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V - John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, vol. 3 Oath - Zollverein 
Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). Vol 3 Oath - Zollverein
Part of: Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, 3 vols.
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VALUE. The notion of value is one fundamental in political economy; but unfortunately there is no politico-economical idea which requires so much effort of the power of attention and so much patience to be thoroughly understood. The reason of this is, that the phenomenon to which it relates is purely relative, and consequently difficult to characterize. In order to acquire a just and precise idea of value, we must therefore enter into explanations of some length.
—The things whose possession is necessary, useful or agreeable to us, are numerous and various; and we can obtain those which we ourselves need only by parting with others of which we have the disposal. Hence exchanges, which, by determining in what quantity one thing is accepted or delivered in return for another, have the effect of establishing a relation of value among all things. Can you, for example, get one hectolitre of wine for one hectolitre of wheat? If you can, the fact that you can, assigns to these two products their relative value. They figure in the exchange as equal quantities, and the one has the same value as the other. Suppose that from some cause, however, we have to give, not one hectolitre, but 120 litres of wheat for one hectolitre of wine; this establishes a new ratio between the quantities exchanged, and the values are no longer the same. The value which the wheat possessed relatively to the wine fell just in proportion to the increase in the number of litres to be delivered in exchange for one hectolitre of wine; the value of the wine, on the contrary, increased in proportion to the diminution in the quantity of it to be furnished in order to procure one hectolitre of wheat. What one of the products has lost in value the other has gained, and this in exactly the same proportion. What we have just said of wine and wheat, is true of all possible products. They all give rise to exchanges, and each of them obtains a value founded on the quantity either of another product, or, in general, of the other products for which it can at any given moment be exchanged.
—The advance of civilization long since did away with barter. The more numerous and diverse products became, the more men realized the necessity of choosing one of them to serve as a medium of exchange; and coined money was chosen for this office, because it possesses certain qualities in a greater degree than any other. Money is one of those things which men desire because of the services which they render, and for which, when in need of them, they give a certain amount of other things. This fact, while it gives to money a certain value in each of the other products, gives also to each of these a value in money; determined by the amount which is required to procure them. Thus, the amount of money which all these products command, i.e., the price which is given for them, constitutes a common denominator of the value which they have in commercial transactions, and it is only necessary to compare their prices to know their relative value. If a hat is worth three dollars, this price, compared with that of sugar, of cloth, of a plow, or of any object whatever, shows how much of these different products can be obtained for it, and consequently what value hats acquire from the quantity either of some particular product or of other products in general which their possession confers the power of acquiring. The existence of an intermediary which assures to the values attached to the various products a term of comparison equally applicable to them all, and which renders it easy to follow the fluctuations in their values, is an immense advantage. But it is important to bear in mind that prices and values are very distinct things. (See PRICES.) Prices express only the quantity of coined money which each product is worth, and this quantity is subject to changes which have their own special causes, but which, while they modify prices, have no influence on the relation of values that exists between the products themselves. Thus we see everything in value is relative. It is the relation existing between two things exchanged, a relation which depends upon the respective quantities which each must deliver to the other in order that the exchange may be made on equal conditions, a relation of which (from the very fact that these conditions must be equal) one of the terms (wherever there is a relation, there must be at least two terms) can not be affected in any sense whatever, without the other term being affected at the same moment in a contrary sense. It is essential that this purely relative character of value be clearly understood, if we would not fall into a multitude of economic errors, so great a part does value play in the speculative part of the science. Among the many consequences which flow from the idea of the relativeness of value, there are two which we will single out, if only to throw a little more light on a subject naturally intricate and abstract: one is, that there are only values, and there is no such thing as a collective value, formed by the union of particular values, susceptible of division, degree or measure; the other is, that there can be no such thing as a general rise or fall of values. And in fact, the values in things being only the expression of the quantity of other things which can be obtained in exchange for them, it is impossible that values should increase in the one case without diminishing in the other. The moment it becomes necessary to give more wheat in order to have a given quantity of wine, we give less wine to procure a given quantity of wheat. The fall in the value of wheat produces the rise in the value of wine, and it is thus in all exchanges. There is no rise of values which does not suppose a fall, and in like manner no fall which does not suppose a rise.
—It has taken much time and reflection to free the theory of value from the complications which rendered it uncertain and obscure. In vain did the first economists examine the question; they did not succeed in presenting its solution under forms sufficiently clear and precise. It would be wrong to blame them for this. To the difficulties met with in the analysis and definition of every relation (ratio), when neither of its terms has anything fixed in it, there were added others, in the case of these first economists, caused by the very imperfection of the language they were obliged to use. In common parlance, the word value had different significations. It was used indifferently to designate, at one time, the degree of utility inherent in the use of things; at another, the power of acquisition which these things possessed with regard to other things; at another still, their money price. Hence came, in the ideas suggested by the word value, associations which prevented people from noting differences and distinctions between these ideas, without the noting of which it was impossible to reduce them all to their essential meaning.
—What economists first thought of was the necessity of attaching to the word value qualifying terms intended to characterize each of the meanings which it owed to usage. The French economists of the last century resolved to apply the term usual value (valeur usuelle) to that quality which gives things the capacity directly to satisfy the wants of those who possess them, and venal value (valeur vénale) to those qualities which give things that capacity only by means of exchange. This was the course taken by Adam Smith also. What the physiocrates called usual value, he designated as value in use, and value in exchange what they called, less correctly, venal value. The moment people introduced into science two distinct meanings for the word value, instead of reserving it, as the most eminent economists do now, to express only the ratio of quantity between things exchanged, it became necessary to make use of adjectives to determine which of the two significations they intended to give to the word, each time they used it. But even this care could not sufficiently obviate the grave inconvenience of using one and the same generic term to express qualities and circumstances which in themselves have nothing in common. Conceptions which involved the idea of value remained undecided; men's minds were confused by applying the idea of one kind of value to another, and the way was opened to confusions which seriously impaired the progress and authority of the science.
—It will be necessary to call attention to several of these confusions by reason of the place which they occupy in the writings of the older economists, and which they have retained even in the works of some of their successors. Some observations upon the most serious of these confusions will serve, on the one hand, to guard us against certain errors into which it is easy to fall, and on the other, by showing what value is not, will make it easier to perceive what it really is.
—We will mention only those which it is important to call attention to. We may consider them as follows: the confusion of value with price; the confusion of value with certain circumstances by which it is influenced; the confusion of value with wealth; and, as a consequence of this last, confusion in the search for an undiscoverable measure of value.
—It was easy, and even natural, to a certain extent, to confound values and prices, since, considering them from product to product, the ones serve to measure the others. In the ordinary course of facts we begin by exchanging the products which we have to dispose of, for their value in money, then we give the amount of money received for the other things which we wish to procure, and it is certain that the value in money of these things really corresponds to their relative value. An article that is worth two dollars in money is worth twice as much as that which is worth only one dollar, and if the exchange were made in kind, we would have to give double the quantity of one to obtain the other. But we must bear in mind that prices merely express the relation that exists between the quantities for which money, and other products, are reciprocally placed in the balance, and this relation remains subject to the empire of circumstances which may affect the disposable quantity of money. If money is abundant, it will be more freely offered for each of the products which it is used to purchase; then its value decreases, and prices rise. If money, on the contrary, becomes scarce, less of it will be given in exchange for other things in commercial transactions, its value will increase, and prices, on the contrary, will fall. Thus, unlike values, which can neither increase nor decrease simultaneously, prices, which are the simple results of the comparative value of money and all other products against which it is exchanged, undergo fluctuations peculiar to themselves, and they may all rise or fall at once. The confusion of prices and values has been the unfortunate cause of rendering nations which were not wanting in scientific worth, singularly obscure. It has led economists to conclude from prices to values, and from values to prices, to suppose them governed by the same laws, and subject to the same accidents, and to attribute to the amount of prices, an influence which it should not have Hence proceeded errors which deservedly esteemed economists have not always avoided, and of which the works of Ricardo himself afford but too many examples.
—One of the most frequent confusions, and one which, by its generality, has proved much more prejudicial to the science, is that which confounds value with some of the circumstances that concur in giving value to things. This is the immediate result of the many different acceptations given to the word value. Writers employed the expressions "value in use" and "value in exchange"; thenceforth it was natural that people should imagine that there must exist between the two kinds of value some secret affinity, some link or bond of union covered by some higher principle, common to both, and they set to work to find that principle. Adam Smith believed he discovered it in materiality and duration: Ricardo, in labor; J. B. Say, in utility; others, in rarity, etc., etc. The inevitable consequence was, that they mistook the very nature of value, and forgot its origin and character; and nevertheless, among the masters of political economy, only a few of the more recent have succeeded in completely escaping from an illusion produced by the use of an inexact and vicious terminology.
—The observations suggested by these errors are applicable to all such affinity except rarity. What is value? As we have already said, it is simply a ratio of quantity between products exchanged, and it is perfectly clear that it can not be found outside of this relation. Doubtless, when, in order to obtain a product, we consent to give others which belong to us in exchange for it, what determines us to do so is some quality in the product itself which pleases us, and which is not to be found, or which is found only in a smaller proportion, in those which we give in return for it. This is the reason for every exchange that is made: there would be no exchange if all things possessed the same qualities, and could procure for us the same enjoyments, and satisfy the same wants; and it is surprising that this simple remark did not suffice to prevent men from connecting with this or that particular quality of things the principle of their value.
—There are things which in order to answer to the wants in view of which we seek them, should possess materiality and duration; there are others which must have absorbed a great deal of labor in their making, and others again which must be susceptible of immediate consumption: we exchange them for one another because our wants and our tastes are different, and because, if to build a house, we must have materials whose duration will resist the ravages of time; we must have, in order to feed ourselves, bread and meat, which do not last, and for our recreation, theatrical representations, concerts and amusements, which produce but a passing emotion, and leave no trace except in our remembrance.
—Utility is essential to the value of things, in this general sense, that we give nothing for any of them but upon condition of finding, in their possession or in the use which we make of them, some pleasure or enjoyment; it may be well to recall, however, that the nature of the wants which they are intended to satisfy has no influence on the more or the less of value which attaches to them. We must first provide for the most imperious necessities of life, and obtain the means of satisfying them; but, this once done, each one takes into consideration other consumers, and this consideration is ampler in proportion as he can accord them more. The wants of the intellect and of the heart, love of the arts, taste for luxury, the promptings of pride or vanity—all concur in determining the esteem in which things are held; and it is not uncommon for men to pay for a flower, or ribbon, or the pleasure of hearing a violinist, for instance, a price equivalent to a considerable quantity of the products without which we would have to suffer the deadly attacks of cold or hunger.
—What gives at times an immense value to products, whose deprivation causes neither inconvenience nor physical suffering, is the price that is put upon them by those who are able to obtain them, and the sacrifices men make in order to possess them. There are men rich enough to gratify their every fancy; and, no matter what the things which their fancy craves, these things from the moment they are sought after and there is a demand for them, acquire, equally with other objects, a real value, based upon the amount of other things which men give in order to obtain them. Although there is nothing that is indifferent in the feelings and tastes which dictate the employment of wealth, from the standpoint of morality, of the future and of social progress, nothing can prevent the objects which serve to gratify frivolous and even blamable desires from having the value of the objects for which they can be exchanged.
—Among other consequences following the opinion that value should have a fundamental principle in one of the material qualities inherent in things, there is one consequence which has given rise to so many controversies, that we can not pass it over in silence here. It has been asked whether it were possible that immaterial things, acts, efforts, services, which are not realized under a tangible and durable form, could have a value; and a goodly number of writers have answered in the negative. The services of governments, of magistrates, of the clergy, of physicians, and of members of the bar; instruction given by masters, professors and artists—all these and many other similar things have been declared without real value; and this despite the fact that it was very evident that those who felt the want of these services did not hesitate to give, in order to obtain them, large quantities of things to which value was attributed because of their materiality. This erroneous opinion has now, however, but few adherents. It is recognized that nothing which men prize sufficiently to give a price for, can be devoid of value, and that those things which are called immaterial have, like all other things, a value proportioned to the quantity of each of the different things which they put those who dispose of such immaterial products in a way to procure for themselves. This error regarding immaterial services has not been confined to the question of value; we meet with it also in essays upon production, wealth and labor.
