Front Page Titles (by Subject) BOOK XXVIII. - The History of Rome, Vol. 4
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BOOK XXVIII. - Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Vol. 4 [10 AD]
The History of Rome by Titus Livius. Translated from the Original with Notes and Illustrations by George Baker, A.M.. First American, from the Last London Edition, in Six Volumes (New York: Peter A. Mesier et al., 1823). Vol. 4.
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Successful operations against the Carthaginians, in Spain, under Silanus, Scipio’s lieutenant, and L. Scipio, his brother; of Sulpicius and Attalus, against Philip King of Macedonia. Scipio finally vanquishes the Carthaginians in Spain, and reduces that whole country; passes over into Africa; forms an alliance with Syphax King of Numidia; represses and punishes a mutiny of a part of his army; concludes a treaty of friendship with Masinissa; returns to Rome, and is elected consul; solicits Africa for his province, which is opposed by Quintus Fabius Maximus; is appointed governor of Sicily, with permission to pass over into Africa.
Y.R.545. 207.I. AT the time when, in consequence of Hasdrubal’s removing his forces, Spain seemed to be relieved of so much of the burden of the war as had been thrown upon Italy, hostilities suddenly revived there with the same violence as before. The possessions of the Romans and Carthaginians in Spain, at that time, were thus situated: Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, had withdrawn quite to the ocean and Gades; the coast of our sea, and almost all that part of Spain which lies to the eastward, was under the power of Scipio, and the dominion of the Romans. Hanno, on the tenth day to Hasdrubal in the province of Gades: the Celtiberian soldiers, being newly levied, dispersed into the neighbouring woods, and thence escaped to their respective homes. By this seasonable victory, was suppressed a war, which was not of so much importance on account of its present magnitude, as of its being a foundation from which one much more considerable might have arisen, had the enemy been allowed, after having roused the Celtiberians to arms, to persuade the other states to join in the same cause. Scipio, therefore, having bestowed liberal commendations on Silanus, and seeing reason to hope that he might be able to finish the dispute at once, by exerting himself with proper activity, advanced into Farther Spain against Hasdrubal. The Carthaginian, (who happened at that time to have his army in Bætica, for the purpose of securing the fidelity of his allies in that country,) decamping hastily, led it away, in a manner much more resembling a flight than a march, quite to the ocean and Gades. He was fearful, however, that as long as he kept his forces together, he should be considered as the primary object of the enemy’s operations. Before he passed over the streight to Gades, he therefore dispersed them into the different cities; in the view, likewise, that they might provide for their own safety by help of walls, and for that of the towns by their arms.
III. When Scipio found that the enemy’s troops were thus widely scattered, and that the carrying about his own to each of the several cities would be a very tedious if not difficult work, he marched back his army. Unwilling, however, to leave the possession of all that country to the Carthaginians, he sent his brother, Lucius Scipio, with ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, to lay siege to the most considerable city in those parts, called by the barbarians Orinx, situate on the borders of the Milesians, a Spanish nation so called—a desirable spot, the adjacent parts affording mines of silver, and the soil being fruitful. This place served Hasdrubal as a fortress, whence he used to make incursions on the states around. Scipio encamped near to it. Before raising his works of circumvallation, however, he sent some persons to the gates to try the disposition of the inhabitants in a conference, and to recommend to them rather to make trial of the friendship than the power of the Romans. As their answers showed no inclination to peace, he surrounded the city with a trench and a double rampart; breaking his army into three parts, in order that one division might always carry on the attack while the other two rested. When the first of these began the assault, the contest was furious and desperate: it was with the greatest difficulty that they could approach, or bring up the ladders to the walls, on account of the showers of weapons which fell upon them; and even of those who had raised them, some were tumbled down with forks made for the purpose, others found themselves in danger of being caught by iron grapples, and of being dragged up on the wall. When Scipio saw that his men were too few to make an impression, and that the enemy, from the advantage of their works, had even the better of the dispute, he called off the first division, and attacked with the two others at once. This struck such terror into the besieged, already fatigued, that not only the townsmen quickly forsook the walls, but the Carthaginian garrison, fearing that the town had been betrayed, likewise left their posts and collected themselves into a body. The inhabitants, upon this, were seized with apprehensions lest the enemy, if they broke into the town, should put to the sword every one they met without distinction, whether Carthaginian or Spaniard. They instantly, therefore, threw open one of the gates, and rushed out of the town in crowds, holding their shields before them, lest any weapons should be cast at them, and stretching out their right hands expanded, to show that they had thrown away their swords. Whether this latter circumstance was unobserved on account of the distance, or whether some stratagem was suspected, is uncertain; but the deserters were attacked as enemies, and put to death. Through this gate the troops marched into the city in hostile array. The other gates were broke open with axes and sledges, and as soon as the horsemen entered, they galloped forward to secure the Forum, for such were the orders; the veterans also were joined to the horse to support them. The legionary soldiers spread themselves all over the city, but, neither slew nor plundered any, except those who stood on their defence. All the Carthaginians were put into confinement, with above three hundred of the inhabitants who had shut the gates; the rest had the town delivered up to them, and their effects restored. There fell in the assault, of the enemy, about two thousand; of the Romans, not more than ninety.
IV. As the capture of this city afforded matter of much exultation to those engaged in it, so it rendered their approach to the camp a magnificent spectacle to the general and the rest of the army, on account of the immense crowd of prisoners which they drove before them. Scipio, having declared his approbation of his brother’s conduct, and in the highest strains extolled his taking of Orinx as equal to his own taking of Carthage, led back his forces into Hither Spain. The approach of winter put it out of his power either to make an attempt on Gades, or to pursue the army of Hasdrubal, now dispersed in all parts of the province. Dismissing, therefore, the legions to their winter quarters, and sending his brother, Lucius Scipio, with Hanno, the enemy’s general, and other prisoners of distinction, to Rome, he himself retired to Tarraco. During the same year, the Roman fleet, under Marcus Valerius Lævinus, proconsul, sailing over from Sicily to Africa, made extensive devastations in the territories of Utica and Carthage, carrying off plunder from the remotest bounds of the Carthaginian territory, even from under the very walls of Utica. On their return to Sicily, they were met by a Carthaginian fleet, consisting of seventy ships of war; seventeen of these they took, and sunk four; the rest were beaten and dispersed. The Romans, victorious by land and sea, returned to Lilybæum, with immense booty of every kind. The sea being thus cleared of the enemy, abundance of provision was brought to Rome.
V. In the beginning of the summer, during which these transactions passed, Publius Sulpicius, pro-consul, and King Attalus, after having wintered at Ægina as mentioned above, united their fleets, consisting of twenty-three Roman five-banked gallies, and thirty-five belonging to the King, and sailed from thence to Lemnos. Philip also, that he might be prepared for every sort of exertion, whether he should have occasion to oppose the enemy on land or sea, came down to the coast of Demetrias, and appointed a day for his army to assemble at Larissa. On the news of the King’s arrival, embassies from his allies came to Demetrias from all sides: for the Ætolians, elated both by their alliance with the Romans, and by the approach of Attalus, were ravaging the neighbouring states. Not only the Acarnanians, Bœotians, and Eubœans, were under violent apprehensions, but the Achæans also were kept in terror, as well by the hostilities of the Ætolians, as by Machanidas, tyrant of Lacedæmon, who had pitched his camp at a small distance from the borders of the Argives. All these, representing the dangers both on land and sea, with which their several possessions were threatened, implored the King’s assistance. Philip, even from his own kingdom, received accounts that affairs there were not in a state of tranquillity; that both Scerdilædus and Pleuratus were in motion; and that some of the Thracians, particularly the Mædians, would certainly make incursions into the adjoining provinces of Macedonia, if the King should be employed in a distant war. The Bœotians, indeed, and the people of the inland parts of Greece, informing him that, in order to prevent them from passing to the assistance of the allied states, the streights of Thermopylæ, where the road is confined, and contracted to a very narrow breadth, had been shut up by the Ætolians with a ditch and a rampart. Such a number of disturbances on all sides were sufficient to rouse even an indolent leader: he dismissed the ambassadors with promises of assisting them all, as time and circumstances would permit. He sent to Peparethus a garrison for the city, a business which required the utmost despatch, accounts having been received from thence, that Attalus had sailed over from Lemnos, and was ravaging all the country round. He despatched Polyphantas, with a small number of forces to Bœotia; and likewise Menippus, one of the officers of his guards, with one thousand targeteers, (the target is not unlike the common buckler,) to Calchis. Agrianum was reinforced with five hundred men, that all parts of the island might be secured. He himself went to Scotussa, ordering the Macedonian troops to be brought over thither from Larissa. He was there informed that the Ætolians had been summoned to an assembly at Heraclea, and that King Attalus was to come to consult with them on the conduct of the war. Resolving to disturb this meeting by his sudden approach, he led his army by forced marches to Heraclea, and arrived there just after the assembly had been dismissed. However, he destroyed the crops, which were almost ripe, particularly round the Ænian bay. He then led back his forces to Scotussa, and leaving there the body of his army, retired with the royal guards to Demetrias. That he might be in readiness to meet every effort of the enemy, he sent people from hence to Phocis, and Eubœa, and Peparethus, to choose out elevated situations, where fires being lighted, might be seen from afar. He fixed a beacon on Tisæum, a mountain whose summit is of an immense height, that by means of lights on these eminences, whenever the enemy made any attempt, he might, though distant, receive instant intelligence of it. The Roman general and King Attalus passed over from Peparethus to Nicæa, and from thence sailed to the city of Orcus, which is the first city of Eubœa, on the left, on the way from the bay of Demetrias to Chalcis and the Euripus.
VI. It was concerted between Attalus and Sulpicius, that the Romans should assault the town on the side next the sea, and at the same time make an attack on the King’s forces on the land side. Four days after the arrival of the fleet, the operations began. The intermediate time had been spent in private conferences with Plator, who had been appointed by Philip to the command of the place. There are two citadels, one hanging over the coast, the other in the middle of the town, and from this there is a subterraneous passage to the ocean, the entrance of which, next to the sea, is covered with a strong fortification, a tower five stories in height. Here the contest first commenced, and that with the utmost violence, the tower being well stored with all kinds of weapons; these, with engines and machines for the assault, having been landed from the ships. While the attention and eyes of all were drawn to that side, Plator, opening one of the gates, received the Romans into the citadel next the sea, of which they became masters in a moment. The inhabitants, driven thence, fled to the other citadel in the middle of the city; but troops had been posted there, to keep the gates shut against them, so that, being thus excluded and surrounded, they were all either slain or taken prisoners. In the mean time the Macedonian garrison, making no resistance, stood in a compact body under the walls. These men Plator (having obtained leave from Sulpicius) embarked in some ships, and landed them at Demetrias in Phthiotis; he himself withdrew to Attalus. Sulpicius, elated by his success at Oreum, so easily obtained, proceeded with his victorious fleet to Chalcis, where the issue by no means answered his expectations. The sea, from being pretty wide at each side, is here contracted into a streight so very narrow, that at first view the whole appears like two harbours facing the two entrances of the Euripus. A more dangerous station for a fleet can hardly be found; for besides that the winds rush down suddenly, and with great fury, from the high mountains on each side, the streight itself of the Euripus does not ebb and flow seven times a day at stated hours, as report says; but the current, changing irregularly, like the wind, from one point to another, is hurried along like a torrent tumbling from a steep mountain; so that, night or day, ships can never lie quiet. But, besides the perilous situation in which his fleet lay, he found that the town was firm and impregnable; surrounded on one side by the sea, extremely well fortified by land on the other; secured by a strong garrison, and, above all, by the fidelity of the commanders and principal inhabitants; which character those at Oreum had not supported with honour or steadiness. The Roman, in a business rashly undertaken, acted so far prudently, that, when he had seen all the difficulties attending it, not to waste time, he quickly desisted from the attempt, removing with his fleet from thence to Cynus in Locris, the landing-place for the city of Opus, which lies at a distance of a mile from the sea.
VII. Philip had received notice from Oreum by the signal fires; but, through the treachery of Plator, it was too late when they were raised on the beacons, and, as he was not a match for the enemy at sea, it was difficult for him to approach the island; he hesitated, therefore, and took no part in that business. To the relief of Chalcis he flew with alacrity, as soon as he perceived the signal. For though Chalcis stands on the same island, yet the streight which separates it from the continent is so narrow, that there is a communication between them by a bridge, and the approach to it is easier by land than by water. Philip, therefore, having gone from Demetrias to Scotussa, and setting out thence at the third watch, dislodged the guard, routed the Ætolians who kept possession of the pass of Thermopylæ, and drove the dismayed enemy to Heraclea, accomplishing in one day a march of above sixty miles to Elatia in Phocis. About the same time the city of Opus was taken and plundered by Attalus. Sulpicius had given it up to the King, because Oreum had been sacked a few days before by the Roman soldiers, and his men had received no share. After the Roman fleet had retired to Oreum, Attalus, not apprised of Philip’s approach, wasted time in levying contributions from the principal inhabitants; and so unexpected was his coming, that, had not some Cretans, who happened to go in quest of forage farther from the town than usual, espied the enemy, he might have been surprised. Without arms, and in the utmost confusion, he fled precipitately to his ships. Just as they were putting off from the land, Philip came up, and though he did not advance from the shore, yet his arrival caused a good deal of confusion among the mariners. From thence he returned to Opus, inveighing against gods and men for his disappointment in having the opportunity of striking so important a blow thus snatched from him, and when almost within reach of his arm. The Opuntians, also, he rebuked in angry terms, because, although they might have prolonged the siege until he arrived, yet they had immediately, on sight of the enemy, made almost a voluntary surrender. Having put affairs at Opus in order, he proceeded thence to Thronium. On the other side, Attalus at first retired to Oreum, but having heard there, that Prusias, King of Bithynia, had invaded his kingdom, he laid aside all attention to the affairs of the Romans and the Ætolian war, and passed over into Asia. Sulpicius, too, withdrew his fleet to Ægina, from whence he had set out in the beginning of spring. Philip found as little difficulty in possessing himself of Thronium, as Attalus had met at Opus. This city was inhabited by foreigners, natives of Thebes in Phthiotis, who, when their own was taken by the Macedonian, had fled for protection to the Ætolians, and had obtained from them a settlement in this place, which had been laid waste and deserted in the former war with the same Philip. After recovering Thronium in the manner related, he continued his route; and having taken Tritonos and Drymæ, inconsiderable towns of Doris, he came thence to Elatia, where he had ordered the ambassadors of Ptolemy and the Rhodians to wait for him. While they were deliberating there, on the method of putting an end to the Ætolian war, (for the ambassadors had been present at the late assembly of the Romans and Ætolians at Heraclea,) news was brought that Machanidas intended to attack the people of Elis while they were busied in preparations for solemnizing the Olympic games. Judging it incumbent on him to prevent such an attempt, he dismissed the ambassadors with a favourable answer, that “he had neither given cause for the war, nor would give any obstruction to a peace, provided it could be procured on just and honourable terms:” then, proceeding through Bœotia by quick marches, he came down to Megara, and from thence to Corinth; and, receiving there supplies of provision, repaired to Phlius and Pheneus. When he had advanced as far as Heræa, intelligence was brought him that Machanidas, terrified at the account of his approach, had retreated to Lacedæmon; on which he withdrew to Ægium, where the Achæans were assembled in council, expecting at the same time to meet there a Carthaginian fleet which he had sent for, in order that he might be able to undertake some enterprise by sea. But the Carthaginians had left that place a few days before, and were gone to the Oxean islands; and from thence, (on hearing that the Romans and Attalus had left Oreum,) to the harbours of the Acarnanians; for they apprehended that an attack was intended against themselves, and that they might be overpowered while within the streights of Rhios (so the entrance of the Corinthian bay is called.)
