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Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). Vol 2 East India Co. - Nullification

Editor: John Joseph Lalor

Part of: Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States, 3 vols.

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K

KANSAS

KANSAS, a state of the American Union. Under its present (state) boundaries it is formed mainly from territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase (see ANNEXATIONS, I.); the southwest portion, lying south of the Arkansas river and west of longitude 23° west of Washington (100° west of Greenwich), was part of the territory ceded to the United States by Texas in 1850. (See COMPROMISES, V.) Under its territorial boundaries Kansas did not include this south west portion. but extended west to the Rocky mountains, thus taking in part of the modern state of Colorado.

—The greater part of Kansas was a part of the district and territory of Louisiana, and of the territory of Missouri, until 1821; after that time it remained for thirty-three years without an organized government. About 1843 the increase of overland travel to Oregon led S. A. Douglas to introduce a bill in the house of representatives to organize the territory of Nebraska, covering the modern state of Kansas and all the territory north of it, in order to prevent the alienation of this overland route by treaties for Indian reservations. This bill he unsuccessfully renewed at each session until 1854, when Kansas was at last organized as a separate territory. (See KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL)

—The Missouri compromise had forever prohibited slavery in this and all the other territory acquired from France north of 36° 30' north latitude; the passage of the Kansas- Nebraska bill, which provided that the territory, when admitted as a state, should be received by congress "with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission," began the "Kansas struggle" between free state and slave state immigrants for the settlement of the territory and the control of its conversion into a state. The latter were first in the field, owing to the proximity of the slave state of Missouri. They crossed the border into the new territory, pre-empted lands, and warned free state immigrants not to cross the state of Missouri, which barred the straight road to Kansas. They were thus able to control the first election for delegate to congress, Nov. 29, 1854. A. H. Reeder, the federal governor of the territory, arrived in Kansas Oct. 7, 1854, and ordered an election for a territorial legislature to be held March 30, 1855. Free state immigration had already begun, in July, 1854, under the auspices at first of a congressional association called the "Kansas Aid Society," and afterward of a corporation chartered by the Massachusetts legislature, Feb. 21, 1855, called the "New England Emigrant Aid Company," and other similar associations. Before this evident free state preparation could be effective the March election took place, and was carried by organized bands of Missourians, who moved into Kansas on election day, voted, and returned to Missouri at night. The territorial census of February. 1855, showed 2,905 legal voters in the territory; in the election of the next month 5,427 votes were cast for the pro slavery candidates and 791 for their opponents. These figures alone, leaving aside the testimony to the terrorizing of free state voters, will explain why the free state settlers always refused to recognize the pro-slavery legislature as representing anything beyond a Missouri constituency.

—By whatever means the election was carried, this initial success of the pro-slavery element gave it a tremendous advantage during the next two years. Its legislature, which met at Pawnee, July 2, 1855, proceeded to make Kansas a slave territory, adopted the slave laws of Missouri en bloc, with a series of original statutes denouncing the penalty of death for about fifty different offenses against the system of slavery, and provided that, for the next two years, every executive and judicial officer of the territory should be appointed by the legislature or its appointees, and that every candidate for the next legislature, every judge of election, and every voter, if challenged, should swear to support the fugitive slave law. The territorial legislature had thus, as far as it was able, made Kansas a slave territory, and guarded against any easy reversal of its action by subsequent legislatures. The free state settlers, therefore, ignoring the territorial legislature, took immediate steps to transform Kansas into a state. without waiting for any enabling act of congress. California and other states had previously formed governments in this manner (see TERRITORIES), but the parallelism was denied by the democratic administration at Washington on the ground that no territory had ever been, or could properly be, thus transformed into a state in direct opposition to the constituted authorities of the territory. The political history of Kansas, for the next few years, is therefore a series of attempts to inaugurate a state government, complicated by disobedience to territorial authorities, indictments of free state leaders for treason, and actual armed conflict between partisans of the territorial and state governments.

—In obedience to the call of a private free state committee, a convention met at Topeka, Sept. 19, 1855, and ordered an election for delegates to a constitutional convention. Only free state voters took part in the election. The convention met at Topeka, Oct. 23, and formed the "Topeka constitution." prohibiting slavery, which was submitted to popular vote and was adopted, Dec. 15, by a vote of 1,731 to 46, only free state settlers voting. An election for state officers was then held, Jan. 15, 1856, at which a governor (C. Robinson), a representative to congress, and a complete legislature and state government, were chosen. The bill to admit the state of Kansas, under the Topeka constitution. was passed by the house of representatives, July 3, 1836, by a vote of 107 to 106, but failed in the senate. Nevertheless, on the claim that the state was already in existence (see STATE SOVEREIGNTY), the free state legislature met at Topeka, July 4, 1856. It was dispersed by federal troops under Col. Sumner, by orders from Washington. This action had been foreshadowed by a proclamation of President Pierce, Feb. 11, in which he declared any such attempt to be an insurrection, which would "justify and require the forcible interposition of the whole power of the general government, as well to maintain the laws of the territory as those of the Union." It was the occasion of considerable excitement, in and out of congress, and a provision, or "rider," was added by the republican majority in the house to the army appropriation bill, forbidding the use of the army to enforce the acts of the territorial legislature of Kansas. The senate rejected the proviso, and during the debate the time fixed for adjournment arrived and the session of congress closed, Aug. 18, 1856, with the army bill unpassed. The president at once called an extra session, in which the army bill was passed without the "rider," and congress again adjourned, Aug. 30. (See also BROOKS, PRESTON.)

—Long before this time Kansas had become the principal topic of newspaper, political and private discussion. The territory itself had fairly relapsed into a state of nature, the free state settlers disobeying and resisting the territorial government, and the slave state settlers disobeying and resisting the state government. A desultory civil war, waged on public and private account, was marked by the murder of many individuals and by the sack of at least two cities in the free state section, Lawrence (May 21), and Osawatomie (June 5, 1856). All this would have been of no more permanent interest than the early lawlessness of California, but for the premonitions which "bleeding Kansas" afforded all thinking men of the infinitely more frightful convulsion to come. The predominance of a moral question in politics, always a portentous phenomenon under a constitutional government, was made unmistakable by the Kansas struggle, and its first perceptible result was the disappearance, in effect, of all the old forms of opposition to the democratic party, and the first national convention of the new republican party, June 17, 1856. (See REPUBLICAN PARTY.) Kansas, it might be said, cleared the stage for the last act of the drama, the rebellion.

