Gustave de Molinari, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare: entretiens
sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété (Evenings on Saint
Lazarus Street: Discussions on Economic Laws and the Defence of Property)
(1849)
[A Draft of Liberty Fund's new translation]
[May 17, 2012]
[9th Evening]
[SUMMARY: Continuation of attacks made on internal
property. – Right
of association. – Legislation which in France regulates commercial
companies. – The public limited company and its advantages. – On
banking monopolies. – Functions of banks. – Results of government
intervention in the affairs of banks. – High cost of discounts. –
Legal bankruptcies. – Other privileged or regulated industries. –
The bakery trade. – The meat trade. – Printing. – Lawyers.
– Stock and investment brokers. – Prostitution. – Funeral
directors. – Cemeteries. – The Bar. – Medicine. – The
Professoriat. – Article 3 of the law of July 7-9, 1833.]
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Title Page of the original 1849 edition
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The photo of Molinari (1819-1912) which accompanied
his obituary in the Journal des économistes
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Introduction
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Molinari's book Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare; entretiens sur les
lois économiques et défense de la propriété. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849)
is being translated by Liberty Fund. The translation was done by Dennis O'Keeffe
and it is being edited by David M. Hart. The critical apparatus of foontnotes
and glossary entries, and introduction are being provided by David Hart.
We welcome feedback from Molinari scholars to ensure that this edition will
be a great one and thus befitting Molinari in his centennial year.
This
page has a detailed Table of Contents and links to other Chapters.
The Ninth Evening
[p. 239]
SUMMARY: Continuation of attacks made on internal property. – Right
of association. – Legislation which in France regulates commercial
companies. – The public limited company and its advantages. – On
banking monopolies. – Functions of banks. – Results of government
intervention in the affairs of banks. – High cost of discounts. –
Legal bankruptcies. – Other privileged or regulated industries. –
The bakery trade. – The meat trade. – Printing. – Lawyers.
– Stock and investment brokers. – Prostitution. – Funeral
directors. – Cemeteries. – The Bar. – Medicine. – The
Professoriat. – Article 3 of the law of July 7-9, 1833.
THE SOCIALIST.
I thought until the present time that the Revolution of 1789 had completely
enfranchised labor and that we lived under a régime of absolute laissez-faire.[308] I
am beginning to cast my mistake aside.
THE ECONOMIST.
Not only has labor not been completely enfranchised, but in certain branches
of production retrogression has gone beyond that of the privileged companies.[309] Instead
of once privileged industries being made free they have been made State monopolies.
Now, State monopoly signals the infancy of any society. In place [p240] of
the institutions of the Middle Ages, what was substituted? The institutions
of Ancient Egypt. This did not, however, stop the retention of industries enjoying
special privileges. The fact is that our economic system is a strange jumble
of monopolies, industries enjoying privileges and free companies.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Then where are there these industries with special privileges? Is it not the
case, according to M. Thiers, that all the privileges were abolished that famous
night of the fourth of August?[310]
THE ECONOMIST.
Yes, according to M. Thiers; not according to the true account.[311] There remains
in France a host of privileged or controlled industries. We have to put banks
at the top of the list. Then come baking, the meat trades, printing, theaters,
insurance, the buying and selling of State property, medicine, the Bar, Ministerial
offices, prostitution and a number of others which I forget.[312]
Let us add again that Association,[313] that
indispensable vehicle of industrial progress, is not freely available in France.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Ah! This time I have caught you in glaring inaccuracy. I know my Constitution
well.
Article 8. Citizens have the right of association, to assemble peacefully
without arms, to petition and to make public their opinions by means of the
press or otherwise.
The exercise of these rights has no limit other than the rights and liberty
of others and the safety of the public.
[p241]
So you see that a right of association obtains in France. Perhaps there is
only too much of it?
THE ECONOMIST.
Political associations are free in France… more or less. It is not the same
with business associations. As you know, the number of kinds of association
is almost boundless. Well, French law recognizes only three kinds of association:
partnerships; limited partnerships; and public limited companies.[314] Save for a few
irritating formalities, the first two are free; the third, however, which is
the most developed, the one most useful to large-scale industrial enterprise,
is subject to prior authorization.[315]
THE CONSERVATIVE.
All right! People want authorization and, after a careful examination, the
government grants it, if there are grounds.
THE ECONOMIST.
Yes, if there are grounds. And you forgot to say that authorization frequently
arrives only six months, a year or two years afterwards, that is to say too
late. You know enough about industry to know that a delay of six months is
enough to cause most enterprises to drop the project.
Socialists complain of the slowness with which business associations are establishing
themselves in France. They do not see that the commercial code has put things
in good order by narrowly confining the right of association. A singular blindness.
Partnership does not involve large accumulations of capital, especially in
a country where wealth holdings are notably sub-divided; limited partnerships
as they are at present regulated, put the share-holders [p242] at the mercy
of a business manager and you know what that results in….The public limited
company alone involves huge agglomerations of capital built out of small holdings
and the best possible management.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
That is not proven.
THE ECONOMIST.
Take a good look at the individual industrial entrepreneur and what do you
find? A capitalist and a manager of labor, a man who receives a return for
his capital and a payment for his work. Take a look at the public limited company
and what will you find? Workers who supply labor and receive a wage, capitalists
who supply capital and receive interest. What is combined in the case of an
industrial entrepreneur is separated in the limited company. This separation
is one step further, taken in the direction of the division of labor; it constitutes
progress.
I will give you the proof of this by pointing out to you some of the inherent
advantages of the limited company.
Preeminent among these is the ability to set up production projects on an
immense scale. This means always being able to match the strength of the effort
to that of the obstacles, and thereby cut the costs of production to a minimum.
The second advantage of the limited company lies in the superior administration
which it allows. A freelance entrepreneur has responsibility only to himself.
The director of a limited company is responsible to his shareholders. He must
give them an account of his activities and justify them. This requirement,
inherent in the very nature of the limited company, entails [p243] on the part
of the director, the need to act with intelligence and probity. If he did not
manage the business intelligently, the shareholders would not fail to remove
him. If he engaged in shady operations, would he really dare to give a public
account of them to a meeting of the shareholders? Well, with the system of
accountancy in use today, he would not be able to keep secret any of his activities.
Where limited companies are the rule, industrial enterprises would necessarily
be managed with intelligence and probity. Industry would necessarily be led
by the most capable and upright men.
Industrial fraud would disappear under this regime. In which industries is
fraud most common? In those which operate in small, segmented and precarious
units. When one cannot count on the future, or construct a large-scale commercial
existence for oneself, one is inclined to seek by all possible means, to make
a lot of money quickly. The quality of products is corrupted. Merchandise known
to be poor is sold as good quality stuff. When one faces on the other hand
an indefinite time period ahead and one is deploying very considerable capital,
one is concerned to acquire a good reputation in order to keep one’s clients.
So good products are supplied along with reliable business dealings.
In enterprises organized on a large scale and in a stable way there is more
probity than in weak and precarious firms. Compare the various branches of
production in France, England, [p244] Holland etc and you will be convinced
of the absolute correctness of this fact. Falsification and fraud do not have
their origin in industrial liberty; they arise on the contrary from obstacles
to the free and full development of industry.
The third advantage of public limited companies and perhaps the most important,
is to make the situation of each enterprise a matter of public knowledge; it
is to make clear on a daily basis the prosperity or the weak performance of
various branches of production.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
How is that so?
THE ECONOMIST.
When a firm manages to sell its products at a price which breaks even, we
say it is at par; when production costs are not covered it is working at a
loss; when production costs are more than covered , it is in profit. In a system
with individualized production it is extremely difficult to grasp these different
industrial situations accurately and to know when one can fruitfully put one’s
capital in a firm and when one cannot. You often risk further building up an
already very lively branch of production, while others are waiting in vain
for funds and labor. These mistakes cease to be possible in the case of limited
companies. Each company having an interest in making public what it is doing
in order to facilitate trading, day by day information is available as to the
situation of different branches of production. By taking a look at Stock Exchange
prices, we know which firms are in loss and which in [p245] profit, and which
are breaking even. One knows exactly which one to invest in to achieve the
greatest profit. If for example the share price in blast furnaces is better
than that in mineral exploitation one would put one’s capital into the iron
industry rather than zinc production. Thus iron production will be increased.