—Rarity deserves special mention. It is not, like materiality, duration, labor, or utility, a quality substantially incorporated in things, it is merely the effect of a disproportion between the quantity in demand and the quantity obtainable, and it, therefore, exercises an effectual influence on the value of the things of which it is either the ordinary or the accidental lot. What causes rarity is the impossibility of increasing a thing at the pleasure of those who wish to obtain it; hence they vie for its possession, and give in exchange for its a much larger quantity of other things than they would if it were more abundant. This it is that assures a very great value to certain products which are found in small number;-this it is also which for a moment gives an extraordinary value to the most common products, such as wine, wheat, wool, cloth, or glass, when, by some accident, the want of them is felt. But rarity, besides being at all times an evil, is, like value itself, only the effect of a relation, and can exist only on condition that it (rarity) does not become general. When bread is more scarce than usual, it acquires an increase of value, but this increase it acquires only because the products given in exchange for it lose in relation to it some of their own proper value, and lose this only because they retain their accustomed abundance. If they became rare or scarce at the same time and in the same proportion as bread, the relation between the quantities exchanged would have suffered no alteration, and their respective values would have remained the same. Rarity acts only privately, only to the extent that it is confined to certain products in opposition to others; and to elevate rarity into the dignity of the general principle of value, is to make a strange mistake; for it is evident, that if rarity extended at the same time to everything offered in exchange, its effects would disappear immediately.
—The confusions between value and wealth do not lead to consequences of so much importance. They spring from correlations which have a real existence, and it is easy to explain them. Private wealth is in proportion to the value of the things of which it is made up. Lands, houses, capital, merchandise, in a word, everything which belongs to individuals, is susceptible of exchange, and consequently possesses the value resulting from the amount of things of another kind which it can be used to obtain. In order to know, therefore, the amount of his wealth it will be sufficient for an individual to ascertain the value in money, the price, of each of the things which he possesses, and then to compare the sum of these prices with what it will enable him to procure in other things. But the correlation between private wealth and the value of the different elements of which it is made up, does not extend to real, positive and general wealth. This latter constitutes a whole, and for want of a term of comparison (because it is not exchangeable) it can not be estimated in any manner. If the things comprised in the sphere which general wealth embraces have all the value which is conferred on each one of them by its particular power of acquisition with regard to other things, the same can not be said of the mass; for this mass admits of no comparison which would permit us to assign it a value, and it would be vain to attempt to find, in the variable relations of exchange that exist between its constitutive parts, an expression which would cover them all. Hence we must have recourse to circumstances entirely foreign to the value which the elements of general wealth receive solely from the exchanges to which they give rise, if we wish to estimate the extent of the wealth of nations in general, or of a nation considered separately.
—However, it will not be without some utility to explain still more the differences which necessarily distinguish value from wealth. Wealth, taken in its aggregate, is the possession of those things by means of which men attain to the satisfaction of their wants, and the more abundant these things are, the greater wealth is. Therefore, it is by its ratio to the wants which it is destined to satisfy, that we must estimate wealth, and this ratio can not be affected by the ratios which exist between the things that constitute it. Not that wealth can increase without modifying the preexisting ratios of value. Wealth increases only to the extent that the efforts of labor, becoming more ingenious and more fruitful, produce a greater amount of some one of those things whose use is either necessary, agreeable or useful to us; from which it follows that this thing offered and delivered in exchange for others in a greater quantity than before, loses something of its relative value, and causes these other things to gain in relative value. Thus every advance in wealth has the effect of reducing the value of the products which it increases, and of raising the value of the products on which it has no effect. This is an eminently beneficial change to the people among whom it takes place; but from the point of view of value the change has no effect, because the value of each thing depends on relations one of whose terms can not increase without the others decreasing.
—It is so difficult for the mind to see in value only the effect of a ratio of exchange, that for a long time most of the economists were preoccupied with the idea of discovering some measure for it. This was a seeking for the impossible. It would have been necessary to find a value to measure value, and where could a value be found which was not itself the result of a ratio, and, because the result of a ratio, as changeable and variable as the other values to which it was sought to make it serve as a comparative measure or standard? But the search for this measure of value has been so common that we can not pass it over without remark.
—Among the things which have attracted attention as specially fitted to serve as a measure of values, coined money, human labor and wheat have been accorded the preference. But it was not given to any one of the three to act as such measure better than the others. When money was taken as the measure of values, it was indeed possible to find what was the value in money of each product at a given moment, and thus to find a comparative term applicable to all products; but it was not possible to discover in money itself a fixed value protected from the variations which are the effects of causes operating on the quantities of the products which have just come into the market to be exchanged one against the other. It was plain that gold and silver, of which money is made, like all other products, varied in value, according to their greater or less abundance in the market, and that they had a very unequal power of acquisition at different epochs, and were also subject to the empire of circumstances, which at one time rendered their extraction more costly, and at others made their consumption greater or more necessary.
—And so of human labor, in which Smith had placed the origin of value, and which he had pointed out as the one thing which afforded its most exact measure. Human labor is unquestionably an element in all production of wealth; but it in no wise follows that its value is absolute, and, that in the relation which it holds to the things against which it is exchanged, it constitutes a term fixed and constant. On the contrary, labor is more or less in demand, and is better or worse compensated at different periods; this is clearly demonstrated by the frequent fluctuations of wages.
—As to wheat, two reasons caused it to be considered that it might serve as a measure of value. One of them was the supposition that the same quantity of wheat must have served at all times to satisfy equal wants of nutrition per individual; the other was the supposition that alimentary products must have preserved, in exchanges, a fixed value, since such products have the power always to create for themselves the demand necessary to correspond to the extent of their supply. The first of these suppositions is erroneous; for wheat is far from having been at all times and in the same quantity an object of man's consumption; the second is true only within certain limits, and in what concerns not any special product, but the aggregate of all the products which minister to the wants of subsistence. Be this as it may, the value of wheat is, and always will be, a relative one, dependent upon the action of circumstances, among which we may reckon the extension and progress of agriculture, and the amount of manufactured products for which it can be exchanged, an amount which tends to increase in proportion as the labor required to produce them increases in power and skill.
—The efforts made by economists to discover a measure of value, prove how difficult it is to disentangle the idea of value itself from the complications by which it is surrounded, and with which it presents itself to the mind. Many writers, even of our own day, have not succeeded in doing so, and it would be easy to cite comparatively recent works in which tendencies to suppose in things the existence of an absolute value still subsist. We must of course make due allowance for the lack of precision in the form under which every fact of relation manifests itself to the mind; but even more allowance must be made for the imperfection of the terminology in use. So long as the word value is used in different senses, we expose ourselves to a confusion of ideas, and the wisest plan would be to take a decided stand in this matter. John Stuart Mill proposes to use the word value to express only the effect of the relation in virtue of which products are bartered one for another, in proportion of such and such a quantity of the one against such and such a quantity of other things. There is nothing more necessary in the interest of science, nor is there anything easier. We have the word price to designate the value of things in coined money; we have the terms immediate or direct utility, and other expressions to designate what is so improperly called value in use. It is easy to reserve for each thing an expression which maintains in language the distinction itself, the special sense which belongs to it.
—Let it be distinctly understood, therefore, that through the rest of this article we shall use the word value only in its real sense. It shall be used to express only the quantity either of a thing or of the things in general which a thing serves to obtain; in other words, the power of acquisition which it exercises by means of exchange.
—Upon what conditions may things be considered to possess value? On what foundations does the property which renders them exchangeable, rest? What are the circumstances which determine in what quantity one thing shall be given for another? The meaning of the word value once clearly determined, these questions become simple, and are easily solved.
—First of all, it is plain that nothing is exchangeable except upon condition, first, of possessing qualities which render it desirable, and second, of being obtainable only at the cost of some effort and pains. No one gives any of those things which every one may have without labor, and value belongs only to those things whose possession costs labor and fatigue. The man who wishes to obtain a thing compares the satisfaction which it will afford him with the sacrifices he must make to obtain it, and decides to part with such or such a quantity of other things which belong to him, in order to procure it. It matters little what motives prompt him to acquire it, whether an imperative want, a frivolous taste, or a simple caprice, the thing has the value at the moment of what he consents to give for it. The diamond for which a value equal to a thousand hectolitres of grain is offered and accepted, has as much value as these thousand hectolitres. In like manner, a hundred kilogrammes of salt are worth no more than the lesson of a dancing master, or the service of a hair dresser, if the price paid for the lesson or the service is sufficient to enable us to buy the same quantity of salt.
—The qualities which render things desirable, the impossibility of obtaining them without personal labor, or without giving in exchange for them other things which have cost personal labor: such are the conditions which confer value on things. The extent or the measure of the value of a thing depends upon the greater or less difficulty which those who covet or need it find in procuring it. It is this that makes the momentary value of a thing depend upon the relation existing between its supply and the demand for it. If a product is not to be found in sufficient quantity to supply all the demand for it, those who desire it enter into competition for its possession; they give in exchange for it more of other products, or of the money with which other products are bought, and, as a consequence, its value rises. If the contrary happens, that is, if a product enters the market in a greater abundance than there is a demand for, its value falls. Those who possess it can not keep it forever; they are obliged to dispose of it, in order to procure other things which are necessary to them, and find themselves constrained, in parting with it, to be content with a smaller quantity of the products they receive in return. Thus it is the condition of supply and demand which assigns to each thing its power of acquisition over other things. All things increase in value when the demand for them is greater than the supply of them; all diminish in value when the supply of them is greater than the demand for them; hence the variations of price to which things are subject, variations which, by expressing the differences that arise in the sums of money against which those things which experience them are exchanged, express like differences in the quantities of other things which these sums enable one to obtain.
—Besides, it must be remarked that the demand for a thing naturally extends or contracts in proportion to the modifications which its value undergoes. When there is a lack of a product it grows dearer; and as then there are many persons to be found whose desire to procure it is checked by the increase of the sacrifices which they must make to obtain it, the demand, checked by its increase in value, is restrained within the limits set by value itself. In like manner, when the price of a thing decreases, purchasers increase in number, and its value descends only to the point necessary that such a product may be found in the market in a quantity proportioned to the supply. Hence the fluctuations of value occasioned by the changes in the relation of supply and demand, have for effect the maintenance of an equality between the two terms of that relation; that is, an equilibrium between supply and demand.
—We must not, however, infer from this fact that there exists any proportionality whatever between the movements of value and the differences in quantity of the things supplied. Everything depends, in the effect produced on the value of the goods, whether by the increase or the decrease of the supply, on the nature of these goods, and on the kind of wants they are intended to satisfy. All goods are not equally necessary to life; and if there are some the demand for which is greatly curtailed because their value has risen even ever so little, there are others, the demand for which people are not nearly so free to lessen. The value of wheat doubles the moment the quantity that can be delivered decreases one-fifth, and is trebled, when this quantity is reduced one-fourth. Wine does not increase in value in the same proportion when the quantity supplied diminishes, for the reason that its consumption is less indispensable; and the products which it is still easier to do without increase in value much less than wine when their supply diminishes. On the other hand, the qualities which render products more or less easy to keep in the state required for use, exert a sensible influence upon the decrease in their value. In case of an extraordinary or superabundant harvest, there are crops which are abandoned to the first comer who wishes to take them, because the owner can not utilize them all himself, and because the price at which he is compelled to sell them will not pay the cost of transferring them to the nearest market. What we are warranted to assert is this, that value is fixed by the relation existing between supply and demand; that it usually increases or decreases in such a way as to equilibrate the two terms of that relation, but in no wise in proportions conformable to the differences expressed in the figure of the quantities supplied.
—How decisive soever the influence exercised by the momentary state of supply and demand may be, the value of things has none the less its own raison d'étre, and a measure which, in despite of the accidents which serve to expand or contract it, constantly tends to return to its normal dimensions. Vainly do the fluctuations of supply and demand succeed one another in contrary directions, these fluctuations necessarily end by compensating one for the other, and the point at which they meet marks the natural value of things.
—What assigns a natural value to things is the fact that it costs something to produce them; that is, the onerosity which attaches to their production. This is true of all things, except of those the quantity of which can not be increased, or which can not be sufficiently increased to keep up with the demand for them. With this one exception, all things are exchanged against one another in accordance with the amount of cost necessary to fashion them for the use of, and to transport them to, the consumer. Those which cost most are exchanged in a lesser numeric quantity, against those which cost less, and thus the differences in their costs of production of various articles are balanced. (See COST OF PRODUCTION.)
