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Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). Vol 3 Oath - Zollverein

Editor: John Joseph Lalor

Part of: Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, 3 vols.

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TABLE.

TABLE. (See PARLIAMENTARY LAW.)

TAMMANY HALL

TAMMANY HALL (IN U. S. HISTORY). A term applied in American politics, first, to the Columbian order, a secret society organized for social and political purposes in New York city in 1789, and which, upon incorporation in 1805, added the name of Tammany society; second, to the place of meeting owned or leased by this society, in which the "regular" democratic organization of the "city and county of New York" assembled up to 1879; and, third, to the political organization itself, meeting in Tammany Hall, whether "regular" or not. The entire subject will be clearer, if it is remembered that many things true of one of these three objects is not true of the other two, and that the same term has been indiscriminately applied to all three, for eighty years. It was first freely used of the secret society, next of the regular political organization assembling in its hall, and in the third and last stage of its history has come to be applied to the democratic faction assembling in Tammany Hall, sometimes regular, sometimes dissident, but never since 1852, commanding the unquestioned allegiance of all the voters of its party in the city. Before that period rival democratic factions existed; since then there have been rival "Halls." The first of these periods covers the years 1800-1834, in which the extension of the right of suffrage and the grant of local self-government formed the chief political issues of the state; the second extends from 1834 to 1853-9, when federal patronage and the democracy of the interior of the state retained the voters of the party in New York city in a tolerably continuous organization in spite of the changes worked in this vote, by foreign immigration and the appearance of the problems of the modern city—its ignorance, its supine wealth, and its costly public works. During the third and last period, while the political organization meeting in Tammany Hall has reached its final development as a well-disciplined body of predatory politicians, the democratic vote of the city, 1879-83, has become divided into two nearly equal divisions. One of these votes with the "county" organization, independent of Tammany Hall, and recognized by the party in the state as "regular." The other body of voters follows the "Tammany" organization, which is not so recognized, but which has a regular local succession to "Tammany," and, during the second and a large part of the third of these periods, was the representative of a majority of the democratic voters of the city.

—As it was only during the first twenty or thirty years of its existence that the Tammany society, or the organization sharing its name, represented a genuine political movement, the history of Tammany for the last fifty or sixty years has been the record of an organization sharing the principles of a wider national party, but bent, first and foremost, on controlling the government of the city in which its lot was cast. Tammany has chiefly attracted attention in this phase as a highly successful effort to govern a great city by organizing its venal vote; a vote extending from the day laborer anxious is for steady employment on the public roads, to the distinguished lawyer solicitous to secure a judgeship at $15,000 a year, with its lucrative refereeships and wide influence.

—The connection is of the slightest between Tamanend, the obscure Indian chief who put his mark to one of Penn's treaties, dealing with the lands of the Delaware Indians, and "St. Tammany," whose festival, on the 12th of May, came, in the closing days of the revolution, to replace St. George's day, three weeks earlier, much as Christmas replaced the Saturnalia. The significant fact is, that after William Mooney had organized the Columbian order, with its thirteen tribes, its twelve sachems, or directors, its sagamore, or master of ceremonies, and its wiskinski, or door-keeper, the secondary name of Tammany society was adopted, because it defined more clearly the popular and local character of the organization in its political action. The child-like interest of the revolutionary period in parades, trappings, terms and mysteries, was apparent in all the organization of the society. For it the year was divided into the seasons of flowers, of fruits, of hunting and of snow; the pipe of peace was smoked at its meetings; its members wore the Indian garb in the great processions of the day, and in 1790 entertained a Creek embassy for days together in costume, and the bucktail which Tammany societies wore throughout Pennsylvania, came, twenty years later, to be, in New York state, the name of one of the earliest of the democratic factions whose intricate relations vex the political student. Tradition has preserved what the preference and fancy of an earlier day selected. The annual celebration of Independence Day in Tammany Hall is still made up of "long talks" and "short talks;" New York newspapers still contain the quaint notices of the annual meetings of the society in the "season of flowers," and its other "council fires," in the "great wigwam," which first appeared while Washington was president; but in the changes of time its great sachem has become a boss, and the chief duties of its wiskinskie, who once gathered the Spanish dollars of the faithful at the door of Martling's long room, have come to be the prompt and persistent collection of political assessments from Tammany office-holders.

—These things are the outer shell of the facts surrounding its early organization and its later development. They unite it, on the one hand, with the familiar channel of political action at the foundation of the republic, and recall its existence now, as the solitary link between the politics of New York city, with 5,189 votes, and the metropolis, with 336,137 males of the voting age. Organized by William Mooney, an Irish-American liberty boy and a violent whig, in the second week of Washington's first administration, the Columbian order represented, in federal politics, state rights; in state affairs, the demand for a wider suffrage; and in local affairs, the claim of the foreign-born citizen for a conspicuous part in politics. All this was not at first apparent. Of the first twelve sachems, ten were federalists. In the hot discussion which succeeded the outbreak of the French revolution, the Columbian order opposed a war with Great Britain. For several years the society was more conspicuous for its riotous celebration of May 12 than for its direct action in politics; but, in the eleven years which preceded its first recorded appearance as a political power, the democratic membership of the body put it in sympathy with the political organization which Aaron Burr was slowly maturing. The Poughkeepsie constitution had imposed a heavy property qualification, a freehold of $50 to $250, or a rental of 40 shillings annually, and the restoration of order had curbed the influence of the "Sons of Liberty"; a mob on the right side, but still a mob. A local moneyed aristocracy, supported by place and birth, resumed the control it enjoyed in colonial days. Its opponents, in 1788, polled one vote in seven in New York city, on a legislative ticket carrying Aaron Burr's name. For ten years the tide continued to run against the popular party, until, in 1800, the Columbian order began at the polls the careful, systematic organization of the voters of the city, to which the success of Tammany has ever since been due. The vote of the city had increased one-half in a decade—in 1801 the qualified voters numbered 7,988—but the city was canvassed, poor citizens were deeded freeholds, "faggot" voters were created by uniting a number of men in the ownership of a single piece of property, the society kept open house during the election, voters were carried to and from the polls, and the entire machinery, long since become familiar, was set in motion to bring out the vote. The result was overwhelming success, and Aaron Burr, the next winter, was nominated as vice-president in the congressional caucus at Washington, on the strength of the victory. The control of the largest city in the Union carried Tammany, at a bound, to a position of influence in national politics which it has never lost. In despair, Alexander Hamilton wrote to Senator Bayard proposing the organization of a similar secret society in the federal party.

—The annual convention in state, and a permanent organization in local politics, was still a quarter of a century distant in American affairs. A property qualification was required of voters; municipal officers were appointed by the governor and a council; a council of revision, made up of appointed officers, passed upon all legislation before it became law; while the representation accorded New York city, and its proportion of voters, left it less powerful in state affairs than at any time until the rapid growth of an urban population in the state at large, stripped it of its preponderating influence seventy-five years later. A permanent secret society was, under these circumstances, invaluable in securing continuous and coherent political action. The constitutional accident, which made the voting power of Tammany relatively greater in electing a president than in choosing a governor, early attracted to it federal patronage; first used with effect in New York state politics, under Madison. New York city was still small enough for the management of its politics by general meetings. The election of assemblymen and congressmen on a general ticket, contributed to concentrate political power. The germ of a general, popular and permanent organization began to show itself in the "general committees," for whose appointment general meetings provided, but such an organization was still far distant. The hard drinking of the day and the social contact of a small city each contributed its share to make acquaintance and frequent reunions a strong and powerful factor in political action. During the last sixty years the meetings of Tammany Hall, however turbulent and disorderly, have never been anything but meetings, differing wholly from the social gatherings of the first third of a century, when it was still true that—

There's a barrel of porter in Tammany Hall,
And the bucktails are swigging it all the night long.
In the time of my childhood 'twas pleasant to call
For a seat and cigar 'mid the jovial throng.

—In the first faction fight of this period, between the Burrites and the Lewisites over the election of Morgan Lewis as governor in 1804, Tammany acted with the former, and began its political career with a bolt; for, while no organization has ever shown a higher respect for local regularity, none has ever been quicker to bolt the action of an Albany legislative caucus or a state convention, in which it has never been popular, and was and is generally in the minority. Before another election came, Tammany had developed, from its own ranks and among its ward workers. Daniel D. Tompkins, one of those young and brilliant leaders whose careers, from the day of Tompkins to the day of Hoffman, have opened so well and fared so ill. A "regular" caucus with which Tammany acted nominated Tompkins, and a year later George Clinton was shelved by his choice as vice-president. For a brief period his son, De Witt Clinton, had acted with Tammany Hall. Like all succeeding mayors, he found how difficult it is for the chief executive officer of the city to distribute his patronage without quarreling with the local organization, and being compelled to fight the organization by a personal machine; to submit; or to resign political power—the three alternatives for seventy years presented to every mayor by Tammany Hall. Clinton, like Fernando Wood, chose the first. The general meetings of Tammany Hall were supporting every step taken by Madison, and its members received, in return, federal patronage, whose importance was enormously increased by the heavy imposts of the day, which, for the first time, were centring at New York. Clinton bitterly complained of this use of patronage, but he was powerless, and the candidate who at last defeated him in a contest for his seat in the senate, was the federal district attorney, Nathan Sanford. The death of John Broome, in the same year, gave Clinton the opportunity of running for lieutenant governor, an office which he reached, and a year later a general meeting in New York nominated him for the presidency. Tammany Hall arrayed itself on the side of regularity, and enjoying federal, state and city patronage, crushed Clinton. The struggle lasted for years with varying success, and ended only with Clinton's death, in 1828, while governor. His previous removal from the office of canal commissioner by Tammany Hall, had aroused an overwhelming popular sentiment in his favor. The frauds charged against Gov. Tompkins—the first of the great public scandals of Tammany Hall—had earlier enabled Clinton (1817) to win in a contest in which the vote of the state at large steadily opposed the dominant city organization, whose wealth and ability enabled it each winter, at Albany, to retrieve in the legislative caucus what it had lost at the polls in November.

—Federal patronage, army contracts and local public works—now first begun—had by this time given the Tammany society wealth. It built, in 1812, its first hall, on the site now occupied by the "Sun" building. Its membership showed that alliance between local politicians and local business men which it retained up to a very recent date. This alliance would be inexplicable in an organization which has uniformly opposed national and state measures, favorable to the city, and increased local taxation; but for the great profits which attend the use of active capital in contracts and in investments guided by an early knowledge of public works. The organization itself has never been true at any period to the real interests of the city. It supported the embargo, it favored the war with Great Britain, and it denounced the Erie canal until the work had reached dimensions which made a share in its contracts profitable, when the votes of its representatives at Albany and the skill of its pamphleteers were enlisted in behalf of enormous appropriations. It opposed a permanent police, was disloyal, and aided Tweed's sack. Yet, neither in its early nor in its later days was the mob, the final residuum of the city, enlisted in Tammany Hall. Clinton, Wood and Morrissey, each commanded a lower stratum of voters than Van Buren, Schell and Kelly. Up to 1879, in spite of occasional eclipses, the lower middle class, which in the long run rules every great city, was the real strength of Tammany Hall. It is a curious illustration of this, that, in 1817 when the Tammany society issued one of its addresses on the state of public affairs, it deplored the spread of the "foreign" game of billiards among young men of the upper classes, and the presence of vice among the lower in the true spirit of a middle class precisian. The character and organization of Tammany Hall only changed for the worse estate, which has made its name a hissing and a by-word, when the small shopkeepers and the rising mechanics of the lower wards of New York were replaced, from 1850 to 1860, by a foreign-born population, with its tenement houses, its rum shops and its beer saloons.

—A general meeting of Tammany Hall in 1820, attended by bucktails from all parts of the state, began the movement which resulted in the constitutional convention of 1821. Its constitution greatly lowered the franchise. This in its turn was followed in 1833 by charter amendments, making the mayor of New York elective. Both radically changed the character of local politics. The centre of political action on all local affairs was shifted from Albany to New York. State patronage ceased to be a conspicuous factor in local politics where the distribution of federal and municipal offices was the first object of political life. Up to 1831, every gubernatorial term but one had been filled by a man who began his active political life in New York ward politics. Since then only three terms have been filled by men (Morgan, Hoffman and Tilden) who were graduated from the same school. With this change in the electorate and the city government, there came an increase in the number of voters, which made it no longer possible for a general meeting to serve the purposes of local politics, or the social gatherings of a secret society to unite the politicians of a city whose population was (1830) 197,112, and whose voters numbered (1835) 43,091. The "general committee" succeeded the general meeting. This body, which survives to-day, grew from two separate sources. The general meeting, after making nominations, had habitually delegated the management of the canvass to a general committee. The ward and district primaries in a similar manner turned over the practical work of the election to their own general committees. A list of the latter in one of the early mayoralty elections fills thirteen and one-half columns of a daily paper, and constituted a roster of the fighting force of Tammany Hall, and an almost equally complete list of local and federal officers. These two bodies gradually came to take shape in a representative general committee, based first on wards and their election districts, until the assembly district came, in 1871, long after the election of assemblymen by districts, to be the working unit in local politics. The wards elected aldermen long after the drift of population had greatly changed their relative vote, and this circumstance continued the ward in city politics, and perpetuated a rotten borough system, which, in the divisions opening the third period of Tammany Hall, placed the regular organization in the hands of men representing a minority of the voters.

—The central and ward organizations grew and prospered together. The "general committee," under its early name as a "general council," first appeared in Tammany Hall in 1822, three delegates representing each of the eleven wards into which the city was divided. The creation of new wards raised the number of forty-five, in 1836 to seventy-five; and in 1843 the division of the city into election districts led to an increase in membership. The wards and their districts were abandoned later for the assembly districts and their election precincts. The steady growth of population has at last given an election precinct an average population from one-half to one-third of the early ward, and in the present (1883) Tammany general committee each precinct has two representatives. From thirty or forty members, the committee has therefore grown to over 1,400, but, instead of representing a majority of the voters of the city, it now controls the votes of a bare third. In the ward, and, later, in the assembly district, the precinct has been, since 1843, the unit of a like organization for ward purposes.

—Theoretically it will be seen that this organization gives representative bodies chosen directly by the voters. Three circumstances, two of them common to all large cities, and the other peculiar to New York, have combined to remove this body from the control of the people. First, voters early abstained from the primaries. This was as much the case in 1830 as in 1880. The delegates to the first national democratic convention were chosen by a larger proportion of office-holders and a smaller number of voters, relative to the voting vote, than attended the primaries whose successive representatives elected the delegates to Cincinnati in 1880. Second, the law never protected these primary meetings from corruption. They began in riot and fraud. Clinton's meetings were regularly mobbed in 1812, and the primaries and meetings of the last decade have been incomparably more orderly, but no less corrupt, than those of previous years. Third, the circumstance that the mayors of New York were at first elected in the spring led to the organization of a general committee at the close of each calendar year in primaries held for this purpose. These primaries, meeting in the ebb between the fall and spring election, never attracted general interest. Tradition and the convenience of politicians have continued them at a season when the average citizen has dismissed politics from his attention, and a brief notice yearly reminds the casual reader that a new Tammany Hall general committee is to be chosen on the last Thursday of the year.

—The general committee, directly representing the ward workers, rapidly relegated the Tammany society to a relatively unimportant position. No careful student of New York politics for the last fifty years, and no one familiar with their actual working for the last fifteen years, can fail to see that the influence of the society has been exaggerated. It has always owned, and, of late years, has controlled by a lease, the hall in which the Tammany organization meets. Tradition and this circumstance render it necessary that the head of the political organization should control a majority of the society. In 1867 the society, and the organization with it, removed from its early quarters (rebuilt in 1860) to its present wigwam on Fourteenth street. Once since then (in 1872) the society closed its doors to the organization. But the organization has existed and acted apart from the society, to which a small share of its members belong. Perhaps no better proof of the local political vitality which accounts for this permanent separate existence without calling in the Tammany society to explain it, could be given than the circumstance that the local republican organization, aided by no society and having no such tie, has maintained its individuality, its existence and its succession for twenty-five years, and, for all practical political purposes, survived its summary reorganization in 1883-4.

—From twenty to thirty years after its organization, the general committee had become an unwieldy body, open to the attacks of mobs, whose riotous proceedings perpetually threw doubt on the validity of the succession, and, what was more important in the eyes of politicians, hopelessly divided the democratic vote. After fifteen years of this condition of affairs, it became plain that the "general committee" was a body as little able to decide the regularity of conflicting ward partisans as the whole body of the faithful in Rome to elect a pope. Shortly after the close of the war, therefore, a new body appeared, reaching its power by slow degrees, in the "committee on organization." This body, at first one, and later two, from each ward or assembly district, secured powers, to carry the analogy a step farther, similar to those of the college of cardinals. Originally a subordinate committee of the general committee, to whom questions of regularity, party discipline and party organization were referred, the committee on organization has come to be the final authority in Tammany Hall. The chairman of this committee is the "boss" of the Hall, and while the committee begins by naming its chairman, the chairman always ends by naming the committee. Its report admits or excludes contesting delegations from the general committee, and the general committee primaries are under the care of its members. The circuit of power is therefore complete, and the downfall of Tweed is the only instance on record of a successful attempt to carry the primaries against a majority of the committee on organization.

—It is possible, if the general committee and the district committees of like character directly made nominations, that the general interest in local politics which renders the voting voter more numerous in New York city than in any city as large, would lead to the genuine popular choice of the general committee. The Tammany Hall organization, however, imposes a third screen between the voter and his vote. All nominations are made by conventions called for this purpose. The mayor, county officers, judges of all varieties, congressmen, senators, assemblymen and aldermen, are each nominated in conventions chosen to suit the occasion. The primaries for these conventions, in theory open to all democrats, are held by the members of the organization which radiates from the chairman of the committee on organization through the general committees to the district committees. These successive transmissions commit the entire organization into the hands of politicians; and Tammany Hall, in theory popular, becomes in practice a well organized and highly disciplined hierarchy of politicians and place-holders, who, in spite of all bolts, control and yearly poll over 50,000 votes, the greater part of whom are directly or indirectly interested in the enormous municipal expenditure of New York city.

—Tammany Hall, during the two periods, in the first of which the general committee was developed, to pass later in the second period under the committee on organization, has shared in every election. Its political history is the political history of New York city, and it is not intended, in briefly sketching the course of the organization, to give more than is needed to make its development plain. The second period of "Tammany" may be considered as extending from the election of C. W. Lawrence as mayor, in 1834, to the crushing defeat of Tammany Hall by Mozart Hall in the election of Fernando Wood, in 1859. This election, the changes of the war and the Tweed ring ended in the Tammany Hall of to-day, and comprise the third period in its history. During the second period, Tammany Hall held the mayoralty for fifteen years out of twenty-five; during the third period, it has held the same office thirteen years out of twenty-four. Measured in this way, the supremacy of Tammany Hall appears to be evenly distributed, but of the last thirteen years seven were under Tweed's mayors, and paved the way for the present position of Tammany Hall as a democratic rump, whose vote has been cast more than once against the party. In the second period, when the Tammany society had been definitely succeeded by the more popular general committee, Tammany Hall was dominant in New York city because it contained the ablest politicians in a city narrowly divided between the whig and democratic voters. Tammany Hall entered its first canvass for mayor, in 1834, liberally supported by the federal patronage of the Jackson administration. The Sixth ward, known later as the "bloody sixth," was then the "office-holders' ward," and included hundreds of the federal employés, who continued to support Tammany Hall until the republican party secured control of the federal government. The whig party had behind it the growing power of the rural vote of the state, organized by Weed and Seward, which elected Seward governor, and changed the face of politics in New York state by transferring the counties of the interior from the democratic to the republican party. Lawrence became mayor by a narrow majority. One year later, in October, 1835, the division between the "loco-foco" or equal rights party and Tammany culminated in the riot which gave the former its name and offered the first proof of the ease with which a large convention could become a mob in a city of a quarter of a million, whose police force was still ten years distant. The alliance between the whig and loco-foco candidates, in 1836, ran through 1837 and 1838, defeating Tammany Hall in these years. The election of J. L. Varian, Tammany, in 1839, began a period of success which lasted until 1844, when James Harper, an American candidate, defeated Tammany Hall. With the election of W. T. Havemeyer, in 1845, the modern period of the city began. Its waterworks were completed, its police organized, and the influence of patronage and public works increased. With them, the prizes of local municipal life multiplied, and in the period from 1845 to 1853 the second of the great feuds in Tammany Hall opened between the "hards" and "softs." The two factions stood in a way for the "hunker" and "barn-burner" factions of the state democracy; but without entering into their state and national relations, the two factions grew out of the struggles in the local organization over nominations and the "regular" succession. The "hards" represented the office-holding faction; and when, in August, 1853, they were mobbed in Tammany Hall by the "softs," the chairman of the former was the collector of the port, Augustus Schell. A year later, Fernando Wood, who had successfully organized a "soft" machine, captured the primaries of the "hards," and secured a united nomination for mayor. The "adamantine" "hards" at once seceded from Tammany Hall, and organized at the Stuyvesant Institute, defeating the regular democratic candidate for governor, Horatio Seymour, by a bolt, precisely as Lucius Robinson was defeated by a like bolt in 1879.

—For nearly ten years, from 1853 to 1863, the struggle between the opposing factions continued. The quarrel had practically begun in 1852, and the national conventions of 1852 and 1856 were asked to pass upon its merits. Every democratic state convention had contesting delegations before it, and every city election saw the democratic vote divided by the presence of two tickets, both claiming regularity. It would be idle to go into the details of these contests. Fernando Wood retained his control over the regular organization until 1857, when the contest was transferred to the Tammany society in its first and last attempt to decide the regularity of two opposing factions. The result proved the attempt futile. Wood was defeated in the society, retained the organization, secured the regular nomination and was beaten, 1858, by Daniel F. Tiemann. The Tammany society, under its new sachems, excluded his general committee, and Wood seceded to Mozart Hall and was elected mayor in 1859 over the Tammany candidate, W. T. Havemeyer. Two years later, the split still continued, and a republican, George Opdyke, was chosen major. In 1863 Tammany was again defeated by the election of C. Godfrey Gunther, an independent democrat, over Frank Boole, who had received the Tammany and Mozart Hall nomination.

—These successive defeats made necessary the change in policy and organization already described. The lavish expenditure which Fernando Wood had begun was resumed at the close of the war by W. M. Tweed. The ring, of which he was the conspicuous figure, combined with the corruption whose story has been so often told, a reorganization of Tammany Hall and the introduction of a sharp and summary discipline carried on by the committee on organization which promptly excluded objectors. The change altered the character of Tammany Hall. The loose and floating body of voters became a standing army of mercenary voters, which might suffer defeat, but never altogether lost its organization or left any question as to the regularity of its succession. John T. Hoffman was elected mayor by Tammany Hall in 1865, re-elected in 1867, and succeeded, on his own election as governor, by A. Oakey Hall, who held office past the defeat of the Tweed ring in 1871, until, in 1872, W. T. Havemeyer was chosen mayor on a citizens' ticket. The sack of the city treasury went on during this period without pause or check. The operations of the ring added over $100,000,000 to the bonded debt of the city, doubled its annual expenditure, and cost tax payers, to take the best approximate estimates, first and last, at least $160,000,000, or four times the fine levied on Paris by the German army. Many causes combined to render this gigantic devastation possible; but all combined could scarcely have compassed this plunder, if Tammany Hall itself had not been reorganized and converted into a standing army of voters encamped in New York city, obeying a single head and able to exclude all dissension from its ranks.

—This organization, without its old opportunities and without its old flagrant corruption, but still a body living on politics, survived Tweed, and after various changes passed, in 1873, under the control of John Kelly, who has remained its head for ten years. Tweed's purposes rendered an alliance with the democracy of the state indispensable. When that was lost, he went to the penitentiary. To John Kelly, this connection was not necessary. Tammany Hall, in 1874, elected W. H. Wickham, and, in 1876, chose Smith Ely. The personal honesty of its leader, the recent fall and punishment of Tweed, and the growth of an independent vote, led to nominations far above the average of past years. In 1878 successive secessions from Tammany Hall left it in a minority, and Edward Cooper was elected mayor by a combination between republicans and democrats in sympathy and full party communion with the state democracy. In 1879, when the state democracy nominated Lucius Robinson as governor, John Kelly was run as a bolting democratic candidate. This completed the isolation of Tammany Hall. The long series of steps by which a social organization with political purposes had become developed into an organized body of voters, acting for its own purposes, independent of all principle but plunder and all aim but office, was at last completed.

TALCOTT WILLIAMS.

TANEY

TANEY, Roger Brooke, was born in Calvert county, Md., March 17, 1777, and died at Washington city, Oct. 12, 1864. He was graduated at Dickinson college in 1795, was admitted to the bar in 1799, and became attorney general of Maryland in 1827, and attorney general of the United States in 1831. In the following year he was appointed secretary of the treasury (see DEPOSITS, REMOVAL OF); but his nomination was not sent to the senate until the service for which he had been selected was performed, and then the senate refused to confirm it. Jackson then appointed him to the supreme court bench, and the senate again refused to confirm him. In 1836, the whigs having lost control of the senate, Jackson appointed him to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Chief Justice Marshall, and the senate confirmed the appointment. He filled the office until his death. His most interesting opinions, in a political point of view, were those given in the Dred Scott case (see that title) and the Merriman case. (See HABEAS CORPUS.)

—Tyler's Life of Taney, 195 foll., makes it evident that Taney, in removing the deposits, acted from a sense of duty, and not from political motives. In the same work, p. 578 foll., is a supplementary opinion in the Dred Scott case, which will at least show Taney's honesty of belief. His opinion in the Merriman case was upheld by the supreme court, after the rebellion was ended, in the Milligan case. See, contra, 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 253; 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 524; Giddings' History of the Rebellion, 403; The Unjust Judge.

A. J.

TARIFFS OF THE UNITED STATES.

TARIFFS OF THE UNITED STATES. The theory of tariff taxation has been discussed in this work in the article CUSTOMS DUTIES. The subject of the present article is merely what has been done in the way of tariff legislation in the United States; and mention can be made only of the more important acts, without any attempt to explain all the motives which led to their enactments, or the manifold results that have followed their adoption and administration. And, first, as to the power of congress to impose tariffs. Under the confederation the states retained the taxing power, and left the central body, the congress of the confederation, without any direct means of defraying whatever expenses the necessities of war compelled it to contract. Some attempts were made to secure for it an independent revenue, but they came to naught. On the return of peace, while still maintaining the form of a confederacy, the states, no longer united by a common danger, became, to a great extent, independent, and each managed its concerns with little regard to the interests of the others. Massachusetts had a navigation act, and levied import duties, and other states followed her example. The restrictions and prohibitions imposed on American commerce were vexatious and destructive, and while the congress had power to enter into treaties of reciprocity, it could not retaliate in any way were its offers of trade refused. The power to do this rested in the states individually, but in spite of many propositions to this effect, no uniform or decisive action on their part could be brought about. From 1783 until the adoption of the federal constitution it was generally recognized that congress should have the power to regulate commercial relations between the states and foreign powers, but the supposed interests of the different states presented an effectual bar against action. "The agitators for the regulation of trade in Virginia belonged to that class of the community which in the eastern and middle states was most bitterly set against the measure. In Massachusetts and New York the merchants were the supporters, and the farmers the opponents. In Virginia the planters were to a man united in the opinion that some steps must be taken to mend commercial affairs, and the merchants quite disposed to let trade alone. The reason is obvious. The condition of things to the south of the Potomac was precisely the reverse of the condition of things to the north of the Potomac. Beyond the north bank of the river the farmers throve, and the merchants did a losing business. Beyond the south bank the merchants were daily growing more prosperous, and the planters more impoverished." (1 McMaster, 272.) The agitation over this question first assumed a definite form in Virginia, and led up to the national trade convention held at Annapolis in 1786, out of which movement arose the federal convention of 1787, which resulted in the framing of the constitution, and the foundation of a central government possessing definite and important functions, and clothed with the power necessary to perform them.

—It would, however, be an error to attribute this action wholly to the commercial needs of the country. The states had just passed through an era of paper money madness, in which each state had vied with the others in excessive issues, with the intention of allowing their inhabitants deeply immersed in debt to free themselves from such burdens. This alone was sufficient to create general poverty, and armed rebellions did occur in many quarters. Manufactures were beginning to arise in New England, and served to turn attention to the development of the internal resources of the country. The jealousies existing among the states had only aggravated the evils arising from mismanaged finances, and in the general scramble for vantage the many restrictions and limitations imposed hindered that industrial growth which, it was confidently believed, would restore prosperity. The folly of thus contending among themselves was seen by the clear headed, and the remedy they believed adequate was an extension of the power of the confederation. The debts contracted by the congress were about to fall due, but the confederation was without resources, and without credit. New York had expressed a willingness to grant to it power to levy duties on imports. Rufus King made a very able report to congress, in which he concluded that the impost was an absolute necessity to the maintenance of the faith of the federal government. While thus agitating for an independent revenue, the government did not cease to urge upon the states the disordered condition of trade and finances, and the advisableness of granting to congress the power to regulate trade. But while commercial reasons were thus at the bottom of the movement, political reasons, quite as cogent, existed in favor of a new distribution of powers, and the action of these two forces, combined, produced the constitution.

—By this important instrument the new government was empowered to levy taxes of every description, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. In connection with our subject it will be important to bear these two powers in mind, as the one has been made an instrument of the other. The right to levy duties upon imported commodities was conceded, and the only limitation imposed upon its exercise was that the duties should be uniform throughout the land. The question then arises whether the government ought to lay taxes for any other purpose than to raise revenue, which involves the question whether congress may lay taxes to protect and encourage manufactures. The arguments for and against this use of the taxing power will be found in Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," §§ 959-973, and are summed up as follows: "So that, whichever construction of the power to lay taxes is adopted, the same conclusion is sustained, that the power to lay taxes is not by the constitution confined to purposes of revenue. In point of fact, it has never been limited to such purposes by congress; and all the great functionaries of the government have constantly maintained the doctrine that it was not constitutionally so limited." It was customary to regulate trade by taxing imports, and this practice was acted upon by all nations at that time. Retaliatory duties were recognized as a proper exercise of power, even when they produced no revenue, and duties primarily intended for revenue purposes might incidentally afford protection to manufactures. The colonies always recognized the right of England to regulate their commerce; but when parliament undertook to levy taxes for another end, they revolted. It might further be said that every civilized nation at that time considered that the power to regulate commerce included the encouragement of manufactures, and acted upon this belief. Some of the states had already adopted regulations which were intended to give such encouragement to their industries, although this encouragement was secured at the expense of the other states; and in ceding this power to make such laws to the general government, it was claimed that the states had expected a continuance of this recognized policy. So that the weight of opinion was in favor of the right to regulate commerce by import duties or other taxes, and chiefly on the ground that the power was generally exercised among nations. From the very first, then, a tariff has been recognized as a measure for raising revenue, for protecting and encouraging domestic manufactures, and as an instrument for regulating commerce. (Story, Comm., §§ 1077-1095.)

—But the conditions which favored these views at the time the constitution was adopted no longer exist, and a very different set of circumstances has arisen to alter in a great measure the opinions on the tax power of the government. At the end of the eighteenth century it was not strange to find the power to regulate trade and commerce with foreign nations granted to congress. Nothing was more natural; for at that time the fiscal and commercial policies of nations were governed by the maxim that no trading or commercial people could ever prosper without regulation of trade, and the more their transactions were regulated by law the higher would be the resulting economic well-being of the country. Regulation however, meant interference and restrictions. Innumerable laws are found on the statute books of nearly every nation that had any trade whatever, which were intended to foster and develop domestic manufactures and domestic commerce. Loans and important immunities were granted by the state to encourage the investment of capital in industrial enterprises; premiums, bounties and drawbacks were offered to producers and exporters; the importation of the raw materials of industry, and the export of manufactured products were unnaturally encouraged; while the importation of such commodities as would come into competition with domestic articles was discouraged by high customs duties, or was even expressly prohibited; the exportation of machinery and the emigration of skilled labor were forbidden under severe penalties; and through discriminating and retaliatory duties a species of commercial war was waged among nations. In fact, the whole system of trade was founded upon regulation, and was to that extent artificial and strained. And in no instance was this result more evident than in the commercial relations which subsisted between a parent country and her colonies, in which all the advantage lay on one side. The American colonies had known no other trading system, and, therefore, believed that the adoption of the same illiberal laws was essential to their existence as an independent power. Their weakness invited insult and harsh laws from other nations; and while one of their first acts after the return of peace was to seek for commercial treaties with European powers, they also sought to protect their commerce with the instruments that were then everywhere employed.

—All of this has changed. As the laws of trade were examined it was seen that they were natural laws, and that any interference with their free play was mischievous, and, instead of creating, destroyed commerce. The suicidal policy of taxing one's self in order to ward off an imaginary danger, became clearer to practical statesmen; and the old theory, that what one nation gains must be at the expense of another, has given way to a more just and accurate view that believes in leaving trade alone, to be governed by an enlightened self-interest. In spite, however, of this change of feeling, the United States has persisted in continuing along the old ruts, and has only two or three times shown any disposition to accept the truths that modern political economy has enunciated and is enforcing in spite of human laws to the contrary. But the inevitable is being enforced at a fearful cost to the people who have not recognized the true principles of trade and adapted their transactions to them. And the high industrial position which the United States holds at this time (1883) is in spite of restrictions, and not in consequence of them.

—No sooner had the first congress met than a measure for taxing imports was introduced by Mr. Madison (April 8, 1789) for the purpose of giving some resources to the almost empty treasury. The measure proposed was extremely simple in its character, being intended as a temporary expedient, and enumerated rum and other spirituous liquors, wines, teas, coffee, sugar, molasses and pepper, as subjects for specific duties, while ad valorem duties were to be levied upon all other articles. The first debate at once disclosed a difference of opinion as to whether or not the tariff should be made protective in its character, but it was not for some years after this that the constitutional power of the government to lay duties for protection was called in question. The difference of opinion we have just noted has continued until to-day, and must always continue so long as a tariff is imposed. Those who favored a protective tariff could however point to existing industries, and claim that they were "infant" industries, requiring a protection against foreign competition. But at once the conflict of interests appeared. Massachusetts wished a duty on rum in order to protect her producers, but objected to one on molasses. Pennsylvania asked for protection to her iron and steel industries, but the southern states, which were chiefly agricultural, were opposed to granting it. The duty on hemp was favored by the south but urged by the north, and so on through the list, hardly one item of which was not opposed on sectional grounds, that the benefits would accrue to certain states and at the cost of the other states. The bill was finally completed, and adopted as a protective measure, but it was so only in name. The preamble read: "Whereas it is necessary for the support of the government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid," etc.; and in the whole history of tariff legislation in this country it is the only law which was thus openly passed for protection to American industry. For prudential reasons this form of preamble was changed, and tariff enactments have on their face since been for the purposes of revenue only. This tariff became a law on July 4, 1789, and was to remain in force until June, 1796. The average duty levied under it was equivalent to an ad valorem rate of 8½ per cent.; and it was thought that this was too high a general scale of taxation, and would result in encouraging smuggling. As this act formed the foundation of our tariff system, we will give the duties imposed: distilled spirits, of Jamaica proof, 10 cents per gallon; other distilled spirits, 8 cents; molasses, 2½ cents; Madeira wine, 18 cents; other wines, 10 cents; beer, ale, and porter, in casks, 5 cents per gallon; in bottles, 20 cents per dozen; bottled cider, the same; malt, 10 cents per bushel; brown sugar, 1 cent per lb.; loaf sugar, 3 cents; other sugars, 2½ cents; coffee, 2½ cents, cocoa, 1 cent; teas from China and India, in American vessels, ranged from 6 to 20 cents per lb, and in foreign vessels some what higher; candles, from 2 to 6 cents per lb; cheese, 4 cents; soap, 2 cents; boots, per pair, 50 cents; shoes, from 7 to 10 cents, according to material; cables and tarred cordage, 75 cents per cwt.; untarred cordage, 90 cents; twine and pack thread, $2; unwrought steel, 50 cents per cwt.; nails and spikes, 1 cent per lb.; salt, 6 cents per bushel; manufactured tobacco, 6 cents per lb.; indigo, 16 cents per lb; wool and cotton cards, 50 cents per dozen; coal 2 cents per bushel; pickled fish, 75 cents per barrel; dried fish, 50 cents per quintal; playing cards, 10 cents per pack; hemp, 60 cents per cwt.; cotton, 3 cents per lb. In addition to these specific duties, an ad valorem duty of 10 per cent. was imposed on glass of all kinds (black quart bottles excepted), china, stone, and earthenware, gunpowder, paints, shoe and knee buckles, and gold and silver lace and leaf; 7½ per cent. ad valorem was charged upon blank books, paper, cabinet wares, leather, ready-made clothing, hats, gloves, millinery, canes, brushes, gold and silver and plated ware and jewelry, buttons, saddles, slit and rolled iron, and castings of iron, anchors, tin and pewter ware. Upon all other articles, including manufactures of wool, cotton and linen, 5 per cent. ad valorem was to be charged, except on saltpetre, tin, lead, old pewter, brass, iron and brass wire, copper in plates, wool, dyestuffs, hides and furs, to be free of duty. Such was the first tariff, and such was the entering wedge of the protective system.

—Between the tariff of 1789 and that of 1816, which marks the second important step in the tariff legislation of the country, there were passed upward of seventeen acts affecting the rate of duties, and the tendency was ever toward higher rates. The most important event of this period was the preparation of Hamilton's famous report upon manufactures, which contained the earliest formulation of protective principles that is to be met with in our legislative history, and still remains the source of protectionist argument. It would be impossible even to briefly summarize in this place this important contribution to tariff history, but the conditions under which it was written were, as I have already stated, peculiar, and many of his doctrines, if not indeed the whole basis of his reasoning, have been swept away by subsequent events. For the protection he advocated was justified chiefly by the fiscal restrictions of other nations. "The restrictive regulations," he says, "which, in foreign markets, abridge the vent of the increasing surplus of our agricultural produce, serve to beget an earnest desire that a more extensive demand for the surplus may be created at home. * * If the system of perfect liberty to industry and commerce were the prevailing system of nations, the arguments which dissuade a country in the predicament of the United States from the zealous pursuit of manufactures, would doubtless have great force. * * But the system which has been mentioned is far from characterizing the general policy of nations. The prevalent one has been regulated by an opposite spirit. The consequence of it is, that the United States are, to a certain extent, in the situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce. They can indeed, without difficulty, obtain from abroad the manufactured supplies of which they are in want; but they experience numerous and very injurious impediments to emission and vent of their own commodities. Nor is this the case in reference to a single foreign nation only. The regulations of several countries with which we have the most extensive intercourse, throw serious obstacles in the way of the principal staples of the United States. In such a position of things the United States can not exchange with Europe on equal terms; and the want of reciprocity would render them the victim of a system which should induce them to confine their views to agriculture, and refrain from manufactures. A constant and increasing necessity, on their part, for the commodities of Europe, and only a partial and occasional demand for their own, in return, could not but expose them to a state of impoverishment, compared with the opulence to which their political and natural advantages authorize them to aspire." A tariff was thus, in Hamilton's view, an instrument of compensation and retaliation rather than a purely protective measure in the sense in which protection is viewed at the present day; and it is needless to add, that Hamilton's view has little force now when the greater number of restrictions upon commerce that existed when he wrote have been removed. A like stand was taken by Jefferson in 1793, when he advocated countervailing foreign restrictions in case they could not be removed by negotiation.

—The wars in Europe tended at first toward a more liberal system of commerce, and the merchants of this country benefited largely by it. Some moderate increase in the rates of duties were from time to some granted, but no real demand for protection until the return of peace in 1801, when the old restrictive system was re-enacted by Europe. This peace was, however, of short duration, and on the resumption of hostilities the commerce of this country was so seriously involved as to create a demand for retaliation. In 1805 the importation of British manufactures was prohibited; a few years later the Berlin decrees of Napoleon and the orders in council of England practically closed the ports of Europe to neutral vessels, and American ship owners suffered greatly. As a measure of retaliation an embargo law was passed in 1807, which was followed by non-intercourse laws. The heroic remedy involved in these measures was equivalent to cutting off a leg to cure a corn, and, together with the commercial war which ensued, worked a revolution in American economy. Prevented from obtaining their usual supplies from Europe, our people began to manufacture on their own account, rendered sure of a market by the war, and also by a doubling in all tariff duties, which was done in 1812 as a war measure. But a return of peace threatened to do away with this artificial situation, in which many factors were combining to stimulate the beginnings of industry, and this the manufacturers clearly recognized. In February, 1816, Mr. Dallas, the secretary of the treasury, made a report to congress on the tariff, and the committee on commerce and manufactures laid before the house a report in which a protective policy was strongly urged. One month later Mr. Lowndes reported a bill from the committee of ways and means. Mr. Calhoun said in the course of debate that the capital formerly employed in commerce had by the war been turned into manufactures. "This, if things continue as they are, will be its direction. It will introduce a new era in our affairs, in many respects highly advantageous, and ought to be countenanced by the government. * * He then said, that war alone furnished sufficient stimulus, and perhaps too much, as it would make their growth unnaturally rapid; but that, on the return of peace, it would then be time for us to show our affection for them. But it will no doubt be said, if they are so far established, and if the situation of the country is so favorable to their growth, Where is the necessity of affording them protection? It is to put them beyond the reach of contingency. Besides, capital is not yet, and can not for some time be, adjusted to the new state of things. There is, in fact, from the operation of temporary causes, a great pressure on these establishments. They had extended so rapidly during the late war, that many, he feared, were without the requisite surplus of capital or skill to meet the present crisis. Should such prove to be the fact, it would give a backset, and might, to a great extent, endanger their ultimate success. Should the present owners be ruined, and the workmen dispersed and turned to other pursuits, the country would sustain a great loss. Such would, no doubt, be the fact to a considerable extent, if not protected." (Works, vol. ii., p. 169.) This utterance is very significant as coming from a southern man. In fact, in this instance it was the south that favored, and the north that opposed, protection; and Webster always referred to the tariff of 1816 as a South Carolina measure. (Works, vol. iii., pp. 297, 502.) Very little of the long debate that followed on the bill has been preserved; the measure passed the house by a vote of 88 to 54, and the senate by one of 25 to 7. It became a law April 27, 1816.

—This tariff not only marked the introduction of an entirely new principle, being intended as a protective tariff in fact as well as in name, but there was also a tendency to adopt, as far as possible, specific duties. There was also introduced what was called the minimum principle, which was in effect a specific duty. Thus, the duty upon cotton goods was 25 per cent., but all goods that cost less than twenty-five cents per yard were to be deemed to have cost twenty-five cents, on which the duty at 25 per cent. would amount to six and one-fourth cents, so that the minimum duty which could be paid on cottons was six and one-fourth cents per yard. Still, little was accomplished by the measure. It was intended to break the fall of the manufacturers, taking them gradually down stairs instead of throwing them out of the window. But the enormous importations even under the new rates of duties, while it filled the public treasury, produced a revulsion in the markets of a country already disturbed and impoverished by the effects of the war. A period of speculation was entered upon, and it was greatly aided and its results aggravated by the excessive issues of paper money. "The new tariff did not have the anticipated effect in aiding manufactures; on the other hand, by tempting larger investments in the hope of anticipated profits, it increased the competition, while it dilated the circle of manufacturing interests. The capital of New England went more decidedly into that branch of industry, so much so that the voice of New England began now to be decidedly on the side of protection. There is no doubt but that competition had much to do with the continued alleged distress of the manufacturers," a distress that was augmented by depressed markets and the debilitating effects of the war. The cry arose that more protection was needed, that British manufacturers were in league against American industry, and naturally ended in an organized movement for higher duties, in spite of the mass of evidence offered that they would, if granted, only produce more competition and a more complex but artificial condition of industry. The crisis of 1819 materially aided the protectionists, who may now be recognized as a party, and having an organ in Niles' "Weekly Register." "National interests and domestic manufactures" were taken up as a war cry, and societies for the promotion of domestic industry were formed in many states. These from time to time held conventions, and formulated long addresses to the people, in which the hard times, the fiendishness of the British government and of British manufacturers, and the necessity of higher duties and more protection, were set forth in terms calculated to make the blood of every American boil.

—This led up to an attempt in 1820 to pass a high tariff measure, and to do away with the credit system, which then applied to imports, and was the forerunner of the modern warehouse system. Auctions, by which it was claimed that the country was flooded with foreign goods to the detriment of domestic manufactures, were to be taxed, in order that the number and transactions might be diminished. Had the national finances permitted such a reduction in revenue from customs, the tariff measure would have prohibited the importation of iron, cottons and woolens, to such an extent had the protective sentiment grown among a very small but influential party. The main support, however, for any further modification in rates lay in the maintenance by foreign nations of their restrictions upon trade. The most important increase applied to cottons and woolens. That on woolens was in retaliation of the higher duties which England imposed upon wools, and which threatened to entirely exclude American wools from the English markets. France heavily taxed our cotton. A further grievance lay in the high duties imposed by European nations upon wheat, which was an important article of export. Discriminating duties on cotton brought from beyond the Cape of Good Hope were favored, because it was claimed those countries consumed none of our raw materials, afforded no market for our produce, employed none of our labor, and exhausted our specie. No act, however, was passed, and no change was made until 1824, when a general tariff measure became a law.

—The commercial and industrial condition had remained much depressed since the crisis of 1819, which had resulted from overtrading and reckless banking. According to Mr. Clay (speech, March, 1824), the general distress of the country was indicated "by the diminished exports of native produce; by the depressed and reduced state of our foreign navigation; by our diminished commerce; by successive unthreshed crops of grain, perishing in our barns and barn yards for the want of a market; by the alarming diminution of the circulating medium; by the numerous bankruptcies, not limited to the trading classes, but extending to all orders of society, by a universal complaint of the want of employment, and a consequent reduction of the wages of labor; by the ravenous pursuit after public situations, not for the sake of their honors and the performance of their public duties, but as a means of private subsistence; by the reluctant resort to the perilous use of paper money; by the intervention of legislation in the delicate relation between debtor and creditor; and, above all, by the low and depressed state of the value of almost every description of the whole mass of the property of the nation." He therefore thought it a fitting time to introduce a "genuine American policy," the object of which was to create a home market for the produce of American labor, and, it may be added, a policy that would directly afford relief to manufactures only. Mr. Webster made a most masterly speech in reply, in the course of which he questioned the universal distress of the country as depicted by Mr. Clay, while admitting the depression, and said, "when we talk, therefore, of protecting industry, let us remember that the first measure for that end is to secure it in its earnings; to assure it that it shall receive its own. Before we invent new modes of raising prices, let us take care that existing prices are not rendered wholly unavailable by making them capable of being paid in depreciated paper." As the presidential election was then depending, political matters were dragged into the debates, and now for the first time it was seriously questioned whether congress had the constitutional power to pass a measure purely for protection, and not as a revenue act. The debates in the house lasted more than ten weeks, and then the bill passed by only a majority of five votes, several of the members being brought into the hall on their sick couches in order that their votes might not be lost. In the senate it commanded a majority of four votes. It could not be regarded as a political measure, nor yet as a party question. Adams, Clay and Jackson, all voted for it; the southern states were dissatisfied with the result, as was also New England. But as iron, wool, hemp and sugar received protection, a combination of the western and middle states received sufficient support to pass the bill. The average rate of duties under the law of May 22, 1824, was 37 per cent.

—Those who supposed that the protectionists would be contented with their victory were much mistaken. No sooner was the tariff of 1824 gained, when an agitation for higher duties was begun, the general depression and the illiberal commercial policies of other nations being the main pretexts. A change, however, was taking place in England, which in a measure compelled the protectionists to seek new reasons for their movement. The trade between the United States and the West Indies had been the cause of much retaliatory legislation on the part of Great Britain and this country since 1815; but in spite of restrictions and prohibitions a profitable though illegal commerce was maintained by American merchants. The measures adopted by the English parliament had not only aroused our congress, but had given rise to threats of retaliation on the part of other European nations. Mr. Huskisson, then president of the English board of trade, was wise enough to recognize the necessity of a change in commercial policy, and inaugurated his system of reciprocity in 1823, which was carried into effect in the following year. This marks the first breach made in England's protective system, and logically led up to the repeal of the corn laws and the abolition of all protective duties, so that at the very time that England was throwing open her ports and removing the restrictions that were imposed on her commerce, the United States was preparing to increase the tariff and raise higher the barriers which were intended to limit her foreign trade.

—In 1825 a financial crisis occurred, which was caused by a great expansion in the paper circulation, and was precipitated by extensive failures in London. This gave the protectionists an opportunity to attribute the distress to the operation of the tariff of 1824. The importations were large; and, owing to changes in the English customs by which important advantages were gained by the English manufacturers, it was argued that the woolen industry, which had grown enormously since the peace, encouraged by the federal legislation, would be ruined unless further protection was afforded. This indicated a marked change in policy, as Prof. Sumner points out. Formerly the "American system" meant retaliation to force a foreign nation to break down its protective system; it was now an instrument to countervail and offset any foreign legislation, even in the direction of freedom and reform or advance in civilization, if that legislation favored the American consumer. (Life of Jackson, pp. 196, 198.)

—Another marked change of opinion was now seen. New England had heretofore opposed protection as hostile to her commercial interests. Manufactures were now springing up in those states, and had made such progress as to create a revulsion in public sentiment; and in 1826 a petition went up from Boston, praying for higher duties on woolens in order to protect this important industry in New England. In 1827 a bill to increase the duties on woolens passed the house, but failed to become a law. Even Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, a good protectionist, was opposed to it, "as prohibitive in its nature, and in no shape one for revenue. He had voted for the protection upon woolens in 1824, but that was no reason why he should favor the prohibition now proposed." "Politics ran very high on this bill. In fact, they quite superseded all the economic interests. * * Passion began now to enter into tariff discussion, not only on the part of the southerners, but also between the wool men and the woolen men, each of whom thought the other grasping, and that each was to be defeated in his purpose by the other." (Sumner.) The rejection of the measure, however, only served to increase the efforts of its friends. A convention of wool growers and manufacturers was held in July, 1827, at Harrisburg, and the iron, glass, wool, woolen, hemp and flax interests were represented, and asked to be recognized in any scheme of protection. The presidential election was to occur in the next year, and the tariff was made a leading issue. The sectional feeling was being strongly developed. The planting states of the south became more determined to resist a policy which they regarded as benefiting the north at their expense, and the north and east became more urgent in demanding a continuance of a system which, they alleged, had tempted their capital into investments that must inevitably be ruined, unless the protective policy was not only maintained, but extended. The secretary of the treasury, Mr. Rush, took up the question in his report, and claimed, that, as the land laws of the country protected agriculture, at least a like amount of protection should be given to industry. (See article on PUBLIC LANDS in this volume, p. 472.)

—A tariff bill was drawn up by Silas Wright, of New York, and he defended its protective features on the ground that "it was intended to turn the manufacturing capital of the country to the working up of domestic raw material, and not foreign raw materials." What followed can best be described in the words of Prof. Sumner: "Mallary tried to introduce those propositions [of the Harrisburg convention] as amendments on the floor of the house. All the interests, industrial and political, pounced upon the bill to try to amend it to their notions. New England and the Adams men wanted high duties on woolens and cottons, and low duties on wool, iron, hemp, salt and molasses (the raw material of rum). Pennsylvania, Ohio and Kentucky wanted high taxes on iron, wool, hemp, molasses (protection to whisky), and low taxes on woolens and cottons. The southerners wanted low taxes on everything, but especially on finished goods, and if there were to be heavy taxes on these latter they did not care how heavy the taxes on the raw materials were made. * * The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish special interests was an economic monstrosity." The legislature of South Carolina protested against the bill, but it passed by a vote of 105 to 74. Mr. Wilde moved to amend the title by adding the words "and for the encouragement of domestic manufactures," a motion that was opposed by Mr. Randolph, because he said domestic manufactures were those carried on in the families of farmers, and "this bill was to rob and plunder one-half of the Union for the benefit of the residue." Mr. Drayton also moved to change the title so that it might read "in order to increase the profits of certain manufactures." The tariff of 1828 become known as the "tariff of abominations." It was the immediate cause of the nullification movement. (See NULLIFICATION.)

—In her protest against the tariff law of 1828 South Carolina spoke of it as "in violation of state rights, and a usurpation by congress of powers not granted to it by the constitution; that the power to encourage domestic industry is inconsistent with the idea of any other than a consolidated government; that the power to protect manufactures is nowhere granted to congress, but, on the other hand, is reserved to the states; that, if it had the power, yet a tariff grossly unequal and oppressive is such an abuse of that power as is incompatible with a free government; that the interests of South Carolina are agricultural, and to cut off her foreign market, and confine her products to an inadequate home market, is to reduce her to poverty. For these and other reasons the state protests against the tariff as unconstitutional, oppressive and unjust." North Carolina also protested against the law, and Alabama and Georgia denied the power of congress to lay duties for protection. In 1829 the feeling in the southern states was very strong against the tariff, and threats of nullification and secession were freely made. In 1830 the tariff was more strictly enforced in spite of a movement looking to reductions in the rates of duties, and in the following year a free trade convention was convened at Philadelphia, and the protectionists met in New York. Addresses to congress were issued by each faction, and the next session of congress was full of the tariff. The president had recommended a revision in his message, and the discontent of the south became more and more apparent. Two bills were prepared by the committee of ways and means, and a third was presented by the committee on manufactures; the secretary of the treasury had his bill, and the senate compiled the fifth measure. The result was the passage of a bill which maintained all of the protective features of the tariff of 1828 while reducing or abolishing many of the revenue taxes. The tax on iron was reduced, that on cottons was unchanged, and that on woolens was increased, while some of the raw wools were made free of duty. This measure was passed on July 14, 1832, in November a convention in South Carolina declared the acts of 1828 and 1832 null and void in that state. The president issued his proclamation against nullification, and in his annual message advocated as early a reduction of duties to the revenue standard as a just regard to the faith of the government, and to the preservation of the large capital invested in establishments of domestic industry, might permit. In January, 1833, a bill to enforce the revenue laws was reported to congress. The state legislatures took a part in the controversy. Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina condemned the tariff as unconstitutional, while New Hampshire passed resolutions in favor of reducing the tariff to the revenue standard. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey and Pennsylvania thought that the tariff ought not to be reduced. In February Mr. Clay introduced a measure that was intended as a substitute for all tariff bills then pending, and looked toward a gradual reduction in duties: of all duties which were over 20 per cent. by the act of 1832, one-tenth of the excess over 20 per cent. was to be struck off after September, 1835, and one-tenth each alternate year thereafter until 1841. As first drawn the preamble stated that, after March, 1840, all duties should be equal, "and solely for the purpose and with the intent of providing such revenue as may be necessary to an economical expenditure by the government, without regard to the protection or encouragement of any branch of domestic industry whatever." The enforcing and tariff acts were carried through together. This was the famous "compromise" tariff, and was followed by a repeal on the part of South Carolina of the nullification law. "This tariff," says Sumner, in his "History of American Currency," "was deceptive and complicated. It had no principle of economic science at its root—neither protection, nor free trade. It was patched up as a concession, although it really made very little, and its provisions were so intricate and contradictory that it produced little revenue. Specific duties were unaffected by it, and these included books, paper, glass and sugar. It did not run its course without important modifications in favor of protection, for it could not bind future congresses, and the doctrine of the horizontal rate of 20 per cent.—a doctrine which had no scientific basis—produced an increase on many articles." Elsewhere the same writer speaks of it as a "pure political makeshift," in which the public and private interests had no consideration." (Mr. Benton, in his "Thirty Years in the United States Senate," has several chapters on this measure, which should be consulted.)

—The four years after 1833 were marked by great speculation, which was chiefly directed toward schemes of internal improvement, and culminated in the crisis of 1837. The depression that naturally followed was made use of by protectionists, and hard times, produced by low duties and insufficient protection, was again a prominent cry. In spite of the fact that in 1836 the government was in a position to distribute a large surplus revenue among the states, in 1838 it stood in need of a larger income. The compromise bill had guaranteed that after 1842 the highest duty levied should not exceed 20 per cent. except in case of war, and in order to maintain this guarantee a 20 per cent. duty was levied upon many new commodities, but without producing the requisite increase of revenue. In 1841 a home league was formed, the purpose of which was to agitate for high duties, and the president's message gave an opportunity for a general discussion of the subject in congress. A provisional tariff bill, by which the operations of the existing tariff were to be continued until August, 1842, passed the house, but in the senate was amended by a proviso postponing the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands until the same date. The president vetoed it, on the ground that it abrogated the provisions of the "compromise act," and for other reasons. Congress did not pass the measure over the president's veto, but incorporated the same proviso respecting distribution into a general tariff law, which suffered the same fate. The president objected to it, first, on the ground that the bill united two subjects which, so far from having any affinity to one another, were wholly incongruous in their character, as it was both a revenue and an appropriation bill; secondly the treasury being in a state of extreme embarrassment, the bill proposed to give away a fruitful source of revenue, a proceeding which he regarded as being highly impolitic, if not unconstitutional; and thirdly, because it was also in violation of what was intended to be inviolable as a compromise in relation to the tariff system. A general tariff act was passed without the obnoxious clause, and was a return to protection. The average rate of duty levied upon dutiable imports was about 33 per cent., and the principle of "home valuations," which had been adopted in the compromise tariff, was dropped. In 1844 Mr. Polk became president, and, as a southern man, it was expected that he would advocate a policy other than protective as a basis for tariff revision.

—It will now be convenient to note some of the changes in circumstances that had occurred since 1825. Up to that time, as I have already said, the main object of the tariff was to countervail the restrictive commercial policy of other nations. It was an instrument for retaliation, by which it was hoped that concessions could be wrung from those countries with which we might have commercial relations. "To all the powers that wish 'free trade,' we say, Let free trade be; to all that will restrict us, we say, Let restriction be." So wrote that ardent protectionist, Niles, in 1826. Now, however, when England was preparing to mitigate the many limitations and restrictions that she had imposed upon her foreign commerce, it was claimed that her action would prove of injury to American interests, industrial and commercial, and that we must increase our restrictions in order that these interests might not suffer, but be amply protected. When Great Britain reduced the tariff on wools, a commodity that congress had more highly taxed in 1824, Mr. Everett said, "Unless the American people think it just and fair that the laws passed by the American congress for the protection of American industry should be repealed by the British parliament, and that for the purpose of securing the supply of our market to the British manufacturer to the end of time, it was the duty of congress to counteract this movement," and again, "Believing, of course, that there is no wish to single it out (the manufacture of woolens) for unfriendly legislation at home, I can not sit still, and see the gigantic arm of the British government stretched out across the Atlantic, avowedly to crush it." In 1832 the doctrine that a high tariff meant low prices was prominently advanced, and somewhat later the balance of trade theory, the excess of imports over exports, causing a drain of specie to the manifest impoverishment of the country, was harped upon. But all through this period the expediency and necessity of protecting "infant industries" were constantly depended upon by the defenders of the "American policy," and as a corollary to this a home market for the agricultural productions of the country, now excluded from foreign markets, was to be created and maintained. In 1839 the agitation against the corn laws was begun in England, and resulted in their repeal in 1846. In 1849 another important step was taken, in the repeal of the navigation laws. Meanwhile a change was occurring in the complexion of the tariff debates in this country. "In the presidential campaign of 1840, protection was advocated, I believe for the first time, on the ground that American labor should be protected from the competition of less highly paid foreign labor. The pauper-labor argument appeared full-fledged in the tariff debates of 1842; and since that time it has remained the chief consideration impressed on the popular mind in connection with the tariff." (Taussig.)

—Mr. Polk, in his inaugural address, was conservative. "I have heretofore declared to my fellow-citizens, that in my judgment it is the duty of the government to extend, as far as may be practicable to do so, by its revenue laws, and all other means within its power, fair and just protection to all the great interests of the whole Union, embracing agriculture, manufactures, the mechanic arts, commerce and navigation. I have also declared my opinion to be in favor of a tariff for revenue; and that, in adjusting the details of such a tariff, I have sanctioned such moderate discriminating duties as would produce the amount of revenue needed, and, at the same time, afford reasonable incidental protection to our home industry; and that I was opposed to a tariff for protection merely, and not for revenue." While Mr. Polk thus confined himself to general phrases, his secretary of the treasury, Mr. Robert J. Walker, prepared a report in which his treatment of the tariff question deserves to be ranked with Hamilton's famous report on manufactures. It stamped Mr. Walker as an economist and practical financier of the highest order, and his utterances mark an important stage of tariff legislation in this country. He laid down the following general principles as a basis for revising the revenue laws: 1, that no more money should be collected than is necessary for the wants of the government, economically administered; 2, that no duty be imposed on any article above the lowest rate which will yield the largest amount of revenue; 3, that below such rate discrimination may be made, descending in the scale of duties, or, for imperative reasons, the article may be placed in the list of those free from all duty; 4, that the maximum revenue duty should be imposed on luxuries; 5, that all minimums and all specific duties should be abolished, and ad valorem duties substituted in their place, care being taken to guard against fraudulent invoices and undervaluation, and to assess the duty upon the actual market value; 6, that the duty should be so imposed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the Union, discriminating neither for nor against any class or section.

—In accordance with Mr. Walker's views, the tariff of 1846 was framed. He divided his classification into nine schedules, each of which had its own rate of duty (comprising many articles), running from 100 per cent. (distilled spirits and brandy), down to 5 per cent. (the raw materials of manufacture). This number of schedules was in the bill altered to eight, and the highest duty levied was 75 per cent. ad valorem. The bill also allowed the warehousing privilege for the first time. (See WAREHOUSE SYSTEM.) After a general debate the measure passed the house by a vote of 114 to 95, but was nearly killed in the senate, being passed only by the casting vote of the president of the senate. The average rate of duty under this act was 25 per cent. ad valorem, and it produced an average annual revenue of $46,000,000, as against one of $26,000,000 under the tariff of 1842.