—Reeder, the first territorial governor, had quarreled with his legislature soon after it first assembled in 1855. He had convened it at Pawnee city, for the purpose, as was alleged, of increasing the value of his own property in that place, and when the legislature passed an act, over his veto, to remove the capital to Shawnee Mission, he refused to recognize it as any longer a legal legislature, and became one of the free state leaders. At the request of the legislature the president removed him, July 31, 1855, and appointed Wilson Shannon, of Ohio. Shannon was incompetent, and fled from the territory in September, 1856. The next governor, John W. Geary, of Pennsylvania, arrived in Kansas Sept. 9, 1856, and by a skillful blending of temporizing and decided measures succeeded in a reasonable time in disbanding most of the armed and organized forces on both sides, and in bringing about a temporary full in the open conflict. Before the end of the year he even claimed to have reestablished order in the territory. Early in the next year he seems to have become distrustful of the sincerity of the federal administration in supporting him, and March 4, 1857, he resigned. Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi (a Pennsylvanian by birth). was appointed in his place. He reached Kansas May 25, 1857, and proved to be one of the most successful of the territorial governors. It must be noted, however, that his work had been much simplified by the enormous increase in the free state immigration, which had by this time almost entirely swamped open opposition.

—Nevertheless, Kansas was still governed by the nearly unanimously pro-slavery territorial legislature, backed by the power of the federal government. After a final attempt of the free state legislature to meet at Topeka, Jan. 6, 1857, which was prevented by the arrest of its members by the federal authorities, the free state party abandoned the Topeka constitution forever. Governor Walker was successful in gaining their confidence, and succeeded in inducing them, for the first time, to take part in the election for the territorial legislature, in October, 1857, which resulted in the choice of a free state legislature and delegate to congress. Before losing their hold of the legislature, however, the pro-slavery party had used it to call a constitutional convention, which met at Lecompton, Sept 5, 1857, and adopted the "Lecompton constitution," Nov. 7. It sanctioned slavery in the state, prohibited the passage of emancipation laws by the legislature, forbade amendments until after 1864, and provided that the constitution should not be submitted to popular vote, but should be finally established by the approval of congress and the admission of the state. Governor Walker had repeatedly promised the free state voters, to secure their participation in the October election, that the proposed constitution should be submitted to popular vote; the convention evaded the fulfillment of the pledge by submitting to a popular vote, Dec. 21, only the provision sanctioning slavery. The vote stood 6,266 "for the constitution with slavery," and 567 "for the constitution without slavery," the free state party generally declining to vote; but the new territorial legislature passed an act submitting the whole constitution to popular vote, Jan. 4, 1858, when the vote stood 10,226 against the constitution, 138 for it with slavery, 24 for it without slavery.

—The whole question then passed into national politics, and occupied most of the next session of congress, 1857-8. Both branches were democratic, but no complete party majority could be secured in the house for the approval of the Lecompton constitution. The president desired and urged it; the senate passed the necessary bill, March 23, 1858; but in the house 22 Douglas democrats and 6 Americans united with the 92 republicans. April 1, to pass a substitute requiring the resubmission of the constitution to the people of Kansas. As a compromise, both houses passed, April 30, the "English bill" (so called from its mover), according to which a substitute for the land ordinance of the Lecompton constitution was to be submitted to popular vote in Kansas; if it was accepted, the state was to be considered as admitted; if it was rejected, the Lecompton constitution was to be considered as rejected by the people, and no further constitutional convention was to be held until a census should have shown that the population of the territory equaled or exceeded that required for a representative. (See APPORTIONMENT.) Aug. 3, the people of Kansas voted down the land ordinance, 11,088 to 1,788, and thus finally disposed of the Lecompton constitution.

—Nevertheless, the territorial legislature called a state convention, which met at Leavenworth and adopted a constitution, April 8, 1858, prohibiting slavery. It was ratified by popular vote, but was refused consideration by the senate, on the ground that Kansas had not the requisite population.

—The territorial legislature directed the question of a new constitutional convention to be again submitted to popular vote in March, 1859. It was approved; the convention met at Wyandotte July 5, and adopted the "Wyandotte constitution" July 27, which was ratified, Oct. 4, by a vote of 10,421 to 5,530. The senate was still a barrier in the way of the admission of Kansas, and it was not until the withdrawal of southern senators (see SECESSION) had changed the party majority in that branch of congress that Kansas was at last admitted as a state, Jan. 29, 1861, under the Wyandotte constitution. Under this organic law slavery was prohibited; the governor was to hold office for two years; the suffrage was limited to whites, and Topeka was made the capital.

—From the beginning of the war of the rebellion, to which the Kansas struggle was the prelude, it was natural that Kansas should take the side of the Union with even more warmth than the other northern states. To her people it was rather the development of an old war than the beginning of a new one, and they sent a larger percentage of their number to the armies in the field than any other state. In state politics the republican party, whose name had from the first been associated with the efforts to make Kansas a free state, has always had a complete and overwhelming predominance. Every governor, congressman and United States senator has been a republican; almost all the local officers have been republican; and there have been very few legislatures in which the opposition to the dominant party has risen so high as 20 per cent. of the whole number of members. Indeed, it can hardly be said that there has been any opposition party in the state since 1857. In 1875 the democrats even dropped their party name, and the combined opposition, under the name of "independent reformers," polled 35,308 out of 84,132 votes, and elected 37 out of 136 members of the legislature. With the exception of this year the republican vote has always been from 60 to 80 per cent. of the whole, and party contest has been confined to struggles between factions of the dominant party. (See also PROHIBITION.)

—This constant and foregone control of the state by one party has operated to the disadvantage of the abler leaders of Kansas in national politics, since the two great parties have naturally reserved their favors for politicians of other and more doubtful states. After the conclusion of the Kansas struggle (see BROWN, JOHN), it would be difficult to name any leader of the state whose name has obtained a national reputation. Another ill consequence has been that politicians have aimed to influence conventions and legislatures, rather than the people, and have not forborne at times the use of the most questionable means of influence. The investigations of the charges of bribery and corruption, in 1872-3, at the elections of United States senators S. C. Pomeroy and Alexander Caldwell, led to the resignation of the latter, and the permanent retirement of the former from politics at the end of his senatorial term. Similar charges have been freely made in regard to other elections in which the people have not taken part, and, though not sustained by the evidence, have given Kansas politics an unpleasant notoriety which is utterly unmerited by the character of the people or by the general conduct of their political contests.

—The name of the state was given from that of its principal river, an Indian word, said to mean "the smoky water." but more probably derived from the name of the Kaws, or Konzas, an Indian tribe living on its banks.

—Among those who have been prominent in state politics, outside of the list of governors, given below, are the following all republicans: Alexander Caldwell, United States senator 1871-3; Sidney Clarke, representative in congress 1863-71; Martin F. Conway, one of the leaders of the free state party, and representative in congress 1861-3, John James Ingalls, United States senator 1873-85; James II. Lane, democratic lieutenant governor of Indiana 1849-53, representative in congress from Indiana 1853-5, the principal military leader of the free state immigrants in the Kansas struggle, and United States senator 1861-6; P. B. Plumb, United States senator 1877-83; S. C. Pomeroy, United States senator 1861-73; and E.g. Ross, United States senator 1866-71.

