper name be mentioned in a law
does not protect against particular persons or groups being either
harassed by laws which discriminate against them or granted privileges
denied the rest of the population. A prohibition of this sort on the
form laws may take is a specious guarantee of legal equality, since it
is always possible to contrive a set of descriptive terms which will
apply exclusively to a person or group without recourse to proper names
... [83]
How are these standard objections to be rebutted?
Meeting Objections to the Universalizability Test
We
must first of all note that, even in Kant and in Kantian writers other
than Hayek, such as R. M. Hare and John Rawls, the test of
universalizability does far more than rule out reference to particular
persons or special groups. The test of universalizability does indeed,
in the first instance, impose a demand of consistency as
between similar cases, and in that sense imposes a merely formal
requirement of non-discrimination. This is the first stage or element
of universalization, the irrelevance of numerical differences. But the
next stage of universalization is that of asking whether one can assent
to the maxim being assessed coming to govern the conduct of others
towards oneself: this is the demand of impartiality between
agents, the demand that one put oneself in the other man's place. And
this element or implication of universalizability leads on to a third,
that we be impartial as between the preferences of others, regardless
of our own tastes or ideals of life - a requirement of moral neutrality.
I do not need to ask here exactly how these elements of
universalizability are related to one another, to ask (most obviously)
if the second is entailed by the first in any logically inexorable way,
or similarly the third by the second. It is enough to note that there
is a powerful Kantian tradition according to which strong implications
do link the three phases of universalization, and that this is a
tradition to which Hayek himself has always subscribed.[84]
Applying
the full test of universalizability to the maxims that go towards
making a legal order, we find that, not only are references to
particulars ruled out, but the maxims must be impartial in respect of
the interests of all concerned, and they must be neutral in respect of
their tastes or ideals of life. If it be once allowed that the test of
universalizability may be fleshed out in this fashion, it will be seen
as a more full-blooded standard of criticism than is ordinarily
allowed, and Hayek's heavy reliance on it will seem less misplaced.
For, when construed in this fashion, the universalizability test will
rule out (for example) most if not all policies of economic
intervention as prejudicial to the interests of some and will fell all
policies of legal moralism. Two large classes of liberal policy,
supposedly allowable under an Hayekian rule of law, thus turn out to be
prohibited by it.
Hayek himself is explicit that the test of
universalizability means more than the sheerly formal absence of
reference to particulars. As he puts it:
The test
of the justice of a rule is usually (since Kant) described as that of
its 'universalizability,' i.e. of the possibility of willing that the
rules should be applied to all instances that correspond to the
conditions stated in it (the 'categorical imperative'). What this
amounts to is that in applying it to any concrete circumstances it will
not conflict with any other accepted rules. The test is thus in the
last resort one of the compatibility or non-contradictoriness of the
whole system of rules, not merely in a logical sense but in the sense
that the system of actions which the rules permit will not lead to
conflict.[85]
The
maxims tested by the principle of universalizability, then, must be
integrated into a system of nonconflictable or (in Leibniz'
terminology) compossible rules, before any of them can be said to have
survived the test.
Again, the compatibility between the several
rules is not one that holds in any possible world, but rather that
which obtains in the world in which we live. It is here that Hayek
draws heavily on Hume's account of the fundamental laws of justice,
which he thinks to be, not merely compatible with, but in a large
measure the inspiration for Kant's political philosophy.[86]
As I have already observed, the practical content of the basic rules of
justice is given in Hume by anthropological claims, by claims of
general fact about the human circumstance. It is by interpreting the
demands of universalizability in the framework of the permanent
necessities of human social life that we derive Hume's three laws of
natural justice.
Kantian Universalizability & Liberal Justice
Note
again that, in Hume, as in Hayek, the laws of justice are commended as
being the indispensable condition for the promotion of general welfare,
i.e. their ultimate justification is utilitarian. But in order to
achieve this result, neither Hayek nor Hume need offer any argument in
favor of our adopting a Principle of Utility. Rather, very much in the
spirit of R. M. Hare's Kantian reconstruction of utilitarian ethics,[87]
Hayek's claim is that an impartial concern for the general welfare is
itself one of the demands of universalizability. A utilitarian concern
for general welfare is yielded by the Kantian method itself and is not
superadded to it afterwards. Hayek's thesis, like Hume's, is that a
clear view of the circumstances of human life shows justice to be the
primary condition needed to promote general welfare. But, like Hare and
Kant, he thinks concern for both justice and the general welfare to be
dictated by universalizability itself.
Hayek's argument, then,
is that the maxims of liberal justice are yielded by applying the
Kantian universalizability test to the principles of the legal order.
As he puts it:
It will be noticed that only
purpose-independent ('formal') rules pass this (Kantian) test because,
as rules which have originally been developed in small
purpose-connected groups ('organizations') are progressively extended
to larger and larger groups and finally universalized to apply to the
relations between any members of an Open Society who have no concrete
purposes in common and merely submit to the same abstract rules, they
will in the process have to shed all reference to particular purposes.[88]
Again, in listing the essential points of his conception of justice Hayek asserts:
...
a) that justice can be meaningfully attributed only to human actions
and not to any state of affairs as such without reference to the
question whether it has been, or could have been, deliberately brought
about by somebody; b) that the rules of justice have essentially the
nature of prohibitions, or, in other words, that injustice is really
the primary concept and the aim of rules of just conduct is to prevent
unjust action; c) that the injustice to be prevented is the
infringement of the protected domain of one's fellow men, a domain
which is to be ascertained by means of these rules of justice; and d)
that these rules of just conduct which are in themselves negative can
be developed by consistently applying to whatever such rules a society
has inherited the equally negative test of universal applicability - a
test which, in the last resort, is nothing less than the
self-consistency of the actions which these rules allow if applied to
the circumstances of the real world.[89]
There
seem to be several elements, then, in Hayek's contention that applying
the Kantian test to the legal framework yields a liberal order. First,
though he does not explicitly distinguish the three stages or phases of
universalization I mentioned earlier, he is clear that the
universalizability test is not only formal, and that it comprehends the
requirement that the scheme of activities it permits in the real world
would be conflict-free. Second, at any rate in a society whose members
have few if any common purposes, law must have a largely formal
character, stipulating terms under which men may pursue their
self-chosen activities rather than enjoining any specific activities on
them; in the term Hayek adopts from Oakeshott,[90]
the form of legal rule appropriate to such an abstract or open society
is "nomocratic" rather than "teleocratic," purpose-neutral rather than
purpose-dependent. Third, in a society whose members lack common
purposes or common concrete knowledge, only abstract rules conferring a
protected domain on each can qualify as rules facilitating a
conflict-free pattern of activities. This means that the conditions of
our abstract or open society will themselves compel adoption of a rule
conferring just claims to liberty and private property - which Hayek
rightly sees as indissolubly linked - once these conditions are treated
as the appropriate background for the Kantian test.
One
crucially important implication of this last point, noted in all of
Hayek's political writings over the last twenty years but spelled out
most systematically in the second volume of his recent trilogy, Law, Legislation and Liberty,
is that the rules of justice which survive the Kantian test can
prescribe justice only in the procedures and never in end-states. As
Hayek puts it, explicating Hume: "There can be no rules for rewarding
merit, or no rules of distributive justice, because there are no
circumstances which may not affect merit, while rules always single out
some circumstances as the only relevant ones."[91]
This
pattern of argument is an important and striking one, worth examining
in detail on its merits, and not capable of being dismissed as prima
facie unworkable. One important point may be worth canvassing, however.
Hayek argues that once the legal framework has been reformed in Kantian
fashion, it must of necessity be one that maximizes liberty. Hamowy
goes so far as to assert that Hayek defines liberty as conformity with the rule of law.[92] Now, whereas not every aspect of Hayek's treatment of freedom and coercion is clear or defensible,[93] it seems a misinterpretation to say that he ever defines
freedom as consisting solely in conformity with the rule of law.
Rather, he takes such conformity to be a necessary condition of a free
order. His thesis is that applying the Kantian test to the legal order
will of itself yield a maxim according equal freedom to all men.[94]
So it is not that the rule of law contains freedom as part of its
definition, but rather that a freedom-maximizing rule is unavoidably
yielded by it. In other terms, we may say that, whereas moral rights do
not come into Hayek's theory as primordial moral facts, the right to a
protected domain is yielded by his conception as a theorem of it.
If
Hayek is right that his method shows the unacceptability of
contemporary patterned conceptions of justice, for example, and if as I
think, he has shown that only procedural justice can be squared with
the liberal maxim demanding equal freedom of action, then we can begin
to see the measure of his achievement. Certainly, his Kantian
derivation of equal freedom deserves close and sympathetic scrutiny,
and it cannot be assumed without argument that Hayek's system cannot
protect individual rights or claims to justice simply because such
rights do not enter the system at a fundamental level. For the most
original and striking claim of Hayek's legal and political philosophy,
which in this respect may be regarded as a synthesis of the theories of
justice of Hume and Kant, is that applying the rational test of
universalizability to the conditions of our world must of necessity
yield a system of rules in which a protected domain of individual
liberty is secured.
Some Criticism of Hayek's System of Ideas: Buchanan and Oakeshott
In
regard to his theory of justice, the criticisms we have surveyed appear
to be premature, or at least inconclusive. We have yet to consider a
much more fundamental criticism of Hayek's system, directed against it
by thinkers in very different traditions, which attends to the highly
ambiguous role in Hayek's theory of the idea of spontaneous order.
James Buchanan on Hayek
One
of the clearest and deepest statements of some of the difficulties in
Hayek's use of spontaneous order arguments may be found in James M.
Buchanan's writings. In an important paper,[95] Buchanan observes that, in Hayek's later writings we find:
the extension of the principle of spontaneous order, in its normative
function, to the emergence of institutional structure itself. As
applied to the market economy, that which emerges is defined by its
very emergence to be that which is efficient. And this result implies,
in its turn, a policy of nonintervention, properly so. There is no
need, indeed there is no possibility, of evaluating the efficiency of
observed outcomes independently of the process; there exists no
external criterion that allows efficiency to be defined in objectively
measurable dimensions. If this logic is extended to the structure of
institutions (including law) that have emerged in some historical
evolutionary process, the implication seems clear that that set which
we observe necessarily embodies institutional or structural
'efficiency.' From this it follows, as before, that a policy of
nonintervention in the process of emergence is dictated. There is no
room left for the political economist, or for anyone else, who seeks to
reform social structures, to change laws and rules, with an aim
of security instead of efficiency in the large ... Any 'constructively
rational' interferences with the 'rational' processes of history are,
therefore, to be avoided.
Buchanan's criticism,
then, is that Hayek's apparent extension of spontaneous order or
evolutionary arguments from the market processes to institutional
structures is bound to disable the tasks of criticism and reform. We
are left with no leverage in Hayek's account which might be used
against the outcomes of the historical process. Instead, it seems, we
are bound to entrust ourselves to all the vagaries of mankind's random
walk in historical space.
In an earlier critique,[96]
Buchanan noted perceptively the phenomenon of "spontaneous disorder" -
the emergence of patterns of activity that thwart the purposes and
damage the interests of all who participate in them. Such "spontaneous
disorder" is, after all, the core of the idea of the Prisoner's
Dilemma, which has been explored imaginatively in Buchanan's writing in
its political and constitutional applications. The neglect in Hayek's
political work in English of any treatment of the problem this Dilemma
poses for his system invites the attempt to accommodate these
fundamental objections.
It is clear, however, that as it stands
Hayek's conception of spontaneous order needs revision or at least
refinement. Buchanan's identification of certain states of affairs as
manifesting spontaneous disorder suggests the question whether the idea
of spontaneous order in Hayek is a value-free explanatory notion or
else a moral notion of some sort. If the former - as Hayek's examples
of spontaneous order in nature suggest - then spontaneous order really
functions as a cipher for invisible hand explanations of the sort
brilliantly discussed by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia.[97]
We
might then be compelled to regard the growth of interventionism and of
the welfare state, and even certain aspects of the functioning of
totalitarian regimes, as exemplifying spontaneous order inasmuch as we
might be able to explain these social phenomena as the unintended
outcomes of human action. If, on the other hand, spontaneous orders are
taken as embodying positive moral values - if, that is to say, the idea
of a maleficient or destructive spontaneous order is repudiated as
incoherent - then it seems clear that Hayek requires a far bolder moral
theory than any he has advanced thus far. In particular, such a moral
theory would need to bridge the gap between evaluative and descriptive
language which is a feature of modern moral philosophy, and in this and
other respects it would need to come much closer to natural law ethics
than Hayek has ever himself done.
Buchanan's critique is
decisive, then, in compelling Hayek to clarify the idea of spontaneous
order as being either a moral notion, which might plausibly be embedded
only in some variant of natural law ethics, or else as a value-free
explanatory concept whose political uses must then be made more
explicit than Hayek has heretofore done.
Buchanan's critique is
important, again, in disclosing that Hayek's attitude to rationalism is
ambivalent and unstable. If we adopt the latter view of spontaneous
order as a value-free explanatory idea, its uses in political argument
depend upon two kinds of considerations. First, they must invoke a
political ethics, which arguably is given by Hayek's synthesis of Hume
with Kant. More problematically, however, the use of an explanatory
idea of spontaneous order in political argument presupposes that we
have a genuine theoretical or synoptic knowledge of social life of just
the sort that Hayek occasionally suggests is impossible. This is to say
that, if we are to make use of the idea of spontaneous social order in
framing or reforming social institutions so as to make best use of
society's spontaneous forces, we need to invoke a theoretical model of
social structure and social process which gives some assurance as to
the outcome of our reforms. To this extent, contrary to some of Hayek's
recommendations but in line with a part of his recent practice, we
cannot avoid adopting a critical rationalist stance toward our
inherited institutions and the historical process. This is true,
whether we accept Hayek's own effort at a political ethics, or
Buchanan's neo-Hobbesian contractarian constitutionalism.
Michael Oakeshott on Hayek
These cited points are reinforced if we consider Michael Oakeshott's attitude to Hayek's work.[98]
Oakeshott is a more intrepid traditionalist than Hayek in that
Oakeshott claims that we cannot in the end do anything but accept the
traditions which we inherit in our society. Certainly, we cannot
appraise our traditions by reference to any transcendental standard of
reason or justice, since such standards (in Oakeshott's view)
necessarily turn out to be abridgements of our traditions themselves.
Like Hayek, then, Oakeshott maintains that all moral or political
criticism must be immanent criticism, but, unlike Hayek, he denies that
there is any inherent or evolutionary tendency for the development of
traditional practices to converge on liberal institutions. For this
reason Oakeshott would insist that his conception of civil association
or nomocracy - upon which, as we have already seen, Hayek draws in his
conception of the juridical framework of the liberal order - is a
description of a strand of practice in the modern European state and
has no necessary application beyond the cultural milieu in which it
came to birth. Oakeshott would accordingly repudiate the implicit
universalism of Hayek's argument for the liberal order.
To some
extent, of course, Hayek concedes that there cannot be universal scope
for liberal principles when he allows that the Great or Open Society is
itself an evolutionary emergence from rude beginnings. Where he differs
from Oakeshott is in affirming that the Great or Open Society in which
liberal principles are uniquely appropriate represents the future of
all mankind. In this respect, Hayek continues to subscribe to an
Enlightenment doctrine of universal human progress which Oakeshott has
abandoned. I do not mean that Hayek has ever endorsed the belief that
historical change is governed by a law of progressive development, but
rather that he seems to take for granted (what surely is most
disputable) that the unhampered natural selection of rival practices
and traditions will result in a general convergence on liberal society.
Hayek's Variant of Classical Liberalism: A Fusing of Libertarian & Traditionalistic Ideals?
A
contrast of Hayek's thought with that of Oakeshott revives one of the
commonest criticisms of Hayek's work, namely, that it straddles
incompatible conservative and libertarian stand-points. The upshot of
my discussion thus far may support this standard criticism in that it
suggests that Hayek's system is poised uneasily between the
constructivist (but not uncritical) rationalism of a Buchanan and the
out-and-out traditionalism of an Oakeshott.
At the same time,
however, elements of Hayek's conception of social evolution via the
competitive selection of rival traditions may provide a point of
convergence, if not of fusion, for some libertarian and conservative
concerns. One central argument in contemporary neo-conservatism, after
all, is in the claim that the stability of the free society depends
upon its containing strong supportive traditions. Modern
neo-conservatives such as Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell take up the
doubts expressed by writers of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Smith
and Ferguson about the effect on society's moral traditions of the
workings of the commercial marketplace itself. A major difficulty in
the neo-conservative analysis is the lack of any very convincing
prognosis: if free markets have corrosive effects in respect of the
moral traditions which support them, so that capitalism institutions
contain cultural contradictions which make them over the long run
self-destroying, what is to be done?
This is an especially hard
question if we recognize (as some of the neo-conservatives themselves
sometimes fail to do) that merely capturing positions of power in the
apparatus of the contemporary democratic state affords no longrun
security for the market order.
Hayek's Voluntaristic Traditionalism: A Market in Traditions
There
is in Hayek's work an argument for voluntaristic traditionalism which
goes some way toward answering this question. Hayek sees that the
principal cause of the erosion of definitive moral traditions in
advanced societies is not so much the market itself, but rather
interventionist policies sponsored by governments. Often with the
support of business, governments have contributed to the erosion of
moral traditions by their educational, housing, and welfare policies.
Hayek's argument for a voluntaristic traditionalism distinguishes him
from neo-conservatives, firstly in that he would argue that it is
government interventionism which causes much of the contemporary moral
malaise and because he would not seek to use government power to prop
up faltering traditions. Rather, he seeks to establish something like a
market in traditions, in the hope that the traditions which
would emerge from an unhampered social life would be most congenial to
the stability of the market order itself. In his argument for a
competitive and voluntaristic traditionalism, Hayek plainly treats
particular traditional communities as filter devices for social
practices of the sort Robert Nozick discusses in his fascinating and
profound account of the framework of utopia.[99]
It
cannot be said unequivocably that Hayek's libertarian traditionalism
answers the most profoundly disturbing doubts of the neo-conservatives.
In particular, Hayek's advocacy of procedural justice, with the role of
chance in distributing incomes being recognized clearly,[100]
confronts the difficulty that the moral defense of capitalism has
chiefly been conducted by reference to the notion of desert. By
comparison with this traditional defense, Hayek's apologia for the
market order may be, as Kristol observes, "nihilistic."[101]
Against
this criticism Hayek may justifiably maintain that there is a sheer
conflict between traditional sentiments of desert and merit and any
clear-sighted defense of the market order - a conflict which the
neo-conservative endorsement of the market order does nothing to
resolve.
Kristol's criticism of Hayek has other, and perhaps
profounder aspects, however. Hayek recognizes that contemporary moral
sentiment is by no means uniformly, or even generally, favorable to the
market order, and, both in his writings on Mandeville[102]
and elsewhere, Hayek has implicitly acknowledged that the spontaneous
growth of moral norms may not, in fact, yield results congenial to a
stable market order. At the same time, Hayek continues to advocate a
strong form of moral conventionalism, resisting the claims of those who
see modern morality as in need of radical reform. There is thus a
tension, perhaps irresolvable in terms of Hayek's system, between his
Mandevillian moral iconoclasm and his moral conservatism.
Conclusion: Hayek's Research Program & Classical Liberalism
In his argument for a voluntaristic traditionalism, Hayek (as we have seen)
answers some of the concerns of contemporary conservatives. His argument for
a market in traditions may be vulnerable to criticism, inasmuch as the growth
of anti-market ethics over the past centuries seems to belie his expectation
that natural selection of moral traditions will filter out those unfriendly
to the market process. In recognition of this, Hayek would in consistency be
compelled to adopt, in respect of moral convention, a more "rationalist" stance
than he usually recommends. He would need to undertake a systematic criticism
of modern morality in regard to its viability as part of an ongoing market order.
In so doing, he would be resuming the task undertaken by those moderate rationalists,
Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, whom Hayek rightly sees as the fountainheads
of classical liberalism. Even if his own system of ideas should prove unstable,
it recalls to us the insights of the great classical liberals, and intimates
the most powerful research program in classical liberal political philosophy.
And, in recalling that intellectual tradition from what had sometimes seemed
an irrecoverable oblivion, Hayek's work is a hopeful augury for an uncertain
future.[103]
Endnotes
For full citations of books and articles
mentioned in these notes, see the following bibliography.
References to Hayek's works are cited by title or by alphabetic letter followed
by numbers to identify books (B- ), articles (A- ), edited works (E- ), and
pamphlets (P- ). See the following Hayek bibliography for
more information. References to books or articles about Hayek and related matters
are found in the last section of the bibliography.
[1a] .
Hayek does not consistently employ the idea of spontaneous social order as an
explanatory device of this sort, and some of the difficulties of his thought
arise from this ambiguity. At the same time, Hayek's use of the idea of a spontaneous
order in society is his most brilliant use in the context of social theory of
his conception of knowledge as at bottom at once conceptual and practical. The
spontaneous or undesigned patterns of order in society have the advantage over
planned or constructed orders, first and foremost, because planned orders can
utilize only explicit or conscious knowledge. Hayek's great thesis, then, is
that, contrary to Descartes' unwitting interventionist disciples, spontaneous
order is the fundamental order in society because it embodies that practical
or tacit knowledge of which theory is only a precipitate or an abridgement.