—Of the consequences of this "revenue tariff of 1846," Prof. Sumner says: "The period from 1846 to 1860 was our period of comparative free trade. The sub-treasury act of 1848 removed subjects of currency and banking from national legislation. Thus these two topics were for a time laid aside. For an industrial history of the United States, no period presents greater interest than this. It was a period of very great and very solid prosperity. The tariff was bad and vexatious in many ways, if we regard it from the standpoint either of free trade or revenue tariff, but its rates were low and its effects limited. It was called 'a revenue tariff with incidental protection.' The manufactures which, it had been said, would perish, did not perish, and did not gain sudden and exorbitant profits. They made steady and genuine progress. The repeal of the English corn laws in 1846 opened a large market for American agricultural products, and took away the old argument which Niles and Carey had used with such force, that England wanted other countries to have free trade, but would not take their products. The effect on both countries was most happy. It seemed as if the old system was gone forever, and that these two great nations, with free industry and free trade, were to pour increased wealth upon each other. The fierce dogmatism of protection and its deeply rooted prejudices seemed to have undergone a fatal blow. Our shipping rapidly increased. Our cotton crop grew larger and larger. The discovery of gold in California added mightily to the expansion of prosperity. The states, indeed, repeated our old currency follies, and the panic of 1857 resulted, but it was only a stumble in a career of headlong prosperity. We recovered from it in a twelve-month. Slavery agitation marked this period politically, and if people look back to it now they think most of that; but industrially and economically, and I will add also, in the administration of the government, the period from the Mexican to the civil war is our golden age, if we have any. As far as the balance of trade is concerned, it never was more regular and equal than in this period." (Lectures on Protection, p. 54.)

—The revenue collected under this tariff was so large, that, in 1857, it became necessary to reduce it, as the circulating medium of the country was being looked up in the treasury. An attempt was made to pass a protective tariff, but it was defeated. The secretary of the treasury had recommended that raw materials should be made free of duty, and also salt, as a necessity for the western packer. The eastern manufacturers favored this measure, and wool was the most difficult commodity to rate, as the west wished it made dutiable and protected. The tariff of 1857 was denounced as the result of a "fraudulent combination of those who favored the protection of hemp, sugar, iron and the woolen manufactures of Massachusetts. It was a blow at the wool grower." By this act the average duty was lowered to about 20 per cent. ad valorem.

—The crisis of 1857 was followed by deficits in the government finances, and it became necessary to revise the tariff. In 1861 a measure known as the "Morrill tariff" was passed, which was a decided step toward a protective measure, but it remained in force only a few months. The war created necessities which compelled the government to seek every possible source of revenue, and while the dilatory and tentative tax methods applied in the first years of the war only complicated matters, and forced the government to have recourse to that most dangerous of financial expedients, an irredeemable paper currency, the tax privilege was exercised as far as it could be before the end of the war. In these years the tariff was carried from a low and revenue rate of duty to one of extreme protection—not for the sake of protection, but in order to obtain revenue. An internal revenue system that was all-pervading was imposed, and it was to counteract the high taxes levied under this system that many of the tariff duties were carried to such an excessive point. Measure after measure raising duties was adopted between the years 1861 and 1866, and it was inevitable that protective duties should creep in. Settled policy there was none, and while revenue was always the plea for action, the duties imposed often defeated that plea, by becoming prohibitive. Everything was taxed, and, under customs and excise laws, commodities might be taxed many times. On the return of peace the important changes made applied chiefly to the internal revenue system, and the perpetual tinkering of the tariff had served to bring out in bold relief the many protective features it contained. "With the termination of the war," writes Mr. David A. Wells when special commissioner of the revenues, "and with accruing receipts from the tariff in excess of the actual requirements of the treasury, the popular tendency, as expressed by legislation, accomplished or projected, has been to reverse the order of importance of these two principles, and to make the idea of revenue subordinate to protection rather than protection subordinate to revenue. And in carrying out, furthermore, the idea of protection, but one rule for guidance would appear to have been adopted for legislation, viz., the assumption that whatever rate of duty could be shown to be for the advantage of any private interest, the same would prove equally advantageous to the interests of the whole country. The result has been a tariff based upon small issues rather than upon any great national principle; a tariff which is unjust and unequal; which needlessly enhances prices; which takes far more indirectly from the people than is received into the treasury; which renders an exchange of domestic for foreign commodities nearly impossible; which necessitates the continual exportation of obligations of national indebtedness and of the precious metals; and which, while professing to protect American industry, really, in many cases, discriminates against it. * * One of the first things that an analysis [of the existing tariff] will show is, that every interest that has been strong enough or sufficiently persistent to secure efficient representation at Washington, has received a full measure of attention, while every other interest that has not had sufficient strength behind it to prompt to action has been imperfectly treated, or entirely neglected."

—The effect of the commissioner's recommendations was to lead up to a general debate on taxation in 1870. A bill which originally proposed to touch only internal duties, was gradually enlarged until it covered not only excise, but also customs duties. Protection had now become a cardinal principle of the republican party, the party in power, and most of the protective features of the tariff were retained under the new measure, which became a law July 14, 1870, and whatever reductions were made applied to commodities in common use, like tea, coffee, sugar, etc., or luxuries, like wines, spirits, brandy, etc. The reduction in revenue by these changes was estimated to be about $29,000,000, and at the same time internal taxes to the amount of $55,000,000 were removed. The real burden of the tariff was hardly lightened, as the high duties on the necessaries of life remained. In 1871 an attempt was made to repeal the duty on coal, but it failed. The question of protection, however, came up, and to prevent further discussion the duties were removed from tea and coffee (1872), and in the same year a general tariff was passed, which still left the protective duties almost unchanged; admitting large classes of manufactures to a reduction of 10 per cent. without designating specifically the articles to which the reduction should apply. Between March 1, 1861, and March 4, 1873, fourteen principal statutes relating to classification and rates, besides twenty other acts or resolutions modifying tariff acts, had been passed, and parts of each were in force. To this must be added the laws passed prior to 1861, and under which customs were still collected. This created great doubt as to what was the law, and the uncertainty gave much trouble to the government, and involved the importers in costly litigation and imposed upon them vexatious delays. "Under these various enactments, questions relating to the proper assessment of duties constantly arise. There is often a direct conflict between different statutes, and occasionally between two or more provisions of the same statute, while single provisions are frequently held to embrace different meanings. These differences can be settled only by arbitrary interpretations or by adjudications in court. * * The number of statutory appeals to the secretary of the treasury on tariff questions during the last fiscal year (1873) was 4,731, exclusive of miscellaneous cases or applications for relief, numbering 5,065."

—The financial crisis of 1873 naturally had some influence upon the revenues of the government, and in 1874 the cry was raised that the government finances were embarrassed through too large reduction in taxes. This allowed the protectionists an opportunity to carry a measure through congress restoring the 10 per cent. duties upon commodities which had been taken off in 1872, and also to increase by one-fourth the duties on sugar. While these movements precluded all idea of revising the tariff so as to return to a revenue standard of duties, yet great dissatisfaction was expressed with the operation of the law. I have just noted one of the difficulties connected with its administration, that of being needlessly complex. Other objections to it consisted in the great stimulus it gave to smuggling and undervaluation of imports, practices which even the honest importer was forced, in self-defense, to adopt. Moreover, the law became each year more and more complicated. It consisted, first, of the act of congress; second, of the decisions of the treasury officials interpreting the law, and these decisions had the force of law and were unchangeable; and, finally, of the decisions of the courts. The expediency, and even the necessity, of a revision, now became more and more urgent. "The revised tariff," writes the secretary in 1875, "contains thirteen schedules, embracing upward of 1,500 dutiable articles which are either distinctly specified or included in general or special classifications. To these must be added nearly 1,000 articles not enumerated, but which under the general provisions of two sections of the law, would be assigned a place as dutiable either by virtue of similitude to some enumerated article, or as articles, manufactured or unmanufactured, not otherwise provided for, making over 2,500 in all. The free list contains an enumeration of over 600 articles, thus constituting a total aggregate of more than 3,000 articles embraced by the tariff either as dutiable or free. Of the articles subject to duty, and either named in, or subject to, specific classification by schedule, 823 pay ad valorem rates varying from 10 to 75 per cent.; 541 pay specific duties, according to quantity or weight; and 160 pay compound, or both specific and ad valorem, rates."

—Not only was a sentiment against the tariff being created on account of its many unreasonable and exorbitant features, but a like feeling was engendered by a desire to reduce war taxation to the limits that an economical administration of the government required. The largest sum collected from customs in any one year was in 1872, when it had attained the amount of $216,370,286. During the years of depression that followed the crisis of 1873 the receipts from this source steadily dwindled, reaching their lowest point in 1878, when they were only $130,170,680. An improvement then became manifest, and in the following years the increase was enormous, giving, in connection with other sources of revenue, a revenue largely in excess of the wants of the government. In 1880 this surplus revenue was nearly $66,000,000; in 1881, more than $100,000,000; and in 1882, $146,000,000. An examination of the annual appropriation bills for these years will show that expenditure kept pace with revenue. While these bills do not take into account the permanent appropriations—providing for the debt, for the collection of customs, etc.—yet, as they are prepared by the executive departments of the government, they give a better idea of the general tendencies of governmental expenditure than would the amounts actually expended. The total amounts appropriated by these bills vary from year to year, but they vary in a general way with the revenue of the government—increasing when the revenue increases, and decreasing when it becomes less. The ten years that followed 1873 gave a proof of this. The public income had hardly begun to be affected by the crash of 1873 when the appropriations for 1874 were framed; but from that year until 1878 there was a steady decrease. Beginning with the bill for 1881, when the effects of the revival of trade and industry in 1879 were beginning to be felt, the appropriations greatly increased, and culminated in the notorious bill for 1883, which included two of the most notorious legislative swindles that could be perpetrated—the river and harbor bill, and the arrears of pensions act. As the surplus revenue in the treasury increased, the demands upon it became greater, and the greater the surplus the more questionable became the schemes for spending it. The accumulation of such a balance was a source of danger, and a constant temptation to jobbers and swindlers who originate and live upon superfluous public expenditure.

—It was now seen that some changes in the tariff would become necessary, not only for the purpose of simplifying its provisions, but also as a means of removing tax burdens from the people. The old question of revenue or protective taxation was revived, and it became manifest that the battle was to be fought on that line. While all right-minded persons saw that taxes should be reduced, when it came to a discussion of methods, a hopeless disagreement arose. Those who favored protection were desirous of abolishing all internal taxes in order that the tariff might remain untouched. The other side wished to reduce the tariff, and take from it the many extravagant protective features. Several measures of tariff reform were defeated in these years, and no final or decisive action was taken until 1882, when congress turned the subject over to a commission of nine members taken from civil life, for consideration. It was evident that here was an excellent opportunity offered for a satisfactory solution of the question. There was a general demand for reduced duties; even protectionists were willing to submit to such a reduction. The presidential campaign of 1880 had been fought on the issue of the tariff, but in that blind and unreasonable way that settled nothing, though awakening a spirit of inquiry. This had given strength to many movements in favor of revenue reform, especially in the western states, and it was in answer to this feeling, which was developing into a political force, that the commission measure was adopted, because it was believed that such a plan would produce the best and speediest results. The president, who had the appointment of the members of the commission, nullified whatever of benefit might be expected of it, for he took men who were directly interested in the maintenance of high protection. Of the nine men chosen there was not one who could pretend to be a student of economic principles, not one who could have explained the incidence of a tax. The influence of the lobby in framing tariff legislation had become notorious, but in this commission the lobby influence was maintained, and allowed even better opportunities for carrying its point than it enjoyed before. The commission traveled over a part of the country taking testimony, and made its report to congress. It was afterward developed that the schedules of duties presented with the report had been prepared by men who were themselves manufacturers and therefore interested in keeping intact protection. The report, while promising a reduction in duties, contained some of the most barefaced attempts to double and triple duties; while making a pretense to revise and reform the tariff, it was but a juggle and a sham. The members of the commission (with one honorable exception, Mr. McMahon, whose technical knowledge of the operation of the then existing tariff was of great service) were wholly unfitted for the work intrusted to them, and as a consequence the results of their labors were of little value. One year had thus been wasted.

—Nor were the events that followed the presentation of this report calculated to increase the expectation that the subject of revenue reform would be adequately handled by congress. The senate, rejecting the commission schedules, prepared a bill of its own; and the house also framed a new bill for its own consideration. The whole session of 1882-3 was given over to a discussion of these various measures, schedule by schedule, and line by line. Every possible difference of opinion was developed in these debates; but, as the high tariff party was in the majority, little toward a reduction of duties could be accomplished. A large number of ad valorem duties were made specific, though no change in the actual amount of tax was thus brought about. Owing to its being a short session, the house was unable to complete the consideration of its own bill, and took up that of the senate. Some differences being developed, they were referred to a conference committee, in which the high protectionists had a large majority. Here many changes were made, some of which had been voted down in both houses, and the resulting hybrid measure became a law one day before the session closed, no time being given for an examination of the recommendations of the conference committee. The law, however, satisfied no one, and there is every likelihood that the whole tariff will be again revised at no late day.

—Meagre as this outline is, it is enough to show that the United States has never had a tariff that was at all suited to its industrial and commercial interests since the first revenue tariff imposed before 1826. And as the average rate of the tariff has increased it has become more and more injurious to the interests involved, as no high tariff can be applied to such various conditions as are to be found in this country without doing as much mischief to one part as good to another.

—AUTHORITIES. Prof. Wm. G. Sumner's Lectures on the History of Protection, Life of Andrew Jackson and History of American Currency. The writings of Henry C. Carey and H. C. Baird. There is no good history of the finances of the country in the English language. The pretentious work of A. S. Bolles is unsatisfactory, and the facts are much distorted. Niles' Weekly Register contains much valuable material, and the writings of Condy Raquet, now quite scarce, should be carefully read. The public documents contain many exceedingly valuable reports on the tariff, and the proceedings of some early conventions (1819, 1831, etc.) throw much light upon the effects of tariff legislation. Mr. David A. Wells has contributed much to a proper understanding of the last war tariff, and stands well to the front in the great number of writers who have given attention to this subject. A special Report on Customs-Tariff Legislation was prepared by the Bureau of Statistics in 1873, and the provisions of the laws are fully given, as also in Heyl's and Williams' two Manuals.

WORTHINGTON C. FORD.

TARTAR

TARTAR, TARTARY. The Chinese Tâ-tâ, or Tâ-tar, was originally a generic term for tributary or vassal peoples, especially of those hordes inhabiting the plateaus of northern Asia beyond the great wall which was built to repel them. One sinologue finds the derivation of the word in one of the forms of obeisance in vogue among the tribes of Mongolia, in which the foot is struck on the ground, and a prominent article of dress, usually worn in front, is at the same moment thrown behind. The leaders of most of the uprisings of population in the grassy plateaus of central Asia that have emerged into history, spurning the epithet of Tâtars, have taken to themselves various dynastic names, such as Hun, Turk, Liào, Kitan, Kin, Mongol, Manchiu, etc. Genghis Khan, for instance, gave to his people the name Mongols (Mungku-jin), "braves," in order to show that they were no longer Tâ-tars, or tributaries, but conquerors. When the Mongols invaded Asia, and even Europe, overrunning Russia, and covering it with ashes and blood, the Christian monks, struck with the resemblance of the word Tâ-tar to Tartarus, and ready to associate these centaurs— man and horse being as one animal—with devils from hell, called them "Tartars." Hence, our incorrect English spelling. Gradually the word Tartary was applied to all the lands ruled by the Mongols—the whole of eastern Europe, and central Asia; "European Tartary" was that part of Russia occupied by the Mongols, while "Asiatic Tartary" stretched from the Caspian to the Yellow sea. As the Mongols were by degrees expelled from Russia, the term was restricted to the Crimea (settled by the Crim Tâtars) and to the Chinese dependencies north and west of the great wall. As Chinese geography was better understood, the once vague and elastic term more and more lost value as a geographical expression. It continued to be applied, however, to that part of Turkestan which was until lately neither Chinese nor Russian—an annually decreasing territory. Since the Russian campaigns under Kauffman and Skobeloff, resulting in the fall of Khiva (1873), of Khokand (1876), and of Merv (1879-80), the whole of "Independent Turkestan" may be considered part of Russian territory, since it has been formally annexed. In 1882 deputations of the inhabitants to St. Petersburg gave their formal adherence to the czar. With this extension of Russian arms to the very borders of Afghanistan, "Tartary" ceases to be a proper geographical expression. In China, the term "Tâ-tar" is popularly applied to the Mongols beyond the great wall, and, by ultra-patriotic haters of the ruling dynasty, to Manchius in general; but it is so mixed up with opprobrious epithets, such as "horsey," "raw," "green," etc., that the word is not in good repute among writers. In central Asia, "Turk" and "Tâ-tar" are synonymous. Foreigners distinguish the Chinese from their Manchiu conquerors, and we read in works of travel and history of "the Tartar city," "the Tartar garrison," as parts of Peking, Canton, etc.

—Ethnologically the "Tartars" are the Altaian group of tribes and nations, not of Aryan blood, that did once, or do now, inhabit the lands of northern and central Asia, including the Scythians of classic writers, the Huns, the Turks, Kirghez, Calmucks, Mongols, Manchius, Tungusians, the various peoples of Turkestan, with many tribes now greatly modified by Aryan admixture, with others as widely scattered as the Tamils of southern India on the one hand, and the Coreans and Japanese on the other, between whose languages modern linguists (Thirwall, Dallet, Ross, Edkins, Aston, Chamberlain) have demonstrated close affinities. Notwithstanding all variations from the original type, the Tâtar face has high cheek bones, thick nose depressed at the roots, scanty beard, round skull, and narrow, slit-like eyes, with a peculiar restless expression, which is the same whether in Constantinople or in Tokio. Balfour thus pictures from life the Manchiu and the Chinese, or the "Tartar," and the native Mandarin. "The Manchiu has a dark complexion and roughish skin; he is a large-boned man; his face is long and lantern-jawed; he has a wide mouth, and a firm, decided nose. The expression of his eyes is shrewd, and under the gloss of etiquette you can detect the natural fierceness of the nomad. The Chinese is the exact reverse. His build is small and flexible; his face—round, unctuous and fat, unseared by the suspicion of a wrinkle—is the color of Devonshire cream. His movements are graceful and suave; they give you the idea of liberally-oiled joints; his hands are delicate, slim, and very plump; his expression is courtly, he has a winning smile and bow for every one. * * Good emperors are not made of such material." The Tâ-tar hordes which have repeatedly rushed out of the north into China, have kept the hoary empire periodically infused with fresh blood and vigor and new imperial dynasties. Yet, though able to conquer, destroy or build on a well-established foundation, they have no elements of permanence; and away from the deserts, cut off from nomadic life, the Tâ-tar fabrics of government in continental Asia have, one after another, fallen to ruins after a burst of grandeur that seems strangely brief in comparison with the enduring character of Aryan institutions and European governments. In religion the Tâ-tars were at first devotees to Shamanism, and then to Buddhism, which degenerated into Lamaism, while in Europe and western Asia many tribes have adopted the Sunni form of Islam. (See also MONGOLS.)

WM. ELLIOT GRIFFIS.

TA-TSING

TA-TSING (Great Pure). The name of the ruling dynasty of China, under whose reign the Middle Kingdom has perforce begun to adopt and assimilate the forces of western civilization. Direct commercial and diplomatic relations between China and Europe can scarcely be said to have begun until the Ta-tsing line of emperors filled the throne in Peking. One of the several foreign imperial houses that have ruled the mightiest empire of Asia, the Ta-tsing, is "the best Tartar dynasty China has ever had." The ancestral home of the Manchiu chieftains, to whom divine honors as founders are now rendered in Peking, is the northern base of the ever-white mountains which separate Corea from Manchiuria. According to legend, one of three celestial virgins, while bathing in a lake on the surface of which were mirrored the snowy peaks, found on her clothes a red fruit dropped by a flying magpie, and immediately eating it, conceived, and gave birth to a son. On the death of his mother, he floated down the river Hurka, and being hailed by the warring chiefs as a supernatural leader, established his capital at Odoli, and began in the fourteenth century the unification of the Manchiu tribes. The name of this ancestor was Aisin-Gioro, or Golden Family Stem. Gradually encroaching upon the Chinese possessions, the Manchius were invited to Peking to assist against rebels. Finding themselves there, they stayed, and began the conquest of the great plain of China. In a word, they supplanted the native Ming dynasty. In exchange for the shaven forescalp and long queue ("pigtail") which they inflicted upon the Chinese, they themselves took the civilization of China, and became docile pupils. The Jesuit missionaries in the capital enjoyed both the friendship and patronage of the first Ta-tsing emperors, Shun Chi, Kang Hi, Yung Cheng and Kien Lung. The sure foothold of the new dynasty in the empire was signalized by the compilation and issue of the famous "Imperial Dictionary," the "Webster's Unabridged" of the Chinese language. Learning and the arts flourished, and intercourse with western nations increased, until in this latter half of the nineteenth century we see that long contested problems are being solved in a manner not Chinese, but cosmopolitan. The old conception of China being the Middle Kingdom, around and far beyond the borders of which lay the uncivilized barbarian countries, is passing away. The long duel between Cossack and Tartar on the north has ended by making "ravenous Russia's" boundary lines the Amur and Usuri rivers, though Ili has been wrested back from the double-headed eagle; and strong garrisons, constantly maintained along her northern frontier, show China's determination to keep her borders from further "rectification" by diplomates. Her attitude toward France in Tonquin, and toward Japan in Corea, show her further intent to keep a "scientific frontier," and uphold her ancient doctrine of Whang-Ti, or sovereign over vassal nations. Under the pressure of necessity she has established legations and consulates in Europe and America, and has recognized the existence of her citizens abroad. At home the adoption of western military and naval organization and equipment, and of engineering, telegraphy and commercial methods, are largely due to the more practical and enterprising nature of the Manchiu leaders and statesmen. (See also TARTAR and RIU KIU.)

—LITERATURE. Williamson's Journeys in North China, Manchuria, London, 1870; Ross' The Manchus, The Reigning Dynasty of China, Paisley, 1879; Griffis' Corea, the Hermit Nation, New York and London, 1883.

WM. ELLIOT GRIFFIS.

TAUISM

TAUISM (TAO-ISM, TO;, or Doctrine of Lao-Tse). One of the three state religions of China is Tauism. It is recognized and supported by the imperial government, and one of the popular sayings is, "However the empire be disordered and convulsed, the Changs (popes of Tauism) and the Kungs (descendants of Confucius) have no occasion to be troubled." Perhaps that which most attracts the attention of foreigners who observe the rites of the Chinese at home or on American soil, is that which is referred to Tauism, rather than to the cult of Buddha or the ethics of Confucius. Yet, the religion and the system of philosophy must be carefully distinguished; for, whatever else Lao-Tse is responsible for, "he ought not to bear the obloquy of being the founder of the Taôist religion." Pure Tauism is probably not to be found in China, though in Corea it is probable that it exists in something like its original purity. In this article we shall briefly sketch the man and his system, describing in detail the widely spread and highly popular religion that calls itself by his name, and of which he is in no sense of the word the founder. Rejecting the vulgar fancies and later traditions which find so dazzling an expression in the gilt and paint and cabalistic characters and incantations of a "joss-house," we shall outline the historical career of Lao-Tse. He was born in the feudal age of China, in the petty kingdom of Tsu, now the province of Honan, in 604 B. C. His surname was Li (plum), and his personal name Ur (ear, or flat ear). From early life he was an arduous student and much given to meditation. When come to manhood, he was appointed librarian, or keeper of the records, at the court of the Chow dynasty. When eighty-eight years old, he was visited by Confucius, then thirty-five years of age, and a conversation between the two followed, in which the elder appears to have given the younger a tart lecture, couched in vaguely oracular language. Confucius seems to have left the sage with the impression that his words were too profound or too transcendental for practical purposes, and after that pursued his own methods of inquiry. It was perhaps subsequent to this interview that Li Ur was known as Lao-Tse, or Venerable Sage; though the two Chinese characters may also be rendered Old Boy—on which basis, the popular legend that he was born with white hair and with the expression of an aged man, was reared. There is not, however, one line in the sage's works, which gives countenance to marvels or supernaturalism of any kind, the multitudinous fantastic legends concerning Lao-Tse having been invented much later. The sage devoted himself to expanding his doctrine of Tau (the Way), and shunned all notoriety. Foreseeing the fall of the Chow dynasty, he left the capital with his face set westward. Before passing through the boundary gate, Yin Hsi, the warden and his admirer, persuaded the sage to commit his doctrines to writing. Lao-Tse complied, and wrote down what appear like lecture notes, which need further oral expansion. In this treatise, Tau-ti King, containing eighty-one chapters in not over 5,000 characters, his views on the Tau (Way) are set forth in an exceedingly verse, gnomic style. He then passed westward beyond the frontier, and with this final sentence of the historian Sze-ma Chien (B. C. 135-68) the voice of history is silent. He died probably about 523 B. C. The systems of Lao-Tse and Confucius may be thus stated: Confucius, a statesman rather than a philosopher, sought to find for men a rule of conduct in a code of practical morals founded on ancient precedents, the examples and precepts of kings and sages. Lao-Tse's labors, on the contrary, were purely philosophical. Man was to attain to the perfection of his nature through contemplation of God, by subduing his passions and possessing his soul in calm. Quietism is thus the first requisite of a true life. The highest morality is inculcated. In speculative physics, Lao-Tse teaches that creation proceeded from a First Principle, impersonal, self-existent and self-developing, which produced motion, whence issued all things in the universe, which have in them the dual principle of active and passive, or male and female. In politics, the sovereign elected of the people should be their model and teacher rather than ruler and judge. The voice of the people is Heaven's voice. The ruler must first right himself, then the country will be well governed. Too much government is to be deprecated. Light taxation, moderate punishments, the people well fed, but not too much enlightened, courtesy and moderation between states, will secure lasting peace and prosperity. Previous to Lao-Tse's time, the Chinese worshiped Shang-ti (Lord of Heaven, Theos, Jehovah) and Tien (Heaven). The Tau-ti King recognized God (Shang-ti) as before Tau, though it is through Tau that Heaven is to be attained. By means of Tau the soul was to attain its original state and be immortal. European scholars at first believed that the Hebrew name Jehovah was contained in Lao-Tse's book, both in phonetics, and by popular apprehension, but this idea is now exploded. The sage recognizes as fact the existence of God (Ti), but makes his Tau (Reason, the Way) primal, and superior to God. The Ti, or virtue of the Tau, becomes fulfilled in man in its highest development, by his abstraction from worldly cares, and freedom from anxiety. In other words, he teaches that non-existence is the goal of man, and equivalent to pure existence; or, as Hegel would say, they are identical. "Being and Non-being are the same." Whether Lao-Tse borrowed this tenet from the India Brahmans, or originated it, is uncertain, but the very vagueness of the system, increased by the terseness of his style, resembling that of oracles or enigmas, made it the fit soil for the strange crop that afterward grew upon it. Until the introduction of Buddhism, 68 A. D., idols were unknown in China, and Tauism was but a philosophy and a literary puzzle, though with new codes of natural and psychical philosophy grafted on it by disciples. As such it was more acceptable to minds to which metaphysical speculation was congenial, than the bald ethics of Confucius, based as these were on materialism and routine precedents; but its evolution was toward degradation. In contact and rivalry with Buddhism, the occult arts and superstitions of centuries past fastened upon Tauism so firmly that what was parasite and what was original stock could not be popularly distinguished. While the mystic element expanded voluminously, professing to teach corporeal immortality, the transmutation of metals, the composition of the elixir of life which raised men to the equal of genii—arts long after introduced into Europe—the popular belief, travestying Buddhism, filled its temples with images of deities, which became gods of the state. Out of the crowd of the early fathers of war, medicine and literature, idol deifies were multiplied indefinitely, until Buddhism was offset with its own weapons, by a native instead of a foreign pantheon. The recognition of Tauism as a state religion practically began when Wu-ti (140-88 B. C.) encouraged the alchemists, though the Tang emperors (618-905 A. D.) first admitted Lao-Tse to the rank of gods, under the title of "Great Supreme, Emperor of the Dark First Cause." Later, titles were added by admiring emperors. It must be remembered that Confucianism was not until a thousand years after the death of its founder universally spread throughout China; nor was it until A. D. 1012 that he received by imperial mandate the title "Most Perfect Sage." During the early centuries of the Christian era. Tauism had the field. The first Tauist popedom, or patriarchate, held by Chang Tau-ling, which was founded in the first century, has been held in the line of his descendants to the present day, and the sect has spread into the various nations surrounding the Middle Kingdom that accept Chinese culture. In the popular religion, "the Three Pure Ones," which are found in Tauist temples form the most conspicuous group of idols representing Lao-Tse, Chaos or Pan-kû, "The first man," and Shang-ti, or God, of the early Chinese religion. Many other idols, representing gods of every degree, incarnating perhaps the forces of nature, crowd the temples; and the religion of Tauism, though professedly based on reason, or at least rationalism, is a hopeless congeries of superstition.

—LITERATURE. The Tau-ti King has been translated into English by the Rev. J. Chalmers (London), into French by Rémusat and Stanislas Julien, and into German by Plancker and V. von Strauss, the first and last being considered the most faithful to the original. See also Legge's The Religions of China, New York, 1881; Martin's The Chinese, New York, 1881; and Oriental Religions, China, Boston, 1881.

WM. ELLIOTT GRIFFIS.

TAXATION

TAXATION, Principles of. It would seem to be in the nature of an economic or commonsense axiom, that a large and varied experience in respect to the management of any one of the great departments of the world's business would result in the gradual evolution and final definite establishment of certain rules or principles which would be almost universally recognized and accepted as a basis for practical application and procedure. But in respect to the matter of taxation—which is a fundamental necessity for the maintenance of civilization and of all government, and is constantly, outside of sheer barbarism, everywhere maintained—no such result has been attained. In no department of economic science is there so much of obscurity and conflicting opinion. "Most economists agree, that there is no science of taxation as there is a science of exchanges"; and "that there are no great natural laws running through and controlling taxation and its effects." And while the student will find examples in the history of states or governments of the practical application of almost every form of taxation which human ingenuity, prompted by necessity, selfishness or greed, could devise; and a sufficient record of effects, to warrant the drawing of general and correct inferences, it is nevertheless probably true, that there is not, at the present time, a single existing tax decreed by despotism, or authorized by the representatives of the tax payers, which has been primarily adopted or enacted solely with reference to any involved economic principles, or which has primarily sought to establish the largest practical conformity under the existing circumstances to what are acknowledged to be the fundamental principles of equity, justice and rational liberty. But, on the contrary, the influence of temporary circumstances, as viewed in most instances from the standpoint of a governmental administration—despotism or republican alike—desirous of retaining power, has ever been the controlling motive in determining the character of taxation; or, as Colbert, the celebrated finance minister of Louis XIV., is reported to have expressed it, in saying, "that the act of taxation consists in so plucking the goose [i.e., the people] as to procure the largest quantity of feathers with the least possible amount of squealing." Hence, apart from its methods of distributing power and patronage, the popular idea of evil, as connected with government, may almost always be referred back to unequal or excessive taxation as a source; and to the reality of which, as evils, more than to any other one agency, may be referred the French revolution, and the ferocity with which it was conducted. Hence, also, the preference almost always shown, on the part alike of those who enact and those who pay taxes, for indirect taxation, which very successfully blinds the tax payer as to the amount which he pays and as to the time and place of its collection. And hence, finally, the idea, which has come to be all but universally entertained, that taxation per se is in itself an evil; something to be avoided if possible, and an escape from which is always "good fortune"; when the real truth undoubtedly is, that there is no one act which can be performed by a community, which brings in so large return to the credit of civilization and general happiness, as the judicious expenditure, for public purposes, of a fair percentage of the general wealth raised by an equitable system of taxation. The fruits of such expenditure are general education and general health; improved roads, diminished expenses of transportation, and security for life and property. And it will be found to be a general rule, that no high degree of civilization can be maintained in a community, and indeed that no highly civilized community can exist, without comparatively large taxation; the converse of this proposition, however, at the same time not being admitted, that the existence of high taxes are necessarily a sign of high civilization. In short, taxation in itself is no more of an evil than any other necessary and desirable form of expenditure; but it is an evil when taxation is rendered excessive through injudicious or wasteful expenditures; or when, by reason of ill adjustment, the levy of the tax is made an occasion for the collection from the people, through the enhancement of profits and prices, of a far greater sum than is requisite to meet the public requirements.

—Adam Smith, in his "Wealth of Nations," laid down four canons, or maxims, (to be hereafter stated), in respect to the levying and collection of taxes in general, which, as they are constantly quoted and referred to with favor, have a better claim to be regarded as in the nature of fundamental truths than any other propositions which have thus far been formulated on this subject. But as these propositions are, as their author characterized them, "general," and not particular, in their nature; and as at least one of them is, in the light of a larger experience, not considered as correct, there is, it must be conceded, much warrant for the assumption, that in the sense of propositions, or rules, universally, or in any large degree, recognized and made the basis of practical application, there are no principles of taxation. To admit the correctness of such an assumption, is, however, at the same time to confess, that human knowledge, in at least one department, has reached its largest limit; and that a class of transactions, which, more than almost any other, are determinative of the distribution of wealth, and the forms in which industry shall be exerted, are best directed by accident or caprice. It is accordingly proposed, in the present article, to make the true state of the case the main objective of inquiry; and, in place of framing any theory at the outset, to rather aim to place before the reader such a review of our knowledge of this subject, and more especially such a summary of the most recent experiences and investigations, as will qualify him for the forming of an opinion, whether any deductions which may be made are to be regarded as merely curious or valuable contributions to the department of economic science under consideration, or whether they rise to the dignity and importance of fundamental and incontrovertible truths or propositions. And as the first step in such a discussion, it is important to start with a definition, and define, at the outset, what is meant by taxation.

—Taxation (from the Latin taxo, or taxare, "to rate," "to value"), in the ordinary sense, means the act or process of apportioning or assessing, and of collecting or gathering from a people, a portion of their property, for the use or support of their government, and for all public needs. The command of a constant and adequate revenue being absolutely essential to the existence of organized government, the power to compel or enforce contributions from the people governed, or, as it is termed, "to tax," is inherent in and an incident of every sovereignty, and rests upon necessity. The question of the obtaining of such revenue, obviously, therefore, is the question of first importance in the economy of a state; the one in comparison with which all others are subordinate. For without revenue (and a government never has any resources except what it has obtained from the people), regularly and uniformly obtainable and coming in, no governmental machinery for the protection of life and property, through the dispensing of justice, and the providing for the common defense, could long be maintained; and in default thereof, production would stop or be reduced to a minimum, accumulations would cease or become speedily exhausted, and civilization would inevitably give place to barbarism and the wilderness.

—Again, the power of taxation being an incident of sovereignty, the right to exercise that power must be coextensive with that of which it is the incident; or, in other words, as the power of every complete sovereignty over the persons and property of its subjects is unlimited, the power, therefore, in every such sovereignty to compel contributions for the service of the state, or, as we term it, "to tax," must be unrestricted. Thus, "the power to tax," says Chief Justice Marshall, in giving the opinion of the supreme court denying the right of Maryland to tax the bank of the United States, "involves the power to destroy"; and in the case of Weston vs. The City of Charleston, the same court, by the same eminent authority, held further, "that if the right to impose a tax exists, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the state or corporation which imposes it, which the will of such state or corporation may prescribe." In the United States, however, it may be here noted, that the sovereignty of the national government, and of the separate states, is materially limited in respect to both taxation and other matters; on the one hand, in virtue of an agreement of union accepted by all the states, and known as the federal constitution; and on the other, in virtue of certain original powers retained by the states, and not delegated by them, in entering the federal Union, to any other or higher sovereignty. Thus, no state of the federal Union can impose any tax upon any agency of the federal government, its mails, its custom houses, its lands, its judicial processes, its money, or through its evidences of indebtedness, upon its credit or borrowing power. On the other hand, the federal government can not tax the agencies or instrumentalities by which any state performs its functions. That such reciprocal limitations are natural and necessary, and exist by implication, not only in the constitution of the United States, but also in the very structure of the federal Union, must be evident, when one reflects that otherwise the federal government on the one hand, and the governments of the states on the other, might impose taxation to an extent that would cripple, if not wholly defeat, the operations of the two authorities, each within its respective and proper sphere of action.

—Natural Limitations on the Meaning and Exercise of Taxation. The term taxation, however, involves something more than the mere act of taking on the part of a government, or its unrestrained power of compelling contributions for the use of the state. The essence of all taxation consists in making the burden of taxation equal upon all subjects of immediate competition; and when this principle is violated, the act of taking, or the enforced contribution, is no longer entitled to be considered taxation, but becomes at once an arbitrary spoliation or confiscation. Thus, to illustrate: suppose it were proposed to tax the stock in trade of red-haired men 5 per cent., and those of red-nosed men 10 per cent.; or (as was proposed by a bill introduced into the congress of the United States in 1874) to exempt incomes below $5,000 from taxation, and tax those equal to $5,000 5 per cent., and all above, 10 per cent.; or to do as actually once was done in England under an income tax law enacted in 1691—tax Catholics at rates double those imposed on Protestants, it seems clear that such transactions could not involve any principle, or be regarded in any other light than the mere arbitrary and despotic exercise of power; or the making of the possession of a red nose, or red hair, or the result of enterprise, skill, economy, or the fortuitous circumstance of birth or belief, the occasion for inflicting a penalty. Yet, this was what substantially was done in the middle ages, when nobles were exempt from taxation because they were nobles, and the common people were taxed because they were villains or bondsmen; when Jews were assessed because they were not Christians, and Catholics because they were not Protestants. And if it be said, as it doubtless will be, in rejoinder to a part of the above illustration, that the rich, by reason of their riches, are abundantly able to pay, and, therefore, should be made to, the answer is, that under a universal and uniform income tax (if there could be such a thing), which would establish a comparative equality of burden, they would pay more by an inevitable law and yet pay equally; while under an unequal law, which takes from them because they are rich, the act of taking has no claim to be considered a tax, but is simply confiscation. For if the state may take five per cent. from the man with $5,000 income, and ten per cent. from the man with more than $5,000, why stop at this amount? We have not approximated the limit or capability of the persons assessed to make contributions. Why not take all that such individuals receive in excess of the average income of the masses? Why not divide up and put every one on an equality? The advocacy of any such forms of contribution under the name of taxation (although the advocates may not be, and generally are not, aware of it), is simply, therefore, the advocacy of the most radical principles of communism. There is, accordingly, a broad and philosophical distinction, which may be claimed to rise to the dignity of an economic principle, between "taxation" and "arbitrary taking." In the soundings which have been made at great depths in the ocean for telegraphic or other purposes, the sounding line has not unfrequently brought up from the bottom small-chambered shells or other minute animals of exquisite organization and structure; and the question naturally arises, In what manner can these minute organisms live and flourish under the enormous pressure that in some instances must be exerted, of at least three tons to the square inch? The explanation is to be found in the circumstance that the pressure is everywhere equalized, being as much from within outward as from without inward, and thus an equilibrium is maintained under which development goes on and existence is made possible; and it is in preserving this equilibrium, this equalization of pressure (says Mr. Lowe, from whose speech as chancellor of the English exchequer the above illustration is derived), that the whole secret of taxation consists. All experience shows that a people who are moderately prosperous will bear the heaviest burdens of taxation without complaint when they feel that the distribution is just and equal; but when the distribution is unequal, somebody inevitably is being either plundered or crushed.

—Limitations of Territorial Sovereignty and Limitations of the Taxing Power Coextensive. It would seem to be in the nature of a self evident proposition, although in fact it is by no means so regarded, that the power of every state or government to tax, must be exclusively limited to subjects within its territory and legal jurisdiction. "All subjects," says Chief Justice Marshall, in giving the opinion of the supreme court, in the case of McCullough vs. Maryland (4 Wheaton, 431), "over which the sovereign power of the state extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, on the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. * * The sovereign power of the state extends to everything which exists by its own authority or is introduced by its permission." "Every nation," says Wheaton, "possesses and exercises exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction throughout the full extent of its territory. It follows, from this principle, that the laws of every state control, of right, all the real and personal property within its territory. The second general principle is, that no state can, by its laws, directly affect, bind or regulate property beyond its own territory. This is a consequence of the first general principle; a different system, which would recognize in each state the power of regulating persons or things beyond its territory, would exclude the equality of rights among different states, and the exclusive sovereignty which belongs to each of them." (Wheaton's International Law, chap. ii., § 2; Fœlix International Prisé, §§ 9 and 10.) And in a decision of more recent date (State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wallace, 306, 328), the United States supreme court said: "The power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state. Property lying beyond the jurisdiction of the state is not a subject upon which her taxing power can be legitimately exercised. Indeed, it would seem that no adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a proposition."

—Protection the Correlative of Taxation. The correlative of taxation, furthermore, is protection; or, in other words, according to the political theory of our governments, national and state, and in fact of every government claiming the title to be free, taxes are the compensation which property pays the state for protection. "Taxes are a portion which each individual gives of his property, in order to secure and have the perfect enjoyment of the remainder. Governments are established for the protection of persons and property within the limits of the state, and taxes are levied to enable the government to afford and give such protection. They are the price and consideration of the protection afforded." (Ingersol, J., Circuit Court of the United States, Duer vs. Small.) "There is nothing poetic about tax laws When they find property, they claim a contribution for its protection." (Lowrie, Chief Justice, Tinley vs. The City, etc., 32 Penn., 381) Montesquieu, writing with the monarchical institutions of France mainly or solely in view, discusses this subject in his "Spirit of Laws" (book xxxi., ch. i.) as follows: "The public revenues are a portion that each subject gives of his property, in order to secure or enjoy the remainder."

—These fundamental principles, defining sovereignty in respect to taxation are, however, violated, either in theory or practice, by most of the states in the federal Union (but not in other countries) in their exercise of the taxing power; as, for example, in Massachusetts, where the law defines personal estate for purposes of taxation so as to include "goods, chattels, money and effects, wherever they are; ships, public stocks and securities, stocks in turnpikes, bridges and moneyed corporations within or without the state"; and where the administrators of the law tax residents for personal property, even of a visible, tangible character, having a situs in another state or country; and, by another and irreconcilable rule, tax non-residents for all of their personal property having a situs within the state. The claim or argument, however, which the advocates of such a system set up in its defense is, that personal property (more especially what is termed in law choses in action, or credits, titles, notes, bonds, mortgages, which are in their nature incorporeal, and therefore invisible and intangible) has no situs, and, therefore, follows and adopts that of its owner. But this rule or fiction of law—mobilia personam sequuntur—was never invented with a view of its being used as a rule to govern and define the application and scope of taxation, but was originally a device of international comity, intended to subserve the convenience of the owner of property; "by which a state holding jurisdiction of the property permits an act, done by the non-resident owner at his domicile, to have the same effect, touching it, as if done at the locus situs. It means, simply, that for the purpose of sale, distribution, or other disposition of the property, any act, agreement or authority, which is sufficient in law where the owner resides, shall pass the property where it is; and the true and right use of it is to facilitate affairs of commerce and the distribution of decedents' estates, by enabling parties to dispose of their property without embarrassment from their ignorance of the laws of the country where it is situated." (Catlin vs. Hall, 21 Vermont, 152.) It would be a more accurate rendering of the rule to say, "Personal property follows the law of the owner's domicile," and not, as in effect claimed, that the law of the owner's domicile follows the property. But "no fiction," says Blackstone, "shall extend to work an injury; its proper operation being to prevent a mischief or remedy an inconvenience, which might result from the general rule of law." At any attempt to misapply a fiction, it falls within and is terminated by that other authoritative maxim of logic and the common law, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. Another great authority in law, Lord Mansfield, says: "Fictions of law hold only in respect of the ends and purposes for which they were invented; when they are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may show the truth." It is also worthy of note, that in Rome, where this fiction originated, its applicability to property was never held, according to Savigny, to extend beyond Roman territory. 125

—It is a curious fact, also, that those states which adopt, in their systems of taxation, the rule of taxing property beyond their sovereignty or territorial jurisdiction, by reason of the possession of its owner, do not carry the principle involved to its logical conclusion, and tax real estate similarly situated. But for this distinction no good reasons can be given, although pretexts, claiming to be reasons, may. One claim, however, is obviously as good as the other. A robber who should draw romantic distinctions between watches and purses, would fail in business. If we are to be robbers in practice, let us, at least, secure some grace by honesty in our professions, and admit that what we thus take is not a tax received as the just recompense of a benefit conferred, but a compulsory levy, having its cause in our greed, and its justification in our power; and as these reasons are as good for a large levy as a small one, and the whole of a man's estate is greater than its part, why not take the whole? "Still further," says Mr. Lowrey, "if we tax a man (in New York or Massachusetts) who has come from Connecticut or England to stay a year, for the property he has left behind, why not the man who has come for a week?" If we are to do business upon the principle that "might makes right," would it not be a brilliant stroke to station ourselves at all the avenues of ingress to a state, and cry "Stand and deliver" to the passengers? From the above citations and arguments, the conclusion would seem to be inevitable, that when a state assesses property situated beyond its territory and jurisdiction, and which its laws and processes are not competent or able to either reach or protect, or assesses one of its own citizens in respect to such property, the act has no claim to be regarded as taxation, but is simply arbitrary taking, in no respect different in principle from confiscation.

—It will be also here interesting to recall some of the antecedents of this fiction of law, that personal property, irrespective of its situs, follows the owner for the purpose of taxation. Its prototype was the ancient taille, or tax of servitude, imposed on persons originally bondmen, or on all persons who held in farm or lease, or resided on lands of the suzerain; and from which proprietors or suzerains of the land were exempt. And as no vassal could at will divest himself of servitude or allegiance to his lord or suzerain, so the obligation to pay taxes always remained upon him as a personal servitude, whatever might be the location of his property. In other words, the condition of the masses all over Europe during the middle ages was not unlike the condition of the slaves in the United States previous to emancipation. They (the slaves) had property in their possession, and spoke of themselves as owners of property, but in reality their property followed the condition of the servitude of their persons, and both persons and property belonged equally to the masters. The taille, furthermore, as a badge of servitude, was supposed to dishonor whoever was subject to it, and degrade him, not only below the rank of a gentleman, but of that of a burgher, or inhabitant of a borough or town; and "no gentleman, or even any burgher," says Adam Smith, "who has stock will submit to this degradation." Now, the idea embodied in the word servitude is, an obligation to render service, irrespective of, or without, compensation; and the idea upon which the taxation of personal property in this country has been based is, that the property owes a servitude to the state where the owner resides, irrespective of its actual location, in virtue of the obligation which its owner, as a citizen, may owe to the state by reason of the protection which the state gives him in respect to his person.

—Again, in old times, the division of property into real and personal was wholly unknown; and under the common law, all property was classed as lands, tenements, hereditaments, and goods and chattels. "In the course of time, however, leases of land for a term of years were classed as chattels, and were distinguished as chattels real; while other chattels, which did not savor of lands, were called chattels personal, 'because,' says Lord Coke, 'for the most part they belong to the person of a man, or else for that, they are to be recovered by personal actions.' And Blackstone tells us, that 'chattels personal are property, and strictly speaking, things movable, which may be annexed to or attendant on the person of the owner, and carried about with him from one part of the world to another'; and as instances, he mentions money, jewelry, garments. Personal property, in fact, consisted almost entirely of such things as could be, and actually were, carried about with the person of the owner, or could be easily secreted. And Blackstone also tells us, that the amount of the personal estate of our ancestors, was so trifling that they entertained a very low and contemptuous opinion of it; and that 'our ancient law books do not, therefore, often condescend to regulate this species of property.' Nothing of an incorporeal nature was anciently comprehended within the class of personal chattels. It was otherwise as to lands or real property, as to which 'incorporeal hereditaments' occupied a conspicuous place from the earliest times. Such was personal property in the early history of our laws. It was of comparatively small importance, and its laws were few and simple; while real property, being of a fixed and permanent nature, was regarded as immeasurably more valuable, and was governed by laws of its own, of the most intricate and abstruse character. Both species of property, when compared with that of our own time, were of small pecuniary value; but between the importance attached to personal and movable property, and the value of real property, there was a difference vastly greater than that which now exists, both because of the comparative insignificant value of personality, and because of the feudal tenure by which lands were held, out of which grew some of the most important consequences to both the land and the person. From these circumstances arose the notion, which became a fiction of the law, that property merely personal always attended the person of its owner; while lands, tenements and hereditaments, being fixed and immovable, and of infinitely more consideration, were held, from their very nature, as well as from motives of political policy, to have a situs of their own, from which they derived their laws and incidents wholly regardless of the domicile of the owner. Growing out of the same reasons, it was also the prevailing opinion, that while immovables were exclusively governed by the law of locality, movables were controlled, according to the same maxim, by the law of the domicile of the owner, and not by that of its situs." In the changed condition of wealth and property, such a fiction, however suitable and useful in primitive times, would now, in many cases, work the greatest injustice, and impair the supremacy which every government should maintain over everything within its territory, both on the ground of public expediency and the private interests of its citizens. And according to Wharton (Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 1872), this fiction of law has been universally abandoned upon the continent of Europe, except in cases as to rights in respect to personalty, which spring from marriage and succession. (Hutchinson, "Southern Law Review.")

—Finally, the attention of the reader or student should be asked to another interesting point in connection with this subject; and that is, that if this article were to have been written by a European, for incorporation into any foreign publication, this discussion of the taxation of extra-territorial property by a state would have no place, except possibly in review of curious tax experiences; for the reason, that nowhere, except in the United States, is there any such system of taxation, or any tolerance given to the ideas upon which it is founded.

—Legitimate Taxation Limited to Public Purposes. Although this proposition has rarely received any notice or consideration by writers on the subject of taxation, and under despotic governments (where there is no restraint on the adoption of any economic policy on the part of the state) would obviously be regarded as of no consequence, or, if conceded, would be nullified by regarding the wishes or whims of the ruler and public purposes as matters synonymous, the experience of the United States, and the decisions of its highest courts, have nevertheless combined to establish it as an economic and legal principle under a free government of the very first importance. The record of this experience may be told as follows: In 1872 the legislature of the state of Kansas passed a law authorizing counties and towns of that state "to encourage the establishment of manufactories and such other enterprises as may tend to develop" such counties or towns by the direct appropriation of money, or by the issue of bonds to any amount that the local authorities might consider expedient; and under this act the city of Topeka created and issued its bonds, to the extent of $100,000, and gave the same "as a donation," a majority of voters approving, to an iron-bridge company, as a consideration for establishing and operating their shops within the limits of the city. The interest coupons first due on these bonds were promptly paid by the city out of a fund raised by taxation for that purpose, but subsequently, when the second coupons became due, and the bonds had passed out of the possession of the bridge company by bona fide sale to a loan association, the city repudiated its obligations, on the ground that the legislature of Kansas had no authority, under the constitution of the state, to authorize the issue of bonds, the interest and principal of which were to be paid from the proceeds of taxes, for any such purpose as the encouragement of manufacturing enterprises. Legal proceedings to enforce payment were thereupon commenced by the bondholders in the United States circuit court, and judgment having been there given for the city, the case was appealed to the United States supreme court, where, with only one dissenting voice, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the following opinions or statement of principles involved given: "It must be conceded," said the court, through Mr. Justice Miller, "that there are rights in every free government beyond the control of the state. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unbounded control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism." * * "The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations of such powers which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, which are respected by all governments entitled to the name." * * "Of all the powers conferred upon the government, that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be lawfully used, and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there are no implied limitations of the uses for which the power may be exercised. To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less robbery because it is done under the forms of the law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms. Nor is it taxation. Beyond a cavil there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. * * It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense, and what is not. But in the case before us, in which towns are authorized to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the inn-keeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner, are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer, which would not open the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the business men of the city or town."

—Other judicial authorities in the United States to whom weight is accorded, have also concurred in this opinion. Thus, Thos. M. Cooley, one of the justices of the supreme court of Michigan, and professor of law in the university of that state, in his work, "Principles of Constitutional Law," thus defines the limits of taxation under the constitution of the United States: "Constitutionally a tax can have no other basis than the raising of revenue for public purposes, and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis, is tyrannical and unlawful. A tax on imports, therefore, the purpose of which is not to raise a revenue, but to discourage and indirectly prohibit some particular import for the benefit of some home manufacture, may well be questioned, as being merely colorable, and therefore not warranted by constitutional principles." The question at issue has also formed the subject of review by the supreme court of the state of Maine, and the following are extracts from the opinions given by the members of this tribunal respecting the limitations on the powers of a free government to impose taxes: "No public exigency can require private spoliation for the private benefit of favored individuals. If the citizen is protected in his property by the constitution against the public, much more is he against private rapacity." "If it were proposed to pass an act enabling the inhabitants of the several towns to vote to transfer the farms, or the horses, or oxen, or a part thereof, from the rightful owner or owners to some manufacturer, whom the majority might select, the monstrousness of such proposed legislation would be transparent. But the mode by which property would be taken from one or many, and given to another, or others, can make no difference in the underlying principle. It is the taking that constitutes the wrong, no matter how taken." "Taxation," said the chief justice (in giving an opinion adverse to the right of a town to grant aid, under a permissible statute of the state legislature, to a manufacturing enterprise), "by the very meaning of the term, implies the raising of money for public uses, and excludes the raising of it for private objects and purposes." "No authority or even dictum can be found," observes Dillon, C. J., in Hanson vs. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, "which asserts that there can be any legitimate taxation, when the money to be raised does not go into the public treasury, or is not destined for the use of the government, or some of the governmental divisions of the state." "If there is any proposition about which there is an entire and uniform weight of judicial authority, it is that taxes are to be imposed for the use of the people of the state in the varied and manifold purposes of government, and not for private objects or the special benefit of individuals. While the state is bound to protect all, it ceases to give that just protection, when it affords undue advantages, or gives special and exclusive privileges to particular individuals and particular and special industries at the cost and charge of the rest of the community." In short, the right of a government to levy discriminating taxes for purposes other than for defraying public expenditures, even though any injustice thereby done to the individual is more than compensated by some indirect benefit to the entire community, is one of those forms of procedure on the part of the state which is antagonistic to the principles of a free government, and which, if fully recognized and broadly carried out, will of necessity be utterly destructive of it; and in respect to which, as in the case of a tax to support an established church, or of a law compelling every man to help catch a fugitive slave, the dissent and resistance of even one citizen makes unjust any enactment authorizing such procedure.

—Subjects of Taxation. The subjects of taxation, to use a happy generalization of the United States supreme court (Foreign-held Bond Case, 15 Wallace), "are persons, property and business. Whatever form taxation may assume, whether as duties, imposts, excises or licenses, it must relate to one of these subjects. It is not possible to conceive of any other though as applied to them the taxation may be exercised in a great variety of ways."

—A tax upon a person is a "poll" or head tax. The essential requisite of a poll tax is, that it be laid on all polls, and be unvarying in amount. A varying poll tax would be an arbitrary exaction, and would not be sustained for a moment as a proper exercise of the right of taxation, if laid without reference to a man's ownership of property. So soon, however, as the amount of the tax exacted is made dependent upon the amount of the property owned, the tax ceases to be a varying poll tax and becomes a tax on the property itself.

—Apportionment of Taxation. This department of the subject of taxation, while the most practical, and, therefore, the most interesting, is at the same time the one most obscure, and the one about which there is the most striking difference of opinion among writers on economic and fiscal subjects. The following four maxims, or canons, laid down by Adam Smith in his "Wealth of Nations," have attained a world-wide celebrity, and are almost always referred to in all discussions of the subject. 1. "The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." 2. "The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty." 3. "Every tax ought to be levied at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it." 4. "Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."

—Almost universally accepted, as the embodiment of the highest wisdom, these four canons or maxims have been, and are, nevertheless, open to some criticism. In the first place, they are so general in their nature, and so lacking in any precise rule or test for application, that they stand in the light of aphorisms, somewhat as the maxims "Honesty is the best policy," "Never put off till to-morrow what can be done to-day," etc., to which all respect is always given, except the desirable one, of practical use in actual cases. In fact, the originators of the very worst forms of taxation now existing, might and probably would plead, that their methods or practices were based on the ideas of Adam Smith, or were as near in conformity to them as was possible under the existing circumstances. Again, the first maxim or canon embodies two propositions antagonistic to each other, and one of which can hardly be considered correct, namely, that every citizen should pay taxes for the support of the government in proportion to his ability; for if, as almost all authorities are now agreed, taxes are the compensation which persons or property pay to the state for protection, then it of necessity follows, that where there is no protection, ability is no just guide for assessment. "Where there is no protection," said Judge Story (in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 276) "there can be no claim to allegiance or obedience" And that Adam Smith did not intend to have his first proposition fully accepted would seem evident from the circumstance that he added to it, and qualified it with these other words, "that is, in proportion to the revenue which they (the citizens) respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." Montesquieu, who wrote at an earlier date, also enunciated even more clearly this common-sense and equitable principle, when he said (see "Spirit of the Laws"), "that the public revenues ought not to be measured by the people's abilities to give, but by what they ought to give." "And what they ought to give," as has been remarked by another writer, "can of course be only measured by the benefit they are to derive."

—The True Measure of the Burden of Taxation on Production. In addition to the maxims or canons proposed by Adam Smith, another, first pointed out by Mr. Edward Atkinson, of Massachusetts, is worthy of being added, and may even be regarded in the light of a fundamental principle; and that is, that the burden or injurious effect of a tax on production or exchange, is not to be measured by the ratio which the tax may bear to the gross value of the subject of taxation, but rather by the proportion which the tax bears to the profit which might normally or naturally result from undertaking a certain line of industry or product. To practically illustrate this, let us take an example. Let us suppose two men, A and B, to start shops for the manufacture of machinery, each with a capital of $20,000, and that each in his operations expends $20,000 for coal and iron, $40,000 in wages, and $4,000 for transportation to the shops of the raw materials for manufacture. The total cost of the annual product of each shop will then be $64,000, or a little more than three times the capital; and a sale of their respective products, at the net price of $66,000, would yield the owners $2,000, or 10 per cent. profit. Now, suppose further, that under such conditions, A has a tax imposed upon him of 3 1/8 per cent. upon the value of his product; it may be a customs or excise tax, or an increased rate of railroad freight. This amounts to $2,000 on $64,000 of product; no excessive burden, it may be said, and only requiring A to sell his $66,000 for $2,000 additional. But suppose A can not get this $2,000 additional; and he certainly can not, if the other man, B, is exempt from this 3 1/8 per cent. tax, or contrives to evade it, and competes with A in the open market. Then, in such a case, this 3 1/8 per cent. tax upon product manifests itself as 10 per cent. upon the entire investment, and absorbs the entire profits, which otherwise might have been realized; so that the business of A first drags, then stagnates, and is finally abandoned; while his workmen are discharged, the village where the shop is located runs down, the artisans, shopkeepers and professional men connected with it complain of hard times, and emigrate from the locality or the country, while the railroad fails to confer all the benefit to the community or profit to its stockholders that might be possible. B, on the other hand, exempt from the tax, keeps on working, and, when hard times come, continues his sales and the occupations of his workmen by taking five per cent. profits instead of ten, and selling his goods, as he can afford to, at reduced prices, to meet temporary conditions. Actual practical illustrations of the injustice and disaster consequent on such discrimination in respect to tax burdens and exemptions are afforded on a small scale in the history of much railroad management, and to a larger extent where two nations, with different systems of taxation, undertake to compete with each other in the sale of the products of their labor in the common markets of the world. We find here an explanation, also, of the immediate beneficial effects which attended the first tentative measures of reform in the British tariff instituted by Sir Robert Peel in 1842 and 1845, which, although consisting mainly in the removal of numerous small but obstructive duties, nevertheless started British industry forward by leaps and bounds, even before the larger burdens of tariff restrictions were removed in later years.

—Popular Theory of Taxation in the United States Stated and Examined. The general idea which constitutes the basis of the system of local taxation mainly recognized in the United States (though not in other countries) is founded on the assumption, that in order to tax equitably, it is necessary to tax everything; the term everything being at the same time used in a sense so indefinite as to embrace not merely things in the nature of physical actualities other than persons, but also persons, income, rights, representatives of property, titles, trusts, conclusions of law, debts, and, in short, any act of assessing capable of resulting in the obtaining of revenue. As a logical consequence of this idea, the exemption of anything from taxation is furthermore held to be not only impolitic but unjust, and if made necessary by circumstances, as something to be regretted.

—Equally popular and plausible is the argument by which this assumption, and the administrative system based upon it, is upheld and defended. "Is not all property," it is asked, "either directly, or through its owner, protected by the state, or sovereignty?" "Do not all persons owe allegiance to the state?" And if so, "why should not all persons and property contribute to the requirements of the state for revenue, in proportion to their ability?"

—But, popular and plausible as are the arguments and assumptions for such a system of local taxation, which in the case of the United States has been made operative over the persons, property and business of nearly sixty millions of people, and fortified by a vast amount of adjudication, it will require but little investigation and analysis to satisfy any one who can divest himself from the influence of old prejudices, of the truth of the following propositions; first, that the assumption that it is necessary to assess everything in order to tax equitably involves an impossibility, and therefore unavoidable inefficiency, injustice and inequality in administration; second, that, as popularly used in respect to matters pertaining to taxation, the term property is made to apply equally to entities and to symbols or non-entities, which is in itself an absurdity; and finally, that the outcome of all this is a system which powerfully contributes to arrest and hinder natural development, to corrupt society, and is without a parallel in any country claiming to be civilized.

—In the incipient stages of society, where property consisted almost or quite exclusively of things tangible and visible—lands, buildings, slaves, cattle, ships, household effects and implements—and the rate of taxation was small, the theory under consideration was not impracticable in its application, and under most circumstances afforded but little opportunity for the working of injustice in respect to arbitrary discriminations in assessing. But its full execution must, nevertheless, even in the most simple condition of society, have been always attended with great difficulties; for there is nothing which men more abhor in government than personal inquisitions; and, in the language of a committee of the French national assembly of 1789 (of which Talleyrand and Larochefoucald were members), the recognition and practice of such inquisitions by any government is something inconsistent with and antagonistic to the maintenance of a free people.