What will the result be? That the market price of iron will fall until it matches
exactly the costs of production: the price of shares falling in these circumstances
to par, people will stop moving towards this branch of production for fear
of no longer covering their costs.
Thanks to this publicly available information on industrial share prices,
production is self regulating, in a way so to speak ‘mathematical’. We are
no longer exposed to producing too much of one thing and too little of another,
to allowing certain prices to inflate and others to fall wildly. An endless
cause of disturbance disappears from the arena of production.
Notice then the singularly democratic character of limited companies. The
private entrepreneur is the irresponsible and absolute monarch; the limited
company governed by shareholders and run by a director and board of responsible
people, is the republic. Having been monarchical, production becomes republican.
That shows to you, once again, that monarchy is on the way out.
THE SOCIALIST.
Society splits up into a multitude of little republics, each one having a
special and economically limited purpose. Now that is a very remarkable change.
[p246]
THE ECONOMIST.
And one not sufficiently remarked on. Unfortunately the barbaric legislation
of the imperial code presents an obstacle to this salutary transformation.
….
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Is not the transformation of which you speak, however, naturally confined
to certain industries? Would there not be serious diadvantages if the limited
liability régime were to be applied to agriculture, for example?
THE ECONOMIST.
What disadvantages? The limited company would solve the twin problem of the
fragmentation of landed property[316] and
the economic concentration of farms. The limited company would permit agriculture
to be carried out on an immense scale and render farms stable, by dividing
landed property up indefinitely into shares of fr.1000, fr.500, and smaller
shares of fr.100, fr.50 and fr.10. From the point of view of the economics
of farming, this change would have an incalculable impact. What disadvantages
do you see in it? Would not a limited company have an interest in cultivating
the soil as well as possible? If it farmed it badly, would it not it not be
forced to close down, after its capital was used up, and leave its position,
either to other firms or isolated individuals? If you see nothing amiss with
an area of land in the possession, in perpetuity, of a single individual, why
should you think it amiss for a collection of individuals to possess it? Does
not the [p247] single owner carry on as well as the association of proprietors?[317]
THE SOCIALIST.
This is quite right. In truth, I cannot imagine why the limited company has
not yet been applied to the cultivation of the soil.
THE ECONOMIST.
Why is agriculture, in France, and elsewhere, the most burdened of economic
sectors? Why is the limited company so tightly regulated?
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Perhaps the previous authorization demanded for the limited company is now
pointless; but do you not admit that government could scarcely give up the
right to exert rigorous supervision over that sort of organization?
THE ECONOMIST.
It would be much more to the point to monitor small private firms. Limited
companies publish full accounts of their activities, operating quite openly,
while small private firms keep what they are doing secret…..
Do you know what effect government supervision has on limited companies? It
serves first of all to diminish the vigilance of shareholders, who trust quite
happily in government supervision. It also serves to hamper the development
of productive operations. Finally it serves to secure comfortable jobs for
the government’s minions.
THE SOCIALIST.
That closes the matter!
[p248]
THE ECONOMIST.
The imperial commissioners, whether of the Crown or the Nation, with jurisdiction
over insurance companies, railway companies and the like, are no more nor less
pointless, no more or less excessive, than those well known
councilors, examiners of pigs’ tongues,[318] inspectors of
woodpiles etc., who flourished under the ancien régime.
I think that should enlighten you on how much credit should be given to the
obstacles placed in the way of the right of association.[319]
[p249] Besides these restrictions which apply in a general way to industrial
and commercial enterprises, there are others which apply particularly to those
which devote themselves to commercial banking.
Our public banks are still subject to the regime of privilege.
[p250]
THE CONSERVATIVE.
I must warn you that on this score I will wage all out war on you. I am not
a supporter of free banking[320] and
I never will be. I cannot understand how the government can allow anyone who
wishes, to print paper money or to issue assignats,[321] and
toss them freely into circulation. Moreover, [p251] what this marvelous utopia
leads to has already been shown.
THE ECONOMIST.
Where?
THE CONSERVATIVE.
In the United States and you know what it led to there.[322] A general bankruptcy. God preserve
us from a [p252] like calamity. I would rather have a bit less freedom and
a bit more security.
THE ECONOMIST.
The only trouble is that your information is quite false. The banks are free
in the [p253] United States, only in the case of six individual States: Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine and Vermont. And it
is precisely these six states and only they which stayed clear of the general
bankruptcy.
If you are skeptical I would beg you to read the remarkable works of MM. Carey[323] and
Coquelin on the banks.[324] [325] In
them you will learn that the free banks of America caused fewer disasters than
the protected banks of Europe.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
And yet I have often heard the complete opposite asserted.
THE ECONOMIST.
By people about as well informed as you. By minds imbued with all the prejudices
of the regulatory regime, who never fail, on an a priori basis and when they
have no information, to lay disorders in production at the door of laissez-faire.[326]
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Agree at least that it was highly imprudent to authorize the first issuing
of paper as money.
THE ECONOMIST.
You do not really believe that. Does not everyone, do not you and I, sir,
create paper money? Do we not give our creditors promises every day to pay
on such and such a date, such [p254] and such a sum of specie? We would give
them tickets payable in other merchandise, in products made by ourselves, for
example, if they were happy to accept tickets issued on such a basis. Unfortunately,
they do not want to. Why? Because they can always exchange cash money against
all sorts of merchandise, whilst they cannot easily make satisfactory use of
other goods. What would my boot-maker do, for example, with a newspaper article
which I undertook to deliver to him three months later, in exchange for a pair
of boots? It is probably true, in the end, that a journalist like myself does
pay for his boots with newspaper articles; but this does require after all
that I succeed in placing them. If I gave my boot-maker a promise payable in
leader-articles for Paris newspapers instead of money, it would be up to him
to place these leaders and Lord knows whether he would manage it. So he will
not accept anything payable except in good, old-fashioned money.
What do these long-term bills do? For the most part, they serve the process
of circulation. If they did not exist, we would have to replace them with sums
in gold or silver. As an individual who issues these dated bills, I am creating
money therefore. I have the right to do this; if it seems sound to me, I can
make millions of promises to pay; I can fill a room with them. The question,
however, is not making them, but of exchanging them against things of real
value, of value incorporated in the form of specie, clothes, boots, furniture
etc. Well, will it be possible for me to exchange my promissory notes indefinitely
against these valuable things? It will not. [p255] I will barely be able to
exchange them for more than the sum which people assume me to be in a position
to pay. Before accepting my notes, people will enquire as to my situation,
my financial resources, my intelligence, my probity and my health. After all
that, they will decide whether my promise to pay is worthwhile or not. There
are smart people who contrive to have their notes valued at more than they
will in fact realize; on the other hand there are incompetents who will not
manage to place theirs for as much as they are worth. In general, however,
each person’s credit matches his abilities.
THE SOCIALIST.
Evaluation is very difficult for all that.
THE ECONOMIST.
Evaluation also demands the most delicate tact. Bankers acquire and develop
this tact through long experience. Those who do not have it go on to ruin themselves.
If the government dared to run a bank in the way it runs so many things, like
a train or an omnibus, you would soon see capital exiting from any banker who
ran his business in this fashion….Fortunately, the government has not yet become
the universal banker. So it is still hardly possible to pump more promises
into circulation than one can reimburse.
What difference is there between a bank’s promise to pay and an individual’s?
None, save that the one is payable on demand and the other is payable at the
contracted due date. Both must be equally supported by real assets before they
are accepted. Your promise will be accepted only on the assumption that it
will be paid on the due date; we accept bank notes only [p256] if we are sure
we can convert them into specie.
When banknotes are not reimbursable in specie, that is to say in the form
of a good, one easily exchangeable, easily put into circulation, when they
are reimbursable in land or houses, for example, they undergo a depreciation
precisely matching the difficulty of exchanging land or houses against a good
more readily circulated; when they are reimbursable neither on demand nor by
some specified due date, in anything possessing real value
– specie, houses, land, furniture etc., – they lose all value,
and cease to be anything other than scraps of paper.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
How does it happen then that people accept banknotes instead of demanding
coin?
THE ECONOMIST.
Because such means of circulation are more convenient, more easy to move and
less costly, that is all.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Once again, though, is not the government right to stop the banks issuing
more bills than they can reimburse?