If we accept that the Cartesian view of knowledge and mind is in error, we have
no alternative but to acknowledge that the constructivist projects of modern
interventionism are all attempts to do the impossible - to replace inarticulate
and tacit knowledge by articulate theory, and spontaneous order by conscious
control.
[1b]. F. A. Hayek,
[B-10], The Sensory Order, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1952, pp. 4-5. The Sensory Order has not in fact gone wholly ignored
by psychologists. For a useful symposium on it, see W. B. Weimer and D. S. Palermo,
eds., Cognition and Symbolic Processes, vol. II, New York, 1978. Also
"Hayek Revisited: Mind as a Process of Classification" by Rosemary Agnitto in
Behaviorism: a Forum for Critical Discussion, 3/2, Nevada, (Spring 1975):
162-171. Neglect of Hayek's contributions to psychology by professional psychologists
may in part be due to his drawing on a tradition in psychology - the neo-Kantian
tradition of Helmholz and Wundt - which fell on hard times when behavioral and
psychoanalytical approaches came to dominate the theoretical investigation of
mental life.
[2]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 5, para. 1.12. At times, Hayek goes so far as almost
to relativize any distinction between appearance and reality. When he adopts
such a position, he breaks with a decisive element in Kantian critical philosophy,
for which the distinction between how things seem to us and how they are in
themselves must be fundamental.
[3]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 171, para. 8.24.
[4]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 42, para. 2.15.
[5]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 165, para. 8.2.
[6]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 193, para. 8.93, and his [B-12],
The Constitution of Liberty, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960,
pp. 13, 438. See Mach's influence on Hayek by consulting the bibliography to
my essay: B-10 and A-119.
[7]. Hayek, Sensory Order,
[B-10], pp. 178-9, para. 8.45. Hayek's affirmation of a practical
dualism in the theory of the mind may well have been influenced by Mises, who
adopts a very similar standpoint in several of his writings.
[8]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 194, para. 8.97.
[9]. Hayek, [B-10],
Sensory Order, p. 194, para. 8.97.
[10]. See W. V. Quine, Ontological
Relativity, New York: 1969. Unlike Hayek, Quine sees compelling reasons
for postulating a realm of abstract entities, including numbers, but, like Hayek,
he admits no ontological gulf between body and mind. Hayek's objection to the
neutral monism defended by William James, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey seems
to be on the grounds of its psychologistic features as it is stated by these
writers: see Sensory Order, p. 176, para. 8.38. Neutral monism need not
have these features, however, and perhaps Hayek's system need not exclude it.
[11]. See Hayek's interesting
discussion of differences of method as between natural and social sciences in
[E-5], the collection which he edited: Collectivist Economic
Planning, London: 1956 (originally published 1935), pp. 10-11. Hayek withdraws
from the strong methodological dualism about natural and social science adopted
here and in many of his earlier writings, explicitly in the Preface to his Studies
in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1967, p. viii, where he asserts that through Popper's work "the difference between
the two groups of disciplines has thereby been greatly narrowed." For a brilliant
discussion of Popper's demarcation criterion for science, see I. Lakatos, "Popper
on Demarcation and Induction," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl
Popper, La Salle, Illinois: 1974, pp. 241-273.
[12]. See F. A. Hayek, "Kinds
of Rationalism" in his [B-13], Studies in Philosophy,
Politics and Economics, Ch. 5, pp. 82-95, and his Law, Legislation and
Liberty, Vol. I, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 29.
[13]. Karl R. Popper in P. A.
Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 1059-1060.
[14]. J. W. N. Watkins in P.
A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper, pp. 401-402.
[15]. Hayek, Sensory Order,
[B-10], p. 176, para. 8.39.
[16a]. Hayek does
cite Popper's ideas of a third world of abstract entities with apparent endorsement
in [B-18], Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III,
p. 157.
[16b]. See Hayek's
reminiscences, "Remembering My Cousin Ludwig Wittgenstein," Encounter
(August 1977), listed as A-143 in Bibliography.
[17]. I owe to Professor Hayek
this information regarding his interest in Mauthner's work. Wittgenstein's reference
to Mauthner occurs in para. 4.0031 of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
The only book-length study of Mauthner's philosophy in English is that of Gershon
Weiler, Mauthner's Critique of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970. Also see Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973, pp. 121-133,178-182.
[18]. See F. A. Hayek, [B-17],
New Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1978, Chapter Six.
[19a]. In attributing
a pragmatist aspect to Hayek's Kantianism, I do not mean to ascribe to Hayek
any of the doctrines of modern Pragmatism, but rather to note the sense in which
for Hayek action or practice has primacy in the generation of knowledge. For
Hayek, in some contrast with Kant, knowledge emanates from practical life in
the sense that it is ultimately embodied in judgments and dispositions to act.
[19b]. In his
[B-13], Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
p. 24, speaking of "the erroneous belief that if we look only long enough, or
at a sufficient number of instances of natural events, a pattern will always
reveal itself," Hayek remarks that "in those cases the theorizing has been done
already by our senses."
[20]. See Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing
How and Knowing That," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46 (1945-1946):
1-16.
[21]. See Michael Polanyi, The
Tacit Dimension, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
[22]. Michael Oakeshott, "Rational
Conduct," in Rationalism in Politics, London: Methuen, 1962, pp. 97-100.
[23]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 60-62. Hayek's belief that the reflexive investigation
of our own minds must always be incomplete, inasmuch as it will always be governed
by meta-conscious rules beyond the range of critical scrutiny, is not one that
Kant could easily have accepted.
[24]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 44, footnote 4.
[25]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, Chapter 4.
[26]. Hayek, [B-17],
New Studies, p. 45, footnote 14.
[27]. Hayek, [B-16],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1976, p. 25.
[28]. I have in mind, of course,
Popper's important criticism of holistic social engineering in Karl R. Popper,
The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, pp.
83-93.
[29]. Hayek goes so far as to
assert that "the idea of a mind fully explaining itself involves a logical contradiction."
See [B-13], Studies, p. 34.
[30]. Hayek, [B-15],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1973, p. 17.
[31]. Descartes may not always
have committed the errors Hayek finds in him or his disciples. See on this Stuart
Hampshire, "On Having a Reason," Chapter 5 of G. A. Vesey, ed., Human Values,
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. II, 1976-1977, Harvester Press,
1976, where on p. 88 Hampshire speaks in Hayekian fashion of "a Cartesian error,
which was not consistently Descartes', and which consists of assuming a necessary
connection between thought on the one side and consciouness and explicitness
on the other . . . "
[32]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 73. On Hayek's view of spontaneous order, see Barry
(1982) in Bibliography.
[33]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, pp. 71-72.
[34]. Hayek, [B-15],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 13.
[35]. Hayek, [B-17],
New Studies, p. 253.
[36]. Hayek, [B-13],
p. 76. "The problems of how galaxies or solar systems are formed and what is
their resulting structure is much more like the problems which the social sciences
have to face than the problems of mechanics . . . " See also [B-16],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II, pp. 39-40.
[37]. Hayek, [B-17],
New Studies, p. 250.
[38]. On Spencer, see J. D. Y.
Peel, Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist, London: Heinemann,
1971.
[39]. See Hayek, [B-18],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III, pp. 153-155.
[40]. See Peter Winch, "Nature
and Convention," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 60 (1959-1960):231-252,
reprinted as Chapter 3 of Winch's Ethics and Action, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1976. In some of his writings published after The Open Society
and Its Enemies, Popper comes closer to a Hayekian position. In his "Towards
a Rational Theory of Tradition," in particular, perhaps in response to Oakeshott's
writings, he effectively abandons the Sophistic dichotomy of nature and convention
entailed in his earlier writings. See Popper's Conjectures and Refutations,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, for this study.
[41]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, Chap. 4.
[42]. Personal communication
from Professor Hayek to the author.
[43]. See Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 61: "...if 'to have meaning' is to have a place in an order
which we share with other people, this order itself cannot have meaning because
it cannot have a place in itself."
[44]. See Hayek, [B-12],
The Constitution of Liberty, p. 160.
[45]. On the calculation debate,
see The Journal of Libertarian Studies 5, No. 1 (Winter 1981) especially
the historical paper by Don Lavoie, "A Critique of the Standard Account of the
Socialist Calculation Debate," pp. 41-87.
[46]. All the preceding three
quotations occur on pp. 80-81 of Hayek, [B-7], Individualism
and Economic Order, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.
[47]. Hayek, [B-7],
Individualism, p. 50.
[48]. Israel M. Kirzner, Competition
and Entrepreneurship, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973,
p. 68.
[49]. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy, London: Unwin, 1974, Chapter XVI.
[50]. See Paul Craig Roberts,
Alienation in the Soviet Economy, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1971.
[51]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 40.
[52]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 35.
[53]. See F. A. Hayek, [B-9],
The Counter-Revolution of Science, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979,
Chapter Three.
[54]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 26.
[55]. Quoted by T. W. Hutchinson,
The Politics and Philosophy of Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981,
p. 214.
[56]. Norman P. Barry, Hayek's
Social and Economic Philosophy, London: MacMillan, 1979, p. 41.
[57]. Barry, Hayek, p.
40.
[58]. Hayek, [B-17],
New Studies, pp. 51-52.
[59]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. viii.
[60]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 6: "while this possibility [of falsification] always exists,
its likelihood in the case of a well-confirmed hypothesis is so small that we
often disregard it in practice."
[61]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 16.
[62]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 36. See also Studies, p. 18: "Where our predictions
are thus limited to some general and perhaps only negative attributes of what
is likely to happen, we evidently also shall have little power to control developments."
And on p. 19: "the wise legislator or statesman will probably attempt to cultivate
rather than to control the forces of the social process."
[63]. Hayek, [B-16],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. II, p. 157, footnote 25.
[64]. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism
in Politics, London: Methuen, 1962, p. 4.
[65]. Rush Rhees, Without
Answers, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 49.
[66]. F. A. Hayek, [P-16b],
Denationalisation of Money, 2nd edition, London: Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1978, p. 52.
[67]. G. L. S. Shackle, Epistemics
and Economics: a Critique of Economic Doctrines, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1976.
[68]. Hayek, [B-12],
The Constitution of Liberty, pp. 35-6.
[69]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, p. 38.
[70]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 113. Hayek acknowledges earlier in his Hume essay (p. 109,
note 5: "My attention was first directed to these parts of Hume's works many
years ago by Professor Sir Arnold Plant, whose development of the Humean theory
of property we are still eagerly awaiting.") Hayek is alluding to his discussions
with Sir Arnold in the early 1930s at the London School of Economics, where
Hayek had migrated to take up The Tooke Professorship. See Sir Arnold Plant,
"A Tribute to Hayek - The Rational Persuader." Economic Age 2, no. 2
(January-February 1970): 4-8, especially p. 5: "I myself had returned to LSE
in the middle of 1930 after six years at the University of Cape Town, where
I had developed a special interest in the scope of and functions of property
and ownership, both private and public. It was a delight to find Hayek as well
seized of the economic significance of the ramifications of property law as
I was myself. I recall his excitement when I called his attention to the profound
discussion of these matters in David Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles
of Morals: section III, Of Justice, and my own gratitude to him for his
influence on my own thinking about so-called intellectual and industrial property
law." The entirety of Sir Arnold's article should be consulted for the light
it sheds on LSE during the 30s as a seedbed for transmitting Austrian economics
(One visitor described LSE as "ein Vorort von Wien" - a suburb of Vienna; Plant,
p. 6). See also Hayek's important Inaugural lecture delivered at LSE March 1,
1933, "The Trend of Economic Thinking," (A-20) and his revealing
article on the history of "The London School of Economics, 1895-1945," (A-60).
During the 1940s Hayek was also editor of LSE's journal, Economica.
[71]. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept
of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
[72]. See, especially, Henry
Sidgwick's masterpiece, The Method of Ethics, in which Sidgwick defends
an indirect form of utilitarian morality.
[73]. For Hayek's criticism of
the standard variety of utilitarian theory, see especially [B-16],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. II, pp. 17-23.
[74]. See Hayek, [B-13],
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, p. 173: "An optimal policy
in a catallaxy may aim, and ought to aim, at increasing the chances of any member
of society taken at random of having a high income, or, what amounts to the
same thing, the chance that, whatever his share in total income may be, the
real equivalent of this share will be as large as we know how to make it."
[75]. See Hayek, [B-16],
Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. II: The Mirage of Social Justice,
p. xiii, for his endorsement of some aspects of Rawls' theory.
[76]. See Ronald Hamowy, "Law
and the Liberal Society: F. A. Hayek's Constitution of Liberty," Journal
of Libertarian Studies 2, no. 4 (Winter 1978): 287-297; J. Raz, "The Rule
of Law and Its Virtue," in Liberty and the Rule of Law, ed. R. L. Cunningham,
Texas A & M University Press, 1979, pp. 3-21; and John N. Gray, "F. A. Hayek
on Liberty and Tradition," Journal of Libertarian Studies 4, no. 2 (Spring
1980): 119-137.
[77]. See footnote 76 above.
[78]. See footnote 76 above.
[79]. See my "F. A. Hayek on
Liberty and Tradition," cited in footnote 76 above.
[80]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, p. 168, ff.
[81]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, pp. 116-117.
[82]. Raz, "The Rule of Law,"
[in Cunningham, ed.], p. 19.
[83]. Hamowy, "Law and the Liberal
Society," pp. 291-292.
[84]. I draw heavily here on
the account of universalization given in J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong, London: Penguin Books, 1977, pp. 83-102.
[85]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 168.
[86]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, pp. 116-117: "What Kant had to say about this [justice] seems
to derive directly from Hume."
[87]. See R. M. Hare, Moral
Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
[88]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p.168.
[89]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 166.
[90]. See Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 163.
[91]. Hayek, [B-13],
Studies, p. 116. Hayek's argument for a procedural conception of justice
- an argument which, unlike Nozick's, does not depend on one's prior acceptance
of Lockean rights theory - is one of the fundamentally important theses of his
later philosophy, all the more important because his claim is that the procedural
view of justice follows from the Kantian principle and is uniquely consonant
with the requirements of the free market process.
[92]. Hamowy, "Law and the Liberal
Society."
[93]. Hamowy is surely right
that Hayek's account of coercion is faulty. On this see Murray N. Rothbard,
The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981,
Chapter 28, "F. A. Hayek and the Concept of Coercion."
[94]. See J. L. Mackie, Ethics,
p. 88: "This ... thesis is well formulated by Hobbes: 'that a man ... be contented
with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against
himself.' Hobbes equates this with the Golden Rule of the New Testament. . .
."
[95]. See James M. Buchanan,
"Cultural Evolution and Institutional Reform" (unpubl.) I am most grateful to
Professor Buchanan for allowing me to read this paper.
[96]. James M. Buchanan, Freedom
in Constitutional Contract, College Station: Texas A & M University
Press, 1977, pp. 25-30.
[97]. Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp. 18-22. For a most penetrating
discussion of some related aspects of social explanation, see Nozick's "On Austrian
Methodology," Synthese 36 (1977): 353-392. See also Edna Ullmann-Margalit's
"Invisible Hand Explanations," Synthese 30 (1978): 263-291. I am indebted
to Professor Lester Hunt both for directing me to Ms. Ullmann-Margalit's article
and for showing me his unpublished paper, "Toward a Natural History of Morality,"
in which some of Ullmann-Margalit's work is pushed further. See also Norman
P. Barry, "The Tradition of Spontaneous Order," Literature of Liberty 5
(Summer 1982): 7-58, as well as Richard Vernon, "Unintended Consequences," Political
Theory 7 (1979): 57-74.
[98]. See Oakeshott's "Rationalism
in Politics," in the book of that name for his most explicit criticism of Hayek.
[99]. See Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, Part Three.
[100]. See Hayek's Law,
Legislation and Liberty, vol. II, Chapter Ten, for the clearest acknowledgement
of the role of chance in the alembic of catallaxy.
[101]. See Irving Kristol,
Two Cheers for Capitalism, New York, 1978, Chapter 7, "Capitalism, Socialism
and Nihilism."
[102]. See Hayek's "Dr. Bernard
Mandeville," New Studies, pp. 249-266; and his remarks on contemporary
morality in the Epilogue to vol. III of Law, Legislation and Liberty,
pp. 165-166.
[103]. For their detailed comments
on an earlier draft of this article, I am indebted to James M. Buchanan, Jeremy
Shearmur, David Gordon, and Lester Hunt. I am also indebted to Michael Oakeshott
and Robert Nozick for illuminating conversation on the themes addressed in this
article.
I have learned much from three studies by Jeremy Shearmur: (1) "Abstract Institutions
in an Open Society," in H. Berghel and others, eds. Wittgenstein, the Vienna
Circle and Critical Materialism, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1979, pp.
349-354; (2) "The Austrian Connection: F. A. von Hayek and the Thought of Carl
Menger," in B. Smith and W. Grassl, eds., Austrian Philosophy and Austrian
Politics, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, forthcoming; and (3) Adam Smith's
Second Thoughts (pamphlet), London: Adam Smith Club, 1982.
Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK
The following bibliography of the writings by and about Friedrich A. Hayek
was compiled near the end of 1982 by John Cody assisted by Nancy Ostrem. We
gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Kurt R. Leube (Editor-in-chief
of the International Carl Menger Library, Vienna), Prof. Albert H. Zlabinger
of Jacksonville University (and co-editor with Kurt Leube of Philosophia Verlag),
Prof. Paul Michelson of Huntington College, Paul Varnell of Chicago, and members
of the Institute for Humane Studies staff, including Leonard P. Liggio, Walter
Grinder, and John Blundell.
While aiming to be the most comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date listing
of Hayekian scholarship yet assembled, this bibliography - owing to the prolific
and dispersed nature of the materials involved - must unavoidably contain errors,
incomplete citations, and omissions. Among the omissions are a great many of
Hayek's voluminous letters-to-editors, short notes or comments, interviews (including
tape recordings, video-cassettes, and films), and book reviews. Such journals
as the Schriften des Vereins fôr Sozialpolitik, Jahrbücher für
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Zeitschrift fôr Volkswirtschaft und Sozialpolitik
(after 1927 superseded by Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie),
and Economica contain many items not listed in this edition of the
bibliography. Many additional bibliographical items by or about Hayek came to
our attention only after our typesetting deadline precluded further citations.
To remedy our omissions and to emend our inaccuracies for a possible subsequent
publication of an enlarged Hayek bibliography we welcome our readers' comments
and assistance.
Earlier bibliographical orientations to Hayek's writings that proved helpful
in creating the present Bibliography are:
Erich Streissler, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich A. Lutz, and Fritz Machlup,
eds. "Bibliography of the Writings of Friedrich A. von Hayek," in Roads
to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 309-315.
Walter Eucken Institut. "Bibliographie der Schriften von F.A. von
Hayek." ["Bibliography of the Writings of F.A. von Hayek."] in Freiburger
Studien. Gesammelte Aufsätze von F.A. Hayek. Tôbingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul
Siebeck (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche und wirtschaftsrechtliche Untersuchungen
5), 1969, pp. 279-284.
Fritz Machlup, "Friedrich von Hayek's Contribution to Economics." The Swedish
Journal of Economics 76 (December 1974): 498-531.
-----------------. "Hayek's Contribution to Economics," in Essays on Hayek.
Edited by Fritz Machlup. Foreword by Milton Friedman. New York: New York University
Press, 1976, pp. 13-39. [Machlup's 1974 and his updated 1976 bibliographical
essays are indispensable guides to Hayek's writings through the mid-1970s. Adhering
to the fourfold classification system of Hayek's writings laid out in the Streissler
1969 Roads to Freedom, Hayek "Bibliography," Machlup devised an alphabetical
and numerical identification code for easy reference to Hayek's books (B- ),
pamphlets (P- ), edited or introduced books (E- ), and articles in learned journals
or collections of essays (A- ).]
-----------------. Wôrdigung der Werke von Friedrich August von Hayek.
Translated by Kurt R. Leube. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge
and Aufsätze 62), 1977, pp. 63-75. [This "Assessment of the Works of Friedrich
August von Hayek is the German translation of the preceding Machlup Bibliography
of Hayek.]
Leube, Kurt R. "Anhang: Bibliographie der Schriften von F.A. von Hayek," ["Appendix:
Bibliography of the Writings of F.A. von Hayek"] in: F.A. von Hayek. Geldtheorie
und Konjunkturtheorie. Reprint of the first edition (Vienna, 1929; see
B-1). Salzburg: Philosophia Verlag, 1976, pp. 148-160. This is identical to
Leube's Hayek Bibliography in: Friedrich A. von Hayek. Individualismus und
wirtschaftliche Ordnung. Reprint of the first German edition (Erlenbach-Zurich,
1952; see B-7). Salzburg: Philosophia Verlag, 1976, pp. 345-357.