—Before attempting to show that this can not be otherwise, we must first recall what constitutes the cost of production. This cost is twofold: part of the cost of production is constant and unavoidable, and enters, though in unequal amounts, into all production; part is accidental, arising from artificial or special causes, and does not attach to all production. The first part of the cost of production here referred to consists in the expenses of labor and in the expenses attached to the employment of capital. There is nothing whose production does not require a certain amount of both these expenses. In the productions of the humblest artisan, days of labor and the consumption of capital under various forms, figure. Raw material has been purchased and transformed; tools and implements have been deteriorated; there have been risks and losses which must be covered; and, in addition to all this, there is the interest which must be paid on the capital employed: it is necessary that the thing produced should be exchanged on such conditions as shall restore to the producer the wages due to his own personal labor, as well as the wages due to the labor of his workmen, if he employs any, and the profit required to bring back to him the portion of capital which he was obliged to sacrifice during the course of his labor. Suppose a product, which, in order to reach the consumer, costs six francs for workmen's wages, and four francs in profits for the preservation of, and interest on, the capital invested in it; the natural value of this product will be the sum of these two amounts; that is, ten francs. Thus the natural value of various products depends upon the proportion in which wages and profits enter into the sum total of their cost of production. All products tend to exchange one against another in proportion to this natural value; and this natural value is the value which continues to subsist for all products as their mean value, whatever departures from such mean value the momentary fluctuations caused by the variations of supply and demand may make in it.
—The reason of this is plain. No industry could subsist if the commodities and goods which it furnishes the public were not taken at the price which the cost of production requires. An industry which could not recover in full the total of its outlay would soon fail. Hence from the moment that any product ceases to exchange against other products in a quantity sufficient to balance the expenses which must be borne by those who make it, we notice that its manufacture begins to be restricted; and the restriction does not stop until it reaches the point at which the reduction in the supply of the product causes it to regain the value in which it was lacking. On the contrary, if a product receives in other products more than the equivalent of its real cost, the profits assured to those who deal in it cause a speedy increase in its production, and the increase in the amount offered very soon deprives it of its value to the extent that such value is exaggerated. Thus it is that the value in things, whenever it departs from its natural point, is finally brought back to it. Competition diminishes in industries which are not sufficiently remunerative, and the supply diminishes with it; competition increases in those industries which are uncommonly remunerative; labor and capital abandon industries which are losing, to engage in those which are gaining; and, owing to this continual change, the value respectively of the products exchanged continues to be, or becomes again, in the case of all products, the value determined by the amount of the cost incurred in their production.
—We do not mean to say that all products of the same kind, considered apart from all others, obtain in exchange merely the equivalent of their own cost in other products. Far from it; there are some which obtain much more, and for this reason: the quantity of each product which can and should be produced is determined by the demand for it, and its value always rises high enough to assure its supply in that quantity. But the conditions of labor are not in all respects equal or similar. They are less favorable in some places than in others, and when these places are called upon to furnish the market a contingent, without which the supply would be inadequate, it is the expenses which production necessitates in those places that determine the general value of products. It follows that this value corresponds, not to an average cost, but to the cost of the part of the product which reaches the market after having required the greatest amount of the different costs. In the actual state of demand that portion has its outlet just as the others have, and among similar products it is the dearest which regulate the value of all, thus adding to those which are cheaper a value greater than their cost of production. This fact is deserving of all the more attention, because many modern writers have overlooked it when discussing the large profits reaped by certain producers, and still more frequently when discussing the subject of rent.
—It is, for instance, a common opinion that the rent of land contributes to raise the price of the means of subsistence, and that it would be otherwise under combinations different from those which up to the present time have governed property. Nothing, however, could be more decidedly false. Like all other products, those of the soil owe their value to the demand for them. All lands are not equally fertile; they can not all produce on the same conditions, and whenever the wants of consumption are such that recourse must be had to lands of inferior quality, their products must necessarily be paid for at a price which will compensate for the cost attached to the cultivation of such lands. In a country like France, in which wheat has, on an average, a value of a little more than eighteen francs per hectolitre, there are lands on which its value is not twelve, and on these lands the excess of the value for which the wheat is exchanged over the costs at which it is harvested is a rent which accrues to the owners of these lands. But this rent has no influence upon the accrued value to cereals; it is simply the effect of that value. The population of France could not do without that part of the wheat crop which could not be produced at a cost less than eighteen francs per hectolitre, and it is this part which assigns to the other parts their natural value. If the demand for the means of subsistence should increase to such an extent as to require the cultivation of lands on which wheat could not be produced except at an average cost of twenty francs per hectolitre, its value would rise still higher, and with it the rent which the land paid to those who owned it.
—The superaddition of value, which the wants of consumption confer, as compared with the products of their cost, or the products of the major part of the land, exists also in the case of a multitude of different industries. Thus it is the cost of extracting ore from those mines in which such cost is greatest, but whose product is necessary in order to meet the demand, which fixes the value of the ore. The same is true in manufacturing industries; the demand for the articles which they produce raises the value of these articles to a figure necessary to pay for the products of those manufacturing industries which are carried on, it matters not for what reason, at the greatest expense; and the higher net cost which is peculiar to these latter, assures to the articles of all the other industries a value which exceeds the real amount of their cost of production.
—But, if the value of the things which are susceptible of indefinite increase finds its rule and measure in the cost of the production of those of them which in order to reach the people who want them cost most, it is otherwise with the value of the things whose quantity it is impossible to increase at the desire or whim of the public. Their rarity exercises an influence on the value of the latter; and raises their value in a proportion which has no relation whatever with what they cost or did cost to produce. A work of art from the hands of one of the old masters, the autograph of an historic personage, or some object which he used during his lifetime, a jewel, a piece of armor, a bronze, a statue found under the lava of Pompeii or among the ruins of Athens or Rome, has an immense value; and there are persons who, to obtain one of these products, would part with a quantity of things in which had been invested a thousand times more wages and profit on capital than was invested originally in the product they purchase. In like manner precious stones, pearls of the first water, gold and silver and other precious metals, possess a value far in excess of what it cost to discover and extract them. Nature did not create them in sufficient quantity to satisfy the desires of all. So also, wines, fruits and tobaccos of certain choice brands, which possess special qualities that cause them to be eagerly sought after, possess in exchange a value far superior to that which their cost of production would give them. They can not be increased; their supply has forced limits; and the desire of obtaining them induces people to give much more for them than it costs to produce them.
—Besides rarity, there are artificial circumstances which affect the value of things and help to increase it beyond what the cost of production would warrant. Such are taxes (except taxes on land, in so far as they affect only the rent), monopolies and restrictions on the freedom of trade. Every tax has the inevitable effect of increasing the price of the merchandise or product upon which it is imposed. The person who pays the tax must be reimbursed; he adds the amount of the tax to what the article costs him, and in exchange he receives back the amount which he paid the state in addition to the natural value of the thing. Such are the effects on the value of things of the taxes levied on them before they reach the consumer, no matter for what reason, at what moment or under what form such taxes are levied. The treasury of the state can levy nothing on them without increasing the cost of their production, and consequently without increasing in an equal measure the value for which they are sold. The effect of monopolies is equally pronounced, and more lamentable. Monopolies are of different kinds; some are established for the benefit of the state, and serve as a source of revenue for it. Of this kind is the monopoly on tobacco in France; the government alone purchases the product in the crude state, manufactures it, and furnishes it for sale at a price which assures the state an annual revenue. Whatever superaddition of value such monopolies give to the products which they affect, is warranted if they serve to relieve a country of other taxes which would cause still greater inconveniences, and this must be borne in mind when considering these monopolies. Patents also constitute a monopoly in favor of the patentees; they may be a just remuneration for the labor and sacrifice to which an invention was due; but it is only by exaggerating the value of the patented article that they exercise any influence. Producers who are free from all competition are masters of the market, and it is an easy matter for them so to manage as to sell only at a large profit on the cost of production. The exclusion of foreign merchandise, through custom house duties intended to reserve the home market for home producers, has to a certain extent the same effect as patents. Consumers are forced to pay a higher price for the protected products than they can be bought for elsewhere, and are subjected to sacrifices which could and should be spared them. This alteration of the natural relations of value between exchangeable products is a real evil; nothing could be more prejudicial to the proper employment of productive forces, and thereby to the progress of social power and wealth. Such acts can be justified only by the necessity of defraying public expenses; but the products whose cost of production and value are to be artificially increased by the imposition of duties, should be carefully selected. The more these products are necessary for the satisfaction of wants common to all, the less those classes who consume scarcely any other products, and who have only the labor of their hands to give in exchange therefor, will have of them, and the more difficult it will be for them to reach that degree of well-being without which their condition can not be improved.
—Value, relative in its very essence, and based for each thing solely upon the quantity of another thing, or of other things in general, which it enables one to obtain, can not be affected by any of the circumstances which act equally upon all things at once. Its elements are labor and capital. It is the very quantity of these two things which every product absorbs before becoming a fit object of consumption that fixes its relative value; and no matter what the rate of wages or profits in a country may be, as the relations of exchange between the products can not be changed by that rate, neither can values be changed thereby. This is not the case, however, when the rate of one of the elements of production only is modified, and this because all products do not contain it in a like proportion. When wages increase, the value of those things into whose cost of production it more largely enters, naturally rises, and the value of those which require less manual labor than capital is comparatively lessened. The contrary is true when the rate of profits increases. In this case, those things whose cost absorbs more capital than labor increase in value, and obtain a greater quantity of other things in exchange. Such fluctuations in the respective value of things are of frequent occurrence, and when they happen it is easy to determine their cause. It will be noticed, however, that, in the ordinary course of facts, there are things whose value tends to fall gradually. These things are those whose manufacture requires more capital. The reason of this is, that, as civilization advances, capital accumulates in such a way that those who possess it are forced to content themselves with smaller profits.
—Such are the laws which govern value, and preside over its distribution among things. Value is not a quality incorporated in things, but is for each product the effect of a relation of exchange, the effect of the quantity of other products it serves to obtain; and this relation is determined, at any given moment, by supply and demand. But, while supply and demand regulate the values of the moment, there is, none the less, for those things whose number may be increased indefinitely at man's pleasure, a natural value, which, despite all the fluctuations to which that value is subject, always prevails in the end. This natural value results from the cost of production, and is determined by the amount of labor and capital employed in the production. A clear understanding of these general principles suffices to enable us to solve all questions pertaining to value, no matter how complicated they may seem to be.
VAN BUREN, Martin, vice-president of the United States 1883-7, and president 1837-41, was born at Kinderhook, N. Y., Dec. 5, 1782, and died there July 24, 1862. He was admitted to the bar in 1803, and served in the state senate 1813-20, in the United States senate 1821-8, as governor in 1829, as secretary of state 1829-31, and as minister to Great Britain 1831-2, this latter nomination being rejected by the senate. (See ALBANY REGENCY, NEW YORK.) On his return he was successively elected vice-president and president, but was defeated in 1840. (See BANK CONTROVERSIES, IV.; LOCO-FOCO; INDEPENDENT TREASURY.) In 1844 his disapproval of the annexation of Texas cost him the democratic nomination; and his New York supporters were naturally in an attitude of armed neutrality toward the new administration. This state of things verged naturally toward open war; Van Buren was nominated for president in 1848; and his nomination was successful in defeating Cass, the regular democratic nominee. This result compelled a compromise between the two factions, but it left Van Buren definitively out of politics until his death. (See BARNBURNERS; ANNEXATIONS, III.; FREE-SOIL PARTY; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IV.)
—Van Buren is commonly known as a master of political intrigue, the democratic "little magician"; as the one who introduced into the national civil service the debauching influences which had for thirty years controlled the civil service of his own state; as the forerunner of that class of mere politicians which has since 1829 generally supplanted the previous race of trained statesmen; as a smooth, easy and adroit manager of political machinery, without political principles, constitutional training, or scruples in party warfare, revering in politics only the Albany regency, and Martin Van Buren as its prophet. All this must be admitted, but only in part. That Van Buren had political principles and the courage to maintain them, even in opposition to his own party, is shown by his opposition, in the New York convention of 1821, to the popular idea of universal suffrage, to "cheapening the right of suffrage by conferring it with an indiscriminating hand upon every one, black or white, who would be kind enough to condescend to accept it"; by his opposition, in the same convention, to the equally popular proposal to exclude the blacks from the right of suffrage; by his refusal, during the panic of 1837, to violate his political creed by recommending interference by government with the course of business; and by his refusal in 1844 to compass his own nomination to the presidency by indorsing the annexation of Texas. On the whole, he may be set down midway between the earlier and the later schools of politicians, with defined principles derived from his education among the former, and yet with sufficient power of adaptation to make use of the vicious machinery of the latter.