VIII. Philip was filled with grief and vexation when he found that, although he had on all occasions made the most spirited and speedy exertions, yet fortune had baffled his activity, by snatching away every advantage when he had it within his view. In the assembly, however, concealing his chagrin, he spoke with great confidence, appealing to gods and men, that “at no time or place had he ever been remiss; that wherever the sound of the enemy’s arms was heard, thither he had instantly repaired; but that it could hardly be determined, whether, in the management of the war, his forwardness or the enemy’s cowardice was more conspicuous; in such a dastardly manner had Attalus slipped out of his hands from Opus; Sulpicius from Chalcis; and in the same way, within these few days, Machanidas. That flight, however, did not always succeed; and that a war should not be accounted difficult, in which victory would be certain if the foe could be brought to a regular engagement. One advantage, however, and that of the first magnitude, he had already acquired; the confession of the enemy themselves, that they were not a match for him; in a short time,” he said, “he should have to boast of undoubted conquest; for whenever the enemy would meet him in the field, they should find the issue no better than they seemed to expect.” This discourse of the King was received by the allies with great pleasure. He then gave up to the Achæans Heræa and Triphylia. Aliphera he restored to the Megalopolitans, they having produced sufficient evidence that it belonged to their territories. Having received some vessels from the Achæans, three gallies of four, and three of two banks of oars, he sailed to Anticyra; from thence, with seven ships of five banks, and above twenty barks, which he had sent to the bay of Corinth to join the Carthaginian fleet, he proceeded to Erythræ, a town of the Ætolians near Eupalium, and there made a descent. He was not unobserved by the Ætolians; for all who were either in the fields, or in the neighbouring forts of Apollonia and Potidania, fled to the woods and mountains. The cattle, which they could not drive off in their hurry, were seized and put on board. With these, and the other booty, he sent Nicias, prætor of the Achæans, to Ægium; and, going to Corinth, he ordered his army to march by land through Bœotia, while he himself, sailing from Cenchrea, along the coast of Attica, round the promontory of Sunium, reached Chalcis, after passing almost through the middle of the enemy’s fleet. Having highly commended the fidelity and bravery of the inhabitants, in not suffering either fear or hope to influence their minds, and having exhorted them to persevere in maintaining the alliance with the same constancy, if they preferred their present situation to that of the inhabitants of Oreum and Opus, he sailed to Oreum; and having there conferred the direction of affairs, and the command of the city, on such of the chief inhabitants as had chosen to fly rather than surrender to the Romans, he sailed over from Eubœa to Demetrias, from whence he had at first set out to assist his allies. Soon after, he laid the keels of one hundred ships of war at Cassandria, collecting a great number of ship-carpenters to finish the work; and, as the seasonable assistance which he had afforded his allies in their distress, and the departure of Attalus, had restored tranquillity in the affairs of Greece, he withdrew into his own kingdom, with an intention of making war on the Dardanians.
IX. Towards the end of the summer, during which these transactions passed in Greece, Quintus Fabius, son of Maximus, who served as lieutenant-general, brought a message from Marcus Livius, the consul, to the senate at Rome, in which he gave it as his opinion, that Lucius Porcius with his legions was sufficient to secure the province of Gaul, and that he himself might depart thence, and the consular army be withdrawn. On which the senate ordered not only Marcus Livius, but his colleague also, Caius Claudius, to return to the city. In their decree, they made only this difference,—that Marcus Livius’s army be withdrawn, but that Nero’s legions remain in the province to oppose Hannibal. It had been concerted between the consuls, by letter, that as they had been of one mind in the management of affairs, so they should arrive together at one time in the city, though they were to come from different quarters; whichever came first to Præneste being directed to wait there for his colleague. It so happened that they both arrived at that town on the same day; and then, having sent forward a proclamation, requiring a full meeting of the senate in the temple of Bellona, on the third day after, they advanced towards the city, from whence the whole multitude poured out to meet them. The surrounding crowds were not satisfied with saluting them, though but at a little distance; each pressed eagerly forward to touch the victorious hands of the consuls; some congratulating, others giving them thanks for having, by their valour, procured safety to the state. In the senate, having given a recital of their exploits, according to the usual practice of commanders of armies, they demanded that, “on account of their bravery and success in the conduct of affairs, due honours might be paid to the immortal gods; and they themselves allowed to enter the city in triumph.” To which the senate answered, that “they decreed with pleasure the matters contained in their demand, as a proper return, due, first to the gods, and after the gods, to the consuls.” A thanksgiving in the name of both, and a triumph to each, had been decreed; the consuls, however, wishing that, as their sentiments had been united during the course of the war, their triumphs should not be separated, came to this agreement between themselves,—that, “inasmuch as the business had been accomplished within the province of Marcus Livius, and as, on the day whereon the battle was fought, it happened to be his turn to command, and as the army of Livius had been withdrawn, and was now at Rome, while Nero’s could not be withdrawn from the province; it should on all these accounts be ordered that Marcus Livius make his entry in a chariot, drawn by four horses, attended by the troops; Caius Claudius Nero, on horseback, without troops.” As the uniting of their triumphs in this manner enhanced the glory of both the consuls, so it reflected peculiar honour on him who condescended to appear in the procession, as much inferior to his colleague in magnificence, as he was superior to him in merit. People said, that “the commander on horseback had, in the space of six days, traversed the extent of Italy, and had fought a pitched battle with Hasdrubal in Gaul, on the very day when Hannibal imagined he was lying in his camp opposite to him in Apulia; that thus this single consul (equal to the defence of both extremities of Italy against two armies and two generals) had opposed against one, his skill; against the other, his person. That the very name of Nero had been sufficient to confine Hannibal to his camp; and as to Hasdrubal, by what other means than by the arrival of Nero had he been overwhelmed and cut off? The other consul, therefore, might proceed in his stately chariot; he was drawn, indeed, by a number of horses, but the real triumph belonged to him who had only one; and that Nero, though he should go on foot, deserved to be for ever celebrated, both for having acquired so much glory in the war, and shown so much indifference to the pompous display of it in the present procession.” With such encomiums did the spectators attend Nero through his whole progress to the Capitol. The consuls carried to the treasury three hundred thousand sesterces* in money, and eighty thousand asses† of brass; to the soldiers, Marcus Livius distributed fifty-six asses‡ each. Caius Claudius promised the same sum to his absent troops, as soon as he should return to the army. It was remarked, that the soldiers, on that day, directed more of their military songs and verses to Caius Claudius than to their own commander; that the horsemen distinguished Lucius Veturius and Quintus Cæcilius, lieutenant-generals, by extraordinary praises, exhorting the commons to appoint them consuls for the next year; and that both Livius and Nero added their authority to this recommendation, respresenting next day in the assembly the bravery and fidelity which the said lieutenant-generals had manifested in the service.
X. When the time of the elections arrived, as it had been determined that they should be held by a dictator, the consul Caius Claudius nominated his colleague Marcus Livius to that office. Livius appointed Quintus Cæcilius master of the horse. By Marcus Livius were elected consuls, Lucius Veturius and Quintus Cæcilius, who was then master of the horse. The election of prætors was next held; there were appointed Caius Servilius, Marcus Cæcilius Metellus, Tiberius Claudius Asellus, and Quintus Mamilius Turinus, at that time plebeian ædile. When the elections were finished, the dictator, having laid down his office, and dismissed his army, set out for his province of Etruria, in pursuance of a decree of the senate, in order to make inquiries, what states of the Tuscans or Umbrians had, on the approach of Hasdrubal, formed schemes of revolting to him from the Romans; or who had afforded him men, provisions, or any kind of aid. Such were the transactions of that year at home and abroad. The Roman games were thrice repeated by the curule ædiles, Cneius Servilius Cæpio and Servius Cornelius Lentulus. The plebeian games also were once repeated entire by the plebeian ædiles, Manius Pomponius Matho, and Quintus Mamilius Thurinus.Y.R.546. 206. In the thirteenth year of the Punic war, when Lucius Veturius Philo, and Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, were consuls, they were both appointed to the province of Bruttium, to conduct the war against Hannibal. The prætors then cast lots for their provinces; the business of the city fell to Marcus Cæcilius Metellus; the jurisdiction in relation to foreigners, to Quintus Mamilius; Sicily, to Caius Servilius; and Sardinia, to Tiberius Claudius. The armies were thus distributed: to one of the consuls, that which had been under Caius Claudius, the consul of the former year; to the other, that which had been under Quintus Claudius, proprætor; they consisted each of two legions. It was decreed that Marcus Livius, proconsul, whose command had been prolonged for a year, should receive two legions of volunteer slaves from Caius Terentius, proprætor in Etruria; and that Quintus Mamilius should transfer his judicial employment to his colleague, and take the command in Gaul with the army which had belonged to Lucius Porcius, proprætor; orders at the same time being given him to lay waste the lands of the Gauls, who had revolted on the approach of Hasdrubal. The protection of Sicily was given in charge to Caius Servilius, with the two legions of Cannæ, as Caius Mamilius had held it. From Sardinia, the old army which had served under Aulus Hostilius, was brought home; and the consuls levied a new legion, which Tiberius Claudius was to carry with him. Quintus Claudius and Caius Hostilius Tubulus were continued in command for a year, that the former might hold Tarentum as his province, the latter Capua. Marcus Valerius, proconsul, who had been entrusted with the defence of the sea coasts round Sicily, was ordered to deliver thirty ships to Caius Servilius, and to return home with all the rest of the fleet.
XI. While the public was under much anxiety, on account of the great danger and importance of the war, and ever apt to refer to the gods the causes of all their successes and disappointments, accounts were propagated of a number of prodigies: that, at Tarracina, the temple of Jupiter; at Satricum, that of Mother Matuta, had been struck by lightning; the people being also greatly terrified by two snakes creeping into the former unperceived through the very door. From Antium it was reported, that ears of corn had appeared bloody to the reapers. At Cære, a pig had been littered with two heads, and a lamb yeaned which was of both sexes. It was said also, that two suns had been seen at Alba, and that light had burst forth on a sudden during the night time at Fregellæ. An ox, it was asserted, had spoken in the neighbourhood of Rome; and a profuse sweat had flowed from the altar of Neptune, in the Flaminian Circus; and also, that the temples of Ceres, Safety, and Romulus, were struck by lightning. These prodigies the consuls were ordered to expiate with the greater victims, and to perform a solemn supplication to the gods during one day; all which was strictly observed in pursuance of a decree of the senate. But what struck more terror into men’s minds than all these ominous and preternatural appearances, at home or abroad, was the extinction of the fire in the temple of Vesta, and for which the vestal who had the watch for that night was whipped to death, by order of the pontiff Publius Licinius. Although this extinction was occasioned, not by the gods directing it as a portent, but by the negligence of a human being, yet it was thought proper that it should be expiated by the greater victims, and that a supplication should be solemnized at the temple of Vesta. Before the consuls set out to the campaign, they received directions from the senate, to “take measures to make the common people return to their lands in the country, where they might now reside in safety, as, by the favour of the gods, the war had been removed to a distance from the city of Rome, and from Latium; for it was quite inconsistent to pay more attention to the cultivation of Sicily than to that of Italy.” It was, however, no easy matter to obtain a compliance with this injunction: the labourers of free condition were most of them lost in the war, slaves were scarce, the cattle had been carried off in booty, and their dwellings thrown down or burnt. Nevertheless a great number, compelled by the authority of the consuls, returned as directed. The mention of this affair had been occasioned by deputies from Placentia and Cremona, who complained that incursions were made on them by the neighbouring Gauls; that a great part of their settlers had dispersed; that their cities were thinly inhabited, and their territory waste and deserted. A charge was given to the prætor Mamilius, to protect the colonies from the enemy. The consuls, in pursuance of the decree of the senate, issued an edict, that all the citizens of Cremona and Placentia should return before a certain day to those colonies; and then, in the beginning of the spring, they set out to carry on the war. Quintus Cæcilius, consul, received his army from Caius Nero; Lucius Veturius, his from Quintus Claudius, proprætor, he filling it up with the new levies which himself had raised. They led their forces into the territory of Consentia. Here, having made great ravages, the troops, now loaded with spoil, were thrown into such confusion, in a narrow pass, by some Bruttians and Numidian spearmen, that not only that spoil, but themselves were in extreme danger. However, there was more tumult than fighting: the booty was sent forward, and the legions without loss made their way to places of safety. From thence they advanced against the Lucanians, which whole nation returned, without a contest, into subjection to the Roman people.
XII. No action took place during that year between them and Hannibal; for the Carthaginian, after the deep wound so lately given both to his own private, and to the public welfare, cautiously avoided throwing himself in their way; and the Romans did not choose to rouse him from his inactivity: such powers did they suppose that leader possessed of, in his single person, though all things round him were falling into ruin. In truth, I know not whether he was more deserving of admiration in adversity or in prosperity; considering, that, though he carried on war for thirteen years, and that in an enemy’s territory so far from home, with various success, with an army, not composed of his own countrymen, but made up of the refuse of all nations, who had neither law, nor custom, nor language in common; who were of different stature, had different garb, different arms, different rites, and almost different gods; yet he so bound them together by some common tie, that neither among themselves nor against their commander, did any sedition ever appear, although, in a hostile country, he often wanted both money to pay them, and provisions also,—wants which, in the former Punic war, had occasioned many distressful scenes between the generals and their men. But, after the destruction of Hasdrubal and his army, on whom he had reposed all his hopes of victory; and when he had given up the possession of all the rest of Italy, and withdrawn into a corner of Bruttium, must it not appear wonderful to all, that no disturbance arose in his camp? For there was this afflicting circumstance in addition to all his other difficulties, that he had no hope of being able even to procure food for his soldiers, except from the lands of Bruttium; which, if they were entirely under tillage, were too small for the support of so large an army. Besides, the war had employed a great part of the young men, and carried them away from the cultivation of the grounds; a base practice likewise prevailing through the whole nation, of making plundering excursions on every side; nor were there any remittances made him from home, where the whole attention of the public was engaged in endeavouring to keep possession of Spain, as if affairs in Italy were all in a state of prosperity. In the former, the fortune of the parties was, in one respect, the same; in another, widely different: the same so far, that the Carthaginians, being defeated in battle, and having lost their general, had been driven to the remotest coast of the country, even to the ocean; but different in this, that Spain, in the nature both of the ground and of the inhabitants, affords greater conveniences for reviving a war, not only than Italy, but than any other part of the world; and that was the reason, that although this was the first of all the provinces on the continent in which the Romans got footing, yet it was the last subdued; and that not until the present age, under the conduct and auspices of Augustus Cæsar. In this country Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, a general of the greatest abilities and character next to the Barcine family, returning now from Gades, and being encouraged to a renewal of the war by Mago, the son of Hamilcar, armed to the number of fifty thousand foot, and four thousand five hundred horse, by levies made in the Farther Spain. In the number of his cavalry authors are pretty well agreed; of the infantry, according to some, there were seventy thousand led to the city of Silpia. There the two Carthaginian generals sat down in an extensive plain, determined not to avoid a battle.