—It is not generally known, furthermore, that Alexander Hamilton, as a member of the conventions which framed the constitution of the United States, and the first constitution of New York, gave all his influence in favor of the restriction of all internal or local taxation to visible, tangible objects, and to the assessment of these specifically and by some uniform and simple rule. The language used by him in one of his papers (the Constitutionalist) on this subject, is as follows: "The genius of liberty reprobates everything arbitrary or discretionary in taxation. It exacts that every man, by a definite and general rule, should know what proportion of his property the state demands. Whatever liberty we may boast in theory, it can not exist in fact while (arbitrary) assessments continue."

—Again, had nothing come down to us in English history from the time of Edward III., other than one of the assessment rolls of that period (when there was little or no property capable of taxation but what was visible and tangible), the evidence would be complete that the mass of the English people were but little better than slaves; for the mere inspection of such rolls shows that their preparation involved such an inquisitorial scrutiny into domestic life, such a seeing, handling and valuation of everything in the household, from the utensils of the kitchen to the furniture of the bed-chamber, as to make personal freedom, or a sense of self-respect, on the part of the tax payer who submitted to such a scrutiny, almost an impossibility.126 And in connection with this subject, it is interesting to note, that the famous insurrection of English yeomen and peasants under "Wat" the Tyler, in the reign of Richard II., the successor of Edward III., originated directly in the attempt of a tax gatherer or assessor to ascertain, by brutal personal examination, whether a daughter of "Wat" had attained the age of puberty, and in consequence had so become liable to enrollment for capitation assessment.

—But to whatever extent simplicity in the elements of property simplified the original methods and ideas in respect to local taxation, the problem involved rapidly changed, and became more and more intricate as increasing population and increasing commerce and intercommunication required that property should, to a great extent, be put into a condition to admit of being readily mobilized, in order to allow of its most profitable use and application. Thus a large part, in fact, the larger part, of what is to-day termed "personal property" in every highly civilized state, is of the most intangible character, and in great part invisible and incorporeal; such, for example, as negotiable instruments in the form of bills of exchange, state, municipal and corporate bonds, and the multiplied forms of evidence of indebtedness, certificates of stock, copyrights, patents, legal-tender notes, etc., all of which, if entitled to the name of property, is, through a great variety of circumstances constantly fluctuating in value; is offset or measured by indebtedness which may never be the same one hour with another; is easy of transfer, and, as essential to using, is in fact continually transferred from one locality to another, and from the jurisdiction of one state to the jurisdiction and laws of another and a different state. In the absence of some superhuman power which will permit that to be seen, which to ordinary vision is invisible, and to know what through the exercise of ordinary reason can not be known, any attempt, therefore, on the part of an assessor to obtain independent cognizance of such commercial and financial instrumentalities for the purpose of valuation and assessment is, on its face, an impossibility; and if the co-operation of the person to be assessed is to be invited or relied on, two of the most powerful influences that can control human action—love of gain, or the unwillingness to part with property, and the desire to avoid publicity in respect to one's private affairs—immediately unite to oppose and prevent such co-operation.

—A resort to personal inquisition, with the accompanying machinery of oaths, "dooming" and penalties, is next in order; under which the state, ignoring all rules enacted for the protection of debtors in the ordinary collection of debts, pursues the citizen for the collection of what it claims to be a debt, with no better result, in nine cases out of ten, than the impairment of the public sense of both justice and morality.127

—But this statement by no means presents all the difficulties that are encountered in the attempt to carry out the popular theory, that it is necessary to tax everything in order to tax equitably. A further large proportion of the so-called personal property of every highly civilized country which is not intangible and invisible, and which requires only ordinary perception for recognition and valuation, is in the nature of instruments or subjects of commerce between states and nations; such as railroad machinery, ships, steamboats, immense stocks of raw and manufactured products accumulated in store for the sole purpose of movement, or actually in transitu. What shall be the situs of all such things for assessment? If actual location is to be determinative, then a product of grain, or merchandise, which, in movement for a market or conversion into other forms, may happen to be in Illinois in April, in Ohio or Massachusetts in May, in New York in July, in New Jersey in August, and in Connecticut in October, will be liable to five separate taxes in one and the same year; for the laws of each of these states require their assessors to return for taxation all such property as at the periods mentioned may be actually within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the taxing authority. On the other hand, if the fiction of law that personal property follows the owner is to govern, then all such property may be taxed where it is not, and be exempt from taxation in the place where it actually is, and where it shares in the benefits that flow from the protective expenditures—police, fire department, etc.—which are incident and necessary to the locality. Furthermore, to tax the instrumentalities or objects of commerce in one locality, and to exempt the same from all direct taxation in another, will clearly not permit the former to enter a common market on an equal basis for competition with the latter. And yet this unjust discrimination is exactly what does result from the attempt of a majority of the states of the federal Union to tax all such instrumentalities or objects under the general head of personal property, and the exemption of the same classes of property from any corresponding assessment in the British provinces of North America, and in all foreign countries with which the United States enter into extensive commercial intercourse and competition. Boards of trade and commercial conventions may pass "deploring" resolutions concerning the decay of American commerce, and committees of congress may continue to investigate the same subject, but so long as ships engaged in the carrying trade on the free ocean, and owned in Canada, England, France, Germany and Holland, are not directly taxed, and ships engaged in competition in the same business, and owned in Portland, Baltimore, New Orleans and San Francisco, are taxed, and taxed heavily, commerce will incline to move in the paths which are made easy and profitable to it. The difference in cost of a single penny in laying down grain at Liverpool, may alone be determinative of the question whether millions of bushels shall be supplied by the wheat fields of the United States, or those of Russia, India or Hungary.

—It is also to be noted, that a very large part of what is termed "personal property" is, through the necessities, policy or organization of governments, made exempt from taxation, as, for example, all instrumentalities and property of a government—its bonds, legal tenders and money—and very generally, also, the deposits and surplus of savings banks. At the present time about one-fifth of all of the personal property of the United States is believed to be embraced within such a category of exemption. And finally, as regards so much of other "personal property" as is tangible and visible and clearly within the jurisdiction and territory of the taxing power, such as articles of personal adornment, clothing, furniture, works of art, musical instruments, books, etc., shall we assume that we have here a class of articles on which it is desirable to levy taxes? Of course the popular answer will be in the affirmative; for are not all these objects, it may be asked, the very ones best fitted to sustain taxation? and are they not in great part luxuries rather than necessities? But how, it may be asked, are you going to tax them? for it is reasonable to suppose that if they are to be taxed, it is to be by a system that works equitably, and not by a system which, by taxing A, and letting B, C and D escape, brings the law into contempt; and, by making the sense of the commission of a wrong on the part of the state the excuse for the commission of another wrong on the part of the individual, gradually undermines the morality of a community that does not wish to be dishonest.

—Distinction between "Real" and "Personal" Property Artificial, and not Natural. As a further help to the understanding of the subject, it is important to here call attention to the circumstance, that the distinction between real and personal property is, to a very great extent, an artificial and not a natural one. Thus, for example, shares in the national debt of France (as well as stock in the bank of France), instrumentalities which in the United States would be regarded as personal property in its most typical form, may by French law be regarded as real estate, and, as such, administered upon. Again, before emancipation in the United States, slaves (which by the federal constitution were recognized as persons) were in some of the states regarded as real estate, and subject to all the laws pertaining to the mortgaging, sale and descent of real property; and at present in Wisconsin, the one species of property which is especially typical of mobility, and is of little value apart from its capability of motion, namely, the rolling stock of railroads, is also made by law real estate. Equally nice is the distinction in the case of machinery. Unattached, or movable, it is personal property; screwed or fastened permanently to the floor or wall, it becomes real estate. An apple upon the tree is real estate; but when fallen, and resting upon the ground, it is not real estate. The attempt to recognize in a system of laws distinctions of property which are purely arbitrary, and which sovereign states may alter at pleasure, are not likely, therefore, to result in anything generally harmonious and satisfactory.

—But the advocates of the infinitesimal system will probably answer, that the fault here is not with the system, but with its administration. Therefore, let a law be made, they say, which will compel every person possessed of such description of property to make and hand in to the assessors a schedule, and certify to its correctness in respect to items and value by oath. But such substantially is already the law in most of the states of the federal Union, and its observance and execution amounts to nothing. Thus, in Ohio, the law subjects to taxation all visible personal property above fifty dollars in value, without any offset of debts; and yet the official reports indicate that not more than one in ten of the adult population of this great and rich state has any property in excess of this amount, which the eye of the law can discover: although investigation will show that it is impossible for a person to dress respectably, or live decently, outside of an alms-house, who has not always at least double this amount of property in his possession. Every intelligent assessor in Ohio, when questioned in respect to the law, will answer, that it can not be executed with even an approximation to exactness, and that a serious attempt to execute it would cause a political revolution; and yet such is the strength of popular prejudice, that any attempt to repeal this law would at present be wholly unsuccessful. In Massachusetts, also, where the law admits no offset of debts against visible and tangible property, and is regarded as complete, and where its execution is acknowledged to be most arbitrary and inquisitorial—some towns publishing each year every known item of each man's personal property, even down to the family pig and a string of sleigh-bells—the most intelligent officials admit that their system is a comparative failure; and almost a complete failure as to reaching evidences of indebtedness, which, as before shown, constitute in modern times so large a part of the personal property of every civilized community. In the state of New York, where the letter of the tax laws in respect to the subjects of taxation is nearly the same as in Massachusetts and Ohio, but the administration less stringent, and where the aggregate of personal property nearly or fully equals in value the aggregate of real property, the proportion of the former returned for taxation is not in excess of one-fifth of the total assessed valuation; while in the great city of New York, with a population of over a million, not 1 per cent. of her citizens stand upon the books of the assessors as possessing any personal property subject to taxation other than shares in banking institutions. In the state of New York the assessed valuation of real estate for the year 1882 was $2,557,218,240, an increase over the preceding year (1881) of $124,556,861; while, on the other hand, the assessed valuation of personal property, in the same state, and under laws that allow but small exemptions, for 1882, was $315,039,085; a decrease from 1881 of $35,982,104. Again, according to the census reports for the United States, the gain in valuation of the real estate of the country between the years 1860 and 1880, was $6,063,760,876; while during the same period the valuation of the personal property of the country declined to the extent of $1,245,287,338. Now, as it is in the nature of an economic axiom, that the market value of the aggregate of land and that of the aggregate of productive capital are equal; and further, that the market value of land is merely the reflection of the value of the productive capital placed upon it, and its immediate vicinity, it follows that the decline in these valuations of personal property above noted, is not real; and simply represents the failure and utter inefficiency of the existing laws which attempt to assess and collect taxes upon such property.

—Such, then, are some of the almost insuperable difficulties, having their origin in the nature of things, and growing out of the correlations of modern civilization, which must be always attendant upon the attempt of any sovereignty to tax everything over which it has dominion or jurisdiction. And hence it is, that, whenever a system of infinitesimal taxation has been projected, its authors have been led, as it were by instinct, to the conclusion, that its execution with any degree of effectiveness must depend upon the employment of extraordinary and arbitrary measures. Thus, the old Romans, who first established the taxation of personal property at the period of the decadence of the empire, and who were not troubled with any restrictions of a constitutional character, or any very nice notions about personal liberty or general morality, clearly perceived this, and accordingly invested their tax officials with the power of administering torture as a means of compelling information and enforcing payment. And thus also have all the officials in every modern state, adopting the infinitesimal system, tried to act, so far as public opinion would uphold them.128

—To complete the record of experience it is only necessary to add, that every effort which has been made in modern times to carry out the infinitesimal system of taxation has proved so uncertain and unsatisfactory, that every country, with the exception of Holland and the states of the federal Union of North America, have abandoned the project as something wholly impractical.129 —Considerations respecting an Income Tax. Recognizing the difficulties attendant upon the attempt to collect taxes from a multitude of objects and by a large variety in methods of assessment, many economists and writers on the subject of taxation are inclined to fall back upon and recommend an income tax, as the one system of taxation most free from objection. What can be fairer, it is said, than that each person should pay in proportion to his annual net gain or income? But practically an equitable assessment, based on the known income of each man, is an idea that never has been and never can be realized. When we come to enacting laws for the collection of revenue, we must take human nature as we find it, and laws which are directly antagonistic to the two most powerful influences that can control human action—love of gain and a desire to avoid publicity in regard to one's private affairs—can never be efficiently administered. Under this head take one illustration. In 1868, with a federal law assessing all incomes over $1,000, and with a trained corps of officials, only 259,385 persons, out of a population of nearly 40,000,000, acknowledged the receipt of any taxable income; and when the exemption was increased to $2,000, the number of persons who paid an income tax was reduced to 116,000; and subsequently ran down to 71,000. Experience, therefore, would seem to demonstrate that an exemption in the United States of $2,000 of income accredited to each individual (for, with a view of keeping up an appearance of equity, the amount of exemption was allowed to be deducted from all incomes), would exempt more than nine-tenths of the property and more than ninety-nine hundredths of the property owners of the United States from this tax. Under such circumstances it is a misnomer to call such an exaction taxation.

—Again, unless an income tax is an exclusive tax, or if it forms (as in most instances it would) an element of a general system of taxation, it must necessarily involve double taxation; first, on the property yielding the income, and second, on the income itself. If the property yielding the income were under the jurisdiction and control of one state, and the person receiving the income was a resident of some other state, the duplication could hardly be avoided. All modern systems of income taxation have recognized the principle of discriminating in favor of persons in the receipt of comparatively small incomes; and have provided as a fundamental feature of their policy, that all incomes below a certain sum (usually a small amount) should be exempted from assessment. Thus, for example, the existing income tax of Great Britain commences with an assessment on incomes of £150 ($750) and upward, and exempts all incomes of a smaller amount. In the United States the income tax, as first enacted in 1863, exempted $600 annual income for each person, together with whatever was paid annually for rent and repairs of residence. But under this form of an income tax there can be no equality between taxed producers and untaxed producers; and more especially, as with any considerable amount of exemption, the untaxed producers will be the most numerous and the greatest producers in quantity as a body. 130 No man is a free man the fruits of whose industry and capital are subject to surcharged (overburdened) exactions to an unlimited degree, and from which his immediate competitors are entirely exempt. Equality of taxation of all persons and property brought into open competition under like circumstances, is necessary to produce equality of condition for all, in all production, and in all the enjoyments of life, liberty and property. And any government, whatever name it may assume, is a despotism, and commits acts of flagrant spoliation, if it grants exemptions or exacts a greater or less rate of tax from one man than from another man, on account of the one owning or having in his possession more or less of the same class of property which is subject to the tax. If it were proposed to levy a tax of 5 per cent. on annual incomes below $750 or $2,000 in amount, and exempt all incomes above these sums, the unequal and discriminating character of the exemption would be at once apparent; and yet an income tax exempting all incomes below these is equally unjust and discriminating. In either case the exemption can not be founded or defended on any sound principles of free constitutional government; and is simply a manifestation of tyrannical power, under whatever form of government it may be enforced. The experience of Great Britain is often adduced as evidence in favor of the practicability and expediency of an income tax. But be this as it may, it would not seem to require argument to prove that any attempt to assess and collect an income tax which should be equal and have none of the features of spoliation or confiscation, from the sparse population of the United States extending from Florida to Alaska, would be entirely unpractical; and that unless the rate was excessive, the taxes received would not pay the cost of assessment and collection; while the rights of property, the great republican principle of equality before the law, and constitutional law itself, would alike preclude any exemption of any income derived from like property.

—Regarding the record of experience as thus detailed, it is not surprising, that many, perhaps a majority, of economists, are ready to believe (as was stated at the outset, in this article), that there is no such thing as a science of taxation, and no definite rules for practical guidance adapted to all circumstances; and, despairing of coming to any more satisfactory conclusion, are willing to accept the maxim of M. Say, the celebrated French economist, that the best system of government finance is to spend little, and the best taxation that which is least in amount. Keeping steadily in view, however, the nature, object and scope of taxation as before defined, together with the acknowledged results of experience, and pursuing the investigation further, it is nevertheless the opinion of the writer, that certain conclusions can be reached which will commend themselves for acceptation as in the nature of principles and as infallible guides for administrative purposes.

—Nothing can not be Something for the purposes of Legitimate Taxation. And as one of the first and most important steps that can be taken in such investigation, it is most desirable that all who wish to understand this subject should clearly comprehend, (and which, absurd as the averment may seem, comparatively few do now comprehend), that nothing can not be something; or, in other words, that property is always a physical actuality, which has become valuable or property, by some form of labor, and can not be created by mere paper documents, except to the extent of the value of the paper and the writing or printing upon it. In other words, a title to property, a representative of property, can no more be property, than a shadow can be a substance: and if this conclusion be true, then it would seem to follow, of necessity, that the act of making debts, bonds, verbal or written contracts, notes, book accounts, mortgages, warehouse receipts, titles, certificates of stock, or any form of salable or transferable rights, is not a creation or production of any new property, but simply an exchange, by contract or operation of law, of the rights and titles of parties in preexisting property; and that any tax on any of these rights or titles is only another form of burdening the property which is the subject of the rights or titles. Enact such laws, also, in respect to taxing titles as we may, experience will prove that taxes can not be practically levied on imaginary things, or legal fictions, because it is some physical actuality, in the sense of embodied labor, that must, after all, and in the end, pay all taxes. If legislatures have the power of creating fiat property, that is, imaginary or fictitious property, it is beyond their power to make it pay taxes, for nothing less than omnipotence can make something out of nothing.131 On the other hand, let us consider, for a moment, the converse of this proposition, namely, that titles are property, and, as such, ought not to be exempted from taxation. If this is so, then it would seem to follow, that, by making titles, we can make property; and that when a man mortgages his farm for $10,000, the community have ten thousand dollars' worth of real estate and ten thousand dollars' worth of personal property, where, before the execution of the mortgage, there was only the specified value of the real estate. Again, if the title is the property, then either the actuality is not property where it exists, or else we have two things occupying the same place at the same time. Credits and titles, of themselves, have no value, and, separated from the things they represent, they can not honestly be sold at all. Who will buy them? But we know the character of the men who will sell them; and that their representatives can always be found in a state's penal institutions.—"A contract," says Ex-President Woolsey (Political Science, vol. i., p. 75), "does not create a right, but only transfers rights. A contract implies in each party a right to do that which the contract relates, and to pass over to another what is my own. If I have no right to use my labor according to my will, or have no property in a thing, I can not transfer the product of my labor, or what I have in my hands, to another. It is thus the exercise in a special case, for the benefit of another, of a right already existing. I can not make that the property of another, by contract, which is not mine already. Were it otherwise—were contracts a source of new power—it would be stronger than God." This is a brief statement of the true nature of a contract or obligation, and a complete refutation of the popular theory that the creation of debts is a creation of property. Again, when attempts have been made to claim salvage for the recovery of bills of exchange, or other titles to property, from wrecks, the courts have decided that salvage in such cases is not allowable; and, therefore, have practically held that credits and titles are not property, but mere rights to property, and in the case of negotiable instruments, when destroyed by fire or otherwise, the right under the destroyed instrument still remains, and can be enforced in courts when identified. A clear comprehension, then, of the facts, that property is embodied labor; that property can alone suffice to pay taxes; that rights, titles and franchises are but the representatives of property; and that, having subjected the property to taxation, there is no sense or equity in again assessing its representative, will at once divest the problem of taxation from many embarrassments which now seem to invest it, greatly simplify it, and go far toward the determination of sound and fixed tax principles.

—What Constitutes an Exemption in Taxation. A word here in reference to the popular idea that the exemption of any form of property is to grant a favor to those who possess such property. An exemption is freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable; but in case of the exclusion of an entire class of property from primary taxation, no person is liable, and therefore there is no exemption. An exclusion of all milk from taxation, while whisky is taxed, is not an exemption; for the two are not competing articles, or articles of the same class. It is true, that highly excessive taxation of a given article may cause another and similar article, in some instances, to become a substitute or competing article; and hence the necessity of care and moderation in establishing the rate of taxation. We do not consider that putting a given article into the free list, under the tariff, is an exemption to any particular individual; but if we make the rate higher on one tax payer or on one importer of the same article than on another tax payer or importer, we grant an exemption. We use the word "exemption," therefore, imperfectly, when we speak of "the exemption of an entire class of property," as, for example, upon all personal property; for if the removal of the burden operates uniformly on all of such, then there can be no primary exemption.

—The Theory and Necessity of Infinitesimal Taxation not supported by either Reason or Experience. If the above reasoning in respect to exemptions in respect to taxation be correct, it follows that it is not necessary, in order to burden equitably and uniformly all persons and property, to tax primarily all persons and property within the taxing district. But as this proposition is in direct opposition to popular theory (at least in the United States), appeal will first be made to the evidence of its truth, derived from the results of actual experience. It is a matter beyond dispute, that the universal, infinitesimal system of taxation is unsatisfactory and unjust, and that the more extensively and rigorously it is administered and applied, the more unequal and impracticable it becomes. On this point the proof already submitted is indisputable. On the other hand, the testimony is equally complete, that the more of simplicity we can introduce into a tax system, and the more the assessment can be restricted to a few articles, the more satisfactory the system becomes. There are places and countries where personal property is entirely, or in a great degree, excluded from taxation, as, for example, the cities of Philadelphia and Montreal,132 and the countries of England and France, and where the burden of the expenses of the state is made to fall primarily and almost exclusively upon realty; and the result is an absolute demonstration, "that a complicated and inquisitorial system of separate taxation of goods and chattels is wholly unnecessary, an obstruction to trade, an injury to production, an unnecessary invasion of private affairs, and a self-torment inflicted on land itself."

—Great Britain, commencing several hundred years ago with a system which contemplated taxing everything, has gradually reduced her tax list to some six or eight articles or sources under the customs, and to an equally limited number under her excise and local systems; and, with every degree of concentration, the relief experienced by the whole population, and the impetus given to material development, has been all but universally acknowledged. In France, also, where the number of owners of real estate, in proportion to population, is greater than in any other country, the essential features of a concentrated system also prevail for local, and, to a limited extent, for general, taxation. And in the case of the United States, it is to be further noted, that the national government, except under the exigencies of a great war, has always recognized in her tax laws the desirability of simplicity and concentration; and that now, although the present system does not tax directly the one-fiftieth part of the property of the country, all parties are agreed that a further limitation of the sources of national revenue is most desirable. But it is curious to note, that while no sensible person entertains the idea that the taxes levied by the national government on spirits, fermented liquors, or tobacco, or upon any imported articles, are paid by the producer or importer, except so far as he is a consumer of the same, the exactly opposite doctrine appears to prevail in the United States in respect to the incidence of local taxation; and the principle which has constituted the basis of most of the state legislation on this subject seems to have been, "that whatever is not taxed directly is necessarily exempt."

—Let us appeal next from the logic of practical experience to the logic of common sense. The theory of infinitesimal taxation, if fully and completely executed, must logically lead, not only to the taxation of every cent in value of every kind of property within the borders of every state, county, township or municipality, but it would require a regular system of custom house espionage, and an army of officers to levy and collect taxes, by a multiplicity of rates upon all goods or property introduced into each township or municipality. If, however, this is not done, what becomes of the vaunted idea, that equality of taxation requires that every particle of property should be subject to a direct burden? But, fortunately for the prosperity of communities, this idea of what is necessary to produce equality of taxation is fallacious, and it is likewise fortunate, that it can be demonstrated that this false system, when partially or fully developed, produces unmitigated evil and inequality.

—All Taxation ultimately and necessarily falls on Consumption. Property is solely produced to supply human wants and desires; and taxes, like all other expenses which enter into the cost of production, must finally be sustained by those who gratify these wants or desires by consumption. Production is only a means, and consumption is the end, and the consumer must pay in the end all the expenses of production. The state is an active and important partner in all production. Without its assistance and protection, production would be impeded or wholly arrested. The soldier or policeman guards, while the citizen performs his labor in safety. As a partner in all the forms of production and business, the state must pay its expenses, i.e., its agents, for their services; and its only means of paying are through its receipts from taxation. Taxes legitimately levied, then, are a part of the cost of all production, and there can be no more tendency for taxes to remain upon the persons who immediately pay them, than there is for rents, the cost of insurance, water supply and fuel to follow the same law. The person who wishes to use or destroy the utility of property by consumption to gratify his desires, or satisfy his wants, can not obtain it from the owners or producers with their consent, except by gift, without giving pay or services for it; and the average price of all property is coincident with the cost of production, including the taxes advanced upon it, which are a part of its cost in the hands of the seller. Again, no person who produces any form of property or utility, for the purpose of sale or rent, sustains any burden of legitimate taxation, although he may be a tax advancer; for, as a tax advancer, he is the agent of the state, and a tax collector from the consumer. But he who produces or buys, and does not sell or rent, but consumes, is the tax payer, and sustains a tax in his aggregate consumption, where all taxation must ultimately rest. In short, no person bears the burden of taxation, under an equitable, legitimate system, except upon the property which he applies to his own exclusive use in ultimate consumption. The great consumer is the only great tax payer.133 —Proportional Taxes on all things of any given Class will be diffused and equalized on all other Property. The examination of the tax rolls in any state, city or municipality, will show that surprisingly small numbers of persons primarily pay or advance any kind of taxes. Thus, it is not probable that more than one-tenth of the adult population, or about one-twentieth of the entire population of the United States, ever come in contact officially with a tax assessor or tax collector. It is also estimated that less than 250,000, or less than ½ of 1 per cent. of the total population of the United States, advance the entire customs and internal revenue of the federal government. It is therefore apparent, that there must be some natural law governing the diffusion of taxes; and if the great mass of the community did not instinctively recognize the existence of such a law, or, to speak more practically, if they did not feel and certainly know, as it were by instinct, and not by education, that the higher the taxes in any state, community or country, the higher their food, fuel, clothing and rents, and the higher the cost of all production, then why should the ninety and nine of the mass of the people take any interest in the fiscal affairs of the state? And why, if only the few who see the tax collector are the ones who pay all, or the major part, of the taxes, is it not for the interest of the many that expenditures on the part of the state should always be as large as possible? Why not have largesses out of the public treasury as in the days of old Rome? Why not public amusements for the many at the public expense? Why not tax the very rich exclusively? Adam Smith undoubtedly first gave the clue to the real and true law when he says "that no tax can ever reduce for any considerable time the rate of profit in any particular trade, which must always keep its level with other trades in the neighborhood." In other words, "taxes and profits, by the operation of the laws of human nature, constantly tend to equate themselves. Man is always prompted to engage in the most profitable occupation and to make the most profitable investment. And since the emancipation from feudalism, with its sumptuary laws, legal regulations of the price of labor and merchandise, and other arbitrary governmental invasions of private rights, individual judgment and self-interest have been recognized as the best tests or arbiters of the profitableness of a given investment or occupation. The average profits, therefore, of one form of investment, or of one occupation (as originally shown by Adam Smith), must for any long period equal the average profits of other investments and occupations, whether taxed or untaxed, skill, risk and agreeableness of occupation being taken into consideration.134 Natural laws will, accordingly, always produce an equilibrium of burden between taxed and untaxed things and persons. We produce to consume, and consume to produce, and the cost of consumption, including taxes, enters into the cost of production, and the cost of production, including taxes, enters into the cost of consumption, and thus taxes levied uniformly on things of the same class, by the laws of competition, supply and demand, and the all-pervading mediums of labor, will be distributed, percussed and repercussed to a remote degree, until they finally fall upon every person, not in proportion to his consumption of a given article, but in proportion to his aggregate consumption. The capitalist bears no greater burden of taxation (and can not be made to bear more by any laws that can be properly termed tax laws) than the proportion which his aggregate individual consumption bears to the aggregate individual consumption of all others in his circuit of immediate competition; and as to his other taxes, he is a mere tax collector, or conduit, conducting taxes from his tenants or borrowers to the state or city treasury. A whisky distiller is a tax conduit, or tax collector, and sells more taxes than the original cost of whisky. A dealer in imported goods keeps on hand a stock of accumulated taxes—imposts, excises, state, city and local taxes; the farmer charges taxes in the price of his products; the laborer, in his wages; the clergyman, in his salary; the lender, in the interest he receives; the lawyer, in his fees; and the manufacturer, in his goods. A Bible printed by the Bible society is always in part loaded with a whisky and tobacco tax, paid by the printers, paper-makers and book-binders, or paid by the producers of articles consumed by these mechanics, and reflected and embodied in their wages and the products of their labor, according to the degree of absence of competition from fellow-mechanics who abstain from the use of these and other taxed articles. The traveler who stops at one of the great city hotels can not avoid reimbursing the owner for the tax he primarily pays on the property; and the owner, in respect to the taxation of his hotel property, is but a great and effective real estate and diffused tax collector. And so all proportional contributions to the state from direct competitors are diffused upon things and persons in the taxing jurisdiction, by a uniformity as manifest as is the pressure upon water, which is known to be uniform in all directions." (Isaac Sherman.)135

—Any primary tax payer, who does not ultimately consume the thing taxed, and who does not include the tax in the price of the taxed property, or its products, must literally throw away his money and must soon become bankrupt, and disappear as a competitor; and accordingly the tax advancer will add the tax in his prices, if he understands simple addition. When Dr. Franklin was asked by a committee of the English house of commons, prior to the American revolution, if the province of Pennsylvania did not practically relieve farmers and other land owners from taxation, and at the same time impose a heavy tax on merchants, to the injury of British trade, he answered, that "if such special tax was imposed, the merchants were experts with their pens, and added the tax to the price of their goods, and thus made the farmers and all land owners pay their part of the tax as consumers."

—These and other like investigations and experiences would, therefore, seem to warrant the annunciation and establishment of the following as great fundamental principles in taxation. Equality of taxation consists in a uniform assessment of the same articles or class of property that is subject to taxation. Taxes under such a system equate and diffuse themselves; and if levied with certainty and uniformity upon tangible property and fixed signs of property, they will, by a diffusion and repercussion, reach and burden all visible property, and also all of the so-called "invisible and intangible" property, with unerring certainty and equality. All taxation ultimately and necessarily falls on consumption; and the burden of every man, under any equitable system of taxation, and which no effort will enable him to avoid, will be in the exact proportion, or ratio, which his aggregate consumption maintains to the aggregate consumption of the taxing district, state or community of which he is a member.

—It is not, however, contended, that unequal taxation on competitors of the same class, persons or things, diffuses itself; whether such inequality be the result of intention or of defective laws, and their more defective administration. And doubtless one prime reason why economists and others interested have not accepted the law of diffusion of taxes as here given, is, that they see, as the practical workings of the tax systems they live under, or have become practically familiar with, that taxes in many instances do seem to remain on the person who immediately pays them; and fail to see that such result is due—as in the case of the taxation of large classes of the so-called personal property—to the adoption of a system which does not permit of equality in assessment, and therefore can not be followed by anything of equality in diffusion. Such persons may not unfairly be compared to physicists, who, constantly working with imperfect instruments, and constantly obtaining, in consequence, defective results, come at last to regard their errors as in the nature of established truths.

—Benefits of limiting Taxation to a few Classes of Things. "By limiting the sources or number of primary taxes we limit the sphere of government and the number and sphere of officials. We limit the sources of official corruption, and we give strength to free institutions by leaving the distribution of taxes, in infinitesimal form, to individual judgment and individual enterprise and competition, the great motor forces in all free government, rather than to the acts of officials, which must all be more or less arbitrary, inquisitorial and offensive; and if in any degree effective, must be executed by espionage, oaths and domiciliary visits, which are not in harmony with the spirit of the age and of free government."

—Conclusion. The subject admits of elaboration and illustration to a much greater extent; but the general conclusions to which all investigation seems to lead, and which in all or part may be worthy of being regarded as principles, may be collectively stated or recapitulated as follows: 1. The right to tax is inherent in every sovereignty, and rests upon necessity. 2. The right to impose a tax, if it exists at all, "is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits." 3. The subjects of taxation are persons, property and business. 4. Equality of taxation consists in imposing an equal burden upon all subjects—persons or things—of immediate competition. When this principle is violated, the act of taking, or the enforced contribution, is no longer entitled to be considered taxation, but becomes at once arbitrary spoliation or confiscation. 5. "All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation, but those over whom it does not extend are, on the soundest principles, exempt from taxation." (Chief Justice Marshall, opinion United States supreme court.) The limitations of territorial sovereignty and the limitations of the taxing power are therefore coextensive. 6. Protection is the correlative of taxation; or taxes, under any government claiming to be free, are the compensation which property pays the state for its protection. "Taxation" without protection, is, therefore, a misnomer. Its proper designation is spoliation. 7. Legitimate taxation must be on account of and limited to public purposes; "and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis, is tyrannical and unlawful." (Cooley, "Principles of Constitutional Law.") 8. Every citizen should pay taxes, not in proportion to his ability to give, but according to what he ought to give; and what he ought to give can only be measured by the benefit he is to derive; or, as Adam Smith expressed it, "in proportion to the revenue which they (the citizens) enjoy under the protection of the state." 9. The burden or injurious effect of a tax on production or exchange is not to be measured by the ratio which the tax may bear to the gross value of the subject of taxation, but rather by the proportion which the tax bears to the profit that might result from undertaking a certain line of industry. 10. Property, in its true sense, as a subject for taxation, is always a physical actuality; and all experience proves that taxes can not be practically levied on imaginary things, or legal fictions, because it is some physical actuality, in the sense of embodied labor, that must in the end pay all taxes. 11. The exemption of any part of the property of the same class which is made the subject of taxation, is spoliation of that part which is discriminatingly burdened. On the other hand, the exclusion of an entire class of property is not an exemption. 12. Proportional taxes on all things of any given class will be diffused and equalized on all other property. 13. All taxation ultimately and necessarily falls on consumption, and the burden of every man, under any equitable system of taxation, which no effort will enable him directly to avoid, will be in the exact proportion, or ratio, which his aggregate consumption sustains to the aggregate consumption of the taxing district, state or community of which he is a member.

—For practical guidance in devising or administering a system of taxation, intended to meet the wants of states or communities exposed to the competition of similar and competing organizations, the following rule or motto, proposed by Mr. Enoch Ensley, of Memphis, Tennessee, may be also regarded as in the nature almost of a tax axiom: "Never tax anything that would be of value to your state, that could or would run away, or that could and would come to you."

—Taxation Bibliography. Economic literature in all languages is very deficient in simple, and at the same time clear and comprehensive, works on the subject of the principles of taxation. No department of political economy, as stated at the commencement of this review, is more obscure or so little understood. Foremost in sources of information, to which the reader who desires to independently investigate is referred, is the chapter on Taxation in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Apart from this, there is probably no one treatise, which any considerable number of economists are willing to accept as standard or authoritative, certainly in all departments. The best modern book, in the opinion of the writer, is J. R. M'Culloch's work, Taxation and Funding, 8vo, London, 1845. This work, however, is out of print, and difficult to obtain, but it can be found in most large libraries. The following other works may be recommended or mentioned. The People's Blue Book: Taxation as it is and as it ought to be, by Chas. Tennant, 16mo, London, 1872. This book is very complete in respect to the tax laws of Great Britain and their administration; and also discusses, in a very readable and generally correct manner, the theory and history of taxation. The Science of Taxation, Leroy-Beaulieu, 2 vols., 8vo, Paris, 1877. This is the best work in any foreign language on taxation. Taxation of Fixed Capital, M. Menier, 16mo, Paris, 1877; English translation, London, 1880. Sur la Proprieté, Thiers, Paris. The chapter on taxation in this work is a luminous exposition of the principle of diffusion of equal taxation. Garnier, Elements des Finances, Paris, 1862-5, and De Parieu, Traité des impots, Paris, 1858, may also be mentioned. Local Government and Taxation, Cobden Club Essays, 8vo, London; a series of essays, presenting the best exposition of the existing systems of taxation in countries other than England and the United States—as Scotland, Ireland, Australia, Holland, Belgium, France, Russia and Spain. The Taxation of the United Kingdom, Baxter, 8vo, London. This work is out of print. It gives an analysis of British taxation, and discusses with great ability some of the most important questions connected with this subject. See also Noble's The Queen's Taxes, 8vo, London, 1870, and Dowell's Sketch of the History of Taxes in England, from the earliest times to the present day, vol. i., to the civil war of 1542, 8vo, London, 1876.

—Essays:First and Second Reports of the Commissioners appointed to revise the laws for the Assessment and Collection of Taxes in the State of New York, David A. Wells, Chairman. As public documents these reports are now out of print. The first of these reports was republished by Harper 8 Bros., New York; and editions of both reports were republished in England and France. The Taxation of Railroad Securities, considered theoretically, and also with reference to actual experiences in the United States and Europe, by a Committee of State Railroad Commissioners, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Chairman. Rational Principles of Taxation, by David A. Wells, Proceedings of the American Social Science Association for 1874. Theory and Practices of Local Taxation in the United States, do., Atlantic Monthly, 1876; The Reform of Local Taxation, do., North American Review, April, 1876; Are Titles and Debts Property? do., Atlantic Monthly, September, 1877. Twelve Letters on the Future of New York, by Geo. H. Andrews, Commissioner of Taxes, 8vo, New York, 1877. Taxation in Massachusetts, by W. J. Minot, 8vo, Boston, 1877. Exclusive Taxation of Real Estate, by Isaac Sherman, New York, October, 1874. The Tax Question: What should be taxed, and how it should be taxed, by Enoch Ensley, Memphis, Tenn., 1873. Taxation: A Plain Talk for Plain People, by Jas. II. Canfield, 8vo, 1883, New York, published by the Society for Political Education. All of the above papers contain valuable information respecting the inequalities and character of the systems of local taxation in the United States. They can not all be easily purchased, but can usually be obtained for reference. For works expressing views antagonistic to those advanced in this article respecting the nature of property, and of credits and titles, the reader is referred to the works of H. D. Macleod, especially Principles of Political Philosophy, 2 vols., London, 1872; and to Political Economy, by Prof. A. L. Perry, New York, 18th ed., 1883.

DAVID A. WELLS.

TAXATION

TAXATION, National and Local. (See REVENUE, PUBLIC; TAXATION.)

TAYLOR

TAYLOR, Zachary, president of the United States 1849-50, was born in Orange county, Va., Nov. 24, 1784, and died at Washington city, July 9, 1850. In 1808 he obtained a commission in the army as lieutenant, and in the war which followed he rose to the rank of major. At the outbreak of the Mexican war he held the rank of major general, and was in command of the army which advanced through Texas into northern Mexico and won a series of victories ending with Buena Vista. In 1848 he was the whig candidate for president, and was elected. (See WHIG PARTY, ELECTORAL VOTES.) His short term of office was marked by the sectional disputes on the subject of slavery which were settled in 1850. (See COMPROMISES, V.) The president's own plan of settlement was the admission of the disputed territories as states, but it was successful only in the case of California. See Fry's Life of Taylor; Powell's Life of Taylor; Abbott's Lives of the Presidents, 299; 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 737; 3 Von Holst's United States, 523; 3 Statesman's Manual, 1831 (for his messages).

A. J.

TELEGRAPH

TELEGRAPH. The electric telegraph, by annihilating time and space, is destined to play in the world a part analogous to that of steam. These two marvelous discoveries, by lending a helping hand to each other, have profoundly modified social relations, and we may, without exaggeration, assert that they are the beginning of a new era for humanity. The electric telegraph, which is still only in its infancy, has not yet yielded all the results which it is destined to produce; but we may even now get an obscure glimpse of what they will be. In politics it simplifies diplomatic relations, by putting governments themselves, by means of dispatches—which follow one another, so to speak, minute after minute—in direct communication, and by doing away with the hesitation and perplexity of their agents abroad. Without doubt political questions remain none the less obscure and embarrassed on this account, but the different opinions formed, the new facts which arise, becoming known instantly to the states interested in them, may have for effect rapid decisions and effectual measures, which but for electricity might arrive too late. From the point of view of the security of governments, the electric telegraph is one of the greatest administrative forces, for it gives the authorities the means of knowing immediately what is taking place at the points the most remote from the centre, and of making their action felt there without delay. In criminal matters the telegraph is a powerful auxiliary of the police; it prevents the flight of the guilty party by shutting him up in its wire-work as in the meshes of a net. By the telegraph line a general-in-chief may be present on every square of the chess-board on which the terrible game called a military campaign is played, and he may keep in constant and direct communication with his lieutenants. Unfortunately the net-work of telegraphs does not long remain intact in times of war, for the destruction of lines is one of the first acts of hostility. However, in the Italian war (1859) a successful effort was made to organize a system of lines which the enemy could not reach: this was the flying telegraph, the apparatus of which, that is, the posts and the wires, put up rapidly by agile workmen, followed the different army corps, and assisted in every movement. Prussia made a noteworthy use of this system in 1870.

—We consider the electric telegraph one of the most powerful means of civilization which has been given to man; and we are of opinion that its future was opened to it only the day on which it was placed within the reach of everybody. The telegraph, which up to that time, in Europe, had been only a mysterious agent in the hands of governments, became an indefatigable apostle of human progress. From the point of view of morals, it is scarcely necessary to point out the influence of the relations it established among all the nations of the globe, of its diffusion of light which tends to raise all nations to the same level, and to the community of interests by which it draws them nearer to each other, or unites them. From the politico-economic point of view, the results are still more striking. By saving the time formerly spent in negotiating commercial affairs, the telegraph has increased commercial transactions in an incalculable proportion. It furnishes, moreover, sure and rapid information which enables merchants to expedite in time to a distant point, goods, the demand for which is urgent. Lastly, it establishes, among all the exchanges and all the markets of the world, a solidarity which prevents or attenuates catastrophes. In a still other order of facts, what misfortunes the telegraph may prevent! In case of a conflagration, it calls assistance from all directions; in case of a flood it warns those who live on the banks of rivers of their impending danger; on railways it averts the most frightful accidents by its power of vastly surpassing in speed the utmost rapidity of steam. We here recall the influence of the telegraph on facts of the moral order, and its influence economic and material, for neither politics nor political economy can be indifferent to these results. The increase of enlightenment and wealth is advantageous, not to individuals only; that increase is an increase of force in which the state which has known how to develop wealth and enlightenment finds the elements of its power. And hence it is that the most civilized peoples, who are at the same time the greatest peoples, were the first to understand the necessity of extending their network of telegraphs as rapidly as possible.

—In the United States the exploitation of telegraphic lines is still left to private industry. And so it was in England before the law of July 31, 1868 (31, 32 Viet., ch. 110), which authorized the government to purchase the telegraph. The great states of Europe have reserved to themselves the monopoly of the telegraph. Apart from the fiscal interest which urges governments to find new sources of revenue, there prevailed not long since in Europe a powerfully accredited opinion, that the telegraphic mode of correspondence should be reserved to governments. But since the introduction of railways and the immense movement of relations and affairs which has been the consequence of that introduction, the telegraph has been looked upon as the necessary complement of that new means of transportation, and European governments have considered, that, with certain guarantees, the use of telegraphic correspondence should be allowed to the public.136

EDMOND BOUQUET.

TELLERS

TELLERS. (See PARLIAMENTARY LAW.)

TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT in the United States

TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT in the United States. (See PROHIBITION, POLICE.)

TEN-HOUR LAW

TEN-HOUR LAW. In the early years of the textile manufactures in this country, the working day was protracted to twelve, thirteen and sometimes fourteen hours. The progressive diminution of the hours of daily labor in the manufactories of Great Britain to eleven hours was followed by a demand for a similar reform in the manufactories of the United States. After the enactment of the English ten-hour law in 1847, this demand became more and more articulate. In 1853 the managers of all the manufacturing companies in Lowell, Lawrence and Fall River, voluntarily reduced the hours of labor of their operatives to eleven per day. No further reduction having been made during the twenty succeeding years, in 1874 Massachusetts enacted a law making ten hours the limit of the day's labor for all females and for all males under the age of eighteen years, employed in the textile industries. (Public Statutes of Massachusetts, chap. 74, secs. 4, 5) In Commonwealth vs. Hamilton Manufacturing Company, 120 Mass. Rep., 383, the supreme court held this act to be constitutional.

C. C.

TENNESSEE

TENNESSEE, a state of the American Union. It originally belonged to North Carolina, whose boundaries extended indefinitely westward. In 1768 the country was opened to settlement by the treaty of Fort Stanwix, and a company of hunters, most of whom became settlers, was formed, June 2, 1769. Their settlements were on the Watauga, one of the headwaters of the Tennessee; and the inhabitants, framing a code of laws signed by each person, became a body politic, the Wataugaassociation. Their numbers and their spirit of independence were both increased by immigrants driven from North Carolina by the tyranny of the royal governor, Tryon; and conventions at Jonesborough, Aug. 23 and Dec. 14, 1784, formed a separate state government, variously called Frankland and Franklin, in its official documents. The constitution was ratified by popular vote; a legislature and a governor, John Sevier, were elected; and a civil war between the two state governments seemed imminent. The North Carolina party in Tennessee finally overthrew the Frankland government in May, 1788; and the North Carolina legislature passed an act of oblivion, and admitted Sevier as a senator. In 1790 North Carolina ceded Tennessee to the United States, stipulating that the inhabitants were to have all the benefits of the ordinance of 1787 (see that title), except that slavery was never to be abolished. The cession was accepted by act of April 2, 1790. A governor, William Blount, was appointed, and the territorial legislature met in February, 1794. A convention at Knoxville, Jan. 11 - Feb. 6, 1796, framed the first state constitution, which was not submitted to popular vote. Under it, the state was admitted by act of June 1, 1796.

—BOUNDARIES. The North Carolina act of cession describes Tennessee as the country within the chartered limits of North Carolina, and west of a line following the northeast and southwest line of the Iron, or Bald, Mountains. The northern and southern boundaries of Tennessee are therefore properly westward prolongations of the corresponding boundaries of North Carolina. The northern boundary, between North Carolina and Virginia, was run as far as the Holston in 1749, but from that point it was undefined. Feb. 2, 1820, commissioners from the two states, at Frankfort, agreed that the northern boundary of Tennessee was to vary slightly north from a true west line, from the Cumberland mountains to the Cumberland river, and then return to latitude 36° 30'. The western boundary is the Mississippi, the western boundary of the United States until 1803.

—Knoxville was the capital until 1802. The capital was then changed to Nashville by the legislature, but has never been permanently fixed there by the constitution. The name of the state was given from that of its principal river.

—CONSTITUTIONS. The first constitution, considered by Jefferson "the most republican yet framed in America," gave the right of suffrage to freemen over twenty-one, on six months' residence; provided for a house numbering not more than forty nor less than twenty-two, apportioned to the counties according to population; for a senate, one-third the number of the house, elected by districts; and for a governor—all elected by the people for two years; and for a judiciary, to be appointed and to hold office during good behavior; and indirectly legalized slavery, by providing for the enforcement of "laws and ordinances now in force and use in this territory," until altered or repealed by the legislature.

—A new constitution was framed by a convention at Nashville, May 19 - Aug. 30, 1834, and ratified by popular vote, March 5-6, 1835. The principal changes were a permission to increase the numbers of the house to seventy-five, until the population should reach 1,500,000, and thereafter to ninety-nine; the omission of certain property qualifications for holding office, which had become obsolete; and the extension of the right of suffrage to persons so nearly white as to be competent witnesses against a white man. In 1853 an amendment made the judiciary elective by popular vote, on a different day from state and county elections. In 1865 a convention at Nashville, Jan. 9-26, framed an amendment abolishing slavery, and a schedule, both ratified, Feb. 22, by a popular vote of 21,104 to 40. The schedule declared the ordinance of secession, and the military league of 1861, null and void; repudiated the rebel war debt; and established a severe test oath for voters, containing the following among other provisions: "That I ardently desire the suppression of the present rebellion; and that I sincerely rejoice in the triumph of the armies and navies of the United States, and in the defeat and overthrow of the armies, navies and all armed combinations in the so-called confederate states."

—The present constitution was framed by a convention at Nashville, Jan. 10 - Feb. 22, 1870, and was ratified by a popular vote of 98,128 to 33,872, March 26. It made very few changes, the principal ones being as follows: the legislature was given power to take away the right of suffrage as a penalty for conviction of infamous crimes, and to prohibit the intermarriage of whites and negroes, or persons of mixed blood to the third generation; slavery, and all laws recognizing the right of property in man, were prohibited; the governor was given the veto power; and homesteads, to the value of $1,000, were reserved to heads of families, and exempted from sale under legal process.

—GOVERNORS: John Sevier, 1796-1801; Archibald Roane, 1801-3; John Sevier, 1803-9; Willie Blount, 1809-15; Joseph McMinn, 1815-21; William Carroll, 1821-7; Samuel Houston, 1827-9; William Carroll, 1829-35; Newton Cannon, 1835-9; James K. Polk, 1839-41; James C. Jones, 1841-5; Aaron V. Brown, 1845-7; Neil S. Brown, 1847-9; William Trousdale, 1849-51; Wm. B. Campbell, 1851-3, Andrew Johnson, 1853-7; Isham G. Harris, 1857-62; Andrew Johnson, military. 1862-5; Wm. G. Brownlow, 1865-9; De Witt C. Senter, 1869-71; John C. Brown, 1871-5; James D. Porter, 1875-9, Albert S. Marks, 1879-81; Alvin Hawkins, 1881-3.

—POLITICAL HISTORY. From the beginning of Tennessee's settlement, there has been a marked political division between East Tennessee, the mountainous region, and the more level country west of it. The former was first settled, and the Watauga association, and the strength of the state of Frankland, had their location in it. For a long time the country around Nashville was the only settled district outside of it. The intervening country was a wilderness, and emigrants to Nashville usually went down the Tennessee to the Ohio, and thence up the Cumberland to their destination. In both the districts of the state the dominant principle was that of democracy, strengthened by frontier independence. The admission of the state was therefore resisted by the federalists in congress as long as prudence would justify resistance; and the new state was strongly democratic. All her officers were democrats, and her electoral votes were cast for the regular democratic candidates at every election until the disruption of that party in 1824-5. Personal influence was always the strongest point in state politics. William Robertson, in West Tennessee, and John Sevier and William Blount, in East Tennessee, held a commanding influence in their respective sections. About the time of Blount's impeachment before the United States senate (see IMPEACHMENTS, I.), he was elected to the state senate, and that body unanimously chose him as its presiding officer. While his own impeachment was in progress, he was himself presiding over a state impeachment trial. His return to the United States senate was only prevented by his death, in 1800. Sevier was state governor twelve years, the intermission of two years being necessary on account of his ineligibility for more than three terms in succession, and was then a congressman until his death. Before the last of these leaders had disappeared from the scene, all their influence had been concentrated in one man, Andrew Jackson. Before the war of 1812 his personal character for frankness and fearlessness had brought him many friends, but probably more enemies, in the western part of the state. His military services, and the success of Tennessee troops under his leadership, made him the autocrat of the state. When he was nominated for the presidency by the legislature in 1824, only twenty-five members ventured to vote against him; and only three of these were elected to the next legislature. The popular vote for president in the state, 1824-32, will show his popularity: 1824, Jackson 20,197, Clay 312, Adams 261; 1828, Jackson 44,090, Adams 2,240, 1832, Jackson 28,740, Clay 1,436. Many towns voted unanimously for Jackson. In one, it is said, a stranger, at the end of the election of 1828, found the inhabitants pursuing, with intent to tar and feather them, two of their number who had voted against Jackson, and so disturbed the unanimity of the town.

—The state-rights element, which in various southern states became a part of the whig party (see that title) about 1832-4, was strongly represented in Tennessee. In 1835 it was strong enough to elect Cannon governor, and ten of the thirteen congressmen; and in 1836 the state's electoral votes were cast for Hugh L. White (see his name), the representative of this element. For the next twenty years the general rule of Tennessee politics was that there was a strong democratic majority in Middle Tennessee, from the Cumberland mountains to the Cumberland river, a slight whig majority in West Tennessee, and a strong whig majority in East Tennessee. In 1839 Jas. K. Polk had 54,680 votes for governor, and Cannon 52,114, but in the next two elections Polk was beaten by Gov. Jones by about the same majority. Until 1856 the state's electoral votes were always cast for the whig candidates; and in 1844 Clay received 60,030 votes for president to 59,917 for Polk, a Tennessee candidate. From 1843 until 1853, five of the eleven congressmen were usually whigs; and from 1853 until 1855, six of the ten were of that party. In 1845 the democrats elected A. V. Brown governor; in 1847 he was beaten by Neil S. Brown, whig; in 1849 N. S. Brown was beaten by Trousdale, democrat; and in 1851 Trousdale was beaten by Campbell, whig; all by very small majorities. In state elections, therefore, Tennessee was exceedingly doubtful; but the general majority in the legislature must class it as a whig state.

—On the dissolution of the whig party, its whole strength in Tennessee was turned into the "American" party. (See those names.) In 1855, for governor, Andrew Johnson, democrat, had 67,499 votes to 65,332 for M. P. Gentry, "American"; and the latter party carried the legislature. As secession and war grew more threatening, the feeling and vote in East and West Tennessee against both became stronger. In 1859 seven of the ten congressmen, all from these two sections, were elected by the "Americans"; but the democratic majority in Middle Tennessee was large enough to give Harris 71,539 votes in the state, to 59,867 for Robert Hatton, "American," and elect him.

—Gov. Harris was an active secessionist, and to him is attributable the secession of the state in 1861. At the first appearance of trouble he summoned the legislature to meet Jan. 7. 1861, and consider the state's federal relations. The legislature passed a bill to call a convention, but at the same time submitted the question to popular vote. At the election, Feb. 9, East Tennessee gave 25,611 majority against, Middle Tennessee 1,382 majority against, and West Tennessee 15,118 majority for, a convention, and the convention did not meet. The first attempt at "coercion" (see SECESSION, III.) renewed the excitement. The legislature was summoned to meet again, April 25, but this time a more certain, though absurdly illegal, plan was followed. May 1, in secret session, the legislature authorized the governor to appoint commissioners to conclude a military league with the confederate states, and the league was ratified by both houses, May 7. It purported to agree, that, "until the state becomes a member of the confederacy," her whole force should be under the control of the president of the confederate states, "upon the same basis, principles and footing as if said state were now and during the interval a member of the said confederacy." Having thus invited confederate troops into the state, and authorized the governor to levy 55,000 state troops, the legislature completed the farce by submitting to popular vote, June 8, a declaration of independence and ordinance of secession. It is quite useless to argue about the right of a state legislature to make a treaty, or the power of a people to vote under military domination. It is only remarkable that so large a vote was cast against secession. In East Tennessee the vote was 14,780 for, and 32,923 against; in Middle Tennessee 58,265 for, and 8,198 against; in West Tennessee 29,127 for, and 6,117 against; in the camps, 2,741 for, and none against; total vote, 104,913 for, and 47,238 against, secession. June 24, Gov. Harris, by proclamation, declared the state out of the union. The popular vote on June 8 had also ratified the confederate constitution. In the autumn, Gov. Harris was re-elected by a vote of 69,269 to 40,467 for Wm. H. Polk; but early in 1862 the advance of the federal forces drove him out of the state capital.

—March 5, 1862, the senate confirmed the president's nomination of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee. He had been a democratic United States senator at the time of the secession; but had treated his state's action with great contempt, and gone on with his official work at Washington. In 1864 he made an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize the state government; and an equally unsuccessful attempt was made to organize East Tennessee into a separate state. In the following year Johnson was successful; the amendment to the state constitution, abolishing slavery, and the 13th and 14th amendments, were ratified; and the state was "restored to her former proper, practical relations to the union," by act of July 24, 1866. Wm. G. Brownlow, a radical republican, was elected governor; the legislatures were republican; and the electoral vote of the state in 1868 was cast for Grant by a popular vote of 56,628 to 26,129 for Seymour.

—The first legislature, in 1865, passed an act to regulate the elective franchise, restricting it to 1, persons "publicly known to have entertained unconditional union sentiments from the outbreak of the rebellion to the present time"; 2, those who had since come of age; 3, persons of proved loyalty from other states; 4, federal soldiers; 5, loyal men who had been forced into the confederate armies; and 6, persons known to the election judges to "have been true friends to the government of the United States." It disfranchised ex-rebels of higher rank for fifteen years, and others for five years, and imposed on all voters the test oath before referred to. In the following year the test oath was made still more voluminous and stringent; it now contained 366 words. In February, 1867, disfranchisement was made a penalty for insurrectionary movements within the state, and negroes were allowed to vote. This latter step was proper under the constitution of 1834 (then in force), which gave the right of suffrage to every "freeman," without using the word "white." Disorder in the western and middle sections of the state now became very general. (See INSURRECTION, II.; KU-KLUX KLAN.) Laws were passed authorizing the governor to arm state guards (mostly drawn from East Tennessee), and to appoint commissioners of registration; and the governor interpreted the latter law as giving to these commissioners the appointment of election judges. Feb. 20, 1869, the governor proclaimed martial law in nine counties of Middle and West Tennessee.

—In the summer of 1869 the dominant party split, and Gov. Brownlow retired to the United States senate. Of the two candidates for the succession, Senter declared in favor of the removal of most of the disfranchisement laws, and received the democratic vote, Wm. B. Stokes, the radical candidate, received 55,036 votes, Senter 120,333; and both branches of the legislature were democratic. The revision of the constitution in 1870 followed; and until 1880 the democratic majority was very large, except in 1872. In that year Andrew Johnson ran as an independent candidate for congressman at large; Horace Maynard, the republican candidate, was elected over his two democratic opponents; and the democratic vote in the presidential election was 94,391 to 83,655 republican. One district in East Tennessee has steadily chosen a republican congressman; and in 1873-5, seven of the ten congressmen were republicans, owing to the democratic division of 1872. In 1881-3 there are three republican congressmen, two from the East Tennessee districts, and one from the Memphis district.

—Since 1874 the debt has been the paramount feature in state politics. Most of it was contracted before the rebellion, to aid state railroads under internal improvement laws of 1851-2. The total amount in 1870 was $41,863,406.69, with $20,701,825.76 nominal assets, most of it in railroad bonds paying no interest. The war had reduced the taxable property of the state nearly one-half; it was very difficult to collect any taxes; and one of the first steps of the new democratic government in 1870 was to reduce taxation over one-half. Thereafter, payments of interest went by default, until in 1879 the net state debt was $20,221,300 principal, and $4,052,717 lapsed interest. In 1876 an arrangement to fund the whole debt at sixty cents on the dollar and 6 per cent. interest, commonly called "the 60-6 plan," was nearly agreed upon between the state and the bondholders. Since that time various plans of settlement have been proposed, named similarly from their percentage of total debt and of interest, and ranging from "50-4" to "100-3"; and a small number of voters have even favored total repudiation of the railroad debt. In 1880 the legislature passed a "50-4" bill for most of the debt, but it was submitted to a popular election, and rejected on a very light vote. In 1880 the whole election turned on the debt question. The republican convention nominated Alvin Hawkins for governor, and declared that all the debt should be paid; that any proposition from the bondholders for its decrease should be thankfully accepted, and that the democrats were responsible for the failure of the 60-6 plan in 1876. The greenback convention nominated R. M. Edwards, and repudiated all but $2,025,000 of the debt. The "state-credit" democratic convention favored prompt payment on the best terms that creditors would accept, and nominated John W. Wright; but a part of the delegates seceded, nominated S. F. Wilson, and called for repudiation of the debt. The result of the election gave the state her first republican governor since Senter, by the following vote: Hawkins, 102,969; Wright, 79,191; Wilson, 57,424; and Edwards, 3,641. The legislature chosen had fifteen democrats and ten republicans in the senate, and thirty-seven republicans, thirty-six democrats, and one greenbacker in the house; but the nominal representatives of both parties were so divided by the various plans that any agreement seemed impossible. In April, 1881, the legislature at last passed a "100-3" act, proposed by the creditors, making the coupons receivable for taxes; but in February following the state supreme court decided the law unconstitutional, on account of its coupon feature.

—In addition to John Bell, Thos. H. Benton, Samuel Houston, Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, James K. Polk, and Hugh L. White (see those names), the following have been prominent in state politics. John D. C. Atkins, confederate congressman 1861-5, democratic congressman 1873-83; William Blount, territorial governor 1790-96, and democratic United States senator 1796-7; Aaron V. Brown, democratic congressman 1839-45 governor 1845-7, and postmaster general under Buchanan; R. R. Butler, republican congressman 1868-75; George W. Campbell, democratic congressman 1803-9, United States senator 1811-14 and 1815-18, secretary of the treasury under Madison, and minister to Russia 1818-21; Wm. B. Campbell, whig congressman 1837-43, governor 1851-3, and republican congressman in 1867; Wm. C. C. Claiborne, democratic congressman 1797-1801, governor of Mississippi and Louisiana territories, and of the state of Louisiana; John Cocke, major general under Jackson in 1813-15, and democratic congressman 1819-27; Henry Cooper, democratic United States senator 1871-7; David Crockett, an eccentric whig congressman 1827-31 and 1833-5, killed in battle at Bexar, Texas, in 1836; John H. Eaton, democratic United States senator 1818-29, secretary of war under Jackson (see KITCHEN CABINET), governor of Florida territory 1834-6, and minister to Spain 1836-40; Emerson Etheridge, whig and "American" congressman 1853-7 and 1859-61, clerk of the house of representatives 1861-3, and thereafter one of the state republican leaders; Meredith P. Gentry, whig congressman 1839-43 and 1845-53, and confederate congressman 1861-5; Felix Grundy, democratic congressman 1811-14, United States senator 1820-38, and attorney general under Van Buren, 1838-40; Isham G. Harris, democratic congressman 1849-53, governor 1857-62, and United States senator 1877-89; John F. House, Bell elector in 1860, and democratic congressman 1875-83; Howell E. Jackson, democratic United States senator 1881-7; Cave Johnson, democratic congressman 1829-37 and 1839-45, and postmaster general under Polk 1845-9; James C. Jones, governor 1841-5, and whig United States senator 1851-7; David McK. Key, democratic United States senator 1875-7, and postmaster general 1877-80; Horace Maynard, "American" and republican congressman 1857-63 and 1866-75, state attorney general 1863-5, minister to Turkey 1875-80, and postmaster general 1880-81; A. O. P. Nicholson, democratic United States senator 1841-3 and 1859-61 (see POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY); Bailie Peyton, whig congressman 1833-7; John Rhea, democratic congressmen 1803-15 and 1817-23; John Sevier, governor of Frankland 1784-8, governor of Tennessee 1776-1801 and 1803-9, and congressman 1811-15; Frederick P. Stanton, democratic congressman 1845-55, and governor of Kansas as a territory 1858-61; Wm. B. Stokes, whig congressman 1859-61, major general of United States volunteers, and republican congressman 1866-71; Albert G. Watkins, whig congressman 1849-53, and democratic congressman 1855-9; W. C. Whitthorne, democratic congressman 1871-83; and Felix K. Zollicoffer, state comptroller 1845-9, whig and "American" congressman 1853-9, brigadier general in the confederate army, killed at Mill Spring in 1862.