—See Holland's Life of Van Buren; Dawson's Life of Van Buren; W. A. Butler's Martin Van Buren; Emmons' Life of Van Buren; Abbott's Lives of the Presidents, 241; 3 Parton's Life of Jackson; 2 Hammond's Political History of New York; Jenkins' Governors of New York, 346; 4 Tucker's United States, 294; Bradford's Federal Government, 434; 2 von Holst's United States, 147; 2 Statesman's Manual, 1153 (for his messages). There is a pen portrait of Van Buren in 2 von Holst, 149. Mackenzie's Life and Times of Van Buren is a collection of stolen private letters of Van Buren and others, giving a painful interior view of "practical politics" in 1819-37.
VERMONT, a state of the American Union.
—The boundary between Massachusetts and New Hampshire (see those states) was long disputed. It was settled in 1740; but, before that time, both colonies had made large grants of land to intending settlers in the disputed territory. After the settlement, a new question came up. New Hampshire, believing that her territory extended at least as far west as that of Massachusetts, claimed all the territory west of the Connecticut river, covered by the present state of Vermont, and, pursuing the usual policy in such cases, continued to make grants of land therein, in order to fill it with settlers devoted to her interests, and dependent on her supremacy for the title to their lands. In 1749 New York appeared as a claimant, though on what ground it is hard to see. She had acquiesced in the western boundary of Massachusetts and Connecticut, as a compromise of their charter claim of the Pacific ocean, or at least the Mississippi, as a western boundary; but New Hampshire had no such charter claim. The fact seems to be that neither New York nor New Hampshire had any rightful claim, and that this territory had been overlooked, and was within the limits of no colony. In 1764 New York obtained an arbitrary decision of the king in her favor, and at once undertook to make the settlers on the "New Hampshire grants," as the territory now began to be called, pay for their land anew. All the judicial machinery of New York was brought into requisition to oust the settlers who refused to pay, and, although the king in 1769 ordered the issue of further New York grants to cease for the time, the New York courts did not cease to harass the settlers. The latter resisted the New York authorities boldly; organized militia forces; selected headquarters, marked by a liberty pole surmounted by a wild cat grinning defiance toward New York; and maintained their independence of both the claimants. Throughout the revolution they maintained a separate warfare against the British, and toward its close there were even some negotiations looking to a separate peace; but the final treaty of peace in establishing the northern boundary of the United States, recognized the "New Hampshire grants" as included in the new nation.
—Jan. 17, 1777, a convention at Westminster declared the grants to be an independent state, by the name of "New Connecticut." A new convention at Windsor, July 2-8, 1777, gave the state the name of Vermont, and adopted the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776, with some few changes, prominent among which was a prohibition of slavery. (See ABOLITION, I.) The preamble contained a full statement of the grievances by reason of which Vermont had refused to submit to New York's jurisdiction. New Hampshire made little opposition to Vermont's proceedings, and Massachusetts recognized the new state in 1781; but New York's opposition was sufficient to prevent her admission to the Union. In 1781 Vermont proceeded to admit to her assembly delegates from the southwestern part of New Hampshire and the northeastern part of New York, east of the Hudson; but, though she disavowed these annexations in the following year, New York still prevented her admission. But New York was wearying of the struggle. Her assembly in 1786 voted final compensation to her worsted adherents, and in 1789 appointed commissioners to acknowledge the independence of Vermont. Jan. 6, 1791, a state convention decided to apply for admission, and the state was admitted by act of Feb. 18, to take effect March 4.
—CONSTITUTIONS. The provision for a "council of censors," to meet once in seven years and revise the constitution, which was abandoned by Pennsylvania in 1790, was retained by Vermont until 1870. By their proposition of amendments, and their ratification by state conventions, the original constitution (see PENNSYLVANIA) has since been slightly modified. In 1836 the original single house was divided into a senate and house of representatives, both elected annually, in the former by counties, and in the latter by towns. In 1870 the term of office of the legislature, governor and other state officers was extended to two years; the council of censors was abolished; and its powers to impeach state officers and to propose amendments were transferred to the legislature. In 1882 the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors was prohibited.
—GOVERNORS. Moses Robinson, 1789-90; Thomas Chittenden, 1790-97; Isaac Tichenor, 1797-1807; Israel Smith, 1807-8; Isaac Tichenor, 1808-9; Jonas Galusha, 1809-13; Martin Chittenden, 1813-15; Jonas Galusha, 1815-20; Richard Skinner, 1820-23; Cornelius P Van Ness, 1823-6; Ezra Butler, 1826-8; Samuel C. Crafts, 1828-31; William A. Palmer, 1831-35; Silas A. Jenison, 1835-41; Charles Paine, 1841-3; John Mattocks, 1843-4; Wm. Slade, 1844-6; Horace Eaton, 1846-9; Carlos Coolidge, 1849-50; Charles R. Williams, 1850-52; Erastus Fairbanks, 1852-3; John S. Robinson, 1853-4; Stephen Boyce, 1854-6; Ryland Fletcher, 1856-8; Hiland Hall, 1858-60; Erastus Fairbanks, 1860-61; Frederick Holbrook, 1861-3; John S. Smith, 1863-5; Paul Dillingham, 1865-7; John B. Page, 1867-9; Peter T. Washburn, 1869-70; John W. Stewart, 1870-2; Julius Converse, 1872-4; Asahel Peck, 1874-6; Horace Fairbanks, 1876-8; Redfield Proctor, 1878-80; Roswell Farnham, 1880-82; John L. Barstow, 1882-4.
—POLITICAL HISTORY. A large part of the state's original population came from Connecticut, whence the proposed name of "New Connecticut"; and the subsequent drift of their descendants to the neighboring state of New York accounts for many Connecticut names, such as Seymour, Phelps and Chittenden, in both the other states. Most of this immigration was democratic, so that the state's politics inclined toward the democratic party; and this tendency, and the likelihood that Vermont would vote for New York city as the national capital, will help to account for New York's acquiescence in her admission. The administrations of Governors Tichenor and Martin Chittenden are the only distinctive federalist periods; and yet the federalists were strong enough to control the legislature, and thus obtain the state's electoral votes for Washington and Adams in 1792, and for Adams and Pinckney in 1796 and 1800. The political revolution of 1800 so far intensified political interest in the state that its majority took better care of the electoral votes, and they were thereafter cast for the democratic candidates until the downfall of the federal party. But the politics of the state had little of the bitterness which elsewhere characterized this period. Governor Chittenden's action in recalling, in 1813, a brigade of the state's militia from the service of the United States, was the only circumstance that ruffled the surface of events; and in the following year the state's participation in the Hartford convention was confined to one county and a single delegate. Immediately after the close of the war the federalist vote began to decrease rapidly, so that in 1813 Gov. Galusha received 15,243 votes out of a total of 15,992, and thereafter the federal party in the state had practically no existence. Until 1815 it was about on an equality with its opponent in every county, and in a heavy majority in the southeastern part of the state.
—As Vermont had been the first state to abolish slavery within its own limits, it was one of the first to declare war upon it without. In the United States senate, Dec. 9, 1820, resolutions of the Vermont legislature were presented, declaring that slavery was a moral and political evil, to be tolerated only of necessity, and that congress had the right to inhibit its extension by the admission of new slave states. (See COMPROMISES, IV.) These resolutions were the guide of the state's policy until the downfall of slavery. During and after the election of 1824 the Jackson candidates were always hopelessly beaten, and the "Adams republicans," even after 1827, regularly defeated both the Jackson and the anti-masonic candidates. About 1831 the national republicans and anti-masons practically united, and the state's electors in 1832 were chosen as anti-masons, with the understanding that they would vote for Clay if their votes could elect him. This contingency did not occur, and the state's vote was cast for Wirt. (See ANTI-MASONRY.) From this time the combination of national republican, anti-masonic and other elements, soon to be known as the whig party, controlled the state, and on the dissolution of the whig party the republican party at once succeeded to it. In effect, the state's last democratic electoral vote was cast in 1820. Since that year the democrats of the state have seldom polled more than 25 per cent. of the total vote in national elections; and, even in the great whig overthrow of 1852, the whig electors obtained a majority of the popular vote, Massachusetts, the only other northern whig state of that year, only giving a plurality. The state's political history is therefore invariably a part of that of the whig and republican parties.
—In state elections the result has regularly been the same. The only elections that have ever been in the least degree doubtful were the triangular contests of 1843-52, between the whigs, the democrats and the abolitionists; but even in these the result was always a plurality for the whig candidates for state offices, and their final election by the whig legislature. The election of 1847 will fairly represent most of them: Eaton (Whig), 23,933; Dillingham (democrat), 18,059; Brainard (abolitionist), 7,163. But it must be remembered that Vermont whigs were usually quite as strongly anti-slavery as the abolitionists, differing from them only on the question of action. Thus, Gov. Wm. Slade was considered a whig in his own state, but a thorough abolitionist out of it. On the formation of the republican party all distinction disappeared, and the party vote rose again to about 75 per cent. of the total. In 1882 the legislature stands as follows: senate, thirty republicans, no democrats; house, 225 republicans, thirteen democrats.
—As in several other states, the heavy and certain majority for one party has hindered the national elevation of Vermont's leading men, among whom may be specified the following: Stephen Roe Bradley, democratic United States senator 1791-5 and 1801-13; Dudley Chase (uncle of Salmon P. Chase), democratic United States senator 1813-17 and 1825-31, and state chief justice 1817-21; Nathaniel Chipman, state chief justice 1789-91 and 1794-7, United States district judge 1791-4, and United States senator 1797-1803; Martin Chittenden, federalist congressman 1803-13, and governor 1813-15; Jacob Collamer, state judge 1833-42 and 1850-54, whig congressman 1843-9, postmaster general under Taylor 1849-50, and republican United States senator 1855-65; George F. Edmunds (republican), member of the state house of representatives 1854-9 and senate 1861-2, United States senator 1866-87, one of the most prominent members of that body, and one of the candidates for the republican presidential nomination in 1880; Horace Everett, whig congressman 1829-43; Solomon Foot, whig congressman 1843-7, and republican United States senator 1857-66; Hiland Hall, whig congressman 1831-43, and state judge 1846-50; Matthew Lyon, democratic congressman 1797-1801, afterward from Kentucky, 1803-11, most noted for his rough-and-tumble fight on the floor of the house in January, 1798, with Roger Griswold, a Connecticut federalist, and for his trial and imprisonment later in the year, under the sedition law; George P. Marsh, whig congressman 1843-9, and minister to Italy 1861-82; Justin S. Morrill, republican congressman 1855-67, and United States senator 1867-85; Samuel S. Phelps, state judge 1831-8, and whig United States senator 1839-51 and 1853-4; Luke P. Poland, state judge 1848-65, republican United States senator 1865-7, and congressman 1867-75; Samuel Prentiss, whig United States senator 1831-42, and federal district judge 1842-57; William Slade, whig congressman 1831-43, and governor 1844-6; and Isaac Tichenor one of the leaders of the original independent government, state judge 1791-6, federalist United States senator 1796-7 and 1815-21, and governor 1797-1807 and 1808-9.
—The name Vermont, equivalent to Green Mountain, seems to have been suggested in 1777 by Dr. Thomas Young, of Philadelphia, to the leaders of the infant republic of "new Connecticut," and at once adopted.
—See 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; 2 Hough's American Constitutions; 4 Documentary History of New York, 329 (correspondence between New York and New Hampshire); Chipman's Life of Seth Warner; 1 Sparks' American Biography (life of Ethan Allen); Slade's Vermont State Papers; Chase's Early History of Vermont; Hiland Hall's History of Vermont (to 1791); Allen's History of Vermont (1798); B. H. Hall's History of Eastern Vermont (to 1800); Williams' History of Vermont (to 1807); Beckley's History of Vermont (1846); Carpenter's History of Vermont (to 1852); Thompson's History of Vermont (with supplement, 1853); Walton's Vermont Register.
VETO (IN U. S. HISTORY). I. BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION. The power in the executive to apply some check to the absolute power of the legislative, is an evident necessity in a national government. Franklin long ago noted that absolute power, if it must be granted at all, had better be granted to the executive than to the legislative. "A single man may be afraid or ashamed of doing injustice; a body is never either one or the other, if it is strong enough. It can not apprehend assassination, and by dividing the shame among them, it is so little apiece that no one minds it." The only question is whether the executive should possess a power of absolute, final prohibition of legislation, or a qualified and limited check. The veto. "I forbid," of the Roman tribunes, was absolute; the American veto is qualified.