THE ECONOMIST.
By that reckoning it should intervene to stop individuals from subscribing
more promissory notes than they can finance. Why does it not do so? First because
it is impossible and next because it is pointless. I have no need to show you
that it is impossible; I will, however, show you in two words why it is pointless.
Your [p257] individual issues are not restricted by your will alone; they are
limited by what everyone else wants. When people judge that you have gone beyond
your ability to pay, they refuse to accept your promises of payment, and your
note issue finds itself blocked. Certainly, no government could judge as accurately
as the interested parties themselves, precisely when an individual has exceeded
his financial means. The intervention of the government to regulate credit
at the individual level, even supposing it were possible, would therefore be
absolutely pointless.
What is true for individuals who issue long-term paper, is no less true for
banks who issue notes in the form of cash on demand.
What is the function of banks, or at least, their main function? It is to
discount bills. It is to exchange valuable assets realizable in the long-term,
for assets whose value is already realized or immediately realizable, such
that they can be put into circulation immediately. It is the buying of long-term
paper with cash or short-term bills, easily cashable.[327]
If the bank pays for these long-term bills, not in specie but in banknotes,
the outcome is different, I agree. The bank might, tempted [p258] by this profitable
discounting, to issue a sizeable flow of paper without worrying whether it
will always and in all circumstances, able to redeem them.
Just as the bank does not accept promissory notes from individuals, however,
when it does not have sufficient trust in their being reimbursed, likewise
individuals will not accept the bank’s notes when they lack the certainty of
being able to realize them, always and in all circumstances.
If individuals judge that the bank is not able to redeem its notes, they do
not take them or they demand coin. Or perhaps they do take them, but subject
to discounting against risk of non-payment.
How can the public know whether a bank is in a position to honor its banknotes,
cash on demand?
Since the public does not accept them, unless it is fully reassured in this
respect, the banks have an interest in making their situation public. Therefore
they publish weekly or monthly accounts of their dealings.
In these accounts members of the public can see how much financial paper has
been issued and the total reserves both in specie and in portfolio form. They
can compare assets with liabilities and hence judge whether they can continue
or not to accept the bank’s issues, and at what price.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
What if the bank presents a false account of the situation?
THE ECONOMIST.
In a word, it engages in fraud. In this case the [259] the holders of its
notes can have or ought to have the power to effect the punishment of this
bank’s directors, as fraudsters, as cheats, dealing falsely in money, and get
themselves reimbursed by the responsible shareholders to the full extent of
the thefts committed against them.
Moreover, the public, guided by its interest, is prudent enough to deal only
with the banks whose directors and administrators offer sufficiently firm moral
guarantees.
You can see then that if the government can dispense with intervening to prevent
individuals from duping the banks, it can also equally well manage without
intervening to prevent the banks from cheating individuals.
Experience here is fully in accordance with theory. The free banks of Massachusetts,
Vermont etc., have caused far fewer disasters than the chartered banks of Europe.
If attempts by the government to regulate the issuing of banknotes are pointless,
what purpose does its intervention serve?
I will explain to you in a few words what purpose it serves.
The intervention of the government in questions of credit, in the end always
comes down to this: it is to grant a bank the exclusive right to issue banknotes
payable on demand. When a bank possesses this right, it can easily take on
any competition. Other financial companies, being restricted to specie and
fixed-term paper, are in no condition to compete with the privileged bank:
In the first place, because banknotes payable on demand [260] are superior
as instruments of circulation, to specie or dated bills.
In the second place, because paper money can be made available more cheaply
than specie. The reason is this.
It is true enough that banknotes must always be based on real and exchangeable
value. The bank must always be in a position to convert them into specie. Here
is what happens, however: when a bank is on stable foundations, it is not as
a rule faced with more than a small number of bills to cash. It can therefore
dispense with the need for a constant stock of specie equal to the sum of its
notes in circulation. It has to be in a position to procure this sum, against
the possibility of its being demanded the redemption of all its outstanding
notes: all that takes is its having access to a sufficient volume of valuable
paper easily realizable in specie. Nothing more could be asked of it. These
assets, however, made up of shares in railway and insurance companies and various
revenue-yielding properties, add up to less than the specie value of the sum
total of interest payments owed.
The less specie the bank is forced to keep in reserve and the cheaper it can
sell its bank notes, the lower it can hold down the discount rate. Ordinarily
the banks do not hold in cash more than a third of the value of their total
note issue.[328] The level of
the cash reserve however is entirely subordinate to circumstance. The bank
has to maintain larger or smaller holdings of specie, according to whether
monetary crises[329] [p261] are more
or less to be feared, and also according to the ease or difficulty with which
the other assets constituting its reserves, can be realized in specie. The
question is a delicate one. The bank is moreover, soon alerted by the reduction
of its discounts, that it is below the necessary limit. For the public is not
slow to buy fewer bills when it has less confidence in their reimbursement.
A bank specifically authorized to issue bank notes, therefore has a double
advantage: it can supply a perfectly
tuned instrument of circulation to those demanding money, and this perfectly
tuned instrument it can also supply more cheaply than its rival banks can supply
the cruder instrument, namely cash. In this way it easily shrugs off all competition.
If the privileged bank however succeeds in remaining sole arbiter of the market,
will it not lay down the law to the purchasers of money? Will it not force
them to pay more for its bank notes than they would pay under free competition?
THE SOCIALIST.
That would seem inevitable to me. It is the law of monopoly.
THE ECONOMIST.
The shareholders of the privileged bank will benefit from the difference.
In truth they will be obliged to admit some co-sharers to the profits of their
fruitful monopoly.
In a large country, when a bank obtains the exclusive right to issue banknotes,
all competition succumbing in the face of this privilege, it will find its
clientele increasing enormously. Soon it [p262] is no longer large enough for
the latter; it abandons some of its work and therefore some of its profits
to a few chosen bankers. It now accepts only bills bearing three good signatures
and surrounds its discounting with formalities and difficulties, such that
those demanding its paper are obliged to have recourse to intermediary bankers
with accounts open at the bank.[330]
This simplifies quite considerably the work of the privileged bank. Rather
than having to deal with several thousand individuals, it now need handle only
a small number of bankers, whose operations it can easily oversee, although
these privileged intermediaries naturally see to it that their services get
paid. Thanks to their small numbers they can lay down the law with regard to
the public. Thus they constitute, under the wing of the privileged bank, a
veritable financial aristocracy, which shares with the bank the advantages
of that privileged status.
These advantages, however, cannot go beyond certain limits. When the
bank and its intermediaries push the discount rate too high, the public turn
to bankers who do their discounting in cash or deposit accounts. Unfortunately,
the murderous competition of the privileged establishment, by greatly reducing
the number [p263] of the former and permitting them only a precarious existence,
leads to a permanently excessive discount price.
In times of crisis the privileges some banks have, lead to even more deadly
results.
I have said to you that a bank must always have been in a position to reimburse
its notes in specie. What happens when it is not in a position to reimburse
them all? What happens is that the notes which cannot be reimbursed depreciate.
Who has to bear this depreciation? Those with these notes in their position.
They undergo virtual bankruptcy.
Well, do you know the purpose of these privileges? They effectively authorize
the banks to get away, legally,
with bankruptcy of this sort. The Bank of France and the Bank of England have
on numerous occasions been authorized to suspend payments in specie. The Bank
of England was a notable case of this in 1797. Those holding notes lost up
to 30% during the course of the suspension. The Bank of France was given the
same leeway in 1848.[331]
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Its notes lost very little value.
THE ECONOMIST.
The magnitude of the loss does not affect the matter. If they had lost only
a thousandth per cent in one day, those bearing this loss would still have
been victims of a bankruptcy.
If these two Banks had not been privileged, their shareholders would have
been obliged to pay the notes presented for redemption, down to the very last
sou. In that eventuality those holding notes would have lost nothing; on the
other hand the shareholders would have had to impose [p264] on themselves sufficient
sacrifice to fulfill all the Bank’s obligations. This, though, is a risk that
all capitalists whose funds are engaged in production run…with the exception,
however, of those who enjoy the privilege of imposing their losses on the public.
THE SOCIALIST.
Now I see why in 1848 the shareholders of the Bank of France were paid their
customary dividends, while all other industrial and commercial companies were
in deficit.