—There is no good history of modern Tennessee. See authorities under NORTH CAROLINA, JACKSON, ANDREW, and JOHNSON, ANDREW; 6 Bancroft's United States, 377 (Watauga association); 3 Hildreth's United States, 539 (Frankland); 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; 2 Hough's American Constitutions; Haywood's History of Tennessee (to 1796); Ramsey's Annals of Tennessee (to 1800); Putnam's Life of James Robertson, and History of Middle Tennessee; Smith's Historical View of East Tennessee (1842); Carpenter's History of Tennessee (1854); A. V. Brown's Speeches; McLeod's Rebellion in Tennessee (1862); McPherson's Political History of the Rebellion, and History of the Reconstruction; Tribune Almanac, 1838-82; Committee Reports to the Tennessee Legislature, 1875-82.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

TERM AND TENURE OF OFFICE

TERM AND TENURE OF OFFICE. Term measures the period for which an office is conferred. Tenure marks the conditions upon which the office is held, whether for a fixed or for an indefinite time. The term of the president and the term of the postmasters he appoints are each for four years; but the tenure of the former can be severed only by the judgment of the senate upon an impeachment, while that of the latter exists only during the pleasure of superior officers.

—Offices may be divided into three classes. civil, military and naval. In the two latter classes definite terms are now rarely found, though we read, that, among the Greeks, generals sometimes held supreme command only for the term of a day; and Roman consuls commanded armies during their short fixed terms of office. Military and naval officers, in modern times, almost invariably hold their offices, if not for indefinite periods, at least for periods determined in reference to probable efficiency of service. Yet, soldiers are generally enlisted for a defined term. (As to the tenure of military and naval officers, in the United States, see PROMOTION, REMOVALS FROM OFFICE.)

—Civil offices may also be divided into three classes: legislative, judicial and executive. To properly present the important considerations by which term and tenure should be determined in these three classes—in their whole range from the president to the highway surveyor, from the national chief justice to the town justice of the peace, from the federal senator to the village trustee—would require a space far-beyond that accorded to this article. Few subjects within the range of political science have been so utterly neglected as that of the proper tenure of office, and none requires a more careful study. It is not perhaps possible to refer to any chapter where the subject is treated in even the most general manner. As a natural consequence, we find not only in different states, but in the same states at different times, for the same offices, terms of diverse lengths, and tenures of miscellaneous variety. The interests of factions and the ambition of leaders, rather than sound views of public interest, seem to have often determined both term and tenure.

—On the one side, intense partisans tell us that parties can not be sustained without being able to give many places to which a long term or a stable tenure would be fatal; while, on the other, the most experienced and thoughtful citizens assure us that parties may trust to sound principles and good administration; repudiating the spoils and office mongering by which they say parties are only debauched and enfeebled. The reasons are almost obvious why the term and tenure most appropriate for one of these three classes would not be equally appropriate for the others.

—1. So far as judicial offices are concerned, the most important considerations have been presented in the article on JUDICIARY, ELECTIVE. And see REMOVALS FROM OFFICE. It may be added, however, that nowhere is well-trained experience more valuable than upon the bench. It not only promotes facility in the doing of the business of the courts, and clearness and consistency in the interpretations of the laws, but it develops that judicial frame of mind which is unperturbed by partisan excitements, and which commands the confidence of litigants. It can hardly be denied that the inexperience which short judicial terms have brought upon the bench has not only greatly delayed the administration of justice, but has greatly impaired public confidence in the courts of every grade.

—2. Turning next to the legislative department, we find decisive reasons why the terms of those elected to represent the people should not be long. These officers represent interests, opinions and policies which are constantly changing; and, at every phase, they have an equal claim to be represented in debate; and, if sound, to be expressed in statutes. Permanency of tenure on the part of legislators would obviously tend to defeat one of the great ends of representative government. Yet, so manifest have been the advantages of that wisdom and facility which come from experience in legislation, and so deep has been the sense of peril from incompetent legislators, that a great portion of these officers—notably senators, both state and federal—have been allowed to hold their places for terms during which great changes of interests and opinions have taken place. And so strong has public opinion been in this direction of late that in many of the states, the terms of judges, senators, mayors, and school officers, as well as of various other officials, have been considerably extended within the last few years, perhaps nearly doubled since the reaction has become vigorous against the spoils system theory of rotation in office. Biennial sessions of the legislature in more than half the states are due to the same cause.

—Despite these changes, the vast volumes of crude statutes—more than a thousand pages a year in a single state—have proclaimed the incompetency of the law makers; causing needless litigation, and making justice remote and uncertain. It will be in vain that a remedy will be sought in limiting legislative power by constitutional amendments. As the statutes become more intricate and official functions more complicated, with our growing wealth and population, there will more and more be a need of larger official experience and larger official terms—to be held under a sterner responsibility—for the supreme work of legislation. Some plan may perhaps be devised for securing more experience in state legislatures, by classifying members, while increasing their terms of office, after the analogy of the national senate.

—But in the legislative department there are inferior officers, not elected by the people—the clerks and other subordinates of congress, state legislatures and municipal councils—who are in no sense representative, but are simply ministerial officers. Next to fidelity and natural capacity, the highest qualification for these places is experience, invaluable experience, in the discharge of their duties. These duties have no honest relation to party politics, or to majorities in legislatures, but are the same at all times and under whatever dominant party. The office of speaker is, within certain limits, an obvious exception. But the less he is a partisan the more fit he is for his duties. The constitution of the United States, like that of Great Britain, confers the power of selecting and removing these subordinates upon the legislative chambers, without restriction as to term or tenure. So it is also in the state legislatures. Who will deny that economy, efficiency, purity and dignity, in legislation, alike demand that those officials should hold their places so long as they fitly perform their duties, and that they should be made to feel it to be a disgrace to allow that performance to be influenced by partisan considerations?

—Before the British spoils system was suppressed by the reforms made within this generation, there had been as demoralizing contests in the British parliament, over the appointment and removal of such subordinates, as have ever disgraced our congress or state legislatures. Now, holding during good behavior and efficiency, the selection of these officials in Great Britain is by methods with which no party interferes; and the discharge of their functions is treated as having no political significance. Parliament has now more time for its great work, and its dignity is no longer impaired by ignominious contests about clerkships and doorkeepers. The most perfect representation, which in theory is sought, would be attained by the shortest practicable terms of office. Terms of six years for federal senators, of two, three and four years for state senators, of two and three years for governors, mayors and various other officers—as they now exist—can not be justified on the mere theory of representation. This theory is based on the right of the people at all times to have their interests and opinions reflected in the halls of legislation. But terms, even if for only a single year—the shortest we recognize—violate that theory. For the opinions of parties and individuals do not make an annual revolution, but often more frequently. When Rhode Island, following the example of Grecian republics, fixed the terms of her representatives at six months, and Connecticut added to those short terms semi-annual sessions of her legislature, each at a different place, for the more convenient and exact representation of the people; and when the factious spoils system spirit of Florence and other medieval republics reduced official terms, first to six, then to four, and finally to two months, they obviously enforced a term tending to a more exact representation than any now provided for in the United States.

—Our longer terms for such offices are justifiable only on the assumption, which they proclaim, that the experience secured by longer public service is more valuable than any ideal exactness in representation. This is an important truth, as bearing upon the proper term of mere ministerial and executive subordinates. It is a truth which senators will do well if they do not longer forget, when they stand up in their places, in the fifth or sixth year of their terms—perhaps long after the majority in the state and legislature which they pretend to represent has been changed since their election—and, in the name of justice and sound policy, demand rotation, removals and short terms on the part of their own subordinates, who represent nothing but the unchanging need of having the constant volume of public work well done, and done in the same way year after year, whichever party is in power, and whatever policy prevails.

—3. The executive department is affected by more complicated reasons. To approve or disapprove legislative enactments is the highest function of governors and presidents. To that extent they are both legislative and representative officers. Next in importance is the duty of those officers to carry into action, in the conduct of executive affairs, the principles and policy which the people approved in their election. This, too, is in a sense a representative function. Much the same reasons, therefore, which require the terms of legislative officers to be short, apply also to presidents and governors; and, in a limited degree, they apply to mayors also. In fixing the term of the president at four years, under our constitution, considerations drawn from his representative function plainly prevailed—must we not say unwisely prevailed?—to the extent that it made his term shorter than that of a senator.

—The constitution fixed the term of no officer in the executive department except that of the president and vice-president. It created no department; yet says "the president may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." Upon this narrow basis, and the precedents of the British cabinet, our cabinet has been reared; and while each of them are equally unrecognized in the constitution and laws (and with us the duty and responsibility are upon the president alone), the cabinet has been, in practice, in both countries, the great central council for advice in regard to all executive action. It is clear, therefore, that the heads of departments, who are to advise him as to his gravest duties, need to have faith in the principles and policy which the president is bound to enforce; and for that reason their tenure of office should depend mainly upon him. There may also be a few other executive officers—foreign ministers sent on special missions involving national policy would be examples—whose peculiar fitness will depend upon their sharing the views of administration, and in all such cases there should clearly be a tenure in the discretion of the president.

—When we go below such officers, we come upon those who not only, upon the theory of the constitution and the laws, but from the very necessities of government, are required to obey legal instructions from those above them to whom they are directly responsible. Each head of a department is clothed by law with the authority and duty of directing the official action, subject to the constitutional power of the president, of all the subordinates of that department. Among all the eighty or more thousands of subordinates standing in graded ranks, from the department secretaries down past great collectors and postmasters to the customs service inspectors, the keepers of light houses and of signal and life-saving stations, there is not one who, according to the laws or sound policy, has any right of advice as to the policy or principles of an administration; not one for whom obedience to legal instructions is not a plain duty; not one whose political opinions are material for good administration; hardly one whose active participation in partisan politics is not a public detriment, tending to neglect of public business and the oppression of the citizen. The duties of these officers are in no sense representative. They are not called upon to act upon any political theory. They perform no duties that depend upon the triumph of political opinions or the success of any party. Whichever party comes into power, whatever party they belong to, their duties are the same. They have no right to regard the political or religious opinions of any citizen in their official action, or need to known them. They do not, like legislators, or town and village officials, meet to consider changing interests and fluctuating politics, but, month after month and year after year, they do, or they should, steadily devote themselves to the same branch of that vast, unchanging public business which, from the smaller officers to the greater, moves on, like brooks and rivers, in an unbroken order and everlasting continuity. Unjustifiable as political indifference is in the citizen, the use of official authority and influence to coerce the action of the private citizen is not less indefensible. We may not, as was found necessary in England, for a hundred years, disfranchise those officials, but we should clearly see, and should make them feel, that they not only need not, but should not, as officials, interfere with party politics or regard political opinions as qualifications for their duties.

—Before considering what should be the term and tenure of this vast body of federal officials—referred to in the national constitution as "inferior officers," and to which a vastly larger number of state and municipal officials holding like relations should be added in our reflections—it will be well to notice some objections which stand in the way of treating the subject upon its own merits. It is declared that any term and tenure which prevents these officers being removed and their successors appointed at the pleasure of the majority, disastrously restricts the freedom and effectiveness of party action, and also deprives them of essential representation in the official life of the country.

—The answer is not difficult. Under our institutions, parties are inevitable and salutary. Their great functions are to arouse, embody, sustain and carry forward a sound public opinion until it finds fit expression in statutes and executive action. Under these institutions the federal and state legislators, and all who govern in municipalities and towns, are selected by the vote of the majority, which, in itself, but too generally expresses the mere will of the dominant party. In the selection of mayors, governors and presidents, that party majority is still more potential. These two classes of officers, the one wielding all legislative authority, and the other all executive authority, in their united action exert all the power which our institutions give, or a free people can safely confer, for the representation and enforcement of their will. All of these officers may be, and in our practice they generally are, within their respective spheres, the trusted favorites of the dominant party, bound in the double allegiance of gratitude and dependence. Through these two classes of officers the adherents of the dominant party practically make, enforce and repeal laws and ordinances at pleasure, instruct and require obedience from all who hold subordinate positions under them, enforce all principles and guide all policy in obedience to which the vast affairs of the nation, from the light houses and the signal stations to foreign embassies, and the great departments, are conducted. Is not this enough? Have we ever suffered because parties have needed opportunities or influence greater than these? Is not here a sphere broad and grand enough, a power and opportunity dazzling enough, to inspire the patriotism and reward the zeal of any party and of the noblest man who ever led any party in a great nation? Unless, therefore, it is claimed that a party, which can not gain or retain power by adhering to the spirit of the constitution and to common honesty and justice, may strengthen itself by using public authority to debauch and coerce the people—unless it can be shown that the term and tenure of "inferior officers" should, in the merely selfish interests of parties, be made brief and precarious, so that patronage and the appointing power may be conveniently prostituted as merchandise in the shambles of partisan politics—we may confidently declare that term and tenure alike of "inferior officers" should be determined quite irrespective of mere party considerations.

—But let us not imagine, because these inferior officers are not representative and are not given large discretionary power, that their term, tenure or relations are not very important. The facts are quite otherwise. The creation of a term of four years for about 3,500 of these offices (to the history of which we shall refer), and the subjection of nearly all of them to a tenure of favoritism and partisanship, within the last forty-five years, contrary to the spirit of the constitution and to the practice of the early statesmen, while working a disastrous revolution in the measure of filling the executive departments, have also exerted a demoralizing influence upon parties and upon all official and political life. It was the short terms and the precarious tenure thus created which made it possible for great parties to levy the expenses of their campaigns, under the name of assessments, upon the humbler officials in the executive service, and to compel them to do the most servile work. It was these political assessments which President Grant prohibited by executive order; which President Hayes declared to be either "a gross injustice to the officers or an indirect robbery of the public treasury" which President Garfield declared to be "shameful," and "the source of an electioneering fund which in many cases never gets beyond the pockets of the shyster and the mere camp followers of the party." It has been these precarious tenures and the habit of removing worthy officials to make places for clamorous favorites and henchmen, which developed the disgraceful acts of patronage mongering and office brokerage, by reason of which office seeking has been made a sort of business, and vast numbers of supernumeraries have been foisted upon the public service. It caused President Garfield to declare "one-third of the working hours of senators and representatives to be hardly sufficient to meet the demands in reference to the appointments to office," and that "with a judicious system of civil service, the business of the departments could be better done at almost one-half the cost." In the debates preceding the passage of the civil service reform bill (of Jan. 16, 1883,) for the suppression of such abuses, Senator Dawes, of one party, declared that the existing system of office getting "destroys the congressman's independence and makes him a slave," and Senator Pendleton, of the other party, said, "It has debauched public morality and made Guiteau possible. It drives senators and representatives into neglect of their chief duty of legislation, and often makes the support of an administration conditional upon obtaining office for friends."

—At the time of the formation of the federal constitution no human forecast could have taken the measure of such evils in our day. The few officials and the simple administration of the first decades hardly gave a hint of the varied complication and the vast official force we now have. There was $2,000,000 of revenue the first year, under the constitution, against more than $360,000,000 last year. Even as late as the administration of John Quincy Adams, the revenue was not one-fourth as much altogether as the surpluses now annually applied to the reduction of the national debt. The number of officers at the two periods is in about the same ratio. It is hence no matter for surprise that no adequate provisions are found in the constitution concerning the tenure of "inferior officers" in the executive service. The occasion for surprise is in the fact that with clearer lights, the later generations have created terms and a tenure which have greatly aggravated the consequences of the defects of the original constitution.

—It is by no means an easy matter to decide with precision what would be the most useful tenure in the several parts of the executive service. Many considerations must be estimated, and a broad field of facts must be kept in view. We have only to consider the great variety of officials to see, that, to most of all the general rules we may lay down there must be some exceptions. The officers in the state department, for example, range from the secretary and the ambassadors to the consular clerks and the copyists. The department of the treasury has at Washington about 3,000 subordinates; to which must be added more than two hundred collectors of internal and customs revenue, the surveyors, the naval officers, the officers of the mints—and all their subordinates—the light house, the life saving, the hospital and the revenue marine services, and many more isolated officials. In the department of the interior there are the pension and patent office service, the land office, the Indian service, the bureaus of education and agriculture, and various other officers. The war and navy departments have civil subordinates of many grades, widely separated. More than 48,000 postmasters, with all their subordinates and various others, with peculiar duties, of which the railroad and steamboat mail service and the complicated mail contract system are examples, are under the postmaster general. The department of justice, with its district attorneys, marshals and election supervisors and their subordinates, the officers of the District of Columbia and of the territories, are also to be added, before we get a general view of the vast number and variety of the officials under the executive.

—The authority to appoint the higher officers, subject to confirmation by the senate, is given by the constitution to the president, with the power, as we have seen, in congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments. Beyond declaring that all civil officers shall be removed on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors, the constitution leaves the stupendous power of removal to mere implication. It has, however, been authoritatively decided, and the constant practice has been (save as qualified of late by the tenure of office acts), that the power of removal belongs to the president as an incident to the power of appointment. The constitution provides no term, and, otherwise than by implication, no tenure for any one of these inferior officers. And prior to a law of 1820, to which further reference will be made, no term or tenure was provided by law for any of them, with the single and peculiar exception of marshals. The tenure of usage had been that of combined efficiency and good behavior. (See REMOVALS FROM OFFICE, CONFIRMATION BY THE SENATE.) It was left for the politicians of later days to discover and to teach, that, to select public servants for their merits, and to retain them because they continued meritorious, are "un-American." That teaching has been the cause of a pernicious practice in its spirit.

—Let us glance at the causes and progress of this great change as bearing upon terms and tenure of office. Aaron Burr early laid the foundations of the spoils system; and, with the aid of Van Buren, his most apt and distinguished disciple, that system had been made potential in New York, several years previous to 1820. It required short terms, and partisan tests for office. It demanded a tenure at the pleasure of the official superior, and required that superior to be a partisan leader. It made political opinions a ground of appointments and removals, and enforced servile obedience to chieftains on the part of all officials. Before 1820, Gov. Clinton, of New York, complained, in a message, "of an organized and disciplined corps of federal officials interfering in state elections." Tammany Hall was then becoming a political power. New York politics had already become so notoriously unscrupulous as to attract almost as much attention as during the present decade. Jackson, contriving how to reach the presidential chair, and affecting the character of a non-partisan, said to a New Yorker, "I am no politician, but if I were a politician, I would be a New York politician." Van Buren soon made him one.

—The spoils system spirit, thus early reduced to practice in New York, was being slowly developed in other parts of the Union. The creed of the spoilsmen had not been avowed, but the men who were first to proclaim it were leading politicians before 1820. In that year, William H. Crawford, secretary of the treasury, was a presidential candidate, and Van Buren, who was to come into the senate in 1821—even then an aspirant for the presidency—was Crawford's supporter. They were unsurpassed for their skillful use of patronage. Both were able to see that if the terms of the inferior officers were reduced to four years, there would be more patronage to dispose of, and an easier introduction of the New York system.

—On April 20, 1820, about thirty days before the adjournment of congress, a bill, drawn by Mr. Crawford, was reported in the senate, which created a term of four years for district attorneys, collectors, naval officers, navy agents, surveyors of customs, paymasters, and for several other less important officers. Mr. Adams says the object of the law was to gain support for Crawford for the presidency. The officers thus subjected to the new term are said to have become "ardent Crawfordites." This was the first fixed term for any such office. The bill further declared that the holdings of all such officers whose commissions were dated Sept. 30, 1814, should expire on the day and month of their date next after Sept. 30, 1820. The expiration of other holdings was fixed for a year later. The bill was thus retroactive, and it made the terms expire on the eve of the presidential election. There was to be a presidential election in 1824, when Crawford and Jackson were to be leading candidates. How largely and promptly this change would add to the patronage of the treasury, where Mr. Crawford presided, need not be pointed out.

—But these were hardly the most ominous provisions of the bill; for, taking the side of the partisan spoilsmen, against the approved doctrines of Madison, and the practice of every president, it declared that those officers "shall be removable at pleasure." Here was rotation legalized for the sake of rotation. Here was the first demand of surrender ever made upon the general government in the spirit of the New York spoils system. Here was practically a revolution in the term and tenure of office; an emphatic degradation of the standard according to which the fate of every one of these officers was to be determined. Without debate, in silence, suddenly, almost stealthily, this disastrous bill was carried through both houses. Mr. Adams, then secretary of state, says President Monroe signed the bill without perceiving its true character. The avowed reason, or rather the apology, for the new policy, was that it would remove unworthy officials; the speciousness of which appears in the facts that the tenures of all in office, worthy and unworthy alike, were, without inquiry, severed absolutely; and nothing but official pleasure was to protect the most meritorious in the future. There was no showing of delinquencies; no charge that the president could not or would not remove unworthy officials, not a word of discussion, not a record of votes, on this revolutionary bill!

—But there were statesmen who foresaw the disastrous consequences. On Nov. 20, 1820, Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, said of the law that "it saps the constitutional and salutary functions of the president, and introduces a principle of intrigue and corruption which will soon leaven the mass, not only of senators, but of citizens. * * It will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for office; render them, as well as those in place, sycophants to their senators, * * and make of them, what all executive directories become, mere sinks of corruption and faction. It must have been one of the midnight signatures of the president, when he had no time to consider or even to read the law." Madison replied in the same spirit. When Mr. Calhoun, then secretary of war, heard of the sudden passage of the bill, he declared it "one of the most dangerous ever passed, and that it would work a revolution." The dangerous consequences of the new policy began very soon to appear. Five years after the passage of the act of 1820, an able committee of the senate, with Mr. Macon at the head—who never aided a relative or henchman to an office—made an earnest report in favor of its repeal. But the spoils system had secretly made progress. Vain, indeed, was it to attempt to repeal a law which had already become a bulwark of the new system, in the spirit of which Jackson, the military hero of the day, and Van Buren, the partisan chieftain of New York and the greatest party manipulator of his time, were working together for the presidency.

—So rapidly did the spirit of revolution advance, that Jackson's first message declared "rotation a leading principle in the republican creed." Ignoring the true rule that every man's claim upon office is in proportion to his fitness to fill it, the same message proclaimed the communistic doctrine that every man has an equal right to office; which, by his removals and appointments, was interpreted to mean, in practice, that no man but a partisan servile to himself had any such right which a president was bound to respect. Three years later, in 1832, Senator Marcy, in the senate of the United States, expounded the spirit of the new four years term spoils system in these memorable words: "When they [New York politicians] are contending for victory, they avow the intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." The new system was, therefore, simply this: no term for more than four years; the tenure, removals at pleasure; office and salaries the spoils of party warfare; rotation in order to give offices to as many servile partisans as possible; appointments and removals for political reason; the duty of the official to be an obedient worker for his party and a servile vassal of its managers. (For the practical effects of this revolution see SPOILS SYSTEM and REMOVALS FROM OFFICE.)

—The attempt made in the senate in 1825 to repeal the law of 1820 was renewed in that body in 1835. Despite the weight of Jackson's administration against it, the repealing act passed the senate by a vote of 31 to 16, every distinguished name in the senate—Benton, Webster, Clay, Calhoun, Ewing, Southard and White, among them, except Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, and Wright, of New York, those states then, as of late, being pre-eminently the "machine," "spoils system" states—being recorded in favor of the repeal. The senate had not at that time come very much under the vicious influence of patronage, or of the feudal code called "the courtesy," which have in late years been so disastrously potential in that body. There had been few officers to confirm. In the debate upon the repealing act, though several senators boldly avowed the barbarous creed of Marcy, Webster said the evil effects of the law of 1820 vastly predominated, and that he was for staying the plague. Mr. Clay declared "the tendency had been to revive the dark ages of feudalism." Mr. Calhoun stated, that "the law had taught officers that the most certain road to honor and fortune is servility and flattery." Mr. Southard declared that "it had tended to make office-holders servile suppliants, destitute of independence of character and manly feeling."

—The partisan power which the four-years term had thus suddenly and vastly increased, aided by the prestige of Jackson's administration, and the forces marshaled for Van Buren's election to the presidency the next year, defeated the repealing act. The victory of the spoilsmen increased the pressure and strength in favor of extending short terms, which the partisan leaders demanded. They next laid siege to the postoffice department. The postal administration, which, when Washington became president, required only seventy-five postmasters, at the opening of Jackson's first term required about eight thousand. Practically, the tenure of postmasters had been during good behavior and efficiency, and there was no term fixed by law. The management of the postal service had been upon business principles, the postmaster general appointing and removing postmasters. There was no good reason for a radical change in that regard. Under such principles, Mr. McLean, as postmaster general under John Quincy Adams, had, with great satisfaction to the people, managed our postal affairs. He was not willing to enforce the new "spoils system" in his office; and for that reason Jackson hastened to remove him to the supreme court bench, and to put a more compliant and most inefficient officer in his place. It was very natural that the attempt should be made to extend the four-years-term theory to the postoffice. Every partisan manipulator wishing more offices for bribes, every politician desiring to be a postmaster, and every congressman seeking patronage, had an interest in favoring it. It would strengthen the four-years-term policy in the senate if a bill for enforcing it should contain provisions for increasing the patronage of senators by requiring postmasters to be confirmed by that body. Accordingly, in 1836—the year of Van Buren's election as president—a bill was passed, requiring that all postmasters whose compensation was one thousand dollars a year or upward, should be appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and that their term of office should be but four years. They were made removable "at the pleasure of the president."

—It is not easy to decide who was most pleased with such a law, the partisan managers whose spoils it greatly increased, the senators whose patronage it more than doubled, or President Jackson, to whose despotism it added many vassals. But what each gained was the common loss of the people; nor was there hardly a pretense that any public interest (unless a perpetual rotation of postmasters and a more universal proscription are in the public interest) would be served by this postal service revolution. Postmasters whose income was less than one thousand dollars were left to be appointed and removed by the postmaster general, and their original constitutional tenure was left unchanged, nor has a four years or other term ever yet been applied to them.

—Thus were a great number of purely business offices deliberately brought within the range of political forces, subjected to senatorial confirmation, given a term which both suggested and facilitated their being made incentives and rewards of selfish activity, and a part of the spoils of partisan victory in every presidential election. Nor was this all. New grounds of difference between the senate and the president were thus created, and great strength was added to the growing power of patronage in that body, which in later years has enabled it to usurp and exercise a controlling and dangerous influence over the appointment and removal of all the principal officers of the government. Here was the beginning of a great and lamentable change in the character and influence of that body. Naturally, true statesmen have since had less influence in the senate. No legislation beyond these two acts of 1820 and 1836 was necessary to complete the partisan revolution in the politics and official life of the country. But various other administrative officers have since been given a term of four years; and it is worthy of notice that congress, disregarding the great distinction between legislative and ministerial functions, has almost never given an officer a longer fixed term than four years. It looks almost as if it had been a settled purpose to force every officer, by a fear of losing his office, to become a henchman of party leaders in every presidential contest.

—Greatly as the country was alarmed by the manifest degradation of political life which the new system was causing, the great contest concerning slavery, becoming absorbing at this time, was fatal to any considerable effort for reform from 1835 to 1867, when Mr. Jencks brought the subject before congress. He prudently directed attention mainly to methods for entering the public service, rather than to term or tenure. It soon appeared that the first condition of success was fuller information among the people in regard to administrative affairs. For more than thirty years the methods of administration, the debates and the political literature of the country, had been misleading the people in the spirit of the "spoils system," and hardening them into acquiescing familiarity with its abuses. The new theory of short terms for the inferior executive officers had come by many to be regarded as an essential part of our original institutions. The new tenure based on favor and partisan servility had been accepted by not a few as peculiarly and essentially republican. The evils they had caused or greatly aggravated were generally regarded as the inevitable drawbacks against the blessings of our liberal institutions. A generation had grown up which accepted the doctrine of rotation in the executive offices as a rule of justice, if not an evidence of liberty. A great portion of the patriotic and honest voters of the country had been induced to think that parties could not prosper (if, indeed, they could live) without a quadrennial opportunity of using the public offices as rewards and bribes, and the right, at all times, of forcing those who fill them to do the partisan work of politics. They were consenting that the government should be plundered as an enemy by each party that captured it. These short terms rest on the false and pernicious theory that the most salutary admonition for good official conduct, in an executive subordinate, is not a sense of direct responsibility to his superior, and a right and duty on the part of that superior to remove for good cause, but the certainty of going out at once when his political opponents succeed, and of going out very soon, in order to make a place for another, however faithfully he may serve the people. It hardly need be pointed out that every time that an efficient and faithful officer leaves his place at the end of his term, or is sent away for political reasons, proclamation is made to the people that the well doing of the public work is not what the government most seeks, but effective party workers and compliant tools of party managers.

—It should be noticed that these four-years term provisions did not extend to the clerks or other inferior officers in the great departments at Washington, or to the subordinates of postmasters, of collectors, or of naval or other officers named in the statutes referred to. And, applying only to postmasters whose compensation was one thousand dollars a year or more, and who alone were made confirmable by the senate, the quadrennial terms extended to only about four hundred out of the eight thousand postmasters—or to one-twentieth of the whole number—in Jackson's time. Nor have these humbler postmasters, or any of their subordinates, or any of the subordinates of the internal revenue service, or any of the customs service clerks, yet been subjected to a four-years term. As to them the theory of the constitution still prevails. Even Jacksonian politicians dared not make four-years terms more comprehensive; only some politicians of our day propose that. Mr. Kasson, of Iowa, for example, offered a bill in the house of representatives, at the last session, creating a four-years term for such subordinates.

—The collectors nominate, and the secretary of the treasury approves the selection of inferior officers in the customs service. The secretary removes them. The postmasters, within the limits of the appropriations, both employ and dismiss their own subordinates without any overruling authority being provided by law. But when the heads of these offices and the prominent postmasters had been given the same four-years term as that of the president, the postmaster general, and the secretaries presiding over departments, and the rotation "spoils system" had become well established, the tenure of all such subordinates, and of the small postmasters as well, inevitably became almost as precarious, if their holding of office was not as short as that of their superiors. If a four-years term and a tenure conditioned on both the servility of the officer and the supremacy of his party, were best for the collector and the postmaster, why were they not best for their clerks? If best for the postmaster, whose compensation was one thousand dollars, why not best for him whose compensation was one hundred dollars, or only ten dollars? All over the country, from the postoffice doorkeeper and the custom house scrubbing woman, to the postmaster general and the secretary of the treasury, that term and tenure, by the force of such logic and the pressure of party leaders for spoils, tended to become universal.

—When a statute of congress could be cited to prove the wisdom of removing a great postmaster to serve the ends of party in states and cities, how could a postmaster general resist the demands of the town and village politicians that the little postmasters should be selected and dismissed in order to serve the ends of little factions and cliques? And how could postmasters refuse to employ and dismiss their clerks upon a theory any less regardless of the public interests? It was the inevitable result of such a system that a servile partisan spirit, an intense, selfish political activity, forever meddling with the freedom of elections, forever bartering places for votes, and a consequent demoralizing neglect of the public business, were everywhere developed in the postal, not less than in the customs, service. Jefferson's prophecy was fulfilled. For the disastrous consequences which speedily followed, see SPOILS SYSTEM, REMOVALS FROM OFFICE. What sweeping and unprecedented removals for mere partisan reasons speedily followed the creation of a spoils system term and tenure, is well known. The name of Jackson is forever associated with merciless proscription and vicious rotation in office. That his system equally tends to keep the worthier classes from the public service and to draw into it scheming henchmen, debauched partisans, and bankrupt speculators, need not be pointed out. Why should an honest man of capacity and self-respect desire for its own sake an office in which to-morrow he may be the victim of a greedy faction of an electioneering secretary, and at best must reach the end of his term by the time he has learned his new business and forgotten his old?

—Other effects injurious to the administration and politics of the country, either caused or greatly aggravated by these four-years-term statutes, have become too serious to be passed without notice. I refer especially to congressional patronage and the usurpation of the executive power by the senate in connection with confirmations. When short terms were in theory made a sort of substitute for the discharge of the executive duty of removals for cause—when removals and appointments came to be based on political influence, and to be held to be a justifiable means of party aggrandizement—when, by the very language of an act of congress, not the welfare of the public, but "the pleasure of the president," and (by analogy) of heads of departments as well—became the rule of action, what more natural than that members of congress should first promise places (in aid of their own election), and next demand them of the president and secretaries as a condition of supporting the administration in congress? That many members have stood above this form of bribery and coercion, and that the majority have but mildly participated in it, we may well believe; yet it has become an alarming evil, the grave perils of which no candid man will deny. A great proportion of all the appointments and removals in our public service have become a part of the perquisites and spoils of congressmen, and have tended to the degradation of official manhood, and to corruption and coercion at elections, in manifold forms. A single appointment which a congressman could control can be vaguely promised to and be made to influence a score of voters. (For the effects of these short terms and of the tenure of office acts upon the senate, see CONFIRMATION BY THE SENATE.)

—As the law now stands, under the tenure of office acts of 1867 and 1869, no officer nominated, subject to confirmation by the senate, of which there are about thirty-five hundred, can be removed, except with the consent of the senate. During the recess of the senate the president may suspend such an officer, and the suspension will be effective until the end of the next session, subject to an agreement between the president and the senate in the meantime. The significance of this condition of affairs can not be mistaken. That great executive power of removal for good cause—the public, just, vigorous and uniform exercise of which is essential to all fidelity, to all economy, to all efficiency, and to every wholesome sense of responsibility, alike on the part of the superior officer who wields it, and the inferior officer who is subject to it—is apportioned and enfeebled. The greater part of it is handed over to a body acting secretly and through political majorities, the members of which neither have nor feel any direct responsibility for the working of the executive branch of the government. The president, constitutionally responsible for the faithful execution of the laws, can neither appoint nor remove any one of nearly thirty-five hundred of the higher officials through whom those laws are to be executed, without the consent of the majority, generally the political and perhaps the hostile majority, of the senate; if, indeed, he can make such removal or appointment without the consent of the senators of the state where an official delinquent defies executive authority. The tendency of such a system is to cause the wishes of senators to be potential, and their favor to be courted in the great departments, custom houses and postoffices, where their power should only be felt through independent criticism or stern investigation, to which their having favorites in office is almost sure to be fatal. Need it be pointed out that such a system tends to constant collisions or corrupt bargains between the executive and the senate? It teaches the people that partisan work and interests are the supreme standards for ministerial offices. It makes the senate as much an executive as a legislative body, its action tending more and more to impair the counterpoise and stability of our institutions. From such causes senators are more than ever before pressed by politicians of every class to make their action upon nominations and removals serviceable to the local interests of parties, factions and chieftains, whereby it has become equally unusual and difficult to make that action turn upon anything else. The struggles about the collectorship at New York and the case of Mr. Conkling are but examples of this tendency. Here again we see the sage prediction of Jefferson being fulfilled.

—The same causes which have tended to make senators the partisan autocrats and patronage purveyors of their states, have drawn upon them a vast demoralizing solicitation for office. It has often made their elections scenes of intense strife and lamentable corruption. It has absorbed the time needed for their public duties. It has blinded them in clouds of adulation. It has made hem unmindful of the higher sentiments of the people. It has caused the senatorial office itself to sink in public estimation. It made the late contest in New Hampshire possible. In estimating the control over state politics and elections gained by senators through their power to appoint and renew collectors and postmasters, it must be borne in mind that senatorial dictation may, and very generally does, extend to the selection and removal of the subordinates of those officers; so that senators (as Mr. Clay predicted in 1835) have very generally become feudal chiefs in the political affairs of their states.

—A few days after President Grant's first inauguration, when every plausible excuse for retaining the tenure of office acts had ceased, the house, which has no share in confirmations, declared itself for the repeal of those tenure of office acts by a vote of 138 against 16. In his message of December, 1869, President Grant declared "those laws inconsistent with a faithful and efficient administration of the government." A few days after that message, the house again voted their repeal by a majority of more than six to one, and in 1872, without a division, the house a third time voted their repeal. The senate was persistent for its courtesy and its usurped power. A majority of its members uphold them still, relentlessly exercising the authority they confer. In this policy Mr. Conkling was a leader, and fell under the rebuke of his own state.

—Such is the situation in large measure caused, and in every particular aggravated, by short fixed terms and a precarious partisan tenure. The period is not remote when, if these laws shall continue in force, the whole time of the senate will not be sufficient for confirming postmasters alone. We must consider the small proportion of the inferior officers to whom a four-years term has yet been extended, if we would comprehend the consequences of making that term universal. Of the about 3,500 now subject to it, about thirty-five are in the treasury department at Washington, more than one hundred are collectors, and about nineteen hundred are postmasters. The proposal to make that term general, according to the Kasson bill, is nothing less than this: that each one of the more than 75,000 other inferior officers shall either go out at the end of four years, or be kept in through as many successful contests of influence and favoritism. Does any candid man believe our institutions could stand such a strain? It is true that the example of a four-years term and a tenure by favor on the part of the most prominent of such officers here caused a great portion of those in the grades below them to be frequently changed. Yet it is a significant fact, standing in strong condemnation of a four-years term, that, despite such examples, the average periods of service in the lower offices, of late, at least, hare been two or three times four years, and have been the longest where administration has been best and politics least partisan and corrupt. The average time of service of the more than 42,000 postmasters, whose term is not fixed by law, has probably been about ten years, at least, if we exclude postoffices established within that period; and that of the subordinates in the New York city postoffice, where Mr. James and his successor have enforced the competitive examinations with such admirable results, is unquestionably longer. It is believed that the average period of service of the inferior officers of the treasury department (and certainly of the state department) at Washington, is longer still.

—We have only to look at the facts to see how disastrous would be the consequences of a four-years term in the great departments and offices. It would require about seven hundred changes, or successful contests for reappointment each year in the treasury department (more than at the rate of two every secular day); changes as frequent as the most barbarous partisan proscription has ever accomplished. A new appointment or a successful contest for a reappointment at the New York custom house every day of the year would be quite inadequate under such terms. If all postmasters were given a term of four years, there would be over ten thousand and five hundred changes or contests every year, or about thirty every day, to be dealt with; to which must be added one-fourth of all the subordinates in all the postoffices in the United States, and also all cases of resignation and removal for cause. If it be conceivable that an intelligent people can ever enter upon such changes, it is plain that there must be an additional postmaster general and secretaries with no other duty than that of working a vast machinery of rotation and partisan warfare. Consider the effect of a four years' term upon the postoffice at New York. It would require between four and five times as many changes each year as have been annually made in the period during which its administration has been so greatly improved. Two new selections or reappointments every three days would not fill the places which such a term would vacate at that office. It is obvious that nearly or quite the whole time of a postmaster would be required to attend to them.

—I have no space for tracing the effects of this short-term system in the offices of states or municipalities. It has contributed greatly to the perpetual and mischievous activity of parties and factions. Officers in cities and villages, whose duties have no legitimate relations with party politics, have been given short terms either in reckless thoughtlessness, or (apparently at least) for the mere purpose of creating annual or biennial prizes to be won in the low scramble of factions and bosses. It is not too much to say that at least the greater part of the political corruption of cities and of the fatiguing labors imposed on good citizens by reason of rotation in municipal offices would be superseded if the official tenure there was made what the public interests require. What can be more disastrous than the existing practice of giving the shortest of terms to heads of bureaus and the making of the tenure of them subordinate, dependent upon the triumph of a party, if not of a faction, or a demagogue, with whom that head is affiliated?

—The salutary tenure for inferior executive officers, sanctioned by the constitution and enforced by all the presidents before Jackson, has also been approved by the last two presidents. "Let it once be fully understood that continuance in office depends solely upon the faithful and efficient discharge of duties, and that no man will be removed to make place for another, and the reform will be half accomplished," are words of the late president. (President Garfield's speech at Athens, Ohio, 1879.) In a letter to Secretary Sherman, dated Nov. 23, 1877, President (then collector) Arthur says: "Permanence in office, which of course prevents removal except for cause, and promotion based upon good conduct and efficiency, are essential elements of correct civil service." In his letter of acceptance as vice-president, he said: "The tenure of office should be stable. Positions of responsibility should, so far as practicable be filled by the promotion of worthy and efficient officers," judgments which his messages have reaffirmed. These views imply that the right and duty of removal for good cause should remain unimpaired. They lend no sanction to a life tenure of office, which is quite inadmissible, or to any other tenure which does not make the common interest paramount to that of any office-holder, administration or party. One of the great objections to a short term is that it is treated as a sort of substitute for the discharge of the duty of removing the untrustworthy and the incompetent, whereby the moral tone, the discipline and the efficiency of the public service are alike degraded. The decisive question as to an "inferior officer" remaining longer in the service should always be, not, Has he been in his place four years or any other number of years? but, Is he a good officer, who, if retained longer, will serve the people most usefully?

—So far from life tenure, or a permanent tenure in the absolute sense, even being admissible, removals should be made for at least the following causes: 1, conviction of an infamous crime or one involving fraud or corruption; 2, facts showing that such crime has been committed; 3, the use of official authority or influence to coerce the freedom of citizens; 4, mental or physical incapacity for official work; 5, intemperance; 6; gross immorality or vices; 7, habitual inefficiency; 8, willful neglect of duty; 9, intentional disobedience to lawful instructions; 10, renunciation of allegiance; 11, acts of treachery or bad faith toward the United States.

—There are yet other grave objections to these short terms. They were provided for a few of the higher offices, on the theory that a longer holding of executive places was a monopoly, and that a quadrennial rotation was republican justice, and essential to the healthy life of parties. The demand that the same term be extended throughout the service is in the spirit of its original creation. The fact that those holding under four-years terms have, as we have seen, retained their places for much shorter periods than those not subjected to such terms, proves that such terms cause the rotation which their champions favor. By reason of the simple facts that such terms are demanded, in the name of rotation and of the communistic theory that every man has an equal right to office, they make a sort of legislative proclamation of such doctrines. They apply alike to worthy and unworthy officials, and hence tell the people that every officer, no matter how pure and useful, should, on the ground of justice to those seeking office, leave his place at the end of four years. He is, in the spirit of such a law, if he stays longer, an odious monopolist, holding by favor what belongs to another. A law fixing a four-years term plainly says to the people that a ministerial officer should not hold his place either so long as he remains upright and efficient, or so long as his superior officer regards him as more useful to the public than an inexperienced man would be. It tells them, that, for reasons paramount to all such considerations, his service should end absolutely with the four years. These reasons—however partisan, communistic, or corrupt, as illustrated in practice—are, by the legislative, made imperative upon the executive. They are undeclared by the law, and are left to mere inferences to be drawn from practice. They are reasons, at once vague and mysterious, which plainly and equally disregard personal merit in the inferior officer displaced and the responsibility of his superior for good administration in his own department. These terms are an invasion by the legislative upon the executive. They suggest that the executive officer can not be trusted to decide how long the services of a subordinate are useful to the public—a power and duty which, under the constitution, plainly belong to the executive. Such considerations will prevent short terms ever being regarded as legislation in the interest of efficient or economical administration. They will be regarded as the enforcement of a pretended system of justice in office holding—as an approval of increased patronage for parties, of diminished power in the executive over its own subordinates, of encroachment on the part of congress beyond the sphere of its responsibility, of more absolute dependence upon mere favor on the part of subordinates. Short terms are, in principle, a sort of invitation, even to the executive himself, to remove for reasons other than the good of the public service; for those terms are in substance a removal, every four years, of every person in the public service, not for any good or even any avowed cause, but utterly irrespective of the merits of those removed. They emphatically teach servility, by saying to every subordinate: "Your sole chance of holding beyond the four years depends on executive favor or partisan and congressional influence exerted for your reappointment. A peaceful holding is not to be a consequence of well doing. Look to favor and influence. Under the laws of your country, or by reason of any merit or usefulness they pretend to respect, you have no claim to stay an hour beyond the quadrennial period." Mr. Webster, in 1835, in urging the repeal of the four years term of 1820, covered the ground in these words: "The law itself vacates the office, and gives the means of rewarding a friend without the exercise of the power of removal at all." If official merit, in the estimation of the appointing power, is a good reason for continuing longer in office, why bring the holding to an end by a fixed term? The end of the term but refers that same question to the identical authority which would, except for the term, have decided it. If unworthy to decide when to remove for cause, is not the superior officer unworthy to decide when to reappoint for merit?

—But the mischief of the four-years term law does not stop there. Every reason which can be urged in favor of a four-years term, can also be urged by party managers and scheming officials against reappointments at the end of those terms. For, how is rotation to be secured, how is each man any more certain to get his fair share of office under short terms, if all the good officers who ought not to have been removed are to be reappointed at the end of their terms? If there are not to be more changes under a four-years term than without it, if inexperience is not to be increased, and skilled servants whom the public has educated are not to be driven out, then what is the gain of the short-term law, upon the theory of its advocates? It would not cause rotation. It would give office to no more office seekers. Every patronage monger, every caucus manipulator, every shiftless office seeker of the land, every aspiring demagogue longing for more offices to pledge for votes, every unscrupulous chieftain seeking more callow officials to tax and more places to give as bribes, every intense partisan believing that spoils are the strength of parties, and that rotation in office is a vital principle of republics, is not only in favor of a four-years term, but will insist on true Jacksonian proscription during that term. Can any argument be necessary to make it clear that every concession to such theories but intensifies and embitters the communistic, partisan and proscriptive spirit which they embody? If a four-years term should be provided in order to make more places for office seekers, then why, upon the same theory, should not terms be reduced to two years, or to one year? When, as of late, the ante-rooms at Washington are crowded with office seekers, and the tables of the secretaries are loaded with office-begging letters, why should clerks be allowed to monopolize their places for four long years, while these applicants are pleading for their share of the offices? The same reasons are just as good for bringing down the term even to two months, as we have seen was the fact in the Florentine and other Italian republics. We must reject rotation as a principle, or carry it to its legitimate results. If the best ability and character for serving the people, and the best and most economical administrators, be not the standard and the end recognized by law, then we can nowhere set them up against the claims of the communistic office seeker and clamorous patronage monger.

—The proportion of federal officials to the population ranges from one in twenty-four in the District of Columbia, to one in 540 in Vermont, and one in 1,500 in Georgia. The average seems to be about one official to every 600 of the population, or one official to every 150 males and females with some competency for official duties. The greater number of postoffices in the northern states gives the larger ratio of federal offices there. That, as a rule, from five to fifty persons make a contest or claim for nearly every vacancy, is well known. Will this demoralizing office seeking be less, will the feverish and selfish activity of parties and factions which it stimulates and feeds be diminished, by giving a four-years term to 80,000 additional offices on the demand of politicians and office seekers who declare that every man has an equal right to office, and that a quadrennial rotation is but yielding to this right? Having, by proclaiming rotation to be a principle of republican justice, provided a place for one office seeker in fifty, shall we then be more or less able than before to resist the communistic demand of the other forty-nine office seekers? Will it tend to dissuade them from demanding removals without cause, or to make them better satisfied that senators hold for six years, and judges during good behavior?

—It hardly need be pointed out, that terms fixed by law would advertise to parties, to every office seeker, and to the feudal lords of patronage, the precise dates of every vacancy. He must know little of office seeking, or of partisan methods for controlling appointments, who does not see that every approaching vacancy would be the subject of deliberate and mischievous bargains and combinations of influence for filling it. The appointing power would be solicited for pledges, men of prominence would be pressed for recommendations, party leaders would be besieged for influence, every corrupt element and every pernicious activity of politics would be intensified beyond anything yet known. For, so long as a removal at an indefinite time must precede an appointment, there is a great uncertainty as to whether any vacancy will exist, and a concentrated effort by patronage mongers at a decisive moment is generally impracticable. The appointing power has some chance of self-protection. An inevitable vacancy for all places at a time known months or years before, would change all this. The potentates of patronage would wrangle over, bargain for and apportion every vacancy months before it happened.

—It is not of course a certainty, if a short term shall ever be established for executive subordinates, that it will be a term of four years, though that is the partisan's favorite period. It may be a term of six or more years. A six-years term would have the advantage of keeping a considerable portion of the changes it would cause out of the period of the presidential election. But with that exception, every other objection urged against short terms would, in large measure, hold against a term of six years. There are obvious reasons why a six-years term would be preferable to one of four years, as there are why a term of ten or more years would be preferable to one of six years. And competent persons would doubtless be more likely to take an official place and to serve for a moderate compensation under a tenure of six years, than under one of four, for much the same reasons that they would still more incline to the public service for a moderate salary under a tenure having regard to merit, which would appeal both to their ambition and to their sense of safety. A four-years or a six-years term for a young man takes him from business experience at an important period of his life. It puts the man of family to expense in adjusting himself to his position. It offers to either only a dreary, admonishing uncertainty, little inviting to a person of prudence or capacity. When, after coming into the service at twenty or thirty years of age, a four-years training by the government as an accountant, an appraiser, a mail distributer, an officer at the mint, the assay office, or the treasury, has made the official skillful, well informed, and valuable as a public servant, it is certainly desirable that he should remain at least two years longer; but would it not be yet more desirable that he should stay so long as he is the most useful man for the place? What good reason can be given for sending away a valuable official at twenty-six or thirty-six, on merely showing that he has served six years? Is it not plain, that, if the tenure and usage should say to him, "So long as you do your duty promptly and well, and maintain a good character, your means of living will not be taken away, nor your place given to another without good cause," he would be stimulated to fidelity in a degree unknown to him who can hold his place only time enough to learn its duties and to look out for another? The government will never be most economically served, nor gain the best to serve it, while its officials are selected or treated as needy birds-of-passage, in mercy supported to-day, but told to find a place elsewhere to-morrow. Who will deny that any intelligent man will engage for a less salary and be more careful to do his work well, if he feels that fidelity and efficiency will protect him against being discharged without cause?

—It may be insisted that the service would not, as a matter of course, end with the six years, but only terminate in case the incumbent should be held unworthy of reappointment. This theory plausibly presents a short term as a kind of substitute for removals. It contemplates, that, at the end of the service of every one of the more than 14,000 executive officers whose period would expire within each year under a six-years term, there would be a special inquest as to the official conduct of each, and a just judgment rendered. We need not dwell on the magnitude of such an undertaking, which makes it chimerical. If the facts which this theory assumes be true, viz., that during the previous six years the official superiors have been ignorant of the merits of their subordinates, such neglect would prove them unworthy to decide as to reappointments. If these merits and demerits have been known, year by year, no special inquiry will be needed. The unworthy will have been, or should have been, removed. Whose duty would it be, in any event, to conduct that inquiry and decide upon reappointments, except that of the identical superior officers whose yearly and daily duty it now is to keep themselves in that regard fully informed, and to make removals day by day whenever good cause exists? Since that obligation can not be increased, the change, if any, contemplated in official supervision under short terms, would seem to be one that would excuse its performance until the end of the term. Insufficiency, insubordination, neglect of duty for party work, and conduct—not absolutely infamous or criminal, perhaps—are to be overlooked during the term, because at its end there is to be a grand inquest. In other words, the moral and legal obligations of officials in the higher places, and the experience and discipline essential on the part of those in the lower places, are both alike to be reduced to short measure, as a part of the benefits of short terms. That this would please the office seekers, patronage mongers and partisans most clamorous for such terms, we need not doubt. On any other theory, or any just or defensible theory as to removals, it is plain that the unworthy would all be removed before the end of the six years, and that all those left at its expiration—whose terms would end—would be precisely those who would deserve a reappointment; which of course shows the term to be unavailing for any useful purpose. If, therefore, the officials having a duty of removal are to be trusted, the six-years or other short term is needless, and if they are not to be trusted to make removals when they should be made, how can they be trusted to make reappointments at the end of the terms? Would they be improved for the duty of reappointment by a statute which would suggest that until the end of terms they should wink at the delinquencies of their subordinates? The better remedy than any short term would be to enforce far more sternly, and, if need be, by the aid of stringent legislation, the duty, declared by Madison, and implied in the constitution, to remove for adequate cause, and not to remove without it; and by fit reform methods (which can not be explained here), to take away the pressure, the threats and the corrupt persuasions which now make the proper discharge of that duty so rare and difficult. Under such a system the unworthy would be warned off as well as weeded out from the public service.

—But let us not forget, that with fixed terms, either for six or ten years, it would be far more difficult to reappoint valuable servants than it would have been to retain them longer if no statute had taught the office seekers and spoilsmen the doctrine of rotation and removals without cause. It is unquestionably true, on the other hand, that an officer too cowardly to discharge his duty, to remove during a term, may more easily get excused by reason of a removal made by act of congress; and, so far as that kind of relief, which first encourages official neglect and then causes it to be forgotten, is an advantage, it must certainly be set to the credit of short fixed terms. With the duty of making removals for cause—which would of course embrace inefficiency by reason of age or any other cause—fitly discharged, we should hear little either of a life tenure, which is utterly indefensible, or of a tenure during good behavior merely, which is inadmissible. An inefficient official may exhibit only good behavior in the legal sense. Good behavior and efficiency combined, are the true basis of tenure for administrative officers. Who but the spoilsman, the partisan and the rotationist in theory—who but those who deny pure, economical and vigorous administration to be the supreme ends—will object to retaining a ministerial officer as long as he is the most useful man for the public service?

—There are doubtless some who think—and, within very narrow limits, perhaps not wholly without reason—that short terms would impress upon the officials a new sense of responsibility in addition to that felt toward official superiors, a responsibility to public opinion. But to what kind of public opinion? The fact that the managers of small local administrations, open to the view of every one, in towns and villages, and that officers elected by the people, feel a wholesome responsibility to public opinion, is a natural source of delusion on the subject. If that sense of responsibility is reliable in the great officers, it would be a good reason why the 80,000 inferior federal officers should be elected rather than appointed—why, in short, the whole theory of the constitution should be abandoned. The greater parts of our system would be indefensible. It is because such a theory is illusory; that, under our system, and under that of every civilized state, such officials are appointed and are governed by superior officers. The popular judgment can rarely decide, with intelligence, how far bad administration, in a great office, is due to the superior officer, or how far to his subordinates, who must obey the instructions. And for that reason all good governments have put the responsibility and duty of removal upon the superior—the president, the governor, and the mayor, whom the people elect, or upon the heads of departments, and hold them responsible for their subordinates. Every attempt by the legislature, through short terms, to substitute for the true responsibility to the executive and for the duty of removal, a new kind of responsibility, is therefore not only a legislative usurpation of executive functions, but is an effort not only repugnant to our constitution, but demoralizing in its tendency. The shorter the term of executive offices, the more difficult and unreliable would be the popular judgment. Make the term a year or a month, and will any candid man say that a popular judgment upon the official conduct of him who fills it could exist? What do the people know of the relative merits of any one of the thousands or hundreds of subordinates in a department? The worst administrations of later years—the corruption, partisan proscription, neglect of official duty in order to coerce elections, political assessments, the degradation of the public servants into the henchmen of chieftains and senators, the bartering of places for votes—have not been originated or most practiced by the more subordinate officials to whom a fixed term has never been extended, but have grown up and become most intolerable around the great custom houses and postoffices, at the head of which are officers holding for four years, confirmed by the senate and beyond removal, except by the consent of that body. If the many thousands of postmasters whose compensation is between five hundred and one thousand dollars a year, were given a term of four or six years, and were made confirmable by the senate, like the postmasters having a higher salary, I must think that not superior postmasters, but more active politicians, would be secured, and that new elements of vicious and feverish activity would be added to our municipal politics in every quarter of the Union. It would be no better, if postmasters were added to the excessive numbers of candidates in our municipal elections. The fate of every clerk and carrier would be involved in the election. Concerning most of these new confirmations, at best, there would be the same vigorous working of party machinery, and the same mischievous combination of selfish influences which now distract communities and vex congressmen in connection with the quadrennial appointment of collectors and postmasters of the higher grade. Few things are clearer in our politics than the fact that a large share of such confirmations are determined by mere official favor or partisan interests. Rare indeed is it that the administrative capacity of the candidate is made a decisive or even a prominent issue. The case of Postmaster James, of New York, is the first instance in our history of the office of postmaster general being conferred by reason of the administrative capacity of the person appointed.

—There are doubtless some who favor a term of years only by reason of an assumed difficulty in bringing about removals. That difficulty grows out of the spoils-system method of making appointments. The same pressure on the part of great politicians and members of congress which crowds the service with their unworthy favorites, keeps them there. The threats and pleadings which foist a brawny henchman, a bankrupt cousin, or a favorite widow, upon the national pay rolls, are repeated when the attempt is made to remove them. The competitive examinations now placed at the gates of the public service will not only exclude the unworthy, but they will bring in those who would have nothing but their superior merit to keep them there, and removals for cause will be easy. They have no influence to back them. And should any superior officer decline to remove for cause, he can be impeached, as Madison advised; for, when members of congress and chieftains can no longer put their favorites and relatives into the departments, they will no longer, as now, have an interest to prevent the arraignment of extravagance and imbecility in the executive service. British experience has confirmed the plain suggestions of reason on those points.

—It has been suggested, that, since competitive examinations are very offensive to the partisans and spoilsmen whose patronage they suppress, the need of them in a measure might be superseded by short terms of office. The suggestion is not even plausible. The shorter the term, the greater the need of ability and business experience upon entering the service; and the greater, also, the need of thorough competitive examinations for selecting the most competent. If the period of service be long, even those incompetent at the start may be trained into usefulness at the public expense. But if the term be too short for such education, large capacity must be required at the start. Make the term only a month, and the public work would be arrested, unless the standard for admission should be greatly raised. While, therefore, competitive examinations could be made to mitigate some of the evils of short terms, such terms would make competitive examinations indispensable.

—It is important to see clearly that the time when a person should leave the public service does not depend upon the manner of getting into it, but upon his usefulness therein, however he got there. Whether he got in by favor, pressure, or competitive examination, the question of his proper term or tenure is the same. Such examinations, and, indeed, nearly all the practical methods of civil service reform, except the demand for the repeal of the short term acts, relate to the means of getting into the service, and to the abuses therewith connected. It is only the specious, unwarranted allegations of the spoilsmen, which declare a dependence of those methods upon a life tenure or long term of office. There is no such dependence. A great portion of the removals without cause are, however, made in order to create vacancies into which dependents or henchmen may be pushed. And, since, under competitive examinations, the place would be filled by whoever could prove himself the better man, this pushing would avail little or nothing, and for that reason unwarranted removals would rarely take place, as the experience of such examinations at the New York custom house and postoffice has clearly shown. While, therefore, such examinations would tend to make a tenure more stable by making powerless the corrupt forces which cause proscriptive removals, I repeat, that the need of applying these methods would increase with every reduction of the term of office and every enfeeblement of tenure. It is an utter misconception of the subject to claim that a permanent tenure of office is an incident of competitive examinations, or any further a consequence of them than this, that, securing the better man, they make it more easy and natural to keep such men as long as the public needs or desires them.

—But, suppose short-term theories should now prevail; what would be the result in the near future? Population doubles in about thirty-five years, and officers increase yet more rapidly. Men now vote who may live to see more than 200,000,000 of people in the Union, and more than 400,000 federal officials.

—Within little more than a decade, the life saving and signal service, the national board of health, the agricultural bureau, the bureau of education and the civil service commission have been added to the public service, and some of them may soon be departments. When there shall be 200,000 postmasters and 300,000 federal officers, there will still be but one president, but one senate, but one secretary of the treasury, but one postmaster general, unless we create others to fight off the office seekers and work a vast machinery of office filling. Shall we deliberately create an official term which will require the refilling of nearly 100,000 of these places every year, in addition to all those that may be made vacant by removals and resignations? Washington could not contain the office seekers and their backers who would swarm there. Could republican institutions long survive?

—Another consideration connected with short terms must not be overlooked. They would greatly embarrass, if not defeat, any adequate system for promotion based on merit or experience. Four successive presidents, all the best administrators in the country, and every well-governed nation of the world, have insisted on promotions for merit, tested by experience, as essential to good administration. When, in his late message, President Arthur declared that "positions of responsibility should be, so far as practicable, filled by the promotion of worthy and efficient officers," he affirmed a principle to which short terms are utterly repugnant, and the wisdom of which the best experience of the world affirms. These terms are an arbitrary interference by the legislative with the executive department, by reason of which, at a fixed time, and irrespective alike of the needs of the public service, of the merits of those who fill it, and of the wishes of those responsible for good administration, the good and the bad alike cease to serve the people. Every worthy officer is sent away—in substance, removed—without cause. Promotion for merit, on the other hand, is based on the theory that an officer is more valuable for his experience, and should, if otherwise worthy, be retained for that reason. Now, it is quite too preposterous for argument to pretend that such experience can be secured in the complicated affairs of government, if there is to be a quadrennial rotation. The very theory upon which such rotation is founded is but a declaration that the paramount aim of the government is not the most competent officers, is not to stimulate effort, and retain the skilled ability it has educated, but to give places to the greatest number of patronage mongers, and salaries to the greatest number of office seekers.