—By the theory of the British constitution the crown has an absolute veto on all legislation; no bill can become a law without the royal signature. Since 1692 the power has never been exercised, and its exercise now would probably provoke a revolution. Instead of it, an adverse vote of the house of lords has been used as a sort of veto upon the action of the house of commons; but its exercise, in matters on which the commons are obstinately bent, is now qualified by the tacit understanding, that "it is well enough once, by way of a joke, but it must not be repeated." Sometimes the way toward the final capitulation of the lords is smoothed by admitting unimportant amendments; sometimes a small majority is swamped by the creation of new peers. In 1871, when the lords obstinately resisted the bill for the abolition of the purchase of military commissions, the Gladstone ministry took the unusual step of putting the principle of the bill in force by royal warrant, as an act of prerogative. The lords, thus pressed, passed the bill with a spiteful vote of censure on the ministry. In any event, the veto of the lords is a very limited one.
—But in the colonies, before the American revolution, the veto power of the crown was enforced with double rigor. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the governors were chosen by the colonies, and had no veto power. In other colonies the governor, whether appointed by proprietors or by the crown, had an absolute veto on the colonial legislature; and the crown had an absolute veto on the action of the governor and legislature. The veto was constantly used by governors to extort money or favors. In Pennsylvania, says Franklin, "it became at last the regular practice to have orders on the treasury in his favor presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter." In many of the colonies, as in South Carolina, the persistent veto of the governor led to his expulsion before hostilities fairly broke out. In others, as in Virginia, the persistent veto of acts to check the slave trade formed one of the most prominent of revolutionary grievances. All of them agreed, in the declaration of independence, on the following, as the first of the reasons for a separation: "He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good; he has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained, and when so suspended he has utterly neglected to attend to them; he has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only; he has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures; he has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people; he has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers." With such an experience of the veto power it is not strange that only one of the original state constitutions (Massachusetts, in 1780) gave its governor even a qualified veto power, and that in the articles of confederation there was no executive veto. Indeed, the articles went to the other extreme. By requiring the assent of nine states to important acts of legislation, they really gave an absolute veto to any minority of five states; and, by requiring the assent of every state to amendments, they gave a veto power to each state. In these respects they more resembled the constitution of the Polish diet, with its liberum veto, its power reserved to each member to veto absolutely any bill introduced into the house. Nullification (see that title) was a subsequent effort to revive and strengthen this state veto, in the interest of slavery and a section.
—II. IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. The introduction of an executive power into the new scheme of government necessarily brought with it a veto power. Randolph's "Virginia plan" gave the veto power to the executive "and a convenient number of the national judiciary," to be final, unless overridden "by—of the members of each branch." Pinckney's plan contains a veto provision so like that which was finally adopted that it must have been altered after its first introduction. The "Jersey plan," as it had no executive, had no veto provision. June 4, Gerry proposed as a substitute for Randolph's veto provision, "that the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not afterward be passed by—parts of each branch of the national legislature." Hamilton moved to strike out the last fifteen words, so as to make the negative absolute; this was rejected unanimously. Butler moved that the executive have power to suspend any law for—days; and this was rejected unanimously. The blank in Gerry's motion was then filled by "two-thirds"; and the whole was adopted by a vote of eight states to two. In this form it was reported from the committee, June 19; was sent to the committee of revision July 26, and reported by them almost in its final shape, except that the time for retaining bills was "seven days," instead of "ten days, Sundays excepted," and that it applied only to bills, and not to joint resolutions, orders and votes also, as the final revision made. Aug. 15, "two-thirds" was changed to "three-fourths," by a vote of six states to four, and one divided; but the change was reconsidered and reversed, Sept. 12, by an exactly similar vote. The whole was then made a part of article I., section 7. (See CONSTITUTION.)
—But during these deliberations other questions had been under consideration. Randolph's plan of uniting the judiciary with the president, as a "council of revision," was again offered by Wilson, June 6 and July 21, and voted down. Aug. 15, Madison proposed to give the veto power to either the president or a majority of the supreme court judges, to be overridden by two-thirds of each house, if either the president or the court should veto a bill, or by three-fourths of each house, if both should veto it; but this was also rejected, and this plan was dropped. Another provision, that of a veto upon the state legislatures, was warmly urged from first to last. The sixth resolution of the "Virginia plan" gave Congress power "to negative all laws passed by the several states contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaty subsisting under the authority of the Union, and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof"; but, by the eighth resolution, the council of revision was to have a veto on the congressional veto, unless the latter should be repeated by the requisite majority. May 31, the first part of the scheme was agreed to, "without debate or dissent." Madison, June 8, wished to extend the national veto to inadvisable as well as unconstitutional laws. He "could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the states as absolutely necessary to a perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the states to encroach on the federal authority. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit them." This extension of the veto was voted down, three states to seven, and one divided. The original provision of the sixth resolution was retained in the report of the committee of the whole, June 13. July 17, the veto on state laws came up for consideration, and Madison again urged it strongly. Gouverneur Morris "was more and more opposed to it. It would disgust all the states and a law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the judiciary department." This excellent suggestion was at once heeded. The exceedingly dangerous veto power over state laws was dropped forever, and instead of it the "supreme law clause" of the constitution was adopted. Under this, the federal judiciary has exercised, with little notice or danger, a veto power over state laws which congress could hardly have attempted without civil war. (See JUDICIARY.) Aug. 23, after the senate had been made a part of the constitution, Charles Pinckney moved that power be given to two-thirds of each house to negative state laws; but six states to five refused to send the proposition to the committee. In a single case, that of state impost laws, a power of "revision and control" was reserved to congress, Sept. 15. (See INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.)
—Hamilton's plan, as read June 18, and still more as finally elaborated for preservation by Madison, would have made the executive veto power a tremendous instrument. It provided that "the governor or president of each state shall be appointed under the authority of the United States, and shall have a right to negative all laws about to be passed in the state of which he shall be governor or president, subject to such qualifications as the legislature of the United States shall prescribe"; and that "no bill, resolution or act of the [national] senate and assembly shall have the force of a law until it shall have received the assent of the president, or of the vice-president when exercising the powers of the president; and if such assent shall not have been given within ten days after such bill, resolution or other act shall have been presented to him for that purpose, the same shall not be a law; and no bill, resolution or other act, not assented to, shall be revived in the same session of the legislature." This proposition was never formally offered, and could never have been passed; but it is an instructive example of a "high-toned government," according to federalist ideas.
—As finally adopted, the veto provision gives the president power to return, with his objections, to the house in which it originated, any bill or joint order resolution or vote, of the two houses. If the vetoed bill is then passed again by two-thirds of each house, it becomes a law; if not, it is a nullity. If the president does not return the bill, with objections, within ten days (Sundays excepted), it becomes a law, unless congress adjourns within the ten days, in which case it shall not be a law. This last stipulation gives the president an absolute veto on all bills, etc., passed during the last ten days of a session of congress: he has only to retain them, as it were, in his pocket, and they are a nullity, even though nine-tenths of both houses should desire to pass them over the veto. This potent executive weapon, angrily called a "pocket veto" at the time, was first employed by Jackson at the close of the session of 1829-;30. He had vetoed the Maysville road bill (see INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS), but many of his supporters in congress were in favor of internal improvements, and he chose to employ the pocket veto on two similar bills passed afterward. When, in 1833, he disposed of Clay's distribution bill in the same manner, the whigs evolved the ingenious theory that the "adjournment" mentioned in the constitution, which made a pocket veto possible, meant only a voluntary adjournment by congress; that the close of a two-years term of service was not an adjournment in this sense, since the constitution, not congress, prevented the return of bills; and that bills retained by the president at the end of a congress became law without his signature. This notion was never vigorously pressed, however. Evidently, it would put the president at the mercy of a mere majority in congress, which would only need to time the final passage of a bill so late on March 3 of their last year as to make it physically impossible for the president to use his veto power.
—It has also been questioned whether the "two-thirds of each house," requisite to pass bills over the veto, is two-thirds of the number elected, or of the number present. The latter was undoubtedly the intention; for the constitution provides that a majority of each house shall be a quorum to do business, and refers repeatedly to this quorum as "a house." In but one case, the power of the senate to advise and consent to treaties, does it use expressly the words "two-thirds of the senators present"; but the treaty power is rather executive than legislative, and this provision can hardly have any bearing on the plain intent of the constitution in matters of simple legislation.
—The American veto system seems to have struck the safest middle line, and attempts to modify it elsewhere have generally proved injurious. The French constitution of 1789 gave the king a veto power, with a provision that the passage of a law three years in succession should override the veto; but this was a failure, for the impatience of the people could not wait three years for a compliance with their will. The Mexican constitution of 1824, in addition to the presidential veto of the United States, gave each house a qualified veto on the other, as follows: if a bill, passed by one house and rejected by the other, should again be passed by the first house by a two-thirds vote, it could only be rejected by a two-thirds vote of the other house. But this had only its natural effect of hurrying on a revolution by a powerless majority. One modification, the power to veto single clauses, given by the confederate constitution of 1861, fairly deserves consideration. (See RIDERS, I.)
—III. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The first exercise of the veto power was by Washington, April 5, 1792. (See APPORTIONMENT.) Until 1830 there were but nine vetoes, two by Washington, none by Adams or Jefferson, six by Madison, and one by Monroe. The most important of these were Madison's veto of the bill to establish a United States bank, Jan. 30, 1815 (see BANK CONTROVERSIES, III.), his veto of the internal improvement bill, March 3, 1817, and Monroe's Cumberland road veto, May 4, 1822. (See INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, II.) Jackson vetoed nine bills, including Clay's distribution bill, which he formally vetoed, Dec. 5, 1833, after giving it a pocket veto at the preceding session. Most of these vetoes were put on internal improvement bills; but one, July 10, 1832, was upon a new United States bank bill, and another, June 10, 1836, was upon a bill fixing a day for the meeting of congress. This frequent use of the veto power by Jackson furnished the bond which united a great number of elements into the whig party, and gave it a name. (See WHIG PARTY, II.) The whig animosity to the veto power was revived by its exercise during Tyler's administration. He vetoed two United States bank bills, Aug. 16 and Sept. 9, 1841 (see BANK CONTROVERSIES, IV.); two tariff bills, June 29 and Aug. 9, 1842; a bill for harbor improvements in eastern states, June 11, 1844; and a bill for building two revenue cutters, Feb. 20, 1845, on account of ambiguity in the language. Polk vetoed two bills, a river and harbor bill, Aug. 3, 1846, and a bill for the settlement of French spoliation claims, Aug. 8, 1846; but an internal improvement bill, passed March 3, 1847, which had been disposed of by a pocket veto, was formally vetoed at the following session, Dec. 15, 1847. Pierce used the veto nine times, on a bill appropriating lands for insane poor, May 3, 1854; an internal improvement bill, Aug. 4, 1854; a French spoliation claims bill, Feb. 17, 1855; an appropriation for the Collins ocean mail steamers, March 3, 1855; two special internal improvement bills, May 19, 1856, another May 22, and two others, Aug. 11 and Aug. 14. Buchanan vetoed a homestead bill, June 22, 1860, in which the price of lands had been reduced by southern senators to so low a figure (25 cents an acre) as to provoke a veto. Lincoln regularly stated any minor objections which he held to any bill in the message approving it; and congress usually obviated the objections by supplementary legislation. June 23, 1862, he vetoed a bill to allow the circulation of bank notes of less than $5 value in the District of Columbia. July 12, 1862, while approving a confiscation bill, he transmitted a veto message already prepared, the necessity for which had been removed by a subsequent explanatory resolution of congress. Up to this time the veto power on legislation had been final, since the two-thirds majority necessary to override it had not been obtained.