THE ECONOMIST.
Let us be fair, however. The shareholders of privileged banks deserved far
less condemnation than the governments which handed out these privileges. In
France, as in England, the privileges dispensed by the Bank came at a heavy
price. In exchange for this favor, the government took possession of all or
part of the capital spent by the shareholders. Not being in a position to repay
them in times of crisis, it extricated itself from this embarrassment, by authorizing
the Bank to suspend its payments in specie. Being unable to fulfill its engagements
towards the Bank, it authorized the Bank to fall short in its undertakings
to the public.[332]
[p265]
Formerly, when governments found themselves unable to pay their debts, they
debased their coinage, adding copper or lead to it, or perhaps even reducing
the weight of the coins. These days they go about it differently: they borrow
large sums from those establishments exclusively authorized, by themselves,
to issue paper currency. Deprived of its natural and requisite foundation,
this money depreciates in times of crisis. The government then intervenes in
order to make the public bear the weight of the depreciation.
What is the difference between these two procedures?
In a system of free competition, no such plundering arrangements would be
possible.
In this regime, banks would have enough capital to fulfill their commitments,
failing which the public would not accept their notes. In times of crisis,
they alone would bear the natural losses of the contraction of circulation;
they would not be permitted to offload it onto the public.
Furthermore, in this regime it would also mean that competition between the
banks [p267] would promptly force down the rate of discount, now held at the
highest level possible.
Finally, this system would generate, on a large and growing scale, banknotes
of real value, rather than bad debt, such currency being distributed according
to the needs of the public and no longer to suit the convenience of parties
granted special privileges. Almost the entire circulation would be economically
produced in paper form, rather than expensively in specie.
THE SOCIALIST.
I have to say that you have very much shaken my deepest beliefs. What? Can
that finance feudalism[333] whose
existence I attributed to free competition, really have sprung up as a result
of monopoly? What? Do the high cost of discounting and the disastrous ups and
downs in the circulation of our money supply result from privilege and not
from liberty?
[p268]
THE ECONOMIST.
Precisely. You socialists are as wrong about the banks as you are about everything
else. You thought the banks were subject to laisser-faire,[334] and
you attributed to freedom, ills which have their origin in privilege. This
has been the huge and deplorable error you have made about everything.
THE SOCIALIST.
This could well be so in fact.
THE ECONOMIST.
If we had enough time to take a look at all the other industries which either
enjoy special privileges or are closely regulated, such as bakery, meat production,
printing, the lawyers, brokerage, sale of public property, the Bar, medicine,
prostitution etc., you would see that privilege and regulation have always
delivered the same disastrous results economically: lowering of production
and a change in its composition on the one hand, disorder and iniquitous distribution
on the other.
Limits were put on the numbers of bakers in the principal areas of population.
It became apparent, however, that this limitation put the people at the mercy
of the bakers and so a maximum price was put on bread.[335] The
wish was to correct one rule by imposing another. Was it successful? The manipulations which
take place on a daily basis in the flour market, are evidence to the contrary.
Speculators conspire with the bakers to create an artificial rise in the price
of flour, the maximum is raised above the real price of the grain, and the
authors of this immoral maneuvering pocket the difference.
[p269]
There are some towns in France where bakery has remained free, for example
in Lunel, and nowhere do people eat bread of better quality or at a lower price.
You know how profitable privileges have been to foreign exchange dealers in
the case of the small numbers in whom they have been invested; you also know
how much the privileges of lawyers have raised the price of civil lawsuits
while at the very same time rendering deposits less secure. In no free branch
of production have failures been as numerous and as scandalous as is the case
with the lawyers.
The privileges which the printers possess have increased the price of printing
by creating a veritable surcharge for the printers.[336] In
Paris these charges come to at least twenty five thousand francs. The printing
workers, along with the bakers’ and butchers’ boys and the notaries’ clerks,
find themselves stuck their whole life long in the lower grades of the business;
not possessing sufficient capital to take out a patent or incur any costs,
they cannot become entrepreneurs or business managers. Another iniquity!
THE CONSERVATIVE.
You drew attention to prostitution too. Is not the limitation on the numbers
of brothels[337] necessary in
the interests of public morality?
THE ECONOMIST.
The obstacles applied to the multiplication of brothels do nothing save to
increase the profits of the madames and silent partners, lowering the while,
the earnings of the unfortunates who trade their beauty and their youth. Sizeable
fortunes are drawn from this [p261] sordid exploitation….The monopoly of the
brothels is reinforced by regulations which forbid prostitutes to stay in cheap
boarding rooms. Those lacking the means for buying furnished accommodation
are forced to put themselves at the mercy of the entrepreneurs of the prostitution
business or engage in itinerant prostitution.
THE SOCIALIST.
Do you not think prostitution will disappear one day?
THE ECONOMIST.
I do not know. In any case, however, it will not be made to go away by means
of coercive regulation. On the contrary that would make it more dangerous.
In circumstances in which property was fully respected, and in which, as a
result, poverty was reduced to a minimum,
prostitution would diminish considerably, for poverty is prostitution’s very
own great and indefatigable supplier. In such a regime there would only be
voluntary prostitutes. Things being thus, it would be a better situation, it
seems to me if prostitution were specialized, in conformity to the division
of labor, rather than universalized. I would rather a few women prostituting
themselves a lot than a lot of women prostituting themselves a little.
You would scarcely guess where privilege and communism have nestled most closely
to one another: in the coffins where our sad mortal remains are laid; in the
cemeteries where our human dust is buried. Funeral directors and cemeteries
are both privileged and shared in common. One cannot bury a corpse at will;
nor are we free to open a cemetery.
In Paris, the administration of funeral services is leased out [p271] to a
single firm.[338] The cost of that
lease is truly excessive, absorbing as much as some three quarters of the presumed
income. And payments are made not to the municipality but to the church businesses
recognized by the State. So much the worse for the dead of religions not officially
recognized. The total revenue from this funerary taxation covers the minor
expenses of the parishes, the payment of well-known preachers, the cost of
the sumptuous decorations in the month of Mary, etc. Heretical or orthodox,
the dead can scarcely claim much.
Handed over thus to a management endowed with special privilege and, into
the bargain, exorbitantly taxed, funeral services could scarcely be other than
expensive and of poor quality. The service costs eight or ten times more than
it would in a free market system, and its inadequacy is confirmed at all times
when death rates are out of the ordinary.
Present funeral arrangements mean that the modest savings of a worker vanish
under the costs of burial, unless his children resign themselves to accepting
the charity of a pauper’s burial. Is there a more monstrous unfairness?
The cemeteries, vast hostelries of death, belong to the municipalities. One
is not allowed to compete with them by using free market cemeteries. Moreover,
reserved places are extremely expensive. Six feet square in the Père Lachaise
cemetery, costs more than an acre of land elsewhere.[339] Only
the rich man can go to kneel at the tomb of his fathers; the pauper is reduced
to leaning on the bank of the common ditch, where, squeezed together like grains
in a [p272] grinder, dwell the successive generations of the poor. The most
savage hordes would be horrified by this communism of the grave; we are used
to it…or to put it better, we tolerate it as we do so many other abuses which
torment us…Have you noticed sometimes in our cemeteries, women of the common
folk trying to find the place where their father, their husband or their child
has been laid? These women had placed there a little cross with an inscription
painted in white. But the cross has disappeared under a new layer of coffins.
Wearied by a hopeless searching, they go away heavy hearted, carrying with
them, the funeral wreath, purchased with a week’s retched earnings…
THE CONSERVATIVE.
Let us leave this lamentable subject. In your list of privileged industries,
you cited the bar, medicine and the professoriate. Everyone is free however
to become a doctor or a lawyer or a professor.
THE ECONOMIST.
This is doubtless true, but these professions are tightly regulated. Well
any regulation which obstructs entry to a profession or branch of production,
or which hinders the exercise of these, contributes inevitably to raising their
costs.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
What? You want people to practice medicine and law freely, and to teach as
they wish…But what will happen to us in the name of God?
THE ECONOMIST.