—But it may be asked whether some evils may not attend constitutional tenure for "inferior officers"—a tenure during the coexistence of good behavior and efficiency—and whether some provision may not be wisely made for those who might leave the service poor and superannuated. We can not speak positively of the future. When evils from such a source shall be developed, then will be the time to meet them. At present, surely, there is not too much trained experience in the public service. It may be that the aptitude and inclination of our people for change of calling, and the facilities for saving and for securing employment in this country, will for many years prevent the need of legislation on such subjects, which in the old and densely populated countries, we know has existed. There will be ample time for action on such subjects years hence. It is not easy to understand an abuse which does not exist, or customary to legislate against evils which are only imagined. The first duty is to provide for bringing the most competent into the public service, and for suppressing patronage and the arbitrary removal of competent public servants. We do not refuse to cure the sick or arrest contagion, from a fear that the future may have an excess of population. Our business men have not, as a rule—though with increasing exceptions said to be advantageous to employés—yet made provisions for those worn out by faithful labor in their employment; and whether the federal government can wisely be more paternal and humane is a question properly left to the future. Much may be said on both sides of it. Our pensions in principle, and our retiring allowance in the army and navy, and for federal judges, directly affirm the justice and utility of making provision for faithful officers worn out in the public service. After putting out the flames and purifying the air of the national household, we can take ample time for improving its attractions. The older governments, generally, and Great Britain with marked success, have made such provisions. The British statutes, which give a retiring allowance only after ten years' faithful service, are by no means based on a theory of mere benevolence. They are justified not only as enabling the government to secure its servants at a smaller salary, but as contributing to their efficiency and fidelity in office; in fact, as being, on the mere score of economy and selfishness, a manifest gain to the public treasury. The salary and the allowance are thought to be hardly more than the salary would need to be, on the average or in the aggregate, but for the allowance upon retirement. This experience, extending over three-fourths of a century, is well worthy of our study whether we ever have occasion to make similar allowance or not. It will show us a royal and aristocratic government regarding the self-respect and comfort of those who, in humble places, serve it faithfully, with a care, dignity and regard for economy which are not quite universal in this great republic.

—If it be suggested that such allowances befit the paternal care of a monarchy, but not the stern justice of a republic, let it be remembered that every subordinate in the British service who can receive them is by statute compelled to gain his place through superior merit disclosed in a stern, open, competitive examination, where neither blood, wealth nor influence avail anything; while it is only in this republic that a great officer or politician can privately force his blockhead son, his discharged housekeeper, his servile electioneering agent, or his bankrupt dependent, upon the public service.

—Whenever the time may come, there are various ways of dealing with the subject: 1, we may fix an age beyond which "inferior officers" shall not remain in the service, thus sternly excluding dotage; 2, we may fix an age after which the salary shall rapidly decrease, which would prevent full payment for impaired capacity, as well as cause seasonable resignations; 3, we may pay a small fixed sum on retirement, after a prescribed period of meritorious service and before reaching a fixed age; 4, we may, on retirement any time after ten years of such service, continue to pay a certain proportion of the salary receivable at the date of retirement, which is the British system; 5, we may, after the official has reached a certain age or period of service, retain a percentage of his salary, to be paid on retirement, which will cost the government nothing and yet be a provision against want; 6, we may refuse to make any provision whatever on the subject, dealing with the public servants according to the severest theories of hostile interest and business relations; or, 7, if we shall find the executive or heads of departments refusing to remove in proper cases (after the repeal of the tenure of office acts and relief from party and congressional influence shall have restored to them a real liberty to do so), or if any bad effects shall attend the restoration of tenure based on character and efficiency, it will be easy, if desirable, to establish a term of years, the length of which should be determined in the light of such experience, and not upon the "spoils system" theories which now prevail. Then if competitive examinations shall have been continuously enforced, there may be neither partisan interest nor prejudice enough left to embolden demagogues to seek popularity by denouncing as an "official class" those who, from whatever grade of life, have worked their way solely by superior merit, and who can hold their places only so long as they continue both upright and efficient. How can that be a class, into which no one can be born, which can be reached only by open competition of merit, through which nothing can be taken or transmitted, and in which no one can remain longer than he is freely retained because he is the best servant of the people?

—We need, and, before the time for action shall arrive, we may expect, a more intelligent public opinion on the subject of office getting and office holding. Of what use to ask a legislator who believes in rotation, who holds a tenure of merit to be "un-American," who has promised ten clerkships to carry his last election, and demands a consulate and a postoffice to carry his next election—to consider the subject on the basis of the public interest? When we better comprehend that the real strength of parties is adherence to sound principles and the enforcement of good administration; when we are prepared to make capacity and character, and not influence and favoritism, the tests for admission to the public service; when the states as well as the nation shall have shown courage to suppress political assessment and the official coercion of elections, when we become convinced that promising places for votes is the worst form of bribery, and that the "spoils system" is as demoralizing to a party as it is disastrous and disgraceful to the country—then we shall see that to refuse to retain a public servant because he is faithful and efficient, is to refuse to protect the public welfare. Then, and possibly not till then, we shall be prepared to deal with our retiring public servants upon the grounds of justice and sound principles. Then we shall be able to give due consideration to what contributes to the honor, efficiency and economy of the public service, to what makes it attractive to a prudent man with a family dependent upon his salary, to what will give it a high place in public estimation, to what will invite to it young men of promise by assuring them that merit will be the condition, alike of stability and of promotion.

DORMAN B. EATON.

TERRITORIAL WATERS

TERRITORIAL WATERS are all waters within the jurisdictional limits set by international law to an independent state. Such waters137 comprise: 1, inclosed waters, which are, first, rivers, lakes and other inland waters wholly within the boundaries of a state; second, if the boundaries of a state are rivers or lakes or other inland waters, unless one of the riparian states has a good title to the whole bed of the same, bounding non-navigable rivers to the middle of such streams, bounding navigable rivers to the middle of their deepest channel, and bounding lakes and other inland waters to the middle of the same; and third, ports, bays, straits, sounds or arms of the sea within (intra fauces) headlands belonging to the same state not more than two marine leagues apart; 2, uninclosed waters, or the open sea to the distance of one marine league outward from the line of low-water mark; and, when bays, straits, sounds or arms of the sea are inclosed by headlands belonging to the same state not more than two marine leagues apart, the open sea to a distance of one marine league outward from a line drawn between the two headlands.

—The law relating to inclosed waters is well settled. The state inclosing them within its naturally extended territory has a right of ownership, as well as a right of jurisdiction, over them; and in order that the passageways of commerce and navigation may be subject to public authority and control, the title to the land under water, and to the shore below ordinary high-water mark, in navigable rivers and lakes (in England, and in states which have adopted the form rather than the substance of the English rule, tide waters) and in ports, harbors, bays, straits, sounds or arms of the sea inclosed as above described, is vested in the state for the public use and benefit. Although a state is entitled to exclusive jurisdiction both civil and criminal, over its inclosed waters, usage gives a concurrent criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on foreign vessels in such waters to the states to which such vessels belong, and the state entitled to exclusive criminal jurisdiction will not exercise it in such cases, the parties being exclusively foreign, unless its authority is invoked, or unless the peace of the country is disturbed.

—The law relating to uninclosed waters is not thoroughly settled. It is the historical result of the assertion by different states at different times of conflicting claims of ownership or jurisdiction over the same or different parts of the open sea. It is a compromise by which all states have practically abandoned the claim of ownership over any part of the open sea, upon the express or tacit assent of all the states that each state is allowed an artificial extension of its territory over the open sea adjacent to its coast, to such a distance as is necessary for its defense and security.

—When modern international law had its rise, few parts of the sea were free from the claims of some European state. England asserted a right of ownership over the sea surrounding Great Britain as far as the coasts of neighboring countries; Spain declared its exclusive right to navigate the gulf of Mexico and the Pacific ocean; Portugal sought to bar the rest of the world from the gulf of Guinea and the Indian ocean; Venice claimed the Adriatic, Genoa the Ligurian, and Denmark the North seas. Sailing without license upon some of these waters was prohibited under penalty of death, and forfeiture of all the offender's goods. Whether originating in capricious assertions of brute force or in substantial services done in policing these seas, many of which were then infested by pirates, some of these claims were so far admitted, that a right of control became established and was recognized by the payment of toll, the furling of flags and other salutes, from which even kings were not exempt.

—From this right of control, as "a dissociation of the ideas of control and property was not then intelligible, the step to the assertion of complete rights of property was almost inevitable." During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries assertions of proprietary rights based upon prescription, or discovery, or police services, or papal grant, over the open sea, were general, and were maintained with varying success. The physical impossibility of obtaining and keeping exclusive possession of any part of the open sea, the growth of commerce and the consequent recognition of the necessity of the free navigation of the ocean, led to a contest between the advocates of mare clausum and those of mare liberum, which was begun in 1609 by Grotius, and which was ended in 1824-5 by the complete abandonment of the last of these "vain and extravagant pretensions"—the claim of Russia to the Pacific ocean north of fifty-one degrees north latitude. It is now universally admitted that the open or high seas—the ocean and all connecting arms and bays or other extensions thereof not within the territorial limits of any nation—are not the subject either of property or of exclusive jurisdiction, and that the right to navigate these seas is common to all nations and their members, and can be abridged or renounced only by actual consent.

—The first germs of the modern doctrine of uninclosed territorial waters are discoverable in a proclamation 1 of James I. of 1604, which contains the two principles which now limit territorial jurisdiction over the open sea, confining it, 1, to a reasonable distance, and 2, to a distance within which the state can prohibit violence. Grotius, while advocating the freedom of the open sea, admitted that portions of it might be occupied by the state possessing the adjacent land. Bynkershoek, in 1702, formulated the modern rule, which is based upon the necessity of securing peace and protection to the lives, property and industries of the subjects of states who live upon their coasts, and which extends the territorial waters of a state over so much of the open sea as can be defended from its coasts. This, according to Bynkershoek's formula, was as wide a belt of open sea as could be effectively commanded from the coast by cannon, a distance which subsequent writers fixed as one marine league, although to the present time it is often described as a distance of a marine league or as far as cannon shot will reach from the coast. To continental jurists this suggestion of Bynkershoek seemed to afford a reasonable basis for the settlement of conflicting claims over the open sea, and, though widest disagreement regarding the extent of territorial waters continued for a century, the principle has gradually gained recognition that any control over the open sea to be valid must be effective. No mention of a marine league belt of territorial waters appears to have been made in any English court until 1801, and no exhaustive examination of the nature of the rights of a state over such waters, and their extent, was made in any English court till 1876, when a case arose (The Franconia)2 involving the right of England to punish a foreigner for an offense committed while on a foreign vessel on a foreign voyage within a marine league of the English coast. The critical review of the opinions of authoritative writers upon international law, then made, showed that: 1. All these writers acknowledge the right of a maritime state to an extension of its territory, in a qualified sense of the word, over some portion of the adjacent sea beyond low-water mark; 2. Though there is found a great variety of opinion among these writers, as to the distance to which such maritime territory should be allowed, that distance varying (setting aside even more extravagant claims) from 100 to three miles, the present limit, not one of them puts such distance at less than three miles; 3. All the earlier writers, and many of the later writers, maintained, that within the zone of three miles the state had, without qualification, a proprietary as well as a territorial right, so that it might at its pleasure exclude foreign ships from passing along the same; but that others of the later writers contended that the state had a territorial, but not a proprietary, right over the zone, or that, at all events, the innocent use of the zone by foreign ships for the purpose of navigation could not without wrong be interfered with. (2 L. R., Ex. Div., 71, 122, 123.)2—But, as the opinions of publicists, even if there were no disagreement among them, are, at best, only secondary evidence of what international law is, the primary evidence of the fact which these writers assert—the existence of an international agreement to treat any part of the littoral sea as belonging to or under the control of the adjacent state—must be sought in treaties and usage. What these disclose is most authoritatively expressed in the opinion, delivered in the leading case above named, by the late Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, who said: "1. Treaties. It may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the rule that the sea surrounding the coast is to be treated as a part of the adjacent territory, so that the state shall have exclusive dominion over it, and that the law of the latter shall be generally applicable to those passing over it in the ships of other nations, has never been made the subject-matter of any treaty, or, as a matter of acknowledged right, has formed the basis of any treaty, or has ever been the subject of diplomatic discussion. It has been entirely the creation of the writers on international law. It is true that the writers who have been cited constantly refer to treaties in support of the doctrine they assert. But when the treaties they refer to are looked at, they will be found to relate to two subjects only: the observance of the rights and obligations of neutrality, and the exclusive right of fishing. In fixing the limits to which these rights should extend, nations have so far followed the writers on international law as to adopt the three-mile range as a convenient distance. There are several treaties by which nations have engaged, in event of either of them being at war with a third, to treat the sea within three miles of each other's coasts as neutral territory, within which no warlike operations should be carried on. Again, nations, possessing opposite or neighboring coasts, bordering on a common sea, have sometimes found it expedient to agree that the subjects of each shall exercise an exclusive right of fishing to a given distance from their own shores, and here also have accepted the three miles as a convenient distance. Such, for instance, are the treaties made between this country and the United States in relation to the fishery off the coast of Newfoundland, and those between this country and France, in relation to the fishery on their respective shores; and local laws have been passed to give effect to these engagements. 2. Usage. The only usage found to exist is such as is connected with navigation, or with revenue, local fisheries or neutrality, and it is to these alone that the usage relied on is confined. Usage as to the application of the general law of the local state to foreigners on the littoral sea, there is actually none. No nation has arrogated to itself the right of excluding foreign vessels from the use of its external littoral waters for the purpose of navigation, or has assumed the power of making foreigners in foreign ships passing through these waters subject to its law, otherwise than in respect of the matters to which I have just referred. Nor have the tribunals of any nation held foreigners in these waters amenable generally to the local criminal law in respect of offenses."

—So far, then, as it is settled, the law applicable to uninclosed territorial waters is as follows: 1. The rights, whatever may be their description, of an independent state over such waters, are created by international law, and are evidenced by the assent of nations which "may be expressed by treaty or the acknowledged concurrence of governments, or may be implied from established usage," and in the absence of such proof of assent the opinions of writers on international law are relevant only as tending to show what claims138 one independent state may exercise over such waters without interference from other independent states. 2. The rights of an independent state over such waters, so derived and so evidenced, are, first, a right of jurisdiction limited to the protection of its coasts from the effects of hostilities between other states which may be at war, the prevention of frauds upon its customs laws, and the regulation of fisheries; and second, a usufructuary right to fisheries. Modern writers who affirm any proprietary right over uninclosed marginal waters unite in basing it upon the fact that the adjacent "state has admittedly an exclusive right to the enjoyment of the fisheries" in such waters. But this seems to be more accurately classed as a usufructuary right, for, if a state has any proprietary right over such waters, it would seem to have the exclusive right to set law over them, and to close them to foreign vessels, as it may close its ports, whereas it is universally admitted that foreign ships have a jus transitus over such waters. 3. The internationally valid exercise of the rights above enumerated by an independent state is limited to a distance of one marine league from low-water mark on its coast.

—There are a few apparent exceptions to this rule. 1. Local pilot laws, which require that a pilot shall be taken on board all vessels entering certain territorial waters at a distance of more than three miles from the coast. Such laws are no real exception to the rule, being based upon the principle that a state has a perfect right to say to foreign ships voluntarily seeking its ports, that they shall not, without complying with its law, enter into its ports, and that if they do enter, they shall be subject to penalties unless they have previously complied with the requisitions ordained; whether these requisitions be, as in former times, certificates of origin, or clearances of any description from a foreign port. or clean bills of health, or the taking on board a pilot at any place in or out of its jurisdiction before entering its waters.3 Other local laws containing provisions affecting foreign ships, or foreigners within such ships, in respect to acts committed or omitted beyond the marine league belt, are referable to the same principle. 2. Customs laws and hovering acts, which authorize municipal seizures beyond the marine league. "It will not," says Dana,4 "be found that any consent of nations can be shown in favor of extending what may be strictly called territoriality, for any purpose whatever beyond the marine league or cannon shot. Doubtless states have made laws, for revenue purposes, touching acts done beyond territorial waters; but it will not be found, that, in later times, the right to make seizures beyond such waters has been insisted upon against the remonstrance of foreign states, or that a clear and unequivocal judicial precedent now stands sustaining such seizures, when the question of jurisdiction has been presented. The revenue laws of the United States, for instance, provide, that, if a vessel bound to a port in the United States, shall, except from necessity, unload cargo within four leagues of the coast, and before coming to the proper port for entry and unloading, and receiving permission to do so, the cargo is forfeit, and the master incurs a penalty (Act March 2, 1797, sec. 27); but the statute does not authorize the seizure of a foreign vessel when beyond the territorial jurisdiction. The statute may well be construed to mean only that a foreign vessel coming to an American port, and there seized for a violation of revenue regulations committed out of the jurisdiction of the United states, may be confiscated; but that, to complete the forfeiture, it is essential that ths vessel shall be bound to, and shall come within, the territory of the United States, after the prohibited act. The act done beyond the jurisdiction is assumed to be part of an attempt to violate the revenue laws within the jurisdiction. If foreign vessels have been boarded and seized on the high sea, and have been adjudged guilty, and their governments have not objected, it is probably either because they were not appealed to, or have acquiesced, in the particular instance, from motives of comity." Phillimore and Twiss both substantially agree with Dana, and hold that judgments affirming the legality of municipal seizures beyond one marine league could not have been sustained if the foreign state whose subject's property had been seized had thought proper to interfere, unless, perhaps, when that state had put in force or at least enacted, for its own benefit, a similar municipal law. 3. The waters in the centre of certain straits, gulfs and bays, which central waters lie outside the limit of a marine league from any of the adjacent coasts, are claimed to be territorial waters, and certain gulfs are in actual practice so treated. France appears to claim inlets whose entrance is not more than ten miles wide. England long claimed the "Queen's Chambers," these being waters within headlands as distant as Orfordness from the Foreland. The bay of Conception, in Newfoundland, which penetrates forty miles into the land, and is fifteen miles in mean breadth, was recently decided to be territorial water by the privy council. The United States claimed Delaware bay in 1793. "Of practice." says Hall,5 "there is a curious deficiency, and there is nothing to show how many of the claims to gulfs and bays which still find their place in the books, are more than nominally alive. It is scarcely possible to say anything more definite than that, while on the one hand it may be doubted whether any state would now seriously assert a right of property over broad straits or gulfs of considerable size and wide entrance, there is, on the other hand, nothing in the conditions of valid maritime occupation, to prevent the establishment of a claim either to basins of considerable area, if approached by narrow entrances, such as of the Zuyder Zee, or to large gulfs which, in proportion to the width of their month, run deeply into the land even when so large as the bay of Fundy, or, still more, to small bays, such as that of Cancale."

—The United States, being an independent state, has the international rights and is under the international obligations above described, in respect to the open sea which washes its coast; but, being a federal Union, jurisdiction and ownership over these waters, as between its constituent members, are regulated, not by international law, but by the terms of that Union. Thus it has been decided6 that the article of the constitution which describes the judicial power, and extends it to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not make a cession of territory or of general jurisdiction, so as to vest in the United States the shores of the sea, below low-water mark, and that whatever soil below low-water mark, within the ebb and flow of the tide, is the subject of exclusive property and ownership, belongs to the state within whose territory it lies, subject to any lawful grants to that soil by the state or sovereign power which governed its territory before the declaration of independence. Massachusetts, for instance, expressly asserts,7 that, "The territorial limits of this commonwealth extend one marine league from its seashore at low-water mark. When an inlet or arm of the sea does not exceed two marine leagues in width, between its headlands, a straight line from one headland to the other is equivalent to the shore line. The boundaries of counties bordering on the sea shall extend to the line of the state, as above defined." So the counties and towns in the state of New York which are bounded generally on Long Island sound, comprehend8 within their limits, for the purpose of ordinary civil and criminal jurisdiction, the waters between their respective shores and the exterior water line of the state. Subject, then, to the paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which in relation to foreign and inter-state commerce has been granted to the United States, each state owns9 the beds of all tide waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been granted away, and may appropriate them, to be used by its citizens as a common for taking and cultivating fish, if navigation is not thereby obstructed. In like manner, the state owns the tide waters themselves and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running. The right which the citizens of the state thus acquire is a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship, and a law of a state, as Virginia, prohibiting citizens of other states from planting oysters in the soil covered by her tide waters, is neither a regulation of commerce nor a violation of any privilege or immunity of inter-state citizenship.

—See Phillimore's Commentaries upon International Law, vol. i., chaps. 4-8, Philadelphia, 1854; Kent's Commentaries, 12th ed., vol. i., pp. 26-36; Twiss' The Law of Nations (Time of Peace), London ed., 1861, chap. 10; Woolsey's International Law, 5th ed., secs. 56-63; Holland's Jurisprudence, pp. 297, 298; 1Twiss' Arts. in Law Magazine, 1877; 2The Queen vs. Keyn, 2 L. R., Ex. Div., pp. 63-240; 3Lush., Adm., 295; 4Wheaton's International Law, chap. iv., secs. 177-206; 5Hall's International Law, pp. 104-130, Oxford, 1880; 6United States vs. Bevans, 3 Wheaton, 336; 7Pub. Stats. of Mass., title 1, chap. 1, sec. 1, and title 6, chap. 22, sec. 1; 8Mahler vs. Transportation Co., 35 N. Y. 352; 9McCready vs. Virginia, 94 U. S., 391; Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, 41 and 42 Vict., cap. 73; Foreign Relations of U. S., 1878, pp. 245-251.

JAMES FAIRBANKS COLBY.

TERRITORIES

TERRITORIES (IN U. S. HISTORY). Before the American revolution the thirteen colonies were "territories" of the British empire: that is, they held much the same relation to the British empire that the present territories hold to the United States. They had many political privileges: they had assemblies of their own, which made their local laws, laid their local taxes, and paid their local officers; three of them until 1691, and two of them thereafter, elected their own governors (see MASSACHUSETTS, CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND); and in very many respects all of them were self-governing commonwealths. But whatever the colonies may have thought of the matter, in the view of the mother country these privileges had their basis in the continuing will of the British sovereignty. The king had no right, theoretically, to alienate permanently any of the prerogatives of the crown; and when his judges or his parliament advised him that any of the privileges which he had granted to the colonies were abused, or proved to be inherently vicious, it was his duty to revoke or alter them. Even a "charter," in this way of looking at it, had no inherent sanctity; it was no contract between king and people, but a grant by the king of privileges whose permanence was conditioned on the advantage of their results to the mother country. Connecticut had the privilege of electing its own governors down to the revolution; but the privilege had no solider basis than in Massachusetts, where it was revoked in the charter of 1691. Of course the colonies saw the matter differently. (See REVOLUTION.) But we are considering now only the view taken by the sovereignty in both cases; and from that point of view it is difficult to see any great difference between the status of the colonies under the British empire, and of the territories under the United States. Both had political privileges, but in both the continuance of the privileges was dependent on the continuing will of the superior, and on the advantages of the arrangement to the superior. The history of the territories of the United States will, it is confidently submitted, show the infinite superiority of the American over the British colonial policy. Indeed, its superiority has become so apparent that the British policy has of late years been radically altered in the direction of the American policy.

—I. ACQUISITION. 1. Under the Colonies. Six of the colonies, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland (see their names), had defined western boundaries; the other seven, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, had none, unless we may consider the Pacific ocean, assigned in the charters and grants of most of them, as a western boundary. There were some irregularities. The boundaries of New Hampshire were always exceedingly vague; and, though most of them were settled by convention with Massachusetts, the New Hampshire authorities asserted an indefinite claim to the territory to the west, to which New York long opposed an equally indefinite claim. (See VERMONT.) New York, as it came into the hands of the English, consisted only of the strip of land on both sides of the Hudson river, which the Dutch had settled. To the north and west of Albany there was a vast extent of Indian territory, whose tribes had either been conquered by the Dutch or had made treaties with them. New York, therefore, claimed a sort of suzerainty over it, without any express grant from the king. The claim was in effect recognized by the king's proclamation of 1763, constituting the province of Quebec, and by the act of parliament of 1774, defining its boundaries: the two ran the boundary line between Canada (Quebec) and New York very much as at present. This really satisfied New York, and yet that colony, perhaps to call attention away from the vagueness of its acknowledged title, continued to assert a much vaguer claim to still further western territory. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, and the colonies to the south, were bounded west by the Pacific ocean in their grants. Virginia (see that state) asserted that her northern boundary ran northwest, instead of west, so that her territory was continually widening as it went westward. The boundaries of Maryland and of the western part of Pennsylvania conflicted with Virginia's claim, but Virginia yielded in these respects, for the purpose of establishing the rest of her claim. South Carolina had really been given a western boundary by the formation of the colony of Georgia, which cut off her further expansion to the west; but it was not yet known whether Georgia covered the whole western boundary of South Carolina, and the latter colony claimed that a narrow strip along the northern edge of its former territory still remained. If there was any such strip it was not more than a dozen miles wide.

—The king's proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763, after constituting the new provinces of Quebec and the Floridas, declared it to be his "royal will and pleasure," as to the territory between them, "to reserve under our sovereignty, protection and dominion, for the use of the said Indians, * * * all the lands and territories lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea from the west and northwest." This was clearly the establishment of a western boundary for all the colonies which had hitherto had none; and the ground of the establishment was as clearly the asserted right and duty of the king to modify his grants and charters, when their results proved to be injurious to the interests of the empire. The right was always denied by the colonies, and their resistance to it was one of the most powerful forces which led to the revolution; and yet, curiously enough, when independence was established, this very proclamation was asserted by the states which had original western boundaries as a valid assignment of a western boundary for the others.

—Virginia hardly showed an enterprise in asserting western claims commensurate with their magnitude and importance. The first Virginia exploring party crossed the Blue Ridge in 1666; but it was not until 1712, under Spotswood's administration, that the country beyond the mountains was reduced to possession. Before the middle of the eighteenth century, settlements had crossed the mountains. The organization of the Ohio company in 1748-9 was due to individual Virginia enterprise; but in the French and Indian war, which followed it (see WARS, I.), Virginia supported the company with her whole force. The place of the first struggles, though now in western Pennsylvania, was then supposed to be in Virginia. In 1774 Gov. Dunmore led the Virginia forces against the Scioto Indians, and compelled them to make peace; but his motives in the expedition were strongly suspected to be selfish. The settlement of Kentucky (see that state) was also due to individual enterprise; and its formal establishment as a Virginia county in 1776 was almost forced on Virginia by George Rogers Clarke, a Virginia surveyor resident in Kentucky. Clarke at once became the champion of Virginia's interest in the northwest. In 1778-9 he led a Kentucky force into Illinois, and conquered that territory and Vincennes, now in Indiana; and the whole was made the county of Illinois by the Virginia legislature. But little attempt was made by Virginia to incorporate the conquest; and at the time of the first cession in 1784 it is improbable that there was any Virginia government in Illinois.

—North Carolina asserted her western claims with more energy and success. The first assertion was due to individual enterprise. The first settlement of Tennessee (see that state) was by hunting parties, and by persons who had found the disturbed state of North Carolina under the royal governor unpleasant. In 1776 their settlements were made "Washington district" of North Carolina; and, as settlements increased, other counties were formed. After the first session, in 1784, the Tennesseans revolted, and formed the state of Franklin, or Frankland; but North Carolina revoked her cession, and suppressed the Franklin revolt. The authority of the state was thus established from the Atlantic to the Mississippi.

—Other colonies dealt in nothing but assertions. None of them made any practical effort to maintain their claim to territory beyond their present western boundary, with two exceptions. Connecticut made a long but finally unsuccessful attempt to oust Pennsylvania from a part of her territory (see WYOMING), and Massachusetts compromised her claims to the territory of New York. (See NEW YORK.)

—2. Under the Confederation. The essential importance of the western territory was as a bond for holding the states together during and after the revolution. The revolution was undoubtedly begun under a vague idea of separate state action in theory, with a controlling necessity for national action in practice; and the articles of confederation were carefully framed with the view of securing as much of the former and as little of the latter as possible. (See STATE SOVEREIGNTY; CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF.) So strong was the particularist feeling in the different states that they were only held firmly together by the first flush of the war feeling; and as this influence relaxed, the tendency to disintegration grew more plainly evident. At first sight, the most powerful opposing force to this disintegrating tendency was the common commercial interest which grew up throughout the states (see FEDERAL PARTY); but the possession of the western territory was a more powerful, though more silent, force, for it reached states which the other force did not touch. If the western territory was to be retained and utilized, but two courses were open: to allow all the states to engage in a general scramble for it, in which each state should secure as much of its claims as it could enforce; or to accept it as national property, defend it by national force, and govern it by national authority. To allow the national bond to break altogether, through the default of the articles of confederation, would have had the former result; and in this instance, as in others, the prejudices of the people at last gave way to their common sense, and they chose the latter. But the process by which they were brought to this conclusion made up one of the vital issues of American politics from 1778 until 1784.

—In the beginning congress seems to have had no notion that the western lands were national property. Among its measures to raise an army, Sept. 16, 1776, it promised grants of lands to officers and soldiers, but was careful to provide that the money necessary "to procure such lands" should be assessed upon the states like other expenses. Oct. 15, 1777, before the articles of confederation were proposed to the states, a motion was made in congress to add a provision that congress should be empowered to fix the western boundaries of the claimant states, and to divide the western territory into independent states; but only Maryland voted for it. Clarke's expedition to the Illinois country in 1778, and Virginia's sudden prospect of boundless territorial wealth, threw the apple of discord among the states. Heretofore the claimant states had been content to claim, without taking active steps to enforce their claims; and their extreme demand had been only the negative provision of the ninth article of confederation, that "no state shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States." Ten of the states, all but New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, had already ratified the articles; but most of them had ordered their delegates to propose alterations before signing. When the proposed alterations were considered in congress, June 22-25, 1778, it was found that Maryland proposed to alter the ninth article by empowering congress to fix the western boundaries of the claimant states; that Rhode Island proposed to alter it by empowering congress to sell crown lands within the states; and that New Jersey only protested against the article as it stood, as unfair to the non-claimant states. All amendments were voted down. Eight of the states signed the articles, by their delegates, July 9; North Carolina, July 21; and Georgia, July 24. New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland refused to sign. New Jersey yielded first: her delegates signed the articles, Nov. 26, 1778, relying on "the candor and justice of the several states" for cessions of their claims. The Delaware delegate signed Feb. 22, 1779, protesting at the same time that his state was justly entitled to a share in the territory which had been won "by the blood and treasure of all." Maryland was now the only obstacle, but it proved for some time insuperable. Dec. 15, 1778, that state formally instructed her delegates "not to agree to the confederation," unless the ninth article should be amended as she had desired; and the letter of instructions demanded that the western territory "should be considered as a common property, subject to be parceled out by congress into free, convenient and independent governments, in such manner and at such times as the wisdom of that assembly shall hereafter direct." This seems to have been the first official proposal of that extension of the federal system which had been first suggested in 1777, probably also by Maryland, and which has been the secret of the success of the American policy.

—Maryland held out for three years; and during that time the articles hung fire. At first her opposition threatened to provoke an explosion, for some of the claimant states seem to have been willing to break up the Union rather than surrender their claims. Dec. 19, 1778, Virginia formally offered to put the articles in force with any one or more states which should ratify them as they stood, so that Maryland at least would have been left out of the Union; and Connecticut agreed, April 7, 1779. But Maryland remained firm; and her firmness, and perhaps the discovery that Virginia's claim, if allowed in full, would neutralize those of the northern states, gradually turned the scale of opinion against Virginia. Feb. 19, 1780, New York led the way by empowering her delegates to agree to a western boundary, and relinquishing all claims beyond. The ceded territory was to be held for the use of "such of the United States as shall become members of the federal alliance," and for no other purpose. By this New York really gave up nothing, and gained a certain instead of a doubtful boundary. But the precedent was a promising one, and congress used it to pass a resolution, Sept. 6, 1780, "earnestly recommending" the other claimant states to follow New York's example, and "earnestly requesting" Maryland to ratify and sign the articles. This was followed, Oct. 10, by another resolution, in which congress committed itself to Maryland's proposed extension of the federal system, promising that the territory ceded should be "formed into distinct republican states, which should become members of the federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other states." From this line of policy congress has never swerved, and it has been more successful than stamp acts or Boston port bills in building up an empire.

—In October, 1780, Connecticut offered to cede her claims, reserving a tract along Lake Eric. Jan. 2, 1781, while Arnold was ravaging Virginia, that state offered to cede her claims northwest of the Ohio, on condition that congress would guarantee her possession of Kentucky and the larger part of Tennessee. Neither of these offers was accepted by congress, but the prospect was so encouraging, that Maryland at once empowered her delegates to sign the articles, and they did so, March 1, 1781. On the same day the New York delegates assented to the western boundary of the state, on condition that the same guarantee should be given to New York as to any other state. Thus the articles of confederation went into force without any real settlement of the territorial question, for the only cession likely to be accepted had amounted to nothing.

—Oct. 30, 1779, congress had passed a resolution, against the votes of Virginia and North Carolina, recommending Virginia to close her land office and forbear issuing land warrants until the end of the war. Oct. 29, 1782, the persistent Maryland delegates moved that the cession of New York be accepted by congress, and the motion was carried against the vote of Virginia, North and South Carolina being divided, and Massachusetts having but one delegate and no vote. The purpose of this action was to get a fulcrum from which to operate on the claim of Virginia, and it was effective. The claim of New York to her own territory west of Albany was derived from her supremacy over the "Six Nations"; and this was now recognized by all the states. But the Six Nations had always asserted a general right by conquest to all the territory west of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina. If this also were admitted, it also had passed to New York, and had been ceded by New York to congress; and the whole western territory was already national property, without the formality of a cession by Virginia or any other state. May 1, 1782, a committee had made an elaborate report to congress. It upheld the claim of New York to its full extent; considered the jurisdiction of the whole western territory, including Virginia's claim, to be already vested in congress by New York's cession of it; and recommended Virginia to make a new and full cession. Consideration of the report was postponed, but it was evidently high time for Virginia to cede the northwest territory absolutely and gracefully, if she desired to save Kentucky and her land warrants there.

—The act of cession was passed by the Virginia legislature, Oct. 20, 1783, and the deed was executed by her delegates in congress, March 1, 1784. Under the circumstances, the terms accorded to the state were sufficiently liberal; the land titles of Virginia settlers were to hold good; the expenses of the state in conquering the territory were to be repaid to her; 150,000 acres were reserved for Clarke and his troops; and any deficiency in Virginia land warrants in Kentucky and Tennessee was to be made good in the northwest territory. The ceded territory was to be organized according to the federal policy which congress had outlined in October, 1780. A supplementary act of cession was presented in congress, Dec. 30, 1788; but this was only to conform the original act to the terms of the ordinance of 1787. Virginia's cession was complete in 1784.

—Massachusetts made an unqualified cession of her claims west of Niagara river, April 19, 1785, in accordance with an act of the legislature of Nov. 13, 1784.

—Congress had not as yet accepted Connecticut's proffered cession, on account of the reservation of a tract extending from the Pennsylvania line 120 miles westward. But Connecticut had loyally accepted the award of congress against her in the case of Wyoming (see that title); and congress at last accepted her cession, May 26, 1786. April 28, 1800, an act of congress authorized the president to deed to Connecticut the title to this "western reserve," on condition that Connecticut should surrender all claim to its jurisdiction, and abandon any claim to the territory within the limits of New York; and the state fulfilled the conditions, May 30.

—Aug. 9, 1787, South Carolina made an unqualified cession of her claims west of a line from the head of Tugaloo river to the North Carolina boundary. The actual cession was a strip of land about twelve miles wide. That portion of it which is now a part of Georgia was transferred to that state in part return for its cession in 1802.

—The South Carolina cession closed the formal record of acquisitions of territory under the confederation; but there were two more cessions, which, though made under the constitution, were only belated completions of confederation arrangements. North Carolina ceded Tennessee in 1784; but, before congress could meet, and accept the cession, it was revoked on account of the anger it excited in Tennessee. Five years later, this feeling had disappeared. In December, 1789, the North Carolina legislature made another cession of Tennessee, which was accepted by act of congress of April 2, 1790. The North Carolina titles and military land warrants were to hold good, and the territory was to be organized as the northwest territory had been, "provided always, that no regulations made or to be made by congress shall tend to emancipate slaves."

—Most difficulty was met in the case of the claims of Georgia, covering the present states of Alabama and Mississippi, north of parallel 31° and south of the South Carolina cession. It had been claimed by South Carolina, because the original grant to the Carolina proprietors covered the territory between parallels 31° and 36° west to the South seas. But the proprietors had transferred their rights to the king; the king had formed the colony of Georgia in 1732, and given to it the territory between the Altamaha river and the most northern part of the Savannah, westward to the South seas; and his proclamation of 1763 had annexed to Georgia the territory between the Altamaha and the St. Mary rivers. In 1787 the two states made a treaty at Beaufort, by which South Carolina obtained the territory afterward ceded by her, and Georgia the rest. Georgia took no steps to cede her share to the United States, but made preparations to reduce it to possession. (See YAZOO FRAUDS.) April 7, 1798, an act of congress organized the territory of Mississippi (see that state), but it covered less than half of the present extent of the state. Its southern boundary was parallel 31; its northern boundary a line due east from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Chattahoochie. This territory had been annexed by the king to West Florida, and was claimed by the congress of the confederation as common property under the treaty of peace in 1783. Feb. 1, 1788, Georgia had passed an act ceding this part of the territory to the United States, on condition of being guaranteed the rest of her claims. This congress refused to do, July 15, 1788, and the cession fell through. Spain, by the treaty of 1795 (see ANNEXATIONS, I.), abandoned all claim to this part of the territory, and the act of 1798 proceeded to organize it into a territory, in spite of Georgia's claims to it; but the same act authorized the appointment of commissioners to treat with Georgia for all her western claims. Madison, Gallatin and Lincoln were appointed commissioners; and the act of May 10, 1800, gave them full power to treat, provided that no money was to be paid by the United States except out of the proceeds of the lands ceded. April 24, 1802, the commissioners agreed upon an arrangement by which Georgia was to cede all her western claims, and receive in return the proceeds of not more than 5,000,000 acres, or $1,250,000. Previous titles were to hold good; and slavery was not to be prohibited in the new territory. The agreement was confirmed by the Georgia act of June 16, 1802, and the act of congress of March 3, 1803; and the ceded territory was added to Mississippi territory by act of March 27, 1804. A provision in the cession for the extinguishing of Indian titles in Georgia by the United States gave some further trouble. (See CHEROKEE CASE.)

—3. Under the Constitution. This branch of the subject is treated as a separate article: ANNEXATIONS.

—4. Right of Acquisition. It must be evident that there was an essential distinction between the acquisitions of territory under the confederation and under the constitution. In the former case, the so-called "acquisitions" were not really acquisitions at all, and Maryland's position was correct. The territory in question had been conquered by national force, and the nation's title to it had been recognized by the international recognition of its boundaries. The "acquisitions" were merely the removal of the cloud on the title which came from the troublesome claims of the states. Under the constitution, the acquisitions were real acquisitions of originally foreign soil.

—But, in either case, the mere holding and organization of the territory into inchoate states is fatal to the notion of an absolute sovereignty in the states. We may call the nation any question-begging name we will, federal alliance, confederacy, or what not: but it is a nation if it can hold and organize territories, and in due process of time and increase of strength it will be prepared to vindicate its right to existence and respect against all comers. And, on the other hand, if we do not recognize the Untied States as a nation, it is altogether impossible to locate any basis for the right to acquire, hold or organize the territories. Under the confederation, congress had no right to exercise any power not expressly granted to it; and the power to acquire, hold and organize territories is conspicuous by its absence. "All this has been done," says the "Federalist," "and done without the least color of constitutional authority." Under the constitution, congress was, it is true, empowered to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States." (Art. IV., § 3); but all respectable authorities agree that this provision referred only to the territory then (1787-8) "belonging to the United States," and gave no power to make future acquisitions. It might fairly be argued, that, when new acquisitions were made, the power above stated applied to them, as then "belonging to the United States;" but the power to acquire is not there. It is the inherent characteristic of a sovereignty, as it is of the individual person, and in neither case requires a permit by charter. It is clearly stated in a resolution proposed by the Maryland delegates, Sept. 13, 1783, that "the United States are vested, as one undivided and independent nation, with all and every power and right exercised by the king of Great Britain over the said territory;" though only Maryland and New Jersey voted for it. There is but one way to evade this conclusion, by the supposition of a temporary suspension or informal alteration of the organic law. Some such idea is advanced by Judge Taney, in his Dred Scott opinion, when he holds that the states had a right to accept a "cession of territory for their common benefit, which all of them assented to;" and by Jefferson (see ANNEXATIONS, I.), in supposing that his unconstitutional acquisition of Louisiana could be condoned by general popular acquiescence. But neither of these will do. The former lacks the essential confirmation of the facts in the case. The dates on which the cessions were accepted by congress have been given above, and a reference to the journals of congress under those dates will show the reader that there was not one cession to which "all of the states" assented. The New York cession was accepted against the vote of Virginia, with two states divided; the Virginia cession against the vote of New Jersey, with South Carolina divided; the Massachusetts cession with New York divided, and the Connecticut cession against the vote of Maryland, with four states divided. The only doubtful one is the unimportant cession of South Carolina, as to which there is no record of the vote. Thus, the various cessions were not accepted by a unanimous agreement of sovereign states, but by an actual, though hardly recognized, national power. Judge Taney was bound to imply unanimity, but his conclusion falls with his innuendo. Jefferson's view is a rank distortion of the national idea, disguised as ultra democracy; and it shows the proneness of man to dress in familiar garments, and re-baptize with a more welcome name, an unwelcome fact to which he can no longer shut his eyes. Jefferson would have been the first to reject the notion that a strong popular majority, regardless of state lines, can rightfully set aside, ever, for a time, the organic law; yet here he extends the idea to a permanent alteration, rather than countenance the idea of a national power in internal affairs. The truth seems to be, that, without the recognition of such a power, the acutest man must be puzzled to explain the right to acquire territory; and that the acquisition of territory is itself the boldest exercise and assertion of national power.

—II. ORGANIZATION OF TERRITORIES. The organization of the territories of the United States has a double object: to provide for good government while the population is sparse; and to encourage their development into self-governing commonwealths, and their incorporation into the federal system, as rapidly as possible. This latter point is the peculiar feature of the American colonial system.

—The organization of the territory northwest of the Ohio, from which have since been formed the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, has been considered elsewhere. (See ORDINANCE OF 1787.) It is sufficient to say here that the government was at first vested in a governor and judges, appointed by congress until 1789, and by the president thereafter; that they were empowered to form a code of laws for the territory, by selection from state statutes; that congress retained a negative on their acts; but that, when there should be 5,000 male inhabitants in the territory, they should have a legislature of their own, congress still retaining the veto power. For a long time, a territory with a complete legislature was called a territory of the first class, and others territories of the second class. There are now only territories of the first class, and two unorganized territories (Indian territory and Alaska).

—For the territories within the original limits of the United States, the ordinance of 1787 was the model. As the successive territories were carved out of the northwest territory, the fundamental provision of the organizing act was that "there shall be established within the said territory a government in all respects similar to that provided by the ordinance of congress, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787, for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, and the inhabitants thereof shall be entitled to and enjoy all and singular the rights, privileges and advantages granted and secured to the people by the said ordinance." The organizing act for Wisconsin, in 1836, was the first of these which was very elaborate. In the cases of Tennessee and Mississippi, south of the Ohio, the organizing acts were like the corresponding acts for northern territories, excepting that section of the ordinance of 1787 which forbade slavery; but in the organization of Alabama, in 1817, the ordinance of 1787 is not referred to, unless it is included in the provision that all laws then in force in the territory of Mississippi should remain in force until otherwise provided by law.

—In the organization of the territories acquired under the constitution, and hence beyond the original limits of the United States, it has been necessary to follow a more elaborate scheme of organization than that of the original territories. The first act in relation to Louisiana, in 1803, was simple enough. It merely empowered the president to appoint all civil, military and judicial officers of the new territory, to define their duties, and to support them with the army and navy of the United States. It was in effect the establishment of a military despotism over Louisiana, and may suffice as an example of the extent to which the sovereign power of the United States over the territories might go, if a wiser policy were not the rule. In this case the despotism was only intended to be temporary; and in the following year the territory was properly organized. As this was the model regularly followed afterward, it may be as well to itemize it. 1. The governor was to be appointed by the president for three years, to be the executive, to pardon offenses against territorial laws, and to reprieve offenders against laws of the United States until the president could act. 2. The secretary was to be appointed for four years, to record territorial acts, and to send copies of the governor's acts to the president every six months. 3. The governor and a legislative council of thirteen members, appointed annually by the president, made up the territorial legislature; and its acts were to be sent by the governor to congress, through the president, and, if vetoed by congress, were to be void. 4. The judges were to be appointed for four years (see JUDICIARY, VI.); but trial by jury, habeas corpus, the privilege of bail, and moderate and usual punishments were secured to the people. 5. Specified laws of the United States were declared to be in force in the new territory. This was really a territory of the second class. When Missouri was formed in 1812, it was as a territory of the first class. Its legislature consisted of a governor, a legislative council, and a house of representatives. The representatives were to be elected by the people; they were to nominate eighteen persons, and out of these the president was to appoint the legislative council of nine. In all cases the territory was to elect a delegate to congress, who was to have the privilege of debate, but not of voting. (See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.) In second-class territories the delegate was regularly chosen by the legislature; in first-class territories, by the people. In minor points, as in the term of office holding, boundaries, etc., there were constant variations; but the general system has been as above.

—It will easily be understood that such a system exerts, from the beginning of population, a steady pressure toward the exercise of political power by the people; and that it is so self-governing in its action that it can correct the dangers of early border lawlessness, while it gives more and still more power to the people as the population becomes fixed and settled. At the same time the land system of the territories, next to be referred to, has been steadily operating to increase, fix and settle the population. The two, working together, inevitably result in the natural and simple development of states. In this manner nineteen territories have been transformed gradually into states. A list of the ratifications or admissions of the thirty-eight states (1883) is elsewhere given. (See CONSTITUTION, I.) Of these, the first thirteen were original states. Of the remaining twenty-five, four were formed out of other states, Vermont, Maine, Kentucky and West Virginia; one, California, was admitted as a state before it was possible to organize it as a territory; one, Texas, was annexed as a state; and the remaining nineteen are the fruits of the territorial system. In the process of transformation, it has been usual, since the admission of Ohio, that congress should pass an "enabling act," authorizing the people of the territory to form a state government; but this has not been regarded as a sine qua non, since the absolute power of congress to admit or reject the state is a sufficient safeguard. (See FLORIDA, IOWA, KANSAS, MICHIGAN.)

—There are now, (1883) eight organized territories, all of the first class, Arizona, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Washington and Wyoming; two unorganized territories, Indian territory and Alaska; and the district containing the national capital, the District of Columbia, governed directly by congress or its agents. (See the names of these territories.) All of the organized territories are inchoate states; Dakota has already applied for admission; and, unless peculiar circumstances interfere in the case of Utah (see MORMONS), it will probably not be long before the United States will have no organized territories.

—It is impossible within reasonable limits, to give the historical geography of the territories, for the changes in their boundaries and areas have been very numerous. For these the reader is referred to the map prefixed to the second volume of Hough's work, cited below, and to the analysis in Walker's statistical atlas of the United States.

—III. LAND SYSTEM. (See PUBLIC LANDS.)

—IV. SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. The prohibition of slavery in the northwest territory is elsewhere given (see ORDINANCE OF 1787); it held good in spite of efforts to evade or abrogate it. (See INDIANA, ILLINOIS, SLAVERY.) In organizing Tennessee and Mississippi territories, it was provided that the article of the ordinance prohibiting slavery should not be enforced; and in organizing Alabama the same thing was done in effect by continuing the laws of Mississippi territory. No act of congress ever established slavery in a territory. In the new acquisitions, in Louisiana and Florida, the territorial organizing act practically allowed slavery by continuing former laws; and the same thing was done in Missouri and Arkansas by continuing the former laws of Louisiana and Missouri. The struggle of 1820 (see COMPROMISES, IV.) ended the extension of slavery by this system, and established a line north of which slavery was prohibited. For further security, all the privileges of the ordinance of 1787 were guaranteed to the people of Oregon territory in 1848; and the same thing was done in effect with Iowa territory in 1838, and Minnesota territory in 1849, by guaranteeing to them the privileges of Wisconsin territory, which came under the ordinance. No such provision was in the Kansas-Nebraska act (see that title) in 1854.

—The acquisition of new territory from Mexico brought up a new series of difficulties. (See WILMOT PROVISO.) California took care of herself by coming in as a free state. Utah and New Mexico were organized without mention of slavery; but, when their territorial legislatures passed laws practically recognizing slavery, it was not possible to unite both houses of congress in vetoing them, and they held good. Nevertheless, when the territories of Nevada, Colorado and Dakota were organized, during the early months of 1861, there was no mention of slavery therein, and the system of slavery had the benefit of the decision in the Dred Scott case. (See that title.) Finally, in 1862 (see WILMOT PROVISO), slavery was abolished in all territories then held or to be acquired.

—See (I.) Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Report of Regents on the Boundaries of New York; authorities under the states named; (2) the leading authority under this section is H. B. Adams' Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Commonwealth; other authorities are the Journals of Congress under the dates named; Land Laws of the United States (1828); the authorities given in Adams' notes; Perkins' Annals of the West (1846); Burnet's Notes on the Northwest Territory (1847); Barber and Howe's History of the Western States (1853); Dillon's History of Indiana (1859); Hildreth's Early History of the Northwest (1864); Blanchard's Discovery of the Northwest (1880); Towle's History of the Constitution, 350; 1 Bancroft's History of the Constitution, 168; 1 Curtis' History of the Constitution, 291; St. Clair Papers (1882); 1 Stat. at Large, 106, 549 (acts of April 2, 1790, and April 7, 1798); 2 ib., 56, 69, 229, 305 (acts of April 28, 1800, May 10, 1800, March 3, 1803, and March 27, 1804); the cessions, etc., are also given in 1 Stat. at Large (Bioren and Duane's edit.) (II.) See authorities under ORDINANCE of 1787; the organizing acts in Stat. at Large, as given among the authorities under states and territories named; 2 Hough's American Constitutions (map); Walker's Statistical Atlas of the United States. (III.) See table 4 in 1 Stat. at Large a list of acts of congress in regard to public lands until 1845; Cutts' Constitutional and Party Questions, 161 (Senator Douglas' description of the land system and its operations); Porter's West in 1880, 585; Report of the Commissioner of the Land Office (1875); Johns Hopkins University Studies in Political Science, particularly No. 3, Shaw's Local Government in Illinois. (IV.) See authorities under the states and other articles referred to.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

TEXAS

TEXAS, a state of the American Union, and the only one which was, before its admission, an independent state, with powers to make war, peace and treaties, send and receive ambassadors, etc. It was at first a part of New Spain, or Mexico, the American claim upon it having been abandoned by the Florida treaty with Spain in 1819 (see ANNEXATIONS, II.); and it participated in the successful revolt against Spanish authority. Jan. 31, 1824, Mexico framed a federal constitution, which went into force Oct. 4. Its fundamental idea was like that of the United States, except that it established the Roman Catholic as the state church, and forbade the use of any other form of worship. March 11, 1827, the "state of Coahuila and Texas" framed a state constitution, patterned after that of the nation in every respect, except its 13th article, as follows. "In this state no person shall be born a slave after this constitution is published in the capital of each district, and six months thereafter, neither will the introduction of slaves be permitted under any pretext."

—American adventurers had already begun to enter the more thinly populated district of Texas, pretending to be good Catholics, and paying little attention to the abolition of slavery. April 1-13, 1833, in convention at San Felipe, they formed a new state constitution, more closely American in design, introducing trial by jury, universal suffrage, and the right of petition; but it was never recognized by the central government. When Santa Anna's new Mexican government, Jan. 31, 1835, undertook to abolish the state governments and transform them into departments, as in France, Texas rebelled. A convention at Austin, Oct. 17 - Nov. 13, 1835, framed a provisional government, and adjourned to Washington, March 1, 1836. On the next day after reassembling, it made a declaration of independence, on the ground that Santa Anna had overthrown the Mexican government and established a military despotism, and that the compact between Texas and Mexico had thus been broken. (See SECESSION, II.) Before its final adjournment, March 17, it had framed a constitution for the republic of Texas. The house of representatives was to be chosen annually, and the senate for three years; and the president was to be chosen by popular vote for three years, but was not immediately re-eligible. "All persons of color, who were slaves for life previous to their emigration to Texas, and who are now held in bondage, shall remain in the like state of servitude." Congress could pass no laws to free slaves, or prevent immigrants from bringing them into the republic. Free negroes were not to be allowed to become or remain inhabitants; and slaveholders could not free slaves, unless with the consent of congress, and on condition of sending the freedmen out of the republic. Under this constitution Texas maintained her independence, which was recognized by the various commercial nations. The story of her annexation to the United States is elsewhere told. (See ANNEXATIONS, III.)

—BOUNDARIES. The eastern and northern boundary of Texas was fixed by the Florida treaty of 1819 with Spain. (The line will be found under ANNEXATIONS, II.) This line was confirmed by treaty of Jan. 12, 1828, with Mexico, and April 25, 1838, with Texas. The southeastern, boundary was natural, the gulf of Mexico. The northwestern and western boundary was a matter of far more difficulty. Volumes have been written to prove that Texas, under the French Louisiana claim, to which the United States succeeded in 1803, and which the United States abandoned in 1819, extended westward to the Rio Grande; and that its reannexation, in 1845, should cover the same territory. All this argument seems needless. After the establishment of the republic of Mexico, the western boundary of Texas was entirely a matter of internal decision in Mexico. The "state of Coahuila and Texas" extended to the Rio Grande; but the national existence of Texas was as much a secession from Coahuila as from Mexico, and the western boundary of the republic of Texas never extended beyond the Nueces river. It is true that the Texan congress, Dec. 19, 1836, defined the western boundary of the republic as the Rio Grande to its head, and thence due north to latitude 42°, about the latitude of Boston. But such a paper declaration, whether it extended to the Nueces, the Rio Grande or the isthmus of Panama, was evidently of no force unless successfully supported by arms. It was so supported, and the authority of Texas was extended up to the Nueces, but never beyond; and the effort to carry Texas jurisdiction beyond, the Mier expedition, was a pronounced failure. Nevertheless, President Polk, in 1846, assumed authority to order the American forces into the disputed territory, and thus brought on the Mexican war. (See WARS, V.) At the end of the war the federal government was in a most embarrassing position. To acknowledge the full claims of Texas would have been to add to her enormous territory the present territory of Arizona, and a large part of Kansas and Colorado; to deny them would have been a confession that the whole nominal cause of the war was fraudulent. Feb. 11, 1850. Texas formally reaffirmed her boundary of 1836. Sept. 9 (see COMPROMISES, V.), congress proposed the following northern and western boundary for Texas, latitude 36° 30' from longitude 100° west to longitude 103° west; thence due south to latitude 32°; thence due west to the Rio Grande, and down that river to the gulf of Mexico. Texas was to cede all claims outside of the boundary to the United States, and the United States to pay to Texas $10,000,000 in 5 per cent. bonds, to run fourteen years. Texas accepted the proposition, Nov. 25, and the boundary was settled.

—The joint resolution of March 1, 1845, consenting to the annexation of Texas, stipulated that "new states, of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said state, be formed out of the territory thereof." Such consent was given by the convention of 1866, but was not made use of by congress at the time. It is now practically impossible to obtain any such consent from the state; and its size must remain undiminished until the development of separate interests within it shall produce a division naturally.

—CONSTITUTIONS. The first constitution of the state was framed by the convention at Austin, July 4 - Aug. 27, 1845, which on its first day accepted the proposition of annexation made by the United States. The senate was to be chosen for four years, by districts; and the representatives, chosen for two years, were apportioned to the counties according to population. The governor was to be chosen by popular vote, to serve two years, but not to be eligible more than two terms in succession. The capital was to be Austin until 1850, and was then to be fixed by popular vote. Judges of the supreme court were to be appointed for six years, removable on address of two-thirds of each house. The slavery provisions of 1835 were retained; but trial by jury was reserved to slaves accused of crimes of a higher grade than petit larceny. The constitution was ratified by popular vote Oct. 13, and the state was admitted by joint resolution of Dec. 29, 1845. The first legislature met Feb. 16, 1846, and the governor was inaugurated three days after. Popular vote in 1850 fixed the capital at Austin, where it has since remained.

—A convention at Austin, Feb. 10 - April 2, 1866, amended the constitution by substituting for the slavery provisions an abolition of slavery. "African slavery, as it heretofore existed, having been terminated within this state by the government of the United States by force of arms, and its re-establishment being prohibited by the amendment to the constitution of the United States." By ordinances the rebel war debt was repudiated, and the legislature was forbidden to assume or pay any part of it; the ordinance of secession was declared null and void, and "the right of secession, heretofore claimed by the state of Texas, distinctly renounced"; and consent was given to the division of the state. The action of the convention was ratified by a light popular vote, June 25.

—A reconstruction convention at Austin, June 1 - Aug. 31, Dec. 7, 1868 - Feb. 6, 1869, framed a state constitution, which was ratified by popular vote Nov. 30 - Dec. 3, 1869. Its first section declared its purpose to be "that the heresies of nullification and secession, which have brought the country to grief, may be eliminated from future political discussion"; and to this end it declared the constitution of the United States, and laws and treaties made and to be made in pursuance thereof, to be the supreme law. It abolished slavery and forbade the importation of coolies; gave the right of suffrage to males over twenty-one, on one year's residence; made the number of representatives ninety, and of senators thirty, both to be chosen by districts; extended the term of the governor to four years, of supreme court judges to nine years, and of district judges to eight years. Persons disqualified to hold office by the 14th amendment were disfranchised. The ordinance of secession and the rebel war debt were declared null and void from the beginning. The state was readmitted to representation by act of March 30, 1870, on the fundamental condition that the constitution should never be so amended as to deprive any class of citizens of the right of suffrage, of the right to hold office, or of school rights, as there secured.

—The present constitution was framed by a convention at Austin, Sept. 6 - Nov. 24, 1875, and ratified by popular vote, Feb. 17, 1876. Its principal changes were the substitution for the first section of a declaration that "Texas is a free and independent state, subject only to the constitution of the United States"; the change of numbers to ninety-three in the house and thirty-one in the senate; the reduction of the governor's term to two years; and the provision of separate schools for white and colored children, but with impartial privileges to both.

—GOVERNORS. J. P. Henderson, 1846-7; Geo. T. Wood, 1847-9, P. H. Bell, 1849-53; Edward M. Pease, 1853-7; H. G. Runnels, 1857-9; Sam Houston, 1859-61; Francis B. Lubbock, 1861-3 Pendleton Murray, 1863-5; A. J. Hamilton, military governor, 1865-6; J. W. Throckmorton, 1866-7; Edward M. Pease, 1867-70; Edmund J. Davis, 1870-74; Richard Coke, 1874-6; Richard Hubbard, 1876-9; Oram M. Roberts, 1879-83.

—POLITICAL HISTORY. Until the close of the rebellion, there was never any real opposition to the democratic party in the state. All the governors, congressmen, United States senators and state officers were democrats. In 1856 the popular vote for the Fillmore electors reached 33 per cent. of the whole; with this exception the democratic popular vote in presidential elections was always during this period over 70 per cent of the whole. Even in local politics the extent of the state's territory was an insurmountable obstacle to the rise of any real political interest. Even in 1861 there was very little political contest. The opposition to the dominant secession party was merely a variety of secession feeling. It was represented by the governor, Houston, and desired mainly the return of Texas to the position of an independent republic, and fresh acquisition of territory on the side of Mexico. With this design the governor for some time refused to summon a special session of the legislature for the purpose of calling a convention. The confederate states party then issued a private call for a convention, to meet Jan. 28, 1861; the governor yielded, and summoned the legislature for Jan. 21; and that body legitimatized the convention, stipulating that any ordinance of secession should be submitted to popular vote. The ordinance of secession was passed, Feb. 1, by a vote of 166 to 7, ratified by a popular vote of 34,794 to 11,235, Feb. 23, and went into effect March 2. The convention, March 20, declared the seat of Gov. Houston vacant. March 23, the constitution of the confederate states was ratified.

—Until 1863 there was a steady influx of slaves from other southern states; after July 4, 1863, Texas and Louisiana were isolated from the rest of the confederacy by the opening of the Mississippi. The close of the rebellion found Texas with an increased black and a decreased white population. June 17, 1865, A. J. Hamilton was appointed military governor, and under his control the convention of 1866 was held and the revised constitution adopted. The "conservative," or democratic, party nominated Gov. Throckmorton, who was elected by 48,631 votes to 12,051 for E. M. Pease, republican. The new legislature, almost entirely democratic, refused to ratify the 14th amendment, and requested the withdrawal of federal troops from the state. In 1867 the reconstruction acts took effect. March 19, Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan took command of the department. He almost immediately became dissatisfied with the state government, and removed Gov. Throckmorton July 30, and most of the other state officers Aug. 29, replacing them by republicans. Aug. 29, Sheridan was superseded by Gen. Hancock, who soon came into collision with the new governor, Pease. The latter distrusted the state courts, and wished to have criminals tried by military commission, which Hancock declined to allow. July 28, 1868, Gen. J. J. Reynolds took command of the state.

—The provisions of the reconstruction acts for registration and voting had reduced the democratic party to a nullity. In the dominant party there were two factions. The radical republicans, headed by E. J. Davis, wished to maintain the disfranchisement of ex-rebels, and to divide the state. The conservative republicans, headed by the former military governor, Hamilton, opposed both of the leading features of the radical programme. The latter naturally received all the support which the democrats could give them. The convention of 1868-9 was stormy throughout, and at its final adjournment Davis and Hamilton became the opposing candidates for governor. Davis was elected, and the radicals also obtained a plurality in the legislature over both the conservatives and the democrats.

—The new legislature authorized the governor, under specified conditions, to declare martial law, and organized a state police force. In 1870, during the sitting of the legislature, martial law was accordingly declared in three counties, and on one of them a penalty of $50,000 was imposed and collected. The legislature protested against this action; the democrats and conservatives united to oppose it; and in the autumn elections they secured three of the state's four congressmen. In 1873 the republican party of the state was finally overthrown. For governor, Richard Coke had 85,549 votes, and Davis 42,663, and the democratic majorities for other officers were equally heavy. Jan. 5, 1874, the state supreme court declared the law unconstitutional under which the election had been conducted. Gov. Davis therefore refused to give up his office, and appealed to President Grant for federal troops to support him. They were refused, for the reason that the governor had signed the election law, had run for office under it, and should now submit to the result of the election. He then desisted from opposition. Since that time the state has been overwhelmingly democratic in all elections. In 1880 the vote for governor was 166,303 for Roberts, democrat: 64,372 for Davis, republican; and 33,670 for Hamman, greenbacker. In 1882 there were twenty-nine democrats and two republicans in the state senate, and sixty-eight democrats, seven republicans, six independents, and two greenbackers in the house. One of the state's six congressmen, 1879-83, is a democratic greenbacker.