—The accession of Andrew Johnson, a southern democrat, to the presidency, with a congress in which the republicans had a strong majority, but would not have a two-thirds majority if all the insurrectionary states should be allowed to send democrats to the senate and house of representatives, made a conflict inevitable. Congress was determined to secure, while it had the power to secure, the right of negroes to suffrage; and the president was as determined to obstruct reconstruction, unless the southern delegations were admitted at once, when the republican two-thirds majority would be at an end, the veto would be as potent as it had always been, and the president could control the course of reconstruction. From February, 1866, until March, 1869, there was an almost continuous storm of vetoes, most of them upon reconstruction bills, or bills extending the principles of negro suffrage in various directions. During 1866 there were the vetoes of the first freedman's bureau bill, Feb. 19; of the civil rights bill, March 27; of the Colorado bill, May 15; and of the second freedmen's bureau bill, July 16; and, on the adoption of the 14th amendment, a message was sent to congress, June 22, suggesting that there were "grave doubts" as to the power of congress to frame an amendment while eleven states were refused representation. In 1867 there were the vetoes of the bill regulating suffrage in the District of Columbia, Jan. 5; of the second Colorado bill, Jan. 29; of the Nebraska bill, Jan. 30; of the tenure of office bill, March 2; of the reconstruction bill, March 2; and of the supplementary reconstruction bills of March 23 and July 19. In 1868 there were the vetoes of the bill regulating appeals on habeas corpus, March 25; of the bills for the re-admission of Arkansas, June 20, and North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana, June 25; and of the joint resolution denying validity to the electoral votes of unreconstructed states. (See, for further particulars, RECONSTRUCTION, and titles of bills mentioned.) Many other bills, which the president neither wished to sign nor cared to veto, were left ten days, and became law without his signature. Congress left him little opportunity for "pocket vetoes," but on his retirement from office, March 3, 1869, he had such an opportunity, and used it, in the case of three bills, which were immediately afterward passed again, and signed by President Grant.
—President Grant's two vetoes were those upon the bill to increase the amount of "greenbacks" to $400,000,000, and to authorize the issue of $46,000,000 in national bank notes, April 22, 1874, and the bill to repeal the increase of the president's salary to $50,000, April 19, 1876. Various circumstances made President Hayes' term of office more prolific in vetoes. In addition to a distinct group of vetoes (see RIDERS, II.), were those upon the bill to authorize the coinage of silver dollars, February 28, 1878; the bill to restrict Chinese immigration, March 1, 1879; and the bill to fund $700,000,000 of the national debt at 3 per cent., March 3, 1881. President Arthur vetoed a bill to restrict Chinese immigration, also a river and harbor bill of about $20,000,000, in 1882.
—IV. IN THE STATES. Four of the states, Delaware, North Carolina, Ohio and Rhode Island, have never given their governors the veto power. In eight others a very limited veto power has been given, which may be overridden by a majority of the whole number elected to each house. These are as follows, the year in which the veto was granted being added: Alabama, 1819; Arkansas, 1836; Connecticut, 1818; Indiana, 1816; Kentucky, 1799; New Jersey, 1844; Vermont, 1836; West Virginia, 1872. In twenty-four others, a two-thirds vote is required to override the veto: California, 1849; Colorado, 1876; Florida, 1865; Georgia, 1789; Illinois, 1870; Iowa, 1846; Kansas, 1859; Louisiana, 1812; Maine, 1820; Massachusetts, 1780; Michigan, 1835; Minnesota, 1857; Mississippi, 1817; Missouri, 1875; Nevada, 1864; New Hampshire, 1792; New York, 1821; Oregon, 1857; Pennsylvania, 1790; South Carolina, 1865; Tennessee, 1870; Texas, 1836 (republic), 1845 (state); Virginia, 1870; Wisconsin, 1848. In Maryland (1867) and Nebraska (1875) a three-fifths vote is requisite. But one state, Kentucky, has changed from a two-thirds vote (1792) to a majority vote (1799). The following states, now requiring a two-thirds vote, as above, required only a majority vote at first: Florida, 1838; Illinois, 1848; Missouri, 1820. Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia were without the veto power until it was granted in the years mentioned above. In Nebraska a two-thirds vote only was needed from 1866 until 1875. In Illinois, 1818-;48, the veto power was given to the governor and supreme court judges, to be reversed by a majority vote; and in New York, 1777-;1821, to the governor, chancellor and supreme court judges, to be reversed by a two-thirds vote. In Vermont, 1786-;1836, a suspensory power until the following session was given to the governor and council. In the states the tendency generally has been to increase the strength of the veto power by making the votes of two-thirds of all the members elected requisite to override it, and, further, by giving the power to veto single sections of appropriation bills. (See RIDERS, III.)
—The veto messages until 1858 are in the Statesman's Manual: since that time they must be sought under their dates in the Congressional Globe and Congressional Record. See also 4 Franklin's Works, 283; 4 Elliot's Debates, 620; 5 ib., 108, 130, 151, 190, 205, 385, 534, 560, 588-;9: 2 Curtis' History of the Constitution, 57, 264; 4 Whig Review, 325; 9 ib., 16; 10 ib., 111; 14 Benton's Debates of Congress, 494; 3 Webster's Works, 416; 1 ib., 267; 1 Colton's Life and Times of Clay, 496; 1 Kent's Commentaries, 226; Federalist, LI., LXXIII.; Story's Commentaries, § 878, and note to § 1566 (Madison's letter of June 25, 1831, on the veto); Poore's Federal and State Constitutions.
VICE-PRESIDENT. (See EXECUTIVE, V.; ELECTORS, SENATE; ADMINISTRATIONS.)
VIRGINIA, one of the thirteen original states of the American Union. Its area formed part of a general grant of James I., April 10, 1606, to two companies, controlled by a general council appointed by the king, the whole grant covering the Atlantic coast from north latitude 34° to north latitude 45°. The special grant to the "London company," with which we have to do, included the mainland and islands between latitude 34° and latitude 41°, or from about Cape Fear to Long Island sound; and the special grant to the "Plymouth company" extended from latitude 38° to latitude 45°, or from the mouth of the Potomac to the northern boundary of Vermont. Between latitude 38° and latitude 41°, where the grants conflicted, neither company was to plant a colony within 100 miles of a colony previously planted by the other. Under this grant settlement was begun at Jamestown, May 13, 1607, May 23, 1609, a supplementary charter defined the limits of the colony, as stated below. March 12, 1611-12, a further charter gave power to convene a colonial assembly, or "great and general court," with power to legislate, provided the laws were not contrary to the laws and statutes of England; and under this charter the first legislative assembly in America met at Jamestown, June 30, 1619, being composed of a council named by the company, and a house of burgesses (see ASSEMBLY) elected by the towns. In 1624 the company was suppressed by a writ of quo warranto, its powers were assumed by the king, and Virginia remained a royal province until 1776. During the commonwealth period, it remained loyal to the crown, and for three years after the death of Charles I. his son was acknowledged as king of Virginia, so that at the restoration this colony claimed to be the new king's "Old Dominion." Its loyalty availed it little. A charter was refused it; the quit rents and the control of the church of England, its established church, were lavished upon court favorites; and in 1676 the tyranny of Gov. Berkeley drove the colonists into a rebellion, headed by Nathaniel Bacon, which was suppressed with vindictive punishment. "The old fool [Berkeley]," said Charles, "has taken away more lives in that naked country, than I for the murder of my father." With the exception of this episode, the colony grew quietly, but strongly, into a populous, rich, slaveholding, Episcopalian commonwealth, with a strong desire for self-government; and at the outbreak of the American revolution it was unquestionably the leading state. Its lower house was dissolved by Gov. Dunmore, May 25, 1775, while preparing a protest against the Boston port bill; but the members met the next day and inaugurated the revolution by proposing a congress. (See CONGRESS, CONTINENTAL.) In the following year, May 6, they again met as usual; but, as the governor had run away, and the regular government was suspended, they organized as a "provincial congress," and framed the first constitution of the state of Virginia.
—BOUNDARIES. The charter of 1609 defined the colony's limits thus: from point Comfort, all along the seacoast to the northward 200 miles, and all along the seacoast to the southward 200 miles, "and all that space and circuit of land lying from the seacoast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest." The boundary lines were evidently not to be parallel lines: one was to be a westward line, and the other northwesterly. If the new colony was to have any limits whatever on the west it would seem most natural that the northerly boundary should be the westward line, and the southerly boundary the northwestward line, to intersect it. Virginia would thus have been a comparatively small colony, of a triangular shape. But the colony, resting on the words "from sea to sea," and interpreting them to mean "from the Atlantic to the Pacific," instead of from the Atlantic around the compound boundary line to the Atlantic again, made the southern boundary the westward line, and the northern boundary the northwestward line, thus making her territory grow constantly wider as it went westward. She was compelled, indeed, to yield to the royal prerogative of taking back presents, and her 200-mile limits were interfered with on the south by the grant of Carolina (see NORTH CAROLINA), and on the north by the grant of Pennsylvania and Maryland. (See those states.) To these encroachments she submitted patiently, conscious that her charter, as she interpreted it, contained an abundant reward for her patience. A line drawn northwest from the western boundary of Maryland will show the extent of Virginia's claims to the western part of Pennsylvania, and to the whole territory northwest of the Ohio-indeed, her "northwest line" might have stretched on and included Alaska, but for the subsequent (1762) fixing of the Mississippi as the western boundary of the colonies. Her claims to the northwestern territory were finally abandoned. (See TERRITORIES.) Her Pennsylvania boundary was finally arranged by mutual consent in 1780, by continuing Mason and Dixon's line five degrees to the west, and thence due north, thus giving Virginia the "pan-handle" in the northwest. For her boundaries with North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia and Maryland, see those states.
—CONSTITUTIONS. 1. The provincial congress, June 12, 1776, adopted a bill of rights, which has been retained in subsequent constitutions, but modified in 1867. Its most important sections were the third, which declared the right of the people to alter, reform or abolish their government at their own wills and the fourteenth, that no government separate from or independent of the government of Virginia should be erected or established within the limits thereof. The two were in effect a declaration of independence. (See STATE SOVEREIGNTY.) June 29, the first state constitution was adopted, without a reference to popular vote. It provided for a general assembly, consisting of a senate of twenty-four members, chosen by districts, to serve four years, and a house of delegates (see ASSEMBLY), chosen by counties and towns, to serve one year, for a governor and council of eight, chosen annually by joint ballot of the two houses; and for a judiciary, to be appointed by the legislature during good behavior. This constitution remained in force for half a century, until the growth of the western part of the state, and its unfairly small representation in the legislature, compelled a general revision. 2. A new constitution was framed by a convention at Richmond, Oct. 5, 1829-Jan. 15, 1830, and ratified by a popular vote of 26,055 to 15,563. It fixed the number of the house of delegates at 134, 31 to the twenty-six counties west of the Alleghanies, 25 to the fourteen counties between the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge, 42 to the twenty-nine counties between the Blue Ridge and tide water, and 36 to the counties, cities, towns and boroughs on tide water; and the number of the senate at 32, thirteen of the districts being west and nineteen east of the Blue Ridge. The proportional representation of the great divisions was not to be changed by the legislature. The governor was now to hold office for three years, and the judges were to be removable by a two-thirds vote of both houses. 3. A new constitution was framed by a convention at Richmond, Oct. 14, 1850-Aug. 1, 1851, and ratified by a popular vote of 67,562 to 9,938. Its principal changes were, that the governor was to be elected by the people for four years; the judiciary was to be elected by popular vote for terms of twelve and eight years, and removable by a vote of a majority of the members elected to both houses; the number of the house of delegates was fixed at 152, chosen for two years, and apportioned among the counties, and the number of senators at 50, chosen by districts for four years; and, in default of the adoption of an equitable principle of apportionment by the legislature, a very complicated scheme was drawn up for reapportionment in 1865, which the course of events overruled. The principle of an obsolete statute of 1805 in regard to slavery was thus transferred to the new constitution: "Slaves hereafter emancipated shall forfeit their freedom by remaining in the commonwealth more than twelve months after they become actually free, and shall be reduced to slavery under such regulation as may be prescribed by law"; and "The general assembly may impose such restrictions and conditions as they shall deem proper on the power of slave owners to emancipate their slaves." 4. After the separation of West Virginia (see that title), the state government which had consented to it was transferred to Alexandria, where a convention from the counties within the federal lines, Feb. 13-April 7, 1864, framed a new constitution, which was not submitted to popular vote. It abolished slavery, fixed the number of the house at not less than 80 nor more than 104, to serve two years, and the number of the senate at not less than one-fourth nor more than one-third the number of the house; and disfranchised those who had held office under the confederate government, or been members of the confederate congress or of rebellious legislatures. 5. The fifth constitution was framed by a convention at Richmond, Dec. 3, 1867-April 17, 1868. It added four new clauses to the original bill of rights, providing that the state should ever remain a member of the United States of America; that the people thereof are part of the American nation; that their paramount allegiance is due to the constitution of the United States and laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof; that slavery shall never exist in the state; and that all its citizens have equal civil and political rights and public privileges. It gave the right of suffrage to "male citizens" over twenty-one on twelve months' residence in the state; made disfranchisement a penalty for dueling; gave the veto power to the governor, and the election of judges to the legislature; and regulated the government of cities. The constitution was ratified by a popular vote of 210,585 to 9,136, July 6, 1869. At the same election the disfranchisement clauses, which had caused the long delay in ratification, and which were submitted to separate vote under an act of congress of April 10, 1869, were rejected. In 1876 an amendment was adopted requiring the payment of a capitation tax before voting, disfranchising for petit larceny, and empowering the legislature to remove dueling disabilities by a two-thirds vote. The capitation tax was subsequently abolished by another amendment.