XIII. When Scipio received the account of this army being assembled, he saw plainly, that, with the Roman legions alone, he could not oppose so great a multitude; nor without using the auxiliary troops of the barbarians, at least for the purpose of making a show of strength; but that, at the same time, it was highly improper that they should compose such a proportion of his force as might enable them, by changing sides, to produce consequences of importance—an event which had caused the destruction of his father and uncle. Sending forward, therefore, Silanus to Colca, who was sovereign of twenty-eight towns, to receive from him the horse and foot which he had engaged to raise during the winter; he set out himself from Tarraco, and collecting small bodies of auxiliaries from the allies who lay near his road, proceeded to Castulo. Hither Silanus brought three thousand auxiliary foot, and five hundred horse. From thence he advanced to the city of Bæcula, his army amounting, in the whole of his countrymen and allies, horse and foot, to forty-five thousand. While they were forming their camp, Mago and Masinissa, with the whole of their cavalry, made an attack on them, and would have dispersed the workmen, had not some horsemen whom Scipio had concealed behind a hill, conveniently situated for the purpose, suddenly rushed out as they advanced to the charge. These, at the first onset, routed all who had pushed on foremost against the men employed in the fortification. The contest with the rest, who advanced on their march drawn up in regular order, was longer and for some time doubtful. But the light cohorts from the outposts, the soldiers called off from the works, and afterwards greater numbers, who were ordered to take arms, came up fresh, and engaged the wearied enemy. At the same time, a large body rushed in arms from the camp to battle. The Carthaginians and Numidians then fairly turned their backs; and though at first they retreated in troops, and without breaking their ranks, yet when the Romans fell furiously on their rear, they thought no more of order, but fled precipitately, and dispersed into such places as each found convenient. Although by this battle the spirits of the Romans were somewhat raised, and those of the enemy depressed, yet for several following days the horsemen and light troops were continually engaged in skirmishes.
XIV. After making trial of their strength in these slight engagements, Hasdrubal led his forces to the field; then the Romans marched out. Both armies stood in order of battle under their respective ramparts, neither party choosing to begin the attack; when it was near sunset, the Carthaginians first, and then the Romans, marched back into camp. They acted in the same manner for several days, the Carthaginian always drawing out his troops first, and first giving the signal of retreat, when they were fatigued with standing. Neither side advanced in the least, nor was a weapon discharged, nor a word uttered. The centre divisions of their lines were composed, on one side, of Romans; on the other, of Carthaginians and African auxiliaries: the wings were formed by the allies, who on both sides were Spaniards. In front of the Carthaginian line, the elephants at a distance appeared like castles. It was now generally said in both camps, that they were to engage in the same order in which they had stood before; and that their centres, consisting of Romans and Carthaginians, who were principals in the war, would no doubt encounter each other with equal courage and strength of arms. When Scipio understood that this opinion was firmly entertained, he took care to alter the whole plan against the day on which he intended to fight. On the preceding evening, therefore, he gave out orders through the camp, that the men and horses should be refreshed and accoutred before day; and that the horsemen, ready armed, should keep their horses bridled and saddled. Before it was clear day, he despatched all the cavalry and light infantry, with orders to charge the Carthaginian outposts; and immediately advanced himself with the heavy body of the legions, having, contrary to the expectation both of his own men and the enemy, strengthened the wings with his Roman troops, and drawn the allies into the centre. Hasdrubal was alarmed by the shout of the cavalry, and, springing out from his tent, saw a bustle before the rampart, his men in hurry and confusion, the glittering standards of the legions at a distance, and the plain filled with troops. He immediately despatched all his cavalry against that of the enemy, marching himself from out the camp with the body of infantry; but, in drawing up his line, he made no alteration in the original disposition. The contest between the horse had continued a long time doubtful, nor could they decide it by their own efforts, because, when either were repulsed, which happened to both in turn, they found a safe refuge among the infantry. But, when the armies had approached within five hundred paces of each other, Scipio, giving the signal for retreat, and opening his files, received all the cavalry and light troops through them; and, forming them in two divisions, placed them in reserve behind the wings. When he saw that it was time to begin the engagement, he ordered the Spaniards, who composed the centre, to advance with a slow pace, and sent directions from the right wing, where he commanded in person, to Silanus and Marcius, to extend their wing on the left, in the same manner as they should see him stretching on the right, and attack the enemy with the light-armed forces of horse and foot before the centres could close. The wings extending in this manner, three cohorts of foot, and three troops of horse from each, together with the light infantry, advanced briskly against the enemy, while the rest followed them in an oblique direction. There was a bending in the centre, because the battalions of Spaniards advanced slower than the wings, and the wings had already encountered, while the principal strength of the enemy’s line, the Carthaginian veterans and Africans, were still at such a distance, that they could not throw their javelins with effect, nor did they dare to make detachments to the wings, to support those who were engaged, for fear of opening the centre to the forces advancing against it. The Carthaginian wings were hard pressed, being attacked on all sides; for the horse and foot, together with the light infantry, wheeling round, fell in upon their flanks, while the cohorts pressed on them in front, in order to separate the wings from the rest of the line.
XV. The battle was now very unequal in all parts; not only because an irregular multitude of Balearians and undisciplined Spanish recruits were opposed to the Roman and Latine troops, but, as the day advanced, Hasdrubal’s troops began to grow faint, having been surprised by the alarm in the morning, and obliged to hasten out to the field before they could take food to support their strength. With a view to this, Scipio had taken care to create delay, for it was not until the seventh hour that the battalions of foot fell upon the wings, and the battle reached the centre somewhat later; so that, before the enemy began regularly to engage, they were enfeebled by the heat of the meridian sun, the labour of standing under arms, and by hunger and thirst, distressing them at once. They stood, therefore, leaning on their shields; for, in addition to their other misfortunes, the elephants, terrified at the desultory manner of fighting used by the horse and the light infantry, had thrown themselves from the wings upon the centre. Harassed thus greatly, both in body and mind, they began to give way, but still preserved their ranks, as if the whole army were retreating by order of the general. The victors, perceiving the superiority which they had gained, redoubled the fury of their assault on all sides, so that the shock could hardly be sustained. Hasdrubal, however, endeavoured to stop his men, crying out that “the hills in the rear would afford a safe refuge, if they would but retreat without hurry;” yet fear overcame their shame, and although such as were nearest the enemy still continued to fight, they quickly turned their backs, and all betook themselves to a hasty flight. They halted, however, for a time, at the foot of the hills, endeavouring to restore order, while the Romans hesitated to advance their line against the opposite steep. But, when they saw the battalions pressing forward briskly, they renewed their flight, and were driven in a panic within their works. The Romans were not far from the rampart; and, continuing their efforts, had nearly surmounted it, when such a quantity of rain poured suddenly down, that it was with difficulty they regained their camp. The sun too, had been excessively hot, as is usually the case when shining forth from among clouds surcharged with water; which added greatly to the fatigues of the day. Some were even seized with a religious scruple against attempting any thing farther at that time. Though both night and the rain invited the Carthaginians to take the repose so necessary to them, yet fear and the impending danger would not admit of it; and as they had reason to expect an assault from the enemy at the first light, they raised the height of the rampart with stones collected from the adjacent vallies, endeavouring to secure themselves by fortifications, since they found no protection in their arms. But the desertion of their allies soon gave them reason to think, that it was the safer way to fly. The beginning of this revolt arose from Attanes, prince of the Turdetans, who deserted with a great number of his countrymen; and afterwards, two fortified towns, with their garrisons, were delivered to the Romans by their commanders. Hasdrubal, dreading, since a disposition to throw off the Carthaginian yoke had once seized their minds, that the evil might spread farther, decamped during the silence of the ensuing night.
XVI. At the first light, the outguards having brought intelligence of the enemy’s departure, Scipio, sending forward the cavalry, gave orders to the army to march; and these were executed with such expedition, that, had they directly pursued the track of the fugitives, they had certainly overtaken them; but they were persuaded by their guides, that there was another and a shorter road to the river Bætis, and where, it was said, they might attack them in their passage. Hasdrubal, finding the ford in possession of the enemy, changed his course, directing it towards the ocean; his army now retreating with precipitancy, so that the Roman legions were left at some distance behind. However, the horse and the light infantry harassed and delayed them, by attacking sometimes their rear, sometimes their flanks; and as they were obliged to halt frequently, on occasion of these interruptions, and to support the attacks, at one time of the horse, at another of the infantry and auxiliary foot, they were overtaken by the legions. The consequence was, not a fight, but a carnage, as of cattle; until at length the general himself, setting the example of a flight, made his escape to the adjacent hills with about six thousand men half armed: the rest were either slain or taken prisoners. The Carthaginians hastily fortified an irregular camp on the highest part of the ground, and defended themselves there without difficulty, the enemy in vain attempting to climb so difficult an ascent. But a blockade, in a place naked and destitute, was hardly to be supported, even for a few days: desertions to the Roman, therefore, were frequent. Hasdrubal having at length procured some ships, and the sea being not far distant, left his army in the night, and fled to Gades. When Scipio was informed of the flight of the general, leaving ten thousand foot and one thousand horse with Silanus for the blockade of the camp, he returned himself with the rest of the forces to Tarraco, where he arrived after a march of seventy days; during which he was employed in examining into the conduct of the petty princes and states, in order that their rewards might be proportioned according to a just estimate of their merits. After his departure, Masinissa having held a private conference with Silanus, passed over with a few of his countrymen into Africa, in order to bring his own nation to participate in the design which he had newly formed. The cause of his sudden change was not at that time well known; but the inviolable fidelity which he ever afterwards preserved towards Rome, through the whole course of a very long life, is sufficient proof that he did not, even then, act without a reasonable motive. Mago went to Gades in the ships which had been sent back by Hasdrubal. Of the rest (thus abandoned by their generals,) some deserted, others fled and dispersed through the neighbouring states; no detachment remaining, considerable either for number or strength. These were the principal events, in consequence of which, under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio, the Carthaginians were compelled to relinquish all footing in Spain, in the thirteenth year from the commencement of hostilities, the fifth from Scipio’s having received the command of the province and of the army. Not long after, Silanus returned to Scipio at Tarraco, with information that the war was at an end.
XVII. Lucius Scipio was employed in conveying to Rome a great many prisoners of distinction, and in carrying the news of the reduction of Spain. While this was considered by all others as a most joyful and glorious event, he alone, by whose means it had been accomplished, insatiable in his pursuit of glory, considered it as a trifle in comparison with those designs which his aspiring mind and sanguine hopes prompted him to conceive. He now directed his views to Africa, regarding the subjugation of Carthage, in all her grandeur, as the consummation of his renown. Deeming it necessary, therefore, to conciliate the friendship of the several African kings and people, he resolved to make the first trial of Syphax, King of the Massæsylians,—a nation bordering on Mauritania, and lying opposite to that part of Spain, particularly, where New Carthage stands. There was an alliance at that time subsisting between this monarch and the Carthaginians. Supposing him, however, not more firmly attached than barbarians usually are, whose fidelity always depends on fortune, Scipio despatched Lælius to him as envoy, with proper presents. Syphax, highly delighted with these, and considering that the Romans were, at that time, every where successful, the Carthaginians unfortunate in Italy, and quite excluded from Spain, consented to embrace the friendship of the Romans, but refused to exchange the ratification of the treaty except with the Roman general in person. Lælius then returned to Scipio, having obtained from the King an engagement merely of safe conduct for him. To him, who aimed at conquests in Africa, the friendship of Syphax was, in every respect, of the utmost importance; he was the most powerful prince in that part of the world, had already opposed even the Carthaginians in war, while his dominions lay very conveniently with respect to Spain, from which they are separated by a narrow streight. Scipio thought the affair of such moment as to warrant the attempt, though attended with considerable danger; since otherwise it could not be accomplished. Leaving, therefore, for the security of Spain, Lucius Marcius at Tarraco, and Marcus Silanus at New Carthage (to which place he himself had made a hasty journey by land,) and setting sail from Carthage with Caius Lælius, in two gallies of five banks, he passed over to Africa, while the sea was so calm, that they generally used their oars, though sometimes they were assisted by a gentle breeze. It happened, that Hasdrubal, at the very same time, after having been driven out of Spain, had entered the harbour with seven gallies of three banks, and having cast anchor, was mooring his ships. On sight of these two five-banked ships, although no one doubted that they belonged to the Romans, and might be overpowered by superior numbers before they entered the harbour, yet nothing ensued except tumult and confusion among the soldiers and sailors, endeavouring to no purpose to get their arms and ships in readiness; for the quinqueremes, having their sails filled by a brisk gale from the sea, were carried into the harbour before the Carthaginians could weigh their anchors, and afterwards, they dared not to raise a disturbance in the King’s port. Having landed, therefore, they proceeded, (Hasdrubal first, then Scipio and Lælius,) on their way to the King.
XVIII. Syphax considered this as a very honourable circumstance (as it really was), that the generals of the two most powerful states of the age, should come, on the same day, to solicit peace and friendship with him. He invited them both to his palace, and as chance had so ordered that they were under the same roof, and in the protection of the same household gods, he endeavoured to bring them to a conference, for the purpose of putting an end to the enmity subsisting between them. Scipio declared, that, in his private capacity, he had not the least ill will to the Carthaginian, which might require a conference to remove it; and with regard to public affairs, he could not enter into any negociation with an enemy without orders from the senate. However, the King showing an earnest desire that he should come to the same table, so that neither of his guests might seem to be excluded, he did not refuse; and they there supped together. Scipio and Hasdrubal, perceiving that it would be agreeable to their entertainer, even reclined upon the same couch during the repast; and so pleasing were the manners of the former, such his pliability on every occasion, and such his engaging conversation, that he acquired the esteem not only of Syphax, a barbarian unacquainted with Roman habits, but even of his inveterate enemy, who, declared publicly, that “he appeared, on acquaintance, more worthy of admiration for his powers in conversation, than for his exploits in war; that he made no doubt, but Syphax and his kingdom would soon be under the direction of the Romans. Such address was that man possessed of, in acquiring an ascendancy over people’s minds, that the Carthaginians were not more intent, at present, in inquiring how Spain had been lost, than how they were to retain possession of Africa. That it was not for the sake of travelling, or in the pursuit of pleasure, that so great a general, quitting a province but lately subdued, and leaving his armies, had passed over into Africa with only two ships, entrusting himself, in an enemy’s country, to the power of the King, and to his fidelity, as yet untried. Scipio had formed the scheme of subduing their people, had long entertained this design, and had openly expressed his regret, that he was not carrying on war in Africa, as Hannibal was in Italy.” The league, however, being ratified with Syphax, Scipio set sail; and after being tossed a good deal during the voyage, by variable and generally boisterous winds, he made the harbour of New Carthage on the fourth day.