—Among the political leaders of the state have been the following, all democrats unless otherwise specified: Richard Coke, governor 1873-7, United States senator 1877-83; David B. Culberson, congressman 1875-83; Andrew J. Hamilton, congressman 1859-61, military governor in 1862, provisional governor 1865-6; Morgan C. Hamilton (elder brother of the preceding), radical republican United States senator 1870-77; John Hancock, district judge 1851-5, congressman 1872-7; Sam Houston (see his name); David S. Kaufmann, representative and senator 1839-45, congressman 1846-51; S. B. Maxey, confederate major general, and United States senator 1875-87; Roger Q. Mills, congressman 1873-83; John H. Reagan, congressman 1857-61, confederate postmaster general 1861-5, congressman 1875-83; Thos. J. Rusk, secretary of war of the republic 1836-8, chief justice 1838-42, and United States senator 1846-56; Gustave Schleicher, congressman 1875-9; James W. Throckmorton, one of the seven voters against secession in 1861, governor 1866-7, congressman 1875-9; Lewis T. Wigfall, United States senator 1860-61, confederate states senator 1862-5.

—See authorities under ANNEXATIONS, III. COMPROMISES, V.: 2 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; 2 Hough's American Constitutions; Kennedy's Rise and Progress of Texas (1844), H. S. Foote's Texas and the Texans (1841); Rankin's Texas in 1850; Olmsted's Journey through Texas (1857); De Cordova's Resources and Public Men of Texas (1858), 16 Democratic Review, 282 (the presidents of Texas); Lester's Sam Houston and his Republic, and review of it in 5 Whig Review, 566; Yoakum's History of Texas (to 1846); Gouge's Fiscal History of Texas (1852); Jones' Official Correspondence relating to the Republic of Texas (1859); Green's Expedition against Mier; Kendall's Texan Santa Fé Expedition (1850); Smith's Reminiscences of the Texas Republic (1876); Texas Almanac, 1873-5.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

THIRD ESTATE

THIRD ESTATE. The Tiers État in French history. Few political pamphlets made so great a noise as that published by the Abbé Siéyès in 1789, at the moment when France had elected the constituent assembly, and which can be summed up in the following terms: "What is the third estate? Everything. What has it been in the political order up to the present moment? Nothing. What does it ask? To be something."139 There are three grave errors in these words. In the France of 1789, the third estate was not everything. In the political order previous to 1789, the third estate, far from being nothing, was daily becoming greater and more powerful. What M. Siéyès and his friends asked for it in 1789 was not that it should become something, but that it should be everything. That the third estate was not everything is proved by the revolution of 1789, which was its victory. Whatever may have been the weaknesses and faults of its opponents, it had to struggle greatly to overcome them, and the struggle was so violent that the third estate was decomposed in the struggle, and paid dearly for the triumph which it won. Let the reader compare to-day the pamphlet of the Abbé Siéyès with the work of Léonce de Lavergne on the provincial assemblies under Louis XIV. (Assemblées provinciales sous Louis XIV.), and he will see in the light of contemporary documents, that if the third estate was not everything in 1789, it was much, enough indeed to become free and preponderant without destroying everything that was not the third estate. Excessive pretension arouses intractable resistance. The Abbé Siéyès did not tell all that the third estate was in 1789, nor what its flatterers wished it might be. What his words contain is not the truth of things, but a revolutionary lie.

—To take French history in its totality and through all its phases, the third estate was the most active and most decisive element in French civilization. Considered from the social point of view, and in its relations with the various classes which have lived together on French soil, what has been called the third estate progressively extended and raised itself, and first greatly modified and then decidedly rose above the others. If we look from the political point of view, and follow the third estate in its relations with the general government of France, we shall find it at first an ally during six centuries of royalty, laboring incessantly for the ruin of the feudal aristocracy, and putting in its place a single power, a pure monarchy, very near, in principle at least, to absolute monarchy. But as soon as it gained this victory and accomplished this revolution, the third estate sought a new one; it attacked the single power which it had so much contributed to establish, and it undertook to change the pure monarchy into a constitutional one. Under whatever aspect we may consider it, whether we study the progressive formation of French society, or that of its governments, the third estate is the most persistent and most powerful of the forces which presided over French civilization.

—This fact is unique in the history of the world. We recognize in the destinies of the principal nations of Asia and of ancient Europe, nearly all the great facts which have agitated that of France; we find the mingling of various races, the conquest of one people by another, profound inequalities between classes, and frequent changes in the forms of government and the extent of power. But nowhere do we see a class appear which, beginning in a very low estate, weak, despised, almost imperceptible at its origin, rising by a continual movement and laboring without interruption, gaining strength from time to time, acquiring successively all that it lacked, wealth, enlightenment, influence, power; changes the nature of society, the nature of the government, and at last becomes dominant to such a degree that one may venture to call it the country itself. More than once in the history of the world the external phenomena of this or that political society have been the same as these mentioned here, but the similarity is merely apparent. In India, for example, foreign invasions, the passage and settlement of various races on the same soil, were frequently repeated; what was the result? The permanence of castes was not affected thereby; society remained divided into distinct and almost immovable classes—no invasion of one caste by another, no general abolition of the rule of castes by the triumph of one of them. After India take China: there also history shows many conquests similar to those of Europe by the Germans; there also, more than once, barbarous conquerors settled in the midst of a conquered people What was the result? The conquered almost absorbed the conquerors, and immobility remained the ruling characteristic of the social condition. In western Asia, since the invasion of the Turks, the gulf between the victors and the vanquished could not be bridged over; no class of society, no event of history, had the power to abolish this first effect of the conquest. In Persia similar events have taken place; different races have struggled and mingled; they attained nothing but invincible anarchy, which lasts for centuries without change in the social condition of the country and without a prospect of developing a civilization.

—Leaving Asia, we turn to Grecian and Roman Europe. At the first glance, we seem to find some analogy between the progress of these brilliant societies and that of our own; but the analogy is merely apparent; there also we find nothing resembling the third estate and its history. The only fact which has appeared, to ingenious minds, somewhat similar to the struggle of the bourgeoisie of the middle ages against the feudal aristocracy, is the struggle between the plebeians and patricians of Rome; they have been sometimes compared. The comparison is altogether false. The struggle between the plebeians and patricians of Rome commenced in the infancy of the republic; it was not, as in France in the middle ages, the result of a slow, difficult and incomplete development of a class for a long period, very much inferior in power, in wealth and in credit, which gradually grows in extent and prominence, and at last engages in a real struggle with the highest class in the state. Niebuhr has proved, in his "History of Rome," that the struggle of the plebeians against the patricians was a consequence, and, as it were, a prolongation, of the war of conquest, the effort of the aristocracy of the cities conquered by Rome to share in the rights of the conquering aristocracy. The plebeian families were the principal families of the conquered populations; placed, by defeat, in an inferior position, they were none the less aristocratic families, formerly powerful in their city, surrounded by clients, and capable, from the first moment, of disputing power with their conquerors. There is nothing in this like that slow, obscure, painful labor of the modern bourgeoisie emancipating itself with great labor from the bonds of servitude, or a condition bordering on servitude, and employing centuries, not to dispute political power, but to win a civil existence. The more we examine the more we see that the French third estate is a new fact in the history of the world, and one which belongs exclusively to the civilization of modern Europe.

—Not only is this fact new, but it has an altogether special interest for France. Nowhere has the bourgeoisie, the third estate, had a destiny so great, so fruitful, as that which fell to it in France. There were communes in all Europe, in Italy, in Spain, in Germany, in England, just as in France. Not only were these communes everywhere to be found, but the communes of France were not those which, as communes, played the greatest rôle in history under that designation and in the middle ages. The Italian communes gave birth to glorious republics; the German communes became free sovereign cities, which have had their own history, and exercised much influence on the general history of Germany. The communes of England allied themselves to a part of the feudal aristocracy, and formed, together with it, the ruling house in the British parliament; and in this way played, at an early period, a powerful part in the history of their country. The French communes, in their period of activity under this name, were very far from rising through such political importance to this historical rank. And still it is in France that the population, the communes, the bourgeoisie, were developed most completely, most efficiently, and ended by acquiring, in general society, the most decided preponderance. There have been communes in all Europe; there was really a third estate only in France; and the revolution of 1789, surely the greatest of European revolutions, was the work of the third estate.

—Since the outbreak and through all the vicissitudes, liberal or illiberal, of that mighty event, it is a commonplace unceasingly repeated, that there are no longer any classes in French society, but simply a nation of thirty-seven millions of persons. If it is meant by this that there are no longer privileges in France, that is to say, special laws or particular rights for certain families, certain estates, or certain occupations, and that legislation is the same, and movement perfectly free for all through all the degrees of the social scale, it is true; unity of legislation and similarity of rights are the essential and characteristic feature of civil society in France; an immense and excellent fact, new in the history of human societies. But under the rule of this fact, within this national unity and civil equality, there exist evident diversities, numerous and considerable inequalities, which the unity of legislation and the similarity of civil rights neither prevent nor destroy. Among owners of real or movable property, land or capital, there are rich and poor; there are large, medium and small landowners. The great landowners may be less numerous and less wealthy, the medium and small may be more numerous and more powerful than formerly; that does not prevent the difference from being real, and great enough to create, in the social order, conditions profoundly different and unequal. In the professions called liberal, which live by their science and intelligence; among lawyers, physicians, scholars and literary men of every kind; some rise to the first rank, attract business and success, acquire fame, wealth and influence; others satisfy the wants of their families and the demands of their position with difficulty; others yet vegetate obscurely in distress, almost without employment. In other walks of life, in which labor is chiefly material and manual, there are also varieties and inequalities of condition: some, by intelligence and good conduct, accumulate capital and enter into paths of ease and advancement; others, either unintelligent or indolent or disorderly, remain in the narrow and precarious conditions of existence depending on wages alone. In all the extent of French civil society, in the midst of labor as well as property, the diversity and inequality of conditions appear, or continue, and co-exist with the unity of legislation and the similarity of rights.

—How could it be otherwise? Let all human societies be examined, in all places and times: whatever be the variety of their origin, of their organization, of their government, of their extent, of their duration, of the kinds or degrees of their civilization, three types of social condition will be found in them all, always the same in essence: 1, men living from the income of their landed or movable property, from land or capital, without seeking to increase it by their own assiduous labor; 2, men occupied in working and increasing by their own assiduous labor, real or personal property, land or capital, which they possess; 3, men living by their daily labor, without income from land or capital. And these diversities, these inequalities in the social condition of men, are not accidental facts, or peculiar to a given age or country; they are universal facts produced naturally in every human society, under circumstances and under laws differing most widely from one another.

—These facts exist in our time and among the French, as they have in other times and places. Modern society in France includes, and will not cease to include, social situations profoundly different and unequal, whether they be termed classes or not. What redounds to its honor is this, that privilege and immobility are no longer attached to this diversity of conditions; that there are no longer, among Frenchmen, special advantages legally granted to some, and inaccessible to others; that all paths to advancement are open and free to all; that personal merit and labor have, in the career of men, an infinitely greater part than was theirs formerly. The third estate of the old régime exists no longer; it has disappeared in its victory over privilege and absolute power; its heirs in modern society are the middle classes, as they are called to-day; but these classes, inheriting the conquests of the third estate, hold them on new conditions as natural as they are imperative. To protect their own interest, as well as to perform their public duty, they must be both conservative and liberal; they must, on the one hand, attract and rally to their standard the remnants of the upper social circles which have survived the fall of the old régime, and, on the other, accept fully the upward movement which the whole people are taking. Nothing could be more natural than that the third estate of the ancient régime in its intercourse with the aristocratic classes was, and long remained, uneasy, suspicious, jealous, even envious; it had rights to obtain and conquests to make; to-day the conquests are made, the rights are recognized, proclaimed, exercised; the middle classes have no longer a motive for disquiet or envy; they may rely on their dignity and their power. With respect to the lower classes, their situation is not less happy; no barrier separates them from the higher; who can say where the middle classes begin, and where they end? They were formed in the name of the principles of common rights and general liberty; they are recruited, and draw new forces continually from the sources whence they came. To maintain the common rights and liberty of all, against the retrograde follies of absolute power and privilege, on the one hand, and, on the other, against the mad pretensions of leveling and anarchy, is now the two-fold mission of the middle classes, and is for them the sure means of retaining preponderance in the state, in the name of the interests of all, of which they are the truest and most efficient representatives. (Compare BOURGEOISIE, SOCIALISM.)

GUIZOT.

TIE

TIE. (See PARLIAMENTARY LAW.)

TILDEN

TILDEN, Samuel Jones, was born in New Lebanon, Columbia county, N. Y., Feb. 9, 1814. He spent a year at Yale, was graduated at New York university in 1838, was admitted to the bar in 1841, and in 1845 was elected to the assembly. There he took sides with the radical wing of the democratic party, the barnburners (see that title); but when they were forced into national politics as the free-soil party, he retired to the practice of the law. He was little heard of in politics until after the rebellion was suppressed, when he became chairman of the democratic state committee. In this position he came into flat antagonism with the Tweed ring of New York city in 1869-70, and took a leading part in the ring's overthrow in 1871. In 1874 he was elected governor by the democrats, and in this position attacked and overthrew the canal ring of western New York in 1875. He had now become so widely and favorably known that in 1876 his party nominated him for president. It was finally decided (see ELECTORAL COMMISSION) that he had received but 184 out of 369 electoral votes, and was not elected. His supporters have never accepted this decision as morally binding, and have always insisted, that, if Hayes was president de facto, Tilden was president de jure; that the commission's conclusion was reached by so applying legal rules as to exclude necessary testimony; and that the action of the returning boards was so confessedly corrupt that the commission did not dare to examine it. Some one, during the pendency of the case, seems to have concluded that the returning boards were so corrupt that there would be no moral wrong in bribing them to act correctly; and the congressional committee, the so-called "Potter committee," which afterward investigated the election, discovered a great mass of cipher telegrams, which, when deciphered, proved to be negotiations for the purchase of the returning boards. Mr. Tilden denied all knowledge of any such negotiations; but, though none of the telegrams were traced directly to him, all of them were fathered upon persons so nearly connected with him, by marriage or close political confidence, that the whole affair has proved an insuperable barrier to Mr. Tilden's further career. To the standing democratic charge that he had been defrauded of his election, it enabled the republicans to reply that he had only failed in the effort to defraud Hayes of his election. Both parties were thus content to argue from their own premises; and neither ventured to bring the counter-charges to a direct issue in 1880 by renominating the candidates of 1876 See Cook's Life of Tilden; Proceedings of the Electoral Commission; 125 North American Review, 1, 193 (Black's and Stoughton's articles); 27 Nation, 217, 250.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

TIMES-SPIRIT

TIMES-SPIRIT, The. (See ZEITGEIST.)

TOMPKINS

TOMPKINS, Daniel D., vice-president of the United States 1817-25, was born at Scarsdale, N. Y., June 21, 1774, and died on Staten Island, N. Y., June 11, 1825. He was graduated at Columbia in 1795, was admitted to the bar in 1797, was state supreme court justice 1804-7, and democratic governor of the state 1807-17. His service as governor was marked by great sacrifices of his personal credit in maintaining the federal government during the war of 1812. He thus became so deeply involved in debt that the latter part of his life was passed most unhappily. See 1, 2 Hammond's Political History of New York (index); Jenkins' Lives of the Governors of New York, 159.

A. J.

TON-KIN.

TON-KIN. (See TONQUIN.)

TONQUIN

TONQUIN (TONG-KING or TUN-KIN). This northern province of the empire of Annam, in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, occupying the lower basin of the Hong-kiang (Red river) derives its geographical and commercial importance from its easy access into the rich Chinese province of Yunnan. The Hong-kiang is practically a navigable stream, and the three southern provinces of China, Kwang-tung, Kwang-si and Yunnan border on Tonquin, which has a coast sufficiently accessible. Added to these advantages, its salubrity, and its resources of grain, timber and the precious metals, make it a most desirable acquisition for a European power anxious to extend its possessions in the east, or to magnify abroad prestige lost at home. The most valuable part of Tonquin is the delta near the sea formed by the four months of the Red river, near or in which are situated the chief towns of the province. These are Ha-noi, the capital, Nin-hai, Elai-phong, Bac-nin, Nam-bin and Min-bin. The climate is much healthier than in the two lower provinces of Annam, Cochin China or Saigon, the thermometer in December falling to 41°. The season from April to August is intensely hot, and the heavy rains are accompanied by storms and typhoons, when the Red river overflows its banks, and spreads a fertilizing flood over the country, which afterward produces heavy crops of rice and other cereals. The delta is intersected by a multitude of watercourses both natural and artificial. The chief exports are rice, sugar, cotton, spices and varied tropical products, but the manufactures are restricted mainly to gongs and articles inlaid with mother-of-pearl. In religion, the mass of the natives are devotees to a form of Buddhism much corrupted by local superstitions; the literati are Confucianists. Their language, reduced to writing by the French missionaries, is a dialect of archaic Chinese, purely monosyllabic, and with a very limited range of articulation, depending for its variety upon tones, which modify and multiply the meanings of each vocable. In ethnology, the Tonquinese are descendants of tribes of southern China, that are mentioned in the ancient chronicles as people with the big toe noticeably large. They have a well-marked physiognomy and anatomical structure, in which personal beauty or grace of movement is not conspicuous. Until about the tenth century of our era, Tonquin (Chinese, tong, east, and king, capital, eastern capital; the name of the chief city, in distinction from Si-king, or western capital of Cochin China) was ruled by princes or governors of Chinese origin, but since 960 A. D. the country has been practically independent, though ever acknowledging China as suzerain, and regularly paying tribute. Tonquin, until near the close of the eighteenth century, was the dominant state of the Annamese empire, but since that time, it has formed one of its three great political divisions, and the dynasty founded in 1803 A. D. by Gya-long by French assistance reigns still at Hué, in Cochin China, the central state.

—Christianity was first introduced by refugees from Japan as early as 1615, and in 1624 the French Jesuit priests began proselyting labors, which, with assistance later from Spanish Dominicans and French Lazarists, have, in spite of numerous bloody persecutions resulted in a roll of converts numbering, in 1854, 500,000. Severe persecutions since that time have greatly reduced these figures. The murder of several French priests and a Spanish bishop led to the Franco-Spanish intervention of 1858. During the century of intercourse with France, these various "revolts" of the Annamese and subsequent negotiations have usually resulted in the gain of fresh slices of land and new commercial privileges. France sends her Jesuits, or secular priests, first, and the brandy and "civilization" follow at the cannon's mouth. The treaty of 1874 gained her the six southern provinces of Cochin China, opened the port of Ha-noi, in Tonquin, to foreign trade, and guaranteed free transit from the sea to Yunnan. As usual with European powers in dealing with Asiatic nations, the French compelled the acceptance of their tariff; and custom house officers were duly installed at Haiphong and Ha-noi (called also Ke-cho, or the market). Owing to the unsettled state of the interior, caused by the ravages of the "Black Flags"—whether allies, invaders, or paid mercenaries of Annam, does not clearly appear—the Red river was not opened even in 1882, seven years after the treaty, and even the French settlement at Ha-noi was in danger. As a precautionary measure, the Saigon authorities dispatched re-enforcements to their nationals at the capital of Tonquin. The local mandarins, interpreting this as a menace, closed the Ha-noi citadel, and concentrated their forces. The French, taking alarm, resolved to precipitate the crisis, and on April 23, 1882, began to bombard the citadel (which, nearly a hundred years before, had been laid out by French engineers), and carried it on the 26th by assault. They then proceeded to administer the custom house for the benefit of the French treasury. Meanwhile China had not been an indifferent spectator of French aggression carried on under cover of protecting her citizens. When the treaty of 1874 was communicated to China and the other powers, the government of Peking protested against its provisions as an invasion of her suzerain rights, and formally gave notice that Annam was still her vassal, and whatever affected her international relations was of deep concern to the Chinese government. Since her reconquest of Ili, or Chinese Turkestan, which secured its formal retrocession from Russia, China has reaffirmed and in some cases enforced her ancient claim of suzerainty upon her vassals. That over Corea and Riu Kiu as against Japan, and perhaps the United States, in the case of Corea, is still unsettled. But her interest in Annam, both as neighbor and tributary, as manifested by military preparations, was so great, that the French evacuated the citadel at Ha-noi, though they fortified their settlement. In making a sortie May 24, 1883, the French commander, Riviere, and a number of his men were killed. The government at Paris at once resolved that France would "revenge her glorious children," and on May 26 declared war against China's vassal. (See also RIU KIU, and COCHIN CHINA.)

—LITERATURE. Crawfurd's Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, 1828; Garnier's Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine, etc., Paris, 1873; Luro's Pays d'Annam, Paris, 1878; Deveria's Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec Annam - Vietnam, Paris, 1880; The French in Tong-king, The Contemporary Review, Nov., 1882; England and France in Indo-China, The National Review, June, 1883; Colquhoun's Across Chrysé, London and New York, 1883, etc.

WM. ELLIOT GRIFFIS.

TRANSPORTATION

TRANSPORTATION, Means of. 1. History. The Romans had an admirable system of roads, and a highway legislation not unlike that now prevailing in France. But in the middle ages both the roads and the law were suffered to decay. Such ways as there were formed part of the property through which they ran; and when the ownership passed into the hands of a feudal lord, he obtained property rights over the road. But as the central government grew in power in various states of Europe, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, it also laid claims to rights over the roads; first in the form of a right to levy tolls; much later in undertaking to build roads, and maintain them under its own control. Throughout the continent the road taxes were oppressive and the highways extremely bad; in this last respect there was some slight improvement in the eighteenth century. A thorough reform was instituted in France by the revolutionary legislation, culminating in the decree of 1811, and further systematized in 1836, providing for public roads free from tolls, and supported by the nation, department or commune, according to the sphere of their importance. Similar legislation was carried out during the same period in other parts of the continent. In England the course of events had been different. The roads had always been recognized as the king's highways. They were maintained by the parishes under parliamentary legislation. (For details see "Edinburgh Review," April, 1864.) The experiment of tolls was cautiously tried; turnpike trusts were introduced at the beginning of the last century with tolerable success. The important acts of parliament in the present century have been those of 1835 and 1862; by the latter the care of roads has been in many cases taken out of the hands of individual parishes and made the subject of the united action of much larger districts. The early American system was modeled upon that of England—especially so in New England; in other parts of the country the county controlled the roads, even when they were maintained by separate communities. Turnpikes were first organized about the end of the last century. They had much more the character of private enterprises than in England, although public bodies often subscribed to the stock. This system was developed throughout the north; south of the Potomac it took no root. (For a variety of details see American State Papers, xx., 866-915.) National appropriations for roads date from the beginning of the century. The chief work of this kind was the Cumberland road; for the expenditures on this and other projects see Am. State Papers, xxi., and House Committee Report, 1835-6, III., 850. The crisis of 1837 put a stop to most of this work; and the subsequent development of railways caused it to be forgotten.

—For a detailed history of canals and railways, see the articles under those headings. In a system of internal navigation—canals, combined with river improvements—France took the lead. The development of the canal system in England and America was almost simultaneous with that of turnpike roads. In England the most important canals were built toward the close of the last century; they were the result of private enterprise far more than were the turnpikes. The period of canal building in America was a generation later, the first third of the present century. In railroad building England, of course, took the lead, followed by Belgium and Germany. Most of the continental governments would have preferred to develop their railways as state concerns, after the analogy of their roads; but from the financial burdens which this would involve they shrank either at the outset (Prussia), or before the system was carried through (Austria and many others). Only in France was the analogy tolerably well maintained, at least as regards the matter of railroad construction. England and America were of course hampered by no such precedents.

—We have thus far spoken of means of transportation only in the narrower sense of ways or roads over which the goods must pass. The transportation agencies yet remain to be considered. As long as these were but the individual cart and ship, their consideration might be neglected; but in their modern organization as express company, steamship company, postoffice, telegraph company, or, above all, railroad company in its relation as carrier, they form the all-important part of our subject. Most of these have been treated under separate headings, so that we need not enter into their origin and history. The railway appears under a double aspect as road and as agency. Many mistakes of public policy were at first made by treating it after the analogy of a highway pure and simple. It may be considered either as a road operated solely by a particular company, or as a company having sole right to operate a particular road. The same distinction may be made with the telegraph; but it is in that case obviously of less importance.

—2. Economic Results of Improvement in means of Transportation. The direct results have been at once increase in rapidity and decrease in expense. In the history of each separate means of transportation these two changes have gone hand in-hand. Take, in the matter of roads, the French statistics, which are in more available form than those of other countries. If we compare the returns of the swiftest public means of conveyance on the main French roads in 1782, 1832 and 1848, respectively, we find that the average speed had more than doubled in the first interval, and had increased by one-third in the second interval; while the prices per kilometre were, at the respective dates, 4 cts., 3¾ cts., 3½ cts. of our money. And this reduction is the more remarkable because of the increase of general prices going on at the same time. Even where the tolls seemed to increase, as with the English turnpike system, the amount saved by diminished wear and tear, increased loads, etc., really produced the same result of lowering the cost of carriage. So in the canal system of different countries; as the facilities were improved, not merely was there a diminution of the traction expenses on that ground, but there was also usually a gradual abandonment of the attempt to make the tolls pay interest on what the canals had originally cost. In the case of the transportation agencies, the facts are still more striking. To take an instance from the history of shipping: By the study of the prevailing winds, systematized by Maury about the middle of this century, the speed of sailing vessels on many frequented routes was nearly doubled, and the expense of carriage thereby greatly diminished. Fifty years of constant improvement in postal facilities have been marked by a reduction of postal charges to less than one-fifth what they were at the beginning. There has been the same kind of improvement and reduction in the steamship and railway service.

—When it comes to the substitution of one means of transportation for another—steam instead of sail, railways instead of waterways—the progress is less direct. We generally find in the first instance increased rapidity secured at an advanced price; then the price begins to diminish, and ultimately may fall below that of the more primitive means of conveyance. When ocean steamships were first introduced, it was not supposed that they could ever compete with sail for the carriage of ordinary freight, even on the most frequented routes. The first indications of real competition being felt in this respect were the unsuccessful efforts to employ sailing vessels with the auxiliary screw. Then came the gradual withdrawal of sail from the business on shorter routes with the most regular communication, to ply on the longer and less frequented ones. But each improvement in ocean steamers gives an additional advantage in competition and diminution in the cost of carriage. The substitution of the screw for the side-wheel, the use of compound engines, are sources of unmixed saving; the enormous increase in the size of the steamers, even when they are run in a manner that seems to involve extravagant waste of coal, increases the net carrying capacity yet more; so that the amount of coal burned per ton carried is under favorable circumstances least on the new boats. The excess of freight rates by steamers, as compared with those by sail, varies from 100 per cent. down to almost nothing: essentially the same relation as subsists between railroads and directly competing canals.

—Railroads, soon after their first introduction, proved themselves more than a match for any competition from wagon roads; and things have now gone on so far, that, according to the census returns of 1880, the five to ten mills which it generally costs the farmer to haul a bushel of wheat a mile by wagon, is a higher rate than he has to pay per ton per mile by railroad. Or, to put the same results in another way: in most of the wheat regions it would not pay to grow grain which had to be hauled twenty miles by wagon; in some regions the limit of wagon hauling is as low as ten miles. But the competition between railroads and canals has taken shape more slowly. It was at first thought to be impossible on any terms; and great was the indignation of the New York legislature when the Central railroad first attempted it as against the Erie canal. Then came the gradual abandonment of the attempt to make canals pay interest on their construction expense; and this seemed constantly to keep them beyond the reach of railway competition on those terms. But the successive railroad improvements, both in engineering and in management, culminating in the wonderful substitution of steel rails for iron, and the enormously increased loads thus rendered possible, have produced such astonishing results in the past fifteen years, that no one would venture to predict what might come in fifteen years more. Since 1870, along with the great improvements in efficiency of service, freight rates have fallen as much as 50 per cent., and the end of the movement does not seem to be yet reached.

—The indirect results of these changes are so far-reaching that we can do little more than enumerate them. The most immediate effect of cheapened transportation is to increase the distance at which it is possible for producer and consumer to deal with one another. To the producer it offers a wider market, and to the consumer more varied sources of supply. Which party obtains the chief benefit of the change is determined by the special conditions of each particular case. On the whole, its operation is more uniformly beneficial to the consumers, as a class, because its temporary advantage for the producers so often leads to over-production. But, in any event, it results in doing away with a large part of the variations in price between different localities. The price is made, not in a local market, but in the world's markets. In the case of less bulky manufactured products, these differences almost disappear, except as they are due to artificial obstructions. In agricultural products, they are on a vastly smaller scale than ever before. And not the least important point where this leveling effect is felt, is in the rent of agricultural land in England, and similarly organized countries. Nearness to market was not long ago a main advantage of high-priced land; now it has to contend on tolerably equal terms with competing land five thousand miles away.

—To comprehend the full meaning of this change, we have only to look at books on industrial organization, published in the early part of this century. The limits from which a large city could draw its various supplies were closely defined by distance. Fresh vegetables and fruits could only be produced for it within the narrowest circle; and successive circles of ground were almost necessarily devoted to different products, according to their different availability for transportation. Now, any improvement by which products could be profitably transported to a greater distance, led to a redistribution. It was no longer location which determined the business to be carried on in a particular spot, but natural advantages more or less independent of location. The market garden might be placed at a greater distance from the city, if by so doing a more fertile spot was secured. The factory might be located far away from the raw material, if other business inducements made it desirable. In short, the whole system of division of labor advanced to a new stage. Not only was each man employed for what he could do best, but he was given a chance to work in the place where he could do it best. And this change made itself strongly felt in international relations. Even the barriers raised by high protective tariffs hardly avail to counteract the effect of reduced freights. It is perfectly possible that a country with a high tariff to-day should be less isolated by this than it would have been a few years ago by the mere cost of transportation with no tariff at all. It is the railroad and the steamship that determine where a new business shall be developed, quite as often as the government policy. The grant of special rates and privileges to shippers is nowadays the most efficient kind of protection. It is this quickening and cheapening of transportation that have given such stimulus in the present day to the growth of large cities. It enables them to draw cheap food from a far larger territory, and it causes business to locate where the widest business connection is to be had, rather than where the goods or raw materials are most easily procured. And the perfection of the means of communication, the postoffice and the telegraph, intensifies the same result. With this growth of city life, and partly in consequence of it, comes the increased gain of large producers at the expense of small producers. With it comes organized speculation, and its attendant results, good and evil; with it comes the development of enormous wealth in the hands of a few individuals, not to speak of the less distinctively economic results which attend the life of a great city.

—3. State Control. It is just because these indirect results are so far-reaching that the question of government control of transportation agencies has attained its present importance. In the earlier systems, all this settled itself. The parishes, towns or counties took up the matter of roads, because it had become a pressing want, and there was no other power to supply it. If a private company was ready to build a turnpike, its help was welcome, and there was no fear of its becoming too great a power in the community. Again, in the very different case of the postoffice, the matter was taken up by the state, partly as a source of revenue, partly as a means of making its presence and authority felt; not on broader grounds of public policy, as a protection to the citizen against the imposition of less responsible agencies. The navigation act of 1651, whatever its defects, has the merit of being the first systematic attempt to control a branch of transportation on grounds of public policy, looking toward its indirect economic and social effects. For some time it remained almost the only one; the systems of roads and canals formed but local or partial exceptions. But, about the year 1840, the simultaneous development of the postal service, the telegraph and the railroad, made it necessary for the state to assume some definite attitude upon the question of management or control of these agencies. The postoffice presented the fewest difficulties. The machinery was in the hands of the government, the people were accustomed to its working; it was only in a subordinate section of the business, the parcels post, that there was really any doubt, and there it was settled on grounds of convenience, or left to settle itself for the time being with the liability of change afterward. The matter was not so clear in the case of the telegraph; state management would require new expenditure, and a new organization, involving many officials. But it was decided affirmatively throughout the continent of Europe; and England, after trying private telegraphy for a long time, changed to a system of government ownership in 1869; so that the United States has for fifteen years stood almost alone in this matter. It was the question of state railroads that involved the most doubt; and it is the harder to trace its exact history from the fact that so many states had no thoroughly fixed policy on the subject. The general course of events in continental Europe may be summarized as follows: In the first instance, the governments were in favor of state railroads, and proposed to develop such a system; afterward they felt the financial difficulties of the undertaking, and turned their attention to the encouragement of private enterprise in this field by various forms of subsidy; then, thirdly, as the railroad power became established, they found it no longer a question of supporting, but of controlling, it; and, finally, they came to look upon state railroads as a source of financial strength, rather than weakness, and to return to their original plan of state ownership. In the United States we have felt only the second and third of these periods; and in neither case has our general policy been so fixed as in Europe. We had a time of indiscriminate encouragement of railroads by land grants and municipal subscription; we are having a time of indiscriminate attempts at control by special legislation in various states. England alone has been free from these strong changes of public policy; whatever encouragement or control there has been was confined within the narrowest limits.

—Any attempt to do justice to the arguments on either side is quite beyond the scope of an article like this; and we conclude this part of the subject by quoting from two writers, representing quite different views, their opinions as to when state ownership of transportation agencies is desirable.

—The first is from Ad. Wagner, of Berlin, a decided advocate of state management; he considers that there are strong reasons for it, 1, when the efficiency of the service requires wide and uniform extension over the whole country and international communications (postoffice, telegraph; somewhat less so in the case of railroads); 2, when the service involves anything like a monopoly, legal or actual (railroads, telegraphs); 3, when it requires constant repetition of the same services, according to fixed schedules, in such numbers as to involve the existence of a large body of officials; 4, when the cost may be lessened by combining a variety of services at small stations (letter and parcels post, railroad stations and telegraph offices); 5, when the service in private management can only be secured by subsidies on a large scale; 6, when it is necessary on grounds of public policy that the service should inure uniformly to the benefit of the whole people. These principles, he concludes, enable us to speak decisively in favor of state management in the case of letter post and telegraph, more reservedly in the case of parcels post and railways; in the matter of navigation they justify it only in exceptional cases. On the other hand, W. Stanley Jevons, writing an impartial opinion, but as an Englishman, averse to great extension of government activity, states the conditions favorable to state management as follows ("Meth. of Soc. Reform," p. 279): "1, when numberless wide-spread operations can only be efficiently connected, united and coordinated in a single, all-extensive government system; 2, when the operations possess an invariable routine-like character; 3, when they are performed under the public eye or for the service of individuals who will immediately detect or expose any failure or laxity; 4, where there is but little capital expenditure, so that each year's revenue and expense account shall represent, with sufficient accuracy, the real commercial conditions of the department." Of these principles the fourth is one of the highest practical importance, which must be considered in discussing any schemes of state management; and one which under a government like that of the United States at present, must generally be decisive.

—4. Principles of Management; Rates. Transportation agencies in private hands will of course be managed on business principles, that is, they will charge all the traffic will bear. It seems at first sight as if non-competitive points were thus left entirely at the mercy of railroad managers. Practically, however, this danger is checked by two important limitations. In the first place, the competition of different localities in the same market is such that if one railroad charges rates arbitrarily higher than its competitors, it renders it impossible for the localities along its route to ship goods at a profit, and will quickly destroy its own traffic; secondly, exorbitant rates may induce the building of a parallel railroad; and however ineffective such roads generally prove after they are built, the prospect of one in the future has the tendency to keep rates down. Moreover—though this is but an indirect consideration—such local rates are almost entirely paid out of rent, and show their chief effect in the value of real estate. The dangerous kind of discrimination, and one which can not be too strongly reprehended, is that which makes special rates for different individuals, doing the same kind of business in nearly the same place. Such discrimination furnishes the most effective argument in favor of some kind of state control. At points where a railroad competes with a water route or with another railroad, through rates may fall as low as the actual cost of hauling, apart from any fixed charges, or, in the case of a war with rates, may temporarily go even lower. But wars of rates do not give shippers the advantage which might seem likely to accrue. They lead to what has been described as the worst form of discrimination, that between different individuals in the same place. They cripple the efficiency of the service, and the possibility of healthy competition. Take as an extreme case of a similar effect, the routes from California to Nevada, where the railways came in competition with wagon roads. They lowered their rates until the teams were driven out of the service, and then raised them to a monopoly figure. The ordinary railroad war does not go so far as this, but it works in the same direction. The history of the different attempts to control this matter by enforced publicity of management, direct provisions concerning, or limitations of dividends, with their varying success, does not come within the scope of this article. The principles here applied to railroads of course hold good of other transportation agencies.

—But in the case of state management, the rates need not be thus arranged on purely business principles. The state has the choice of four systems: 1, gratuitous service; 2, payment of expenses, partial or complete; 3, business profits; 4, monopoly rates as a source of special revenue. The fourth of these was the prevailing view up to the end of the last century; it has since been abandoned. The first is now mainly exemplified in the case of roads, and some few waterways, where the want and use are so general, and the expense comparatively so slight, that there is no injustice in taxing the community to defray the cost of the service. Cases may also arise where the collection of tolls produces so slight a revenue that the advantage of free service to the community quite outweighs it. Most of the free canal arguments come under this head. But for the great majority of instances the choice is between the second and third principles; it is a question of tolls vs. profits. Canals and letter post have been managed under the former principle; the telegraph stands on the border line; while parcels post, railroads and shipping, in so far as they have been owned by the state, have been mainly managed as business enterprises. The theoretical principle would seem to be, that such agencies under state management should just pay expenses. If they do more than this, it may constitute an especially undesirable tax. But the whole question is so complicated with the problem of remunerating invested capital on the one hand, and of freeing the community from the exactions of individuals on the other, that we can make little use of this principle. Practically it may be said that the state undertakes certain services, in transportation as well as elsewhere, in which it would be impossible to obtain a business profit at any rates (thus postal service on unfrequented routes); and it undertakes others where the main charges are so fixed that additional use of the facilities is all but unattended with additional cost (canals; letter carriage). In both of these cases the principle of tolls has great advantages. On the other hand, there are certain services which the government performs in more or less direct competition with private individuals, as the parcels post or the railways of Belgium and Germany; there are yet others whose acquisition has loaded the state with a special bonded debt, or other fixed obligations. It is doubtful policy for the state to assume ownership on these conditions, especially the latter. But if matters are in this condition the attempt to obtain profits from the business seems to be generally the wisest course, and often the only admissible one.

—E. Sax, Verkehrsmittel; Wagner, Finanzwissenschaft; Foville, La Transformation des Moyens de Transport.

ARTHUR T. HADLEY.

TREASON

TREASON (IN U. S. HISTORY). Under the confederation there was no such legal offense as treason against the United States, since there was no such thing as allegiance to the United States. (See ALLEGIANCE, I.) Treason and allegiance had reference only to the state. A remnant of this feeling made the definition of treason, when it was first introduced into the convention of 1787, Aug. 6, consist in "levying war against the United States, or any of them, and in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them." The clause was fully debated, Aug. 20, and changed to its present form. (See CONSTITUTION, Art. III., § 3.) But all the debaters professed themselves dissatisfied with it. Gouverneur Morris acutely pointed out the fact, that "in case of a contest between the United States and a particular state, the people of the latter must be traitors to one or the other authority." But a motion to give congress the "sole" power to define the punishment of treason was lost, five states voting for it, and six against it. Seldom has the omission of a single word had more momentous effects. In this case it left to congress and the states, as almost all the speakers acknowledged, a concurrent power to punish for treason; and so it enabled a seceding state to offer to its minority a choice between treason against the state and treason against the United States. Had the vote been six states to five for the insertion of the word, the state sovereignty and secession arguments would hardly have been worth the trouble of refuting.

—Had the constitution given to congress the "sole" power to define the punishment of treason, the states would have been remitted, for protection against such domestic disturbances as Dorr's rebellion (see that title), to a simple law against seditious assemblages; and the protection would have been efficient. As it is, most of the states have inserted in their constitutions a provision that "treason against the state of—shall consist only in levying war, etc.," following the constitution of the United States. These provisions have always been practically in nubibus: there has hardly been a case of indictment for treason against a state, excepting the action of Rhode Island in the Dorr case, and that came to nothing. But they fostered the idea of allegiance to a state, and thus carried into secession the multitude who disliked secession, but dreaded to commit treason against the state.

—At the end of the rebellion there were no prosecutions for treason. It has been roundly asserted that the reason for this was the consciousness of the government of the United States that it had been illegally suppressing a misnamed rebellion, that treason could only hold against a state, and that Jefferson Davis and his associates had committed no crime and engaged in no treason, in any sense known to the constitution or its framers. Those who so argue forget that Mr. Lavis, at least, was no prisoner of war; that his surrender was unconditional and in a territory under military occupation; and that, if there had been any such impotent spite against him as this theory assigns to the government, a drum head court martial and a file of men would quickly have made it patent, treason or no treason. The fact seems to be that his escape was due entirely to lack of spite. The collapse of the rebellion had been too complete to allow of spite. The nation stood aghast as it realized the thoroughness of its work; and its controlling impulse was to efface as rapidly as possible all evidences of the conflict. Treason trials would have been a festering sore in the body politic, and they were avoided.

—There can be no doubt that this policy was just, as well as wise. For seventy years before 1860, men who did not realize the full force of what they said had been boasting of the "voluntary" nature of the union, in contrast with the effete despotisms of Europe. (See NATION.) The nation's long laches in asserting its paramount authority in the last resort gave Jefferson Davis and his associates an exemption from the animus of treason which can never be claimed again. All men have now had fair warning, as Jefferson Davis had not in 1860, that the Union is not "voluntary," so long as the nation is determined to maintain it; and that any attempt to break it up is treason to the United States, even if it is obedience to a state. It might be that a future rebellion would be suppressed with a similar generous forbearance from ultimate vengeance; but the chance is an uncommonly small one.

—The act of April 30, 1790, made death the penalty for treason, as defined in the constitution, on conviction by "confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act." It also made fine and imprisonment the punishment of misprision of treason, the concealment of it. For seventy years this act was sufficient. There were few trials under it, the principal one being that of Burr (see his name); and these were practically failures. In 1861 an act was passed making conspiracy to oppose the laws or seize the property of the United States a high crime, but this was punishable only by fine and imprisonment. The act of July 17, 1862, provided, that, if any person should thereafter commit the crime of treason against the United States, his slaves, if any, should be declared free, and he himself should suffer death, or fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; that any one convicted should forever be incapable of holding office under the United States; and that it should be the duty of the president to seize and apply to the use of the army the property of six classes of leaders of the rebellion, who seem to have been considered prima facie guilty of treason. There were, finally, no southern prosecutions under it. Davis and others were indicted, but never brought to trial. The few prosecutions were in northern states.

—See Story's Commentaries, §§ 1290, 1790; ib., § 1795 (for law cases); Whiting's War Powers (10th ed.), 95; the state sovereignty view of treason is in Bledsoe's Is Jefferson Davis a Traitor? and "Centz"'s Republic of Republics, 413 foll., (see also index under Treason); Indianapolis Treason Trials; for the indictment against Davis see Schuckers' Life of Chase, 534; the act of April 30, 1790, is in 1 Stat. at Large, 112; the act of July 17, 1862, is in 12 Stat. at Large, 589.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT. This is the most extensive and complex of all the departments of the United States government. Established by act of Sept. 2, 1789 (1 Stat. at Large, p. 65), the department of the treasury has grown from a little office with a few clerks, to a vast establishment employing no less than 3,400 officers at Washington, with numerous bureaus, and with branches, fiscal, marine and miscellaneous, all over the country. The secretary of the treasury is head of the department, and is one of the seven cabinet officers (salary $8,000). The law requires that he shall be a person not interested in the business of trade or commerce. He is required to digest and prepare plans for the revenue and public credit; to prescribe forms of keeping public accounts; to make reports annually, and specially, when called upon, to congress, as to all matters pertaining to his office; to superintend the collection of the revenue; to grant all warrants for moneys issued from the treasury in pursuance of appropriations made by law; and to perform all such duties connected with the finances of the United States as are required by law. The multifarious business transacted under control of the treasury department has been greatly expanded within the past twenty years. It embraces the management of the national debt, the national currency and coinage, the supervision of the national banks, the internal revenue system, the customs revenue, the commercial marine of the United States, the light house system of the country, the survey of the coast and the interior triangulation of the United States, the inspection of steam vessels, the life-saving service, and the marine hospitals. There are two assistant secretaries of the treasury (salary, $4,500 each), either of whom may be designated as acting secretary in the absence or inability of their chief, and between whom is divided the responsibility for the great variety of current business and correspondence which does not by law require the signature of the secretary. The routine work of the secretary's office is distributed among eight divisions (each under a chief at $2,500 salary, and employing about 400 clerks in all). The accounts for all receipts and disbursements by the United States, or any of its officers, are by law examined in the office of some one of the six auditors of the treasury (salary $3,600 each). The first auditor (58 clerks, etc.) has charge of all accounts in the civil service, custom houses, judiciary, public debt, etc. The second auditor (157 clerks, etc.) settles all accounts connected with the army (except as follows, under the third auditor), bounties and Indian affairs. The third auditor (171 clerks, etc.) adjusts accounts of the quartermaster general, engineer corps, commissary general, unpaid pensions, war claims, etc. The fourth auditor (48 clerks, etc.) adjusts all accounts connected with the navy. The fifth auditor (30 clerks, etc.) has charge of the internal revenue accounts, diplomatic and consular, and state department accounts, the census, etc. The sixth auditor (295 clerks, etc.) settles all accounts relating to the postal service. All the above accounts, when audited, go to the first or second comptroller of the treasury (salary $5,000 each) for re-examination. The first comptroller (58 clerks, etc) must countersign all warrants issued by the secretary, revise the accounts of the first and fifth auditors, examine drafts and requisitions for salaries, etc. The second comptroller (70 clerks, etc.) examines and certifies accounts received from the second, third and fourth auditors. The commissioner of customs (salary $4,000, 31 clerks, etc.) revises and certifies the revenue accounts, and all matters connected with the marine. The register of the treasury (salary $4,000, 148 clerks, etc.) has charge of the account books of the United States, showing every receipt and disbursement: he registers all warrants drawn by the secretary upon the treasurer, signs and issues all bonds, United States notes, and other securities, and has charge of the tonnage or shipping accounts, and the entire registry of vessels in the United States. The comptroller of the currency (salary $5,000, 89 clerks, etc.) supervises the entire national bank system of the country. This important office was created in 1863. The comptroller is charged with the execution of all laws relating to the issue and regulation of national currency secured by United States bonds; he has a seal of office, commissions and employs bank examiners, assumes control of any national banks becoming insolvent, appoints receivers therefor, makes an annual report to congress upon the condition, resources and liabilities of the national banks, and compiles statistics of other banks, banking companies and savings banks. The director of the mint (or, more properly, mints) of the United States (salary $4,500, 14 clerks etc.) is the head of a treasury bureau established in 1873, and has charge of all mints and assay offices, making annual reports to congress on the coinage of the country, the yield of precious metals, and collateral subjects. The commissioner of internal revenue (salary $6,000, 293 clerks, etc.), an office established in 1862, superintends the assessment and collection of all duties and taxes imposed by the laws providing internal revenue. The states and territories were divided into numerous collection districts during the war, for assessing and gathering the excise and stamp duties upon spirits, tobacco, etc., but the collectors of internal revenue were reduced by executive order in 1883, to eighty-two. The solicitor of the treasury (salary $4,500, 15 clerks, etc.), though an officer of the department of justice, has special charge of legal measures to prevent and detect frauds upon the revenue, having charge of all suits involving money in which the United States is interested, except those arising under the internal revenue laws, which are in charge of the solicitor of internal revenue. He also has charge of the secret service employés engaged in detection of counterfeiting and other frauds on the government. The chief of the bureau of statistics (salary $3,000, 36 clerks, etc.) is charged with the annual reports on commerce and navigation, internal commerce, etc., and publishes annual, quarterly, monthly and occasional reports, embodying the latest statistical information as to imports and exports, immigration, shipping, etc. The superintendent of the coast and geodetic survey (salary $6,000, 156 clerks, etc.) has charge of the survey of the coasts and rivers of the United States, publishing annual reports, tide-tables, sailing directions, and maps and charts. The supervising surgeon general (salary $4,000, 17 clerks, etc.) is charged with the marine hospital service and the fund for the relief of sick and disabled seamen. The supervising architect of the treasury department (salary $4,500, 93 clerks, etc.) is charged with preparing designs and plans for all public buildings erected by the United States for custom houses, United States courts and postoffices, and the supervision of the same. The supervising inspector general of steam vessels (salary $3,500, 5 clerks, etc.) administers the steamboat inspection laws, with the aid of a board of inspectors. The superintendent of the life-saving service (salary $4,000, 23 clerks, etc.) supervises the organization and employés of the coast service for the protection of life and property, and prepares the statistics of marine disasters. The chief of the bureau of engraving and printing (salary $4,500) has charge of the engraving and printing of all bonds, treasury notes, national bank notes, certificates, internal revenue stamps, etc., of the United States. This great establishment occupies a separate building constructed especially for its uses, and employs about 1,200 hands. The treasurer of the United States (salary $6,000, 277 clerks, etc.) receives and keeps the moneys of the United States, and disburses them only upon warrants drawn by the secretary of the treasury, and duly recorded. He is also charged with the custody of all public moneys in the sub-treasuries at New York and eight other cities, acts as agent for redemption of national bank notes, is trustee of the bonds of the United States, and custodian of Indian trust funds, besides having entire charge of the payment of interest on the public debt. The immense vaults and strong-boxes of the treasury are all in the custody of this officer.

—As will be seen from the above outline, the multifarious business of the fiscal system of the United States is widely and carefully distributed through a series of responsible officers, appointed by the president and senate, who give bonds for the faithful discharge of their duties. The system of keeping and adjusting accounts is very thorough and systematic, and the checks and safeguards for the protection of the public money so thoroughly organized by distribution among many responsible heads, as to render any wrongful disbursement very difficult, if not impossible.

—The treasury department occupies a very large freestone and granite edifice, containing 195 rooms, constructed after the Ionic style of architecture, the cost of construction having been $6,000,000. It was in this department that the employment of women as government clerks was first introduced in the year 1863, and several hundred of that sex are now employed in the various departments at Washington.

—The following is the complete list of secretaries of the treasury from the beginning of the government, with their terms of office:

1. Alexander Hamilton...	Sept. 11, 1789
2. Oliver Wolcott...	Feb. 2, 1795
3. Samuel Dexter...	Jan. 1, 1801
4. Albert Gallatin...	May 14, 1801
5. George W. Campbell...	Feb. 9, 1814
6. Alexander J. Dallas...	Oct. 6, 1814
7. William H. Crawford...	Oct. 22, 1816
8. Richard Rush...	March 7, 1825
9. Samuel D. Ingham...	March 6, 1829
10. Louis McLane...	Aug. 2, 1831
11. William J. Duane...	May 29, 1833
12. Roger B. Taney...	Sept. 23, 1833
13. Levi Woodbury...	June 27, 1834
14. Thomas Ewing...	March 5, 1841
15. Walter Forward...	Sept. 13, 1841
16. John C. Spencer...	March 3, 1843
17. George M. Bibb...	June 15, 1844
18. Robert J. Walker...	March 6, 1845
19. William M. Meredith...	March 8, 1849
20. Thomas Corwin...	July 23, 1850
21. James Guthrie...	March 7, 1853
22. Howell Cobb...	March 6, 1857
23. Philip F. Thomas...	Dec. 12, 1860
24. John A. Dix...	Jan. 11, 1861
25. Salmon P. Chase...	March 7, 1861
26. William Pitt Fessenden...	July 1, 1864
27. Hugh McCulloch...	March 7, 1865
28. George S. Bontwell...	March 11, 1869
29. William A. Richardson...	March 17, 1873
30. Benjamin H. Bristow...	June 4, 1874
31. Lot M. Morrill...	July 7, 1876
32. John Sherman...	March 8, 1877
33. William Windom...	March 5, 1881
34. Charles J. Folger...	Oct. 27, 1881

A. R. SPOFFORD.

TREATIES.

TREATIES. A treaty is an agreement, league or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formally signed by commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the several sovereigns or the supreme power of each state.

—Historical View. This is the modern definition; in the ancient world, treaties were not so much contracted as they were dictated. A conqueror with an army at the gate of a capital was perfectly able to settle the terms by himself, and he would stay there until he had satisfactory pledges that the terms would be carried out. The treaty of peace of Antalcidas, B. C. 387, is a good instance. Tiribazus, with the Persian fleet in the Hellespont, summoned deputies from the Greek states, and read terms of peace as follows: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus should belong to him. He also thinks it just to leave all the other Grecian cities, both small and great, independent, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which are to belong to Athens, as of old. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind, both by land and sea, with ships and with money." No parties refused to accept it. Very often, too, the conquered had to pay down so much gold or so many slaves or ships, by way of earnest; at the treaty made by the Romans, B. C. 190, Antiochus, just defeated at Magnesia, had to cede Asia Minor, to pay 1,500 talents within twelve years, and to give up his elephants, ships of war and even some guests at his court. This was a typical treaty of those days. Occasionally, however, even then, the treaty was more of a contract than this, and settled, and defined the relations of states among each other; the peace of Callias, B. C. 371, which settled the independence of the various Grecian states, and the terms on which they were to exist between themselves, was as much a manifestation of international law as many of the modern congresses have produced. Heffter has traced the history and growth of this branch of international law very clearly and briefly, and it may be useful before proceeding with the subject, to insert here his historical view of the matter, from the times we have alluded to until when Talleyrand, Nesselrode, Castlereagh, Bernstadt and Metternich, with other lesser lights, in 1814-15, formed a parliament to balance off the powers of the world against each other with the closest care.

—Treaties, together with the negotiations which precede them, are the most fruitful source of international law; they, and the spirit which leads to their enactment, show on what points nations and governments are in accord.

—In the ancient world, treaties were almost the only manifestation of any common principle of law. Nevertheless, they present little interest; they rarely go beyond the narrow circle of the needs of the moment. Sometimes they show us the misfortunes of the conquered; sometimes their object is the conclusion of a long or short armistice; occasionally also the establishment of business relations, or even that of a kind of dikéodosie founded on reciprocal rights. The treaties concluded between the states, or rather between the princes, of the middle ages, offer still less of interest. The state itself was then only an agglomeration of private affairs and needs: the prince disposed of peoples and countries as he would of his own fields. The feudal lords and the church alone enjoyed a certain protection which they in their turn accorded to others, and yet that was often insufficient.

—From the fifteenth century the turning point comes; a jurisprudence of political treaties begins to be formed, which is closely connected with the first steps of a European state-craft, and reflects in it the general spirit of later times. Innumerable treaties were concluded at that period, which often only wore a temporary mask for the true intentions of the parties, and which were rarely taken seriously. They would break them after a little with the same ease, to replace them by treaties of alliance with the enemies of those who had just been their allies. Wheresoever there might be any spoil to gain or share, each rushed to seize his part (le systéme copartageant, it was called). Marriages and dowries played a minor but very considerable part in the treaties of those days. With the religious struggles of the sixteenth century higher interests began to be considered. At first they were discussed within the states, but the movers of international politics soon began to try to profit by these religious struggles, without any scruples for the interests of any particular religion. In this sixteenth century the politics of commerce obtained a preponderating influence over the general affairs of Europe: especially after the insurrection of the united provinces against the Spanish monarchy, for the sake of colonial interests, the scene of war was changed to the most distant parts of the world.

—The first half of the seventeenth century is filled with the bloody slaughters of the holy wars, to which the congress of Westphalia put a final end. This was the congress where the diplomacy of the great powers celebrated a triumph. Its work on this occasion was for a long time a source of pride, but nevertheless, like a new Pandora, there escaped from its casket many gifts which were to be sources of distress. However, the treaty of Westphalia was to form the firm foundation of the status quo and of the balance of power of Europe, and at the same time it is the line of demarkation between an ancient and modern system of diplomacy. Up to that time in treaty negotiations diplomacy had relied on rights which were at least apparent to every one; after the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck its object was much less the re-establishment of rights which had been violated; it regulated matters more according to political rule, and in so doing destroyed many rights which had been established by the older methods. At the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia there comes, as if directly in consequence of it, a restless state of international policy, directed, sometimes to the acquisition of material advantages, sometimes to maintain the political equilibrium which had been re-established at the price of so many sacrifices. The policy of intervention is at its height, and with it the usage of European congresses and combinations. Governments find themselves perfectly free now that the états généraux have been suppressed. The Hague becomes the neutral green-room of the diplomatic struggle; it is the place where the cards are dealt, and where each tries to finish the game; a place where adversaries engaged outside in mortal struggles can meet each other freely.

—During the eighteenth century, or up to the French revolution, the international jurisprudence of Europe continues to present a system of political combinations, whose chief aim is to prevent as much as possible any threatening preponderance in the general equilibrium, unless the fortune of war or of circumstances throws one of the parties at the mercy of others. This arrangement of political affairs gave rise to a nerveless and colorless diplomacy, which pursues above everything the preservation of the status quo. But this conciliatory spirit disappears in its turn after the partition of Poland is effected, and after the revolution's success is assured. The victorious revolution dictates its treaties, the conquered are obliged to submit on account of their momentary needs. Senatus consulti, or simple manifestoes, announce to Europe what alterations are taking place in their midst. Then the Napoleonic policy arises, and treaties from the beginning of our century up to 1814 circle around it, either to strengthen it or to prepare that secret coalition which, when transformed into open resistance, created the political web of 1815. The preservation, and, when it is necessary, the alteration, of this web, was for a time the end of monarchical congresses and of ministerial conferences with their declarations and protocols, until the pentarchy was broken up by the energy of peoples and of governments jealous of their independence. The great business of European diplomacy, which only affected, sometimes in an indirect way, the public questions of the day, were in the second half of the last century the maritime rights of neutrals, and in our century at first the Napoleonic system on the continent, then the suppression of the slave trade, and finally, the commercial union of Germany, the international emancipation of trade, navigation, arts, literature and labor.

—The rough division may, therefore, be made, that, in the ancient world, treaties were usually for peace after a war, and were dictated rather than contracted; in the middle ages, treaties were often ostensibly contracted for states-manlike objects, but were never meant to be kept. "Each treaty plants the seeds of a new war." As Machiavelli says (Del Principe, 1532), "A prudent prince will not and ought not to observe his engagements when it would operate to his disadvantage, and the causes no longer exist which induced him to make them." Spinoza, another later writer, whose words, like those of Machiavelli, apply to the period we are speaking of, says very much the same. (Tract. Theol. Polit., cap. iii.) Of course these words apply to very modern times also, but in a less marked degree. Ever since the publication of the works of the early jurists, Gentilis and Grotius, the current has been setting in the other direction, and now the question rather is, how to enforce a treaty, than how to break it. The growth of the popularity of the principle of arbitration in the last ten or twenty years perhaps marks the commencement of a fourth period. (See ARBITRATION.)

—Theoretical View. For the history and discussion of the ideas and theories concerning treaties, we may refer to the works of writers on international law. Most of the questions dealt with even in so late writers as Wheaton and Lawrence are now practically settled as much as the older ones of Grotius and others, such as, whether a Christian nation can make a treaty with an infidel power. We may briefly allude to one or two questions on which different views are still sometimes expressed. Do treaties expire in case of a war or change in government in which either of the contracting parties is interested? To which the text books answer, treaties are of two kinds: 1. Transitory conventions, which are perpetual in their nature, so that, being once carried into effect, they subsist independent of any change in the sovereignty and form of government, and, although their operation may in some cases be suspended during war, they revive on the return of peace without any express stipulation. Such are cases of cession, boundary or extension of territory, or those creating a permanent servitude in favor of one nation within the territory of another. Exceptions to the latter class are such cases as a telegraph treaty, in which special war provisions are always inserted, which bind neutrals as well as belligerents, though perhaps in a different way. (Fischer's Die Telegraphic und das Völkerrecht, Leipzig, 1876.) 2. Treaties so called, or fœdera, of friendship, commerce, etc., expire of course when, first, either party loses existence as a perpetual state; second, the internal constitution is so changed as to render the treaty inapplicable, as concluded in view of a particular constitution, as when, by the French revolution, the French form of government was changed, third, war arises between the contracting parties; and fourth, by limitation of the treaty itself.

—But under whichever of these two heads the treaty falls, if, while a treaty is in force, a right vests under it, the expiration of the treaty can not extinguish that right. "The treaty had its full effect the instant a right was acquired under it; it had nothing further to perform; and its expiration or continuance afterward was unimportant." (U. S. Supreme Court, in reference to the treaty of 1800 with France.)

—Treaties are, in general, subject to very many of the rules to which contracts are subject. When a question arose between England and the United States as to the boundary line between this country and Canada, the question turning on the interpretation of certain treaties that had been entered into, England submitted to the emperor of Germany, the arbitrator, the following rules of interpretation for treaties, which are very similar to the rules of interpretation that might have been submitted in the case of a contract: 1. The words of a treaty are to be taken to be used in the sense in which they were commonly used at the time when the treaty was entered into. 2. In interpreting any expressions in a treaty, regard must be had to the context and spirit of the whole treaty. 3. The interpretation should be drawn from the connection and relation of the different parts. 4. The interpretation should be suitable to the reason of the treaty. 5. Treaties are to be interpreted in a favorable rather than an odious sense. 6. Whatever interpretation tends to change the existing state of things at the time the treaty was made, is to be ranked in the class of odious things.

—The antecedent conditions on which the validity of a treaty depends are also very much the same as in the case of a contract: the parties must be capable of contracting, the agents must be duly empowered, the object must be lawful and possible, there must be a mutual consent, etc. Another condition is often inserted in the text books, that the parties must give their consent freely, or must be so situated that the consent of both may be regarded as freely given, but it is difficult to see how this can be so.

—Another question arose especially concerning the declaration of the treaty of Paris, with respect to the effect of the flag on enemy's goods. Are, for instance, the United States bound by it? All other countries of importance have adhered to the rule there laid down, except the United States, and some foreign writers have considered the United States bound by this general uniformity of opinion. But we do not see any good reason for this view, and probably a foreign court would hesitate before applying the doctrine where an American was a party before it.