—GOVERNORS: Charles Robinson, 1861-3; Thomas Carney, 1863-5; S. J. Crawford. 1865-9; Jas. M. Harvey, 1869-73; Thomas A. Osborn, 1873-7; George T. Anthony, 1877-81; John P. St. John, 1881-3.

—See 1 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Cutts' Treatise on Party Questions, 84; authorities under KANSAS NEBRASKA BILL; 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 235; Greeley's Political Text Book of 1860, 87; Report of the House Special Committee on the Troubles in Kansas (republican report, pp. 1-67, democratic report, pp 68-109): 1 Draper's History of the Civil War, 409; the particulars of the "Emigrant Aid Society" are in 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 465; 3 Spencer's United States, 514; Harris' Political Conflict in America, 168; Buchanan's Administration, 28: Claskey's Political Text Book, 346; Gihon's Geary and Kansas (generally the fairest contemporary account); Robinson's Kansas; Gladstone's Englishman in Kansas; Holloway's History of Kansas (1868); Wilder's Annals of Kansas (1875); 4 Sumner's Works, 127; Porter's West in 1880, 323.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL

KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL (IN U. S. HISTORY), the act of congress by which the territories of Kansas and Nebraska were organized in 1854. Its political importance consisted wholly in its repeal of the Missouri compromise. (See COMPROMISES, IV.)

—Before the introduction of the bill it did not seem possible for any further question to arise as to slavery in the United States. In the several states slavery was regulated by state law; in the Louisiana purchase both sections had in 1820 united to abolish slavery in the portion north of latitude 36° 30', ignoring the portion south of it; all the southern portion, outside of the Indian Territory, was covered soon afterward by the slave state of Arkansas; and in the territory afterward acquired from Mexico both sections had united in 1850 in an agreement to ignore the existence of slavery until it could be regulated by the laws of the states which should be formed therefrom in future. Every inch of the United States seemed to be thus covered by some compromise or other. (See COMPROMISES.)

—The slavery question was in this condition of equilibrium when a bill was passed by the house, Feb. 10, 1853, to organize the territory of Nebraska, covering, also, the modern state of Kansas. It lay wholly within that portion of the Louisiana purchase whose freedom had been guaranteed by the Missouri compromise, and the bill therefore said nothing about slavery, its supporters taking it for granted that the territory was already free. In the senate it was laid on the table, March 3, the affirmative including every southern senator, except those from Missouri; but their opposition to the bill came entirely from an undefined repugnance to the practical operations of the Missouri compromise, not from any idea that that compromise was no longer in force. If it had been repealed by the compromise of 1850, those most interested in the repeal do not seem to have yet discovered it in 1853.

—During the summer of 1853, following the adjournment of congress, the discussion of the new phase, which the proposed organization of Nebraska at once brought about in the slavery question, became general among southern politicians. The southern people do not seem to have taken any great interest in the matter, for it was very improbable that slave labor could be profitably employed in Nebraska, even if it were allowed. The question was wholly political. The territory in question had been worthless ever since it was bargained away to secure the admission of Missouri as a southern and slaveholding state; but now immigration was beginning to mark out the boundaries of present territories and potential states, which would, in the near future, make the south a minority in the senate, as it had always been in the house, and perhaps place it at the mercy of a united north and northwest. To prevent this result it was of importance to southern politicians, 1, that, if the Missouri compromise was to endure, Nebraska should remain unorganized, in order to check immigration and prevent the rapid formation of another northern state; 2, that, if the Missouri compromise could be voided, Nebraska should at least be open to slavery, for the same purpose as above, since it was agreed on all hands that free immigration instinctively avoided any contact with slave labor; and 3, that, if slave labor could possibly be made profitable in Nebraska, the territory should become a slave state, controlled by a class of slave owners in full sympathy with the ruling class of the southern states. The last contingency was generally recognized as highly improbable; one of the first two was the direct objective point.

—When congress met in December, 1853, the southern programme, as above stated, had been pretty accurately marked out. It was not a difficult task to secure the support of northern democrats for it. because the latter had for five years been advocating the right of the people of New Mexico to decide the status of slavery in that territory. (See POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.) The only step backward that was necessary was to accept the application of the doctrine to all the territories, whether south or north of latitude 36° 30. The excuse for this backward step was thus stated by Douglas in his report of Jan. 4, 1854: "The Nebraska country occupies the same relative position to the slavery question as did New Mexico and Utah when those territories were organized." A wrong premise: for the difficulty in the case of New Mexico and Utah had arisen entirely from the fact that the status of slavery in them was unsettled, and could not be settled without a struggle; while in the case of Nebraska the struggle was rightfully over, and the status of slavery fixed. Congressional action was directed, in the former case, toward an amicable adjustment of the dispute, and in the latter case, toward a needless reopening of the dispute; and yet the assumed parallelism of the two cases was absolutely the only justification ever offered by Douglas and the Douglas democracy of the north for their introduction and support of the Kansas Nebraska bill. They seem to have been forced into it by their constitutional arguments in support of "squatter sovereignty"; after arguing that congress had no constitutional power to prohibit slavery in New Mexico in 1850, it seemed difficult for them, without stultifying themselves, to argue in favor of the power of congress in 1820 to prohibit slavery in Nebraska. They seem to have forgotten that the compromise of 1850 was confessedly not based upon constitutional grounds at all, but was a purely political decision, based upon expediency; that the constitutional objections to the power of congress to prohibit slavery in a territory applied equally to the power of congress to prohibit a territorial legislature from legislating for or against slavery, and so struck at the very root of the compromise of 1850 itself; and that the expediency which counseled them to refrain from meddling with the slavery question in New Mexico and Utah as imperatively counseled them to refrain from disturbing the settlement of the slavery question in Nebraska.