—GOVERNORS. Patrick Henry, 1776-9; Thos. Jefferson, 1779-81; Thos. Nelson, 1781; Benjamin Harrison, 1781-4; Patrick Henry, 1784-6; Edmund Randolph, 1786-8; Beverley Randolph, 1788-91; Henry Lee, 1791-4; Robert Brooke, 1794-6; James Wood, 1796-9; James Monroe, 1799-1802; John Page, 1802-5; Wm. H. Cabell, 1805-8; John Tyler, 1808-11; James Monroe, 1811; George W. Smith, 1811-12; James Barbour, 1812-14; Wilson C. Nicholas, 1814-16; James P. Preston, 1816-19; Thos. Mann Randolph, 1819-22; James Pleasant, 1822-5; John Tyler, 1825-7; William B. Giles, 1827-30; John Floyd, 1830-34; Littleton W. Tazewell, 1834-6; Windham Robertson, 1836-7; David Campbell, 1837-40; Thos. W. Gilmer, 1840-41; John Rutherford, 1841-2; John M. Gregory, 1842-3; James McDowell, 1843-6; Wm. Smith, 1846-9; John B. Floyd, 1849-52; Joseph Johnson, 1852-6; Henry A. Wise, 1856-60; John Letcher, 1860-64; William Smith, 1864-5; Francis H. Pierpont, 1865-8; Henry H. Wills, 1868-70; Gilbert C. Walker, 1870-74; James L. Kemper, 1874-8; F. W. M. Holladay, 1878-82; Wm. E. Cameron, 1882-6.
—POLITICAL HISTORY. For the century succeeding the opening of the conflict with the mother country, 1760-1860, the whole policy of Virginia is expressed in the declaration of her bill of rights, "that no government separate from or independent of the government of Virginia should be erected or established within the limits thereof." Under the colonial system the resistance to encroachment was directed against the king's governors, and under the constitution against the federal government; and the only period during which the Virginia policy ever had full and free play was that of the confederation and the few years of loose alliance that preceded it, 1775-89. Size, population, wealth and concurrence of sentiment among leading men made Virginia the great exponent of "state sovereignty." (See that title.) For such a rôle her colonial history went far to prepare her. The character of her immigration, its sympathy in blood, breeding and prejudices with the English royalist party of 1620-80, and the final impress given to the mould by the establishment of a state church, were all calculated to make Virginians fully conscious of their own importance, and ready to maintain their individual opinions. Further, the necessarily backwoods character of Virginia life, the absence of any such object of loyalty as a personally present king, and the introduction of negro slavery, tended to exaggerate in the Virginian the personal characteristics of his English prototype, while it took away the checks which had operated upon the latter: and the English royalist was metamorphosed into the Virginia democrat. Virginia democracy was thus not based on any Calvinistic view of the universal equality of men in their infinite inferiority to their Maker; nor in any theoretical love for humanity: it was rather a general agreement by all white Virginians to recognize one another's feeling of individual importance, and to support the state government under which that feeling found the safest shelter. John Randolph's exclusive application of the expression "my country" to Virginia, only voiced the conscious or unconscious feeling of all Virginia democrats.
—The political history of the state until 1881 was therefore that of the democratic party. Its electoral votes and its state government were steadily of one party, and only an occasional congressman among the opposition varied the general rule. The state's ratification of the constitution in 1788 was only accomplished by a meagre majority of ten votes (see CONSTITUTION, II.); and it is safe to say that the majority was only obtained by a sense of the insecurity of Virginia's title to western lands if a general scramble for the territories should be brought on by a failure to organize national government. (See TERRITORIES.) The inauguration of the new government marked Virginia's importance. Washington's presidency was due only to himself: the positions of Jefferson and Randolph in the cabinet, and of Madison as leader in the house, were due to Virginia's leadership among the states. There was thus developed at once the seed of what soon came to be known as the "Virginia influence," hard to define exactly, and yet very apparent in the politics of the time. Throughout the controlling tide-water counties of the state, where genealogy was a science held in the highest esteem, where immigration had almost ceased to bring new and confusing strains of blood into the established stocks, and where exhaustion of tobacco lands had not yet begun to banish the old families, nearly every leading man was related more or less distantly to most of his competitors; the different congeries of families were just far enough removed to deaden any ambitious struggles for clan supremacy; the opinions of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Page, Giles, Bland, Taylor, Tazewell, the Nicholases, the Randolphs, and other democratic leaders, came to subordinate leaders with the force of family as well as political sympathy; and the whole formed the shadowy but powerful "Virginia influence," which made or destroyed presidents until 1825. From the beginning of Hamilton's centralizing policy (see FEDERAL PARTY, I.), the Virginia influence stood stiffly against it, and thus became the corner-stone of the new democratic party. From Virginia proceeded most of the efforts which gradually gave the new party control of the south and a "fighting chance" in the middle states. When federalist partisanship in 1798 threatened what Hamilton considered "a tyranny," the half-uttered counter-threat of forcible resistance came from Virginia and her daughter, Kentucky. (See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.) When the federal party was finally overthrown, in 1800-1, Virginia and New York took the same places in the dominant democratic party that Virginia and Massachusetts had held in the revolutionary struggle. The former state was still able, from its pre-eminence in the country and party, to name the president, while the vice-president was generally given to the latter. The "Old Dominion" of colonial times thus became the "Mother of Presidents" under the constitution.
—The Virginia influence was not altogether undisputed, even in its own state. The greatest of Virginians, Washington, was a federalist, and so were John Marshall, Charles Lee, Henry Lee, and (after parties had fairly developed) Patrick Henry. The general prevalence of the Virginia influence in national affairs after 1800 soon wiped out the last trace of federalism in Virginia, but at the same time it prepared the way for a Virginia schism. As the leaders, Jefferson and Madison, became more absorbed in national politics, more dependent on northern democrats, and more neglectful of their state, an ultra Virginian faction, "republicans of the old school," or "quids," appeared, headed by John Randolph, and including also Tazewell and John Taylor. Their public defection took place in March, 1806, and from that time they spared no effort to secure the presidency in 1809 for Monroe, a candidate of far less ability than Madison, but recommended by his long absence from national politics and his supposed devotion to his state. But the defection was a failure. In January, 1808, the Virginia legislature nominated Madison for the presidency, and the nomination was repeated, two days afterward, by the congressional caucus. (See CAUCUS, CONGRESSIONAL.) A caucus of Monroe members of the legislature nominated him, and the federalists supported him in the state; but the Monroe ticket was badly defeated in Virginia, and unheard of elsewhere. The Virginia influence was thus still triumphant: Monroe himself submitted in 1811 by entering the cabinet of Madison; and his former supporters either followed him, or kept up a filibustering opposition to the war of 1812.
—But the general spread of democratic ideas, and the decrease of the state's comparative importance, had already doomed the influence of Virginia. In 1817 it was hardly able to nominate Monroe for the presidency, and its lame success in that year, as well as in 1821, was due mainly to the influence of tradition upon the new men and new states in politics. Republics are not always ungrateful, and it was not until the last Virginia leader had been duly honored that the field was field to be fairly open for others. From that time Virginia was no longer to be the "Mother of Presidents." With one accidental exception, the sceptre was to be transferred to other states. In 1790 she was the first of the states in population: in 1830 she was third, New York and Pennsylvania having outstripped her. Changes had also been taking place within the state. The western part of the state (now West Virginia) had more than three times as much population in 1830 as in 1790, while the eastern part of the state had increased very little; and yet the apportionment of representation remained fixed as in 1776. The crying need of a reform in this respect brought about the convention of 1829, one of the most distinguished assemblages of able men that ever met in any state. The desire of each section to be well represented sent to the convention Madison, Monroe, Marshall, John Randolph, Giles, Mercer, Tazewell, John Taylor, Garnett, Leigh, and all the ablest men of the state. The object of the delegates of the western and middle sections was to base representation on white population only for both houses; the eastern delegates wished for the "federal basis," including three-fifths of the slaves. The former plan, as in South Carolina (see that state) would have given the taxing power to the western and middle sections, while the east held the taxable property. At first the convention inclined toward compromising by giving a white basis of representation to the house, and a federal basis to the senate; but in the end the eastern delegates succeeded in establishing the artificial apportionment already detailed, which deprived their section of comparatively little political power. Slavery had been the secret of the difficulty. East and west of the Blue Ridge the white population was not far from equal; but the latter section had comparatively few negroes, while the blacks outnumbered the whites in the former, and three-fifths of them counted under the federal basis, which governed quite closely the apportionment as it was settled. The constitution had hardly been adopted when Virginia was startled by an unsuccessful negro insurrection in Southamption county, near Norfolk, in August, 1831, under the lead of one Nat Turner. When the legislature met, the western delegates at once took the insurrection as a text, and an animated debate followed for several weeks, in which every plan for abolition was proposed and advocated. At last this extraordinary discussion, the only one of its kind ever held in a southern legislature before 1865, was stifled, and never revived—Until about 1835 democratic control of the state was hardly disputed: the popular vote for Jackson in 1832 was 75 per cent. of the total vote. During Jackson's second term the whig party of the state was developed, and, though it never fully controlled the state, it was able to give its opponent battle on even terms for nearly twenty years. It contested every county of the state: in the eastern part it gained votes through the desire of many slave-holders for a system of internal improvements which should offset the exhaustion of land, and check emigration; in the western and middle sections it was aided to some extent by the traditional opposition to the usually democratic tidewater counties; and the nullification element, John Tyler being its best known exponent, gave it some assistance. At first it was strong enough to elect Tyler and B. W. Leigh to the United States senate, and to make Gilmer governor; and in 1840 its presidential electors were defeated by only 1,392 votes out of 86,394. Thereafter it remained an opposition party, with about 47 per cent. of the total vote. Its best known leaders were Tyler, Leigh, John Minor Botts, Preston, Stuart and Faulkner, those of the democrats being W. C. Rives, Dromgoole, Mason, Hunter, Bocock, Letcher and Wise. After 1849 the whig vote decreased, and after 1853 most of its former leaders became democrats. But some, not choosing to take that course, adopted the "know-nothing" organization (see AMERICAN PARTY), and contested the state with about the former whig vote. The proportionate popular vote may be seen by the results of the elections for governor: (1855) Henry A. Wise, democrat, 83,424, Thos. S. Flournoy, "American," 73,244; (1859) John Letcher, democrat, 77,112, Wm. L. Goggin, "American," 71,543. In spite of the large minority vote, the democrats continued to control the legislature and all but one or two of the congressmen.
—As the sectional disputes of 1850-60 began to verge evidently toward war, Virginia strove hardest to avert that calamity. (See BORDER STATES) The struggle for the state's electoral vote in 1860 was won by the old whig element (see CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY), the popular vote standing 74,681 for Bell, 74,323 for Breckinridge, 16,290 for Douglas, and 1,929 (in western Virginia) for Lincoln. The special session of the legislature in January, 1831, called a peace convention of all the states (see CONGRESS, PEACE); appointed commissioners to ask the president of the United States and the governor of South Carolina to keep the peace for sixty days; and, in calling a state convention, provided that its action should be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection. These pacific measures were due solely to the general dislike of secession by the people, who knew that in case of war their state must be the battle ground; and the real feeling of the state politicians was better shown by the passage of numerous resolutions of a covertly warlike nature—appropriating money to arm the state, and threatening forcible resistance to any attempt by the federal government to coerce any seceding state. The convention met Feb. 13, and for two months debated the various propositions offered. It was so divided that any resolution asserting the abstract right of secession was sure of a small majority in favor of it, while any resolution looking to the practical exercise of the right was equally sure of a slight majority against it. April 17, the deliberations were brought to a crisis by President Lincoln's call for troops. (See INSURRECTION.) Under the excitement of the moment, and the stimulus of still greater mob excitement in Richmond, an ordinance of secession was passed, by a vote of 88 to 55, to take effect when ratified by the people, May 23. But the new order of Virginia politicians, unsafe guides in any such crisis, had no great confidence in the popular vote, and proceeded in a course which no one has ever attempted to defend on any constitutional theory. The convention, April 25, ratified the constitution of the confederate states, and, by its commissioners and A. H. Stephens, commissioner from the confederate states, formed a "temporary convention," placing the state's whole military force under the president of the confederate states. Both measures were to be void if the popular vote in May should be against secession; but the irruption of confederate troops made the election a farce. In this lawless fashion the secession of Virginia was accomplished. It was followed by a counter-revolution, which permanently deprived the state of its western section. (See WEST VIRGINIA.) When West Virginia had been admitted as a state, its original revolutionary government was transferred to Alexandria, where it remained until the close of the war, claiming to be the government of Virginia, but receiving obedience only from the counties within the federal lines.