—Treaties are classified in a good many different ways. A note in Mr. Hall's book on international law (Oxford, 1880), sums up this matter briefly: "Most writers devote considerable space to a classification of treaties. Vattel, for example, divides them into equal treaties, by which 'equal, equivalent or equitably proportioned' promises are made; unequal treaties, in which the promises do not so correspond; personal treaties, which expire with the sovereign who contracts them; and real treaties, which bind the state permanently. De Martens arranges them under the heads of personal and real treaties, of equal and unequal alliances, and of transitory conventions, treaties properly so called, and mixed treaties. Of these last, the first kind, being carried out once for all, is perpetual in its effects; the duration of the second, which stipulates for the performance of successive acts, is dependent on the continued life of the state and other contingencies; and the third partakes of both characters. Heffter divides them into, 1, constitutive conventions, which have for their object either the constitution of a real right over another's property, or some obligation to give or to do or not to do something (e.g., treaties of cession, establishment of servitudes, treaties of succession); 2, regulating conventions for the political or social affairs of nations and of their governments (e.g., treaties of commerce); 3, treaties of alliance. Calvo distinguishes treaties, with reference to their form, into transitory and permanent; with reference to their nature, into personal and real; with reference to their effects, into equal and unequal, and simple and conditional; finally, with reference to their objects, into treaties of guarantee, neutrality, alliance, etc. It is not very evident in what way these and like classifications are of either theoretical or practical use." "Treaties included among those which have been supposed to express principles of law, appear to be susceptible of division into three classes: 1, those which are declaratory of law as understood by the contracting parties; 2, those which stipulate for practices which the contracting parties wish to incorporate into the usages of the law, but which they know to be outside the actual law; 3, those which are, in fact, mere bargains, in which, without any reference to legal considerations, something is bought by one party at the price of an equivalent given to the other." (Hall.)

—It has now been practically settled, that, whatever powers an agent may have been given, a treaty must be ratified by the sovereign or proper authority before it can be considered as binding. Usually the crown or supreme power of the land is the treaty-making and treaty-ratifying power, but in England especially, and to a certain extent in some other countries, any treaty involving money matters has to be passed upon by the popular assembly, and, as a general rule, where any decided step is about to be taken by treaty, the opinion of parliament is first obtained, though, perhaps, informally.

—In Sweden the king makes peace in conjunction with the senate.

—In Germany the executive has power to make war, but, when offensive, only with the consent of the bundesrath; it has power to make peace in all cases. By article 11 of the constitution (reichs-verfassung), the executive has the power to make treaties with the limitation that the consent of the legislature is necessary when the provisions refer to subjects under the power of the legislature. These are as follows: Article 4. Foreign commerce and intercourse, colonization and emigration, financial system, weights and measures, patents and copyrights, rights of assembly, post and telegraph, sanitary police, laws of contract and private law, commercial law, railroads, settlement, residence and citizenship of different states, military system. These are the powers which the different German states reserve to themselves the right to deal with, and, therefore, no treaty can be made concerning any of them without permission from the legislature.

—In France, by article 9 of the constitution (Lois Constitutionelles, July 16, 1875), the president may declare offensive war with the consent of the legislature. By article 8, the president is to negotiate and ratify treaties alone, unless they involve questions of peace, commerce, finance, status of persons and rights of property of Frenchmen in foreign countries, cession of territory by or to France; in these cases the consent of the legislature is necessary.

—In the United States the makers of the constitution tried a new method of enforcing a treaty by enacting, that all treaties should be considered as the supreme law of the land, and providing for their ratification by the senate. But another clause gives the house of representatives control over all foreign commerce and other matters often dealt with in treaties. By section 8 of article 1, of the constitution, "The congress shall have power—1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises * * *; 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes; 4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization * * *; 10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." Now, these are all of them matters also dealt with in treaties which are to be entered into and ratified (by section 2 of article 2) by the president, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." And such treaties are also, by the constitution, to have the same force and effect as if they were the supreme law of the land. The treaties on the above and other subjects often, therefore, in their provisions, come into conflict with the laws of congress, especially with those in connection with commercial subjects, which usually spring from the house of representatives, and an interesting series of questions has in consequence been brought before our courts. To take one recent case out of many. By article 4 of a treaty between the United States of America and his majesty the king of Denmark, concluded at Washington, April 26, 1826, and thereafter duly ratified and proclaimed, and renewed by article 5 of the treaty entitled "Convention between the United States of America and his Majesty the King of Denmark, for the discontinuance of the Sound Dues," concluded at Washington, April 11, 1857, and thereafter duly ratified by the senate, and proclaimed, and which is still in full force and effect, it is provided that: "No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article, the produce or manufacture of the dominions of his majesty the king of Denmark, * * than are or shall be payable on the like articles, being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country." By article 1 of the treaty entitled "Convention between the United States of America and his Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands," concluded at Washington, Jan. 30, 1875, and thereafter duly ratified and proclaimed on the part of the United States, and to carry which into effect the necessary law has been duly passed (Aug. 15, 1876) by the congress of the United States, and which is still in full force and effect, it is provided as follows: "The United States of America hereby agree to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth and manufacture, or produce, of the Hawaiian islands, into all the ports of the United States, free of duty." The schedule following said article includes: "Muscovado, brown and all other unrefined sugars," of grades therein mentioned, and all "syrups of sugar-cane, melado and molasses." Certain merchants having imported such goods from Denmark, claimed that the aforesaid articles imported were, under and by virtue of the aforesaid treaty with Denmark, entitled to be admitted into this port free from the payment of any duty whatsoever, for the reason that "like articles, being the produce or manufacture of (any) a foreign country," to wit, the Hawaiian islands, are, pursuant to the treaty with that country, admitted into all the ports of the United States free of duty. The collector of New York collected duties on the goods, and the merchants, having paid under protest, brought suit against the collector to recover the money. Judge Wallace, in the United States circuit court, decided in favor of the collector, chiefly on the ground, apparently, that congress may annul or repeal a treaty, as far as it is municipal law, provided its subject matter be, under the constitution, within the legislative jurisdiction of congress, and that in this case there had been such a repeal of the clause in question by implication, by the tariff legislation of congress. As Judge Curtis says, "If an act of congress should levy a duty upon imports, which an existing commercial treaty declares shall not be levied, so that this treaty is in conflict with the act," the later act of congress "gives the rule of decision in a judicial tribunal of the United States, in a case to which one rule or the other must be applied." This rule is well established, now, in our courts. See other cases, such as, Ropes vs. Clinch, 8 Blatchford, 304; Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall, 616; Gray vs. Clinton Bridge, Woolworth, 150.

—Take another case, one analogous to which has recently arisen: Suppose the United States, by treaty with another country, takes away from its own residents or citizens, in certain cases, some constitutional right, such as trial by jury; are the American courts in those cases estopped by the treaty from seeing that such right is not withheld from those under its jurisdiction? The other country would probably expect us to fulfill our treaty, but the courts would probably hold that even the supreme law of the land was to be governed by our constitution. These considerations lead us to the last division of our subject, the enforcement of treaties and the growth of the powers of courts of justice in that regard.

—Enforcement of Treaties. The following distinctions may perhaps be usefully made in connection with this part of the subject. After the sovereign or supreme power of a state has entered into a treaty obligation, its fulfillment or enforcement usually comes under the jurisdiction and control of the sovereign or head of the nation himself, by or with the aid of one of three powers of the land: 1, the legislature or council of state; 2, the army and navy department; or, 3, the law and courts of justice of the country. Consequently, while the different obligations of treaties are theoretically enforceable by the nation itself, they may for practical purposes be said to be under the control of one of the above mentioned departments. The executive and legislative branches have control of such clauses in treaties as deal with peace or war, cession of territory or of money, of guarantee, neutrality or intercourse. The head of the army or navy in action is almost wholly in charge of the humane and moral clauses of modern treaties, such as those which deal with aid to the wounded, etc.; and of truces and cartels, and other laws of war, and of railroad and telegraph or cable treaties, so far as the war clauses are concerned. The judicial power is responsible for the carrying out of naturalization and extradition treaties, commercial engagements, the laws of prizes, some of the effects of treaties concerning war and peace, such as the rights of seizure, embargo, blockade, etc., and the clauses of treaties which affect the rights of citizens and foreigners in their individual and private capacity.

—The distinction as to what classes of treaties come before the courts, is pointed out by the late Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Foster vs. Neilson (2 Peters, 314): "Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department, and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court. * * This seems to be the language of contracts, and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature. Until such act shall be passed, the court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject." That is, a treaty is a contract, and before the courts can accept a treaty as the supreme law of the land, for them to enforce, it must, by the action of congress, be changed from a contract into a law, unless, as another judge says, "the treaty itself gives a rule of law in respect to private rights, capable of execution without the aid of further legislation, and operating directly upon the interest which is the subject of the judicial inquiry." And if the treaty does not come within either of these rules, that must be decided by the courts, too; therefore, especially in this country, the power of the courts, whether used positively or negatively, in the enforcement of treaties and their obligations, is very great.

—In Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dallas, 199, certain Virginians owed money to some Englishmen in 1774. In 1777 the legislature passed a law to sequester British property, providing that Virginian citizens owing money to English subjects might pay the same to the Virginian government and get a discharge for their debt. The debtors in this case took advantage of this act. In 1783 a treaty was entered into between the United States and Great Britain, by the fourth clause of which it was agreed "that creditors on either side shall meet with no legal impediment to the recovery of the full value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." The supreme court held, reversing the decision of the lower court, that the treaty of the United States annulled the law of Virginia, and gave the right to the Englishmen to recover their debt.

—In the case of the United States vs. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 103, a French ship had been captured and condemned as a prize by the United States circuit court of Connecticut in 1800. A writ of error was prosecuted to the supreme court, and before the hearing a treaty was entered into between the United States and France, one of the clauses of which was to the effect that property captured and not yet definitely condemned should be mutually restored. The court held that the sentence of the circuit court was not definitive, and ordered the prize to be restored. The court said: "In mere private cases between individuals a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns, where individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import."

—Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheaton, 112, is a decision as to the effect of treaties on the title to real property, and decided, among other points, what we have already seen, that a treaty providing for the rights of subjects of one country, claiming lands by inheritance in another, is perpetual in its effect. If it expires by lapse of time, any right that has previously arisen in consequence of its existence is not extinguished by its expiration. "The treaty had its full effect the instant a right was acquired under it; it had nothing further to perform; and its expiration or continuance afterward was unimportant."

—The United States vs. Watts, 14 Federal Reporter, 130, is an extradition case, where the United States had extradited the defendant for having committed one offense, tried him for it, and then proceeded to try him for another. The court discharged the prisoner, after examining both the executive and legal authorities on the question. Mr. Hamilton Fish, the secretary of state, had contended that the receiving power has the right, if so inclined, after having tried the extradited person on the charge on which he had been surrendered, with a bona fide intent and effort to convict him on that one charge, to try him for any other offense of which he may have been guilty. (Messages and Documents, Dep. of State, May, 1876.) Lord Derby denied this, and the United States court in this case agreed with Lord Derby, saying: "It results as a necessary consequence of the duty imposed on the courts to respect and obey the stipulations of a treaty as the supreme law of the land, that they are also charged with the duty of determining its meaning and effect, and this duty they must conscientiously and fairly perform, even though the construction they feel compelled to give to it should differ from that given to it by the political branch of the government."

—The cases we have mentioned are typical instances from our reports as to how our courts have enforced various provisions of treaties, even against the apparent interests of their own country and countrymen, and many other similar cases might be cited, both from our own and from the European law reports.

—From the times of Sir Leoline Jenkins (1625-84) the English admiralty courts have been very determined, in prize cases, in seeing that justice was done in all cases where foreigners were concerned, even where the foreigners were allies of a hostile country. Sir William Scott, in maintaining, later, this tradition of his court, gave a great impetus to the enforcement of international law, especially in following and observing the treaty rights of neutral or other foreigners. We may note one instance, taken at random from the English reports, the case of The Fama, 5 Robinson, 106, which was as follows: In 1803 some goods in a ship sailing from New Orleans to Havre de Grace were seized by an English vessel, England then being at war with France. By the treaty of Idelfonso, 1796, Louisiana had been ceded to France. The New Orleans merchant claimed that the treaty was a secret treaty, and had not yet been carried into effect by the handing over of Louisiana to the French, wherefore it still remained a Spanish possession, and he should have restitution. Sir William Scott agreed to this view of the matter, and decided that the national character of a place agreed to be surrendered by treaty, but not actually transferred, continues as it was under the character of the ceding country, and ordered restitution by the English captors to the New Orleans merchant. All of which shows that the courts of law in civilized nations are the most effective enforcing agencies for treaties between nations, as for contracts between individuals, and that their jurisdiction is rapidly growing, and trenching on our next class. The next class of sanctions for treaties are those of the executive. They are to be employed where, as Livy says, "they are made by the command of the supreme power, and whereby the whole nation is made liable to the wrath of God if they infringe it." And the wrath of God or the fear of man is still about all that causes their fulfillment when either country would rather break them. The jurists of all ages have tried to find some way in which these national treaties could be enforced, and they have appealed, to a great extent in vain, to the better feelings and aspirations of monarchs and popular assemblies. The methods, other than physical force, employed by nations to enforce a treaty obligation, have been: 1. The performance, by way of ratification, of religious rites and ceremonies, or the use of threats or influence by officers of different religions. In ancient times all treaties were entered into with the most sacred religious rites, and if these or any other formalities were left out, the treaty was not considered binding. But this kind of sanction only caused an obedience to the letter of the treaty, as, to use an extreme instance, when Antiochus stipulated in a treaty to give up half his fleet to the Romans, and Labeo carried that clause into effect by sawing every ship belonging to the monarch into two. The power of religious threats in the enforcement of treaties has been best exemplified in the case of the Roman church. By the use of excommunications and interdicts that church often was able to cause international agreements to be carried into effect, when one side of those who had entered into the agreement endeavored to draw back; but the selfishness with which the church used this power, and the power it also claimed and exercised of releasing princes from treaty obligations, neutralized all the good effect on international morality it might otherwise have caused. The ratification of a treaty was a very solemn affair, transacted in some great cathedral, in the presence of all the pomp and power of the church and of the nations involved. The ambassadors who had drawn up the treaty would there in due form solemnly touch the cross, the holy evangels, and the holy letters, and swear by their honor to observe and carry out fully, really and in good faith all the articles that were contained in the treaty. (Peace of Munster, 1648.) The most modern example is perhaps the alliance between France and Switzerland in 1777, which was solemnly confirmed by the oath of the contracting parties in public in the cathedral of Solcure. The emperor of Germany was addressed always as semper Augustus; the king of France, as most Christian; the king of Spain, as most Catholic; the king of England, as defender of the faith; the king of Portugal, as most faithful; and the king of Hungary as his apostolic majesty. 2. The handing over of territory, money or hostages, as a pledge for the fulfillment of a treaty, was also a means much used in ancient times, and it was successful so far as it went. It has gradually fallen into disuse, except as regards the occupation of territory. The last occasion on which hostages were given, was at the treaty of Aix la-Chapelle, in 1748. 3. There remain the methods by which third parties are made or become responsible for the carrying out of a treaty; such as armed intervention, mediation, arbitration or guarantee. These methods, leaving arbitration out of consideration, are found to be of little use at the present time. The third country, on the one side, is likely to have the weight of any interference neutralized by a third power interfering on the other side. There are probably no countries with which the great powers of Europe have not at some time or other in their history entered into a treaty of guarantee, and most of these treaties have not expired. Lastly, we come to those conventions between nations and clauses in treaties which practically have to be left to the enforcement, if at all, of the commanders and officers of any conflicting forces. The "modern rules of war," as they are called, as relating to the treatment of the wounded and of prisoners, as to the use of railroads or telegraphs, as to truces or neutrals, and blockades or searches, must be left, in the nature of things, to the discretion and judgment of the officers who are in command at the time, and they are not only responsible to their own country but to many other countries both in indirect and direct ways. At the Brussels conference of 1874 the project of an international convention on these matters was proposed, but was not effected. The conference expressed some general views on the rules which should govern occupation of a hostile country by a military force, the treatment of prisoners, aid to the sick and wounded, etc. The presence of foreign military and press representatives with a modern army, must be noted as one of the greatest influences in matters falling under this head. There are certain treaties, however, which neither the efforts of law courts nor the commands of authorities, which are, as we have seen, the only two sanctions of treaties, can ever hope to enforce. These are treaties made by a nation with some alien and weaker nation living in its midst. From the treaties of Rome with Latium, Spain with the Moors, and Germany with the Bohemians, down to the treaties of England with Ireland or India, and the United States with the Chinese and Indians, treaties have only been used as one means of extermination and violence. Perhaps there never was a series of treaties between two peoples so systematically entered into for the purpose of breaking as those between the United States and the Indian tribes of North America. They were considered at first as independent nations capable of entering into treaties, but in 1871 congress passed an act to the effect that they were not nations capable of contracting with the United States by treaty; since then, the term convention has been used, but the name has made very little difference. The contracts have been uniformly broken. The law courts, where appealed to, have almost invariably, as far as possible, endeavored to enforce the rights of the Indians, but the jurisdiction necessary has usually in these cases been given by law to officers of the army or agents of the executive who have usually sided, either openly or through lack of positive action, with the immigrating violators of the public faith.

—A recent writer, Mr. Hall, (in his "Rights and Duties of Neutrals," p. 7), says he "does not discover any ground for the claim (of treaties) to exceptional reverence. They differ only from other evidences of national opinion in that their true character can generally be better appreciated," and he proceeds to attack them from the point of view of international law, as misleading and useless. On the other hand, other writers on international law have almost universally considered treaties as the principal "constituent part" of their subject. Possibly, as Napoleon the Great said, they are very often "Forms which, however necessary to disguise the dependence of weak states, prove, in the case of strong ones, only a desire to deceive," especially in the case of those which we have called national treaties. Whichever of these views may be correct, we have seen that treaties have always played an important part in the history of the world, and that their usefulness to the general progress of mankind has always increased more when enforced and fulfilled than when broken—Authorities. The works on INTERNATIONAL LAW are also authorities on our subject. Besides the authorities given under that head in volume II. of this work, we may add the works on International Law of Twiss, Westlake, Ward, Hall, Woolsey and Sheldon Amos. The last edition of Heffter, 1881; the Rights and Duties of Neutrals, Hall, London, 1874; the International Law article (Prof. E. Robertson) in the Encyclopædia Britannica; Mrs. Jackson's Century of Dishonor, New York, 1882; and the congressional and departmental reports of various Indian commissions on that branch of the subject; Fischer's Die Telegraphie und das Völkerrecht. Leipzig, 1876, on that branch. The following is a list of the collections of treaties which have been made: The Argument and Proceedings at the Genera Arbitration, 1873; Manning's Law of Nations, edition Sheldon Amos, London, 1875; International Commercial Law, Leone Levi, London, 1863. Also the following compilations of treaties and matters relating thereto: Calvo, Recucil des Traités; Moreuil, Recueil des Traités diplomatiques, 1853; Jean Dumont et T. Rousset, Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gensou Recueils des Traités de Paix, d'Alliance, etc.; Barbeyrac (Jean), Histoire des anciens Traités jusqu' à Charlemagne; Saint Prest (J. Y.), Histoire des Traités de Paix du 17e Siècle; Negociation sécrètes touchant la Paix de Munster et d'Osnaburg; Martens (George Frederic de) Recueil de Traités d'Alliance, de Paix, de Treue, de Neutralité, de Commerce, etc., 1761-1808; also a supplement; M. le Comte de Garden, Histoire générale des Traités de Paix; Koch, Histoire Abrégée des Traités de Paix depuis la Paix de Westphalia; Rousset, Supplement to the Corps Universel of Dumont; Wenk (F. A. G.), Coder Juris Gentium Recentissimi, Leipzig, 1781; Robinet, Dictionnaire Universel, 32 vols., 1787; Schmauss (J. J.), Corpus Juris Gentium, 1730.

EUSTACE CONWAY.

TREATIES, Fishery.

TREATIES, Fishery. At the close of the revolutionary war, in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of Sept. 3, 1783, one of the most important questions discussed had reference to a definition of the privileges of fishermen, citizens of the United States, in the waters of British North America. Their right to fish on the Grand Banks or in the gulf of St. Lawrence, or elsewhere in the open sea, could not, of course, be denied, but it was claimed that they should not fish in British waters, or land in British territory to dry or cure their catch. At that time the methods of our fishermen were different from those now in use. The resources of our own coast were little understood, and the greater part of the New England fishing fleet resorted every summer to Labrador, Newfoundland, and the gulf of St. Lawrence, where they fished near the shores, making a harbor usually every night, always in threatening weather, and curing their fish upon the rocky shores, before loading them into the vessels for final home transportation. It was therefore important that they should retain as many as possible of the privileges enjoyed by them before the outbreak of the revolution. A compromise was finally agreed upon, and by the terms of article III. of the treaty of Paris (Sept. 3, 1783), it was arranged that the people of the United States should have liberty to fish on such parts of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen could, and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of their Britannic majesties' dominions in America; and to dry and cure fish in the bays, harbors and creeks of Nova Scotia, the Magdalen islands and Labrador, so long as they were unsettled, or after their settlement if they could secure permission from the inhabitants or proprietors. By this treaty they were excluded simply from their former privilege of drying fish on the coasts of Newfoundland, Prince Edward island and Cape Breton.

—The war of 1812 suspended for a second time the privileges of our fishermen in British waters; and when the question of their readjustment was brought up, strong petitions were made by the British colonists against a renewal of the privileges of 1783.

—At the first meeting of the commissioners assembled at Ghent to draw up the articles of peace, it was announced "that the British government did not intend to grant to the United States gratuitously the privileges formerly granted * * for purposes connected with the fisheries." They argued that the claim of an immemorial and prescriptive right to these privileges was untenable, and that the rights which the inhabitants of the United States had possessed when British subjects, could not be continued to them after they had become citizens of an independent state. After much discussion the subject was dropped, and the treaty of Ghent (Dec. 24, 1814) contained no reference to the fishery question. The governors of the British colonies were now instructed to exclude our fishing vessels from their harbors and coasts, and the naval officers stationed in that district received orders to resist all encroachments. The result was the capture of several of our fishing vessels on the charge of trespassing in British waters.

—In 1818 commissioners from the two countries met in London to settle amicably disputed points in connection with the fisheries, and their deliberations resulted in the signing of the convention of Oct. 20, 1818. By the terms of the first article of the convention it was provided that subjects of the United States should have forever the right to take fish of every kind on the southern, western and northern coasts of Newfoundland, on the shores of the Magdalen islands, and on that of Labrador, from Cape Jolly northward, and to dry and cure fish in any of the bays, harbors and creeks of these regions, except the Magdalens, so long as they should remain unsettled. The United States renounced any claim of right to take, dry or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any British territory not mentioned in the specifications above. American fishermen were, however, to be admitted to all harbors for shelter, repair of damages, purchasing wood or obtaining water. In order to secure the observance of this treaty our government issued to its fishermen a notice warning them against violation of the provisions of the first article of the above mentioned convention, a copy of which was annexed to the circular.

—In 1847, in consequence of a petition addressed to the queen by the Canadian parliament, negotiations were opened for the establishment of reciprocal free trade between the United States and Canada. In exchange for reciprocity in trade with the United States in all natural productions, such as fish, wheat, timber, etc., access was offered to the fisheries of all the colonies, except Newfoundland, which refused consent. Some years were consumed in fruitless effort, and it was not until June 5, 1854, that the reciprocity treaty was signed, the senate of the United States confirming it August 3. By this treaty the fishermen of the United States gained a right to fish on all the coasts of British North America, while British fishermen gained access to the waters of the United States north of Cape May (latitude 36°); the salmon and shad fisheries were reserved for the exclusive uses of the subjects of each country; certain rivers and months of rivers, to be determined by a commission to be appointed for that purpose, were also reserved. The treaty also contained numerous provisions to secure and regulate free trade in certain articles of commerce. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years, after which it could be terminated upon a year's notice by either party. The commission to designate the places reserved to each country occupied years in deliberations, the results of which were so insignificant that they do not deserve discussion in this connection.

—The reciprocity treaty terminated March 17, 1866, in consequence of notice given by the United States, notwithstanding efforts on the part of Great Britain to secure its renewal. The provisions of the treaty of 1818 were now revived, and continued in force until 1871, a period of fifteen years, during which there were constant clashing and uncertainty. American fishermen were at once warned that their right to fish in British waters would terminate on the 17th of March 1866. It was subsequently decided, however, that during 1866 vessels from the United States should be allowed to fish in all provincial waters upon the payment of a nominal license fee to be exacted as a formal recognition of right. This privilege was continued for four years. In 1870 it was, however, discontinued, owing, it is claimed by the British government, to the failure of our fishermen to provide themselves with licenses, a claim which was to a certain extent, I have no doubt, a true one. During the year 1870 a considerable number of American fishing vessels were seized by British and provincial vessels, and forfeited.

—It now became necessary for the two governments again to meet the question squarely, and to this end was appointed the joint high commission, which met in Washington, Feb. 27-May 8, 1871, and from whose deliberations resulted the treaty of Washington. Articles XVIII. to XXV. inclusive, and XXXII. and XXXIII. of the treaty of Washington appertain to the fisheries. By the provisions of these articles citizens of the United States are allowed to take fish of every kind except shell fish along the shores of Canada, and British subjects have equal rights on the coast of the United States north of latitude 39° north, the shad, salmon and other river fisheries being excluded, and some trifling local exceptions in the treaty of 1854 being confirmed. Article XXI, provided for free trade between Canada and the United States in all fishery products save fish of inland lakes and rivers, and fish preserved in oil. It was the theory of the makers of this treaty that the United States was in all particulars the chief beneficiary, and it was consequently provided in articles XXII. and XXIII. that "inasmuch as it is asserted by the government of her Britannic majesty that the privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States are of greater value than those accorded to the subjects of her Britannic majesty," a commission should be appointed to decide upon the amount of compensation which should be paid by the government of the United States for the privileges to them accorded. The commission referred to met in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, at Halifax, N. S., and was in session from June 15 to Nov. 23, 1877. Its members were Mr. Maurice Delfosse, at that time Belgian minister at Washington, Sir Alexander T. Galt for Great Britain, and Hon. Ensign H. Kellogg for the United States. The record of its sessions may be found in 3495 printed pages of the "Documents and Proceedings of the Halifax Commission," vols. i-iii., Washington, 1878. The entire lack of reliable statistics of the fisheries was of course fatal to the cause of the United States, the great mass of irrelevant and contradictory testimony given by fishermen and others summoned before the commission being nearly equally unconvincing and confusing on each side. Canada presented the so-called "official statistics" of its fisheries printed for ten years or more in the reports of the minister of marine and fisheries: these at the time appeared valid and valuable, though the charges since published by Prof. H. Y. Hind show that their accuracy is far from being unimpeachable.140 The decision of the case rested entirely with the neutral member of the commission, Mr. Delfosse, who without doubt based his action not upon the testimony presented, nor the facts otherwise accessible to him at the time, but upon certain considerations of diplomatic expediency, based upon the previous treaty relations of Great Britain and the United States. He adjudged to Great Britain the sum of $5,500,000, to be paid by the United States in exchange for alleged privileges granted to its fishermen in British waters. This sum was paid in 1878, and the terms of the treaty having been thus fully complied with, the fishermen of the two countries entered upon a mutual participation of fishing territory for a period of twelve years.

—The only important difficulty occurring under this treaty was in January, 1878, when several Gloucester vessels, taking in cargoes of frozen herring at Fortune Bay, N. F., were attacked by the people of the vicinity, their nets cut up, and the crews driven away from the shore. This proceeding was manifestly an interference with American rights under the treaty, and the claim that local laws were being transgressed was quite untenable, such laws being annulled by the treaty. Such was the view taken by the British government, and damages to the amount of £15,000 were awarded, to be divided among the injured herring vessels, the total amount of claims being $105,305.

—The present treaty terminated July 4, 1881, and notice having been given by the United States, its provisions will be invalid after the same date in 1883, when, unless some new arrangement be made, our privileges in British waters will be limited as before, and Canadian fish will no longer pass into our markets free of duty.

—It is impossible in this place to discuss at length the advantages and disadvantages of the existing treaty. They may, however, receive passing allusion. The advantages to the United States were supposed to be twofold: 1, the right to buy bait in provincial ports; 2 participation in the inshore mackerel fishery of the gulf. The first is scarcely worth considering by treaty makers. The advantage to the bait seller is equally as great as to the buyer. Many provincial ports are dependent for livelihood upon trade with American fishing vessels, and only the most short sighted policy on the part of Canada and Newfoundland can exclude the only purchasers from their markets, for every vessel visiting one of their ports expends from $50 to $200. The second "advantage" strangely enough lost its value simultaneously with its acquisition. For half a century previous to the past decade the mackerel fleet of New England was engaged for at least half the season in fishing in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and sometimes several hundred sails at one time were in close proximity to, if not within, the three-mile line. The general adoption of the purse seine resulted in a complete revolution in the mackerel fishery, as is shown in the following table, kindly furnished by Major D. W. Low, of Gloucester:

The number of vessels and their catch in sea-packed barrels, up to 1880, is from British sources, with exception of catch of 1878 and 1879, which is from reports of Boston fish bureau; 1880 and 1881 was from United States fish commission. The vessel in the gulf in 1882 was the schooner Yankee Lass, of Boston. The market value of some of the mackerel was increased by scraping and messing them by the labor of the crews, extra labor. The cost of catching the mackerel was much greater than the price obtained, making an aggregate loss to those engaged in it.

G. BROWN GOODE.

TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES

TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES. Nov. 29, 1775, the continental congress appointed a committee of secret correspondence, charged with the duty of corresponding with the friends of the colonies in other parts of the world. March 3, 1776, this committee instructed Silas Deane to go to France, and ascertain from M. de Vergennes "whether, if the colonies should be forced to form themselves into an independent state, France would enter into any treaty or alliance with them for commerce, or defense, or both." Sept. 17, 1776, congress adopted a plan of a treaty to be proposed to the King of France. This plan embraced the following political ideas: 1. Equality with natives in the payment of duties or imposts, and the enjoyment of privileges, immunities, and exemptions in trade, navigation and commerce. This was not incorporated in any treaty actually concluded by the United States until after the peace of 1814. 2. Equality between France and the United States in colonial export duties. 3. Exemption from the droit d'aubaine. 4. That on the surrender of contraband of war by the commander of a vessel taken on the high seas in time of war, the vessel shall be allowed to proceed on its voyage. 5. That each party may capture goods the property of citizens of the other when found in enemy's ships in time of war. 6. That vessels and property rescued from pirates shall be restored. 7. That the ports of each shall be open to the prizes of the other without payment of duties, but shall not be open to the prizes of the enemies of the other. 8. That if a war breaks out, citizens of one power, residing as merchants in the dominions of the other, may have time to close their business and remove their properties. 9. The citizens of neither power can take out letters of marque against the other in time of war. 10. Citizens of each may trade with enemies of the other in time of war in articles not contraband, and free ships shall make free goods except as to articles contraband. 11. Vessels of either coming into ports of the other, and not wishing to break bulk, shall not be obliged to do so, in the absence of cause for suspicion. 12. Merchant vessels of one power on the high seas may be visited by vessels of war of the other for the purpose of examining their sea letters and passports. If these are found correct the cargoes can not be examined. The draft also contained several provisions respecting the contemplated alliance with France.

—On Feb. 6, 1778, two treaties were concluded in Paris with France: a treaty of alliance, and a treaty of amity and commerce. The treaty of alliance contained the usual provisions in regard to mutual action in time of war and in making peace, and, in article xi., a mutual territorial guarantee, which afterward became a subject of contention. France guaranteed to the United States the whole of their possessions: the United States, in return, guaranteed to France its then present possessions in America, and such as it might acquire by a treaty of peace. The treaty of amity and commerce was somewhat less liberal than that proposed by congress, and contained the most favored nation clause.

—Oct. 8, 1782, a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded with the Netherlands; April 3, 1783, a similar treaty with Sweden; Jan. 20, 1783, an armistice with Great Britain, followed on Sept. 3, 1783, by a definitive treaty of peace with that power; Dec. 10, 1785, a treaty of amity and commerce with Prussia; January, 1787, a treaty of peace and friendship with Morocco; and, Nov. 14, 1788, a consular convention with France.

—These several treaties, concluded prior to the adoption of the constitution, are remarkable for the directness and freedom from doubt with which they assume sovereign powers to be in the central government: as in 1, the restraints upon duties, charges and fees in the ports of the several states; 2, the prohibition of the exaction of the droit d'aubaine in the states; 3, the permission to aliens to own and dispose of real estate anywhere in the United States; 4, their right to reside and do business in the states on an equality with natives; 5, their right to worship after their own faith; 6, the right of foreign consuls to exercise judicial functions in the several states over the estates of their countrymen deceased; 7, their right to exercise police over vessels of their nationality in American ports, to arrest the officers and crews of the vessels, and to try and determine all disputes between them. They are also remarkable for humane provisions respecting the treatment of prisoners of war, and the exemption of women, children and non-combatants from the hardships of war, which have not yet been universally accepted.

—The treaty of peace with Great Britain recognized valuable fishing rights on the Grand Banks, in the gulf of St. Lawrence, and in the bays, harbors and creeks of Nova Scotia, the Magdalen islands and Labrador, as belonging to the citizens of the United States in common with subjects of Great Britain.

—When Washington became president, he found the northern frontier of the United States occupied by British military posts: at Detroit, at Mackinaw, at Buffalo, at Niagara, at Oswego, at Point au fer, at Dutchman's point, and even in the interior of Ohio. On the south, Spain had established a station at Natchez, and was pushing forward to Vicksburg under pretense of a treaty with Indians claimed to be independent. Both were intriguing with the Indians, evidently believing that the United States must disintegrate, and desiring, as nearest neighbors, if not next of kin, to obtain in the dissolution as much as possible. In this state of things the French revolution broke out; England took up arms against France; and Spain, on May 25, 1793, joined England. Meanwhile France, through an injudicious and irritating envoy, was making trouble for Washington, by attempting to fit out privateers for French use, and to rekindle the dormant feeling of hostility to England. In addition to a hostile occupation of our frontiers, England was seizing and confiscating our nascent commerce under pretenses that had no right but that of force. Washington was pressed to cast the fortunes of the United States on the one side or the other of the great struggle. In this emergency he sent John Jay, the chief justice of the United States, to London, as a special envoy. Nov. 19, 1794, Jay concluded the treaty which has since borne his name. It provided for the withdrawal of the British garrisons; for the settlement of some disputed points in the boundaries; for a joint commission to determine what payments should be made by the United States to Great Britain on account of the claims of British creditors; and for another joint commission to determine what payments should be made by Great Britain to the United States on account of illegal captures. It reasserted the power of the federal government over the subject of land titles in the states, made provision for consulates, contained a provision (the first one) as to the extradition of persons charged with crime, and provisions for regulating commercial intercourse. It contained no disavowal of the arbitrary principles which Great Britain had asserted, no provisions that free ships should make free goods, and it granted to Great Britain the privileges for her vessels of war and prizes which France enjoyed under the treaty of 1778. This treaty was disclosed by a senator. Its publication created an intense excitement, which lasted until the appropriations for carrying it into effect had passed a subsequent congress. I think it is the judgment of history, that, with all its shortcomings, it was a wise measure. We came out of the war of independence poor, with a great debt, with a depreciated paper currency emitted by the states and emitted by authority of Congress, with a paralyzed business, and with a narrow ribbon of population along the shores of the Atlantic, of uncongenial pursuits, with great difficulties of communication, and with no common historical traditions prior to the war. With the greatest difficulty the aversion to a stronger central government was overcome. The constitution started its operation in time of peace, among a people a large minority of whom, if not an actual majority, was averse to it. Jay's treaty secured a certainty of a longer time of peace for it to take root and grow. If we had not concluded that treaty, we might have been bound in honor to go to war with England at that time. I can not see what the result of such a war would have been: but I can see that by putting off taking part in the great struggle for eighteen years, we secured precious time for the people to become accustomed and attached to the new form of government: and on this I found my opinion that the measure, however intrinsically defective, was a wise turning point in our history.

—Partly in consequence of the conduct of Genet, partly in consequence of our refusal to abide by the guarantees of the treaty of 1778, and partly in consequence of the conclusion of Jay's treaty, a diplomatic rupture took place with France, accompanied by acts of hostility on the high seas. Congress, on July 7, 1798, enacted that the treaties and consular convention with France were no longer regarded as obligatory. This state, neither of war nor of peace, was terminated by a treaty in 1800, which was followed, in 1803, by three conventions one for the cession of Louisiana, with a provision putting the commerce of France on the footing of the most favored nation in the ceded ports; one providing for the mode of payment of 60,000,000 francs to France by the United States and one providing for the further payment by the United States of 20,000,000 francs to citizens of the United States who had claims against France. The claims excluded from participating in the division of this sum, constitute what are known as the French spoliation claims.

—These treaties were assailed at the time of their conclusion, both on account of the acquisition of Louisiana, and of their not providing for the payment of the spoliation claims. Without expressing an opinion on the latter point, on the broader question I may say that history fully justifies the wisdom of a measure acquiring for us the mouth of the Mississippi. Jay's treaty and these treaties had a marked influence on the political history of the country. They mainly contributed to wrest the federal government from the hands of those who favored the adoption of the constitution, and place it in the hands of those who opposed it. They thus converted a jealous and astute oligarchy in the south from opponents into supporters of the new form of government, and made it their interest to preserve it during the long years that they held power. When the day of change at last came, the constitution had ceased to be an experiment. It had traditions in the national heart deep enough to protect it.

—One other treaty of this period, the treaty of Oct. 27, 1795, with Spain, has survived to this time, and proved serviceable in recent political history. It contained agreements not to embargo the vessels or effects of citizens of either power in the territories of the other, and that, when arrested, persons should be prosecuted according to the ordinary forms of law, and have the right to employ agents and attorneys, and to have access to them. In the recent insurrection in Cuba, the insurgents had on their side everything to appeal to our sympathies. They were colonists, contending for self-government; humane men, contending against brute force; abolitionists, struggling against the re-establishment of slavery. Persons, said to be citizens of the United States, were seized and imprisoned without law, and denied access to counsel. Their properties were embargoed, and their incomes sequestrated. The treaty of 1795 gave us means of relief without resort to force; and afforded the government of the peninsula an opportunity of yielding to our demands without risk of revolution or of being upset. It requires but little imagination to conceive the evil effects upon the United States of a war resulting in the conquest of Cuba, and its admission into the Union subject to the conditions of the constitution as affected by article XV. of the amendments.

—The Napoleonic wars swept away all our commercial treaties, except the treaty of 1795 with Spain. The Dutch subsequently contended that the treaty of 1782 with the Netherlands survived, but the American government contended otherwise successfully. Peace was concluded with Great Britain by the treaty signed at Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814. This treaty contained provisions for settling some parts of the boundaries that were in dispute, and a declaration against the slave trade; but it was silent on the subject of impressment and change of allegiance, and of the rights in the fisheries. On the latter point, a correspondence between John Quincy Adams and Lord Bathurst ensued. The former contended that the United States received their interest in the fisheries on the division of the British empire at the peace of 1783, and, therefore, could not be deprived of it by the abrogation of all treaties caused by a war. The latter maintained that the rights of the United States depended upon the existence of the treaty, and fell with its abrogation. This view was practically maintained. The treaty was criticised because it did not contain an abandonment of the right of impressment. This could not have been obtained from Great Britain; but the right has never been enforced since the maritime successes of that war, and is now practically as dead as if it had been abandoned in the treaty. The same commissioners concluded a commercial treaty with Great Britain, which was in force four years by its terms, and was subsequently extended ten years, and then expired of its own limitation. In that treaty, it was for the first time agreed that no higher or other duties or charges should be imposed in any of the ports of the United States on vessels of another power, than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States; that the same duties should be paid on the importation into the United States of any articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of a foreign power, whether such importation should be made in vessels of the United States, or in vessels of that power, and that in all cases where drawbacks were or might be allowed upon the re-exportation of any goods, the growth, produce or manufacture of either country respectively, the amount of the drawback should be the same, whether the goods should have been imported in American vessels, or in vessels of the foreign power. These provisions have often since been inserted in treaties.

—In 1818, a convention was concluded at London for the definition and regulation of the fisheries, and also for the further settlement of disputed boundaries; and a joint occupation of the country west of the Rocky mountains was agreed to. The rights conceded to the United States fishermen by this convention are decidedly less than those conceded by the treaty of 1783, and are expressed in language which has given rise to much contention, the United States contending that it gives the right to fish within the waters of the bay of Fundy and other similar waters, and Great Britain contending otherwise. The treaty was negotiated, on the part of the United States, by two eminent diplomatists, but can not be regarded as a satisfactory solution of a question which is, in fact, difficult of solution. I shall refer later to modifications that have been made in it. The third article, which provided for the joint occupation of the territory west of the Rocky mountains, was, in 1827, extended indefinitely, with a privilege to each to give twelve months' notice of a purpose to abrogate and annul it. The United States gave this notice during President Polk's term. The two powers then concluded the treaty of June 15, 1846, adopting the 49th parallel as their line to the middle of the channel separating the continent from Vancouver's island. It is to be regretted that the Oregon boundary question became entangled in party politics. The great Irish emigration began soon after the settlement of 1846; and the discovery of gold in California carried the stream of population to the shores of the Pacific. We had everything to gain by delaying the settlement, if it was to be done by compromise, as it actually was. But while slavery existed, there was a strong interest to prevent the extension of free territory, and a settlement was forced which can not be called far-seeing or statesmanlike.

—The treaty with Spain of Feb. 22, 1819, closed a long series of diplomatic discussions relating to the boundaries between Louisiana and Florida, to condemnations of American vessels by French consuls within Spanish territories, to the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans prior to the acquisition of Louisiana, and to the fitting out, within the United States, of expeditions against Spain in aid of the revolutionary colonists. By the treaty the United States adjusted its southern boundary by the acquisition of Florida, and by an agreement as to the line from the gulf of Mexico to the Pacific; and each party made a general renunciation of claims against the other. As there was little population in Florida, and no settled institutions and form of civilization differing in spirit and in language from that prevailing in the United States, the measure was statesmanlike. It also tended to prolong the rule of the south, which eventually operated, as already explained, to increase the chances for the permanency of our institutions.

—The congress of Panama, convened on the suggestion of Bolivar, aimed to secure military, political and commercial alliances. It failed in all, partly for reasons which make all such attempts quixotic, and partly in consequence of the existence of slavery in some and not in others of the powers. An account of the treaties of the United States would be incomplete without an allusion to the failure of this the most ambitious attempt at negotiations. We did, however, conclude separate treaties of amity and commerce with most of the American states of Spanish or Portuguese origin.

—In 1817 congress framed for the first time a general navigation law, restricting importations to vessels of the United States, or to vessels of the country of the origin of the goods. We find the marks of this legislation in subsequent commercial treaties, in the provision that whatever kind of produce, manufacture or merchandise of any foreign country could be, from time to time, lawfully imported into the United States in their own vessels, might also be imported in the vessels of the other power.

—The extending commerce of the United States also induced the revival of some of the powers respecting our vessels in foreign ports, and foreign vessels in our ports, and disputes of seamen and deserters, which had been conferred upon consuls by Jefferson's convention of 1788 with France. These important provisions were for many years inserted in treaties of commerce. In 1853 Mr. Everett, as secretary of state, negotiated a purely consular convention with France; and, since then, the custom has been to treat of these subjects in special conventions.

—During the administration of Gen. Jackson great progress was made in adjusting private claims growing out of the French revolution. Claims conventions were made with Denmark, the Two Sicilies and France. This policy of solving private international questions by arbitration is well settled in the United States; and was the subject of comment in the French chamber of peers as early as 1831, when the Baron de Barante, discussing the French claims convention of 1831, said of the United States, "Lorsqu' on viole à leur égard les règles de la neutralité, ils ne font pas la guerre. * * Faire rendre justice à leurs citoyens est done un de leurs premier devoirs; et en cela, ils sont plus à imiter qu' à blâmer. De sorte que, sans éclater en hostilités, ils se plaignent, produisent patiemment leurs réclamations; et quand le jour arrive ou l' on a besoin de leur bienveillance, ou leur amitié pourrait être à rechercher, ils profitent de l'occasion, et font solder les créances privées, dont on contestait ou retardait paiement."

—During the administration of President Tyler the northeastern boundary, about which there had for many years been a dispute with Great Britain, which more than once threatened to come to blows, was finally settled by yielding to Great Britain a considerable part of the territory of the state of Maine. The same treaty introduced the policy of joint efforts for the suppression of the slave trade, and contained the only agreement which had then been made, since Jay's treaty, with any power for the surrender of persons charged with the commission of crime. Since then, extradition treaties have been made with most of the powers with which we have diplomatic relations, and the catalogue of crimes upon which the treaties operate has been much extended, as will be seen by comparing the list of crimes in article II. of the treaty of June 13, 1882, with Belgium, with that contained in article X. of the Webster-Ashburton treaty.

—During the administration of Mr. Polk two important political treaties were made. The first placed our commercial relations with China on a treaty basis, and gave us the right of exterritorial jurisdiction within defined limits. The second terminated the war with Mexico by a treaty which annexed California to the United States. The influence of the latter upon the fortunes of the country was instant and decisive. The influence of the former upon the destinies of China is beginning to be apparent.

—During the same administration the first international postal convention was concluded. As early as 1787 France invited the United States to make such a convention. In the reorganization of the government the scheme fell through, and sixty years elapsed before a postal treaty was made. In the course of another thirty years the system was vastly improved, and has become universal.

—The same administration concluded with New Grenada a treaty whereby the United States agreed to guarantee the neutrality of the isthmus of Panama, and the rights of sovereignty and property of New Grenada therein. The United States invited Great Britain in 1849 to join in this guarantee. No answer was given to the invitation; but in April of that year the treaty known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was concluded. This treaty has given rise to more questions than it contains articles. Before ratifications were exchanged, a question arose whether it should apply to the Belize. Then discussions were had about the canal to which it should apply, and at the end of two years it was settled that it should apply to the Hise grant. Then Great Britain for some years tried to evade its operation upon the Mosquito Indians. Then it had prolonged negotiations with Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras, in order to dispose of the Indians. By this time the rebellion broke out, and the interest of the United States in the question was suspended. The grant of canal franchises to the French company revived interest in it. Then the United States proposed to abrogate most of the treaty, which Great Britain declined. Then the president, in 1882, informed Great Britain, that the treaty having been made with a view to the construction of a canal under the Hise grant, and the same having become impracticable for causes for which Great Britain alone was responsible, the United States did not regard the treaty as longer binding. The policy of making this treaty has been much questioned; but it certainly dispossessed Great Britain of an important military, naval and political position on the isthmus, at a time when the relative strength of the two powers was very different from what it is now; and, as construed by the United States, it contains no continuing engagements to embarrass us. Judged by these results the measure was wise. When the question was slumbering after a rest of over twenty years, it was revived by the proposition to abrogate the treaty. In spite of the distinguished names supporting that act, I can not but regard it as unwise. The question was not at that moment what is called "a burning question"; it could have rested, perhaps, for many years, before a solution would have been necessary; and meanwhile the relative strength of the two powers was every day changing in our favor.

—In President Pierce's time the adhesion of the United States was asked to the declarations of the congress of Paris, and answer was made that the president proposed to add to the first proposition the words "And that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, unless it be contraband." This was not acceded to. When the Franco-German war broke out, the French minister notified the secretary of state that in the war France would conform to the declaration of Paris; and the German minister notified him that private property on the high seas would be exempted from seizure by vessels of war, without regard to reciprocity.

—During the same presidential term a treaty was concluded with Great Britain for reciprocity in the free admission of certain enumerated articles between the United States and what is now known as the Dominion of Canada, and for the common enjoyment of the British inland fisheries by both peoples. I can not but regard this as a wise and statesmanlike treaty, which would have led to a nearer political connection with Canada. The war, however, enabled some Canadians to show a spiteful feeling toward us, to which congress responded by the abrogation of the treaty. Since that day Canada has been drifting away from the United States in legislation and policy.

—The United States are founded upon the right of persons at their own election to abandon an old allegiance and acquire a new one. Yet this principle did not receive the formal adhesion of any other power until Feb. 22, 1868, when the naturalization treaty with the North German Union was signed. Since then, similar treaties have been entered into with Bavaria, Mexico, Baden, Würtemberg, Hesse, Belgium, Sweden and Norway, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Ecuador and Denmark. The principles recognized in these treaties are, that an agreed term of residence in the new country is necessary before the change of allegiance will be recognized by the old; and that a resumption of residence in the old country without intent to return may be taken to be an abandonment of the acquired citizenship.

—The same period saw a series of agreements made for the protection of trade marks. This arrangement has been made with Russia, Belgium, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Spain, Great Britain and Brazil.

—The close of the war left questions pending with Great Britain growing out of captures by vessels of war fitted out on British territory; and claims by Great Britain against the United States on behalf of British subjects injured in their persons or properties by the forces of the United States. There were also differences growing out of alleged interferences with the fishermen of the United States. There was, too, a difference in the construction of the treaty of 1847 for settling the northwestern boundary. That convention required the line, after leaving the mainland, to proceed to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's island, and thence southerly, through the middle of said channel and of Fuca's strait, to the Pacific ocean. There were three channels: the Rosario to the east, the Douglass in the middle, and the Canal de Haro to the west. Both parties agreed that the Douglass was not the main channel. Great Britain claimed the Rosario as that channel; the United States the Canal de Haro. The treaty concluded at Washington on May 8, 1871, was intended to determine all these questions. It provided for a tribunal of arbitration at Geneva for the settlement of the Alabama claims, and laid down three rules for the government of the tribunal, which the two powers agreed to communicate to other powers. It arranged for a claims commission to sit at Washington and decide upon the British claims. It agreed to restore the fishermen of the United States to the rights enjoyed under the abrogated reciprocity treaty, for a term of years for a limited reciprocal commercial arrangement, and the payment of a sum of money to be determined by a joint commission, to sit at Halifax. It provided for common enjoyment of the waters of the lakes and canals; and it referred the settlement of the boundary dispute to the arbitration of the emperor of Germany. In due time these questions were disposed of in the manner provided by the treaty. The decisions, so far as they were adverse to the United States, have been the subject of criticism here; and so far as they were adverse to Great Britain, of criticism there. My own judgment is, that, without dwelling upon details, the prestige and influence of the United States, and the respect in which it was held in other parts of the world, were decidedly increased by this treaty, and by the proceedings which took place under it.

—During President Hayes' term the treaty with China was modified so as to allow the United States to regulate, limit or suspend the coming of Chinese to the United States or their residence here, but not to absolutely prohibit it. Congress exercised this power to the extreme limit allowed by a liberal construction of the treaty. During the same term a convention was proclaimed which had been concluded during the presidency of Gen. Grant, providing for the establishment of an international bureau of weights and measures; and a convention was concluded with the emperor of Morocco and the principal powers of Europe for the purpose of better defining the right of protection of Christian powers in that Mussulman kingdom.

—In President Arthur's time the United States have acceded to the international convention for the amelioration of the wounded in armies in the field; and a general treaty of friendship and commerce has been concluded with Mad agascar.

—The collection of treaties made in 1873, and revised in 1876, contains, in all, 255 instruments. Twenty-nine have since been added to it. Of the whole 284 some have become entirely obsolete, others in part so, either through their own limitation, by agreement of parties, by notice given by one party to terminate, by absorption of the contracting party into another nationality, by effect of war, or by act of congress. A reference to the notes to that collection will give information in detail on these points.

—A treaty made under authority of the United States is, under the constitution, in common with laws made in pursuance of the constitution, the supreme law of the land. It is subject to the constitution, and is inoperative when conflicting with it. It overrides all state laws in conflict with it. It overrides all laws of the United States in conflict with it and anterior to it; but, within the territory of the United States, and in its operation upon officers of the United States, it is controlled by laws enacted by congress after its conclusion. For municipal purposes it ceases to be law; internationally the duty of observing it is not weakened by municipal law.

—One thing more is to be remarked. Our treaties in two languages, with powers not using the English language, have rarely been the subject of contention as to construction. On the other hand, we have made few treaties with Great Britain, with which we use the English language in common, the construction of which has not been more or less in dispute.

—During the revolution, and up to the adoption of the constitution, it was the custom to make the agreements of the United States with Indian tribes in the form of treaties. This practice was continued under the new form of government. The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among the powers which are capable of making treaties. Nevertheless, such treaties are not the treaties which form the subject of this article.

J. C. BANCROFT DAVIS.

TRENT AFFAIR

TRENT AFFAIR, The (IN U. S. HISTORY). In the autumn of 1861 the government of the confederate states (see that title) sent J. M. Mason and John Slidell as commissioners to Great Britain and France respectively. They ran the blockade to Havana, and there embarked on an English merchant steamer, the "Trent," for St. Thomas, on their way to England. About noon of Nov. 8 the vessel was stopped in the old Bahama channel by the United States steamer "San Jacinto," Capt. Wilkes, and the commissioners were taken out of her and transferred to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, as prisoners.

—Capt. Wilkes' act was warmly approved by the people of the United States; but he had nevertheless transgressed the neutral rights for which the United States had always contended, and he had undertaken to put in force the right of visitation and search which the United States had found insufferable when it was claimed by Great Britain. (See EMBARGO.) The United States government therefore disavowed his action, and surrendered the prisoners to Great Britain. There was, however, a residuum of American ill-feeling toward Great Britain because of the British government's officious preparations for an improbable war. Before giving the United States any opportunity for explanation or disavowal, the British ministry prepared troops and transportation for Canada, forbade by proclamation the exportation of arms and munitions of war, and instructed Lord Lyons, its minister at Washington, to withdraw from the United States unless the prisoners were set at liberty and an apology tendered within a time "not exceeding seven days."

—See Diplomatic Correspondence for 1861-2, and authorities under REBELLION, as 2 Draper's Civil War, 540.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

TUNGUSIC RACES.

TUNGUSIC RACES. (See TARTAR.)

TURKEY.

TURKEY. (Turkish, Dowlet el Othmanié, or Ottoman Rule, also Othmanié vilayeti, or Ottoman provinces. Ottoman Empire and Sublime Porte—sublimine portœ—are the two phrases used in treaties. Through Asia and in most Mohammedan communities, as well as through Moslem history, the Turkish dominion is El Roum and its head Sultan el Roum, in allusion to his succession to the lower Roman empire.) The term Turkey is in general limited to the territory directly occupied by the Turkish empire, a territory in which Turks constitute probably less than one-twentieth of the population, and the term Turkish empire is in general confined to the government carried on by this small fraction of the population. Under this government, a number of races preserve a distinct organization, tribal, ecclesiastical or territorial, and the territory recognized in treaties as the Turkish empire, the government carried on by the Turks and the races inhabiting Turkey, must be carefully distinguished in the study and discussion of this subject. The territory of the Turkish empire consists of the four provinces in Europe immediately subject to the porte; the organized province of eastern Roumelia, the autonomous but tributary state of Bulgaria; the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "occupied and administered" by Austria; the Asiatic provinces, including two in Arabia, directly subject to the Turkish government; the tributary principality of Samos; the autonomous administration of Crete; Cyprus, occupied, subject to fixed charges, by Great Britain; Egypt, whose relations are discussed elsewhere under that title; and the single African province directly subject to the porte, Tripoli. The extent of this territory and its population is, from the lack of statistics, extremely indefinite. The following statement can not be considered more than approximate:

Turkey in Europe:	Kil. Car.	Pop.
Immediate possessions	165,438	4,490,000
Eastern Roumelia	35,901	815,946
Bosnia and Herzegovina (occupied by Austria) Sandjak of Novi Bazar	61,065	1,158,440 168,000
Bulgaria (tributary)	63,972	1,998,983
	326,376	8,631,400
Turkey in Asia:
Immediate possessions, including Arabian provinces	1,889,055	16,182,900
Samos	468	40,089
	1,889,523	16,152,989
Turkey in Africa:
Tripoli (province)	1,033,850	1,010,000
Egypt (dependency)	2,987,000	17,577,000
	4,020,350	18,587,000
Turkish empire	6,236,250	43,391,000
Immediate possessions	3,087,850	21,633,000
Dependencies	3,148,400	21,758,000

In Europe the area, undetermined, of the sandjak of Novi Bazar, with a population of 168,000, is still under Turkish administration, although a part of Herzegovina. In Asia the only portions of Arabia under the organized control of the Turkish government are the two vilayets of Habesh, or Hedjaz and Yemen, and the Haram (sacred) containing Mecca. These contain a population of 1,296,845. In Egypt the figures given above exclude Kordofan, Darfur and several provinces in the Soudan having a territory of 1,000,000 square miles, and a population of 10,800,000, whose successful revolt in 1883 renders their distant connection with the empire doubtful. Servia (48,950 kil. car; and 700,211 pop.) and Montenegro (9,030 kil. car.; 236,000 pop.) were dependencies up to the treaty of Berlin.

—The boundaries of Turkish territory, exclusive of appanages, are the product neither of geographical lines nor ethnical divisions; but of a long series of treaties, of which the last and most important is the treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878. Under this treaty the northern boundary of European Turkey still includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, with the exception of the sandjak of Novi Bazar, are for all practical purposes Austrian. Serbia next bounds Turkey to the Danube, and the space between this river and the Balkans is occupied by the tributary state of Bulgaria, with the exception of the Dobrudja and the additional territory lying north of a line drawn from Silestria on the Danube to the Black sea, south of Mangolia. The Black sea, the Bosphorus, the sea of Marmora, and the Hellespont and the Ægean, constitute the remaining boundaries of Turkey in Europe until Greece is reached. The present boundary between the two countries was determined by an international boundary commission acting under the Berlin treaty, but following the line determined upon at the Constantinople conference in 1881. Instead of the original line from the month of the Kalamas to that of the Salymbria river, the new boundary, which ceded 265 geographical miles, or two-thirds the area under the original award, starts from Kara Derwent, on the gulf of Salonica, follows the southern ridge of the Olympus, passes south of Messova, and reaches the Adriatic by crossing the valley of the Arta, of which Greece receives two-thirds. The Adriatic forms the western boundary of Turkey, except where the Berlin treaty gave Montenegro (Czernagora) an approach to the sea by ceding Antivari. The 1,814 square miles constituting the previous area of Montenegro were also enlarged by adding from Herzegovina the districts of Banzani, Rudine, Nicsic, Duga, Piva, Drobuzak, Yezera, Kolashin and Saranci, 1,167 square miles, and from Albania, Spuz, Podgoritza, Zablyak, Plava Gusigne, Antivari and Krazina 661 square miles; in all, 1,828. Turkey in Asia has natural sea boundaries on the north and west, while Arabia in a sense bounds it on the south. Its eastern boundary begins, under the Berlin treaty, at Makialos, on the Black sea, and, running southeast in an irregular line, rejoins the old boundary just beyond Kaghizemann. This cession to Russia included Batoum, Kars and Ardahan, of which the last is the only place with a population of 5,000. An additional tract one-third as large, including Bajazet, ceded by the treaty of San Stefano, was retained by Turkey, its possession greatly improving its strategic line about the headwaters of the Euphrates. At the same time the new boundary between Turkey and Persia, by ceding to the former the town of Kotovi, gave a Russian ally control of the head waters of the Araxes. The Turkish sovereignty over Arabia is practically limited to Mecca, Medina, their port Jiddah and Yemen, a large tract in the interior extending to the Persian gulf being under independent control, while the desert region between Arabia proper, Syria and Mesopotamia, maintains a precarious independence. Turkish authority is also limited in Armenia, where the powers have a treaty right of interference; in the pashalic of Lebanon, a tract eighty-seven miles long, which can only be governed by the porte through a Christian pasha, satisfactory to the powers supporting the French occupation in 1861; in eastern Roumelia an autonomous province south of the Balkans, also governed by a Christian pasha; in Samos, an independent tributary principality; in Crete, an autonomous province; in Cyprus, under British control; and, as already mentioned, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These limitations sufficiently indicate the intricate nature of the sovereignty enjoyed by the sultan, whose character is more clearly conveyed by the indefinite native term "Ottoman Rule" than by any exact term.

—The ethnical character of the Turkish empire is the result of successive conquests, which have associated widely different races without uniting them in a common political society, or amalgamating them by ties of blood and intermarriage; a circumstance which explains much in the arrested development of Turkey. The European territory of the empire is inhabited by Indo-Europeans, Slaves and Greeks, with (probable) remnants of aboriginal tribes in Albania. The islands of the Ægean, Asia Minor, and the mountains which connect its central plateau with the Caucasus, are, in the main, inhabited by Indo-European races, Greek, Armenian and Kourdish succeeding each other from west to east. Syria and the great plain to the east is, in general, inhabited by races Semitic in origin, whose blood grows purer toward the south. The one notable exception is in Irak-Arabia, the borderland between Persia and the southeastern extremity of Mesopotamia, where a strong Indo-European element appears. Scattered over this entire area, but growing infrequent in the south and rarely occurring in European Turkey, are nomadic Tatar tribes still living in the black tents of the steppes. The government of the realm is in the hands of a comparatively small body of "Turks," the descendants of the original Tatar invaders, of prominent and leading families, which adopted the religion of, and were incorporated with, the conquerors, at varying intervals during the 700 years ending with the eighteenth century, and of the constant accessions to this ruling class from captives in war, or the steady draft made for 500 years (1300-1800) on the male children of subject races. The Moslem and Christian creeds have maintained one great division in the empire, language has done more, and the great difficulties of communication have maintained separate and distinct some populations almost pure in race and blood. But these influences have all been so modified by time and conquest, the great solvents of race, that a complete change in character without an alteration in form has often taken place, not unlike that occurring in a pseudomorphic crystal. A "Turk" may be one or two generations removed from a pure Hellenic descent, a "Greek" have none but Slave blood in his veins, and a "Bulgarian" be the descendant of a peasant proprietor of the Roman period.