-----------------. "Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Arbeiten F.A. Hayeks
zu verwandten Problemkreisen" ["Selected Bibliography of the Works of F.A. Hayek
to Related Problem Areas"], in the German reprint of the first edition (Vienna,
1931; see B-2) of Preise und Produktion. Vienna: Philosophia Verlag,
1976, pp. 13-18.
Books
B-1 Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie. (Beitrage
zur Konjunkturforschung, herausgegeben vom Österreichisches Institut fôr
Konjunkturforschung, No. 1). Vienna and Leipzig: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky,
1929/2, xii, 147 pp. (England 1933, Japan 1935, Spain 1936.) Translated into
English by N. Kaldor and H. M. Croome with an "Introduction to the Series, Library
of Money and Banking History" by Lionel Robbins as Monetary Theory and the
Trade Cycle. London: Jonathan Cape, 1933, 244 pp. American edition, New
York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1933. Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
1966. The German first edition of Geldtheorie is described as "Contributions
to Trade Cycle Research, published by The Austrian Institute for Trade Cycle
Research, No. 1." This Institute was founded by Ludwig von Mises, and Hayek
was its Director from 1927-1931.
See also foreword and bibliography to the 2nd German edition by Kurt R. Leube,
"Vorwort und Bibliographie zur Weiderauflage F. A. Hayek: Geldtheorie und
Konjunkturtheorie." Salzburg: (W. Neugebauer) Philosophia Verlag, 1976.
[Hayek's Geldtheorie (1929) together with its English translation (1933)
is an expanded version of the paper (A-7a) delivered at a meeting of the Verein
fôr Sozialpolitik, held in Zurich, in September 1928 (See A-7a with annotations).
Hayek cites earlier studies as the foundations for his Geldtheorie:
A-2a, A-6, A-7a, A-9a, A-13. Hayek presents, from the Austrian School perspective,
a critical assessment of rival theories on the cause of trade cycle. He argues
that the cause of all significant trade cycle fluctuations are monetary interventions
which distort relative price relationships.].
B-2 Prices and Production. (Studies in Economics
and Political Science, edited by the director of the London School of Economics
and Political Sciences. No. 107 in the series of Monographs by writers connected
with the London School of Economics and Political Science.) London: Routledge
& Sons, 1931/2, xv, 112 pp. 2nd revised and enlarged edition, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1935/9, also 1967 edition, xiv, 162 pp. American edition,
New York: Macmillan, 1932. German edition. Preise und Produktion. Vienna,
1931/2, also 1976 edition. (Japan 1934, China [Taipei] 1966, France 1975).
See also the selected bibliography to the 2nd German edition: Kurt R. Leube,
"Ausgewählte Bibliographie zur Wiederauflage F. A. Hayek: Preise und
Produktion." Philosophia Verlag, 1976.
[The 1st edition of Prices (1931) literally reproduced Hayek's four
lectures on industrial fluctuations presented at the University of London (LSE)
during the session 1930-1931. The "Preface to the Second Edition" of Prices
(1935) states how Hayek developed Austrian capital theory following the four
lectures. These developments were contained in the 2nd edition and prepared
for by A-11a, A-12, A-13, A-14, A-21, A-22, A-23, A-24a, as well as by the first
German edition of Preise (1931), the English version (B-1), and A-9a.
Economist Sudha R. Shenoy, in an unpublished manuscript, has done a detailed
comparative analysis of the differences between the 1931 and 1935 editions of
Prices.]
B-3 Monetary Nationalism and International Stability.
Geneva, 1937; London: Longmans, Green (The Graduate Institute of International
Studies, Geneva, Publication Number 18), 1937, xiv, 94 pp. Reprinted New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1964, 1971, 1974.
[Revised version of five lectures delivered at the Institute Universitaire
de Hautes Études Internationales at Geneva. Hayek surveys the consequence
of alternative monetary arrangements, such as gold vs. paper currency and flexible
vs. fixed exchange rates.]
B-4 Profits, Interest and Investment: and Other Essays
on The Theory on Industrial Fluctuations. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1939/3, viii, 266 pp., also 1969 edition. Reprinted New York: Augustus
M. Kelley, 1969, 1970; Clifton, New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975.
[Collection of essays, mostly reprints or revised versions of earlier essays,
which are attempts "to improve and develop the outline of a Theory of Industrial
Fluctuations contained in" B-1 and B-2. The first chapter, "Profits, Interest
and Investment" is new; the other chapters are revisions of A-37a, A-27a, A-26,
A-19, A-21, A-14, A-9a. Hayek's essays defend the Austrian School's theory of
the trade cycle. He argues that monetary interventions cause far-ranging economic
distortions that bring about malinvestment and unemployment.]
B-5 The Pure Theory of Capital. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1941/2 (also 1950 edition); Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1941 (also 1950, 1952 and 1975 editions); xxxi, 454 pp. (Spain 1946,
Japan 1951 and 1952).
[Growing out of Hayek's concern for the causes of the trade cycle or industrial
fluctuations, this work deals with capital, interest, and time components in
the structure of production.]
B-6 The Road to Serfdom. London: George Routledge
& Sons, 1944/1945/20 (also 1969 edition); Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1944/1945/20 (also 1969 edition), 250 pp. (Sweden 1944; France 1945;
German version 1945: Der Weg zur Knechtschaft. Zurich 1945/3 (also
1952 edition); the German translation by Eva Röpke is available in paperback
from Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag (Munich, 1976); Denmark, Portugal, and Spain
1946; Netherlands 1948; Italy 1948; Norway 1949; Japan 1954; China [Taipei]
1956/1965/1966; Iceland 1980).
Reprinted in two different paperback versions with new Prefaces by F. A. H.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1956 (see B-13, chapt.
15) and also 1976 paperback edition by University of Chicago Press and Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
[Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom in his "spare time from 1940 to 1943"
while he was engaged in pure economic theory. The central argument was first
sketched in A-37b (1938) and expanded in P-2 (1939). Hayek's thesis is that
social-political planning endangers both political and economic liberties of
the individual.]
B-7 Individualism and Economic
Order. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1948/5, also 1960, 1976; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948/5, also 1969, 1976, vii, 272 pp. Paperback
edition, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway edition 1972 (out of print), but
now available in a University of Chicago paperback edition; (German edition,
Zurich, 1952, Norway [shortened version] 1953, Spain 1968, Netherlands no date.)
See also bibliographic postscript in the German reprint of the 1st edition,
Erlenbach-Zurich: 1952: Kurt R. Leube, "Bibliographisches Nachwort zur Wiederauflage
F. A. Hayek: Individualismus und wirtschaftliche Ordnung." Salzburg:
Philosophia Verlag, 1977.
[Individualism reprints P-5, A-34, A-49, A-50, E-5 (Chapt. 1: "The
Nature of the Problem"), E-5 (Chapt. 5: "The (Present) State of the Debate"),
A-41, A-48, A-45, A-38; and some previously unpublished lectures: Chapt. 5:
"The Meaning of Competition" and Chapt. 6 "'Free' Enterprise and Competitive
Order." These articles and speeches sound the Hayekian warning against economic
and social planning.]
B-8 John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Friendship
and Subsequent Marriage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951/1969;
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951/1969, 320 pp.
[During the 1920s the Mill-Taylor correspondence became available for scholarly
assessment of how much ideological influence Harriet Taylor exerted on the political,
economic, and social ideas of her intimate friend and eventual husband, John
Stuart Mill. Hayek's volume presenting their correspondence allows the reader
to judge the nature of their relationship.]
B-9 The Counter-Revolution of Science:
Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952,
255 pp; new edition New York, 1964; 2nd edition with 1959 Preface to German
edition, Indianapolis, Indiana: LibertyPress, 1979, also available
in LibertyPress paperback. (Germany 1959, Frankfürt am Main edition
published under the title Missbrauch und Verfall der Vernunft or "The
Abuse and Decline of Reason"; German reprint of Frankfurt edition, Salzburg:
Philosophia Verlag, 1979; France excerpts, 1953; Italy 1967.)
[The two major sections of this volume first appeared as articles in Economica
as A-46 (1942-1944) and A-42 (1941), respectively: the third study first appeared
as A-70 (1951). Hayek analyzes the intellectual origins of social planning and
engineering. Topics covered include: scientism and the methodology of studying
society, collectivism, historicism, non-spontaneous or rationalistic social
planning, as well as the role of Saint-Simon, Comte, and Hegel in legitimizing
scientistic sociology.]
B-10 The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into
the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1952; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, xxii, 209 pp; new edition
1963/1976. Reprinted Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Book paperback,
1963 (out of print). University of Chicago Press has reissued the paperback
in a Midway Reprint, 1976, with the Heinrich Klüver Introduction.
[Though published in 1952, the "whole principle" of The Sensory Order
was conceived 30 years earlier by Hayek in a draft of a student paper composed
around 1919-1920, while he was still uncertain whether to become a psychologist
or an economist. Three decades later his concern about the logical character
of social theory led him to reexamine favorably his youthful conclusions on
certain topics of epistemology and theoretical psychology: concepts of mind,
classification, and the ordering of our mental and sensory world. In his 1952
Preface Hayek acknowledges his indebtedness "particularly" to Ernst Mach and
his analysis of perceptual organization.]
B-11 The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law. Cairo:
National Bank of Egypt, Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Lectures, 1955, 76
pp. [Publication of four lectures Hayek delivered at the invitation of the National
Bank of Egypt. These essays form a historical survey of the evolution of freedom
and the rule of law in Britain, France, Germany, and America.]
[Reprinted in a revised, edited, and abridged format as Chapters 11 and 13 -
16 of Hayek's B-12; Chapters 11 and 16 of the B-12 version were reprinted under
the title, The Rule of Law. Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane
Studies (Studies in Law, No. 3), 1975.]
B-12 The Constitution of Liberty.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960; Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960/1963/5 (also 1969 edition); Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1960,
x, 570 pp. Also available in paperback: Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. Gateway Edition,
1972.
German translation: Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken
Institut (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche and wirtschaftrechtliche Untersuchungen
No. 7), [J. C. B. Mohr/P. Siebeck], 1971. (Spain 1961, Italy 1971, China [Taipei]
1975).
[Hayek composed the Preface of The Constitution of Liberty on his 60th
birthday (May 8, 1959). He intended this survey of the ideals of freedom in
Western civilization to commemorate the centenary of John Stuart Mill's
On Liberty (1859). In "Acknowledgments and Notes" he describes the various
preliminary drafts and versions he incorporated into this volume; also see B-11.
Hayek stresses the working of the liberal, spontaneous order of society, which
is too complex to be subjected to social planning and engineering.]
B-13 Studies in Philosophy, Politics
and Economics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967/1969; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967/1969; Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1967/1969; x, 356 pp. Reprinted in paperback New York: Simon and Schuster Clarion
Book, 1969.
[This volume of 25 essays contains reprints of articles and speeches by F. A.
H. as well as previously unpublished writing and speeches over a 20-year period
preceding 1967. Reprints (often revised) include: A-76, A-102, A-103b, A-112,
A-108, A-115, A-65, A-68, A-99a, etc. Consult volume to determine other essays
published for the first time. The scope of topics includes essays on epistemology,
history of ideas, specialization, Hume, spontaneous order, the liberal social
order, the transmission of liberal economic ideas, and a variety of other topics
on philosophy, politics, and economics.]
B-14 Freiburger Studien. Gesammelte Aufsätze.
Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche und wirtschaftsrechtliche
Untersuchungen 5) J.C.B. Mohr/P. Siebeck, 1969, 284 pp.
["Freiburg Studies. Collected Essays." German anthology of Hayek's essays. Contains
German versions of such items as P-9 and P-10.]
B-15 Law, Legislation and Liberty: A
New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy,
Vol. I, Rules and Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1973, xi, 184 pp.
A trilogy published in the following sequence:
Vol. I, Rules and Order, 1973
Vol. II, The Mirage of Social Justice, 1976
Vol. III, The Political Order of a Free People, 1979
These volumes are also available in paperback, Phoenix Books editions of the
University of Chicago Press. A French translation, Droit, Législation
et Liberté, is available from Presses Universitaires de France in
the Collection Libre Échange, edited by Florin Aftalion and Georges Gallais-Hamonno.
[Vol. I distinguishes between liberal spontaneous order ('cosmos')
and planned or engineered, rationalistic social orders ('taxis'). Hayek
also traces the changing concept of law, principles vs. expediency in politics,
and the 'law of legislation'.]
B-16 Law, Legislation and Liberty: A
New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy,
Vol. II, The Mirage of Social Justice. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, xiv, 195 pp.
[Vol. II outlines the meaning of justice in the free, liberal social order,
critiques the notion of 'social' or distributive justice, and contrasts it with
the market order or 'catallaxy', the regime of the Open Society.]
B-17 New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics and the History of Ideas. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1978; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
[This volume of 20 essays supplements Hayek's earlier Studies (B-13)
by reprinting in a more accessible form some of his earlier articles and unpublished
lectures not reprinted in Studies. Reprints include P-11a, P-9, A-121,
P-10, A-127, P-9, A-131a, A-136a, A-116, A-113. Consult New Studies
for titles of essays not previously published. Ranging over themes from philosophy,
politics, economics, and the history of ideas, Hayek analyzes such topics as
constructivism, the 'atavism of social justice', liberalism, the dangers of
economic planning, and the ideas of Mandeville, Smith, and Keynes. Chapter 2
reprints his 1974 Nobel Prize speech, "The Pretence of Knowledge."]
B-18 Law, Legislation and Liberty: A
New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy,
Vol. III, The Political Order of a Free People. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, xv, 244 pp.
[Vol.III concludes Hayek's trilogy. Hayek exposes the weakness inherent in most
forms of democratic government and outlines his alternative constitutional,
political, and legal arrangements to create a democratic order that would be
consistent with the free society. The Epilogue, "The Three Sources of Human
Values," reprints Hayek's Hobhouse Lecture delivered at the London School of
Economics, May 17, 1978.]
Pamphlets
P-1 Das Mieterschutzproblem, Nationalökonomische
Betrachtungen. Vienna: Steyrermuhl-Verlag, Bibliothek fôr Volkswirtschaft
und Politik, No. 2, 1929. ["The Rent Control Problem, Political Economic
Considerations." Hayek's later article (A-9b) was adapted from P-1 (the more
detailed study on the effects of rent control) and both were used to form the
substance of Hayek's "The Repercussions of Rent Restrictions," in F. A. Hayek,
Milton Friedman, et al., Rent Control: A Popular Paradox. Evidence on The
Effects of Rent Control. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1975, pp. 67-83;
this last volume grew out of an earlier version: Arthur Seldon, ed. Verdict
on Rent Control. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1972.]
P-2 Freedom and the Economic System. University of
Chicago Press (Public Policy Pamphlet No. 29. Harry D. Gideonse, editor), 1939,
iv, 38 pp.
[Reprinted in an enlarged form from Contemporary Review (April 1938).]
P-3 The Case of the Tyrol. London: Committee on Justice
for the South Tyrol, 1944. [F. A. H. advocates Tyrolean autonomy independent
of Italian hegemony. Compare with Hayek's article A-53 (1944).]
P-4 Report on the Changes in the Cost of Living in Gibraltar
1939-1944 and on Wages and Salaries. Gibraltar, no date (1945).
P-5 Individualism: True and False. (The Twelfth Finlay
Lecture, delivered at University College, Dublin, on December 17, 1945.) Dublin:
Hodges, Figgis & Co. Ltd. 1946; and Oxford: B. H. Blackwell Ltd. 1946, 38
pp.
[Reprinted in Individualism (B-7), chapter 1. German edition: "Wahrer
and Falscher Individualismus." Ordo 1, 1948. Spain, 1968. Also reprinted
in the various translations of B-7.]
P-6 Two Essays on Free Enterprise. Bombay: Forum
of Free Enterprise, 1962.
P-7 Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Politik. Freiburger
Universitätsreden, N.F. Heft 34, Freiburg im Breisgau: H.F. Schulz, 1963,
24 pp.
[English version, "The Economy, Science and Politics," chapter 18 of B-13. The
original (in German) was Hayek's inaugural lecture on the assumption of the
professorship of Political Economy Albert Ludwig University at Freiburg im Breisgau,
June 18, 1962.]
P-8 Was der Goldwährung geschehen ist. Ein Bericht
aus dem Jahre 1932 mit zwei Ergänzungen. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut
(Vorträge und Aufsätze, 12), 1965, 36 pp. (France 1966): Révue
d'Economie Politique 76 (1966), for French version.
["What Has Happened to the Gold Standard. A Report Beginning with the Year 1932
with Two Supplements."]
P-9 The Confusion of Language in Political Thought With
Some Suggestions for Remedying It. London: Institute of Economic Affairs
(Occasional Paper 20), 1968/1976, 36 pp.
[Lecture originally delivered in 1967 in German to the Walter Eucken Institut
at Freiburg im Breisgau. Reprinted in English as Chapter 6 of B-17, and in German
as "Die Sprachverwirrung im politischen Denken" in B-14.]
P-10 Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren. Kiel:
(Kieler Vorträge, N.S. 56), 1968, 20 pp.
["Competition as a Discovery Procedure." Originally delivered in English as
a lecture to the Philadelphia Society at Chicago on March 29, 1968 and later
on July 5, 1968, in German, to the Institut für Weltwirtschaft of the University
of Kiel. The German version was published first, but it lacked the final section
found in the English version published in Chapter 12 of New Studies
(B-17). The German version also was reprinted in F. A. H.'s German collection
of essays entitled Freiburger Studien (B-14), 1979.]
P-11a Die Irrtômer des Konstruktivismus und die Grundlagen
legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher Gebilde. Munich-Salzburg 1970/2 (also
1975 edition). Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze
51), 1975. (Italy, 1971).
[Reprinted with some changes as "The Errors of Constructivism" (Chapt. 1) of
B-17.]
P-11b A Tiger by the Tail: The Keynesian Legacy of Inflation.
A 40 Years' Running Commentary on Keynesianism by F. A. Hayek. Compiled
and introduced by Sudha R. Shenoy. London: Institute of Economic Affairs (Hobart
Paperback #4), 1972; 2nd edition 1978, xii, 124 pp. Also reprinted, San Francisco:
The Cato Institute (The Cato Papers, No. 6), 1979. See A-130.
P-11c Die Theorie Komplexer Phänomene. Tôbingen:
Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge and Aufsätze 36), 1972.
[English version, "The Theory of Complex Phenomena" appears in Chapter 2 of
B-13. This essay originally appeared in English in M. Bunge, ed. The Critical
Approach and Philosophy. Essays in Honor of K. R. Popper. New York: The
Free Press, 1964.]
P-12 Economic Freedom and Representative Government.
Fourth Wincott Memorial Lecture delivered at the Royal Society of Arts, Oct.
21, 1973. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs (Occasional Paper 39), 1973,
22 pp.
[Appears as Chapter 8 of B-17.]
P-13 Full Employment at Any Price? London: Institute
of Economic Affairs (Occasional Paper 45), 1975/1978, (Italy 1975), 52 pp.
[Three Lectures. Lecture 1: "Inflation, The Misdirection of Labour, and Unemployment;
Lecture 2: "The Pretence of Knowledge" (Hayek's 1974 Nobel Prize Speech); Lecture
3: "No Escape: Unemployment Must Follow Inflation." A Short Note on Austrian
Capital Theory is added as an Appendix. Reprinted as Unemployment and Monetary
Policy. San Francisco: Cato Institute (Cato Paper No. 3), 1979, 53 pp.]
P-14 Choice in Currency. A Way to Stop Inflation.
London: Institute of Economic Affairs (Occasional Paper 48), February 1976/1977,
46 pp.
[Based on an Address entitled "International Money" delivered to the Geneva
Gold and Monetary Conference on September 25, 1975 at Lausanne, Switzerland.]
P-15 Drei Vorlesungen ôber Demokratie, Gerechtigkeit und
Sozialismus. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze
63 [J.C.B. Mohr/P. Siebeck]), 1977. ["Three Lectures on Democracy, Justice,
and Socialism."]
P-16a Denationalisation of Money: An Analysis of the Theory
and Practice of Concurrent Currencies. London: The Institute of Economic
Affairs (Hobart Paper Special 70), October 1976, 107 pp.
P-16b See, along with P-16a, the revision:
Denationalisation of Money - The Argument Refined. An Analysis of the Theory
and Practice of Concurrent Currencies. Hobart Paper Special 70, Second
(Extended) edition, 1978, 141 pp.
P-17 The Reactionary Character of the Socialist Conception,
Remarks by F.A. Hayek. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1978.
P-18 Economic Progress in an Open Society. Seoul,
Korea: Korea International Economic Institute (Seminar Series No. 16), 1978.
P-19 "The Three Sources of Human Values." The Hobhouse Lecture
given at the London School of Economics, May 17, 1978. Published in the Epilogue
to Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1979 (B-18).
[German translation: "Die drei Quellen der menschlichen Werte." Tôbingen: Walter
Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze 70) [J. C. B. Mohr/P. Siebeck],
1979.]
P-20 Social Injustice, Socialism and Democracy. Sydney,
Australia, 1979.