XIX. As Spain had now rest from the Carthaginian war, so it was manifest that some states remained quiet rather through fear, arising from the consciousness of misbehaviour, than through sincere attachment. The most remarkable of these, both in greatness and in guilt, were Illiturgi and Castulo. The inhabitants of Castulo, allies of the Romans while they were successful, had, on the destruction of the first Scipio’s and their armies, revolted to the Carthaginians. Those of Illiturgi, by betraying and killing such as had fled to them after that calamity, had added barbarity to revolt. To have executed severe vengeance on those states, at Scipio’s first coming, when affairs in Spain were in a precarious state, would have been more suited to their demerits than agreeable to principles of sound policy; but now, when affairs were in a state of tranquillity, the proper time for inflicting punishment seemed to have arrived. He therefore sent for Lucius Marcius from Tarraco, and despatching him with a third part of the forces to besiege Castulo, he went himself with the rest of the army against Illiturgi, where he arrived on the fifth day. The gates there had been already shut, and every precaution taken, and preparation made for repelling an attack. So far had their consciousness of what they merited served them instead of a declaration of war. Hence Scipio took occasion to represent, in an exhortation to his soldiers, that “the Spaniards themselves, by shutting their gates, had shown what, in justice, they had reason to apprehend; that they ought, therefore, to entertain a much greater animosity against them than against the Carthaginians: for, with the latter, the contest was for empire and glory, almost without resentment, but the former they were called upon to punish both for perfidy and cruelty. That the time was now come when they were to take vengeance for the horrid murder of their fellow-soldiers, and for the treachery ready to be executed on themselves also, had they happened to fly to the same place; and, by a severe example, to establish it as a maxim to all future ages, that no Roman citizen or soldier, in any state of fortune, should be injured with impunity.” Their rage being excited by this harangue, they distributed the scaling-ladders to chosen men in each company; and the army being divided into two parts, one of which Lælius, lieutenant-general, was to command, they assaulted the city in two places at once, striking terror into the assailed by the two-fold danger to which they were exposed. It was not one leader, or a number of chiefs, but their own violent apprehensions, in consequence of their guilt, that induced the inhabitants to make a vigorous defence: they were fully sensible, and they reminded each other, that “their punishment, not a victory, was the object aimed at; that the matter for present consideration was, where they should choose to meet death, whether in the field and in fight, where the chance of war, equal to both parties, often raises the vanquished, and pulls down the conqueror; or whether, after seeing their city burned and demolished, and after suffering every indignity and disgrace, they should expire among chains and stripes, in the presence of their captive wives and children.” Therefore, not only those who were of an age to bear arms, or the men alone, but women and boys added exertions beyond the strength of their minds or bodies, supplying with weapons those who were engaged in the fight, and carrying stones to the walls for others who were strengthening the works; for beside that their liberty was at stake, and by which the brave are powerfully excited, the extreme severity of punishment which they must all expect, with a disgraceful death, were before their eyes. Further, their courage was inflamed by mutual emulation in toil and danger, and even by the sight of each other. Thus animated, they opposed the enemy with such determined bravery, that the army which had subdued all Spain was often repulsed from the walls; and began, in a contest with the youth of a single town, not much to their honour, to abate of their ardour. Scipio perceiving this, and dreading lest, by these unsuccessful attempts, the courage of the enemy should be raised, and his own men dispirited, thought it necessary to exert himself in person, and take a share in the danger. Whereupon, reprimanding the troops for their want of spirit, he ordered ladders to be brought to him, threatening to mount the wall himself, since the rest were backward: and, accordingly, he had already advanced near it, and not without danger, when a shout was raised on all sides by the soldiers, alarmed at the situation of the general, and the scalade was attempted at once. Lælius, too, pressed on at the other side. The inhabitants were then no longer able to make opposition, and those who defended the walls being beaten off, the Romans took possession of them.
XX. The citadel, too, during the tumult, being attacked on that side where it was thought impregnable, was taken. While the inhabitants were engaged in defence of those places where the danger appeared, and the Romans in making greater approaches where they found it practicable, some African deserters, who were then among the Roman auxiliaries, observed, that the most elevated part of the town, though protected by a very high rock, was neither secured by any works nor provided with men for its defence. As they were light of body, and very active from constant exercise, carrying iron spears along with them, they climbed up, by means of the irregular prominences of the rock, and when they met with a cliff too high and smooth, by driving in the spikes at moderate distances, they formed a kind of steps. In this manner, the foremost drawing up by the hand those who followed, and the hindmost lifting up those before them, they made their way to the summit: and from thence, with loud shouts, poured down into the city, which had been already taken by the Romans. Then it plainly appeared, that resentment and hatred had been the motives of the assault: no one thought of taking prisoners, no one thought of booty, though the objects lay before their eyes. The armed and unarmed were slain without distinction, women and men promiscuously; the cruel rage of the soldiers proceeded even to slaying of infants. They then set fire to the houses, and what could not be thus destroyed, they levelled to the ground; so earnest were they to erase every trace of the city, and to abolish every mark of the enemy’s residence. Scipio from thence led his army to Castulo, which was defended by a great concourse of Spaniards, and also by the remains of the Carthaginian army, collected from the places whither they had dispersed in their flight. But the news of the calamities of the Illiturgians had preceded the arrival of Scipio, and thrown the garrison into fright and despair; and as they were differently circumstanced, while each party wished to provide for their own safety, without regard to the rest, at first silent suspicion, afterwards open discord, ensued, and caused a separation between the Carthaginians and Spaniards. Cerdubellus openly advised the latter to surrender. Himilco commanded the Carthaginian garrison auxiliaries, who, together with the city, were delivered up to the Romans by Cerdubellus, after he had privately made terms for himself. This victory was not followed with so much severity; the guilt of this people not having been so great as that of the former, and their voluntary surrender mitigating, in some degree, the resentment against them.
XXI. Marcius proceeded from thence, in order to reduce to obedience such of the barbarians as had not been completely subdued. Scipio returned to New Carthage, in order to pay his vows to the gods, and to exhibit a show of gladiators, which he had prepared in commemoration of the death of his father and uncle. The combatants exhibited on this occasion were not of that sort which the Lanistæ are wont to procure, a collection of slaves, or such free men as are base enough to set their blood to sale. Every champion here gave his service voluntarily, and without reward; for some were sent by the princes of the country, to show a specimen of the bravery natural to their nation; some declared that they would fight to oblige the general; some were led by emulation, and a desire of superiority to send challenges; and those who were challenged, from the same motive, did not decline them; some decided, by the sword, controversies which they could not, or would not, determine by arbitration, having agreed between themselves that the matter in dispute should be the property of the conqueror. Not only people of obscure condition, but men of character and distinction; Corbis and Orsua for instance, cousin-germans, having a dispute about the sovereignty of a city called Ibis, determined to decide it with the sword. Corbis had the advantage in regard to years. The father of Orsua, however, had been last on the throne, having succeeded to it on the death of his elder brother. Scipio endeavoured to accommodate the matter by calm discussion, and to assuage their resentment; but they both affirmed that they had refused to submit it to their common relations, and that they would have no other judge, either god or man, but Mars. They severally preferred death in fight to a submission to the other’s authority, the elder confident in his strength, the younger in his activity; and so determined was their rage, that it was impossible to reconcile them. They afforded an extraordinary spectacle to the army, and a striking example of the evils occasioned by ambition. The elder, by experience in arms and superior skill, easily vanquished the ill-managed valour of the younger. To this exhibition of gladiators were added funeral games, conducted with as much magnificence as the province and the camp could supply.
XXII. While Scipio was thus employed, operations were carried on by his lieutenant Marcius, who, having passed the river Bætis, which the natives call Certis, got possession of two wealthy cities, by surrender, without a contest. There was another called Astapa, which had always taken part with the Carthaginians; but that circumstance did not so much call for resentment, as from their having acted towards the Romans with an extraordinary degree of animosity, beyond what the exigencies of the war could warrant. This was the more surprising, as they had no city so secured, either by situation or fortification, as that it might encourage such fierceness of temper; but the disposition of the inhabitants delighting in plunder, led them to make incursions into the neighbouring lands belonging to the allies of the Roman people, and even to seize on small parties of soldiers, together with the sutlers and traders. A large detachment, also, which was attempting to pass through their territory, was surrounded by an ambuscade, and put to death in a place where they could not defend themselves. As soon as the army approached to besiege the city, the inhabitants, conscious of their crimes, saw no prospect of safety in surrendering to a people so highly provoked; and as their fortifications were in such a state that they could not greatly hope to defend themselves by arms, they contrived a plan of the most shocking and savage nature, which they agreed to execute on themselves and their families. They fixed on a part of the Forum, into which they brought together all their most valuable effects, and having made their wives and children seat themselves on this heap, they piled up timber all round it, and threw on it abundance of faggots. They then gave a charge to fifty young men in arms, that “as long as the issue of the fight should be uncertain, they should carefully guard in that spot the fortunes of all, and the persons of those who were dearer to them than their fortunes. Should they perceive that their friends were worsted, and that the city was likely to be taken, that then they might be assured, that every one whom they saw going out to battle would meet death in the engagement. They then besought them, by the deities celestial and infernal, that mindful of their liberty, which must terminate on that day either in an honourable death or disgraceful slavery, they would leave no object on which the enraged enemy could vent their fury. That they had fire and swords at their command; and that it were better that their friendly and faithful hands should consume those things which must necessarily perish, than that the foe should insult over them with haughty scorn.” To these exhortations they added dreadful imprecations against any one who should be diverted from their purpose, either by hope or tenderness; and then with rapid speed and violent impetuosity, they rushed out through the open gates. There was none of the outposts strong enough to withstand them, because nothing could have been less apprehended than that they should dare to come out of the fortifications; a very few troops of horse, and the light infantry, despatched in haste from the camp, threw themselves in their way. The encounter was furious, owing more to their impetuosity and resolution, than to any regular disposition. The horse, therefore, which had first engaged, being discomfited, communicated the terror to the light infantry; and the battle would have reached to the very rampart, had not the main body of the legions drawn out their line, though there was very little time allowed them for forming. Even among their battalions there was some confusion; while the Astapans, blinded with fury, rushed on against men and weapons with the most daring insensibility of danger. But in a short time the veteran soldiers, too steady to be disturbed by such rash attacks, by killing the foremost, stopped the advance of the next. Afterwards, when they endeavoured to gain upon them, finding that not a man gave way, but that they were obstinately determined to die, they extended their line, which their numbers enabled them to do with ease; they then surrounded the flanks of these desperates, who, forming into a circle, and continuing the fight, were slain to a man.
XXIII. This severity, executed by an enraged enemy on those who opposed them in arms, especially as they were at the time engaged in hostilities with another people, was not inconsistent with the laws of war. But the more shocking havock was in the city, where a weak unarmed crowd of women and children were assailed by their own countrymen, who tossed their almost lifeless bodies on the burning pile, while streams of blood kept down the rising flames, and who at last, wearied with the wretched slaughter of their friends, cast themselves with their arms into the midst of the fire. Just as the carnage was completed, the victorious Romans arrived. On the first sight of such a horrid transaction, they were for a time struck motionless with astonishment; but afterwards, on seeing the gold and silver glittering between the heaps of other matters, with the greediness natural to mankind, they wished to snatch them out of the burning heap. In attempting this, some were caught by the flames, others scorched by blasts of the heat, the foremost finding it impracticable to make a retreat against the press of so great a crowd. Thus was Astapa utterly destroyed by fire and sword, and without enriching the soldiers with booty. All the other inhabitants of that district, terrified at this event, made their submissions. Marcius led back his victorious army to join Scipio at Carthage. Just at the same time, some deserters arrived from Gades, who promised to deliver up the city, the Carthaginian garrison, and the commander of the garrison, together with the fleet. Mago had halted there after his flight; and having collected a few ships from the ocean adjoining, and, with the assistance of Hanno his lieutenant, assembled others from the nearest parts of Spain, had brought some supplies from the coast of Africa. Terms being adjusted with the deserters, and ratified on both sides, Marcius was despatched thither, with some cohorts equipped for expedition, and Lælius also, with seven three-banked and one five-banked galley, that they might act in concert both by land and sea, in the execution of the business.
XXIV. Scipio was seized with a severe fit of sickness; and the danger being magnified by report, (every one, through the natural propensity to exaggeration, adding something to what he had heard,) the whole province, more especially the distant parts of it, were thrown into disorder: which showed what important consequences must have attended the real loss of him, when the rumour of his illness alone could excite such storms. Neither the allies continued faithful, nor the army obedient to command. Mandonius and Indibilis, who had entertained confident expectations that, on the expulsion of the Carthaginians, the dominion of Spain would fall into their hands, being entirely disappointed in all their hopes, called together their countrymen of Laceta and Illiturgi; sent for the young men of Celtiberia to assist them, and carried hostilities and devastation into the territories of the Suessetanians and Sedetanians, allies of the Roman people. Another commotion arose in the camp at Sucro, where there were eight thousand Romans stationed to secure the obedience of the nations bordering on the Iberus. Their disposition to mutiny did not take its rise from the uncertain accounts of the general’s life being in danger; it had sprung up some time before, from the licentiousness incident to a long state of inaction, and partly from their circumstances being straitened during peace, having been accustomed during the war to live more plentifully on plunder. At first, they only expressed their dissatisfaction in private discourses; “if there was a war in the province, what business had they there, among people who were at peace? If the war was already ended, why were they not carried back to Italy?” They also demanded their pay with a peremptoriness unbecoming the condition of soldiers, while those on guard used to throw out abuse on the tribunes, as they went their nightly rounds. Favoured by the darkness, some had even gone out and plundered the peaceable country round: and at length they used to quit their standards without leave, openly, and in the day-time. In a word, every thing was directed by the licentious humour of the soldiery, nothing by the rules and discipline of war, or the commands of the officers. The form, however, of a Roman camp was preserved, merely on account of the hope which they entertained, that the tribunes would be infected with their madness, and become sharers in their mutiny and revolt. They therefore permitted them to hold their courts at the tribunals; they applied to them for the watchword, and mounted guards and watches in their turn; and as they had taken away all the power of command, so, by submitting from choice to the usual duties, they kept up the appearance of obedience to orders. But when they found that the tribunes disapproved and blamed their proceedings, that they endeavoured to put a stop to them, and openly refused to assist in their designs, the mutiny then burst out; and having, by violence, driven the tribunals from their stands, and soon after, from the camp, with the unanimous approbation of the whole body they bestowed the supreme command on Caius Albius of Cales, and Caius Atrius of Umbria, common soldiers, who were the principal movers of the sedition. These men, not satisfied with the ornaments used by tribunes, had the assurance to lay hold of the badges of supreme command, the rods and axes; never considering that their own backs and necks were in danger from those very rods and axes, which they carried before them to strike terror into others. Their groundless belief of Scipio’s death blinded their understandings; and they entertained not a doubt that, on the news of that event, which would soon be generally known, the flames of war would break out in every part of Spain: that during this confusion money might be exacted from the allies, and the neighbouring cities plundered; and that the disturbances being general, and all men acting without restraint, their own behaviour would be the less liable to observation.
XXV. No accounts of the death of Scipio being received, the rumour which had been inconsiderately propagated, began to die away. They then began to enquire for the first authors of it; but every one threw it off from himself, that he might appear rather to have believed rashly, than to have been the contriver of the fiction. The leaders, now forsaken, began to dread even their own badges of office, and considered with terror the real and just authority which was about to take place of the empty show of command which they possessed, and which would doubtless be exerted to their destruction. While the mutiny was at a stand through the amazement of the soldiers, on receiving undoubted intelligence, first that Scipio was alive, and afterwards that he was in good health, seven military tribunes, despatched by himself, arrived in the camp. On their coming, the mutineers were at first exasperated, but they were soon softened by the mild and soothing language in which these addressed such of their acquaintances as they met. For, at first going round the tents, and then in the public tribunals, and in the prætorium, wherever they observed circles of soldiers engaged in conversation, they accosted them in such a manner, as carried the appearance rather of an enquiry into the cause of their resentment and sudden disorder, than of throwing any blame on what had passed. The reasons generally alleged were, that “they had not received their pay regularly; although at the time of the horrid transaction at Illiturgi, and after the utter destruction of the two generals and their two armies, it was by their bravery that the Roman name had been supported, and the province secured. That the people of Illiturgi had indeed met with the punishment due to their guilt, but their meritorious conduct had remained unrewarded.” The tribunes answered, that “in these remonstrances their requests were founded in justice, and should be laid before the general; that they were highly pleased to find that there was nothing in their case more grievous or incurable; and that, by the favour of the gods, they had both Publius Scipio and the state to reward their merit.” Scipio, well practised in wars, but utterly unacquainted with the storms of intestine commotions, was filled with anxiety on the occasion; fearing lest the army should exceed all bounds in transgressing, or himself in punishing. For the present, he resolved to proceed as he had begun, by gentle measures; having, therefore, despatched collectors through the tributary states, he received reason to hope to be soon able to discharge the arrears. An order was then published, that the troops should come to Carthage to receive their pay, either in separate divisions or in one body, as they should choose. The mutiny, of itself abating in violence among the Romans, was reduced to a state of perfect tranquillity by the measures which the rebellious Spaniards suddenly adopted. Mandonius and Indibilis, on receiving information that Scipio was alive, desisted from their undertaking, and returned into their own country, as there was now remaining neither countrymen nor foreigner, to whom they could look up for a concurrence in their desperate scheme. The soldiers, after revolving every plan, were of opinion that they had nothing left, except (what is not always the safest retreat from bad counsels) the submitting themselves either to the just anger of the general, or to his clemency, of which it was thought they need not despair. “He had pardoned even enemies, with whom he had been engaged in battle: their mutiny had not been attended with any serious consequences; no lives had been lost, nor had any blood been shed: therefore, as it had not in itself been violent, it merited not a violent punishment.” Men’s minds are generally ingenious in palliating guilt in themselves. They only hesitated then, whether they should go and demand their pay in single cohorts, or in a body. The majority voted, that, as the safer way, they should proceed in a body.