—Throughout the war, Richmond was the capital of both the state and the confederacy, and all the political feeling of the state was concentrated upon the prosecution of the war, with very little friction between the two authorities. In May, 1865, President Johnson refused to recognize Gov. Smith, and the Pierpoint administration took its place without dispute, and held it for two years. During this time the state's idea of reconstruction was fully carried out; the constitution of 1864, with its prohibition of slavery, was accepted, but the test oath was abolished, the proposed amendment to the constitution of the United States was voted down, and stringent vagrant acts were passed for the control of the freedmen. In March, 1867, the state government came under the reconstruction laws. (See RECONSTRUCTION.) The reconstruction convention, in framing a new constitution, disfranchised all persons who had held office of even the lowest grades under the state or confederacy until 1865, and enforced the disfranchisement by providing for a stringent test oath and registry law. In a large part of the state it would thus have been impossible to find qualified office-holders, and no attempt was made to put the constitution to vote until a new act of congress allowed a separate vote on the objectionable clauses. They were rejected, and the state was readmitted, Jan. 26, 1870.
—For nearly ten years the state remained democratic in all elections, the dominant party taking the name "conservative." The republican vote was at first large, but was continually in the minority, except in the election of four of the nine congressmen. In 1874 the democrats secured eight of the nine congressmen, and thereafter the republican vote was of little importance. The most troublesome problem for the successive legislatures was that of the state debt. It amounted, Jan. 1, 1871, to $47,390,840.93, of which about $37,200,000 was for debt contracted before April, 1861, and for lapsed interest thereon. March 30, 1871, a bill was passed to fund two-thirds of this amount (leaving one-third as the proportion of West Virginia) into bonds whose coupons should be receivable for state taxes. The popular objections to this seem to have been mainly as follows: that the receipts from state taxation, at the rate of fifty cents on $100, were regularly about $2,500,000 per annum; that the expenses of government and public schools were about $1,600,000; that the interest on the funded debt would be about $1,800,000; and that the state was absolutely unable to increase the rate of taxation so as to make up the deficit. The whole question evidently hinges on this last assertion, whose truth can not well be proved or disproved: it is only certain that no such assertion would have been made by the ancient commonwealth. The passage of the funding bill at once went into politics, and the next legislature, March 7, 1872, repealed the "tax coupon" feature of the law. But, before the repeal, about $17,000,000 had been funded in tax coupon bonds, and the state court of appeals decided that a repeal as to them would be a breach of contract and unconstitutional. Still, the legislature was unable or unwilling to lay taxes sufficient to pay the interest, and the constant receipt of coupons for taxes kept the treasury in a state of chronic bankruptcy. In 1873 an act was passed to pay one-third of the interest, after government expenses should have been paid—a proviso which effectually nullified the law. In 1877 a final effort was made to increase revenue by a liquor law (the Moffett act), which compelled liquor sellers to register sales by means of a mechanical register upon the counter: but this only produced about $500,000 annually, insufficient to make up the deficit. In March, 1878, a bill was passed offering to the bondholders refunding bonds with interest at 3 per cent. for eighteen years, and 4 per cent. for thirty-two years thereafter. The probability of a settlement on some such basis crystallized the opposition into a "readjuster" party, led by William Mahone. It made some little effort in the election of 1878, though Gov. Holliday, the debt-paying candidate, was elected by 101,940 out of a total vote of 106,329. In the following February the "readjuster movement" took complete shape, as the final "McCulloch bill" was being perfected. This act, passed March 28, 1879, and accepted by the bondholders, provided for forty-year refunding bonds, with interest at 3 per cent. for ten years, 4 per cent. for twenty years, and 5 per cent for ten years, coupons receivable for taxes. The interest would thus have been about $900,000 annually for ten years, and there would have been little danger of a deficit. But the readjusters, in addition to the standing claim of inability to levy a higher rate of taxation than fifty cents on $100, denounced the tax coupon feature of the act as "against public policy, and degrading to the state and people." On this issue they obtained a popular majority in the election of November, 1879; and by a coalition of their forty delegates with the seventeen republican members they obtained a majority in the lower house of the legislature. They have since controlled the state, though the "debt-paying" electoral ticket, recognized by the national democratic committee, was successful in the presidential election of 1880. In December, 1879, Mahone was elected United States senator, and when his term began, in March, 1881, he at once ranged himself with the republicans, declaring that he had been elected as a readjuster, not as a democrat. Since that time, the fusion of the readjusters and republicans has been complete, and has controlled the state. In November, 1881, it elected Governor Cameron by a vote of 111,473 to 99,757 for the "funder" candidate, Daniel, and obtained a majority in both branches of the legislature. Riddleberger, who was the framer of the bill passed in 1873, was sent to the United States senate for the term beginning in 1883. But the defection of a few of their number during the session prevented the readjusters from carrying out their debt programme, and the future of the party is very uncertain. Its leaders are supported by the national administration, which is republican, and yet the fusion between readjusters and republicans has never been more than a mechanical mixture, and there are many signs of its breaking asunder. While it lasts it at least secures the free exercise of the right of suffrage to the negro voters of the state.
—In addition to the names of Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Monroe, John Randolph, Tyler, Wirt and Washington (see those names), the following have been among the more prominent of the state's political leaders: William S. Archer, whig congressman 1820-35, and United States senator 1841-7; Philip P. Barbour, democratic congressman 1814-25 and 1827-30, and supreme court justice 1836-41; Theodorick Bland, anti-federal delegate to congress 1780-83, and congressman 1789-90; Thomas S. Bocock, democratic congressman 1847-61, confederate congressman and speaker of the house 1862-5; Alexander R. Boteler, whig and "American" congressman 1859-61, confederate congressman 1862-4; John Minor Botts, whig congressman 1830-43 and 1847-9, and an open opponent of secession throughout the rebellion; James Breckinridge, federalist congressman 1809-17; Matthew Clay, democratic congressman 1797-1815; George C. Dromgoole, democratic congressman 1835-41 and 1843-7; John W. Eppes, democratic congressman 1803-11 and 1813-15, and United States senator 1817-19; Charles J. Faulkner, whig and democratic congressman 1851-9, and minister to France 1859-61 (see WEST VIRGINIA); John Floyd, democratic congressman 1817-29, governor 1830-34, and a leading nullificationist; John B. Floyd (son of the preceding), governor 1849-52, secretary of war under Buchanan, and brigadier general in the confederate army; William B. Giles, democratic congressman 1790-99 and 1801-3, United States senator 1804-15, and governor 1827-30; Thomas W. Gilmer, governor 1840-41, congressman 1841-4 ("Tylerized" whig, afterward a democrat), and secretary of the navy under Tyler; Wm. L. Goggin, whig congressman 1839-43, 1844-5, and 1847-9; John Goode, confederate congressman 1862-5; democratic congressman 1875-81; Benjamin Harrison (father of Pres. Harrison), delegate to congress 1774-8, and governor 1782-4; Patrick Henry, the state's popular leader in the revolution, delegate to congress 1774-6, governor 1776-9 and 1784-6, leader of the antifederalists in the Virginia convention of 1788 (see CONSTITUTION, II.), and afterward a federalist; Robert M. T. Hunter, democratic congressman 1837-43 and 1845-7, United States senator 1847-61, confederate senator 1862 (see CONFEDERATE STATES); Eppa Hunton, confederate brigadier general, democratic congressman 1873-9 (see ELECTORAL COMMISSION); Arthur Lee, congressional commissioner to France and Spain 1776-80, and delegate to congress 1782-5; Henry Lee, a cavalry officer in the revolution, delegate to congress in 1786, federalist governor 1792-5, and congressman 1799-1801; Richard Henry Lee, delegate to congress (see DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE) 1774-80 and 1784-7, and United States senator 1789-92; Benjamin Watkins Leigh, whig United States senator 1834-6, then resigning rather than obey "instructions" from the legislature; William Mahone, confederate major general, organizer of the "readjuster" party, and United States senator 1881-7; George Mason, a revolutionary and anti-federal leader (see CONSTITUTION, II.); James M. Mason, democratic congressman 1837-9, United States senator 1847-61, and confederate commissioner to Great Britain; John Y. Mason, democratic congressman 1831-7, secretary of the navy under Tyler and Polk 1844-9, and minister to Great Britain 1854-9; Charles F. Mercer, democratic congressman 1817-39; Wilson C. Nicholas, democratic United States senator 1800-4, congressman 1807-9, and governor 1814-16; Edmund Pendleton, delegate to congress 1774-5 and president of the Virginia convention of 1788; William B. Preston, whig congressman 1847-9, secretary of the navy under Taylor, confederate senator in 1862; Edmund Randolph, delegate to congress 1779-82, governor 1786-8 (see CONVENTION of 1787; CONSTITUTION, II.), attorney general and secretary of state under Washington, who requested him to resign in 1795 for official misconduct; Peyton Randolph, delegate to congress and president of that body 1774-5; Thomas Mann Randolph, democratic congressman 1803-7, and governor 1819-22; William C. Rives, democratic congressman 1823-9, minister to France 1829-32 and 1849-53. United States senator 1833-4 and 1836-45, and confederate congressman 1861-4; James A. Seddon, democratic congressman 1845-7 and 1849-51 (see CONFEDERATE STATES); Andrew Stevenson, democratic congressman 1823-34, speaker of the house 1827-34, and minister to Great Britain 1836-41; Alexander H. H. Stuart, whig congressman 1841-3, secretary of the interior under Fillmore; John Taylor, democratic United States senator 1792-4, and 1803, and 1822-4 (see authorities under CONSTITUTION, IV. c); Littleton W. Tazewell, democratic congressman 1800-1, and United states senator 1824-32; Abel P. Upshur, state judge 1826-41, and secretary of the navy and of state under Tyler; George Tucker, democratic congressman 1819-25, professor of political economy in the state university 1825-45, and a standard historian; Henry St. George Tucker, democratic congressman 1815-19, thereafter chancellor of the Winchester district, president of the court of appeals, and professor of law in the university until 1845; John Randolph Tucker, state attorney general 1857-65, and democratic congressman 1875-83; and Henry A. Wise, democratic congressman 1833-44, minister to Brazil 1844-7, governor 1856-60, and confederate brigadier general.
—See 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; 2 Hough's American Constitutions; Neill's History of the Virginia Company (1869); H. B. Adams' Influence of Maryland (boundary of Virginia); Stith's Early Settlement of Virginia (1747); De Haas' Early Settlement of Virginia; 1 Force's Tracts (Bacon's rebellion); 3 Sparks' American Biography, 2d series (Life of Bacon); C. Campbell's [Early] History of Virginia; Beverley's History of Virginia (to 1706); Keith's History of Virginia (1738); Burk's History of Virginia (continued by Jones and Girardin to 1781); J. W. Campbell's History of Virginia (to 1781); Jefferson's Notes on Virginia; Howe's Historical Collections of Virginia; Meade's Old Churches and Families of Virginia (1857); Grigsby's Convention of 1776; Debates and Proceedings of Conventions (1788, 1829-30, 1850, and 1867); Nicolson's Debates in the Virginia Legislature (1798); Dew's Review of Debates in Virginia Legislature of 1831-2; Foote's Historical and Biographical Sketches of Virginia; Virginia Historical Register (1848-53); Howison's History of Virginia (to 1847); Carpenter's History of Virginia (to 1852); Dabney's Defense of Virginia; Botts' History of the Great Rebellion; Virginia: A. Geographical and Political Summary (1876); Appleton's Annual Cyclopœdia (1861-81).
VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. (See KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS.)