—Dec. 15, 1853, in the senate, A. C. Dodge, of Iowa, offered a bill to organize the territory of Nebraska, but his bill, like the one of the preceding session, made no reference to slavery. Jan. 4, 1854, it was reported with amendments by Douglas, chairman of the committee on territories. The report endeavored to make out a parallel between New Mexico and Nebraska by comparing the Mexican abolition of slavery in the former case with the act of 1820 in the latter case; it remarked that in either case the validity of the abolition of slavery was questioned by many, and that any discussion of the question would renew the excitement of 1850; and it recommended, though not directly, that the senate should organize the new territory without "either affirming or repealing the 8th section of the Missouri act, or [passing] any act declaratory of the meaning of the constitution in respect to the legal points in dispute." But the report stated the basis of the compromise of 1850 as follows: "that all questions pertaining to slavery in the territories, and in the new states to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives, to be chosen by them for that purpose." This was, in the first place, incorrect, since the New Mexico and Utah acts left no such power to the territorial legislature (see POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY), and, in the second place, not pertinent, since it was an attempt to expand an act of congress, passed for a particular purpose, into a great constitutional rule which was to bind subsequent congresses. Jan. 16, Dixon, of Kentucky, gave notice of an amendment abolishing the Missouri compromise in the case of Nebraska. This was the first open signal of danger to the Missouri compromise; and on the following day Summer, of Massachusetts, gave notice of an amendment to the bill, providing that nothing contained in it should abrogate or contravene that settlement of the slavery question. Douglas at once had the bill recommitted, and, Jan. 23, he reported, in its final shape, the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which, in its ultimate and unexpected consequences, was one of the most far-reaching legislative acts in American history.

—The bill divided the territory from latitude 37° to latitude 43° 30' into two territories, the southern to be called Kansas, and the northern Nebraska; the territory between latitude 36° 30' and 37° was now left to the Indians. In the organization of both these territories it was declared to be the purpose of the act to carry out the following three "propositions and principles, established by the compromise measures of 1850": 1, that all questions as to slavery in the territories, or the states to be formed from them, were to be left to the representatives of the people residing therein; 2, that cases involving title to slaves, or personal freedom, might be appealed from the local tribunals to the supreme court; and 3, that the fugitive slave law should apply to the territories. The section which extended the constitution and laws of the United States over the territories had the following proviso: "except the 8th section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6, 1820, which, being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by congress with slavery in the states and territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any territory or state, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the constitution of the United States." With the exception of these two novel features, the bill was the usual formal act for the organization of a territory. An amendment offered by Chase, of Ohio, allowing the people of the territory to prohibit the existence of slavery therein, if they saw fit, was voted down, 36 to 10. It is difficult to see any reason for the affirmative vote, since the Chase amendment was strictly in the line of "popular sovereignty," but it was probably due in part to a general distrust of any amendment coming from the anti-slavery element, and in part to the idea that the closing words above given, "subject only to the constitution of the United States," excluded the Chase amendment and made popular sovereignty unilateral in the territories, with authority to permit slavery, but not to prohibit it. March 3. 1854, the bill passed the senate by a vote of 37 to 14. In the affirmative were fourteen northern democrats, and twenty-three southern democrats and whigs; in the negative were eight northern antislavery senators. free-soilers or "anti-Nebraska men" (see REPUBLICAN PARTY), Bell, southern whig, Houston, southern democrat, and Hamlin, of Maine, James, of Rhode Island, and Dodge and Walker, of Wisconsin, northern democrats—The bill was not taken up in the house until May 8, and was passed May 24, by a vote of 113 to 100. The affirmative vote included forty-four northern democrats, fifty-seven southern democrats, and twelve southern whigs, the negative vote included forty-four northern democrats, two southern democrats, forty-four northern whigs. seven southern whigs, and three free-soilers. May 30, the Kansas Nebraska bill was approved by the president, and became law.

—The effects of the bill upon the parties of the time are else where referred to. (See DEMOCRATIC PARTY, V.; WHIG PARTY, III.; REPUBLICAN PARTY. I.; AMERICAN PARTY.) They may be summarized as follows: 1, it destroyed the whig party, the great mass of whose voters went over, in the south to the democratic, and in the north to the new republican party; 2, it made the democratic party almost entirely sectional, for the loss of its strong anti-slavery element in the north reduced it in the course of the next few years to a hopeless minority there; 3, it crystallized all the northern elements opposed to slavery into another sectional party, soon to take the name of republican; and 4, it compelled all other elements, after a hopeless effort to form a new party on a new issue, to join one or the other sectional party. Its effects on the people of the two sections were still more unfortunate: in the north, it laid the foundation for the belief, which the Dred Scott decision was soon to confirm, that the whole policy of the south was a greedy, grasping, selfish desire for the extension of slavery; in the south, by the grant of what none but the politicians had hitherto asked or expected, the abolition of the Missouri compromise, it prepared the people for the belief that the subsequent forced settlement of Kansas by means of emigrant aid societies was a treacherous evasion by the north of the terms of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. In other words, the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and still more the Dred Scott decision which followed it, placed each section in 1860, to its own thinking, impregnably upon its own peculiar ground of aggrievement: the north remembered only the violation of the compromise of 1820 by the Kansas- Nebraska bill, taking the Dred Scott decision as only an aggravation of the original offense; the south, ignoring the compromise of 1820 as obsolete by mutual agreement, complained of the north's refusal to carry out fairly the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the Dred Scott decision. (See also FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWS.) And all this unfortunate complication was due entirely to Stephen A. Douglas' over-zealous desire to settle still more firmly and securely a question which was already settled.

—On the other hand, it is but fair to give Douglas' grounds for his action, as reported by Cutts (cited below). Having shown the imperative necessity for immediate organization of the two territories, he proceeds as follows (italics as in original): "If the necessity for the organization of the territories did in fact exist, it was right that they should be organized upon sound constitutional principles; and if the compromise measures of 1850 were a safe rule of action upon that subject, as the country in the presidential election, and both of the political parties in their national conventions in 1852, had affirmed, then it was the duty of those to whom the power had been intrusted to frame the bills in accordance with those principles. There was another reason which had its due weight in the repeal of the Missouri restriction. The jealousies of the two great sections of the Union, north and south, had been fiercely excited by the slavery agitation. The southern states would never consent to the opening of those territories to settlement, so long as they were excluded by act of congress from moving there and holding their slaves; and they had the power to prevent the opening of the country forever, inasmuch as it had been forever excluded by treaties with the Indians, which could not be changed or repealed except by a two-thirds vote in the senate. But the south were willing to consent to remove the Indian restrictions, provided the north would at the same time remove the Missouri restriction, and thus throw the country open to settlement on equal terms by the people of the north and south, and leave the settlers at liberty to introduce or exclude slavery as they should think proper." All this is certainly of very great force, but only as a statement of the problem which was to be solved mainly by Douglas and the northern democracy, and not, as Douglas evidently takes it, as a justification of the particular solution which was adopted. (See, further, DRED SCOTT CASE, SLAVERY, SECESSION, UNITED STATES.)