What will happen to us? We will be cured much more quickly and cheaply. Our
law suits will [p273] will cost us less and our children will receive a better
education, that is all! If you want that, put your trust in supply and demand,
under a regime of free competition. If teaching were freed thus, would educational
entrepreneurs stop asking for good teachers? Would the latter not have an interest
as a consequence, in being able to supply substantial and wide knowledge? Would
not their salaries be in proportion to their merits? If the exercise of medicine
came to be released from the regulation which impedes it, would the sick continue
any less to seek out the best doctors? Among the studies imposed on doctors
and lawyers today, how many are pointless practically? How many displace vital
knowledge? What use, I ask you, are Latin and Greek to doctors and lawyers?
THE CONSERVATIVE.
To want lawyers and doctors to stop learning Latin and Greek, is that not
going too far?
THE ECONOMIST.
The costs of this Latin and Greek are in part met by taxpayers, who sustain
these university establishments, and in part by the clients of lawyers and
doctors. Well I wonder to myself in vain what a lawyer and a doctor, who have
to discuss French laws and heal French people who are sick, can do with Latin
or Greek. All the body of Roman law has been translated, along with Hippocrates
and Galen.
THE CONSERVATIVE.
What about medical terminology then? [p274]
THE ECONOMIST.
Do you think an illness named in French cannot be healed as easily as one
named in Latin or Greek? When therefore, will we deal with it as it deserves,
with this evil charlatanism of false and formulaic etiquette that Molière pursued
with such remorseless good sense?[340] …
It would take volumes, however, to count the host of privileges and regulations
which obstruct the entry to the most crucial professions and which hamper the
carrying out of the most vital work.[341].
I will finish by quoting a final pronouncement from that monument of barbarism
known as the Code français.
There is the general complaint that the great public utilities have scarcely
developed in France. Do you want to know why? Read this article of the law
of the 7-9th of July, 1833.[342]
Art. 3. All large-scale public works, roads of highest quality [p275] and
docks undertaken by the state or by private companies, with or without tolls,
with or without subsidies from theTreasury, with or without sale of public
land, may not be carried out, except under a legal enactment which will be
confirmed only after a government inquiry. An ordinance will suffice to authorize
the building of roads, canals and branch railways, not exceeding twenty kilometers
in length, of bridges and all other projects of lesser importance. This ordinance
must also be preceded by an inquiry.
Well, do you know how much time it takes to mount a ministerial inquiry, to
discuss or law or effect an ordinance? Will you complain, then, knowing this,
that the spirit of business does not develop in France? Complain rather that
the unfortunates you have garrotted cannot walk.
1. Molinari’s 1: Coquelin on Legislation concerning Commercial Organizations
In an article on “Les Sociétés commerciales en France et en Angleterre” (Commercial
companies in France and England) in the Revue des Deux Mondes (Review of the
Two Worlds) [of 1st of August, 1843], M. Charles Coquelin has insisted
above all on the need for full liberty to commercial associations. Here are
some extracts from this remarkable essay:
In recent years schools of philosophy have formed, which claim to be leading
humanity, by means of the process of association, towards purposes as yet
unknown. Is there any need to name them, when the last syllables of their
sonorous proclamations still echo all around us? What did the leaders of
these schools want? To improve the existing order, to purge this human society
of the blemishes which the work of the ages has formed, to continue the efforts
of past generations to perfect by degrees its procedures and structures?
All this was not enough to satisfy the ambitions of these philosophers. The
society we have, had not in their view been sufficiently controlled; it was
not sufficiently absolute, not sufficiently restricted; it left too much
room to human free will; it was too regarding of human spontaneity. What
they wanted was an utterly unitary society with a single centre and single
leader, its reach, like its purposes, extending and obtaining everywhere,
a society in which human individuality disappears in the current of social
action, one possessed of a single spirit and a single motivation, a society
in which man knows only one connection, but one which clasps him, so to speak,
whole and entire. This is what those self-proclaiming apostles of human sociability
wanted. Is that what the future holds in store for us? Is this how progress
has to unfold? The truth is far from this: the study of the true character
of man and the knowledge of the facts of history, show us on the contrary,
that in the natural course [p249 ] of things, every day has the social bond
dividing and multiplying; that humankind, in its normal development, in its
real aspiration to progress, rather than leading society to such a narrow
and wretched uniformity, tends constantly to divide and diversifty its forms,
to spread it, so to speak, on objects more numerous and varied, every day.
Man is a social creature, some say, and on this basis they want him to be
absorbed in one and only one kind of society, as if the social proclivity
attributed to him can be exercised only there. Yes, man is a social being;
this makes him all the more a creature of sensibility. Herein is his most
distinctive and his noblest attribute. Along with the feelings of sociability,
however, he cherishes within himself a need, not to be denied, for freedom
and for a certain spontaneity in his relationships. He is a dynamic and diverse
being as much as a social one, and he inclines by instinct towards a society
as dynamic and diverse as his own nature. So instead of binding himself,
once and for all, to a single societal form, by a heavy chain which will
impede his freedom of movement, he must instead bind himself by countless
light reins, which by connecting him on all sides to people of his sort,
nevertheless respect the way in which his lively nature works. This is what
reason demands; this is where progress lies....
In years past the principle of association was not widely applied in France.
Whether before or after the Revolution, one found scarcely more than a few
of those stunted organisations that the basic development of society achieves
but few or none of those powerful conglomerations of capital and labor which
put a nation’s commerce up to the level of large-scale enterprise. Lots of
people put the blame on the spirit of the French people, little disposed,
they say, to the goings-on of commercial enterprises. Without calling a halt
over this explanation, which seems to us premature, we will [p250]show that
the cause of the ill is entirely a matter of the law regulating our industries.
The law of 1807,[343] which
regulates commercial enterprises, has subsisted unchanged until the present.
It is in its outlook and its activities that we must search for the causes
of the torpor in which business languishes among us, as also in the abuses
and scandals which have attended its only too rare applications. – We
can summon it up thus: the law recognises only three kinds of business companies:
partnerships; limited partnerships; and public limited companies.
Under partnership, all the members must be mentioned by name in a published
legal agreement. They are, moreover, united by the bonds of a narrow solidarity,
being indefinitely responsible without limit, on pain of their person and
goods alike, for all undertakings contracted by the society, and for the
social undertakings contracted by each one of them, provided he has signed
under the company name.
The limited partnership involves a contract between one manager or a number
of united managers and one financial backer or several associated financial
backers, called “sponsors”or limited share associates. Managers’ names are
the only ones which are posted in the legal agreement. They alone can sign
under the company name. Management is theirs alone. As regards them, the
firm entails all the aspects of a partnership. As for the sponsors, they
are liable for losses only to the extent of the financial contribution they
have made or of the funds which they owe the firm.
The public limited company is not based on signatures under the company
name. It is not designated by the name of any of the associates. It is named
through the specification of the purpose of the exercise. All the associates
of the company, without [p251] distinction, enjoy the advantage of liability
only up to the limit their agreed holdings. The company is administered by
executives under revocable contract, partners or not, salaried or not, who
contract with respect to their management of the company, no personal or
collective obligation with respect to the operations of the company, and
who are responsible only for the carrying out of their mandate.
When one considers in overall terms the system I have just explained, one
cannot help being struck by the restrictive spirit which dominates it and
gives itself away, just in these few words: the law recognises three types
of commercial company. Association being no more than a natural act, one
would expect it necessarily to be regulated in a spontaneous way between
the contracting parties, in ways and under conditions freely determined by
themselves, according to their interests and needs. We find, on the contrary,
that the law substitutes itself in certain respects, for the parties to the
contract: it encroaches on their freedom by dictating to them the mode of
association allowed to them, specifically restricting them to choosing between
the three forms it has itself established. It goes even further, by imposing
on each of these specified forms, narrow and unbending rules, whose application
it is not permissible even to modify according to different circumstances....
What exactly is the public limited company in France today? Is it by chance
a form of association which commerce might be able to apply to its own purposes?
It quite obviously is not; it is a form reserved by legal privilege for certain
outstanding firms, whose out of the ordinary size and glamorous performance
recommend them. It is only these, effectively, which can present themselves
to the Council of State with any reasonable chances of success, on which
chances public opinion is formed, and which have in their favor the support
of the established authorities and of some [p252] powerful men. Firms of
this kind are rare and whatever their individual importance, that fact in
itself renders them of secondary interest for the nation. As for the host
of second order enterprises, or to put it another way, those whose usefulness
is less apparent, access to the status of public limited company is absolutely
forbidden them.