P-21 Wissenschaft und Sozialismus. Tôbingen: Walter
Eucken Institut, (Vorträge und Aufsätze 71) [J. C. B. Mohr/P. Siebeck],
1979.
["Science and Socialism."]
P-22 Liberalismus. Translated from English by Eva
von Malchus. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze
72) [J. C. B. Mohr/P. Siebeck 1979], 47 pp.
["Liberalism"] Reprint-translation into German of article in New Studies
(B-17).
Books Edited or Introduced
E-1 Hermann Heinrich Gossen. Entwicklung der Gesetze des
menschlichen Verkehrs und der daraus fliessenden Regeln fôr menschliches Handeln.
Introduced by Friedrich A. Hayek. 3rd edition. Berlin: Prager, 1927, xxiii,
278 pp.
["The Laws of Human Relationships and of the Rules to be Derived Therefrom for
Human Action." Cf.: A-15. Gossen's (1810-1858) fame rests on this one book,
first published in 1854, in which he developed a comprehensive theory of the
hedonistic calculus and postulated the principle of diminishing marginal utility.
He thereby anticipated the marginal utility breakthrough in the theory of economic
value in 1871 by Menger, Jevons, and Walras.]
E-2 Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser. Gesammelte Abhandlungen.
Edited with an introduction by Friedrich A. von Hayek. Tôbingen: Mohr, 1929,
xxxiv, 404 pp.
[This edition includes von Wieser's Collected Writings published between 1876
and 1923. Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser (1851-1926) was Hayek's mentor at the
University of Vienna and represented the "older Austrian school" of Economics.
See A-4 and A-125b.]
E-3 Richard Cantillon. Abhandlung ôber die Natur des Handels
im Allgemeinen. Translated
by Hella von Hayek. Introduction and annotations by F. A. von Hayek. Jena,
1931, xix, 207 pp.
[A French translation of Cantillon's "Essay on the Nature of Trade in General"
appeared as Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général
in Revue des Sciences Économiques (Liège, April-October,
1936). Italian translation by the Italian liberal editor of Il Politico,
Luigi Einaudi appeared in Riforma sociale (July 1932).]
E-4 Beiträge zur Geldtheorie. Edited and prefaced
by Friedrich A. Hayek. Contributions by Marco Fanno, Marius W. Holtrop, Johan
G. Koopmans, Gunnar Myrdal, Knut Wicksell. Vienna, 1933, ix, 511 pp.
["Contributions on Monetary Theory."]
E-5 Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical
Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. Edited with an Introduction
and a Concluding Essay by F. A. Hayek. Contributions by N. G. Pierson, Ludwig
von Mises, Georg Halm, and Enrico Barone. London: George Routledge & Sons,
1935, v, 293 pp. (France 1939, Italy 1946.)
[Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley (1967), 1970 from the 1935 edition;
reprinted Clifton, New Jersey: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975. Hayek's Introductory
Chapter 1 deals with "The Nature and History of The Problem" of socialist calculation.
Hayek's concluding chapter concerns "The Present State of the Debate." Mises'
(1881-1973) article "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth" (translated
from the German by S. Adler), chapter 3, had set off the debate when it appeared
originally under the title "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialstischen Gemeinwesen"
in the Archiv fôr Socialwissenschaften 47 (1920). N.G. Pierson's (1839-1909)
article, "The Problem of Value in the Socialist Community," chapter 2, originally
appeared in Dutch in De Economist 41 (s'Gravenhage, 1902): 423-456.]
E-6 Boris Brutzkus. Economic Planning in Soviet Russia.
Edited and prefaced by Friedrich A. Hayek. London: George Routledge & Sons,
1935; xvii, 234 pp.
E-7 The Collected Works of Carl Menger. 4 volumes
with an Introduction by F. A. von Hayek. London: The London School of Economics
and Political Science (Series of Reprints of Scarce Tracts in Economic and Political
Science No. 17-20), 1933-1936.
Volume 1: Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre (1871) 1934.
Volume 2: Untersuchungen ôber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften
(1883) 1933.
Volume 3: Kleinere Shriften zur Methode und Geschichte der Volkswirthschaftlehre
(1884-1915) 1935.
Volume 4: Schriften ôber Geldtheorie und Währungspolitik (1889-1893),
1936.
[Vol. 1 contains a biographical introduction to Menger by Hayek. Vol. 4 contains
a complete list of Menger's known writings.]
Later 2nd German edition: Carl Menger, Gesammelte Werke. 4 vols. Tôbingen,
1968-1970.
["Collected Works"]
E-8 Henry Thornton. An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects
of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802). Edited and introduced by Friedrich
A. Hayek. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 368 pp.
E-9 John Stuart Mill, The Spirit of the Age. Introduced
by F.A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, xxxiii, 93 pp.
[Hayek's Introduction is entitled, "John Stuart Mill at the Age of Twenty-Four,"
and surveys Mill's intellectual development at the time of Mill's famous essay,
"The Spirit of the Age," which represented important deviations from Benthamite
Utilitarian liberalism.]
E-10 Capitalism and the Historians. Edited and introduced
by F. A. Hayek. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, and Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1954, 188 pp.
[The inspiration for the several papers presented was The Mont Pélèrin
Society meetings held at Beauvallon in France in September 1951 on the distortions
of historians and intellectuals in describing Capitalism and The Industrial
Revolution. Hayek's Introduction (pp. 3-29) is entitled "History and Politics"
and is reprinted in B-13 and (in German) as "Wirtschaftsgeschichte and Politik"
["Economic History and Politics"] in Ordo 7 (1955): 3-22. T. S. Ashton's
first chapter is "The Treatment of Capitalism by Historians"; L. M. Hacker's
second chapter is entitled "The Anticapitalist Bias of American Historians";
Bertrand de Jouvenel contributed chapter 3, "The Treatment of Capitalism by
Continental Intellectuals"; T. S. Ashton's chapter 4, "The Standard of Life
of the Workers in England, 1790-1830," originally appeared in The Journal
of Economic History, Supplement 9, 1949; the final article by W. H. Hutt,
"The Factory System of The Early Nineteenth Century," originally appeared in
Economica (March 1926). Hayek's volume provoked many pro and con reviews.
A sampling: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Reporter (March 30, 1954):
38-40; Oscar Handlin, The New England Quarterly (March 1955): 99-107;
Charles Wilson, Economic History Review (April 1956); Asa Briggs, The
Journal of Economic History (Summer 1954); W. T. Eastbrook, The American
Economic Review (September 1954); Max Eastman, The Freeman (February
22, 1954); Helmut Schoek, U.S.A. (July 14, 1954); Eric E. Lampard,
The American Historical Review (October 1954); and John Chamberlain,
Barron's (January 4, 1954.)]
E-11 Louis Rougier. The Genius of the West. Introduction
by F.A. v. Hayek. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing (published for the Principles
of Freedom Committee), 1971, pp. xv-xviii.
E-12 Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. Economics as a Coordination
Problem. The Contributions of Friedrich A. Hayek. Foreword by F.A. Hayek.
Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1977, pp. xi-xii.
E-13 Ludwig von Mises. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological
Analysis. Translated by Jacques Kahane. 1981 Introduction by F.A. Hayek.
Indianapolis: LibertyClassics, 1981, pp. xix-xxiv. Dated August 1978.
[Hayek's Foreward pays tribute to Mises for the anti-socialist impact that Mises'
Die Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen ôber den Sozialismus (Jena: Gustav
Fischer, 1922) created on many intellectuals after the First World War.]
E-14 Ewald Schams. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Prefaced
by F.A. Hayek. Ready in Spring 1983. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
Articles in Journals, Newspapers, or Collections of Essays
A-1a "Das Stabilisierungsproblem in Goldwährungsländern."
Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Sozialpolitik, N.S. 4 (1924).
["The Stabilization Problem for Countries on the Gold Standard." See note A-2a
for the biographical context of Hayek's first two article publications. The
journal in which Hayek published some of his first articles was closely associated
with the Austrian School of economics through its editorial direction. It underwent
several name changes:
1892-1918: The journal was known as Zeitschrift fôr Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik
und Verwaltung. Organ der Gesellschaft österreichischer Volkswirt.
["Journal of Political Economy, Social Policy, and Administration. Publication
of the Society of Austrian Political Economy"], and was published in Vienna
by F. Tempsky.
1919-1920: Suspended publication.
1921-1927: It was known as Zeitschrift fôr Volkswirtschaft und Socialpolitik.
["Journal of Political Economy and Social Policy"] and was published in Vienna
and Leipsig by F. Deuticke.
After 1927, the journal was superseded by Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie.
["Journal of National Economy"]. See Bibliography A-22, etc.
The heavily Austrian School of economics-oriented editorial staff included:
1892-1918 Ernst von Plener (1841-1923)
1892-1914 Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914)
1892-1907 Karl Theodor von Inama-Sternegg (1843-1908)
1904-1916 Eugen von Philippovich (1858-1917)
1904-1918 Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser (1851-1926)
1911-1916 Robert Meyer (1855-1914)
1921-1927 R. Reisch (1866-?), Othmar Spann (1878-1950), and others.]
A-1b "Diskontopolitik und Warenpreise." Der Österreichische
Volkswirt 17 (1,2), (Vienna 1924).
["Discount Policy and Commodity Prices."]
A-2a "Die Währungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten seit
der Überwindung der Krise von 1920." Zeitschrift fôr Volkswirtschaft
und Sozialpolitik. N.S. 5 (1925).
["The Monetary Policy in the United States Since Overcoming the Crisis of 1920."
Both this article and A-1a grew out of Hayek's post-graduate studies in America
which he pursued from March 1923 to June 1924 at New York University. On the
chronology of the Nobel Prize biography of Hayek: Official Announcement of the
Royal Academy of Sciences, republished in the Swedish Journal of Economics
76 (December 1974): 469 ff. Also see Machlup, ed. (1976), pp. 16-17, as well
as the annotation in the present Hayek Bibliography on item A-64. Hayek's
American academic sojourn took place while he was on a leave of absence from
his Austrian civil service position (1921-1926) as a legal consultant (along
with Ludwig von Mises) for carrying out the provisions of the Treaty of St.
Germain, see Bibliography A-145, p. 1 for Hayek's anecdote and background
for his introduction to von Mises through von Wieser.]
A-2b "Das amerikanische Bankwesen seit der Reform von 1914."
Der Österreichische Volkswirt 17 (29-33), (Vienna 1925).
["The American Banking System since the Reform of 1914."]
A-3a "Bemerkungen zum Zurechnungsproblem." Jahrbôcher
fôr Nationalökonomie und Statistik 124 (1926): 1-18.
["Comments on the Problem of Imputation." On the valuation of Producer goods.
Compare Wilhelm Vleugel's Die Lösung des wirtschaftlichen Zurechnungsproblem
bei Böhm-Bawerk und Wieser. Halle: Neimeyer (Königsberger Gelehrte
Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Shriften, Vol. 7, part 5), 1930.]
A-3b "Die Bedeutung der Konjunkturforschung fôr das Wirtschaftsleben."
Der Österreichische Volkswirt 19 (2), (Vienna 1926).
["The Meaning of Business Cycle Research for Economic Life."]
A-4 "Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser." Jahrbôcher fôr Nationalökonomie
und Statistik 125 (1926): 513-530.
[Commemorative article on the occasion of the death of Hayek's Austrian School
of economics mentor, von Wieser (1851-1926). Compare with Hayek's later article
on von Wieser in The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
(1968, 1972). Also see E-2 (1929) Hayek's German introduction and edition
of von Wieser's Collected Writings. A-4 translated into English in an abridged
form appears in The Development of Economic Thought: Great Economists in
Perspective. Edited by Henry William Spiegel. New York & London: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1952, 1961, pp. 554-567.
A-5a "Zur Problemstellung der Zinstheorie." Archiv fôr
Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik 58 (1927): 517-532.
["On the Setting of the Problem of Rent Theory."]
A-5b "Konjunkturforschung in Österreich." Die Industrie
32 (30), (Vienna 1927).
["Business Cycle Research in Austria."]
A-6 "Das intertemporale Gleichgewichtssystem der Preise und
die Bewegungen des 'Geldwertes.'" Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 28 (1928):
33-76.
["The Intertemporal Equilibrium System of Prices and the Movements of the 'Value
of Money.'"]
A-7a "Einige Bemerkungen ôber das Verhältnis der Geldtheorie
zur Konjunkturtheorie." Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik
173/2 (1928): 247-295. Also see same journal, Volume 175, for a discussion.
["Some Remarks on the Relationship between Monetary Theory and Business Cycle
Theory."]
[See B-1 with annotation. The journal in which Hayek published this article
was the publication of the influential Verein fôr Sozialpolitik, founded
in 1872 by (among others) Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917). This organization for
social reform did not express a monolithic unity of doctrine, but was, nevertheless,
excoriated by its opponents as a union of 'Professorial Socialists' (Katheder
Sozialisten). See the interesting group photograph of a meeting of the
Verein at the University of Zurich, September 11-13, 1928, showing
the wonderfully variegated grouping that includes Hayek, von Mises, Machlup,
A. Rôstow, Hunold, Morgenstern, Strigl, and Sombart in Albert Hunold, "How Mises
Changed My Mind." The Mont Pélèrin Quarterly 3 (October
1961): 16-19. For background on the Verein, see Haney (1949), pp. 546,
820, 885. It was at the September 1928 meeting of the Verein that Hayek
presented his paper, A-7a, which eventually grew into his Geldtheorie
(1929).]
A-7b "Diskussionsbemerkungen ôber 'Kredit und Konjunktur.'"
Shriften des Vereins fôr Sozialpolitik 175, Verhandlungen 1928, (1928).
["Discussion Comments on 'Credit and Business Cycle'". . . (Transactions 1928).]
A-8 "Theorie der Preistaxen." Közgazdasági
Enciklopédia, Budapest, 1929.
[In Hungarian-German printing.]
A-9a "Gibt es einen 'Widersinn des Sparens'? Eine Kritik der
Krisentheorie von W.T. Foster und W. Catchings mit einigen Bemerkungen zur Lehre
von de Beziehungen zwischen Geld und Kapital."
["Is There a 'Paradox of Saving'? A Critique of the Crises-Theory of W.T. Foster
and W. Catchings with some Remarks on the Theory of the Relationship between
Money and Capital."] Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie 1, no. 3
(1929): 125-169; revised and enlarged edition, Vienna: Springer, 1931.
[English version: "The Paradox of Saving." Economica 11, no. 32 (May
1931). Reprinted in B-4 ("Appendix"). The English translation was done by Nicholas
Kaldor and Georg Tugendhat.]
A-9b "Wirkungen der Mietzinbeschränkungen." Munich: Schriften
des Vereins fôr Sozialpolitik 182 (1930)
["The Repercussions of Rent Restrictions." See P-1 for different treatments
of the effects of rent control. A-9b formed the substance of Hayek's article
in the Hayek-Friedman volume mentioned in P-1.]
A-9c "Bemerkungen zur vorstehenden Erwiderung Prof. Emil Lederers."
Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie 1 (5), (1930).
["Comments on the Preceding Reply of Prof. Emil Lederer."]
A-10 "Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M.
Keynes." Economica 11, no. 33 (August 1931 - Part I): 270-295.
[See also A-11b.]
A-11a "The Pure Theory of Money: A Rejoinder to Mr. Keynes."
Economica 11, no. 34 (November 1931): 398-403.
[In the same issue of Economica, pp. 387-397, Keynes' article appears:
"A Reply to Dr. Hayek."]
A-11b "Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M.
Keynes." Economica 12 (February 1932 - Part II): 22-44.
[See also A-10 and A-11a.]
A-11c "Das Schicksal der Goldwährung." Der Deutsche
Volkswirt 6 (20), (1932). ["The Fate of the Gold Standard." See P-8.]
A-11d "Foreign Exchange Restrictions." The Economist
6 (1932).
A-12 "Money and Capital: A Reply to Mr. Sraffa." Economic
Journal 42 (June 1932): 237-249.
A-13 "Kapitalaufzehrung." Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
36 (July 1932/II): 86-108.
["Capital Consumption."]
A-14 "A Note on the Development of the Doctrine of 'Forced
Saving'." Quarterly Journal of Economics 47(November 1932): 123-133.
[Reprinted in B-4.]
A-15 "Gossen, Hermann Heinrich." Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan, 1932. Vol. 7, p. 3.
A-16 "Macleod, Henry D." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.
New York: Macmillan, 1933. Vol. 2, p. 30.
[Henry Dunning Macleod (1821-1902) was a Scottish economist who wrote The
Theory and Practice of Banking, 2 vols, (1856) and The Theory of Credit,
2 vols, (1889-1891).]
A-17 "Norman, George W." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.
New York: Macmillan, 1933. Vol. 2.
A-18 "Philippovich, Eugen von." Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences. New York: Macmillan, 1934. Vol. 12, p. 116.
A-19 "Saving." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.
New York: Macmillan, 1934. Vol. 13, pp. 548-552.
[Reprinted in revised form in B-4.]
A-20 "The Trend of Economic Thinking." Economica
13 (May 1933): 121-137.
[Hayek's first inaugural lecture given at the University of London about a year
after he assumed the Tooke professorship, in which speech he explained his general
economic philosophy. See B-13, p. 254.]
A-21 Contribution to Gustav Clausing, ed. Der Stand und
die nächste Zukunft der Konjunkturforschung. Festschrift fôr Arthur Spiethoff.
Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1933.
[Translated into English in B-4 (Chapter 6) as "The Present State and Immediate
Prospects of the Study of Industrial Fluctuations." Arthur Spiethoff, (1873-1957),
who is honored in this Festschrift, was born in 1873, studied under
Schmoller, and devised a "non-monetary overinvestment theory" of the business
cycle. See Haney (1949), p. 673.]
A-22 "Über Neutrales Geld." Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie
4 (October 1933).
["Concerning Neutral Money."]
A-23 "Capital and Industrial Fluctuations." Econometrica
2 (April 1934): 152-167.
A-24a "On the Relationship between Investment and Output."
Economic Journal 44 (1934): 207-231.
A-24b "The Outlook for Interest Rates." The Economist
7 (1934).
A-24c "Stable Prices or Neutral Money." The Economist
7 (1934).
A-25 "Carl Menger." Economica N.S. 1 (November 1934):
393-420.
[This is an English translation of Hayek's Introduction to Menger's Grundsätze
in E-7. Reprinted in The Development of Economic Thought: Great Economists
in Perspective. Edited by Henry William Spiegel. New York and London: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1952, 527-553. Also reprinted in Principles of Economics
by Carl Menger. Translated by James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz. With an Introduction
by F. A. Hayek. New York & London: New York University Press, 1981, pp.
11-36. See A-131a.]
A-26 "Preiserwartungen, Monetäre Störungen und Fehlinvestitionen."
Nationalökonomisk Tidsskrift 73, no. 3 (1935).
[Reprinted in a revised form in B-4 as "Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances
and Malinvestments." Originally delivered as a lecture on December 7, 1933 in
the Sozialökonomisk Samfund in Copenhagen. First published in
German and later in French in the Revue de Science Economique, Liège
(October, 1935).]
A-27a "The Maintenance of Capital." Economica N.S.
2 (1935): 241-276.
[Reprinted in B-4.]
A-27b "A Regulated Gold Standard." The Economist
(May 11, 1935).
A-28 "Spor miedzy szkola 'Currency' i szkola 'Banking'." Ekonomista
55 (Warsaw, 1935).
A-29 "Edwin Cannan" (Obituary). Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie
6 (1935):246-250.
[Cannan (1861-1935) is also celebrated by Hayek in A-72. Cannan associated himself
at the London School of Economics with a group who developed liberal theory.
This group included Lionel Robbins, Cannan's successor, and his colleague Sir
Arnold Plant (see Plant, 1969), Sir Theodore Gregory (Athens), F.C. Benkam (Singapore),
W.H. Hutt (South Africa), and F.W. Paish (Paris).
A-30 "Technischer Fortschritt und Überkapazität."
Österreichische Zeitschrift fôr Bankwesen 1 (1936).
["Technical Progress and Overcapacity."]
A-31 "The Mythology of Capital." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 50 (1936):199-228.
[Reprinted in William Fellner and Bernard F. Haley, eds., Readings in the
Theory of Income Distribution. Philadelphia: 1946.]
A-32 "Utility Analysis and Interest." Economic Journal
46 (1936): 44-60.
A-33 "La situation monétaire internationale." Bulletin
Périodique de la Societé Belge d'Études et d'Expansion
(Brussels), No. 103. (1936).
["The International Monetary Situation."]
A-34 "Economics and Knowledge." Economica
N.S. 4 (February 1937): 33-54.
[Reprinted in B-7. Also reprinted in J. M. Buchanan and G. F. Thirlby (eds.)
L.S.E. Essays on Cost. New York and London: New York University Press,
1981 as chapter 3. Originally presented as a presidential address to the London
Economic Club, 10 November 1936.]
A-35 "Einleitung zu einer Kapitaltheorie." Zeitschrift
fôr Nationalökonomie 8 (1937):1-9.
["Introduction to a Theory of Capital."]