—See Congressional Globe, 33d Congress, 1st Session, 221; Greelcy's Political Text Book, 79; Claskey's Political Text Book, 346; 3 Spencer's United States, 504; Cutts' Treatise on Party Questions, 91; 2 Stephens' War Between the States, 241; Buchanan's Administration, 26; Botts' Great Rebellion, 147; Benton's Examination of the Dred Scott Decision, 156; Harris' Political Conflict, 155; 1 Draper's Civil War, 417; 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 224; New Englander, May, 1861; Giddings' Rebellion, 364; 2 Wilson's Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, 378; Cairnes' Slare Power. 115; Schuckers' Life of Chase, 134; authorities under KANSAS, and other articles above referred to; Theodore Parker's Speeches, 297. The act is in 10 Stat at Large, 277.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

KENTUCKY

KENTUCKY, a state of the American Union, formed from territory originally belonging to Virginia. A land company formed the government of "Transylvania" within its limits, May 23, 1775, but Governor Dunmore refused to recognize it, and the Virginia legislature formed the whole territory into the county of Kentucky, Dec. 6, 1776. In 1784-5 three conventions demanded a separation, to which the Virginia legislature agreed on condition that congress should agree, and that Kentucky should assume a share of Virginia's debt, and recognize Virginia's land warrants. Congress postponed consideration of the matter until the organization of the new federal government; and this, and the neglect to insist on the navigation of the Mississippi (see ANNEXATIONS, I), so angered the people that active but unsuccessful efforts were made to constitute Kentucky an independent republic, in alliance with Spain or with the British in Canada. The final act of the Virginia legislature, consenting to separation, was passed Dec. 18, 1789; congress, by act of Feb. 4, 1791, admitted the state, the admission to take effect June 1, 1792; and a state convention, April 2-19, 1791, formed the first constitution of Kentucky. This last was the tenth popular convention which had been held during the long process of admission.

—BOUNDARIES. The Virginia act of Dec. 6, 1776, had defined the county of Kentucky as "all the country west of the Big Sandy creek to the Mississippi," and this was the limit of the subsequent state. The boundary between Virginia and Kentucky, from the Big Sandy southwestward, along the ridge of the Cumberland mountains, was fixed by joint commissioners in May, 1799, and was ratified by Kentucky Dec. 2, 1799, and by Virginia Jan. 13, 1800. The southern boundary, between Kentucky and Tennessee, was settled by joint commissioners in February, 1820, and ratified by congress May 12, 1820.

—CONSTITUTIONS. The first constitution made suffrage universal on two years residence in the state. The house of representatives was to consist of not more than 100 nor less than 40 members, chosen annually by the people. Every fourth year a number of electors equal to the number of representatives was to be chosen by popular vote, and these were to choose the governor and a senate one-fourth of the house's members, "men of the most wisdom, experience and virtue, above twenty-seven years of age." The legislature was empowered to prohibit the importation of slaves, but not to pass emancipation laws without consent of owners and compensation. The selection of the capital was intrusted to a committee, who chose Frankfort.

—The second constitution was framed by a convention at Frankfort, July 22- Aug. 7, 1799. It was not submitted to the people, and took effect Jan. 1, 1800. Its principal changes were the abolition of the electoral system and the choice of the governor and senate by popular vote, the latter in senatorial districts. An effort, led by Henry Clay, to insert a clause securing the gradual abolition of slavery was defeated.

—The third constitution was framed by a convention at Frankfort, Oct, 7, 1849-June 11, 1850, and ratified by popular vote. Its principal changes were a complete reorganization of the judiciary system; the fixing of the number of senators at 38 and of representatives at 100; the limiting of the state debt to $500,000; and the insertion of a clause declaring the right of property in slaves to be "before and higher than any constitutional sanction."

—GOVERNORS: Isaac Shelby (1792-6); James Garrard (1796-1804); Christopher Greenup (1804-8); Charles Scott (1808-2). Isaac Shelby (1812-16); George Madison (1816-20); John Adair (1820-24); Joseph Desha (1824-8); Thomas Metcalfe (1828-32); John Breathitt (1832-6); Jas. Clark (1836-40); Robert P. Letcher (1840-44); William Owsley (1844-8); John J. Crittenden (1848-51); Lazarus W. Powell (1851-5); Charles S. Morehead (1855-9), Beriah Magoffin (1859-63); Thos. E. Bramlette (1863-7); John L. Helm (1867-71); P. H. Leslie (1871-5); James B. McCreary (1875-9); Luke P. Blackburn (1879-83).

—POLITICAL HISTORY. Notwithstanding Kentucky's determination to separate from Virginia, the political connection between the two states was very intimate for many years. The first inhabitants were very largely of Virginia origin, and the Virginia influence over their leaders is well illustrated by the coincidence in the passage of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798 and 1799. (See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.) The only disturbing element was a small but active "Spanish party," whose leaders, some of them prominent in the state judiciary, were pensioners of the Spanish commandant at New Orleans until the cession of Louisiana. (See ANNEXATIONS, I.) The feeling of the mass of the people, however, was so strongly against Spain and the Spanish party that both Genet and Burr made Kentucky the scene of their most active intrigues. (See GENET, CITIZEN; BURR, AARON.) A federalist party was gradually formed, and in 1795 it succeeded in securing the election by the legislature of Humphrey Marshall to the United States senate. With the exception of this federalist success, the state was under republican (democratic) control during its early years, and in 1801 the tenure of the dominant party was made permanent and secure by the national overthrow of the federal party. The state's electoral votes were cast for Washington and Jefferson in 1792 and for Jefferson and Burr in 1796; and from that time until 1830 the governors, legislatures and congressmen were democratic, though in 1824 the electoral votes of Kentucky were naturally given to Henry Clay.

—The only purely local political contest during this period was upon the relief of delinquent debtors, 1820-26. An act for that purpose was passed by the legislature, and was decided unconstitutional, first by a circuit court and then by the state supreme court. The "relief party" elected their candidate for governor in 1824, and a majority of the legislature, but not the two thirds majority necessary to remove the judges. They therefore proceeded to reorganize the supreme court by act, and two supreme courts were in existence until 1826, when the "anti-relief party" gained control, repealed the act of reorganization, and left the old court in possession.

—Henry Clay exercised a great influence over the politics of Kentucky from the beginning of his public life. In 1828 the state's electoral votes were cast for Jackson against Adams, and most of the state's representatives in congress were "Jackson democrats"; but the new governor was a partisan of Clay. On the appearance of the national whig party, soon after, with Clay as its leader, Kentucky became a whig state, and so remained until the overthrow of the party. The legislatures were whig; the governors were whig until 1831; and a majority of the representatives in congress were of the same party. In 1837-9 there was but one democratic representative out of thirteen; but usually the whig proportion was from one-third to one-half. The United States senators, during the same period, were all whigs; Senator Powell, chosen in 1859, being the first democratic senator chosen by Kentucky since 1828. In 1854 the whig organization, now taking the name of Americans, elected the governor, a majority of the legislature, and six of the ten congressmen. In 1856 the democrats for the first time carried the state in a presidential election, and the state's electoral votes were cast for Buchanan. In 1858 the legislature also became democratic. In 1860 the electoral votes of the state were cast for Bell. (See BORDER STATES, CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY)

—At the outbreak of the rebellion in 1861 the sympathies of the state administration were with the south, and an extra session of the legislature was summoned by the governor. Jan. 18, for the purpose of calling a state convention. This the legislature refused to do, but appointed delegates instead to the "peace convention" at Washington. Another extra session of the legislature was called, April 28. It again refused to call a state convention, refused to grant the governor $3,000,000 to arm the state guard, and ordered that body to take the oath of allegiance to the United States as well as to the state. June 30, representatives were chosen to the extra session of congress, eight being unionists and one secessionist, the total vote being 92,500 for the former and 37,700 for the latter.