XXVI. Whilst they were employed in these deliberations, a council was held at Carthage concerning them; the members of which were divided in opinion, whether the authors only of the mutiny, who were not more than thirty-five, should be punished; or whether it was not necessary, that what ought to be called a revolt rather than a mutiny, and afforded such a dangerous example, should be expiated by the punishment of a greater number. The milder opinion prevailed, that the punishment should be confined to those who were the instigators to it, and that, for the multitude, a reprimand was sufficient. As soon as the council was dismissed, orders were issued to the army which was in Cartharge, to prepare for an expedition against Mandonius and Indibilis, and to get ready provisions for several days; in order that people might think that this had been the business of the meeting. Then, the seven tribunes, who had before gone to Sucro to quell the disturbance, were again sent out to gather further information on the matter, when each of them made a return of five names of the leaders of it; with the intent that proper persons, appointed for the purpose, should invite these, with friendly countenance and discourse, to their lodgings, and that there, when stupified with wine, they might be secured in chains. When they came near Carthage, they heard, from some persons on the road, that the whole army was to set out, next day, with Marcus Silanus, against the Lacetanians, which not only freed the disaffected from the apprehensions which, though concealed, lay heavy on their minds, but occasioned great joy amongst them; as they supposed that the general would be left alone, in their power, instead of their being in his. A little before sunset, they entered the city, and saw the other army busy in preparations for a march: they were received with discourses framed for the purpose, that “their coming was highly agreeable and convenient to the general, as it had happened just before the departure of the other army;” after which they retired to refresh themselves. The authors of the mutiny, having been conducted to lodgings by the persons appointed, were, without any tumult, apprehended by the tribunes, and thrown into chains. At the fourth watch, the baggage of that army which, as pretended, was to march, began to set out. A little before day the troops moved also, but stopped in a body at the gate, whence guards were sent round to all the other avenues, to prevent any one going out of the city. Those who had arrived the day before, were then summoned to an assembly, and they ran together into the Forum to the general’s tribunal in the most turbulent manner, intending to excite terror by their tumultuous shouts. Just as the general was taking his seat, the troops, who had been recalled from the gates, spread themselves round, under arms, behind the unarmed assembly. On this, all the arrogance of the latter sunk at once, and, as they afterwards confessed, nothing terrified them so much as the unexpected vigour and complexion of the general, whom they had expected to see in a sickly state—his countenance showing more sternness, they said, than they had ever remembered to have seen, even in battle. He sat silent for a short time, until he was told that the authors of the mutiny were brought into the Forum, and that all things were prepared.
XXVII. Then, a herald having commanded silence, he began thus: “Never did I imagine that I should be in want of language to address my own army: not that I ever gave more attention to words than to business; for, having lived in camps almost from my childhood, I was ever well acquainted with the soldier’s way of thinking. But, with what sentiments, or in what terms, I should speak to you, I am entirely at a loss. I know not even what appellation I ought to give you. Can I call you countrymen, who have revolted from your country; or soldiers, who have renounced obedience to command, and broke through the obligation of your oath; or enemies? I behold, indeed, the persons, faces, habit, mien of my fellow-citizens; but I perceive the actions, words, schemes, dispositions of foes. For what other object did your hopes and wishes aim at, than the same which was proposed by the Illergetians and Lacetans? They, however, chose for leaders in their mad enterprise, Mandonius and Indibilis, men of royal distinction; you conferred supreme authority and command on the Umbrian, Atrius, and the Calenian, Albus. Soldiers, deny that it was the act of you all, or that you all approved of it: assert that it was the madness and folly of a few. I shall willingly give credit to your disavowal; for the crimes committed are of such a nature, that did the guilt of them extend to the whole army, it could not be expiated without very extraordinary atonements. I unwillingly touch those matters, as I should wounds; but unless such are touched and handled, they cannot be cured. After the Carthaginians were expelled from Spain, I really believed that there was not, in the whole province, any one place, or any description of men, to whom my life was not a matter of concern: such had been my conduct, not only towards the allies, but even towards the enemy. And yet, even in my own camp, so much was I deceived in my opinion, the report of my death was not only readily believed, but longed for. Not that I wish this behaviour should be imputed to you all: I assure you, if I could believe that my whole army wished my death, I would here, this instant, die before your eyes; nor could life afford me any pleasure if it were displeasing to my countrymen and soldiers. But every multitude, like the sea, is incapable of moving itself; the winds and gales put it in motion: thus, when either calms or storms appear in you, all the madness lies in the first advisers. This you have caught by infection: and even this day, you do not seem to me to be sensible to what a pitch of folly you have proceeded, or how heinous your attempts have been with respect to me, how heinous with respect to your country, your parents and your children; how heinous with respect to the gods, who were witnesses of your oath; how heinous against the auspices under which you serve; how heinous against the practice of the service, the discipline of your ancestors, and the majesty of the supreme authority and rule! With regard to myself, I say nothing. Be it, that ye believed the report rather through want of thought, than through a wish that it should be true; and let me even be supposed such a person, that it were no wonder if the army were weary of my command: yet, what had your country deserved of you, that, by uniting your counsels with Mandonius and Indibilis, you were going to betray it? What had the Roman people merited, when you took away the power from tribunes appointed by their common suffrage, and conferred it on private men? when, not even content with having them for magistrates, you, a Roman army, bestowed the badges of your generals on men who never had been possessed of so much as a single slave? Albius and Atrius dwelt in the general’s pavilion, the trumpets sounded by their orders, the word was taken from them, they sat on the tribunal of Publius Scipio, they were attended by lictors, the way was cleared for them, the rods and axes were carried before them. That it should rain stones, that lightnings should be darted from heaven, and that animals should produce monstrous births, you look upon as prodigies. This is a prodigy that can be expiated by no victims, by no supplications, without the blood of those who dared to commit such enormous crimes.
XXVIII. “Now, although no wickedness proceeds on any grounds of reason, yet, in a transaction of such atrocity as this, I should be glad to know what was your intention, what your scheme. Formerly, a legion, which had been sent as a garrison to Rhegium, wickedly put to death the principal inhabitants, and kept possession of that opulent city for ten years; for which offence the whole legion, four thousand men, were beheaded in the Forum at Rome. These, however, did not put themselves under the command of an Atrius, a man no better than a scullion, whose very name was ominous; but of Decius Jubellius, a military tribune: nor did they join themselves to the enemies of the Roman people, either to the Samnites or Lucanians. You united in counsels with Mandonius and Indibilis, with whom you intended to have united also your arms. Besides, those men expected to hold Rhegium as a lasting settlement, as the Campanians held Capua, after taking it from the ancient Tuscan inhabitants; and as the Mamertines held Messana in Sicily,—never entertaining a thought of making war on the Roman people or their allies. Did you intend to settle your habitations at Sucro? a place in which, if I your general at my departure, after finishing the business of the province, had left you, and there to remain, you ought to have appealed to gods and men, on not being allowed to return to your wives and children. But supposing that you had banished out of your minds all recollection of them, as you did of your country and of me, let us examine what could be your design, and whether it can be accounted for on the supposition of a depravity of principle, without including also the utmost degree of folly. While I was alive, and the other part of the army safe, with which I took Carthage in one day, with which I vanquished, put to flight, and drove out of Spain, four generals, with four armies of the Carthaginians; could you expect that you, who were but eight thousand men, (all of you of course inferior in worth to Albius and Atrius, since to their command you submitted yourselves,)—could you imagine, I say, that you should be able to wrest the province of Spain out of the hands of the Roman people? I lay no stress upon my own name, I put it out of the question, supposing myself no farther ill treated, than in your easily and joyfully giving credit to the report of my death: What! if I were dead; was the state to expire along with me; was the empire of the Roman people to fall with Scipio? Jove, supremely great and good, forbid that the city built for eternity, under the favour and direction of the gods, should last no longer than this frail and mortal body. Although so many illustrious commanders, Flaminius, Paullus, Gracchus, Posthumius, Albinus, Marcus Marcellus, Titus Quintus Crispinus, Cneius Fulvius, my relations the Scipios, have all been lost in one war, yet the Roman people still survive, and will survive, whilst a thousand others perish, some by the sword, some by disease: and must the Roman state have been carried out to burial along with my single body? You yourselves, here in Spain, when my father and uncle, your two generals, were slain, chose Septimus Marcius your leader against the Carthaginians, exulting in their late victory. I mention this as if Spain would have been without a leader; but would Marcus Silanus, who was sent into the province, invested with the same privileges, the same command with myself; would my brother Lucius Scipio, and Caius Lælius, lieutenant-generals, be wanting to avenge the majesty of the empire? Could either the armies, or the leaders, or their dignity, or their cause, admit of a comparison? And even if you were superior to all these, would you bear arms on the side of the Carthaginians, against your country, against your countrymen? Would you wish that Africa should rule over Italy. Carthage over the city of Rome? And for what fault, I would ask, of your nation?
XXIX. “Coriolanus, provoked by a grievous and undeserved banishment to take up arms against his oppressors, yielded, however, to the call of duty to a parent, and refrained from committing parricide on his country. What grief, what anger had incited you? Was the delay of your pay for a few days, and while your general was sick, sufficient reason for declaring war against your native land? to revolt from the Roman people to the Illergetians? to leave no obligation, divine or human, unviolated? Soldiers, the truth is, you have been mad; nor was the disorder which seized my body more violent than that which seized your minds. It shocks me to mention what such men believed, what they hoped, what they wished. But let all those matters be buried in oblivion, if possible; if not, let them however be covered in silence. I doubt not but my language may appear to you severe and harsh; yet how much more harsh your actions than my words! Do you think it reasonable, that I should bear the facts which you have committed, and that you should not have patience to hear them mentioned? But even with these things you shall be reproached no farther: I wish you may as easily forget them as I shall. Therefore, as to what concerns you all in general, if you are sorry for your error, I am fully satisfied with the expiation. The Calenian, Albius, the Umbrian, Atrius, and the other authors of that abominable mutiny, shall atone with their blood for the crime of which they have been guilty; and if you have recovered your sound judgment, the sight of their punishment will not only be not disagreeable, but even pleasing to you, for the tendency of their schemes was as pernicious and destructive to yourselves as to any other persons whatsoever.” Scarcely had he finished his speech, when, according to a plan preconcerted, their eyes and ears were at once assailed by every object of terror. The troops, which had formed a circle round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields; the herald’s voice was heard citing by name those who had been condemned in the council: they were dragged naked into the midst, and at the same time, all the apparatus for death was produced; they were chained to the stake, beaten with rods, and beheaded; the spectators all the while standing so benumbed with fear, that not only no violent expression against the severity of the punishment, but not even a groan, was heard. They were then all dragged out, the place was cleared, and their fellows being summoned by their names, took the oath of obedience to Scipio before the tribunes of the soldiers, as the same time receiving their pay. Such was the end and issue of the rising which began at Sucro.
XXX. About the same time Hanno, Mago’s lieutenant, having been sent from Gades with a small body of Africans, had, by tempting the Spaniards with money, collected four thousand young men in arms, near the river Bætis: but being afterwards beaten out of his camp by Lucius Marcius, and having lost the greatest part of his forces in the tumult, and others also in the flight, (his disordered troops having been pursued by the cavalry,) he made his escape with very few attendants. During these transactions on the Bætis, Lælius, sailing through the streight, came with the fleet to Carteja, a city situated on the coast, and where the sea begins to expand itself. There had been hopes of gaining possession of Gades without a contest, by means of a conspiracy of the inhabitants, some of whom came of their own accord to the Roman camp with promises to that effect, as has been mentioned before; but the plot was discovered before it was ripe; and Mago having seized all the conspirators, gave them in charge to Adherbal, the prætor, to be conducted to Carthage. Adherbal put them on board a ship of five banks, and sending it off before him, because it sailed slower than any one of three banks, followed himself at a small distance with eight three-banked vessels. The quinquereme was just entering the streight, when Lælius, who had sailed in a quinquereme also from the harbour of Carteja, attended by seven triremes, bore down on Adherbal and the triremes; taking for granted that the quinquereme, once caught in the rapid current of the narrow pass, would not be able to tack about. The Carthaginian, alarmed by this unexpected affair, hesitated for some time whether he should follow the quinquereme, or face the enemy. This delay put it out of his power to avoid an engagement, for they were already within a weapon’s cast, and the Roman pressing him closely on all sides. The force of the stream, too, had rendered it impossible to manage their ships; nor was the fight like a naval engagement, for nothing was effected either by skill or prudence. The tide, indeed, might be said to have the entire command, for it bore them down, sometimes on their own, sometimes on the Roman vessels, while they were endeavouring in vain to row in a contrary direction; so that a ship which was flying might be seen whirled round by an eddy, and carried full against the conqueror; while another, engaged in pursuit, if it happened to fall into a contrary current, would be turned about as if for flight. Thus one ship aiming a violent stroke of its beak against the hull of the enemy, being carried itself in an oblique direction, received a blow from the beak of that it had strove to pierce; while that which lay with its side exposed to the assailant, was suddenly whirled round, so as to present its prow to them. While the battle between the triremes was thus doubtful and irregular, being governed entirely by chance, the Roman quinquereme, more manageable, either from being steadier on account of its great weight, or from making its way through the eddies by its superior number of rowers, sunk two triremes, and brushing along close by a third, swept off the oars on one side, handling roughly some others which it had overtaken: but Adherbal crowded sail, and with the five remaining ships escaped to Africa.
XXXI. Lælius returning victorious to Carteja, and having learned there what had passed at Gades, (that the plot had been discovered, the conspirators sent to Carthage, and the hopes which had invited them thither entirely frustrated,) he sent to acquaint Lucius Marcius, that he was of opinion that they ought to return to the general, unless they chose to waste time to no purpose lying before Gades. Marcius assenting, they both returned to Carthage a few days after. By their departure, Mago not only gained a respite from the dangers which had environed him both by sea and land, but on hearing of the rebellion of the Illergetians, he even conceived hopes of recovering Spain. He sent messengers to the senate at Carthage, with instructions to exaggerate both the intestine dissension in the Roman camp, and the defection of the allies; and to exhort them to send such supplies as should enable him to recover the empire of Spain, which had been transmitted to them by their ancestors. Mandonius and Indibilis, returning into their own territories, kept themselves quiet for some time, not knowing what to determine, until they could learn what measures were taken with regard to the mutiny; for if pardon were granted by Scipio to his countrymen, they did not doubt but that it would extend to themselves. But when the punishment of the offenders came to be known, supposing that their own crime would be thought to demand an equal atonement, they called their countrymen to arms, and re-assembling the auxiliaries which had joined them before, they marched out with twenty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse, into the territory of Sedeta, where, at the beginning of the revolt, they had established a camp.