A-36 "Das Goldproblem." Österreichische Zeitschrift
fôr Bankwesen 2 (1937).
["The Gold Problem."]
A-37a "Investment that Raises the Demand for Capital."
Review of Economic Statistics 19 (November 1937).
[Reprinted in B-4.]
A-37b "Freedom and the Economic System." Contemporary
Review (April 1938).
[Reprinted in enlarged form in P-2.]
A-38 "Economic Conditions of Inter-State Federation." New
Commonwealth Quarterly 5 (London, 1939).
[Reprinted in B-7.]
A-39 "Pricing versus Rationing." The Banker 51 (London,
September 1939).
A-40 "The Economy of Capital." The Banker 52 (London,
October 1939).
A-41 "Socialist Calculation: The Competitive 'Solution'."
Economica N.S. 7 (May 1940): 125-149.
[Reprinted in B-7.]
A-42 "The Counter-Revolution of Science." Parts I-III. Economica
N.S. 8 (February-August 1941): 281-320.
[Reprinted in B-9.]
A-43 "Maintaining Capital Intact: A Reply [to Professor Pigou.]"
Economica N.S. 8 (1941): 276-280.
A-44 "Planning, Science and Freedom." Nature 148
(November 15, 1941).
A-45 "The Ricardo Effect." Economica N.S. 9 (1942).
[Reprinted in B-7. See also in B-17, Chapt. 11: "Three Elucidations of the Ricardo
Effect," and A-127.]
A-46 "Scientism and the Study of Society." Part I: Economica
N.S. 9 (1942). Part II: Economica 10 (1943). Part III: Economica
11 (1944).
[Reprinted in B-9.]
A-47 "A Comment on an Article by Mr. Kaldor: 'Professor Hayek
and the Concertina Effect'." Economica N.S. 9 (November 1942): 383-385.
A-48 "A Commodity Reserve Currency." Economic Journal
53 (1943).
[Reprinted in B-7 as chapter 10. Also reprinted in part as a pamphlet, "Material
Relating to Proposals for an International Commodity Reserve Currency," submitted
to The International Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, N.H.
by the Committee for Economic Stability (1944). #380 of the F. A. Harper Archives
at The Institute for Humane Studies.]
A-49 "The Facts of the Social Sciences." Ethics 54
(October 1943).
[Reprinted in B-7.]
A-50 "The Geometrical Representation of Complementarity."
Review of Economic Studies 10 (1942-1943): 122-125.
A-51 "Gospodarka planowa a idea planowania prawa." Economista
Polski (London, 1943).
[Cf. Chapter 6 of B-6: "Planning and the Rule of Law."]
A-52 Edited: "John Rae and John Stuart Mill: A Correspondence."
Economica N.S. 10 (1943): 253-255.
A-53 "The Economic Position of South Tyrol." In: Justice
for South Tyrol. London: 1943.
[Compare with P-3.]
A-54 "Richard von Strigl" (Obituary). Economic Journal
54 (1944): 284-286.
[Strigl who died in 1944 was a "Neo-Austrian" who developed the theory of saving
and investment and analyzed monopolistic competition theory.]
A-55 "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic
Review 35 (September 1945): 519-530.
[Reprinted in B-7 and in a revised, abridged version as a pamphlet; Menlo Park,
CA: Institute for Humane Studies. (Reprint No. 5), no date (1971, 1975).]
A-56 "Time-Preference and Productivity: A Reconsideration."
Economica, N.S. no. 4, 12 (February 1945): 22-25.
A-57 Edited: "'Notes on N.W. Senior's Political Economy' by
John Stuart Mill." Economica N.S. 12 (1945): 134-139.
A-58 "Nationalities and States in Central Europe." Central
European Trade Review 3 (London, 1945): 134-139.
A-59 "Fuld Beskaeftigelse." Nationalökonomisk Tidsskrift
84 (1946): 1-31.
A-60 "The London School of Economics 1895-1945."
Economica N.S. 13 (February 1946): 1-31.
A-61 "Probleme und Schwierigkeiten der englischen Wirtschaft."
Schweizer Monatshefte 27 (1947).
["Problems and Difficulties of the English Economy."]
A-62 "Le plein emploi." Economie Appliquée
1, no. 2-3, (Paris, 1948): 197-210.
["Full Employment."]
A-63a "Der Mensch in der Planwirtschaft." In Simon Moser (ed.)
Weltbild und Menschenbild. Innsbruck and Vienna: 1948.
["Man in the Planned Economy."]
A-63b "Die politischen Folgen der Planwirtschaft." Die
Industrie. Zeitschrift der Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller.
No. 3 (Vienna, January 1948).
["The Political Effects of the Planned Economy."]
A-64 "Wesley Clair Mitchell 1874-1948" (Obituary). Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society 111 (1948).
[Compare with Arthur F. Burns' commemoration of Mitchell in the Twenty-Ninth
Report of The National Bureau of Economic Research. New York: 1969; adapted
in The Development of Economic Thought. Edited by Henry William Spiegel.
New York, 1952, 1961, pp. 414-442. Also note Hayek's personal association with
Mitchell, as indicated in B-17, p. 3, note 3, during Hayek's stay in America
during the early 1920s. Also note the correspondence between Wesley Mitchell
and Hayek mentioned in Emil Kauder, A History of Marginal Utility Theory.
Princeton University Press, 1965.]
A-65a "The Intellectuals and Socialism." The University
of Chicago Law Review 16, no. 3 (Spring 1949): 417-433. German translation
in Schweizer Monatshefte 29 (1944-50); Norwegian translation (1951).
[Reprinted in B-13 and by the Institute for Humane Studies, 1971.]
A-65b "A Levy on Increasing Efficiency. The Economics of Development
Charges." The Financial Times (April 26-28, 1949).
A-66 "Economics." Chambers' Encyclopaedia 4 (Oxford
1950).
A-67 "Ricardo, David." Chambers' Encyclopaedia 11
(Oxford 1950).
A-68 "Full Employment, Planning and Inflation." Institute
of Public Affairs Review 4 (6) (Melbourne, Australia 1950).
[Reprinted as Chapter 19 in B-13. Also in German (1951) and Spanish (1960).]
A-69a "Capitalism and the Proletariat." Farmand 7,
no. 56 (Oslo: February 17, 1951).
A-69b "Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit." Jahresbericht der
Zôricher Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesellschaft (1951).
["Equality and Justice."]
A-70 "Comte and Hegel." Measure 2 (Chicago, July
1951).
[Reprinted in B-9.]
A-71 "Comments on 'The Economics and Politics of the Modern
Corporation'." The University of Chicago Law School, Conference Series
no. 8, (December 7, 1951).
A-72 "Die Überlieferung der Ideale der Wirtschaftsfreiheit."
Schweizer Monatshefte 31, No. 6 (1951).
["The Transmission of the Ideals of Economic Freedom." First in German (1951)
and later in an English translation as "The Ideals of Economic Freedom: A Liberal
Inheritance," in The Owl (London 1951), pp. 7-12. A "corrected version"
in English is reprinted as Chapter 13 of B-13. Published in The Freeman
2 (July 28, 1952): 729-731, as "A Rebirth of Liberalism." A remarkably
similar overview of the various liberal currents that flowed into modern economic
liberalism is given by Carlo Mötteli (a financial editor for Neue Zôcher
Zeitung) in Swiss Review of World Affairs 1, no. 8 (November 1951)
and entitled "The Regeneration of Liberalism," reprinted in The Mont Pélèrin
Quarterly 3 (October 1961): 29-30.]
A-73a "Die Ungerechtigkeit der Steuerprogression." Schweizer
Monatshefte 32 (November 1952).
["The Injustice of the Progressive Income Tax." cf. A-79 and A-73b of which
this is a translation.]
A-73b "The Case Against Progressive Income Taxes." The
Freeman 4 (December 28, 1953): 229-232.
A-74a "Leftist Foreign Correspondent." The Freeman
3 (January 12, 1953): 275.
A-74b "The Actonian Revival." Review of Lord Acton
by Gertrude Himmelfarb and Acton's Political Philosophy by G. E. Fasnacht.
The Freeman 3 (March 23, 1953): 461-462.
A-74c "Decline of the Rule of Law. Part I." The Freeman
3 (April 20, 1953):518-520; Part II The Freeman 3 (May 4, 1953): 561-563.
A-74d "Substitute for Foreign Aid." The Freeman 3
(April 6, 1953): 482-484.
A-74e "Entstehung und Verfall des Rechtsstaatsideales." In:
Albert Hunold (ed.) Wirtschaft ohne Wunder. Volkswirtschaftliche Studien
fôr das Schweizerische Institut fôr Auslandsforschung. Zurich, 1953.
["The Rise and Fall of the Ideal of the Constitutional State."]
A-75a "Marktwirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik." Ordo
6 (February 1954): 3-18.
["Market Economy and The Economic Policy."]
A-75b "Wirtschaftsgeschichte and Politik." Ordo 7
(March 1955).
["Economic History and Politics." See E-10.]
A-76 "Degrees of Explanation." The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 6, no. 23 (1955): 209-225.
[Received by journal Nov. 11, 1954. Hayek acknowledges indebtedness to Chester
Barnand, Heinrich Klôver, Herbert Lamm, Michael Polanyi, Karl Popper, Warren
Weaver and the members of a Faculty Seminar of the Committee of Social Thought
in the University of Chicago "for reading and commenting on an earlier draft
of this paper." Reprinted in revised form in B-13, Chapter 1.]
A-77 "Towards a Theory of Economic Growth, Discussion of Simon
Kuznets' Paper." In: National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad.
New York: Columbia University Bicentennial Conference, 1955.
A-78 "Comments." In: Congress for Cultural Freedom (ed.) Science
and Freedom. London: (Proceedings of the Hamburg Conference of the Congress
for Cultural Freedom) 1955.
[Also printed in German.]
A-79 "Progressive Taxation Reconsidered." In: Mary Sennholz
(ed.) On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises.
Princeton: D. von Nostrand Co., 1956. Presented on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of his [von Mises'] Doctorate, February 26, 1956.
A-80 "The Dilemma of Specialization." In Leonard D. White
(ed.) The State of the Social Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1956.
[Reprinted in B-13, Chapter 8.]
A-81a "Über den 'Sinn' sozialer Institutionen." Schweizer
Monatshefte 36 (October 1956).
["On the 'Meaning' of Social Institutions."]
A-81b "Freedom & The Rule of Law." (The Third Programme,
BBC Radio; lst of 2 talks.) The Listener (Dec. 13, 1956).
A-82a "Was ist und was heisst 'sozial'?" In Albert Hunold
(ed.) Masse und Demokratie. Zôrich: 1957.
["What is 'Social' - What Does It Mean?" Translated in an unauthorized English
translation in Freedom and Serfdom (ed. A. Hunold), Dordrecht, 1961.
The reprint in B-13, Chapter 17 is a revised version of the unauthorized English
translation "which in parts gravely misrepresented the meaning of the original."]
A-82b Review of Mill and His Early Critics by J.
C. Rees. Leicester: University College of Leicester, 1956. In Journal of
Modern History (June 1957): 54.
A-83 "Grundtatsachen des Fortschritts." Ordo 9 (1957):
19-42.
["The Fundamental Facts of Progress."]
A-84 "Inflation Resulting from the Downward Inflexibility
of Wages." In: Committee for Economic Development (ed.) Problems of United
States Economic Development, New York: 1958, Vol. I, pp. 147-152.
[Reprinted in B-13, Chapter 21.]
A-85a "La Libertad, La Economia Planificada y el Derecho."
Temas Contemporaneos (Buenos Aires) 3 (1958).
["Liberty, the Planned Economy, and the Law."]
A-85b "Das Individuum im Wandel der Wirtschaftsordnung."
Der Volkswirt No. 51-52 (Frankfurt am Main 1958).
["The Individual and Change of Economic System."]
A-86 "The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization." In: Felix
Morley (ed.) Essays in Individuality. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1958.
A-87 "Freedom, Reason, and Tradition." Ethics 68
(1958).
A-88a "Gleichheit, Wert und Verdienst." Ordo 10 (1958):
5-29.
["Equality, Value, and Profit."]
A-88b "Attualità di un insegnamento," In: Angelo Dalle
Molle, ed. Il Maestro dell' Economia di Domani (Festschrift for Luigi
Einaudi on his 85th Birthday). Verona, 1958, pp. 20-24.
["The Reality of a Teaching," In The Master of the Economics of the Future.
Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961), who is honored in this Festschrift, was a classical
liberal Italian economist and statesman. He was the first president of Italy
(1948-1955). Following World War II he was governor of the Bank of Italy and
devised programs for monetary stabilization. Einaudi is celebrated by Hayek,
in an allusion, in A-72.]
A-89 "Liberalismus (1) Politischer Liberalismus." Handwörterbuch
der Sozialwissenschaften 6 (Stuttgart-Tôbingen-Göttingen, 1959).
["Liberalism (1) Political Liberalism." See Chapter 9 of B-17.]
A-90 "Bernard Mandeville." Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften
7 (Stuttgart-Tôbingen-Göttingen, 1959).
A-91 "Unions, Inflation and Profits." In: Philip D. Bradley
(ed.) The Public Stake in Union Power. Charlottesville, University
of Virginia Press: 1959.
[Reprinted in B-13.]
A-92 "Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit." Schweizer Monatshefte
39 (1959).
["Freedom and Independence."]
A-93 "Verantwortlichkeit und Freiheit." In: Albert Hunold
(ed.) Erziehung zur Freiheit. Erlenbach-Zôrich: E. Rentsch, 1959: 147-170.
["Responsibility and Freedom."]
A-94 "Marktwirtschaft und Strukturpolitik." Die Aussprache
9 (1959).
["Market Economy and Structural Policy."]
A-95 "An Röpke." In Wilhelm Röpke, Gegen die
Brandung. Zürich: E. Rentsch, 1959.
["On Röpke."]
A-96a "The Free Market Economy: The Most Efficient Way of
Solving Economic Problems." Human Events 16, no. 50 (Dec. 16, 1959).
[Reprinted in P-6.]
A-96b "The Economics of Abundance," in Henry Hazlitt, ed.
The Critics of Keynesian Economics. Princeton and London: Van Nostrand
Co., 1960, pp. 126-130.
A-97a "The Social Environment." In B. H. Bagdikian (ed.) Man's
Contracting World in an Expanding Universe. Providence, R.I.: 1960.
A-97b "Freedom, Reason and Tradition." Proceedings of
the 16th Annual Meeting: The Western Conference of Prepaid Medical Service
Plans, (Winnipeg 1960).
A-97c "Progenitor of Scientism." National Review
(1960).
A-97d "Gobierno Democratico y Actividad Economica." Espejo
1 (Mexico City 1960).
["Democratic Government and Economic Activity."]
A-98 "The Corporation in a Democratic Society: In Whose Interest
Ought It and Will It Be Run?" In: M. Anshen and G. L. Bach (eds.) Management
and Corporations 1985. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
[Reprinted in B-13.]
A-99a "The 'Non Sequitur' of the 'Dependence Effect'." The
Southern Economic Journal 27 (April 1961).
[Reprinted in B-13, Chapter 23.]
A-99b "Freedom and Coercion: Some Comments and Mr. Hamowy's
Criticism." New Individualist Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1961): 28-32.
A-100a "Die Ursachen der ständigen Gefährdung der
Freiheit." Ordo 12 (1961):103-112.
["The Origins of the Constant Danger to Freedom."]
A-100b "How Much Education at Public Expense?" Context
1 (Chicago 1961).
A-101 "The Moral Element in Free Enterprise." In: National
Association of Manufacturers (eds.) The Spiritual and Moral Significance
of Free Enterprise. New York: 1962.
[Reprinted in B-13 as Chapter 16. Originally delivered as an address to the
66th Congress of American Industry organized by the N.A.M. New York, December
6, 1961.]
A-102 "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility." Proceedings
of the British Academy 48 (1962), London, 1963, pp. 321-344.
[Reprinted as Chapter 3 in B-13.]
A-103a "Wiener Schule." Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften
12 (Stuttgart-Tôbingen-Göttingen, 1962).
["The Vienna School."]
A-103b "The Uses of 'Gresham's Law' as an Illustration of
'Historical Theory'." History and Theory 1 (1962).
[Reprinted in B-13, Chapter 24.]
A-104 "Alte Wahrheiten und neue Irrtômer." In: Internationales
Institut der Sparkassen, ed. Das Sparwesen der Welt, Proceedings of
the 7th International Conference of Savings Banks. Amsterdam: 1963.
["Old Truths and New Errors." Reprinted in B-14; Italian translation in
Il Risparmio (Milan) 11 (1963).]
A-105 "Arten der Ordnung." Ordo 14 (1963).
English version under the title "Kinds of Order in Society." New Individualist
Review (University of Chicago) 3, no. 2 (Winter 1964): 3-12.
[Reprinted in B-14.]
[The five volumes of New Individualist Review (1961-1968) in which
"Kinds of Order" appears have been published in one volume as New Individualist
Review. Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1981. Reprinted as pamphlet:
Menlo Park, California: The Institute for Humane Studies (Studies in Social
Theory No. 5), 1975. Hayek used this essay as the basis of the second chapter
of Vol. I of Law, Legislation and Liberty (B-15). Reprinted in German
in B-14.]
A-106 "Recht, Gesetz und Wirtschaftsfreiheit." In: Hundert
Jahre Industrie und Handelskammer zu Dortmund 1863-1963. Dortmund, 1963.
["Right, Law, and Economic Freedom." Reprinted in B-14.]
A-107 Introduction to "The Earlier Letters of John Stuart
Mill." In F.E. Mineka, ed. John Stuart Mill, Vol. XII. Toronto: Toronto
University Press and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
A-108 "The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume."
Il Politico 28, no. 4 (December 1963): 691-704.
[Lecture delivered for the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University
of Freiburg im Breisgau on July 18, 1963. Reprinted as chapter 7 of B-13. Also
(in German) in B-14.]
A-109 "The Theory of Complex Phenomena."
In Mario A. Bunge (ed.) The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy:
Essays in Honor of Karl R. Popper. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
Inc., 1964.
[Reprinted in B-13; see P-11c. ]
A-110 Parts of "Commerce, History of." Encyclopaedia Britannica,
vol. VI. Chicago: 1964.
A-111 "Die Anschauungen der Mehrheit und die zeitgenössische
Demokratie." Ordo 15/16 (1965): 19-41.
["The Perception of the Majority and Contemporary Democracy." Reprinted in B-14.]
A-112 "Kinds of Rationalism." The Economic Studies Quarterly
15, no. 3 (Tokyo, 1965). [Reprinted in B-13, Chapter 5. Originally delivered
as a lecture on April 27, 1964 at Rikkyo University, Tokyo. German translation
in B-14.]
A-113 "Personal Recollections of Keynes and the 'Keynesian
Revolution'." The Oriental Economist 34 (Tokyo, January 1966).
[German translation in B-14. Reprinted in B-17.]
A-114 "The Misconception of Human Rights as Positive Claims."
Farmand Anniversary Issue II/12 (Oslo, 1966): 32-35.
A-115 "The Principles of a Liberal Social
Order." Il Politico 31, no. 4 (December 1966): 601-618.
[Paper submitted to The Tokyo Meeting of the Mont Pélèrin Society,
Sept. 5-10, 1966. German translation in Ordo 18 (1967); also reprinted
in B-14. Reprinted as Chapter 11 of B-13 in a slightly altered version, deleting
final poem linking spontaneous order to Lao-Tzu's Taoism of wu-wei.
See Chiaki Nishiyama (1967) for a discussion of and reflection on Hayek's paper.]
A-116 "Dr. Bernard Mandeville." Proceedings of the British
Academy 52 (1966), London 1967.
["Lecture on a Master Mind" delivered to the British Academy on March 23, 1966.
Reprinted as Chapter 15 of B-17. German translation in B-14.]
A-117 "L'Etalon d'Or - Son Evolution." Revue d'Economie
Politique 76 (1966).
["The Gold Standard - Its Evolution."]
A-118 "Résultats de l'action des hommes mais non de
leurs desseins." In: Les Fondements Philosophiques des Systèmes Economiques.
Textes de Jacques Rueff et essais rédiges en son honneur. (Paris 1967).
[Translated in English in B-13 as "The Results of Human Action but not of Human
Design." German translation in B-14.]
A-119 Remarks on "Ernst Mach und das sozialwissenschaftliche
Denken in Wien." In Ernst Mach Institut (ed.), Symposium aus Anlass des
50. Todestages von Ernst Mach. (Freiburg i. B., 1967.)
[See (B-10) for the influence of Mach (1838-1916) on Hayek. A-119 is part of
a symposium commemorating the 50th anniversary of Mach's death: "Ernst Mach
and Social Science Thought in Vienna."]
A-120 "Rechtsordnung und Handelnsordnung." In Eric Streissler
(ed.), Zur Einheit der Rechts-und Staatswissenschaften,Vol. 27. Karlsruhe,
1967.
["Legal Order and Commercial Order." Reprinted in B-14.]