—At first the idea of "neutrality" between the federal and confederate governments was somewhat in vogue in Kentucky, and Governor Magoffin, by proclamation of May 20, 1861, even ordered both the federal and confederate authorities to abstain from any entrance upon the soil of the state. The legislature which met in September, 1861, put an end to this idea. By very large majorities it passed over the governor's veto a resolution demanding the unconditional withdrawal of confederate troops from Kentucky; another to transfer the command of the state troops to Gen. Robert Anderson, of the federal army; and another to request the resignation or expulsion of United States senators Breckinridge and Powell. From this time the position of the state was never ambiguous, and those citizens of the state who went into the confederate armies warred against their state as well as against their national government. Dec. 18, 1861, a mass "sovereignty" convention met at Russellville, and appointed a revolutionary state government which controlled some of the southern counties for a few months, but dissolved before the first advance of the federal armies. Dec. 10, 1861, the confederate states congress had passed an act admitting Kentucky, and the state was represented there by members chosen by the Kentucky regiments in the confederate service. In 1862 Bragg, in his great raid, drove the legislature out of Frankfort and inaugurated Richard Hawes as provisional governor, Oct. 4; but Hawes retired the next day with Bragg's retreating army. During the remainder of the war Kentucky was released from most of the distresses which were felt by the other border states which were the seat of war; but had to endure the minor hardships of guerilla warfare, military interferences with elections, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. and abolition of slavery.

—Throughout and since the war the state has been steadily democratic, the opposition proportion of the popular vote being 30 per cent, in 1864, 26 per cent, in 1868, 46 per cent. in 1872, 37 per cent. in 1876, and 39 per cent, in 1880 During the same period the governors, congressmen, and most of the local officials have been democrats. In 1880 the republicans carried one of the ten congressional districts, the ninth, comprising the southeastern portion of the state; in three other districts the republicans secured between 40 and 50 per cent. of the total vote; in the remaining six the republican vote is of hardly any influence. In the legislature of 1830-81 the democrats had 112 of the 137 members of the state legislature.

—The name of the state, originally Kain-tuck-eé, is said to mean "the dark and bloody ground," and to have been given because the territory was the scene of almost constant Indian warfare. The derivation is at least doubtful.

—Among the political leaders of the state have been the following: William T. Barry, democratic representative 1810-11, United States senator 1815-16, and postmaster general under Jackson; James B. Beck, democratic representative 1867-75, and United States senator 1877-83; Joseph C. S. Blackburn, democratic representative 1875-83; Linn Boyd, democratic representative 1835-7 and 1839-55, and speaker of the house 1851-5; John C. Breckinridge (see his name); Benj. H. Bristow (see WHISKY RINGS, ADMINISTRATIONS, XXII.); John Young Brown, democratic representative 1878-7; William O. Butler (see his name); John G. Carlisle, democratic representative 1877-83; Henry Clay, J. J. Crittenden (see those names); Garret Davis, whig representative 1839-47, and United States senator 1861-72, James Guthrie, secretary of the treasury under Pierce, and democratic United States senator 1865-8; Joseph Holt, postmaster general and secretary of war under Buchanan, and judge advocate general under Lincoln; Richard M. Johnson (see his name); Amos Kendall, postmaster general under Jackson and Van Buren (see KITCHEN CABINET); J. Proctor Knott, democratic representative 1867-71 and 1875-83; Robert P. Letcher. representative (Clay republican and whig) 1823-35, governor 1840-44. and minister to Mexico 1849-52; Humphrey Marshall, representative (whig) 1840-52, (American) 1855-9, minister to China 1852-4, and brigadier general in the confederate service; George D. Prentice, editor of the Louisville "Journal" (whig) 1830-70; L. H. Rousseau, major general in the United States army, republican representative 1865-7, James Speed, attorney general under Lincoln and Johnson.

—See 1 Poore's Federal and State Constitutions; Filson's Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucky (1784), Mann Butler's History of Kentucky (to 1813); H. Marshall's History of Kentucky (1824); Collins' History of Kentucky (to 1850: continued to 1877): Cassaday's History of Louisville (to 1852); Arthur and Carpenter's History of Kentucky (1852); Allen's History of Kentucky (1872); 2 Draper's Civil War, 222, 356; Danville Review, March, June, September, 1862, ("Secession in Kentucky").

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS

KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (IN U. S. HISTORY), two series of resolutions adopted in 1798-9 by the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia, for the purpose of defining the strict construction view, at that time, of the relative powers of the state and federal governments. (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, II.)

—The underlying reason for the preparation of these resolutions was the feeling which had been growing since 1791, that the federal party, not satisfied with the powers given to the federal government by the constitution, was endeavoring to obtain further and greater powers by strained and illegitimate interpretations of the powers which had been granted (see BANK CONTROVERSIES, II.; CONSTRUCTION); the immediate moving cause was the passage of the alien and sedition laws in 1798. (See ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS.) Jefferson and Madison therefore prepared these two series of resolutions as a statement of the objections not only to these particular laws, but to broad construction in general.