XXXII. Scipio quickly conciliated the affections of his men by his punctuality in discharging all arrears, to the guilty as well as to the innocent, and which was strengthened by the mildness of his discourse, and the benignity of his countenance towards all without distinction. Summoning an assembly on his departure from Carthage, after copious invectives against the perfidy of the petty princes then in rebellion, he declared, that “he was setting out to take vengeance for their crimes, with feelings very different from those which he had lately experienced, while he was applying a remedy to the error of his countrymen; that then he had, with grief and tears, as if cutting his own bowels, expiated either the imprudence or the guilt of eight thousand men by the death of thirty; but now he was proceeding with cheerfulness and confidence to the destruction of the Illergetians: for these were neither born in the same land, nor connected with him by any bond of society; and for the only connection which had subsisted, that of good faith and friendship, they had wickedly rent it asunder. That there was one circumstance respecting his army, which gave him great satisfaction, which was, their being all either of his own country, allies, or of the Latine confederacy; that there was scarcely a single soldier in it who had not been brought thither from Italy, either by his uncle, Cneius Scipio, the first of the Roman name who entered that province, or by his father in his consulate, or by himself. That they were all accustomed to the name and authority of the Scipios: that he wished to carry them home with him to a well-deserved triumph; and that he entertained confident hopes that they would support his claim to the consulship, as if they were, every one of them, to share the honour of it. That as to the expedition before them, that man must have forgotten his own exploits, who could consider it as a war. For his part, he was really more concerned about Mago, who had fled with a few ships, beyond the limits of the world, into a spot surrounded by the ocean, than about the Illergetians; for on that spot, there was a Carthaginian general; and whatever forces might be there, they were Carthaginians. Here was only a band of robbers, and leaders of robbers; who, though they might have courage sufficient for ravaging their neighbours’ grounds, burning their houses, and seizing their cattle, would show none in the field, or in regular battle; and who, whenever they should see an enemy, would rely more on their activity for flight, than on their arms. It was not, therefore, because he apprehended any danger from thence, that he had determined to suppress the Illergetians before he left the province, but principally that such a heinous revolt should not escape without punishment: and, also, that it might not be said, that there was one enemy left in a country which had been overrun with such bravery and success. He desired them, therefore, with the favour of the gods, to follow him, not to what could properly be called a war, for the contest was not with a people on an equality with them, but to inflict punishment on a set of criminals.”
XXXIII. After this discourse he dismissed them, with orders to prepare for a decampment on the following morning. After a march of ten days, he arrived at the river Iberus, which he passed, and on the fourth day he pitched his camp within sight of the enemy. There was a plain before him, encircled by mountains; into this valley Scipio ordered some cattle, taken mostly from the surrounding lands, to be driven forward, in order to provoke the savage greediness of the barbarians; sending with them some light-armed troops as a guard, and giving orders to Lælius, that as soon as these should be engaged in skirmishing, he should charge with the cavalry from a place of concealment. A conveniently projecting mountain covered the ambush of the cavalry, and the battle began without delay; for the Spaniards rushed on the cattle, as soon as they saw them at a distance, and the light infantry attacked them, occupied with their booty. At first, they endeavoured to terrify each other with missive weapons; afterwards, having discharged their light darts, which were fitter to provoke than to decide the fight, they drew their swords, and began to engage foot to foot. The contest between the infantry was doubtful; but the cavalry came up, who, charging straight forward, not only trod down all before them, but some also, wheeling round along the foot of the steep, fell on the enemy’s rear, inclosing the greater part of them: so that the number slain was far more considerable than is usual in such kind of engagements. This discomfiture served rather to inflame the rage of the barbarians than depress them. In order, therefore, to show that they were not dispirited, at the first light on the day following, they led out their troops to battle. The valley being narrow, as has been mentioned, could not contain all their forces; so that only about two-thirds of the infantry and all their cavalry came down to the engagement. The remainder of the foot they posted on a hill on one side. Scipio, judging that the narrowness of the ground was a favourable circumstance to him, both because fighting in a confined space seemed better suited to the Roman than the Spanish soldier, and also because the enemy could not completely form their line, turned his thoughts to a new scheme. Finding that he could not extend his cavalry on the wings, and that those of the enemy, whom they had brought out with the infantry, would be useless, he ordered Lælius to lead the cavalry round the hills by the most concealed roads, and to keep separate as much as possible the fight of the cavalry from that between the infantry. He himself led forward the battalions of infantry, placing four cohorts in front, for he could not greatly extend his line, and without delay began the engagement, in order to divert the enemy’s attention, by the hurry of the conflict, from Lælius’s detachment, who were advancing from among the hills. In this they succeeded, for the Spaniards were unconscious of their coming, until they heard the tumult of the fight between them and their own cavalry on the rear. Thus there were two different battles; two lines of foot, and two bodies of horse, were engaged along the extent of the plain, the circumscribed ground not allowing them to be composed of both together. On the side of the Spaniards, as neither their foot could assist the horse, nor the horse the foot, the latter, who had rashly ventured into the plain, relying on the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces; and the cavalry, being surrounded, could neither withstand the Roman infantry in front, (for by this time their own was entirely cut off,) nor the cavalry on their rear; but, having formed in a circle, and defended themselves a long time without changing their position, they were all slain to a man. Thus, not one of those who were engaged in the valley, either horse or foot, survived the fight. The third company, which had stood on the hill, rather to view the engagement securely, than to take any part in it, had both room and time to make their escape. The two princes also fled with them during the tumult, and before the army was entirely surrounded.
XXXIV. The same day, the camp of the Spaniards was taken, together with about three thousand men, beside other booty. Of the Romans and their allies, there fell one thousand two hundred; above three thousand were wounded. The victory would have been less bloody, if the battle had happened in a more extensive plain, so as to have allowed the enemy an easy flight. Indibilis, renouncing his project of proceeding farther in the war, and seeing no better prospect of safety in this desperate state of his affairs than in the honour and clemency of Scipio, which he had already experienced, sent his brother Mandonius to him; who, prostrating himself at his feet, lamented “the fatal frenzy of the times, wherein, as it were, through some pestilent contagion, not only the Illergetians and Lacetanians, but even the Roman camp had been infected: that the present state of himself, his brother, and the rest of his countrymen, was such, that, if it was required, they would surrender up to Scipio the life which he had spared to them; or, if they might be still preserved, they would ever devote it to his service; for in such case they should be actually twice indebted to him alone for existence. That, in the former case, they had confidence in their cause, before they had made trial of his clemency; but now, on the contrary, they could have none in their cause, and their only hope lay in the mercy of their conqueror.” It was the practice of the Romans, observed from very early times with respect to persons with whom they had formed no treaty of friendship or alliance, never to exercise any act of authority over them: for they were not held as subjects, until they had surrendered all their property, both sacred and common, had given hostages, delivered up their arms, and received garrisons in their towns. On the present occasion, Scipio, after severely reproaching Mandonius, who was present, and Indibilis, who was absent, said, that “they had deservedly been brought to ruin by their own wicked practices; that they should owe their lives to the generosity of himself and the Roman people. Further, he would not even deprive them of their arms; those were only to be taken, as pledges, by such as feared a renewal of war; they should, therefore, be freely left them; nor should their minds be shackled with fear. Should they again revolt, he would not take vengeance on guiltless hostages, but on themselves; he would inflict no punishment on defenceless enemies, but on those who carried arms. That he left it to themselves, who had experienced both, to choose the favour or the resentment of the Romans.” On these terms Mandonius was dismissed, and they were only fined a sum of money for the pay of the troops. Scipio, having sent on his lieutenant into Farther Spain, and Silanus back to Tarraco, delayed only a few days, until the Illergetians had paid the fine demanded of them. Then, with some troops lightly equipped, he followed Marcius, whom he overtook at a small distance from the ocean.
XXXV. The negociation, some time before commenced with Masinissa, had been delayed by various causes; the Numidian choosing to confer only with Scipio himself, and from his hand to receive the ratification of the compact. This was Scipio’s reason for undertaking at that time so long a journey, and to places so distant from his quarters. When Masinissa received notice at Gades from Marcius, that he was drawing nigh, complaining that his horses were injured by being pent up in the island; that they not only caused a scarcity of every thing among the men, but felt it themselves; and besides, that the horsemen were losing their spirits through want of exercise; he prevailed on Mago to allow him to pass over to the continent, to plunder the adjacent country of the Spaniards. On landing, he sent forward three chiefs of the Numidians, to fix a time and place for a conference, desiring that two of them might be detained by Scipio as hostages, and the third sent back to conduct him to the place appointed. They came to the conference with but few attendants; the Numidian had long been possessed with admiration of the man he was about to meet, from the fame of his exploits, and had formed a perfect idea of the grandeur and dignity of his person. But on seeing him, his veneration increased; for the elegance of his appearance, naturally majestic, was added to by his flowing hair, and by his becoming dress, not decorated with ornaments, but in a style truly manly and military; by his age also, as he was in full vigour, aided by the bloom of youth, renewed as it were after his late illness. At their meeting, the Numidian, struck with a degree of astonishment, first “thanked him for having sent home his brother’s son; assured him, that ever since that transaction he had sought for the present opportunity, which being at length offered by the favour of the immortal gods, he had not neglected: that he wished to exert himself in his service and that of the Roman people, with more zeal and effect than had ever been shown by any foreigner, in support of the Roman interest: that although this had long been his wish, yet he was less able to effect it in Spain,—a territory with which he was little acquainted; but in his own country, in Africa, where he had been born, and educated with the hopes of enjoying the kingdom of his father, it would be more easily in his power to serve them: that if the Romans thought proper to send the same commander, Scipio, into Africa, he had good reason to hope that the existence of Carthage would be of very short duration.” Scipio received and heard him with much satisfaction; he knew that Masinissa was the main support of the enemy with respect to cavalry, and the young man himself had given considerable proofs of spirit. After they had mutually pledged their faith, he returned to Tarraco; and Masinissa having, with permission of the Romans, ravaged the neighbouring soil, that he might not appear to have passed over to the continent for nothing, returned to Gades.
XXXVI. While Mago was preparing to pass into Africa, despairing of success in Spain, (of which he had been encouraged to entertain hopes, first, by the mutiny of the soldiers, and afterwards by the revolt of Indibilis,) information was brought from Carthage, that the senate ordered him to carry over to Italy the fleet which he had at Gades, and having there hired as many of the Gallic and Ligurian youth as he could find, to form a junction with Hannibal, and not to suffer the war to sink into languor, after the very great exertions and greater successes which had signalized its beginning. Money, to answer this purpose, was brought to Mago from Carthage, in addition to which he extorted much from the people of Gades, plundering not only their treasury but their temples, and compelling them to bring in their private properties of gold and silver to the public stock. As he sailed along the coast of Spain, he landed his men not far from New Carthage; and having ravaged the lands adjoining, brought up his fleet from thence to the city; where, having kept his soldiers on board the ships during the day, he disembarked them in the night, and led them on to that part of the wall over which the Romans had entered when they took the place; for he had a notion that the garrison was not strong, and that, on seeing a hope of changing masters, some of the townsmen would raise a commotion. But those, who had fled in a panic from the fields, had already brought an account of the dispersion of the country-people, and the approach of the enemy; the fleet also had been observed during the day, and it was sufficiently evident that its station before the city had not been chosen without some reason. The garrison were therefore drawn up, and kept under arms, within side the gate which looks towards the bason and the sea. The enemy, rushing on in a tumultuous manner, with crowds of seamen mixed among the soldiers, advanced to the walls with more noise than strength, when the Romans, suddenly throwing open the gate, rushed forth with a shout, and having disordered and repulsed the motley band at the first onset and discharge of their darts, pursued them with great slaughter to the coast, nor would one of them have survived the battle and the pursuit, had not the vessels, warping close to the shore, received them as they fled in dismay. Those on shipboard also were not without their share of the confusion, occasioned by the drawing up of the ladders, lest the enemy should force in along with their own men, and in cutting away their cables and anchors to avoid the delay of weighing them. Many, in attempting to swim to the ships, as they could not in the declining light distinguish whither they ought to direct their course, or what to avoid, met a miserable death. Next day, when the fleet had fled back to the midocean, there were found between the wall and the shore eight hundred men slain, and two thousand stands of arms.
XXXVII. Mago, returning to Gades, was not permitted to enter the place, on which he put with his fleet into Cimbis, at a little distance, and from thence sent ambassadors, complaining of their having shut their gates against an ally and friend. While they apologized for this act, alleging that it had been done by a part of the multitude, who were offended because some of their effects had been carried off by the soldiers when they were embarking, he enticed their suffetes* (which is the name of the chief magistracy among the Carthaginians) and their treasurer to a conference; and then ordered them to be crucified, after they had been mangled with stripes. From thence he sailed to the island Pityusa,† about one hundred miles from the continent, inhabited at that time by Carthaginians, where the fleet was received in a friendly manner, and supplied not only with abundance of provisions, but with a reinforcement of young men and arms. Emboldened by these succours, the Carthaginian proceeded to the Balearick islands, about fifty miles distant. There are two of the Baleares,‡ one larger and more powerful in men and arms than the other, and which has also a harbour, where he believed he might pass the winter commodiously, as it was now the latter end of autumn. But here he met with an opposition, as violent as if the inhabitants of that island had been Romans. As they now mostly use slings, so at that time these were their only weapons, in the skilful use of which the Baleareans universally excel all others. Such a quantity, therefore, of stones was poured, like the thickest hail, on the fleet as it approached the land, that, not daring to enter the harbour, the Carthaginians tacked about to the main. They then passed over to the smaller of the Baleares, which is equally fertile in soil, though, as already noted, of lesser strength. Here they landed, and pitched their camp in a strong post, over the harbour, taking possession of the city and country without a contest. Then, having enlisted two thousand auxiliaries, and sent them to Carthage for the winter, they hauled their ships on shore. After Mago had departed from the coast, the people of Gades surrendered to the Romans.
XXXVIII. Such were the transactions in Spain under the conduct and command of Publius Scipio; who, having committed the charge of the province to Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Audinus, returned to Rome with ten ships; and having obtained an audience of the senate in the temple of Bellona without the city, made a recital of his services in Spain, how often he had engaged the enemy in pitched battles, how many towns he had taken, and what nations he had reduced under the dominion of the Roman people; that “he had gone into Spain against four generals, and four armies, who were elated with victory; and that he had not left a Carthaginian in all that country.” On account of these exploits, he rather made trial how far he might hope for a triumph, than pushed for it with any earnestness, because it was well known that no one had ever been honoured with it for achievements performed, unless invested with a public office. When the senate was dismissed, he proceeded into the city, and carried before him to the treasury fourteen thousand three hundred and forty-two pounds weight of silver, and of coined silver a great sum. Lucius Veturius Philo then held the assembly for electing consuls; and all the centuries with extraordinary marks of attachment named Publius Scipio consul. The colleague joined with him was Publius Licinius Crassus, chief pontiff. We are told that this election was attended by a greater concourse of people than any during that war. They had come together from all parts, not only for the purpose of giving their votes, but of getting a sight of Scipio; and ran in crowds, both to his house and to the Capitol, while he was performing sacrifice, by offering to Jupiter a hundred oxen, which he had vowed on occasion of the mutiny of the soldiers in Spain. Strong expectations were at the same time entertained, that, as Caius Lutatius had finished the former Punic war, so Publius Cornelius Scipio would finish the present; and that, as he had already expelled the Carthaginians from every part of Spain, he would in like manner expel them from Italy. They therefore destined Africa to him as a province, as if the war in Italy were at an end. The election of the prætors was then held: two were appointed, who were, at the time, plebeian ædiles, Spurius Lucretius and Cneius Octavius; and, of private rank, Cneius Servilius Cæpio, and Lucius Æmilius Popus.Y.R.547. 205. In the fourteenth year of the Punic war, as soon as Publius Cornelius Scipio, and Publius Licinius Crassus entered on the consulship, the provinces for the consuls were named; for Scipio, Sicily, without drawing lots, with the consent of his colleague, because the necessary attendance on religious matters required the presence of the chief pontiff in Italy; for Crassus, Bruttium. The provinces of the prætors were then disposed of by lot; that of the city fell to Cneius Servilius; Ariminum (so they called Gaul,) to Spurius Lucretius; Sicily to Lucius Æmilius; and Sardinia to Cneius Octavius. The senate was held in the Capitol; there, on the matter being proposed by Publius Scipio, a decree was made, that the games, which he had vowed during the mutiny of the soldiers in Spain, should be exhibited, and the expense defrayed out of the money which himself had conveyed to the treasury.