A-121 "The Constitution of A Liberal State." Il Politico
32, no. 1 (Sept. 1967): 455-461.
[German translation in Ordo 19 (1968) and in B-14.]
A-122a "Bruno Leoni, the Scholar." Il Politico 33,
no. 1 (March 1968): 21-25.
Also translated in the same journal as "Bruno Leoni lo studioso." (pp. 26-30).
In commemoration of Leoni's death (November 21, 1967).
A-122b "Ordinamento giuridico e ordine sociale." Il Politico
33, no. 4 (December 1968): 693-724.
["Juridical Regulation and Social Order."]
A-123a "A Self-Generating Order for Society." In John Nef
(ed.), Towards World Community. The Hague, 1968.
A-123b Speech on the 70th Birthday of Leonard Reed. In: What's
Past is Prologue. New York: Foundation for Economic Education, 1968.
A-124 "Economic Thought VI: The Austrian School." In International
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York:
The Macmillan Co. & Free Press, 1968, 1972; Volume 4, pp. 458-462.
A-125a "Menger, Carl." In International Encyclopaedia
of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: The Macmillan
Company & Free Press, 1968, 1972; Volume 10, pp. 124-127.
A-125b 'Wieser, Friedrich von." In International Encyclopaedia
of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: The Macmillan
Co. & The Free Press, 1968, 1972; Volumes 15, 16, 17, pp. 549-550.
A-126 "Szientismus." In W. Bernsdorf (ed.), Wörterbuch
der Soziologie, Edited by W. Bernsdorf. 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1969).
["Scientism."]
A-127 "Three Elucidations of the 'Ricardo Effect'." Journal
of Political Economy 77 (March-April 1969): 274-285.
[Reprinted in B-13 and (in German) in B-14.]
A-128a "The Primacy of the Abstract." In Arthur Koestler and
J. R. Smythies (eds.), Beyond Reductionism - The Alpbach Symposium.
London, 1969.
[Reprinted in B-17.]
A-128b "Marktwirtschaft oder Syndikalismus?" In: Protokoll
des Wirtschaftstages der CDU/DSU (Bonn 1969).
["Market Economy or Syndicalism?"]
A-129a "Il sistema concorrenziale come strumento di conoscenza."
L'industria 1 (Turin, January-March 1970): 34-50.
[Translated with an English summary as "The Competitive System as a Tool of
Knowledge."]
A-129b "Principles or Expediency?" In Toward
Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises on the Occasion of his 90th Birthday,
September 29, 1971. Sponsoring Committee F. A. von Hayek et.al; F. A. Harper,
Secretary. Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane Studies, 1971, vol I,
pp. 29-45.
A-129c "Nature vs. Nurture Once Again." A comment on C. D.
Darlington, The Evolution of Man and Society, London, 1962 in Encounter
(February 1971). [Reprinted as Chapter 19 in B-17.]
A-130 "The Outlook for the 1970's: Open or Repressed Inflation."
In Sudha R. Shenoy (ed.) A Tiger by the Tail: The Keynesian Legacy of Inflation.
A 40-Years' Running Commentary on Keynesianism. London: Institute of Economic
Affairs (Hobart Paperback 4), 1972.
[This actually appeared in a pamphlet format (P-11b) to which Hayek adds a new
article, "The Campaign Against Keynesian Inflation." This article is also reprinted
as Chapter 13 of B-17.]
A-131a "Die Stellung von Mengers 'Grundsätzen' in der
Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre." Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie
32, no. 1 (Vienna, 1972.)
English version: "The Place of Menger's Grundsätze in the History
of Economic Thought." In J. R. Hicks and W. Weber (eds.), Carl Menger and
the Austrian School of Economics. Oxford, 1973, pp. 1-14. Reprinted as
Chapter 17 in B-17. Compare with E-7.
[The 1934 earlier and distinct biographical study entitled "Carl Menger" found
in E-7 was "written as an Introduction to the Reprint of Menger's Grundsätze
der Volkwirtschaftslehre which constitutes the first of a series of four
reprints embodying Menger's chief published contributions to Economic Science
and which were published by the London School of Economics as Numbers 17 to
20 of its Series of Reprints of Scarce Works in Economics and Political Science."
An English translation of this earlier "Carl Menger" Introduction can be found
in Carl Menger, Principles of Economics. A translation of Menger's
Grundsätze by James Digwall and Bert F. Hoselitz, with an Introduction
("Carl Menger") by F. A. Hayek. New York and London: New York University Press,
1981, pp. 11-36.
A-131b "In Memoriam Ludwig von Mises 1881-1973." Zeitschrift
fôr Nationalökonomie 33 (Vienna 1973).
A-131c "Tribute to von Mises, Vienna Years." National
Review (Autumn 1973).
A-131d "Talk at the Mont Pélèrin." Newsletter
of the Mont Pélèrin Society 3 (Luxembourg 1973).
A-132a "Inflation: The Path to Unemployment." Addendum 2 to
Lord Robbins et. al. Inflation: Causes, Consequences, Cures: Discourses
on the Debate between the Monetary and the Trade Union Interpretations.
London: The Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA Readings, No. 14), 1974, pp.
115-120.
[Reprinted from The Daily Telegraph of London (October 15 and 16, 1974).]
A-132b "Inflation and Unemployment." New York Times
(Nov. 15, 1974).
[Reprinted from The Daily Telegraph of London.]
A-132c Hayek, F.A. "Introduction" to Catallaxy: The Science
of Exchange. Paper read at the first meeting of The Carl Menger Society,
London, December 1974.
[Hayek did not continue his intention to complete this book. The "Introduction"
along with comment and discussion by Hayek, Lionel Robbins, and others is available
in transcription at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
A-132d "The Pretence of Knowledge." An Alfred Nobel Memorial
Lecture, delivered December 11, 1974 at the Stockholm School of Economics. In
Les Prix Nobel en 1974. Stockholm: Nobel Foundation, 1975.
[Reprinted in Full Employment at Any Price [P-13]. (Occasional Paper
45), Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1975. Also reprinted in Unemployment
and Monetary Policy: Government as Generator of the Business Cycle with
a foreword by Gerald O'Driscoll Jr. San Francisco: Cato Institute, 1979, pp.
23-36. This has also been reprinted as Chapter 2 of B-17.]
A-132e "Freedom and Equality in Contemporary Society." PHP
4 (The PHP Institute, Tokyo), (Tokyo 1975).
A-132f "Economics, Politics & Freedom: An Interview with
F. A. Hayek." Interview conducted by Tibor Machan in Salzburg, Austria. Reason
6 (February 1975): 4-12.
A-133a "Die Erhaltung des liberalen Gedankengutes." In Friedrich
A. Lutz (ed.) Der Streit um die Gesellschaftsordnung (Zurich 1975).
["The Preservation of the Liberal Ideal of Thought."]
A-133b T.V. interview on "NBC Meet the Press." Sunday, June
22, 1975. Meet the Press 19, no. 25 (June 22, 1975) Washington, D.C.:
Merkle Press, Inc. 1975, 9 pp.
A-133c "The Courage of His Convictions." In Tribute to
Mises 1881-1973. The Session of the Mont Pélèrin Society
at Brussels 1974 devoted to the Memory of Ludwig von Mises. Chislehurst, 1975.
A-133d "The Formation of the Open Society." Address given
by Professor Friedrich A. von Hayek at the University of Dallas Commencement
Exercises, May 18, 1975.
[Unpublished typescript, available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
A-134a "Types of Mind." Encounter 45 (September 1975).
[This was revised and retitled "Two Types of Mind" in Chapter 4 of B-17.]
A-134b "Politicians Can't Be Trusted with Money." [(Newspaper
editor's title. Paper delivered in September at the Gold and Monetary Conference
in Lausanne, Switzerland.) The Daily Telegraph of London, Part I (September
30, 1975); Part II "Financial Power to the People" (newspaper editor's title
October 1, 1975).]
A-135a "A Discussion with Friedrich Hayek." American Enterprise
Institute. Domestic Affairs Studies 39 (Washington, D.C. 1975).
A-135b "World Inflationary Recession." Paper presented to
the International Conference on World Economic Stabilization, April 17-18, 1975,
co-sponsored by the First National Bank of Chicago and the University of Chicago.
First Chicago Report 5/1975.
A-136a "The New Confusion about Planning." The Morgan
Guaranty Survey (January 1976): 4-13.
[German translation in Die Industrie 10 (1976).]
A-136b "Institutions May Fail, but Democracy Survives." U.S.
News and World Report (March 8, 1976.)
A-136c "Adam Smith's Message in Today's Language." Daily
Telegraph, London (March 9, 1976.)
[Reprinted as Chapter 16 of B-17.]
[The gap in identification number (A-137 through A-141) will be supplied in
subsequent revisions of this Hayek bibliography.]
A-142 "Il Problema della Moneta Oggi." Academia Nationale
dei Lincei. Atti de Convegni Rome (1976).
["The Problem of Money Today."]
A-143 "Remembering My Cousin Ludwig Wittgenstein."
Encounter (August 1977).
A-144a "Die Illusion der sozialen Gerechtigkeit." In Schicksal?
Grenzen der Machbarkeit. Eine Symposion. Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1977.
["The Illusion of Social Justice." Cf. B-16, Vol. II of Law, Legislation
and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice esp. Chapt. 9, also note Chapter
5 of B-17: "The Atavism of Social Justice."]
A-144b "Toward Free Market Money." Wall Street Journal
(August 19, 1977).
A-144c "Persona Grata: Interview with Friedrich Hayek." Interviewed
by Albert Zlabinger, World Research INK 1, no. 12 (September, 1977):
7-9. Also available as a 30 minute 16mm color movie, entitled "Inside the Hayek
Equation," from World Research, Inc.; Campus Studies Division; 11722 Sorrento
Valley Rd., San Diego, CA 92121.
A-144d "An Interview with Friedrich Hayek." by Richard Ebeling.
Libertarian Review (September 1977): 10-16.
A-144e "Is There a Case for Private Property." Firing
Line. Columbia, S.C.: Southern Educational Communications Association,
1977.
A-145 "Coping with Ignorance." Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture.
Imprimis (Hillsdale College) 7 (July 1978) 6 pp.
[Reprinted in Cheryl A. Yurchis (ed.) Champions of Freedom. Hillsdale,
Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, (The Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series Vol.
5) 1979.]
A-146a "The Miscarriage of the Democratic Ideal." Encounter
(March 1978).
[A slightly revised version later appeared as Chapter 16 of B-18.]
A-146b "Will the Democratic Ideal Prevail?" In Arthur Seldon,
ed. The Coming Confrontation: Will the Open Society Survive to 1989? London:
The Institute for Economic Affairs (Hobart Paperback No. 12), 1978, pp. 61-73.
[Revised version of an article which appeared in Encounter (March 1978).]
A-147 "Die Entthronung der Politik." In Überforderte
Demokratie? hrsg. von D. Frei, Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien des schweizerischen
Instituts fôr Auslandsforschung, N.F. 7, Zurich 1978.
["The Dethronement of Politics" in Has Democracy Overextended Itself?
See also Chapter 18 of B-18: "The Containment of Power and the Dethronement
of Politics."]
A-148a "Can we still avoid inflation?" In Richard M. Ebeling
(ed.) The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle and Other Essays. New
York: Center for Libertarian Studies (Occasional Paper Series 8) 1978.
A-148b "Exploitation of Workers by Workers." The last of three
talks given by Professor F. A. Hayek under the title, "The Market Economy" (Radio
3, BBC). The Listener (August 17, 1978): 202-203.
A-149 "Notas sobre la Evolución de Sistemas de Reglas
de Conducta." Teorema 9, no. 1 (1979): 57-77.
["Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct." Spanish version of
Chapt. 4 of B-13.]
A-150 "Towards a Free Market Monetary System." The Journal
of Libertarian Studies 3, no. 1 (1979): 1-8.
[A lecture delivered at the Gold and Monetary Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana
(November 10, 1977).]
A-151a "Freie Wahl de Währungen." In Geldpolitik,
ed. by J. Badura and O. Issing. Stuttgart and New York, 1980, pp. 136-146.
["Free Choice of Currency Standards."]
A-151b "An Interview with F. A. Hayek." Conducted by Richard
E. Johns. The American Economic Council Report (May 1980.)
[Reprinted in IRI Insights (publication of Investment Rarities, Inc.)
1 (November-December, 1980): 6-12, 14-15, 32.]
A-151c "Midju-Modid." Frelsid (Journal of the Freedom
Association of Iceland) 1 (1980): 6-15.
["The Muddle of the Middle."]
A-151d "Dankadresse." In Erich Hoppmann, ed. Friedrich
A. von Hayek. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980, pp. 37-42.
[See Hoppmann (1980) in the Bibliography of Works Relating to Hayek.]
A-151e Review of Thomas Sowell's Knowledge and Decisions.
(New York: Basic Books, 1980). In Reason 13 (December 1981): 47-49.
A-151f "L'Hygiène de la démocratie." French
translation of the English text of a speech delivered April 12, 1980 at the
1'Assemblée Nationale in Paris by Friedrich A. Hayek.
["The Health of Democracy." In Liberté économique et progrès
social (périodique d'information et de liaison des libéraux)
No. 40 (December-January 1981): 20-23.]
A-151g "The Ethics of Liberty and Property." Chapter 4 of
a forthcoming book, The Fatal Conceit. Published in the proceedings
of the Mont Pélèrin Society 1982 General Meeting, 5-10 September,
Berlin. Institut fôr Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität zu Kö1n,
1982.
Works about or relevant to Friedrich A. Hayek
Aaron, Raymond. "La Definition Libérale de Liberté." Archiv
europäischer Sociologen II (1961).
["The Liberal Definition of Liberty."]
Agonito, Rosemary. "Hayek Revisited: Mind as a Process of Classification."
In: Behaviorism: A Forum for Critical Discussions 3, no. 2 (Spring
1975): 162-171.
Allen, Henry. "Hayek, the Answer Man." The Washington Post (December
2, 1982), pp. Cl, C17.
Arnold, G. L. "The Faith of a Whig." Twentieth Century London (August
1960).
Arnold, Roger A. "The Efficiency Properties of Institutional Evolution: With
Particular Reference to the Social-Philosophical Works of F. A. Hayek." Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1979.
[Dissertation supervised by James M. Buchanan.]
--------------. "Hayek and Institutional Evolution." The Journal of Libertarian
Studies 4, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 341-352.
Barry, Norman P. "Austrian Economists on Money and Society." National Westminster
Bank Quarterly Review (May 1981): 20-31.
--------------. An Introduction to Modern Political Theory. London:
Macmillan, 1981.
--------------. Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy. London: Macmillan,
1979.
--------------. "The Tradition
of Spontaneous Order." Literature of Liberty 5 (Summer 1982): 7-58.
[A major section of this article deals with Hayek.]
Baumgarth, William P. "The Political Philosophy of F. A. von Hayek." Harvard
University Ph.D. Dissertation in Government, Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
--------------. "Hayek and Political Order: The Rule of Law." The Journal
of Libertarian Studies 2, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 11-28.
Bay, Christian. "Hayek's Liberalism: The Constitution of Perpetual Privilege."
Political Science Review 1 (Fall 1971): 93-124.
Bettelheim, Charles. "Freiheit und Planwirtschaft." In: Die Umschau. Internationale
Revue, Mainz, 1 (1946): 83-192.
["Freedom and the Planned Economy."]
Bianca, G. Verso la Schiavit¶. Replica a von Hayek. Naples, 1979.
["(The Road) to Serfdom. Reply to von Hayek."]
Birner, Jack. "Hayek's Research Program in Economics." Ph.D. dissertation for
Erasmus University in Rotterdam, no date (1982?).
[In Dutch with a 36-page summary in English. The English summary is available
at the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, CA 94025.]
Black, R.D., Collison Coats, A.W., and Goodwin, Craufurd D.W. (eds.) The
Marginal Revolution in Economics: Interpretation and Evaluation. Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973.
Bohm, Stephan B. "Liberalism and Economics in the Hapsburg Monarchy," 12 pp.
Unpublished typescript. Paper presented to "The History of Economics Society
Conference," Kress Library, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration,
June 16-19, 1980.
[Paper available at the Institute for Humane Studies]
Boland, L.A. "Time in Economics vs. Economics in Time. The 'Hayek Problem.'"
In The Canadian Journal of Economics (Canadian Economic Association)
Toronto, 2, no. 2 (1978): 240-262.
Bostaph, Samuel. "The Methodological Debate between Carl Menger and the German
Historical School." Atlantic Economic Journal 6 (September 1978): 3-16.
Bradley, Jr., Robert. "Market Socialism: A Subjectivist Evaluation." The
Journal of Libertarian Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 23-40.
Brell, K.H. "Zur Problematik der progressive Einkommensbesteuerung. Eine Antikritik
zu F.A. von Hayeks 'Ungerechtigkeit der Steuerprogression' und C. Fohls 'Kritik
der progressive Einkommensbesteurung'." Dissertation Karlsruhe (Berenz) 1957.
["On the Problematic of the Progressive Income Tax. A Counter-Critique to F.A.
von Hayek's 'The Injustice of the Progressive Income Tax' and C. Fohl's 'Critique
of the Progressive Income Tax.'"]
Brittan, Samuel. "Hayek and the New Right." Encounter 54 (January
1980): 30-46.
Broadbeck, M. "On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences." Philosophy of
Science 21, no. 2 (April 1959).
Brown, Pamela. "Constitution or Competition? Alternative Views on Monetary
Reform." Literature of Liberty 5 (Autumn 1982): 7-52.
[A major section of this article surveys Hayek's proposals for the 'denationalization'
of money. See Hayek, P-14, P-16a, and P-16b.]
Brozen, Yale M. "The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation."
Journal of Law & Economics 13 (October 1970) 279-292.
Buchanan, James M. "Cultural Evolution and Institutional Reform." Unpublished
manuscript.
----------------. Cost and Choice. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,
1969.
----------------. Freedom in Constitutional Contract. College Station,
Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1979.
Buchanan, James M. and Thirlby G.F. (eds.) L.S.E. Essays on Cost.
London: Weidenfield Nicolsen, 1973.
[Classic essays on cost from the London School of Economics, including Hayek.]
Buckley, Jr., William F. "The Road to Serfdom: The Intellectuals and Socialism."
In Fritz Machlup, ed. Essays on Hayek. New York: New York University
Press, 1976, pp. 95-106.
Business Week. "The Austrian School's Advice: 'Hands Off!'" Business Week
(August 3, 1974).
Campbell, William F. "Theory and History: The Methodology of Ludwig von Mises."
University of Minnesota M.A. thesis. Minneapolis, 1962.
Chambers, Raymond J. Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
[Also see Thomas Cullom Taylor, Jr. (1970).]
Congdon, Tim. "Is the Provision of a Sound Currency a Necessary Function of
the State?" National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review. (London, August
1981): 2-21.
[Deals with the assorted problems of Hayek's (P-16b). See Norman P. Barry (May,
1981).]
Corbin, Peter D. (Principal Investigator, Research Coordinator, American Geographic
Society.) "Geoinflationary Variations in the U.S. Economy."
[Examination of the Austrian theory of inflation which emphasizes the spatiotemporal
aspects of the inflationary process. Available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
Crespigny, Anthony de. "F.A. Hayek, Freedom for Progress." In Anthony de Crespigny
and Kenneth Minogue (eds.) Contemporary Political Philosophers. New
York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1975; London: Methuen, 1976, pp. 49-66.
Cunningham, Robert L. (ed.) Liberty and the Rule of Law. College Station,
Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1979.
[A collection of 13 papers delivered at a conference in honor of F.A. Hayek,
Jan. 14-18, 1976 in San Francisco. Co-sponsored by Liberty Fund, Inc. and the
University of San Francisco.]
Davenport, John. "An Unrepentant Old Whig." Fortune (March 1960):134-135,
192, 194, 197-198.
[Outline of Hayek's Social Philosophy on the occasion of the publication of
B-12.]
Davis, Kenneth. Discretionary Justice. A Preliminary Inquiry. Baton
Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1969.
Delettres, J.M. Les récentes théories der crises fondées
sur les disparités des prix. Paris: Pendone, 1941, pp. 195-276.
["Recent Theories of Economic Crises Based on Disparities in Prices."]
Diamond, Arthur M. "F.A. Hayek on Constructivism and Ethics." The Journal
of Libertarian Studies 4, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 353-366.
Dietze, Gottfried. "Hayek on The Rule of Law." In Fritz Machlup, ed. Essays
on Hayek. New York: New York University Press, 1976, pp. 107-146.
-----------------. "From the Constitution of Liberty to its Deconstruction
by Liberalist Dissipation, Disintegration, Disassociation, Disorder." In Fritz
Meyer, ed., Zur Verfassung der Freiheit. Festgabe fôr Friedrich von Hayek.
Stuttgart, New York: Gustav Fischer Verlag (Ordo, vol. 30), 1979, pp.
177-197.
Dolan, Edwin G., editor. The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics.
Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, Inc. 1976.
[Exposition by several authors of the history, principles and applications of
the Austrian School of Economics. Among the topics of interest are Israel M.