In the face of factors like these, we can see why association has not been
able to make great progress in France and why, inevitably, commerce is almost
entirely deprived of its blessings. Indeed, until these last few years, in
which the spirit of association, anxious to get itself up to date, has burst
through the legal barriers, scarcely anything about France’s appearance could
offer us a single clue as to the creative potential of commercial forces
working in harness. At present, which are the rare companies with extensive
joint-stock in our country? In England, under more favourable yet still too
stern conditions, association has been developed for a long time on a vastly
stronger basis. The number of joint-stock companies which that country contains
is incalculable; the imagination would be staggered with the volume of capital
involved and, with the amount of freedom they enjoy, these companies have
produced marvels. It is the same in the United States. Without our counting
the innumerable joint-stock banks that country has, each sizeable part of
the Union has can number a host of firms of all types, some of them enormous.
The smallest cities, the towns, even the villages, have their own. They support,
reinforce and energise private enterprise, at the same time as they complement
it. In overall terms, whether they confine themselves to the role of protecting
individual firms, or commit themselves to operations of an exceptional kind,
their activity and their immense resources, increase the industrial power
and wealth of the country. What a long way we are from this marvellous development!
2. Molinari’s Long Footnote 2: Say on the Bank of France
[p264]
In a letter addressed to M. Napier, in Edinburgh, J.-B. Say provided an interesting
account of the privileged status of the Bank of France. Here are a few instructive
extracts from that letter:
.....The Bank was recognised by the Bonaparte government, and received from
him, by a law of the 24 germinal in the year XI (14th April, 1803),
the exclusive right to put bearer-bills into circulation.[344].
The apparent motive was to give the public a more solid guarantee of notes
issued. The real motive was to make the bank pay [p265] for the exclusive
privilege of having in circulation, notes bearing no interest. It paid for
this exclusive privilege, as did the Bank of England, by making loans to
the government.
Events moved on. The Battle of Austerlitz took place. The public, which
knew that the Bank had been obliged to lend Napoleon 20 million of its bills,
taking a look at the military strength of this Austrian prince and Russia,
thought he was doomed, and themselves rushed to the Bank to have their holdings
of its bills reimbursed. The Bank suspended payment in December 1805. The
Battle of Austerlitz took place on December 2nd. The capitulation
of Presbourg was the outcome of the (French) victory. Napoleon emerged more
than ever the master of France’s resources. He settled his debts with the
Bank which accepted his payments again from the beginning of 1806.
Napoleon took advantage of the extremities into which he himself had cast
the Bank, and to avoid, so he said, the embarrassment that had forced him
to suspend payments on his bearer bills, he changed the Bank’s administration
under a law he had passed on 22 April 1806.
This law meant that the administration of the Bank was handed over to a
governor (Jaubert) and two Deputy-Governors, all three nominees of the Head
of State, but who were responsible to the general body of shareholders, as
represented by the two hundred most notable of them.
At the same time, the Bank’s capital, which comprised 45,000 shares at Fr.
1000, was increased to 90,000 shares, constituting a capital of Fr. ninety
million.
The needs of the public, which it was said, called for heftier [ p266] discounts,
and the purpose, which the government affected to hold, of taking shares
in this establishment, were the apparent motive. The real reason, on the
government’s part, was the improved access to larger-scale borrowing, which
it would gain from the enlargement of the Bank’s capital.
The new shares were sold profitably from the establishment’s point of view.
The credit and power of the government were taken to the highest possible
point by these unexpected successes.
The governor of the Bank exercised huge influence over the board of directors,
made up of big wholesalers, of whom some were given honorary titles and others
positions for their protégés. This influence was not a matter of duress but
it was insurmountable. Upright characters who scorned the advantages one
can draw from financial transactions, were in a minority in all the deliberations
involved. The capital of the Bank, in various forms, (some in 5% consolidated
funds, some in Treasury bonds or the takings from taxation) was entrusted
whole and entire to the government; but at the same time people resisted
as far as they could from lending it their bearer bills, because the latter,
having no security other than unenforceable undertakings by the government,
would not be reimbursable on presentation.
... In 1814, when France, divided by factions of interest and opinion, was
invaded by all the armies of Europe, the government forced the bank to make
it some extraordinary loans. At that time, its loans and enforceable undertakings,
exceeded [p267] its stock of specie and short-term paper, by about 20 million.
As a result, on January 18th, when those in possession of its
paper, driven by fear, presented themselves en masse, to get their bills
honored, the Bank was obliged, not to suspend payment completely, but to
reduce reimbursement to Fr.500,000 per day. Each payment was limited to a
Fr1000 note per person. The Bank reduced its discounting, called in its dated
paper, and from the month of the February following, it resumed its payments
with an open counter and for all sums.
At this time, its loans to the government, on the basis of Treasury Bonds
or tax receipts, or on any other paper earning interest payments, are as
high as twenty six millions.
J.-B. Say.
Paris, 14th August, 1816.
(Mélanges d’Économie politique. Oeuvres de J.-B. Say; Collection of Guillaumin
and Company)
We know that the Bank has not ceased to be the supplier of government, to
the great disadvantage of those obliged to suffer the consequences its privileged
operations.[345]
3. Molinari’s Long Footnote 3: Chevalier on the Right to enter Professions
in America
The privilege which, in France, results from the saleability, at very high
prices, of positions of responsibility, established by the law of April 20th,
1816, and in various other countries, is based on regulations, which have determined,
in the public interest, real or imagined, the numbers of persons permitted
to work in certain departments, does not exist in the United States. Everyone
is free to become an auctioneer, exchange dealer, bailiff, attorney, notary,
insofar as these professions have their analogues in America, for the judiciary
and ministerial system there is quite different.
The tendency today is to do away even with the guarantees which society once
thought must be demanded of the man who aspires to defend the widow and the
orphan or of anyone out to manage the lives of his fellow-citizens. In Massachusetts
(I advisedly refer to the more enlightened states) to be a lawyer required
one, before 1836, to have been admitted to the degree of Bachelor of Law by
a university, or anyway effectively to have passed a certain number of years
in the office of a practitioner, who would in due course present the candidate
to the court. To practice medicine, or what is different again, to have the
right to pursue a client for payment of a professional bill, one had to have
acquired pass grades at the medical school of the University of Harvard, near
Boston. Today you can be a lawyer in Massachusetts, on the sole condition of
passing a public examination in front of a jury of lawyers, chosen for each
session by the judge. As for medicine, the examination clause is no longer
binding, even for claims over honoraria. Since 1836, the small barrier separating
that profession from complete freedom has disappeared.
(Michel Chevalier, De la Liberté aux états-Unis. – Extract from the
Revue de Deux-Mondes (Review of Two Worlds), July 1st 1849, p.20).[346]
Endnotes
[308] This is one of the half dozen or so references in the Soirées to the doctrine of “laissez-faire” or the idea that there should
be no government intervention in economic matters whatsoever. [See the
glossary entry on “Laissez-faire” and Molinari’s use of this expression
throughout Les Soirées.]
[309] In a long article on the "Corporations privilégiées” (privileged
corporations), vol. 1, pp. 480-91, Charles Coquelin, the editor of the DEP, discusses how even though formally abolished by the legislation
of the Revolution the privileged corporations reappeared in the 19th century
in a different form. It was because of this that the DEP devoted "quite
a large amount of space” to criticizing them in both the old and new forms.
The historical survey of the privileged corporations under the old regime
which he provides in the article is an edited version of a chapter on "Etat
de l'ancienne législation française sur les communautés de marchands et
d'artisans, sur les réglemens de fabrication…” by Augustin-Charles Renouard, Traité
des brevets d'invention, de perfectionnement et d'importation (Paris: Antoine-Augustin Renouard, 1825), pp. 56-124. Renouard (1794-1878)
was a lawyer and a vice-president of the Société des Économistes.