—Jefferson was unwilling to appear openly in the matter, either, as his enemies charge, because of the secretiveness and underhandedness which were natural to him, or, as his friends put it, because of his punctilious regard to the requirements of his position as vice-president. He therefore intrusted the resolutions which he had prepared to George Nicholas, of the Kentucky legislature, under a solemn assurance that "it should not be known from what quarter they came" Nicholas became the reputed father of the resolutions, and it was not until December, 1821, that his son obtained from Jefferson an acknowledgement of their real authorship. The resolutions were passed by the Kentucky house, Nov. 10, 1798, and by the senate Nov. 13, and were approved by the governor Nov. 19. The Virginia resolutions were prepared by Madison, who was then a member of the legislature, were introduced by John Taylor, of Caroline, were passed by the house Dec. 21, 1798, and were passed by the senate and approved by the governor, Dec. 24. The resolutions were transmitted by the governors of the two states to the governors of the other states, to be laid before their respective legislatures. The only responses, all warmly antagonistic to the resolutions, were made by Delaware, Feb. 1, 1799, by Rhode Island in February, by Massachusetts Feb. 9, by New York March 5, by Connecticut May 9, by New Hampshire June 14, by Vermont Oct. 30; that of Massachusetts is especially long and argumentative, and fully denies the competency of any state legislature "to judge of the acts and measures of the federal government," Nov. 14, 1799, the Kentucky legislature added another resolution to its series of 1798, thus forming the so-called Kentucky resolutions of 1799. In the Virginia legislature the unfavorable answers of the other states were referred to a committee, Madison being chairman, which made, Jan. 7, the celebrated "report of 1800," explaining and defending the resolutions of 1798. With this report the formal history of the resolutions ends. They were renewed, however, in substance, by other states in later years, as by Pennsylvania in 1809, and by Massachusetts in 1814, and, oddly enough, one of the first and most emphatic repudiations of these later offsprings of the Virginia resolutions came from the Virginia legislature. How far the later doctrines of nullification and secession are the legitimate outcome of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions will be considered after the substance of these resolutions, and the exact language of the more important ones, have been given.

—THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS (of 1798) are nine in number, as follows: 1. "That the several states composing the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purpose, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government: and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party; that this government. created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself since that would have made its discretion, and not the constitution. the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." 2. The second resolution denied the power of congress to pass laws for the punishment of any crimes except those mentioned in the constitution, and therefore declared the sedition law to be "void and of no force." 3. The third made the same declaration as to the same law on the ground of its abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press. 4. The fourth made the same declaration as to the alien law on the ground that no power over aliens had been given to the federal government by the constitution. 5. The fifth made the same declaration as to the same law on the ground that it infringed the right of the states to permit the migration of such persons as they should think proper to admit until the year 1808 6. The sixth made the same declaration as to the same law on the ground that it violated the amendments which secured "due process of law" and "public trial by an impartial jury" to accused persons, and also that it transferred the judicial power from the courts to the president. 7. The seventh complained of broad construction in general as "a fit and necessary subject for revisal and correction at a time of greater tranquillity, while those specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate redress." 8. The eighth directed the transmission of the resolutions to the state's senators and representatives in congress for the purpose of securing a repeal of the obnoxious acts. 9. The ninth directed the transmission of the resolutions to the other states, with a warning that, "if the barriers of the constitution were thus swept from us all" by an acknowledgment of the power of congress to punish crimes not enumerated in the constitution, "no rampart now remains against the passions and the power of a majority of congress," nor any power to prevent congress, which had banished the aliens, from banishing, also, "the minority of the same body, the legislatures. judges, governors, and counselors of the states, nor their other peaceable inhabitants, who may be obnoxious to the view of the president or be thought dangerous to his election or other interests, public or personal"; and it closed by asking that "the co-states, recurring to their natural rights not made federal, will concur in declaring these void and of no force, and will each unite with this commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of congress." The additional Kentucky resolution of 1799, reiterated its definition of the constitution as "a compact," and declared "that the several states which formed that instrument, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction; that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts, done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy; that, although this commonwealth, as a party to the federal compact, will bow to the laws of the Union, yet it does, at the same time, declare that it will not now or ever hereafter cease to oppose, in a constitutional manner, every attempt, at what quarter soever offered, to violate that compact; and finally, in order that no pretext or arguments may be drawn from a supposed acquiescence, on the part of this commonwealth, in the constitutionality of those laws, and be thereby used as precedents for similar future violations of the federal compact, this commonwealth does now enter against them its solemn protest."

—THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS were eight in number. 1. The first resolution expressed the determination of the legislature to defend the constitutions of the United States and of the state. 2. The second expressed its warm attachment to the Union. 3. "That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the federal government as resulting from the compact to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states, which are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them." 4. The fourth expressed the deep regret of the assembly at the introduction of a broad construction of the constitution as inevitably tending to change the American republican system into "at best a mixed monarchy." 5. The fifth protested against the alien and sedition laws as unconstitutional. 6. The sixth called attention to the amendment protecting liberty of speech and of the press as having been originally proposed by Virginia. 7. The seventh expressed the affection of Virginia for the other states, and concluded as follows: that "the general assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions in the other states, in confidence that they will concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional; and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each for co-operating with this state, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights and liberties reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." 8. The eighth requested the governor to transmit the resolutions to the governors of the other states, to be laid before their legislatures, and to the Virginia senators and representatives in congress.

—Hardly any problem in American political history offers so many difficulties as the effort to get at a fair estimate of these two series of resolutions. The evil and the good are so complicated that disentanglement sometimes seems hopeless. On the one hand, the general spirit of the resolutions, their insistence upon the absolute illegality of anything but a strict construction of the constitution, has always been a fundamental feature of the party founded by Jefferson and Madison. Its doubtful utility is elsewhere considered; but, whether necessary or unnecessary, the doctrine is legitimate, and is one of the factors which have made up American political history to the present time. (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, II., VI.; CONSTRUCTION.) On the other hand, the illegitimate doctrine that the American Union is a "compact" between separate and sovereign states is so clearly, even "peremptorily," laid down in both series of resolutions that it can not be mistaken or evaded. The historical truth of this doctrine is elsewhere considered (see NATION, STATE SOVEREIGNTY); it remains here only to consider the difference between the state sovereignty of Jefferson and Madison, and that of the nullificationists and secessionists of later times. It is difficult to follow, at the best, and is still more obscured by the course of Benton and other later Jeffersonians in flatly denying that the sovereignty of states, proprio vigore, is asserted in the resolutions. By so doing, they made an issue on which Calhoun and Calhoun's disciples found no difficulty in overthrowing them. It does not seem to have occurred to them that the issue might perhaps have been fairly confessed and avoided.

—Before considering the question whether the term "nullification," as used by Jefferson in the Kentucky resolution of 1799, was identical with the same word as used by Calhoun, it is well to notice how carefully both the Kentucky and the Virginia resolutions avoid any suggestion of action by a single state. They certainly maintain the doctrine that "each state acceded to the Union as a state, and is an integral party" to the "compact under the style and title of a constitution for the United States"; and from this doctrine the Calhoun programme derives its justification. But, in the application of the doctrine by Jefferson and Madison, it is always "those sovereignties" which are to undo unconstitutional laws—"the states," not "a state"; and practically the Jeffersonian doctrine seems to have been that there were but two parties to the "compact," the states of the one part, and the federal government of the other, and that the former in national convention were to be frequently assembled to decide on the constitutionality of the latter's acts. Webster, long afterward, ridiculed unsparingly the idea that the states could form a compact with another party which was only created by the compact, and non-existent before it; and Calhoun's theory that the "compact" was between the states themselves, and that the federal government was the result of it and not a party to it, seems more logical than Jefferson's. Logical or illogical, however, Jefferson's theory was infinitely less destructive than Calhoun's; was strictly in line of constitutional practice; and is perfectly in accord with the constitution's provisions for its own amendment. The state sovereignty preamble in the first Kentucky resolution, and third Virginia resolution, is not essential, and is, in fact, only a hindrance, to the spirit of the resolutions, which is simply that desire for a national convention of the states which has since been the first thought of all Jefferson's disciples in times of difficulty or danger. This Jeffersonian idea of the ultimate interpreter of doubtful constitutional questions can not be more strongly put than in Jefferson's own words, in his letter of June 12, 1823, to Justice Johnson: "The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in convention, at the call of congress, or of two-thirds of the states. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs."