Kirzner's "On the Method of Austrian Economics" and "The Theory of Capital;"
Murray N. Rothbard's "The Austrian Theory of Money," and Gerald P. O'Driscoll,
Jr.'s and Sudha R. Shenoy's "Inflation, Recession, and Stagflation."]
Dorn, J.A. "Law and Liberty: A Comparison of Hayek and Bastiat." Unpublished
paper (October 1980), 50 pp.
[Available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
Dreyhaupt, K.F. and Siepmann U. "Privater Wettbewerb im Geldwesen. Uberlegungen
zu einem Vorschlag von F.A. von Hayek." Ordo 29 (1978).
["Private Competition in Monetary Affairs. Reflections on a Proposal by F.A.
von Hayek."]
Dyer, P.W. and Hickman, R.H. "American Conservatism and F.A. Hayek." Modern
Age 23, no. 4 (Fall 1979).
Eagley, Robert V. The Structure of Classical Economic Theory. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Eastman, Max. Review of Hayek's Capitalism and the Historians. The Freeman
4 (February 22, 1954): 385-387.
Eaton, Howard O. The Austrian Philosophy of Value. Norman, Okla.:
The University of Oklahoma Press, 1930.
Ebeling, Richard. "An Interview with Friedrich Hayek." Libertarian Review
(September 1977): 10-16.
---------------. "Reflections on John Hick's 'The Hayek Story.'" Unpublished
manuscript, no date; 23 pp.: Available from the Institute for Humane Studies,
Menlo Park, California 94025.
---------------. "Hayek on Inflation." Unpublished Paper presented to The Carl
Menger Society Conference entitled "Hayek - An Introductory Course," London,
Dec. 6, 1980.
Ellis, Howard S. German Monetary Theory, 1905-1933. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1934.
Fabrini, L. "La teoria del capitale e dell interesse di F.A. Hayek." Revista
internazionale de scienze sociali. Milano, Anno 58, Series 4, Volume 22
(1950): 250-286.
["The Theory of Capital and Interest of F.A. Hayek."]
Falconer, Robert T. "Capital Intensity and the Real Wage: A Critical Evaluation
of Hayek's Ricardo Effect." Texas A & M Ph.D. Dissertation. College Station,
Texas, 1971.
Finer, H. Road to Reaction. London: Dobson, 1946.
[Reprinted Boston, 1945. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973.]
Fingleton, Eamonn. "The Guru Who Came In From the Cold." NOW! (January
30, 1981) 39-41.
Flanagan, T.E. "F.A. Hayek on Property and Justice." Unpublished manuscript
presented at the Theory of Property Summer Workshop at the University of Calgary,
July 7-14, 1978.
Frankel, S. H. "Hayek on Money." Unpublished paper presented to The Carl Menger
Society Conference on Hayek at University College, London, October 28, 1978.
[This conference was structured around Hayek's newly published New Studies
in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. In addition
to Frankel, it featured Thomas Torrance, Hillel Steiner and Jeremy Shearmur.]
Fridriksson, Fridrik. "Hayek á Íslandi 1940-1980." Frelsid
3 (1981): 312-336.
["Hayek and Iceland, 1940-1980."]
----------------. Friedrich A. Hayek. Forthcoming book developed from
Fridriksson's Virginia Polytechnic Institute M.A. thesis in economics.
Garrigues, A. "El individualismo verdadero y falso, segun Hayek." Moneda
y credito, Revista de economie 34 (Madrid, 1950): 3-14.
["Individualism: True and False, according to Hayek."]
Garrison, Roger W. "The Austrian-Neoclassical Relation: A Study in Monetary
Dynamics." University of Virginia, Department of Economics, Ph.D. Dissertation,
1981.
Geddes, John M. "New Vogue for Critic of Keynes." The New York Times
(May 7, 1979).
Gerding, R. and Starbatty, J. "Zur 'Entnationalisierung des Geldes.' Eine Zwischenbilanz."
Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze 78) (J.C.B.
Mohr/Paul Siebeck), 1980.
["On the 'Denationalisation of Money.' An Interim Statement."]
Gilbert, J.C. "Professor Hayek's Contribution to Trade Cycle Theory." Economic
Essays in Commemoration of the Dundee School of Economics, 1931-1955. pp.
51-62.
Glasner, David. "Friedrich Hayek: An Appreciation." Intercollegiate Review
7 (Summer 1971): 251-255.
Good, D.F. "The Great Depression and Austrian Growth after 1873." The Economic
History Review 31 (1978).
Gordon, Scott. "The Political Economy of F.A. Hayek." Canadian Journal
of Economics 14 (1981): 470-487.
Graf, Hans-Georg. "Muster-Voraussagen" und "Erklärungen des Prinzips"
bei F.A. von Hayek. Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und
Aufsätze 65) (J.C.B. Mohr/P. Siebeck), 1978.
["'Pattern-Prediction' and 'Clarification of Principle' in F.A. von Hayek."]
-----------------. "Nicht-nomologische Theorie bei Komplexen Sachverhalten."
Ordo, Jahrbuch fôr die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 26 (1975):
298-308.
["Non-nomological Theory in Complex Phenomena."]
Graham, F.D. "Keynes vs. Hayek on a Commodity Reserve Currency." The Economic
Journal 54 (1944): 422-429.
Grant, James. "Hayek: The Road to Stockholm." The Alternative: An American
Spectator 8, no. 8 (May 1975): 10-12.
Gray, John N. "F.A. Hayek on Liberty and Tradition." The Journal of Libertarian
Studies 4 (Spring 1980): 119-137.
-----------------. "Hayek on Spontaneous Order." Unpublished paper presented
to The Carl Menger Society Conference on Hayek, London, Oct. 30, 1982.
Grinder, Walter E. Review of two books: Macro-economic Thinking & The
Market Economy by Ludwig M. Lachmann; and A Tiger by the Tail: The
Keynesian Legacy of Inflation. In Libertarian Review (November
1974): 4-5.
-----------------. Review of 4 books: F.A. Hayek's The Counter-Revolution
of Science; Individualism and Economic Order; Studies in Philosophy, Politics
and Economics; and Ludwig M. Lachmann's The Legacy of Max Weber.
In Libertarian Review 4, no. 4 (April 1975): 4-5.
-----------------. "In Pursuit of the Subjective Paradigm" and "Austrian Economics
in the Present Crisis of Economic Thought." In Capital, Expectations and
the Market Process by Ludwig M. Lachmann. Edited by Walter E. Grinder.
Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, Inc., 1977.
-----------------. "The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle: Reflections
on Some Socio-Economic Effects." Unpublished paper presented at The Symposium
on Austrian Economics, University of Hartford, June 22-28, 1975.
[Available at the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, CA 94025.]
Gross, N.T. The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1750-1914.
Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, Part 1. London, 1973.
Haberler, Gottfried. "Mises' Private Seminar: Reminiscences." The Mont
Pélèrin Quarterly 3 (October 1961): 20-21.
[See also an expanded version in Wirtschafts Politische Blätter
(Journal of Political Economy, Vienna) 28, 4 (1981). A Festschrift
issue on the Centenary of Ludwig von Mises' birth (1881-1981).]
Hagel III, John. "From Laissez Faire to Zwangswirtschaft: The Dynamics
of Interventionism." Unpublished paper presented to The Symposium on Austrian
Economics. University of Hartford, June 22-28, 1975, 37 pp.
[Available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
Hamowy, Ronald. "Hayek's Conception of Freedom: A Critique." New Individualist
Review 1, no. 1 (April 1961): 28-31.
-----------------. "Freedom and The Rule of Law in F.A. Hayek." Il Politico
36, no. 2 (June 1971): 349-377.
-----------------. "Law and the Liberal Society: F.A. Hayek's Constitution
of Liberty." Journal of Libertarian Studies 2, no. 4 (1978): 287-297.
Hampshire, Stuart. Thought and Action. London: Chatto and Windar,
1970.
-----------------. "On Having a Reason." In G.A. Vesey, ed., Human Values.
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol II 1976-1979: Harvester Press, 1976.
Chapter 5.
Haney, Lewis H. History of Economic Thought. New York: Macmillan,
1949, 4th edition.
[See especially pp. 607-634 ("Fully Developed Subjectivism: The Austrian School.")
and pp. 811-831 ("Economic Thought in Germany and Austria, from 1870 to World
War II."]
Harris, R. "On Hayek." Swinton Journal (1970).
Harrod, R. Money. London: St. Martin's Press, 1969.
-----------------. "Professor Hayek on Individualism." In R. Harrod, ed. Economic
Essays, 2nd edition. London and New York: 1972, pp. 293-301.
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
Hartwell, Ronald Max. "Capitalism and the Historians." In Fritz Machlup, ed.
Essays on Hayek. New York: New York University Press, 1976, pp. 73-94.
Hawtrey, Ralph G. Capital and Employment. London, 1937, especially
chapter 8: "Professor Hayek's Prices and Production."
-----------------. "The Trade Cycle and Capital Intensity." Economica
n.s. 7 (February 1940):1-15.
[Hawtrey was an economist connected with the British Treasury from 1919 to 1937.
He "developed a purely monetary theory of the business cycle on a macro-economic
concept of equilibrium." See citation under Sennholz.]
-----------------. "Professor Hayek's Pure Theory of Capital." Economic
Journal (Royal Economic Society) 51 (London 1941): 281-290.
-----------------. "Prof. Hayek's 'Prices and Production'." In Capital
and Employment, 2nd edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1952, pp.
233-267.
Heimann, E. "Professor Hayek on German Socialism." The American Economic
Review. 35 (1945): 935-937.
[Compare with B. Hoselitz.]
Hicks, J.R. "Maintaining Capital Intact: A Further Suggestion." Economica
9 (1942): 174-179.
-----------------. "The Hayek Story." In Critical Essays in Monetary Theory.
Oxford University Press: 1967.
[See Richard M. Ebeling citation.]
Hicks, J.R. and Weber, W. Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Hoppmann, Erich (ed.) Friedrich A. von Hayek. Vorträge und Ansprächen
auf der Festveranstaltung der Frieburger Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät
zum 80. Geburtstag von Friedrich A. von Hayek. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1980.
[Festschrift with bibliography on F.A. Hayek's 80th birthday presented by the
Faculty of Economics of the University of Freiburg. Contributors include: Erich
Hoppmann, Berhard Stoeckle, Karl Brandt, Christian Watrin, Hans Otto Lenel,
and Klaus Peter Krause. Hayek's "Dankadresse," pp. 37-42, surveys highlights
in Hayek's intellectual career and writings from the vantage point of his 80th
year. The Hoppmann-edited Festschrift honoring Hayek also lists the contributors
to the earlier 1979 Ordo Festschrift for Hayek, edited by Fritz Meyer,
et.al (p. 53), and contains valuable updatings on bibliography by and about
Hayek (pp. 55-60).]
Hoselitz, B.F. "Professor Hayek on German Socialism." The American Economic
Review 35 (1945): 926-934.
[Compare with E. Heimann.]
Housinden, Daniel M. Capital, Profits, and Prices: An Essay in The Philosophy
of Economics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
Howey, Richard S. The Rise of the Marginal Utility School: 1870-1889.
Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1960.
Hoy, Calvin M. "Hayek's Philosophy of Liberty." Columbia University Ph.D. Dissertation.
New York, 1982.
Hummel, Jeffrey Roger. "Problems with Austrian Business Cycle Theory." Reason
Papers No. 5 (Winter, 1979): 41-53.
Hunt, Lester. "Toward a Natural History of Morality." Unpublished essay.
Hutchinson, T.W. The Politics and Philosophy of Economics: Marxians, Keynesians
and Austrians. New York and London: New York University Press, 1981.
Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen. Wittgenstein's Vienna. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1973.
[Important along with Carl Schorske's volume on Fin-de-siècle Vienna
for the cultural-historical context in which Hayek and his cousin Wittgenstein
lived. See A-143.]
Johnson, Frank. "The Facts of Hayek." Sunday Telegraph Magazine (London,
no date, [1975?]) 30-34.
[Profile and biographical sketch along with photographs of F.A. Hayek.]
Johnston, William. The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History,
1848-1938. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press,
1972.
Johr, W.A. "Note on Professor Hayek's 'True Theory of Unemployment.'" Kyklos
30, no. 4 (1970): 713-723.
Jones, Harry W. "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State." Columbia Law Review
58, no. 2 (February 1958).
Kaldor, N. "Prof. Hayek and the Concertina Effect." In Economica N.S.
9 (1942): 148-176; reprinted in: Kaldor, Essays on Economic Stability and
Growth. London: Duckworth, 1960.
Kasp, M.E. Die geldliche Wechsellagenlehre. Darstellung und Kritik de geldlichen
Wechsellagentheorien von Hawtrey, Wicksell und Hayek. Jena: Fischer, 1939.
["Monetary (Exchange) Models. Representation and Critique of the Monetary (Exchange)
Theories of Hawtrey, Wicksell, and Hayek."]
Kauder, Emil. "Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School."
Zeitschrift fôr Nationalökonomie 17 (1957): 411-425.
----------------. A History of Marginal Utility Theory. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Keizai, S. "Theories and Thoughts of Prof. Hayek." The World Economy.
Tokyo, 1964.
Keynes, J.M. "A Reply to Dr. Hayek." Economica 12 (November 1931):
387-397.
[Cf. Hayek: A-10, A-11a, A-11b.]
Kirzner, Israel M. The Economic Point of View: An Essay in The History
of Economic Thought. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960.
----------------. "Divergent Approaches in Libertarian Economic Thought." The
Intercollegiate Review 3 (January-February 1967): 101-108.
----------------. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
----------------. "Hayek, Knowledge and Market Processes." Paper delivered
at The Allied Social Science Association meetings in Dallas, Texas. New York:
Xerox, 1975.
----------------. Perception, Opportunity and Profit. Studies in the Theory
of Entrepreneurship. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Chapter 2.
----------------. "Entrepreneurship, Choice, and Freedom." In Verfassung
der Freiheit: Festgabe fôr Friedrich A. von Hayek zur Vollendung seines achtzigsten
Lebensjahres. Edited by Fritz W. Meyer, et.al. Stuttgart, New
York: Gustav Fischer Verlag (Ordo 30) 1979, pp. 245-256.
Knight, F.H. "Professor Hayek and the Theory of Investment." The Economic
Journal 45 (1935): 77-94.
Kristol, Irving. "Capitalism, Socialism and Nihilism." In Two Cheers for
Capitalism. New York, 1978. Chapter 7.
Lachmann, Ludwig M. Macro-economic Thinking and the Market Economy: An
Essay on the Neglect of the Micro-Foundations and Its Consequences. London:
The Institute of Economic Affairs (Hobart Paper 56), 1973, 56 pp. Reprinted,
Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane Studies (Studies in Economics,
No. 6), 1978.
[See also Lachmann's essay "Toward a Critique of Macroeconomics," pp. 152-159,
in Edwin G. Dolan, ed. The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics.]
-----------------. "Methodological Individualism in The Market Economy."
In Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek. Edited
by Erich Streissler et al. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
[This essay is also reprinted in Capital, Expectations ... ]
-----------------. "Reflections on Hayekian Capital Theory." Paper delivered
at The Allied Social Science Association meetings in Dallas, Texas. New York:
Xerox, 1975.
-----------------. Capital, Expectations, and the Market Process: Essays
on The Theory of the Market Economy. Edited with an Introduction by Walter
E. Grinder. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews & McMeel, Inc., 1977.
[See in this volume especially Walter E. Grinder's Introduction "In Pursuit
of the Subjective Paradigm" (pp. 3-24) and his "Austrian Economics in the Present
Crisis of Economic Thought" (pp. 25-41). Noteworthy among Lachmann's articles
in this volume are: "The Significance of the Austrian School of Economics in
The History of Ideas" (pp. 45-64), and "A Reconsideration of the Austrian Theory
of Industrial Fluctuations," (pp. 267-286). The Appendix contains a useful Bibliography
of "The Writings of Ludwig Lachmann" (pp. 338-340).]
-----------------. "From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and
the Kaleidic Society." Journal of Economic Literature 14 (March 1976):
54-62.
-----------------. "Austrian Economics under Fire: The Hayek-Sraffa Duel in
Retrospect," 18 pp. [Available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
-----------------. "Austrian Economics: An Interview with Ludwig Lachmann."
Interviewed by Richard Ebeling. Institute Scholar (Publication of the
Institute for Humane Studies) 2, no. 2 (February 1982): 6-9.
[The Interview contains interesting facts about Hayek, The London School of
Economics, and the Austrian approach to money and inflation.]
-----------------. "Ludwig von Mises and The Extension of Subjectivism." In
Method, Process, and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises.
Edited by Israel M. Kirzner. Lexington, Massachusetts & Toronto: Lexington
Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1982, pp. 31-40.
Lakatos, I. "Popper on Demarcation and Induction." In P.A. Schilpp (ed.) The
Philosophy of Karl Popper. LaSalle, Illinois; 1973, pp. 241-273.
Lavoie, Don. "A Critique of the Standard Account of the Socialist Calculation
Debate." The Journal of Libertarian Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 1981):
4-87.
-----------------. "The Market as a Procedure for the Discovery and Convergence
of Inarticulate Knowledge." Paper presented at The Liberty Fund Conference on
Thomas Sowell's Knowledge and Decisions. Savannah, Georgia; April 1982.
[See Literature of Liberty 5 (Summer 1982): 60, for a summary of Lavoie's
paper.]
-----------------. "Rivalry and Central Planning: A Reexamination of the Debate
over Economic Calculation under Socialism." Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University,
1982.
Leduc, G. "En rélisant von Hayek." Revue d'Economie Politique
86 (1976): 491-494.
["Rereading von Hayek."]
Leoni, Bruno. Freedom and the Law. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand,
1961.
Lepage, Henri. "Hayek ou 1'économie politique de la liberté."
["Hayek or the Political Economy of Liberty"]. Part 6 of Demain le libéralism
["Tomorrow Liberalism"]. Paris: Le Livre de Poche (8358L), Collection Pluriel,
1980, pp. 409-453.
[Lepage, author of the influential Tomorrow, Capitalism, surveys the
scholarly achievements of Hayek, covering the Austrian School of Economics,
Hayek's theory of the business cycle, his rivalry with Keynes, the value of
liberty, the Road to Serfdom, and Hayek's "Grand Synthesis" (Law,
Legislation and Liberty). The article is sprinkled by anecdotes culled
from a long interview with Hayek in February 1979.]
Letwin, Shirley Robin. "The Achievements of Friedrich A. Hayek." In Fritz Machlup,
ed. Essays on Hayek. New York: New York University Press, 1976, pp.
147-162.
Leube, Kurt R. "Friedrich A. von Hayek - Nobelpreis fôr Wirtschaftswissenschaften."
(University of Salzburg Research Papers, 1974).
["Friedrich A. von Hayek - Nobel Prize for Economic Science."]
----------------. "F.A. von Hayek. Zu sienem 75. Geburtstag." Salzburger
Nachrichten 1975.
["F.A. von Hayek. On His 75th Birthday."]
----------------. "Inflationstheorie bei Hayek und Keynes." (Paper prepared
for a Seminar at the University of Salzburg, 1975).
["Inflation Theory in Hayek and Keynes."]
----------------. "Vorwort und Bibliographie zur Wiederauflage F.A. Hayek:
Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie. Salzburg, 1975.
["Foreword and Bibliography to the Second (German) Edition of F.A. Hayek, Geldtheorie,"
(B-1).]
-----------------. "Ausgewählte Bibliographie zur Wiederauflage F.A. Hayek:
Preise und Produktion." Vienna, 1975.
["Selected Bibliography to the Second (German) Edition of F.A. Hayek's Prices
and Production," (B-2).]
-----------------. "Hayek's Perception of the 'Rule of Law'." The Intercollegiate
Review (Winter 1976/1977).
-----------------. "Bibliographischer Anhang." In F.A. Hayek, Geldtheorie
und Konjunkturtheorie. Salzburg: 2. erw.Aufl., 1976, pp. 148-160.
[Kurt Leube was from 1969-1977 Hayek's Research Assistant and associate at the
University of Salzburg. He currently is Managing Co-editor with Albert Zlabinger
of The International Carl Menger Library, Philosophia-Verlag, and is working
on a life of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. He has written and lectured extensively
on Hayek and The Austrian School of Economics. The "Bibliographical Appendix"
in this entry on the German reprinting of Hayek's Geldtheorie (B-1),
is but one of an extensive number of scholarly and bibliographic contributions
by Leube on Hayek. In subsequent editions of the present Bibliography
we will cite the extensive writings by Leube.]
-----------------. "Bibliographisches Nachwort zur Wiederauflage F.A. Hayek:"
Individualismus und wirtschaftliche Ordnung. (Salzburg 1977).
["Bibliographical Afterword to the Second (German) Edition of F.A. Hayek: (B-7)."]
-----------------. "Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser und Hayek." (Unpublished paper
presented in Bonn, 1977.)
-----------------. "Wer sind die 'Austrians'." Wirtschaftspolitische Blatter,
1978.