[310] On
the night of August 4, 1789 the National Constituent Assembly voted to
abolish the seigneurial rights of the Nobility and the Church. See the
following document: [In French]: "4, 6, 7, 8 et 11 Août,” vol. 1,
pp. 39-41 in Collection
complète des lois, décrets ordonnances, réglemens et avis du Conseil d'État:
de 1788 à 1824 inclusivemen, par ordre chronologique: suivie d'une table
analytique et raisonné des matières, Volume 1,
ed. J.B. Duvergier (Paris: A. Guyot et scribe, 1824). [In English]: A Documentary
Survey of the French Revolution, ed. John Hall
Stewart (New York: Macmillan, 1964), "15. The August 4th Decrees (4-11
August, 1789), pp. 106-110. For a discussion of the legal implications
of the decree see M.F. Laferrière, Essai
sur l’histoire du droit français depuis les temps anciens jusqu'à nos jours,
y comprise le droit public et privé de la Révolution française. Deuxième
édition, corrigée et augentée. Tome second (Paris:
Guillaumin,1859). Chap. III deals with the decree of August 4 and other
legislation abolishing feudalism.
[311] Adolphe Theirs, Histoire
de la Révolution française (Paris: Lecointre et Durey, 1823-27) in 10 volumes.
[312] Ambroise Clément lists under the category of "privileged” or "legal
monopolies” the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, gunpowder, the
delivery of mail, the issuing of money, education, and public works. He
also lists numerous areas of economic activity which can only be practiced
with a government issued license such as mines, legal notaries, lawyers,
bailiffs, money changers, brokers, printers, book sellers, bakers, butchers,
and porters. Ambroise Clément, "Monopole,” in DEP vol. 2, pp. 219-25.
[313] Molinari capitalizes the word “Association” perhaps to mock his Socialist
friend who believed that all economic activities should be conducted by
means of voluntary cooperatives or associations. The Economists clearly
distinguished between those activities which would be better handled by
voluntary associations at the level of the family or the commune, or for
some specific purposes such as religion, charity, savings cooperatives,
and so on, and those activities which could be better handled by firms
competing in the free market for customers. [See Ambroise Clément, "Association,” DEP vol.1, pp. 78-85. See also the glossary entry on “Association.”]
[314] Molinari uses the terms “la société en nom collectif, la société en commandite
et la société anonyme” which we have translated as “partnerships; limited
partnerships; and public limited companies” respectively. These three types
of business associations are discussed by Renouard, "Sociétés commercials,” DEP,
vol. 2, pp. 647-50. See also the long footnote in the chapter where Molinari
quotes at length from an article by Charles Coquelin on “Les Sociétés commerciales
en France et en Angleterre” (Commercial companies in France and England)
published in the Revue
des Deux Mondes (Review of the Two Worlds) [August, 1843].
[315] The French "Code de Commerce” (Commercial Code) was enacted in 1807
by Napoleon. The creation of "sociétés composées uniquement d'actionnaires”
(or limited liability companies) required specific government authorization
until the law was changed in 1867. The creation of joint stock companies
was made much easier in England with the passage of the Joint Stock Companies
Act of 1844 and 1856.
[316] See Molinari’s earlier discussion of the fragmentation of landed property
caused by French inheritance law in Soirée 4.
[317] See Molinari’s proposal for French farming to be undertaken by anonymous
limited companies in Soirée 4 p. ???].
[318] Molinari uses the expression "conseillers langueyeurs de porcs”
which refers to health inspectors who examined the mouths of pigs to see
if they were infected with tapeworms which caused small cysts in the mouth.
[319] See Molinari’s long footnote 1 at the end of the chapter.
[320] The term Molinari uses is “la liberté des banques” which refers to the
theory developed by Charles Coquelin in the mid 1840s that private banks
in a completely free market would compete to provide banking services even
in such things as the issuing of money, which would no longer be a government
monopoly. Coquelin wrote a series of articles on free banking in the early
1840s for La Revue
des Deux-Mondes and these ideas were further developed
in his major book on the subject, Du Crédit et des Banques (1848).
He provides a history of banking a defense of his ideas in the article "Banque”
in DEP, vol. 1, pp. 107-45. See also, J.-E. Horn, La liberté des banques (Paris:
Guillaumin, 1866).
[321] Assignat was the name given to the paper currency issued by the National
Assembly between 1789 and 1796. They were originally issued as bonds based
upon the value of the land confiscated from the church ("biens national")
and were intended to pay off the national debt. Later they became legal
tender in 1791. Overissue led to a spectacular hyperinflation which wiped
out their value in a few years. The initial number issued in April 1790
was 400 million; in September 1792 2.7 billion were in circulation; and
by the beginning of 1796 when they were abandoned there were perhaps 45
billion in circulation. In an effort to control the rise in prices caused
by this inflation various attempts were unsuccessfully made to regulate
prices such as the "Maximum” in 1793. As a result of this experience
Napoleon returned the country to a gold backed currency, the franc, in
1803. See Andrew D. White, Fiat Money Inflation
in France, How it came, what it brought and how it ended (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896) </title/1948>;
Charles Coquelin, "Assignats” DEP vol. 1, pp. 77-78.
[322] Larry White states that "Proponents of free banking have traditionally
pointed to the relatively unrestricted monetary systems of Scotland (1716–1844),
New England (1820–1860), and Canada (1817–1914) as models.
Other episodes of the competitive provision of banknotes took place in
Sweden, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Spain, parts of China, and Australia.
In total, more than sixty episodes of competitive note issue are known,
with varying amounts of legal restrictions. In all such episodes, the countries
were on a gold or silver standard (except China, which used copper).” See,
Lawrence H. White, "Competing Money Supplies” The Concise Encyclopedia
of Economics <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CompetingMoneySupplies.html>.
[323] Henry C. Carey (1793-1879) was an American economist who argued that
national economic development should be promoted by extensive government
subsidies and high tariff protection. [See the glossary entry on “Carey.”]
[324] GdM
- The
Credit system in France, Great Britain and the United States,
Philadelphia, 1838. What is
Currency? by J. C. Carey. Du Crédit et des Banques by
Charles Coquelin. Paris, 1848. Chez Guillaumin et Compagnie. Henry
Charles Carey, The Credit
System in France, Great Britain, and the United States (London: John Miller, 1838). Henry Charles Carey, Answers
to the questions: What constitutes currency? What are the causes of unsteadiness
of the currency? and What is the remedy? (Philadelphia:
Lea & Blanchard, 1840).
[325] See
the glossary entry on “Coquelin”. As the editor of the Dictionnaire
de l'économie politique (1852-53) Coquelin wrote
a large number of articles (all of which are in vol. 1 as he died before
it could be completed), many of which are on banking and money. See, "Assignats,”
"Banque,", "Billet de banque,” "Crédit,” and "Crises
commerciales."
[326] This is one of the half dozen or so references in the Soirées to the doctrine of “laissez-faire” or the idea that there should
be no government intervention in economic matters whatsoever. [See the
glossary entry on “Laissez-faire” and Molinari’s use of this expression
throughout Les Soirées.]
[327] Molinari is here grappling with the idea of “time preference”, which
is defined in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: "people are willing
to pay positive interest rates to get access to resources in the present,
and they insist on being paid interest if they are to give up such access".
See
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/BohmBawerk.html>.
[328] Molinari is referring here to the notion of “fractional reserve banking”
whereby only a fraction of the banks assets are at hand at any given time
to be redeemed upon request by depositors.
[329] Molinari bases his analysis on the theory of commercial and banking crises
developed by Charles Coquelin in "Crises commerciales", DEP vol. 1, pp. 526-34 and Le
crédit et les banques (1848 and 1859). According
to Coquelin the root cause of such crises is the existence of "une
banquet publique privilégiée” (a government privileged public bank) which
is able to lend out more paper money than it has backed by specie and thus
offer lower interest rates on loans to favored groups thus distorting economic
activity. The historical examples Coquelin studies are the crisis of 1825,
1837, and 1846.
[330] GdM
- At the Bank of France the days for discounting have been fixed for Monday,
Wednesday and Friday of each week, and on the last three days of each month,
whatever days of the week these may be. To be allowed to discount and to
have a current account at the Bank, it is necessary to make a request in
writing for these to the Governor, and accompany this with a certificate
signed by three persons declaring knowledge of the signature of the applicant
and attesting to his trustworthiness in matters of business. (Dictionnaire
du commerce et des marchandises (Dictionary of Commerce and Merchandise)), article on Banks). DMH -
Molinari has the quote correct but not the title. It should be Dictionnaire
universal du commerce, de la banquet et des manufactures, ed. M. Montbrion (Paris: Adolphe Delahays, 1850), 4th edition, vol.