XXXIX. He then introduced to the senate ambassadors from Saguntum, the eldest of whom addressed them in this manner: “Conscript Fathers, although there is no degree of evil beyond what we have endured, in order that we might preserve our faith towards you inviolate to the last; yet so highly has your behaviour, and that of your commanders, merited at our hands, that we do not repent of having exposed ourselves to sufferings. On our account you undertook the war, and although it is now the fourteenth year since it began, yet you still maintain it with such persevering spirit, as to endanger yourselves, while having often brought the Carthaginians to the very brink of ruin. At a time when you had so grievous a contest to maintain, and with such an antagonist as Hannibal, you sent your consul, with an army, into Spain, to collect as it were what remained of us after a shipwreck. Publius and Cneius Cornelius, from the moment of their arrival in the province, never ceased to pursue measures favourable to us, and destructive to our enemies. They, first of all, regained and gave back to us our city; and, sending persons to search for our countrymen who had been sold and dispersed through every part of Spain, they restored them from slavery to liberty. When, after experiencing the utmost wretchedness, we were near being happily settled, your commanders, Publius and Cneius Cornelius, fell, more to be lamented in some measure by us, even than by you. Then, indeed, it appeared as if we had been called from distant places to our original residence, only that we might be a second time ruined; only that we might see a second destruction of our country. That, to accomplish this, there was no occasion for an army of Carthaginians; we might be utterly destroyed by our oldest and most inveterate enemies, the Turdulans, who had also been the cause of our former calamity. In which conjuncture, you speedily, and beyond our expectations, sent to us this Publius Scipio, the author of our well-being, the supporter of all our hopes; of whose election to the consulship, our having been eye-witnesses, and our being able to carry home the joyful news to our countrymen, renders us the happiest of the Saguntines. He, having taken a great number of the towns of your enemies in Spain, always separated the Saguntines from the rest of the prisoners, and sent them home to their own country; and, lastly, by his arms, so humbled Turdetania—a state so inveterate in its animosity against us, that, if its power had continued, Saguntum must have fallen,—that not only we, but (let me say it without presumption) even our posterity, need have no apprehensions from it. We now see their city destroyed,—the city of a people for whose gratification Hannibal ruined Saguntum. We now receive tribute from their country—a circumstance not more gratifying to us, in the profit we derive from it, than in the satisfying of our revenge. In gratitude for these blessings, greater than which we could not either hope or implore from the immortal gods, the senate and people of Saguntum have sent us, their ten ambassadors, to present their thanks; and, at the same time, to congratulate you on the success which has of late years attended your arms in Spain and Italy. You hold the possession of Spain, so acquired, not only as far as the city Iberus, but to the utmost limits and boundaries by the ocean; while in Italy you have left nothing to the Carthaginian, but what the rampart of his camp encloses. To Jove, supremely great and good, who presides over the fortress of the Capitol, we have been ordered, not only to make acknowledgments for these blessings, but, with your permission, to bear thither this offering, a golden crown, in token of victory. We request that you will permit us this act of reverence; and, also, that you will ratify by your authority, and fix on a permanent footing, the advantages bestowed on us by your commanders.” The senate answered the Saguntine ambassadors, that “the destruction and restoration of Saguntum would be an example to all nations, of social faith fulfilled on both sides; that their commanders, in restoring that city, and delivering its inhabitants from slavery, had acted properly, regularly, and agreeably to the intentions of the senate: that all other acts of kindness shown them had likewise their approbation, and that they gave them permission to deposit their charge in the Capitol.” Orders were then given that apartments and entertainment should be provided for the ambassadors, and a present made to each of them, of not less than ten thousand asses.* Other embassies were then introduced and heard. On the Saguntines requesting that they might be allowed to take a view of Italy, as far as they could go with safety, guides were given them, and letters despatched to all the towns, requiring them to entertain these Spaniards in a friendly manner. The senate then took into consideration the state of public affairs, the levying troops, and the distribution of the provinces.
XL. People in general expressed a desire that Africa should be constituted a new province, and assigned to Publius Scipio without casting lots; and he, not content with a moderate share of glory, affirmed that he had been appointed consul, not for the purpose only of carrying on the war, but of finishing it; that this could be accomplished by no other means than by transporting an army into Africa; declaring openly, that if the senate should oppose him in that point, he would carry it by the votes of the people. The principal senators by no means approved of the design; and whilst the rest, either through fear, or a desire of ingratiating themselves with him, declined uttering their sentiments, Quintus Fabius Maximus, being asked his opinion, expressed himself to this effect: “I know, Conscript Fathers, that many among you are of opinion, that we are this day deliberating on an affair already determined: and that he will expend words to little purpose who shall deliver his sentiments on the subject of Africa being constituted a province, as on a matter open to discussion. Yet, in the first place, I do not understand how Africa can be a province, already secured to that brave and active commander, our consul; when neither the senate have voted, nor the people ordered, that it should at all be considered as such; and again, if it were, in my judgment it is the consul who acts amiss; for it is a mockery of the senate to pretend to consult them on a question if already decided, and not the senator, who in his place would speak to the business which he supposed in hand. Now I am well aware, that, by disapproving this violent haste to pass over into Africa, I expose myself to two imputations; one, the caution natural to my temper, which young men have my free consent to call cowardice and sloth; while I have no reason to be sorry, that, although the schemes of others always carried at first view a more specious appearance, yet mine were on experience found to be more useful. The other imputation to which I shall be liable, is that of detraction and envy towards the rising glory of the valiant consul:—from a suspicion of which kind, if neither my past life and morals can free me, nor a dictatorship and five consulships, together with a store of glory acquired in the transactions both of war and peace, that it is more likely I should be satiated, than desirous of more; let my age at least acquit me. For what emulation can I have with him, who is not equal in age even to my son? When I was dictator, when I was in full vigour, and proceeding in a course of the greatest achievements, no one heard me, either in the senate or before the people, make opposition to the proposed measure, (although such as had never before been heard of, even in conversation,) of conferring power equal to mine on the master of the horse, and who, at the very time, was endeavouring to injure my character. I chose to effect my purpose by actions rather than words; and that he who was set on a level with me in the judgment of others, should at length, by his own confession, allow me a superiority over him. Much less would I now, after having passed through every dignity of the state, propose to myself contests and emulations with a man blooming in youth. Is it that Africa, if refused to him, might be decreed as a province to me,—to me, already wearied, not only with the toils of business, but even with length of years? No: with that glory which I have already acquired, I am to live and die. I stopped the career of Hannibal’s conquests, that you, whose powers are now in vigour, might be able to gain conquests over him.
XLI. “As I never, in my own case, regarded the opinion of the world when set in competition with the advantage of the state, it will be but reasonable that you pardon me, Publius Cornelius, if I do not consider even your fame in preference to the public good. If either there were no war in Italy, or the enemy here were such, that a victory over him would be productive of no glory, he who should attempt to retain you in Italy, notwithstanding that he consulted therein the general welfare, might seem to intend, while he restrained you from removing the war, to deprive you of a subject of future glory. Yet Hannibal, a powerful enemy, with an army unimpaired, maintains a footing in Italy, for the fourteenth year. Would you then have reason to be dissatisfied, Publius Cornelius, with your share of fame, if you should in your consulate expel such a foe from out of Italy; a foe, who has been the cause of so much mourning, of so many calamities to us? In fine, should you not be content to enjoy the reputation of having finished the present Punic war, as Caius Lutatius did that of finishing the former? Unless, indeed, you will say, that Hamilcar is a general more formidable than Hannibal; or that a war in Africa is of greater importance than it would be in Italy; that a victory there, (supposing it should be our good fortune to obtain such while you are consul,) would be more profitable and illustrious than one here. Would you choose to draw away Hamilcar from Drepanum or Eryx, rather than to expel the Carthaginians and Hannibal out of Italy? Although you should look with a more partial regard on the renown which you have acquired, than on that which you have in prospect, yet surely you would not pride yourself so much in having freed Spain, as in freeing Italy. Hannibal is not yet in such a condition, that he who prefers engaging with another general, must not evidently appear to be actuated by fear of him, rather than by contempt. Why, then, do you not direct your efforts to this point, and carry the strength of the war immediately to the place where Hannibal is, and not by that circuition, presuming that, when you shall have passed into Africa, Hannibal will follow you thither? Do you wish to be crowned with the distinguished honour of having finished the Punic war? In the very nature of things, you are to defend your own property, before you attack another’s. Let peace be restored in Italy, before hostilities commence in Africa. Let us be delivered from fear ourselves, before we attempt to make others afraid of us. If both can be accomplished under your conduct and auspices, it will be well. After you have vanquished Hannibal at home, then go and lay siege to Carthage. If one or the other of these conquests must be left to succeeding consuls, the former, as it will be the more important and the more glorious, will be also the cause of the subsequent one. For in the present state of affairs, besides that the treasury cannot maintain two different armies, one in Italy, and another in Africa; besides that we have nothing left us wherewith we could equip fleets, or be able to supply provisions, who does not see what danger must be incurred? Publius Licinius will wage war in Italy, Publius Scipio in Africa. What if Hannibal, having gained a superiority, should advance to the city, (may all the gods avert the omen! my mind is shocked even at mentioning it; but what has happened, may happen again,) will that be a time for us to be obliged to send for you, the consul, from Africa, as we sent for Quintus Fulvius from Capua? Besides, are we to suppose that in Africa the chances of war will not be the same with both parties? Let your father and your uncle be a warning to you,—cut off, together with their armies, in the space of thirty days; and after having, during a course of several years, by their great services, as well on land as at sea, rendered the name of the Roman people, and of your family, in the highest degree illustrious among foreign states. The whole day would not be sufficient, were I to recount to you all the kings and generals, who, by passing rashly into an enemy’s country, have brought the greatest calamities on themselves and their armies. The Athenians, for instance, a state remarkable for prudence, having, at the instigation of a youth who was distinguished as much by his active spirit as by his nobility, neglected a war at home, and sent over a large fleet to Sicily, (their commonwealth at that time in a most flourishing condition,) suffered, in one naval engagement, such a blow as could never be retrieved.
XLII. “But, not to bring examples from distant countries, and times of such remote antiquity, Africa itself, and Marcus Atilius, (a remarkable instance of both extremes of fortune,) may serve as a warning to us. Be assured, Publius Cornelius, that, when you shall have a view of Africa from the sea, all your exploits in Spain will appear to you to have been only matter of sport and play. For, in what circumstance can they be compared? After sailing along the coasts of Italy and Gaul, where there was nothing to oppose you, you carried your fleet into the harbour of Emporiæ, a city belonging to our allies; and, having landed your men, you led them through countries entirely free from danger, to Tarraco, to the friends and allies of the Roman people. From Tarraco, you passed amid Roman garrisons. It was on the Iberus, indeed, that the armies of your father and uncle were exasperated by the loss of their generals, their new commander being Lucius Marcus, irregularly appointed, it is true, and chosen, for the time, by the suffrages of the soldiers; but, except that he wanted a noble birth, and a regular course of promotion, equal to many celebrated captains in every military accomplishment. The siege of New Carthage you carried on quite at your leisure, while neither of the three Carthaginian armies attempted to relieve the place. As to the rest of your exploits, I am far from wishing to lessen their merit, but they are certainly, by no means, to be compared with a war in Africa; where there is not a single harbour open to our fleet; no part of the country at peace with us; no state our ally; no king our friend; no room, any where, either to stand or advance. On whatever side you turn your eyes, all things are hostile and threatening. Will you depend on Syphax and the Numidians? Suffice it to say, that they were once trusted. Rashness is not always successful; and hypocrisy, by acquiring a foundation of credit in smaller matters, prepares for itself the opportunity of deceiving with greater advantage. The foe did not get the better of your father and uncle by arms, until their Celtiberian allies had first got the better of them by treachery. Nor were you yourself brought into so much danger by Mago and Hasdrubal, the enemy’s generals, as by Indibilis and Mandonius, whom you had received into your protection. Can you, who have experienced a defection of your own soldiers, place any confidence in Numidians? Both Syphax and Masinissa are desirous of becoming the greatest powers in Africa, to the exclusion of the Carthaginians; but still they prefer the interest of those people to that of any other state. At present, mutual emulation embitter them against each other, and which arises from their feeling no immediate apprehensions from any foreign force. The moment they behold the Roman arms, they will instantly unite, as if to extinguish a fire equally threatening them both. The efforts which these same Carthaginians made in support of Spain, were widely different from what they will exert, in defence of the walls of their native city, of the temples of their gods, their altars, and their dwellings; when their wives, distracted with fear, shall accompany them as they go to battle, and their helpless children gather round them. Besides, what if the Carthaginians, thinking themselves sufficiently secured by the harmony subsisting in Africa, by the faith of the kings their allies, and by their own fortifications, should, on seeing Italy deprived of your protection, either send over a new army from Africa into Italy, or order Mago, (who, we know, has sailed over from the Baleares, and is now cruising on the coast of the Alpine Ligurians,) to join his forces to those of Hannibal? We should then be seized with the same terror which we felt lately, on hearing of the approach of Hasdrubal; and whom you, (who are to shut up with your army, not only Carthage, but all Africa,) allowed to slip through your hands into Italy. You will say, that he was defeated by you: the less, for that very reason, can I wish that he should be permitted, after being defeated, to march into this country; and that, not only upon the account of the public, but your own also. Allow us to ascribe to your good conduct all those events in your province which were favourable to you and to the state; and to impute such as were unfavourable to fortune, and to the chances of war. The more merit and bravery you possess, the more is your country and all Italy concerned to keep at home so powerful a protector. You cannot but acknowledge, that wherever Hannibal is, there the main stress and head of the present war must be looked for: yet the reason you give for passing over into Africa is, that you may draw Hannibal thither. Whether the Carthaginians, therefore, be in this country or in that, your business is to oppose him. Now, I pray you, whether will you be better able to cope with him in Africa, where you are to stand alone; or here, with the army of your colleague joined to your own? Is not the importance of this consideration sufficiently evinced by the recent fate of the consuls Claudius and Livius? What! is Hannibal to be feared here, as receiving an augmentation of men and arms from the remotest corner of the country of Bruttium, (and which he in vain solicits from home;) or with Carthage at his back, and all Africa confederated with him? What is this plan of choosing to fight there, where your forces must be less by half, and those of the enemy considerably greater, rather than here, at the head of two armies against one, and that one impaired in strength by so many battles, and by such long and laborious service? Consider well how far this plan of yours resembles that of your father. He, in his consulship, after having gone to Spain, came back from his province to Italy, in order to meet Hannibal as he was descending from the Alps: you, when Hannibal is in Italy, intend to quit the country, not because you judge that measure useful to the state, but because you expect from it splendour and glory to yourself. Just as when, without an order of the commons, without a decree of the senate, you left your province and your army;—yes, you, a commander employed by the Roman people, entrusted to two ships the fortune of the public, and the majesty of the empire, which were then exposed to hazard in your person. In my judgment, Conscript Fathers, Publius Cornelius Scipio was elected consul for the purpose of serving us and the people; not for his own private schemes of ambition. In my opinion, the armies were enlisted for the protection of the city and of Italy, and not to be carried about by the consuls with king-like ostentation, in gratification of their own vanity, and to any part of the world they may think proper.”