["Who Are the 'Austrians'."]
-----------------. "Ökonom und Philosoph: Zum 80. Geburtstag des grossen
Österreichers Friedrich A. von Hayek." Die Industrie 19 (1979).
["Economist and Philosopher: On the 80th Birthday of the Austrian Friedrich
A. von Hayek."]
-----------------. "F.A. Hayek - Zum 80. Geburtstag." Zeitschrift fôr das
gesamte Kreditwesen. Frankfurt/M. 1979.
["F.A. Hayek - On His 80th Birthday."]
-----------------. "Hayek und die österr. Schule der Nationalökonomie."
Bayern Kurier, Munich 1979.
["Hayek and the Austrian School of Economics."]
Liggio, Leonard P. "Hayek - An Overview." Unpublished paper presented to The
Carl Menger Society Conference entitled "Hayek - An Introductory Course," London,
December 6, 1980.
[See also contributions at this conference by Pirie, Ebeling, Steele, Graham
Smith, and Shearmur. The edited papers, in the possession of Laurie Rantala,
may be published.]
Lippincott, Benjamin E., ed. On the Economic Theory of Socialism.
New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1970.
Loenen, J.H.M.M. "The Concept of Freedom in Berlin and Others: An
Attempt at Clarification." The Journal of Value Inquiry 10 (Winter
1976): 279-285.
Lutz, Friedrich A. "Professor Hayek's Theory of Interest." Economica
10 (1943): 302-310.
-----------------. "On Neutral Money." In Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour
of Friedrich A. von Hayek. Edited by Erich Streissler et.al. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 105-116.
Lynch, Thomas E. "Toward a Rational Political Philosophy: An Essay on the Origins
of Hayek's Liberal Radicalism." B.A. Honors Thesis for The Degree in Political
Economy. Williamstown, Massachusetts; Williams College, January, 1981, 72 pp.
[Available at the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, CA 94025.1
McClain, Stephen Michael. "The Political Thought of the Austrian School of
Economics." The Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. Dissertation. Baltimore, 1979.
[McClain's premise is that "the Austrian School, through the writings of Ludwig
von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, explicitly and comprehensively fashioned
a political theory for capitalism." Chapters on Hayek cover his political thought,
concept of liberty, limits of knowledge and the spontaneous order, the rule
of law, and constitutionalism.]
Macfie, A.L. Theories of the Trade Cycle. London: Macmillan, 1934.
[Deals with Hayek's Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie (B-1) and Preise
und Produktion (B-2) on pp. 45-87.]
Machlup, Fritz. "Liberalism and the Choice of Freedom." In Roads to Freedom:
Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek. Edited by Erich Streissler
et.al.: London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 117-146.
[Machlup has been a close personal and intellectual friend of Hayek's since
the early 1920s.]
-----------------. "Friedrich von Hayek's Contribution to Economics." The
Swedish Journal of Economics 76 (December 1974): 498-531.
[Reprinted in revised, updated form as "Hayek's Contribution to Economics" in
Machlup's Essays on Hayek (1976).]
-----------------. ed. "Hayek's Contribution to Economics." In Essays on
Hayek with a Foreword by M. Friedman. New York: New York University Press,
1976, pp. 13-59.
[Contains the proceedings of a special regional meeting of the Mont Pélèrin
Society (August 24-28, 1975) held at Hillsdale College (Michigan). Contributors
to this quasi-Festschrift include Fritz Machlup, William F. Buckley, Jr., Gottfried
Dietze, Ronald Max Hartwell, Shirley Robin Letwin, George C. Roche III, and
Arthur Shenfield. This volume contains "Excerpts of The Official Announcement
of the (Swedish) Royal Academy of Sciences" (p. xv, ff) pertaining to Hayek's
Nobel Prize in Economics. Also included is Hayek's brief banquet speech reprinted
from the Nobel Foundation's volume Les Prix Nobel 1974, pp. 38-39.]
-----------------. "Friedrich von Hayek on Scientific and Scientistic Attitudes."
The Swedish Journal of Economics 76 (1974).
[Reprinted in Machlup, Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences.
New York and London, 1978, pp. 513-519.]
-----------------. Wôrdigung der Werke von Friedrich August von Hayek.
Tôbingen: Walter Eucken Institut (Vorträge und Aufsätze, Heft 62),
1977, pp. 63-75.
["Assessment of the Works of Friedrich August von Hayek."]
Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books,
1977, pp. 83-102.
Maling, Charles E. "Austrian Business Cycle Theory and Its Implications." Reason
Papers No. 2 (Fall 1975): 65-90.
Marget, Arthur W. "Review of Friedrich A. Hayek, Prices and Production
and Preise und Produktion." Journal of Political Economy 40 (April
1932): 261-266.
Matis, H. Österreichs Wirtschaft 1848-1913.
["Austria's Economy, 1848-1913."] Berlin, 1972.
-----------------. "Sozioökonomische Aspekte des Liberalismus in Österreich
1848-1918."
["Socio-economic Aspects of Liberalism in Austria, 1848-1918."] In H.-U. Wehler,
ed. Sozialgeschichte Heute. Göttingen, 1974.
May, Arthur. Vienna in the Age of Franz Josef. Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1966.
[See especially Chapter 3, "The Kingdom of Learning," and Chapter 7, "Science
and Scholarship."]
Melis, R. "Rettifiche al neutralismo economico." Il Politico 16 (1951),
275-284.
["Alterations in Economic Neutrality."]
Meyer, Fritz W. et.al, eds. Zur Verfassung der Freiheit: Festgabe
fôr Friedrich A. von Hayek zur Vollendung seines achtzigsten Lebensjahres.
Stuttgart, New York: Gustav Fischer Verlag. (Ordo: Jahrbuch fôr die Ordnung
von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 30), 1979.
["On the Constitution of Liberty: A Gift for Friedrich A. von Hayek on the Completion
of his 80th Year." This Festschrift honoring Hayek contains contributions from
Karl Popper, Chiaki Nishiyama, George J. Stigler, Ludwig M. Lachmann, Charles
K. Rowley, Arthur Seldon, Christian Watrin, Israel Kirzner, James M. Buchanan,
Milton Friedman, and others.]
Milgate, M. "On the Origin of the Notion of 'Intertemporal Equilibrium'." Economica
46 (Fall 1979).
[Cf. Hayek, A-6.]
Miller, David. "Review of Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II: The
Mirage of Social Justice." British Journal of Law and Society 4 (Summer
1977): 142-145.
Miller, Eugene F. "Hayek's Critique of Reason." Modern Age 20, no.
4 (Fall 1976): 383-394.
-----------------. "The Cognitive Basis of Hayek's Political Thought." In Robert
L. Cunningham Liberty and the Rule of Law. College Station and London:
Texas A & M University Press, 1979. pp. 242-267.
Miller, Robert. "Hayek, the Inter-War Years and the Gold Standard." Unpublished
paper presented to The Carl Menger Society, June 10, 1978.
Minard, Lawrence. "Wave of the Past? Or Wave of the Future?" Forbes
(October 1, 1979): 45-50, 52.
[Profile on Hayek with painting of Hayek featured in the cover of this issue
of Forbes. This painting is now at the Heritage Foundation in Washington,
D.C.]
Mises, Ludwig von. Bureaucracy. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1944.
-----------------. Human Action. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966.
-----------------. The Historical Setting of the Austrian School.
New Rochelle, New York, 1969.
-----------------. The Theory of Money and Credit. Irvington-on-Hudson,
New York: Foundation for Economic Education, 1971; Indianapolis: LibertyClassics,
1981.
[Foreword by Murray N. Rothbard, (1981); Preface by Lionel Robbins (1934)]
-----------------. On the Manipulation of Money and Credit. Dobbs
Ferry, New York: Free Market Books, 1978.
Molsberger, G. "Grundsätzliches ôber Freiheit, Ordnung und Wettbewerb."
In Ordo, Jahrbuch 24 (1973): 315-325.
["Basic Principle of Freedom, Order and Competition."]
Morrell, Stephen O. "In Search of a New Monetary Order: An Open Discussion
on Aspects of a Freely Competitive Monetary Arrangement." Institute Scholar
(Publication of the Institute for Humane Studies) 1, no. 1, (1980): 1-2.
Morris, M.W. "The Political Thought of F.A. Hayek." Political Studies
2 (1972): 169-184.
Moss, Lawrence S., ed. The Economics of Ludwig von Mises: Toward a Critical
Reappraisal. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1976.
[This volume resulted from the Symposium on the Economics of Ludwig von Mises,
Atlanta, Georgia, November 5, 1974 to assess the recently deceased Mises' (Sept.
29, 1881-Oct. 10, 1973) contributions to economic and social thought. Among
the interesting essays included in this volume are Fritz Machlup's "The Monetary
Economics of Ludwig von Mises" and Israel M. Kirzner's "Ludwig von Mises and
Economic Calculation under Socialism." Since Hayek's life and writings are intimately
connected with those of von Mises, this volume offers a valuable research tool
in Fritz Machlup's two Appendices on Mises: "Chronology" and "Major
Translated Writings of Ludwig von Mises."]
Murray, A.H. "Professor Hayek's Philosophy." Economica 12 (August
1945): 149-162.
Nawroth, E.E. Die Sozial- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie des Neoliberalismus.
Heidelberg: Kerle and Lowen: Nauwelaerts, 1961.
["The Social and Economic Philosophy of Neoliberalism."]
Nishiyama, Chiaki. "The Theory of Self-Love. An Essay on the Methodology of
the Social Sciences, and Especially of Economics, with Special Reference to
Bernard Mandeville." University of Chicago Ph.D. Dissertation, 1960.
[Nishiyama's dissertation was done under Hayek's supervision. From 1950-1962
Hayek was professor of social and moral science in the Committee of Social Thought
headed by John U. Nef at the University of Chicago. 1960 also saw the publication
of Hayek's B-12.]
-----------------. "Hayek's Theory of Sensory Order and the Methodology of
the Social Sciences." The Journal of Applied Sociology 7 (Tokyo 1964).
-----------------. "Revival of the Philosophy of Economics: A Critique of Hayek's
System of Liberty." The Economics Studies Quarterly 15, no. 2. (Tokyo
1965).
-----------------. "Arguments for the Principles of Liberty and the Philosophy
of Science." Il Politico 32 (June 1967): 336-347.
[Commentary on and response to Hayek, A-115.]
-----------------. "Anti-Rationalism or Critical Rationalism." In Zur Verfassung
der Freiheit: Festgabe fôr Friedrich A. von Hayek zur Vollendung seines achtzigsten
Lebensjahres. Edited by Fritz W. Meyer et al. Stuttgart, New York:
Gustav Fischer Verlag (Ordo 30) 1979, pp. 21-42.
-----------------. Human Capitalism. A Presidential Lecture delivered
at the 1981 Stockholm Regional Meeting of The Mont Pélèrin Society,
August 30, 1981. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1982, 33 pp.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books,
1974.
-----------------. "On Austrian Methodology." Synthese 36 (1977):
353-392.
Oakeshott, Michael. Rationalism in Politics. London: Methuen, 1962.
O'Driscoll, Jr. Gerald P. "Hayek and Keynes: A Retrospective Assessment." Iowa
State University Department of Economics Staff Paper No. 20. Ames, Iowa: Xerox
1975.
[Paper prepared for the Symposium on Austrian Economics, University of Hartford,
June 22-28, 1975.]
----------------. "Comments on Professor Machlup's Paper." Unpublished manuscript
presented at a special regional meeting of the Mont Pélèrin Society,
held August 24-28, 1975, at Hillsdale College in Hillsdale, Michigan.
[The quasi-Festschrift volume (Essays on Hayek. Edited by Fritz Machlup.
New York: New York University Press, 1975) was a product of the Hillsdale Mont
Pélèrin meeting and included the important Fritz Machlup bibliographical
essay (in revised form) to which Prof. O'Driscoll alludes in his title. O'Driscoll's
comments in this unpublished manuscript assess Hayek's contributions to economic
and social theory.]
-----------------. "Spontaneous Order and the Coordination of Economic
Activities." The Journal of Libertarian Studies 1, no. 2 (Spring 1977):
137-151.
-----------------. Economics as a Coordination Problem: The Contributions
of Friedrich A. Hayek with a foreword by F.A. Hayek. Kansas City: Sheed
Andrews & McMeel, 1977.
-----------------. "Frank A. Fetter and 'Austrian' Business Cycle Theory."
History of Political Economy 12, 4 (1980): 542-557.
O'Driscoll, Gerald P. and Rizzo, Mario J. "What Is Austrian Economics?" Presented
at The American Economic Association meetings in Denver, October 1980, 70 pp.
[A revised and enlarged version will be forthcoming as a book: Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1983, to be entitled The Economics of Time and Ignorance.]
O'Neill, John, ed. Modes of Individualism and Collectivism. London:
Heinemann, 1973.
[A wide-ranging anthology of articles, including Hayek's "Scientism and the
Study of Society" (A-46), sections from Karl Popper's The Poverty of Historicism
(1961), etc. The O'Neill anthology presents the methodological debate in the
social sciences over scientism and the confrontation between methodological
individualism and its opponents. Contains a valuable bibliography on these issues,
pp. 339-346. See also Jeffrey Paul (1974).]
Palmer, G.G.D. "The Rate of Interest in the Trade Cycle Theories of Prof. Hayek."
The South African Journal of Economics 23 (1955): 1-18.
Pasour, Jr., E.C. "Cost and Choice - Austrians vs. Conventional Views." The
Journal of Libertarian Studies (Winter 1978): 327-336.
Paul, Jeffrey Elliott. "Individualism, Holism, and Human: An Investigation
into Social Scientific Methodology." Brandeis University (Department of Philosophy)
Ph.D. Dissertation [74-16, 832] 1974.
[See also John O'Neill, ed. (1973).]
Peel, J.D.Y. Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist. London:
Heinemann, 1971.
Pigou, A.C. "Maintaining Capital Intact, on F.A. von Hayek: The Pure Theory
of Capital." Economica 8 (1941): 271-275.
Pirie, Madsen. "Hayek - An Introduction." Unpublished paper presented to The
Carl Menger Society Conference entitled "Hayek - An Introductory Course," London,
December 6, 1980.
Plant, Sir Arnold. "A Tribute to Hayek - The Rational Persuader." Economic
Age 2, no. 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1970): 4-8.
Polanyi, Michael. "The Determinants of Social Action." In Roads to Freedom:
Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek. Edited by Erich Streissler
et.al. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 145-179.
[A paper on the polycentric self-regulating processes of the spontaneous order
vs. central planning. Polanyi was the first to coin the term 'spontaneous order'
and originally presented the present essay at the University of Chicago in 1950,
the year in which Hayek joined the Committee on Social Thought at the University
of Chicago. See also Polanyi's The Logic of Liberty. London and Chicago,
1951.]
Quine, W.V. Ontological Relativity. New York, 1969.
Raico, Ralph. "A Libertarian Maestro." The Alternative: An American Spectator
8, no. 8 (May 1975): 21-23.
[Analysis of Hayek.]
Ranulf, Sv. "On the Survival Chances of Democracy." Aarhus (Universitetsforlaget).
Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1948.
Raz, Joseph. "The Rule of Law and Its Virtues." Law Quarterly Review 93
(April, 1977): 185-211.
[Reprinted in Cunningham (1979), pp. 3-21.]
Reekie, W. Duncan. Industry, Prices and Markets. Oxford: Philip Allan
Publishers, Ltd. 1979. American Publisher, John Wiley, 1979.
Rees, J.C. "Hayek on Liberty." Philosophy (1961).
Rhees, Rush. Without Answers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1969.
Rizzo, Mario J. Time, Uncertainty and Equilibrium - Explorations on Austrian
Themes. Lexington, Mass.: Heath and Co., 1979.
Robbins, Lionel. "Hayek on Liberty." Economica (February 1961): 66-81.
[Cf. following version of this article.]
----------------. "Hayek on Liberty." Economics and Politics. London:
Macmillan, 1963.
[Cf. preceding version of this article.]
----------------. Autobiography of an Economist. London: Macmillan
& Co., 1971.
Roberts, Paul Craig. Alienation in the Soviet Economy. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1971.
Robertson, David J. "Why I Am a Conservative." Unpublished paper presented
to The Carl Menger Society, March 11, 1978.
[A critique of Hayek's "Why I am not a Conservative."]
Roche III, George C. "The Relevance of Friedrich A. Hayek." In Fritz Machlup,
ed., Essays on Hayek. New York: New York University Press, 1976, 1-12.
Rothbard, Murray N. Man, Economy and State. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
Nostrand, 1962.
-----------------. "The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar." In Leland B.
Yeager (ed.) In Search of Monetary Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 94-136.
-----------------. "Money, The State and Modern Mercantilism." Modern Age
(Summer 1963): 279-289.
-----------------. "Von Mises, Ludwig." In International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: The Macmillan
Company & The Free Press, 1968, 1972, vol. 15, 16, 17, pp. 379-382.
-----------------. "Conservatives Gratified by Nobel Prize to Von Hayek." Human
Events (November 16, 1974).
-----------------. America's Great Depression. Kansas City: Sheed
& Ward, 1975.
-----------------. "The Austrian Theory of Money." In Edwin G. Dolan (ed.)
The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics. Kansas City: Sheed &
Ward, 1976, pp. 160-184.
-----------------. "The New Deal and The International Monetary System." In
Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy. Edited by Leonard
P. Liggio and James J. Martin. With a Preface by Felix Morley. Colorado Springs:
Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1976, pp. 19-64.
-----------------. "Inflation and the Business Cycle: The Collapse of the Keynesian
Paradigm." In For a New Liberty. New York: Collier Macmillan, 1978,
pp. 171-193.
-----------------. What Has Government Done to Our Money? Novato,
California: Libertarian Publishers, 1978.
-----------------. "F.A. Hayek and the Concept of Coercion." Ordo
31 (Stuttgart, New York: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1980), pp. 43-50.
[See following citation.]
-----------------. "F.A. Hayek and the Concept of Coercion." In The Ethics
of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1981. Chapter 28.
[See preceding citation for original publication of this essay.]
-----------------. "The Laissez-Faire Radical: A Quest for the Historical Mises."
The Journal of Libertarian Studies 5, no. 3 (Summer 1981): 237-254.
Roy, Subroto. "On Liberty and Economic Growth: Preface to a Philosophy for
India." Cambridge University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1982.
Rueff, Jacques. "Laudatio: Un Message pour le siècle." In Erich Streissler
et al., eds. Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A.
von Hayek. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 1-3.
[Tribute to Hayek's intellectual achievements: "Laudatio: a Message for the
Age," presented for the Hayek 70th birthday Festschrift.]
Rupp, Hanns Heinrich. "Zweikammersystem und Bundesverfassungsgericht. Bermerkungen
zu einem verfassungspolitischen Reformvorschlag F.A. von Hayeks." In Zur
Verfassung der Freiheit: Festgabe fôr Friedrich A. von Hayek zur Vollendung
seines achtzigsten Lebensjahres. Stuttgart, New York: Gustav Fischer
Verlag, 1979, pp. 95-104.
["A Two-Chamber System and the Federal Constitutional Court - Notes on a Proposition
of F.A. von Hayek for a Constitutional Reform."]
Ryle, Gilbert. "Knowing How and Knowing That." Proceedings on the Aristotelian
Society 46, (1945/1946): 1-16.
Sabrin, Murray and Corbin, Peter B. (American Geographical Society.) "Geographical
Implications of Austrian Trade-Cycle Theory: An Analysis of the U.S. Economy,
1947-1972." A Preliminary Report to the Fred C. Koch Foundation. Wichita, Kansas
(February 1976), 68 pp.
[Empirical studies testing Austrian trade cycle theory, accompanied by computer
graphic print-out. See Corbin. Available at the Institute for Humane Studies.]
Sacristan, A. "Friedrich August von Hayek o el intento de romper con la neoclassica."
In Comercio Esterior 25 (1975), pp. 193-195.
["Friedrich August von Hayek on the Intention of Breaking with Neoclassicism."]
Sampson, Geoffrey. "Nozick vs. Hayek; Retrospective vs. Anticipant Liberalism."
Unpublished paper presented to The Carl Menger Society Conference on Nozick,
Oct. 27, 1979.
Sarduski, W. "The Political Doctrine of Neoliberalism and the Problem of Democracy."
Panstwo i Prawo 3 (1978): 90-100.
Saulnier, R.J. Contemporary Monetary Theory: Studies on Some Recent Theories
of Money, Prices and Production. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938
and London: King, 1938.
Schorske, Carl E. Fin-de-siècle Vienna, Politics and Culture.
New York: Basic Books, 1980.
[See also Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (1973);
Arthur May, Vienna in the Age of Franz Josef (1966); and William Johnston,
The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848-1938. Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1972.]
Schuller, A. "Konkurrenz der Wahrungen als geldwirtschaftliches Ordnungsprinzip."
In Wirtschaftspolitische Chronik (Institut fôr Wirtschaftspolitik an
der Universitat Koln) 26 (1977): 23-50.
["Concurrent Monetary Standards as an Ordering Principle of Monetary Economics."]
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