—Statistics in regard to racial and religious divisions in the empire are mere estimates. It is probable that about one-third of the population of European Turkey is Mohammedan, most estimates agreeing at this point. In Asiatic Turkey the Mohammedan population constitutes the larger portion; but the usual estimate which gives it seven-eighths of the total is an exaggeration. Over thirty years ago Ubicini, who placed the total population 50 per cent. too high, gave the number of Armenians at 2,400,000, Greeks 2,000,000, Kurds 1,000,000, Slaves 6,500,000, and Arabs 900,000; while frequently quoted, these figures are mere approximations. If the term Ottoman or Turk is limited to the ruling class, the Turks constitute an extremely small fraction of the whole. If it is extended to the large Turkish-speaking population of Asia Minor and Armenia, and the smaller fraction using the same language in European Turkey, it includes nearly all the Moslem population in these divisions of the empire. But, while Turkish came to be the Mohammedan tongue in the region long occupied by the Seljuks, and first conquered by the Turkish sultans, the line of the caliphate dominion can still be traced by the prevalence of Arabic as the Moslem tongue among the races, chiefly Semitic, south of the Taurus, which checked the Arab advance. Greek is the familiar tongue of the seacoast of Asia Minor, which remained in Byzantine hands long after the interior was occupied by Turkish. In European Turkey, Greek and Greeks are superseded in the interior by Bulgarian. Eastern Roumelia, lying south of the Balkans, has 573,560 Bulgarians, 174,700 Turks, 42,659 Greeks, 19,549 Gypsies, 4,177 Armenians and 1,306 Jews. In Thrace and Macedonia this proportion would be reversed. The Armenians and Kurds, comparatively recent Turkish conquests, indicate the purity of their stock by the use of their own language. The empire contains, besides the races already named, in Europe, Albanians (Skipetars), Zingari, a mixed Slave-Greek race, and small settlements of Ukraine Tatars and Circassians. In Asia, besides the leading races of Ottomans, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks and Kurds, there are Druses and Maronites in Mount Lebanon, Yezidis, the fire-worshipers of Mesopotamia, and large wandering Turkoman tribes on the plateau of Asia Minor, to which the Circassian immigration of recent years has added a new element. While modern Turkish law affects to regard all these races as Ottoman subjects, each has retained its individuality, the larger divisions manage their own internal affairs, and scattered communities and districts maintain a separate existence of their own.

—Over this diversified territory and these still more heterogeneous races, the Turkish government is superimposed, obtaining its original authority by conquest and the high administrative ability of early sultans. This power has been retained in the lack of any subject peoples equal alone to rebellion, and through the early policy which early incorporated the natural leaders of the local races among the conquerors. Historically the successor of the Parthian empire, like it the result of an invasion from central Asia, and more successful in organizing an army than in civil sway, the Turkish rule leaves behind it no civil monuments but buildings constructed by Greek and Semitic architects. The circumstance that the Turkish invaders adopted the Mohammedan religion has profoundly influenced the policy of the empire; but it has no more changed the character of its rule than the like adoption of the local cult of China has altered the essential character of the Machu conquest, or left it other than an invasion encamped in a palace. Politically the empire of the sultan is divided, in part by geographical conditions, and in part by race and language, into certain grand divisions, accepted in discussions of the eastern question, and familiar in its diplomatic correspondence; but these divisions are undefined and have no administrative significance. Turkey in Europe is divided in its eastern half by the Balkans into Bulgaria and Roumelia, the latter having an eastern and western division, and covering, in the extension given it by Turkey and the treaty of San Stefano, Thrace and Macedonia. Albania occupies the remainder of European Turkey. Asiatic Turkey is divided, after the same loose fashion, into Anatolia, or Asia Minor, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and the triangular plain between, usually assigned to Arabia on maps, but in all senses part of the empire. These divisions, used much more frequently in foreign discussion of the empire than its actual divisions, correspond very closely in use to the "north," "south," "Pacific slope," "west," "northwest," as employed in the United States; convenient but by no means exclusive, and often misleading, divisions. The only territorial divisions having a political and administrative significance, are vilayets, provinces or governments general, closely analogous to the French department, and governed by a wall; sandjaks, arrondissements governed by mutessarifs; kayas, cantons, governed by karmakaurs; nahiés, townships, towns or communes, governed by mudirs; and lastly villages, which in European Turkey have as their head a kodja bashi, and in Asiatic Turkey a kahya, usually of local selection.

—Of these divisions the vilayet is the successor of the Byzantine thema, whose boundaries many existing vilayets follow, and the sandjak is generally the representative of one of the ancient military fiefs, which, under the earlier sultans, were ruled by a semi-independent and hereditary bey, who furnished a contingent of troops, generally horse. Shortly after the conquest of Constantinople, the Byzantine province was adopted as the new, unit of administration, the sandjaks being grouped for this purpose under the government of a wali, or prefect, as the word is used in Arabic history. The practical result of this difference between the origin of these two divisions, is, that the vilayet is often bounded by an artificial or official line, while the sandjak, particularly in European Turkey and in the mountainous regions of Asiatic Turkey, represents a natural and historical division of territory. The sandjaks of European Turkey, whose arrangement in vilayets has not been permanent since the treaty of Berlin, are Monastir Korytya, Prisrend, Urhkul and Debra in the vilayet of Monastir, Jannina, Prevesa, Argyro Kastro Berat and Trikala, the vilayet of Jannina; Salonica Seres and Drama, vilayet of Salonica, Adrianople, Rodosto and Gallipoli, vilayet of Adrianople. The old sandjaks of Phillipopolis and Slivno constitute eastern Roumelia and Rutschuk, Tultiha, Varna, Tirnova and Widdin, Bulgaria. Novi Bazar and Scutari are sandjaks under a separate administration. The vilayets of Asiatic Turkey, nineteen in number, have remained unchanged through a long period. Constantinople, rather a metropolitan district than a vilayet; Brusa; Aidin; Kastamuni (Paphlagonia); Angora (Bozok); Konieh (Iconium), or Karamania; Adana (Cilicia); Sivas (Cappadocia); and Trebizond (Pontus and Colchis); make up Asia Minor. Erzerum and Kharput cover Armenia and part of Kurdistan. Part of the latter is to be found in the vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul. Mosul also extends into Mesopotamia, whose southern portion is the vilayet of Baghdad. Syria is divided into Aleppo and Syria proper, with its capital at Damascus. The islands of the Ægean and Rhodes make a separate vilayet, as did Cyprus. Crete ranks as a European vilayet. The two Arabian vilayets are Hedjaz and Yemen, or Habesh, and Hedjer, or the Haram. Tripoli is also a vilayet. In the above summary, the classical division corresponding most closely to the vilayet is given. These administrative divisions originated, however, like the entire framework of Turkish administration, in the Byzantine empire. The Byzantine thema and vilayet are substantially the same unit, and their respective boundaries closely correspond. Asiatic Constantinople corresponds to thema Optimaton, with its eastern end curtailed by early Turkish conquest; thema Opsikion is Brusa; Aidin, thema Thrakesian, the Turkish administration still preserving the division which consigned a part of the seacoast to the same government as the adjacent islands. Themata Anatolikon and Kibyrrhaioton are substantially Konieh, Seljuk conquests having extended the original coast line of the southern province and including Lake Tchölli on the northeast. Adana differs little from thema Seleukeias. Various causes have united to modify the Euxine provinces, and their relation to the Byzantine divisions is less apparent. The short-lived empire of Trebizond determined the littoral vilayet of that name, and Kastamumi, Angora and Sivas are the survivals of independent sultanates, as are in all probability Kharput, Erzerum and Diarbekir. South of this point the administrative divisions of the caliphate exercise their influence on the political geography of Turkey.

—Government. The Turkish government is an absolute despotism, tempered by the democratic equality of Moslem law. A standing army, a most unusual resource in oriental history, has supported it from an early period. Its administration has followed Byzantine models, and the loose character of its conquest led to the large grant and exercise of local government and administration among subject races. Only within a recent period has an organized bureaucracy been attempted, and with but partial success. The adoption by a Tartar conquest of the forms of a Semitic caliphate, modified by European (Roman and modern) administration, fills the political forms of the Turkish rule with contradictions which render a coherent statement difficult.

—The three strands of Turkish administration, civil (legislative, judicial and administrative), military and religious, all run back to the sultan, whose titles sufficiently express his relation to each. As "Caliph of the Prophet of God" and "Emir el Moumenien," (Commander of the Faithful), he is the spiritual head and military commander of Moslems. In one capacity he has the right to interpret the Koran and Moslem traditions, and is hence at the head of Moslem law. In the other he has a claim upon the military service of Moslems, two capacities further supported by the fact that he is "Guardian of the Sacred Places," not de jure but de facto, and is hence employing his spiritual and temporal powers in protecting Moslem rites. This control in addition gives him a predominant influence over the three chief sources of Moslem doctrine, in the sheriff of Mecca; the sheikh-ul-islam at Constantinople, his spiritual deputy; and the mosque of Akkbar at Cairo. The reigning prince of the house of Othman is, in addition, in his own right, "Khan," that is, prince of his tribe; "Sultan of Sultans," and "Ruler of the Two seas and Two lands which make up the Ottoman realm, by the right of the sword." In theory, therefore, the sultan is the prescriptive head of his Moslem subjects under Moslem law, and the absolute ruler and conqueror of other races in his dominions. Nor, however modified by treaties or obscured by European administration, does this distinction ever altogether disappear.

—Legislative authority vests absolutely in the sovereign as caliph and sultan, spiritual and temporal prince. Turkish law itself is divided into two great divisions, the sheriaàt, or spiritual law, and the kanouni (rules), or temporal law. The former is derived from the Koran, the traditions of the prophet, and the decisions of his immediate successors. In theory, this law is fixed and immutable; but, as the only supreme authority in its interpretation is the spiritual deputy of the sultan, and ten centuries have accumulated in addition contradictory rescripts, or fetvahs, the sheriaàt can be accommodated in practice to any exigency. Stare decisis is, however, imbedded in Turkish law in the phrase "The gates are here closed," and Turkish, like all Moslem jurisprudence, is full of instances of judicial resistance to an absolute monarch. The kanouni is the act of the prince proprio motu, like the constitutions of civil law, after which it is modeled, and from which it is directly derived. Codified by Ibrahim Halebi (of Aleppo), under the reign of Solyman I., the multequa bears at every turn the influence of the Justinian code, and is a laborious attempt to unite in one the civil legislation and judicial decisions of the Moslem law. It remains the final authority in Turkish courts, but has been modified by the Hatti Sherif of Gulhaneh (Nov. 3, 1839), in which the Sultan Abdul Medjid declared equal rights; Hatti Humazoun, 1836, in which religious liberty was enacted; a penal code, 1840; a commercial code, copied from the French, 1840, etc. In the contradictory progress of recent years, these have been greatly multiplied by a maze of decrees. Besides the Moslem law, the subject races are, for many purposes—marriage, divorce, legacies, larcenies, lesser offenses, and cases relating to ecclesiastical benefices and succession—under their own canon law. The principle of exterritoriality extends over foreigners resident in Turkey, the jurisdiction of consular courts; each administering the municipal law of its origin.

—The sheikh-ul-islam is the ultimate judicial authority of the empire, his fetvah, in the form of an answer to a case stated, deciding all administrative and judicial issues. The ancient courts of the empire (sheri courts) consist of the high court of appeal (aryodaci), divided into two chambers (soudours), presided over by the cadi-asker of Roumelia, or European Turkey, and the cadi-asker of Anatolia, or Asiatic Turkey, each having the jurisdiction indicated. Subordinate courts exist for each of the mevlievets, or grand judicial districts, which include several kayas. These judicial divisions do not correspond with the vilayet and sandjak, being less in number and differently arranged. Constantinople and Mecca are the first two, and the other divisions of the empire are arranged in three classes. The organization of the three series of courts is the same, consisting of a cadi, judge, varying in rank, but always a mollah who pronounces the decision; a mufti, who expounds the law; naibs, or deputies; and kiatibs, or notaries. Appointments to all judicial positions are annual. revocable, and divided according to rank between the sultan, sheikh-ul-islam, cadi-askers and lower judges. The distinction between civil and criminal law is not observed in the courts; corruption exists in all, and the practice is of the loosest description. Judicial positions are filled from the ulema, or learned men, graduates of schools (medrerrehs) connected with the mosques. Judicial salaries are paid out of a tax on suits. "Mixed" civil and penal tribunals for the trial of cases between Ottoman subjects and foreigners, and between Moslems and Christians, exist in the capital and seaports on the French model, with a court of cassation (Mekheméh e Temyzi) at Constantinople.

—In the civil administration of the empire the sultan is the final source of authority and appointment, acting through his personal representative, the grand vizier, an office abolished during the brief period of constitutional reform under Midhat Pasha, but restored, with some loss of position, on the abolition of the paper constitution of 1878. An elaborate administrative organization on European models succeeding in some instances to analogous departments under the old régime, furnishes ministries of foreign affairs, war, marine, artillery, interior affairs, justice, finances, commerce and agriculture, public instruction, religious tenets, public works. Of these, the foreign affairs corresponds to the reis effendi of earlier history, the subordinate title indicating the superior position in all foreign relations claimed by the sublime porte up to a very recent period, while the circumstance that the "dragoman," or interpreter of the ministry, fills as important a position in practical negotiations as the minister, in its way illustrates the long period in which the Turkish government refused the use of any language but its own in diplomatic negotiations. The minister of war is the successor of the seraskier, whose office, while distinct, in warlike reigns was always held by the grand vizier. The minister of marine succeeds the capitan pasha, a title by a familiar blunder often appearing in European history as a name. The minister of artillery remains the solitary survival of the ancient superiority of Turkey in this weapon. The other ministries are of European origin, with the exception of the religious tenets, organized as one of the reforms of Mahmoud II. The ministries holding these portfolios are organized on the French model in a council of state, or "divan," under the presidency of the sultan, or of a special minister appointed for the purpose. There is, besides, a privy council and a "senate," the successor of the old imperial "Medjliss," in which the subject races were and are represented, membership in which it would be difficult to define; but both the vizier, the sheikh-ul-islam and the leading pashas, with the heads of the six nations, sit in it. The remaining organization of the government needs no remark save that the polyglot character of the empire has given a disproportionate importance to the bureau of rescripts and translation, the calamizeh, and it has for fifty years furnished the ablest Ottoman administrators the few among their number enjoying special training. High appointments have, from time immemorial, been made from among the personal attendants of the sultan and the pashas, caprice governing the selection.

—Provincial administration in vilayets is committed to the wali, assisted by a defterdar, book-keeper, who has charge of the finances, a mektoubji, secretary, and subordinate officers. A local medjliss (council), including these officers, local dignitaries, the heads of the local Christian communities, and others, sits in each vilayet, and constitutes a popular body, whose influence varies with the vigor of the imperial administrator. The sandjak and kaya are each similarly organized. The governor of a vilayet is always, and the head of a sandjak is generally, known as a pasha. Down to mudirs, administrative officers are non-residents, and always Moslems, save where treaty regulations require Christian appointees in Lebanon and eastern Roumelia. Remnants of local self-government exist everywhere in the medjliss, the organization of villages, the management of internal affairs by particular wards or districts, many of the latter having enjoyed a rude autonomy from immemorial times. Trade-guilds, esnafs, in every city settle disputes and regulate trade customs, practically administering a very considerable body of commercial law.

—Autonomous institutions, civil and ecclesiastical, are allowed to each Christian sect, and the Israelites. Turkish administration recognizes seven "nations" (milleti) or communities: the Greek, Armenian, Uniate Armenians, Latin (Catholic), Protestant, Bulgarian and Israelite. The first of these communities was organized by the berat, or writ of investiture, granted the Greek patriarch of Constantinople by Mahmoud II., in 1453. In 1875 the Bulgarian church, previously a part of the Greek church, was organized under an exarch. The Greek, Bulgarian and Armenian are national churches. The Uniate Armenians are a small body united in faith to the Roman Catholic church. The Latin church, besides lesser bodies, includes the Maronites of Lebanon and the Chaldeans of Gebel Tour and Mesopotamia. The Jacobite or Syrian church in the latter region has also of late years received civil recognition. Besides being ecclesiastical bodies, these sects all constitute civil corporations whose head is the spiritual primate only in the case of the Greek church and Uniate Armenians. The Protestants have a civil head, the Jews are represented by a chief rabbi, and the civil representative of the rest is the archbishop, resident at the metropolis, who in the Armenian church is also a patriarch. Each of these sects is organized for civil purposes, with a synod at the capital, and is divided into dioceses and parishes. Its authorities collect the capitation or military exemption tax (kharadj), and certain traditional dues for their own maintenance. Their courts regulate subjects usually under the jurisdiction of canon law, inflict punishments for petty offenses, and once settled all civil cases to which suitors of the same faith were parties. Where a village or town is composed of a single sect, the larger share of internal administration falls to the hands of its authorities. The Protestant communities scattered over Turkey, the fruit of American missionary labor, are organized as democracies, with annual meetings for the election of officers.

—Independent of all other branches of the government stands the seraglio, a state, not a domestic, institution, not merely the residence or the family of the sultan, for the Turkish empire has had no ruling family in the European sense, but the imperial household. Unlike most Moslem sovereigns, the early Turkish sultans recognized no distinction as wives and concubines between the women of their harem. The harem thus formed, probably a survival of ancient tribal practice, was reorganized after the conquest of Constantinople, under Byzantine influence. Its body-guard was uniformed in a dress copied from the Varangar garb, its chief posts were given to eunuchs, who first become conspicuous in Turkish affairs after this date, and the sacrosanct character of the Moslem harem received the protection of an elaborate and minute organization and ceremonial foreign to oriental ideas, but which has had an extraordinary power in consolidating and rendering permanent in influence palace intrigue. In the seraglio, the mother of the sultan, validè sultana, has taken the place of the empress in Byzantine history. Its chief functionary is the kislar agha, chief of eunuchs, an officer whose personal relations with the sultan give him a rank next after the grand vizier, and an influence often transcending his. The commander of the household troops is generally the commander-in-chief of the army. Moslem succession and inheritance passing the oldest male of the family, collateral branches were in the earlier history of the reigning family carefully eliminated, thus keeping the succession in the direct line. During the last fifty years, this practice has been abandoned, and the succession has passed from brother to brother and uncle to nephew, while collateral lines begin to appear. The khans of Crimean Tartary, now the Russian Crimea, claim a descent from Othman, and are the only cadet branch of the royal family. The women of the seraglio during the last three centuries have been recruited from Circassian tribes, which have furnished the other leading harems of the capital. This circumstance has united the seraglio and the other great households in a web of feminine kindred, acquaintance and intrigue, often overlooked by the foreign observer, but deeply influencing the daily current of affairs.

—Finance. The Turkish fisc has never lost the stamp of conquest. An oppressive octroi, imposed on all the traffic of walled cities, supports the charges of local government. Its rates vary, its amount is unknown; and while it is collected by imperial officers, the receipts are absorbed and expended in each province. The imperial government levies a kharadj, the capitation tax, on all Christian males for exemption from military service; tithes on all produce; the verghi, a tribute or tax on produce or receipts, a quasi income tax; sheep tax; a tobacco segie, salt, stamp, excise, fisheries, registration, forests, with a large number of lesser taxes. Of these taxes the first three are early Moslem taxes, and the sheep tax is probably the survival of a tax levied by the khan in the pastoral stage of the tribes by which the empire was founded. It is still levied in theory, not as a tax on the sheep, but as rental for pasturage. The kharadj existed unchanged in name and character under the caliphate. Its average in 1883 was twenty-eight piasters, the levy per head varying from fifteen to sixty piasters. Collected at times by Turkish officers, koldjis, and again by the heads of subject communities, in 1834 and 1850 the duty of collecting this tax was, after a rude census, definitely made over to the authorities of each "nation." The verghi appears to be derived from the inscribed tribute levied on conquered provinces by the caliphs, and is a tax on the income from real and personal property, varying greatly in amount in different provinces, and often falls upon property from which tithes are also collected. The tithes are a tenth in kind of all produce, collectible before a sale can be effected by the peasant or proprietor. By a privilege conferred by Constantine, confirmed by Mahmoud II., but in recent times modified, the inhabitants of the capital are free from taxation. Imperial taxes were farmed under the Byzantine government, and the practice was continued by the Turkish conquerors. In 1695, Mustafa II. extended the annual leases of the revenue to life grants. In the last fifty years the Turkish government has repeatedly assumed the immediate collection of its revenues, and as regularly let them again to meet present necessities, past extravagance, or to secure loans.

—Expenditure, receipts and indebtedness are alike vague in Turkish finance. The unit of account is the piaster (4.4 cents, or 22½ centimes), a coin originally of the value of the Spanish dollar, which 200 years of depreciation have reduced to its present value. The Turkish lira, or pound (£T=100 piasters) is the usual unit in debt statements. At the opening of the Crimean war, the revenue of the empire, for a number of years, had fluctuated from £T6,500,000 to £T7,500,000. The expenditure, from this period until the financial collapse of the empire in 1874-5, was all of the revenue and as much more as could be raised by loans and the issue of a paper currency. At this time the nominal receipts were £T22,552,200, and the expenditure £T23,143,276, deficit £T591,076. The actual average receipts, 1872-6, were £T18,190,000. The paper budgets for 1880-81 (1295-6, H.) give the receipts as 1,615,584,000 piasters; expenditures, 1,914,876,359; deficit, 299,292,359 piasters. The items are as follows:

RECEIPTS.	Piasters.
Land revenue tax	225,000,000
Exemptions from military service	46,000,000
Tithes	500,000,000
Customs	180,000,000
Sheep tax	165,000,000
Tobacco	100,000,000
Various receipts	96,993,000
Real estate	5,200,000
Forests	6,070,000
Salt works and mines	72,309,000
Post	6,300,000
Telegraphs	15,700,000
Receipts from ministry of marine	36,505,000
Receipts from ministry of war	28,500,000
Ordnance	4,000,000
Sanitary administration	5,135,000
Tribute from Egypt	76,500,000
Tribute from Eastern Roumelia	24,000,000
Other tributes	13,372,000
Various products	8,991,000
Total Receipts	1,615,584,000

EXPENDITURES.	Piasters.
Foreign debt	209,647,961
Domestic debt	39,312,441
Floating debt	241,863,946
Civil list appanage	86,497,324
Senate	2,406,019
Chamber of deputies	6,593,981
Council of state	1,880,400
Audit office	1,066,640
Prime minister and his personal accounts	2,291,364
Judicial	15,081,848
Restitutions	575,000
Administration	52,704,152
Prisons	8,780,680
Post and Telegraphs	24,959,098
Various expenses	619,300
Ministry of foreign affairs	19,810,232
Ministry of justice	32,809,850
Ministry of public instruction	8,100,093
Ministry of public works	10,330,004
Ministry of commerce and agriculture	15,163,720
Administration	25,212,359
Indirect contributions	36,631,640
Verghi	21,718,702
Sheep tithes and taxes	49,638,016
Ministry of war	536,304,944
Ministry of marine	81,154,650
Grand master of artillery	86,144,487
Religions endowments	33,573,414
Pensions and reliefs	52,552,851
	1,703,915,116
Extraordinary expenses	210,961,243
Total Expenditures	1,914,876,359

Turkish budgets are, however, the vaguest approximations. The territory ceded in 1878 and 1881 returned 13 per cent. of the revenue of the empire. The rest has been greatly disorganized, and its revenue can not be placed at over £T16,313,006. Of this the tributes return (omitting Bulgaria) £T1,143,720, the six revenues ceded the bondholders, tobacco, salt, stamps, excise, fisheries and silk, £T1,983,416; and customs, £T1,992,800. The other leading items are: tithes, £T5,000,000; verghi, £T2,250,000; sheep, £T1,650,000; kharadj, £T460,000. Of the expenditures one-third has for some years gone to the army, the only branch of the government whose claims receive even partial attention. The "civil list," which is little more than the sultan's personal expenditure through the seraglio and other channels, has for years been from $3,000,000 to $4,000,000.

—The Turkish debt shares the uncertainties of all Turkish finance. The standing army, organized by Mahmoud II. at the opening of the century, enabled the government to collect taxes in all parts of the empire, and greatly increased the revenues. This met the enlarged expense of European reforms in the army; but at the opening of the Crimean war foreign loans began, and by 1875 these had reached a nominal capital of £240,000,000. Fourteen issues were made in this period, beginning at 80 and ending at 43½. One of £5,000,000 in 1855 was secured by the guarantee of France and England, and the tribute from Cyprus has been sequestered for its benefit by Great Britain, while the first, for £3,000,000, was secured by the Egyptian tribute, whose balance went to the loan of 1855. During the thirty years in which Turkey paid its interest, every conceivable expenditure was met by issuing current obligations; these were regularly consolidated, a foreign loan obtained at usurious rates, and the old process resumed. At home, forced loans in the shape of irredeemable paper money (caimés) were also raised. In 1875 the empire announced that for five years the interest would be paid, half in cash and half in 5 per cent. bonds. Interest ceased altogether before this period was over, and Turkey remained among the defaulting states until the iradé of Dec. 20, 1881, reduced the debt from a nominal capital of £252,801,885 to £106,437,234, and the interest to 4 per cent. Up to August, 1883, £63,149,663 of the consolidated debt had been reissued. The Turkish government proved reasonably faithful to its share of the agreement, but Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece have failed to contribute to the share of the debt allotted to them. The revenues set apart to meet debt obligations yielded £T2,283,624 during the first fourteen months, Jan. 1, 1882-Feb. 28, 1883. Meanwhile the Turkish government has continued to add to its floating obligations, which, in August, 1883, were £T28,000,000. This is certain to precipitate another collapse, as the annual deficit is not less than £T7,000,000.

—Land Tenure. The fee under Moslem law vests in the state. Upon conquest, believers, i.e., converts to Islam, are allowed to retain occupancy of their lands (known as tithable) upon payment of a tenth of the produce; non-believers pay a tribute tax levied either on the soil or on the produce, and when originally inscribed varying from one-half to one-eighth. Lands held under these tenures have steadily diminished in amount, and constitute the only freehold estates known. They are divided into two classes, according to the character of the fee, whether complete (mulk) or charged with various burdens (memluk), and pay a tax on transfer or succession. Besides city freeholds, large estates of agricultural lands granted for special services or held by descent from local over-lords belong to this class. A third class of free-hold (mehkemé) arose apparently from judicial sequestration. This can be mortgaged by two witnesses, the other freehold only by registry. Waste lands revert to the state, and lands belonging to religious foundations, or devoted to civil uses, aqueducts, bridges, etc., pay no tithes. The first circumstance has resulted in the ownership of large tracts by the state, and the second in the extensive transfer of realty to religious trusts, constituting vakouf lands. Estimates make three-fourths of the land in the empire of this character. While probably true of city realty, this is not true of agricultural lands, which are held in village ownership in all parts of the empire. The vakouf lands arise from two sources: state grants (sarai), and the transfers of private persons (kasamain). State grants are, in general, absolute and perpetual. Private transfers are of two classes: customary or stated (aadet), and legal (sheriah). The one is a nominal transfer, occupancy remaining in the grantor, the grantee receiving a ground rent, calculated, by a legal fiction, as interest on the purchase money, often also nominal. Upon the failure of male heirs in the direct male line, these grants revert to the mosque. The administration of vakouf property was assumed by Mahmoud II., but without obtaining the revenue anticipated. Repeated propositions to sequester the vakoufs have been made; but the government has never ventured further than plans. State lands consist chiefly of miri and waste (adiyet) lands. There are besides the private domain of the sultan, fiefs attached to particular offices, military fiefs, etc., most of which have reverted to the state and been added to the miri. This, which figures in all Turkish land schemes, is land whose revenue belongs to the public treasury. Large tracts of this land have been let from time to time, and much of it is held on perpetual leases, which are open to sale or inheritance, reverting to the state on the suspension of cultivation. Local customs greatly modify land tenure, and few definite statements are true of the entire empire. Land in Bulgaria and Roumelia is in small holdings, in Thrace and Macedonia in large estates. Village ownership obtains in southern Turkey in agricultural lands, as well as in many parts of Asia Minor and Armenia, where, however, the ownership of tracts by beys still extends over large areas.

—Trade, Tariff and Products. Commerce with Christian nations was conducted in the sixteenth century under a 5 per cent. impost tax, which was reduced to 3 per cent. in behalf of England, and this capitulation was confirmed and extended in 1675 and in 1831. In 1861, commercial treaties with Great Britain and France, obtained by other nations, including the United States, placed export duties at 8 per cent., raised import duties from 5 to 8 per cent., and reduced the transit duties from 3 to 1 per cent. These treaties were denounced in 1883, the porte proposing to substitute specific for ad valorem duties—in no case higher than 20 per cent.—suppress transit duties, provide a warehouse system, and require all duties to be paid in gold. About one-fourth of the commerce of Turkey is with Great Britain. Turkish exports consist chiefly of grain, wool, opium and native manufactures. The exports and imports for a series of years are given in the following table:

At Smyrna, the second seaport of the empire, one-third of the imports consist of domestics, of which two-thirds come from Great Britain. The remainder of the imports consist of miscellaneous manufactures. Of the exports, figs, opium, valonia, (acorns), black and red, and raisins, in nearly equal shares, make up one-half of the exports from year to year. Silk cocoons, sponges, wool and rugs constitute from 15 to 20 per cent. of the exports.

—In 1876 the wheat crop of Turkey was placed at 80,000,000 bushels, and the total cereal crop at 100,000,000. The tobacco crop in 1875 was estimated at 77,880,000 pounds, and valued at $5,985,600; and in 1881 the crop was placed at 82,500,000 pounds. One-half of this is grown in European Turkey, and by far the most valuable in Roumelia, in and about Cavala, Macedonia; nearly a fifth being in the latter district. The average production of attar of roses, nearly all of which is produced on the southern slope of the Balkans, is 3,470 pounds, the crop varying from 6,000 pounds in 1866, to 1,700 in 1872. The mohair (tiftik) clip in Angora was 35,000 bags in 1880 and 30,000 in 1881, about 6,000,000 pounds. The herds producing it are estimated at 600,000 head. The importance of Turkish products rests rather upon their possibilities, than their accomplishment. In grain, in wool, and in cotton, as well as in coal and copper, it is capable of adding heavily enough to the world product to make it a serious rival.

—The mineral resources of Turkey are known to be large, but are practically untouched—the solitary exception being the copper mines of Arghana. By Turkish law all mines and mineral deposits are the property of the state, to which all land reverts on the discovery of mineral treasures. All grants of mines for working require their surrender to the state after a certain period, with plant and working tools complete. Work can be resumed only upon the purchase of the equipment from the government at a valuation fixed by the administration of mines, whose engineers add to the oppressive legal restrictions of the government the vexatious interference of half-educated men. The most important mineral deposits of Turkey are the coal fields of the Heraclea basin, on the Euxine coast of Asia Minor, 150 miles from the Bosphorus. They are 450 square miles in extent, estimated to contain 60,000,000 tons, and are probably much larger, as the Kooslov vein is from three to eighteen feet thickness, and worked with case in horizontal runs. During the Crimean war this region supplied the allied fleet. Tests showed the coal bituminous, to be equal to Newcastle, free from slag, and firing rapidly. At present 33,000 tons are raised annually, and delivered at Constantinople at $4.08 per ton. Constantinople, in the six years 1875-80, imported 1,205,935 tons of coal from England. An extremely rich deposit of carbonate of copper at Kebban Maaden, in the Arghana district, north of Diarbekir, has been worked for centuries, and is still mined under government supervision, supplying interior Turkey with the copper universally used for domestic utensils. Chrome is mined at Dag Ardi, Brusa vilayet, and near Salonia, the average output in each place being 3,000 tons. Emery is mined near Smyrna, manganese near Trebizond, argentiferous lead near Erzeroum, Akdar Maaden, in Castamuni, and near Kaiserizeh. Antimony is shipped in small quantities from Chios. Many other mineral deposits are known to exist, some of which were worked in ancient times, but none are now utilized.

—Transportation. The roads of the empire are in a primitive state, but are in better condition in European than in Asiatic Turkey. In the latter a wheeled vehicle is rarely seen away from the coast, and the roads are tracks worn by caravans. The mail is carried on horseback by relays of horses after a system which has come down unchanged from the cursus publica of the Roman and Byzantine empire, and the tezkereh, or official permit to use these relays for private travel is analogous to the diploma issued under the Roman empire for the same purpose. During the French occupation a road was built from Beirut to Damascus, and a diligence line is run on it. Telegraph lines, 17,048 miles in length, connect the larger cities and the capital under government management. By special convention, the Anglo-Indian government leases for its own purposes a line connected with the land line and cable in the Persian gulf.

—European Turkey contained, in 1881, 988 miles of railroad, built by the Oriental Railways company, at $57,600 per mile, the capital of the company being $158,400,000 nominal, the actual money value of the shares as allotted being 45 per cent. of their par value. The lines built and open for traffic since 1875, with the exception of the Banialuka and Doberlin, are as follows:

	Miles.
Constantinople 8 Bellova...	351
Adrianople 8 Dedeagatch...	92
Salonica 8 Mitrovitza...	226
Adrianople 8 Zamboli...	115
Banialuka 8 Doberlin...	64
Varna 8 Rutschuk...	140
Total...	988

Asiatic Turkey has 250½ miles of railroad, in three lines, of which the first and most important was built by an English company at a cost of $10,665,675. It is (1883) being extended to Sevdikini, 38 miles. These lines are as follows, the last being government property:

	Miles.
Smyrna 8 Aidin, and branches	83
Smyrna 8 Cassaba, and branches	108
Scutari 8 Ismidt, and branches	59½
Total	250½

Constantinople contains 13½ miles of tramways (city horse railroads), and they are to be found in Smyrna, Sidon, Jaffa and other cities.

—History. The Turkish empire arose in western Asia Minor, and had nearly reached the western limits of its European conquest before it moved eastward. The first signs of the empire appeared in the ebb of the invasions of Genghis Khan and his sons, whose advance seems to have received a check on the plateau of Asia Minor, after having swept away the minor Seljuk sultanats which divided between them what is now Asiatic Turkey. It is still doubtful whether Ertogul, the father of Othman, founder of the line, is more than a tribal hero, and the legends which assign Othman a Commenian ancestor in Byzantine story, and trace his descent from the tribal progenitor in central Asia, Kara Koum, probably express the historic fact that a rule of Tartar origin, arising in a tribe which for at least 200 years had been familiar with the civilization of Asia Minor, took its earliest form under Byzantine influence. In Turkish history Ertogul is the tribal hero, Othman (1299-1326) the founder, and Orkhan (1326-60) the organizer of the new monarchy. His tent-door became the sublime porte, his army was made up of a disciplined infantry and an enrolled cavalry, not a feudal militia. Orkhan crossed the Bosphorus, and the Turkish rule was established in its present European limits by the battle of Kassova (1356), when the defeat of Bajazet I. (1389-1402), on his eastern frontier, midway in Asia Minor, by Tamerlane, would have destroyed the Turkish empire had it been an Asiatic power. In the next three reigns, the power of the empire was further extended in Europe, and crowned by the conquest of Constantinople (1453) by Mohammed II. (1451-81).

—The oriental conquests of Selim I. (1512-20) and the assumption of the title of caliph carried the empire to its present Asiatic limits, and worked a profound change in its character. The next of the line, Suleiman I. (1520-66), the lawgiver of the dynasty, showed this at every turn. His mosques were Arab mosques, his code was drawn by an Aleppan, and the reorganization of the empire showed like influences. The Turkish rule was now at its widest, extended and stretched from northern Hungary to central Persia, from southern Russia to Egypt. The Turkish infantry remained the best in Europe; but Lepanto (1571) showed that its fleet was weak, and it never regained full mastery of the sea, although it still acquired one island after another, Murad IV. (1623-40) falling between weak and brutal sultans (1574-1623), and a drunkard, Ibrahim (1640-49) gave Turkey its last eastern conquests, reaching Tabreez. The fortunes of the empire were again retrieved in Europe by the able succession of Köprili viziers (1646-90), but no personal ability could prevent the consequences of a disaster like the siege of Vienna (1683), and the peace of Carlowitz (1703) definitely closed the era of Turkish conquest.

—Through the middle of the eighteenth century, Mahmoud I. (1730-54) deferred the advance of Russia by an alliance with France and western Europe, as Abdul Medjid (1839-61) did through the middle of the nineteenth century. Catharine II. resumed the Russian advance in the last century, and the peace of Kutchuk Kai Nardji (1774) and Jassy (1792) established the dependent position of Turkey. Mahmoud II. (1808-39) gave the empire a new lease of life by organizing a standing army, which enabled the empire to reconquer its Asiatic possessions, parceled among overlords who owned a slight allegiance. With the exception of Ibrahim Pasha, no oriental rebel has since been able to hold his own against the sultan. Against Europe, the porte remained powerless. The revolt of Greece (1821-9), Servia (1815-29), Roumania (1861), the treaty of Adrianople (1833), and other successive treaties, ending with the treaty of Berlin (1878), have reduced the empire to its present limits.

TALCOTT WILLIAMS.

TYLER

TYLER, John, president of the United States 1841-5, was born in Charles City county, Va., March 29, 1790, and died at Richmond, Va., Jan. 17, 1862. He was graduated at William and Mary college in 1806, was admitted to the bar in 1809, and served in the state legislature 1811-16 and 1823-5, in the house of representatives 1816-21, as governor 1825-7, and as United States senator 1827-36. All this time he had belonged to the extreme southern state-sovereignty school of politicians, and had quarreled with Jackson when the latter had undertaken to suppress nullification (see that title) in South Carolina. With the rest of this school he went into the conglomeration of factions, which, about 1836, took the name of the whig party (see that title), and in the election of that year received 47 votes for vice-president. In 1840 he was nominated for the vice-presidency by the whigs, for a double reason: he was a pronounced adherent of Clay, whom Harrison had defeated for the presidency; and he was also a pronounced believer in state sovereignty, so that his nomination would gratify the nullification wing of the party. Harrison's sudden death left the whigs in control of congress, but without the two-thirds majority necessary to override the vetoes of a president who was far more closely in sympathy with the democratic party than with that to which he nominally belonged. The result was an almost immediate quarrel between the new president and his party, which was never healed. (See WHIG PARTY, II.; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IV.; BANK CONTROVERSIES, IV.; TARIFFS: INDEPENDENT TREASURY; INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT; CENSURES; CORPORAL'S GUARD.) Some little effort was made at the end of his term of office to give him the democratic, or an independent, nomination for a new term; but it was a failure, and he retired from politics in 1845, having completed the annexation of Texas. (See ANNEXATIONS, III.) In 1861 he reappeared as president of the peace congress at Washington. (See CONFERENCE, PEACE.) On the outbreak of hostilities he became an ardent secessionist, and was a delegate from Virginia in the confederate congress until his death.

—See Abbott's Lives of the Presidents, 274; Wise's Seven Decades of the Union. For the democratic view of his administration, see 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 211-631; 11 Democratic Review, 502 (at the beginning of his term); 16 Democratic Review, 211 (at the end). For the whig view, see Botts' History of the Rebellion, 75; 1 Whig Review, 334; 2 Colton's Life and Times of Clay, 355; Clay's Private Correspondence, 455-480. The most exact account is in 2 Von Holst's United States, 406. Tyler's messages are in 2 Statesman's Manual, 1337.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

[125.]"But it may be said, that the state in taxing personal property situate beyond its territory, does not in fact tax the property, but the owner, over whom the state has jurisdiction in respect to such property. In answer to this claim, attention is here asked to the following extract from an argument made some years ago by Mr. G. P. Lowrey, of New York, before a committee of the legislature of New York, when this subject was up before them for consideration. 'This claim,' he said, 'involves a dangerous inaccuracy, and arises from a confusion of the idea of the assessment with the idea of the tax. These two stand upon altogether different bases. The assessment is to the person in respect to the property; but the tax is to the property in respect to itself alone. In the order of consequence a tax goes before an assessment. A tax stands upon an existing relation between the property and the state, as protector and protected, and is that portion of the public burden which the property ought to bear because of that existing relation. An assessment stands upon the existing relation between the property and its owner or possessor; it follows the tax, and is merely the method of securing it. The danger, in saying that the tax is to the person in respect of his property, is, that, by the form of the expression we justify an assessment upon a person for all property indiscriminately. We transpose the subjects, and make the law seek out the person, and then tax him according to his property, instead of first seeking property which it has a right to tax, and then as a secondary matter, a person to whom it may be assessed. Even if a knowledge of the property is obtained by inquiry addressed to the owner in the shape of a general assessment, still the rationale of the matter presupposes the right to tax on account of the property and our relation to it directly. If we disregard this rationale, we may, perhaps, register an assessment where we are not entitled to levy a tax.'

—The person to whom the assessment is made need not be the owner. He may be the agent, trustee, guardian, executor or administrator. This is because the property, which owes the tax by reason of being protected, has not hands wherewith to take from itself a portion of itself, to pay for protection to be accorded to the remainder. Therefore the law, following the property to get the tax, makes its demand upon whoever it finds in possession, without inquiring upon what interest the property is based. This it does, ignoring all persons beneficially interested in the title, even the owner himself. 'Every person,' says the statutes of New York, 'shall be assessed, etc., for all personal property owned by him, including all property in his possession, or under his control, as agent, trustee, guardian, etc.'

—Thus it will be seen, that, for the purpose of assessment, possession is a title superior to ownership. And I now reiterate, that, according to the theory of our government, a tax stands upon the just obligation of all property to contribute to the support of the power which protects it; but that the assessment stands upon the possession or power of the person assessed, over the property taxed. This may be further illustrated. Movables can never be out of the actual or constructive presence of some one, and, therefore, there is always a person in esse to whom the assessment may be made. But the case is very different with unmovables, and therefore, lands are often taxed and assessed by their own name and designation, and specifically sold to satisfy the specific assessment, no person's name anywhere appearing in the proceedings.

—Keeping this vital distinction between an assessment and a tax clearly in view the mind will come by easy steps to an understanding of how it is that a tax, to a man who has no property in the state, is a tax upon his person. Process is the eye of the law. Its vision is limited by territorial boundaries. Whatever does not exist within that limit, does not, for any purpose of law, exist at all. The rich man, whose property is in Europe and the pauper, whose property is nowhere, are then equal, as persons, before the law. A tax upon a pauper would be a personal tax. A tax upon the rich man is, by unimpeachable parity of reason, the same. Such a tax would be a gross solecism on our system. The philosophy of our plan of voluntary political association, is that all individuals, and all the values within a community, shall aggregate into one mass all the power which they separately contain, which sum total shall constitute a sovereignty of the whole. This sovereignty—the soul of the state, which can not be impaired, and the state survive—reflects back upon its constituents, in detail, all that it has received from them. What it receives, and what it returns, is of two kinds, as to both source and object, viz., individual service to the government, and protection to the individual from it. Thus, in his individual capacity, a man is bound to perform military service, and the state, by the military arm, is bound to protect him from invasion. He is bound to do jury duty, and the authorities are bound, upon his demand, to provide him a jury. He is bound to aid the sheriff, and the sheriff is bound to execute process in his favor by posse comitatus if necessary. These personal services correspond to those which in feudal times the mesne lord holding a frank tenement owed the lord paramount. They can not be compounded for, for their value consists in their being rendered in kind. Their performance is the only price which the citizen pays for his citizenship. The terms are not only consistent and harmonious with our general scheme of government, but are highly politic. They are a liberal invitation to all men to come and add to ours their lives, their hopes, their strength, labor and courage, that we may build up a nation. To all political privileges we admit each one by virtue of his being a man, free born and of lawful age, we ask him nothing concerning his property, unless his property asks something from us."

[126.]A copy of an assessment roll of the time of Edward III. (1329-67) given by Lingard in his history of England, contains a list of articles, down to a towel and a bench; and the historian notes that in the returns are carefully mentioned the very rooms in which the articles were found, and that there were no exemptions except one suit of clothes for each person, which were supposed to be included in the tax levied on the poll or person.

[127.]"It is claimed that each individual owes the state annually a certain sum of money in the way of taxes, proportioned to his entire property. If he voluntarily pays, he escapes arbitrary measures. If he declines to pay, or tries to avoid payment, he has no just cause to complain if he is regarded in the light of a criminal, or if the same arbitrary measures are used to collect his tax, as if it were a debt owing by one citizen to another. But let us examine this averment. If the defaulting tax payer is to be regarded as a criminal, and as such placed in the worst possible light, be certainly ought not to be deprived of the privileges of a criminal; which are, a right to a public investigation according to the rules of evidence adopted by free and enlightened communities, a right to be heard before condemnation, and the right to be presumed innocent of having property subject to taxation until the fact is ascertained otherwise by legal proof. But under the existing tax laws of most of the United States there are not accorded to the tax payer the privileges of a criminal; for no tax can be assessed on a large proportion of the personal property of the state according to any rules of legal evidence that any common law court would adopt. No assessor, under the laws of New York, for example, in assessing personal property, can act judicially. The law gives him no power to obtain legal testimony of a character that is admissible in a court; he must act the part of an arbitrary despot against an inculpated tax payer, or not act at all, and his conclusions for acting must be reached at best by the testimony of those who have no means of knowing anything, in a legal sense, about the subject matter under investigation. It seems clear, therefore, that any attempt to tax without legal evidence is an act of usurpation or despotism, wholly antagonistic to the principles of a free government, and that it is a mockery to characterize such acts as, in any sense, judicial proceedings Nor does the right to reduce or regulate the assessment by the oath of the tax payer relieve the law in any degree of its unequal and despotic character; for every individual holding public office knows that oaths, as a guarantee of truth in respect to official statements, have ceased to be of any value. The assessments made according to the oaths of parties, furthermore, are not made according to legal evidence, upon examination and proofs; but according to the will and secret caprice of each tax payer, instigated by his selfishness, and the natural depravity of human nature. Each tax payer, under the present rule, becomes, therefore, the interpreter, not only of the law, but of the fact, and makes a secret interpretation of both, and we have as many interpreters of the law as there are numbers of tax payers; and also an indefinite multiplicity of assessors; for each person who unfairly reduces his own assessment, arbitrarily assesses thereby some other of the community for the difference. Could or would any people apply the same rules for the collection of debts? Is there any one who has so much confidence in human nature that he will propose a law, that a person who issued shall be discharged from all claims of indebtedness if he will make oath, interpreting both the law and the fact himself, that he owes the claimant nothing? Is it believed, that under tariff laws, the government could get sufficient revenue to pay for its collection, if the importer was permitted to offset debts against the value of his goods; or if the law was peremptory that his oath alone should be given, and that there should be no legal examination, inspection or proof of the value or character of the importations?" (Second Report of Commissioners of New York, 1873.)

[128.]The most curious and confirmatory evidence of this is to be found in a method of procedure adopted in the city of Boston, Massachusetts—a method which has no parallel except in the records of the middle ages and of the inquisition, and constitutes, in itself, a satire upon any claim to the enjoyment of a wholly free and enlightened government. For failing to obtain satisfactory information about the private affairs of any individual, the chief assessors and their subordinates in this city, to the number of some fifty, meet in secret session, in a large upper chamber set aside for the purpose, and appropriately termed the "dooming chamber," when the citizen in question, without being present either by counsel or in person, is arbitrarily doomed to the payment of any sum which a majority of those present may think proper; and from which "dooming" there can be no appeal.

[129.]Holland, by reason of her immense national debt, the largest comparatively of any country, has been obliged to maintain a most rigorous and extensive system of taxation in order to raise revenue sufficient to the wants and requirements of the state. But it has been prominently brought out in recent years, that the decadence of Holland dates almost from the hour when taxes were imposed on manufactories, commerce, fishing industry, and moneyed capital. Business went elsewhere, and with the decline of business the ability to pay taxes diminished, and the burden of taxation augmented. (See Journal des Economistes, November, 1871; also, "Principles of Political Economy," J. R. M'Culloch, pp. 470-71.)

—Within recent years the local taxation of Great Britain has been made the subject of special inquiry and investigation by a committee of parliament; and, in addition to several official reports, two prize essays on the same subject have been published by the statistical society of London (i.e., "On the Local Taxation of Great Britain and Ireland"; First and second Tayler Prize Essays, by R. H. Inglis Palgrave, and John Scott, of the Inner Temple); while the necessity of raising increased revenue in France has also drawn especial attention to the subject of local taxation in that country; but it is particularly noticeable, that in neither England nor France has any prominent speaker or writer advocated the direct taxation of personal property; or even alluded to the subject, except to scout the very idea of such a proposition.

[130.]If we assume 5 per cent. as about the average profit of money, land or other property in the United States, over and above all charges and taxes, then an exemption of $600 would represent an accumulation yielding an income of $12,000. If the exemption is raised to $2,000, as it was at one time in the United States, then it would represent $40,000.

[131.]These views, it should be understood, are, however, heresies to some of the best thinkers and writers on political economy. Some confuse themselves on the subject, by first defining property as anything that can be bought or sold, and then, since a title—as, for example, a deed - can be bought and sold, accept the inference that a title is necessarily property. But let us analyze this definition and assumption. We can, without doubt, sell and deliver a deed to a farm, but what is sold in such instances is the farm, including a right, a right to have dominion over it. But it may be rejoined, that a right of dominion is property. Let us, therefore, carry the analysis a little farther. If the farm in California is property in the state where it is, and where it is taxed, any right or title to the same farm, held in New York or England, be it in the nature of a deed, a mortgage, a partnership interest, or any other form of title, can not be the property; for the same thing certainly can not be property in two separate states and jurisdictions, and in two distinct forms and manifestations, at the same time. On the other hand, if it be assumed that the title to the farm is the property, and, as such, can be rightfully taxed where it (the title) is, then it stands to reason that the subject of the title, the farm in California, ought not to be also regarded as property, and taxed in New York or England. In other words, if the title to the farm is property, then the farm is not really in California at all (unless the owner of the title resides there), but goes out of that state in the pocket of the individual who walks off with the title to it. We have all heard of such concentration of meat that all that is valuable in an ox for food can be put into a quart can; but such a concentration of property as is here supposed is something much more remarkable; and admits of a man having a drove of oxen in his hand, ten acres of woodland in his hat, a church with a steeple in one coat pocket, and a four-story brick block and a mill privilege in the other.

[132.]In 1874 the real estate of Philadelphia was assessed at $539,003,602, on an asserted full valuation. The personal property of the city subject to taxation at the same time, was returned at a valuation of $9,464,873; and included horses, carriages, furniture, gold and silver watches. The system of taxation in Montreal, dominion of Canada the same year, was as follows: one-fifth of 1 per cent. on the value of real estate; one-fifth of 1 per cent. for school tax; one-twentieth of 1 per cent. on railway property; 7½ per cent. on rentals. In addition, there were water rates, and special taxes on insurance, telegraph, ferry and street railway companies, and on innkeepers, billiard tables, theatres, breweries, banks, brokers, etc., and licenses on grocers, butchers, exhibitions, dogs, etc.

[133.]On this subject the eminent French economist, Joseph Garmer, in his Traité des Finances, ch. v., says: "From the point of view of distributive justice and economic truth, and to attain an equitable apportionment of the public burdens, we must put the question: A tax being given, on whom does it fall in the last analysis? No absolutely satisfactory answer to this question, insoluble in its generality, has been given or could have been given. However, Ricardo, who made a profound study of taxation, thought that taxes, no matter of what kind, are always paid by the consumer, on his capital or on his income, the producer always making them enter into the cost of production; and employing his capital and his industry in other branches when he can not include the taxes he pays in such cost. James Mill likewise adopted the same opinion. This was Franklin's view also; he thought that the merchant always added the tax to his bill or invoice. It was likewise Adam Smith's idea, who, in passing, says: 'The tax is finally paid by the last purchaser or consumer.' ['Wealth of Nations,' edited by J. E. Thorold Rogers, vol. ii., p. 132.]—The physiocrates had been led to think that taxes finally fell, directly or indirectly, on the landed proprietor, to whom they thought the entire net product of production, which in the end is the only thing taxed, and which alone should be taxed by the legislator, comes back.

—J. B. Say says that Ricardo may be right in the abstract, but that, in fact, the producer does not always succeed in making the consumer pay the tax, a part of which he (the producer) must bear himself. The French economist adds: 'This subject does not admit of an absolute opinion. There is probably no kind of contribution which does not fall on several classes of citizens.' According to him, therefore, the subjects taxed (bases de l'impot) should be increased sufficiently to attain this end: that those producers who are not reached by one tax may be reached by another.

—The views held by the physiocrates on production being incomplete and erroneous, their financial conclusion is no longer worthy of consideration. J. B. Say's conclusion is in harmony with those of Ricardo and Smith; but it is lacking in precision. That of Ricardo, if it be exact, should be amended thus: 'Taxes in general and in the long run, fall on the consumer.' And, indeed, in the face of the facts, it is difficult to admit, that this diffusion or transmission of burdens is made directly, immediately and without effort. If we may so express ourselves, Ricardo considers the phenomenon as if it were happening in vacuo, whereas, in reality, the tax, to find its natural or definitive incidence and to traverse the successive strata of society, needs a pretty long lapse of time, a thing which is effected only after many and complex repercussions. The burden weighs at first on certain classes of citizens; then, by degrees, it apportions itself among a greater number of tax payers, or among all tax payers, and by successive repercussions it becomes an integral part of the price of things, in such a way that the person who buys most things pays most taxes. At first view the tax seems paid, whereas it has only been advanced.

—However, the solution of this question is not, we repeat, possible, as to taxation considered in general; it is possible, if possible at all, only if we consider the different kinds of taxes apart from one another, and according to their special assessment. It is necessary to consider apart their accidental and their permanent effects, their temporary and definitive effects. We must remark, also, that both for taxation and for the cost of production, the law of supply and demand is predominant. That law it is which permits, according to very variable cases and circumstances, the landowner, capitalist or workman to have the tax reimbursed to him by the leaseholder, the manufacturer, or the merchant, and which permits these latter to have themselves reimbursed, in turn, by the consumers; or which compels each of them to pay a part of the tax. It is, therefore, erroneous to affirm that the producer has himself always and equally reimbursed by the consumer. At the end of a period of time, the tax imposed on one or many categories of individuals is repercussed on other classes, and in the end fiscal charges weigh on all the classes of the population, even the taxes on the wealthy, which fall indirectly and in a certain proportion on the poor themselves, since for the labor of the poor there is less demand by the wealthy, whose saving or consumption the tax has curtailed.

—It is an error to say of a tax that its weight divided ad infinitum becomes almost insensible to those who bear it. This would be true of one sole tax, but it is not true when there is question of several taxes; taxes may apportion themselves and repercuss as much as you will, but they must be paid, and they produce their natural effects none the less. Division, diffusion and repercussion are unfortunately not synonymous with evaporation. We can, therefore, formulate no general law as to the incidence, the repercussion or diffusion of taxes. On this point there is among economists a great diversity of opinions and much hesitation."

—Lorenz von Stein, in his Finanzwissenschaft, maintains that all taxes, and even the fines paid by criminals, finally become component parts of the prices of things, just as do the costs of production, and in the last analysis fall on the consumer. Etienne Laspeyres, in the article Staatswirthschaft, in Bluntschli's Staatswörterbuch, defends the same view. As far back as 1790 the Marquis de Cassux published a work, "The Absurdity of the Land Tax," demonstrated by showing that all taxes, no matter of what kind, ultimately become part of the prices of commodities.

—In addition to the opinions of recognized economic authorities above noted by M. Garnier, J. R. M'Culloch, whose article on "Taxation," contributed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, James Mill pronounced "masterly," thus expresses himself: "The truth is, that every burden laid, directly or indirectly, on any article for which there is any considerable demand, falls ultimately on its consumers." ("Taxation and the Funding System," p 17.) M. Thiers, as shown by an extract from his work, "Rights to Property," quoted in connection with this article by the author, was an unqualified believer in the diffusion theory of taxation. Adam Smith would also appear to have completely indorsed it, when he says, "No tax can even reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in any particular trade"—i.e., all business—which must always keep its level with other trades in the neighborhood." And again, in discussing the taxes upon luxuries, he says, "such taxes, though they fall indifferently upon every species of revenue, and are paid finally by whoever consumes the commodities upon which they are imposed," etc. The reader will, therefore, notice that Mr. Wells' views on this department of taxation are substantially in harmony with those of Adam Smith, Ricardo, James Mill, M. Thiers, J. R. M'Culloch, J. B. Say; they also found an earnest advocate in one of the soundest thinkers and shrewd practical observers America has ever produced—the late Isaac Sherman, of New York.—ED.

[134.]As applied to the wages of labor, the truth of this principle is equally incontestable. "The sewing girl performing her toilsome work by the needle at one dollar a day, the street sweeper working the mud with his broom at a dollar and a half, the skilled laborer at two and three dollars, the professor at five, the editor at five or ten, the artist and the songstress at ten or five hundred dollars a day, are all members of the working classes, though working at different rates. And it is only the difference in their effectiveness that causes the difference in their earnings. Bring them all to the same point of efficiency, and their earnings also will be the same." (W. Jungst.)

[135.]The method in which taxation diffuses itself has been thus illustrated by M. Thiers, in his work "Rights to Property." "In the same manner," he says, "as our senses, deceived by appearances, tell us that it is the sun which moves and not the earth; so a particular tax appears to fall upon one class, and another tax upon another class when in reality it is not so. The tax really best suited to the poorest member of society is that which is best suited to the general fortune of the state; a fortune which is much more for the possession and enjoyment of the poor man than it is for the rich; a fact of which we are never sufficiently convinced. But of the manner, nevertheless, in which taxes are divided among the different classes of the state, the most certain thing we can say is: That they are divided in proportion to what each man consumes, and for a reason not generally recognized or understood, namely, that taxes are reflected, as it were, to infinity, and from reflection to reflection become eventually an integral part of the prices of things. Hence the greatest purchasers and consumers are everywhere the greatest tax payers. This is what I call 'diffusion of taxation,' to borrow a term from physical science, which applies the expression 'diffusion of light' to those numberless reflections, in consequence of which the light which has penetrated the slightest aperture spreads itself around in every direction, and in such a manner as to reach all the objects which it renders visible. So a tax which at first sight appears to be paid directly, in reality is only advanced by the individual who is first called upon to pay it."

Footnotes for TELEGRAPH

[136.]Aristide Dumont wrote in 1854: "The use of the telegraph, once it has been popularized, is called to render to the production of wealth services which have some relation to those created by economic and rapid ways of circulation, since these services shorten time, that stuff of which life is made, and since, in every industry, they impress greater activity upon production, and, as a consequence, diminish the amount of unproductive capital, lower the amount of current expenses in business, facilitate exchanges, and abridge transactions of every kind.

—But from another point of view, the telegraph is called to render much greater services to industry. If we suppose the net-work of telegraphs extended and popularized, not only over the entire surface of Europe, but over every civilized point of the world, a single day would be sufficient to exchange news between the most distant markets; thenceforth there would be none of those uncertainties which so frequently disturb commercial relations, and none of those rumors which facilitate stock-jobbing [?]. A sort of equilibrium would become established, and production would become more independent of the emotions produced by politics. Is it not true that if the electric telegraph had embraced, in the course of the year 1853, the Danubian provinces, Constantinople, St. Petersburg, Odessa; and that if it had been possible to exchange a dispatch, in one day, between these different points and Paris, France's public funds and industrial values would have undergone fewer fluctuations? Kept constantly informed of what was happening, Frenchmen would have been less excited, and this would have prevented the rum of a great many individuals.

—Thus the electric telegraph facilitates the production of wealth in two ways: 1, by saving time and permitting a diminution in the amount of unproductive capital; 2, by establishing a sort of equilibrium between all markets, and of thus diminishing the influence of the uncertainty of politics on industry.

—But if we consider the telegraph from the moral point of view, we believe that it has introduced into the world a revolution still more profound. If, in fact, the various continents are united, and they will-be united in the course of this century [a prophecy fulfilled not very long after it was made]; if communication can be had in a few hours between London, Canton, New York, Calcutta and Paris, a new force will be added to the civilizing power of humanity, to the diffusion of enlightenment and to the radiation of good upon evil. The limits which pen peoples up will be blotted out, and peoples the most remote from one another acquire solidarity and unity. Men will emigrate more freely, for they will be no longer morally separated by any barrier. The superabundant population of Europe will feel less repugnance to transfer their activity to shores hitherto unknown; for, if they go even to the antipodes, they will not be, as formerly, remote from their country, their relations and their habits. This fear of remoteness has been hitherto a great obstacle to the spread of civilization. Some peoples are less subject than others to this species of nostalgia, and it is they who have accomplished the greatest things. The telegraph will tend more and more to remove that obstacle."

Footnotes for TERRITORIAL WATERS

[137.]Different writers use the terms jurisdictional waters, water territory, maritime territory.

[138.]"Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act (1878)," 41 and 42 Vict., cap. 78, notwithstanding its preamble, is such a claim.

Footnotes for THIRD ESTATE

[139.]The third edition of this pamphlet has this note: "This work, written during les Notables of 1788, was published in the first days of January, 1789.

Footnotes for TREATIES, Fishery

[140.]Prof. Hind's charges of intentional falsification of fishery statistics by the British authorities so widely published, are not sustained by evidence, and should not be entertained for a moment. The hundreds of errors which he has pointed out are evidently the result of inattention on the part of the responsible persons, and of childish incompetency on that of the clerks employed in their preparation.

Footnotes for UNITED STATES NOTES.

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T

TABLE.

TAMMANY HALL

TANEY

TARIFFS OF THE UNITED STATES.

TARTAR

TA-TSING

TAUISM

TAXATION

TAXATION

TAYLOR

TELEGRAPH

TELLERS

TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT in the United States

TEN-HOUR LAW

TENNESSEE

TERM AND TENURE OF OFFICE

TERRITORIAL WATERS

TERRITORIES

TEXAS

THIRD ESTATE

TIE

TILDEN

TIMES-SPIRIT

TOMPKINS

TON-KIN.

TONQUIN

TRANSPORTATION

TREASON

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

TREATIES.

TREATIES, Fishery.

TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES

TRENT AFFAIR

TUNGUSIC RACES.

TURKEY.

TYLER