XLIII. By this speech, formed for the occasion, by his authority and his established character for prudence, Fabius influenced a great part of the senate, especially those advanced in years; and a greater number approving of the wariness of the sage than of the spirit of the youth, Scipio is said to have spoken thus: “Conscript Fathers, even Quintus Fabius himself, in the beginning of his speech, has acknowledged that, in the declaration which he has made of his sentiments, he might possibly be suspected of detraction; and although I will not presume to bring a charge of such a nature against so great a man, yet certainly, whether through a defect in his discourse, or in the subject, the suspicion has not been removed. For, in order to avoid the imputation of envy, he has extolled his own honours, and the fame of his exploits, in very magnificent terms; tending to show, that whatever competition I may enter into with others; however I may fear that some person, now in obscurity, may one day be equal with me; yet, from him I have no kind of rivalry to apprehend: for he has attained to such a height of eminence, that he will not suffer me at any time to be placed on a level with him, however anxiously I may wish it; and that I do wish it, I will by no means dissemble. He has, therefore, represented himself as a man of gravity and wisdom, who has passed through every degree of public honours; and me, as below the age even of his son; as if ambition extended not his views beyond the present life, and did not look forward to posterity and future remembrance as the greatest possible reward. I well know, that it is usual with persons of exalted merit to compare themselves with the illustrious men, not only of the present, but of every age; and I do not deny, Quintus Fabius, that I wish not only to overtake you in the race of glory, but (pardon the expression) to outrun you, if I can. That disposition of mind will not, I hope, affect you towards me, nor me towards my juniors, that we should be displeased if any of our countrymen became distinguished like ourselves; for that would be an injury not only to those who were the objects of our envy, but to the state, and in some measure to all mankind. Fabius has descanted on the danger which I must incur if I pass into Africa, so as to appear anxious, not only about the safety of the nation and the army, but about mine. Whence has this concern for me so suddenly arisen? When my father and uncle were slain; when their two armies were cut off almost to a man; when Spain was lost; when four armies and four generals of the Carthaginians, by terror and by arms, kept possession of every thing; when the public were at a loss for a general to conduct that war, and no one stepped forward except myself; when no one dared to declare himself a candidate; when the Roman people had conferred the command on me, though but twenty-four years old,—how happened it that no mention was then made of my age, of the power of the enemy, of the difficulties of opposing him, or of the recent calamity of my relatives? Has any greater misfortune befallen us in Africa, than had at that time been experienced in Spain? Are there now on that continent more numerous armies or better generals, than there were then in Spain? Was I fitter at that time of life for conducting a war than I am now? Is a contest with a Carthaginian enemy less difficult in Spain than in Africa? It is an easy matter, after four Carthaginian armies routed and entirely dispersed; after so many cities taken by force, or terrified into a surrender; while all places, even as far as the ocean, have been brought under entire subjection; while so many princes, so many savage nations have been wholly reduced; in a word, after all Spain has been re-conquered, and in such a manner as that no trace of war remains;—it is easy, I say, to depreciate the value of my services, just as easy, in truth, as it will be, if I shall return victorious from Africa, to make light of those very circumstances which are now so greatly aggravated, and painted in such terrible colours, for the purpose of detaining me here. It is affirmed that no entrance can be found into Africa; that there are no harbours open to us; that Marcus Atilius was taken prisoner there, as if Marcus Atilius had miscarried on approaching that coast. But Fabius does not recollect that this commander (afterwards, indeed, unfortunate) found the harbours of Africa open, and during the first year performed extraordinary services; and, as far as concerned the Carthaginian generals, remained unconquered to the last. The example which you produce, therefore, does not in the least deter me. If that loss had even been sustained in the present war, and not in the former; if lately, and not forty years ago; yet why should I not as well pass into Africa after Regulus was made prisoner, as into Spain after the Scipios were slain; nor suffer it to be said, that the birth of Xantippus, a Lacedæmonian, was, by the defeat of our consul, more fortunate to Carthage, than mine to my own country? and why might I not assume additional confidence from that very circumstance, that it was possible for the bravery of one man, a Spartan, to produce such important consequences? But we are also told of the Athenians neglecting a war at home, and passing inconsiderately into Sicily. Why do you not rather (since you have leisure to recount Grecian fables) mention Agathocles King of Syracuse, who, when Sicily was for a long time wasted by a Punic war, by passing over into this same Africa, averted that war to the place from whence it came?
XLIV. “But what need is there either of ancient or foreign examples to remind us how useful it is to spread terror among the enemy by a sudden attack; and after removing the danger to a distance from ourselves, to make him abide the hazard? Can there be any greater or more striking instance than is found in Hannibal? Between wasting the territories of others, and seeing our own destroyed with fire and sword, the difference is immense. The assailant has ever more spirit than the defendant; and people’s apprehensions are the greater in the latter case. When you have entered an enemy’s territories, you can then see more distinctly the advantages and disadvantages which pertain to the same. Hannibal never entertained a hope that so many nations in Italy would revolt to him as did, and which was induced by our misfortune at Cannæ. How much less can any firm and steady support in Africa be expected by the Carthaginians, who are themselves faithless allies, severe and haughty masters? As to ourselves, even when deserted by confederates, we stood firm in our own natural strength, the soldiery of Rome. This the Carthaginians do not possess; beside, their soldiers are procured for hire,—Africans, with Numidians, of all men the most unsteady in their attachments. If no obstruction be thrown in my way at home, you shall shortly hear, that I have made good my descent, and that Africa is in a blaze of war; that Hannibal, in returning thither, comes but to experience a defeat, and that Carthage is besieged: in fine, expect confidently more frequent and more joyful despatches from that continent than you received from Spain. These hopes are suggested to me by the fortune of the Roman people, the gods who witnessed the treaty which the enemy have violated, and the friendship of the Kings, Syphax and Masinissa, to whom I shall look for aid while securing myself against perfidy. The war will disclose many things which do not appear now; and it is the business of a general, not to fail of improving the overtures of fortune, and to convert casual occurrences to the accomplishment of his designs. I shall, Quintus Fabius, have the antagonist whom you assign me, Hannibal: I shall compel him to fight in his own country, and Carthage rather shall be the prize than the half-ruined forts of the Bruttians. With respect to the security of the state, and that it should suffer no injury while I am on my passage; while I am landing my army in Africa; while I am marching forwards to Carthage; be careful in any assertion as to what you, Quintus Fabius, were able to accomplish, at a time when Hannibal was pursuing a rapid career of victory through all parts of Italy; be mindful, I say, lest it be considered as an insult, that you do not too freely affirm of him, that, shaken and almost broken in pieces, his overthrow by Publius Licinius the consul were easy,—a man by the way of the most consummate valour, and who declined the lot of so distant a province as Africa, only because, being chief pontiff, he must not be absent from his religious duties. In fact, even though the war were not to be brought to a speedier conclusion by the method which I propose, still it would concern the dignity of the Roman people, and their reputation among foreign kings and nations, that we should appear to have spirit, not only to defend Italy, but to carry our arms into Africa; and that it should not be spread abroad, and believed, that no Roman general dared what Hannibal had dared; and that, in the former Punic war, when the contest was about Sicily, Africa had been often attacked by our fleets and armies; but that now, when the contest is about Italy, Africa should enjoy peace. Let Italy, so long harassed, enjoy at length some repose: let Africa, in its turn, feel fire and sword. Let the Roman camp press on the very gates of Carthage, rather than that we, a second time, should behold from our walls the rampart of that of the enemy. Let Africa, in short, be the seat of the remainder of the war: thither be removed terror and flight, devastation of lands, revolt of allies, and all the other calamities with which, for fourteen years, we have been afflicted. It is sufficient that I have delivered my sentiments on those matters which affect the state, the dispute in which we are involved, and the provinces under consideration: my discourse would be tedious, and unsuitable to this audience, if, as Quintus Fabius has depreciated my services in Spain, I should, on the other hand, endeavour in like manner to disparage his glory, and extol my own. I shall do neither, Conscript Fathers; but, young as I am, I will show that I excel that sage, if in nothing else, yet certainly in modesty and temperance of language. Such has been my life and conduct, that I can, in silence, rest perfectly satisfied with that character which your own judgments have formed of me.”
XLV. Scipio was heard the less favourably on account of a rumour which prevailed, that if he did not carry the point in the senate, of having Africa decreed to him as his province, he was determined immediately to submit the business to public decision. Therefore Quintus Fulvius, who had been consul four times, and censor, demanded of the consul, that he should declare openly in the senate, whether “he meant to abide by the determination of the Fathers in regard to the provinces, or whether he intended to bring the matter before the people?” Scipio having answered, that he would act in such a manner as he should deem most advantageous to the state, Fulvius replied, “I did not ask the question through ignorance of what you would answer, and what you intended to do. It is thus plainly seen, that you are rather sounding the senate, than consulting them; and have an order ready to be proposed to the people, if we do not immediately decree to you the province that you desire. I therefore call upon you, tribunes, to support me in refusing to give my opinion, and for this reason, that, although a majority should concur with me, yet the consul would appeal from their judgment.” On this an altercation arose, Scipio insisting, that it was unfair for the tribunes to interpose, so as to prevent any senator from giving his opinion, on being asked it in his place. The tribunes determined thus: “If the consul submits the regulation of the provinces to the senate, we are satisfied that their decision shall be final, and we will not suffer that matter to be carried before the people; if he does not so submit it, we will support such as shall refuse to give their opinion on the subject.” The consul desired time until the next day, that he might confer with his colleague, and the affair was then submitted to the senate, who decreed the provinces in this manner: to one consul, Sicily, and the thirty ships of war, which Caius Servilius had commanded the preceding year, with permission to pass over into Africa, if he should judge it for the advantage of the state; to the other, Bruttium, and the war against Hannibal, with the army which Lucius Veturius, or that which Quintus Cæcilius, commanded; that these latter should cast lots, or settle between themselves, which of them should command in Bruttium, with the two legions which would be left by the consul; and that he, to whose lot that province fell; should be continued in it for another year. The others also who were to have the charge of armies, besides the consuls and prætors, had their commission prolonged. It fell by lot to Quintus Cæcilius, that, in conjunction with the consul, he should manage the war against Hannibal in Bruttium. Scipio’s games were then exhibited to a vast concourse of spectators, who expressed the highest approbation. Marcus Pomponius Matho, and Quintus Catius, being sent ambassadors to Delphi, with a present out of the spoils of Hasdrubal, carried a golden crown of two hundred pounds weight, and representations of the prizes, formed of one thousand pounds weight of silver. Although Scipio had not obtained, nor earnestly solicited, authority to levy soldiers, he yet was permitted to enrol volunteers; and as he had declared that the fleet should be no expense to the public, so he might receive such contributions as should be offered by the allies for building new ships. The states of Etruria first promised to give assistance to the consul, proportioned to the respective abilities of each; the people of Cære engaged to bring corn, and provisions of all kinds, for the seamen; the Populonians, iron; the Tarquinians, canvass for sails; the Volaterrans, tackling and corn; the Arretians, thirty thousand shields, the same number of helmets; of javelins, short pikes, and long spears, each an equal number, amounting in the whole to fifty thousand; to supply axes, mattocks, bills, buckets, and millstones, sufficient for forty ships of war, with one hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat; they also promised to contribute to the expense of the decurions* and rowers. The people of Perusium, Clusium, and Rusella gave assurance of fir for building ships, and a large quantity of corn. The states of Umbria, with the people of Nursia, Reate, and Amiternum, and the whole country of the Sabines, engaged to furnish soldiers. Fir, however, he took out of the woods belonging to the state. Great numbers of the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrusinians, voluntarily gave in their names to serve in the fleet. The Cameritans, though confederated with the Romans on equal terms, sent a cohort of six hundred men and arms. Having laid the keels of thirty ships, twenty quinqueremes, and ten quadriremes, Scipio pressed forward the work by his personal attendance, in such a manner, that on the forty-fifth day after the timber had been brought from the woods, the ships were rigged, armed, and launched.
XLVI. The consul proceeded to Sicily with thirty ships of war, having embarked about seven thousand volunteers. Publius Licinius came into Bruttium to the two consular armies, of which he chose for himself that which had been commanded by the late consul, Lucius Veturius; he placed Metellus at the head of the same legions as before, because he thought it would be the easier for him to transact business with those who were accustomed to his command: the prætors also repaired to their different provinces. Money for the war being wanting, the quæstors were ordered to sell a district of the Campanian territory, extending from the Grecian trench to the sea: they were also empowered to make inquiry what lands had been the property of any native, in order that they might be transferred to the Roman people; with a reward to any informer of the tenth part of the value of the lands so discovered. It was also given in charge to Cneius Servilius, prætor of the city, that the natives of Campania should be obliged to remain in those places which had been decreed for their residence by the senate, and that such as removed to any other should be punished. During the same summer, Mago, son of Hamilcar, after having spent the winter in the smaller of the Baleares, and having there embarked a chosen body of young men on board his fleet, which consisted of near thirty ships of war, and a great number of transports, carried into Italy twelve thousand foot, and about two thousand horse; and, by his unexpected arrival, surprised Genoa, there being no forces stationed to protect the coast. From thence he sailed to the coast of the Alpine Ligurians, to try if he could raise any commotions there. The Ingaunians, a tribe of the Ligurians, were at that time engaged in war with the Epanterians, who inhabited the mountains: the Carthaginian, therefore, having deposited his plunder at Savo, a town of the Alps, and left a squadron of ten ships of war to protect it, sent the rest to Carthage, to guard the sea-coast, a report being spread that Scipio intended to pass over thither. He then formed an alliance with the Ingaunians, whose friendship he esteemed, resolving in person to attack the mountaineers. His army increased daily, the Gauls, induced by the greatness of his character, pouring in from all sides. When the senate were informed of these proceedings, by letters from Spurius Lucretius, they were filled with much anxiety, apprehending that the joy which they had conceived, on the destruction of Hasdrubal and his army, two years before, would prove ill-founded, if another war, equal to the former, only under a different general, were to arise from the same quarter. They therefore commanded Marcus Livius, proconsul, to march an army of volunteer slaves from Etruria to Ariminum, at the same time charging the prætor, Cneius Servilius, if he judged it advantageous to the state, to order the city legions to be led into the field, by such commander as he should think proper. Marcus Valerius Lævinus conducted those legions to Arretium. About this time eighty transport ships of the Carthaginians were taken on the coast of Sardinia by Cneius Octavius, who held the government of that province. Cælius relates that these were laden with corn and provisions for Hannibal; Valerius, that they were carrying to Carthage the plunder of Etruria, and the Ligurian mountaineers, who had been made prisoners. In Bruttium, hardly any thing memorable happened during that year. A pestilence had attacked both Romans and Carthaginians with equal violence, except that the Carthaginians, besides the disorder, were distressed by famine. Hannibal spent the summer near the temple of Juno Lacinea, where he built and dedicated an altar, with an inscription in the Carthaginian and Greek characters, containing a pompous recital of his exploits.
[* ]24,218l. 15s. 0d.
[† ]258l. 6s. 8d.
[‡ ]3s. 7½d.
[* ]These were two magistrates chosen annually, and invested with powers similar to those of the Roman consuls. The Carthaginians had a senate also like that of the Romans. There was one peculiarity in their proceedings which deserves notice: when the members were unanimous, there was no appeal from their decision; but when opinions were divided, the business devolved to the community at large. For a very long time the people interfered but little with the administration of public affairs; but afterwards, by means of factions and cabals, they almost entirely engrossed it to themselves, which proved a principal cause of their ruin. They had a council consisting of 104 members, called the tribunal of the hundred, to which the commanders of armies were responsible for their conduct.
[‡ ]Majorca and Minorca.
[* ]32l. 5s. 10d.
[* ]Officers who had the command of the rowers.