1, p. 182.
[331] The suspension of specie payment (gold) upon demand by holders of paper
money is called "cours forcé” in French. The Bank of England suspended
specie payments for notes between 1797 and 1819. It was during this period
that David Ricardo published his The
High Price of Bullion (1810) </title/204/38448> which attributed
the inflationary price rises to the over issue of paper money during the
suspension of spice by the bank. The Bank of France was modeled on the
Bank of England and was founded as a private bank in 1800 with Napoleon
as one of the shareholders. It was granted a monopoly in issuing currency
in 1803. Payment in specie upon demand was suspended twice in the 19th
century, both times during revolutions - 1848-1850 and 1870-1875. See,
Coquelin, "Cours forcé” DEP,
vol. 1, p. 493.
[332] See
Molinari’s long footnote 2 at the end of the chapter.
[333] Molinari uses the expression “féodalité financière” which we have translated
as “finance feudalism”, which seems appropriate coming from the mouth of
the Socialist since the term “finance capitalism” was coined by Marxist
critics of the capitalist system, e.g. Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapitialismus.
Eine Studie zur jüngsten Entwicklung des Kapitalismus (Finance Capitlism: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalism) (Vienna,
1910).
[334] This is one of the half dozen or so references in the Soirées to the
doctrine of “laissez-faire” or the idea that there should be no government
intervention in economic matters whatsoever. [See the glossary entry on
“Laissez-faire” and Molinari’s use of this expression throughout Les Soirées.]
[335] Joseph Garnier discusses the regulation of the bakery business in
"Boulangerie,” DEP,
vol. 1 pp. 124-200. Although this industry was substantially deregulated
as part of the sweeping reforms of March 1791 it was quickly re-regulated
out of fear of rising bread prices. All regimes since the Revolution continued
to regulate bakeries by limiting the number who could enter the trade, the
amount of emergency reserves of flour they had to keep on hand, the level
of taxation of bread, and regulations concerning home-baking and baking for
the needs of the military. The result according to Garnier was an industry
that was "as abusive and barbarous as during the time of the corporations
(under the old regime)."
[336] The printing industry was deregulated by the law of March 1791 but was
re-regulated under Napoleon in 1810. The main method of controlling the
industry was to limit severely the number of those who enter the field
and to impose high levels of money deposits which had to lodged with the
government in case they infringed the censorship laws.
[337] Prostitution was legal in France until 1946 though heavily regulated.
A
"maison de tolérance" (brothel) could be established with the permission
of the police and health authorities on condition that the
"femmes publiques" (prostitutes) undergo regular health inspections
(at least once every two weeks) and carry at all times an identity card which
they had to present to police upon demand. Males could not own brothels so
they were run by a manager ("directrice" or madam) who had silent
partners (usually men) who would put up the capital for the business. As
setting up a
"maison" fully furnished was expensive many women preferred to
freelance ("prostitution interlope") by renting cheap rooms ("hotel
garni" or “maison garnie”) and working from there, thus avoiding surveillance
by the health inspectors as well as the madam. This was illegal under a police
ordinance of 6 November 1778 which was revived in the Law of 30 September
1828. Boarding house owners who rented such rooms were liable to a 500 livres
fine. Molinari calls the individuals who run brothels
"entrepreneurs de prostitution" (entrepreneurs in the prostitution
business) which suggests that he thinks they are running a business much
like many others which provide a voluntary service to customers but which
are heavily regulated by the government, with unfortunate consequences. Parent-Duchâtelet
has published a copy of an ID card issued to prostitutes with a long list
of "Obligations and Prohibitions" (vol. 1, p. 686). [See, Alexandre-Jean-Baptiste
Parent-Duchâtelet, De la prostitution
dans la ville de Paris considérée sous le rapport de l'hygiène publique,
de la morale et de l'administration. 3e édition complétée par des documents
nouveaux et des notes par MM. A. Trébuchet et Poirat-Duval (Paris: J.-B. Baillière et fils, 1857). 2 vols.]
[338] By the Decree of 18 May 1806 funerals were made a monopoly of the Church
(Fabriques et Consistoires). In the late 1830s criticism of the cost and
the way services were carried out led to the municipal government of the
city of Paris taking this power away from the church and granting it to
a private citizen in 1838, a M. Baudouin. One of the charges against the
church was that in the case of the death of children, parents were changed
for a single service but several children were placed in the same carriage
at the same time. This did not stop the complaints as others who wanted
the right to conduct funerals, such as Vafflard and Pector, challenged
Baudouin's business practices during the early 1840s (such as using only
2 bearers when the law required 4) and were eventually able to replace
him. [See, Alfred Des Cilleuls, Histoire
de l'adminstration parisienne au XIXe siècle. Volume 2: Période 1830-1870 (Paris: H. Champion, 1900), pp. 472-74.]
[339] The Père-Lachaise cemetery is the largest cemetery in Paris and has the
tombs of many famous French people. An expansion in 1850 more than doubled
its size and made room for over 70,000 graves. It is named after Père La
Chaise who was the confessor to King Louis XIV. The land which had once
been owned by the Jesuit order was turned into a public cemetery under
Napoleon in 1804. This is the cemetery where Molinari was finally laid
to rest in 1912.
[340] In Bastiat's "Theft by Subsidy” (JDE, January 1846) published in Economic Harmonies
Series 2 he parodies a parody by Molière in Le
Malade imaginaire (The Imaginary Invalid) concerning the practices of 17th
century doctors. It is supposed to be part of the ceremony granting a degree
of Doctor of medicine and hence the right to practice. Here is Molière's
dog latin followed by a translation: Ego, cum isto boneto Venerabili
et doctor, Don tibi et concedo Virtutem et puissanciam Medicandi, Purgandi,
Seignandi, Perçandi, Taillandi, Coupandi, Et occidendi Impune per
total terram. [I give and grant you Power and authority to Practice Medicine,
Purge, Bleed, Stab, Hack, Slash, and Kill With impunity throughout
the whole world.] Bastiat writes his own version of the parody for would-be
tax collectors: Dono tibi et concedo Virtutem et puissantiam, Volandi,
Pillandi, Derobandi, Filoutandi, Et escroquandi, Impune per totam istam
Viam. [I give to you and I grant virtue and power to steal, to plunder,
to filch, to swindle, to defraud At will, along this whole road].
[341] See
Molinari’s long footnote 3 at the end of the chapter.
[342] Recueil
général des lois et des arrêts, en matière civile, criminelle, commerciale
et de droit public; par J.-B. Sirey et L.-M. de Villeneuve, An 1833 (Paris: M. Bachelier,
1833). "Loi sur l'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique".
Titre premier. - Dispositions préliminaires. Article 3, p. 349-50.
[343] DMH
-During Napoleon's Empire the French legal system went through major changes,
first with the introduction of the "Code civile” (the Civil or Napoleonic
Code) in 1804, in which Napoleon took a personal interest, and secondly
with the "Code de commerce” (Commercial Code) in 1807. The Commercial
Code regulated everything from the conduct of merchants, contracts, the
structure of businesses, banks, insurance, bankruptcy, and credit. [See,
Paul Pradier-Fodéré, Précis
de Droit Commercial contenant l'explication des articles du Code de Commerce
et des lois commerciales les plus récentes, la discussion résumée des questions
controversées et des modèles de formules, précédé d'une introduction et
suivi d'une table analytique des matières. 2nd ed. (Paris: Guillaumin & Cie, 1866).]
[344] Bearer bills are banknotes or other exchangeable notes requiring only
delivery to become the exchangeable property of whoever receives them.
They do not have to be endorsed.
[345] Jean-Baptiste
Say, Oeuvres
diverses: contenant Catéchisme d'économie politique, Fragments et opuscules
inédits, Correspondance générale, Olbie, Petit volume, Mélanges de morale
et de littérature, précédées d'une notice historique sur la vie et les
travaux de l'auteur, avec des notes par Ch. Comte,
E. Daire et Horace Say (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848). (Volume 12 of Collection
des principaux économistes), pp. 516-19.
[346] Michel
Chevalier, De
la liberté aus États-Unis (Paris: Capelle, 1849), chap. V. “La liberté des professions...”,
pp. 30-32.
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