—Though state sovereignty was by no means essential as a basis for the resolutions, it was the shortest and easiest way to justify them. It is therefore important to notice that in the hands of Jefferson and Madison state sovereignty, separate or collective, was to be a shield for the protection of the individual; in the hands of Calhoun it was to be a shield for a section and for slavery. The distinction is not trivial; it is vital, as can be seen most easily from its necessary results. It is difficult to conceive of an act involving individual rights, which an American congress could be induced to pass, so arbitrary and tyrannical as to lead a state, or even a group of states, beyond declamation and resolutions, and into open conflict with the federal government. Even the development of so-called "sections" would hardly have been likely to make even state sovereignty anything more than a check, and a very weak one, upon the federal government, so long as the country was reasonably homogeneous and each state had separate interests. But the development of slavery as a distinctive badge of a particular section made state sovereignty, for the section, really sectional sovereignty, since all its states were controlled by a common design. While each state tended to its own particular direction, the total force exerted was fairly balanced and comparatively harmless; when the force of a group of states became bound together by slavery, state sovereignty became an imminent peril to union. The Jackson and Benton school of democrats seem to have had this distinction in mind when they so warmly denied that which seems so difficult to deny, the identity of Jefferson's and Calhoun's state sovereignty. It is apparent, however, that the distinction is one of purpose, not of substance. (See SLAVERY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY.)

—It has been stated that the great object of state opposition to federal enactments, in the minds of Jefferson and Madison, was to secure the meeting of a national convention of all the states, in which, as the highest exponent of national authority, the federal enactment would be valid unless declared void, or "nullified," by an amendment which when ratified by three-fourths of the states, should bind not only congress and the executive, but the judiciary as well. Such a convention has been a desideratum with Jefferson's party at intervals since 1787. and, as it is provided for in the constitution, it would be a perfectly legitimate mode of procedure; but the difficulty of uniting the necessary proportion (two-thirds) of the states in the demand for it has as yet proved insuperable. This seems undoubtedly to have been the "nullification" intended by the Virginia resolutions. 1, from the debates upon them in the Virginia assembly which passed them, and 2, from the remarks of the "report of 1800" upon the third Virginia resolution. Jefferson, not being the avowed author of the Kentucky resolutions, has left no defense or explanation of them, but a line of citations is given among the authorities at the end of this article, illustrative of his adherence to the general position that "the states" (in national convention) were the final interpreters of the constitution. The objection to this statement of the main object of the resolutions is that, as such a convention is provided for in the constitution, its defense by a state legislature was a work of supererogation. In this respect it is well to compare the proceedings of the British parliament in 1792-3, which the reader will find well stated by Yonge, as cited below: that body had passed an alien bill, a sedition bill (suspending the habeas corpus act), and a bill authorizing magistrates to disperse by force any public meeting to petition the king or parliament, or to discuss grievances, if the object or the language should to the magistrates seem dangerous. The American congress had followed the first two steps of the British precedent (excepting the habeas corpus suspension): to follow it out in full nothing was needed but a temporary forgetfulness of the difference between the unlimited power of parliament and the limited power of congress. To Madison and Jefferson the common federalist claim that the federal government was the "final" judge of its own powers seemed to be a paving of the way for some such politic forgetfulness, and for a possibly indirect prohibition of any new national convention: hence the resolutions. Their descendants have found that the small percentage of the voting population, which can, by a change of vote, overturn the dominant party in congress, is a better guarantee against congressional usurpation than all the resolutions of our history: Madison and Jefferson, with only ten years experience behind them, may fairly be held excusable for seeing no refuge from congress but the state legislatures.

—It can not, however, be doubted that Jefferson and his school would have looked upon forcible resistance by a single state to an oppressive federal law with far less disapproval than their opponents would have done (see NATION, I.), though it is just as certain that they would have looked upon such resistance as a revolutionary right. It was so stated in 1829-30 by Edward Livingston, the devoted adherent of Jefferson in 1798 and of Jackson in 1833 (see NULLIFICATION), as cited below. In a constitutional point of view, this fundamental difference between the right of "the states" in national convention, and of a single state, proprio vigore, to "nullify" acts of congress, and to interpret the constitution, above and beyond the federal judiciary, is the essential difference between the "nullification" of Jefferson and that of Calhoun. The strongest evidence to the contrary is a sentence in Jefferson's original draft of the Kentucky resolutions. It is as follows: "that every state has a natural right, in cases not within the compact, to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits." This was struck out in the final copy of the resolutions, but by whom is not known. Various explanations of this sentence have been offered, the most plausible being that the inexcusable sentence was due only to heat of composition, and was struck out by Jefferson on his realizing the full force of what he had written. On the one hand, this sentence has arrayed against it a great mass of contemporary testimony; on the other, if it is to stand as Jefferson's perfected theory, every atom of Calhoun's theory finds in it a perfect antetype.

—It is also fair and proper, in this connection, to call the reader's special attention to a letter of Dec. 24, 1825, from Jefferson to Madison, which has never hitherto received the prominence which it deserves. It is on the subject of internal improvements. He regards opposition to the new system as "desperate," but proposes a new series of resolutions, to be passed by the Virginia legislature, as a protest against it. They are much like the resolutions of 1798, but conclude by demanding an amendment to the constitution, to grant the doubtful power (see INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS), and by promising for the state and imposing upon the citizens of the state an acquiescence in the acts which we have declared to be usurpations" "until the legislature shall otherwise and ultimately decide."

—The above has been given, so far as possible, with a due regard to the standpoint and feelings of the republicans of 1798. There remains now to be considered the opening assertion of both series of resolutions, that the American Union is a "compact" between the several states. No one, not the most unreasoning admirer of Jefferson or Madison, can now defend this assertion, which is the great political error of the resolutions. (For its further consideration seeSTATE SOVEREIGNTY.) Even if it were true, the doctrine of nullification would not necessarily or properly flow from it; but the doctrine of secession is too plainly based upon it to make it an easy or profitable task to attempt to separate the two. (See NULLIFICATION, SECESSION.) It is not meant that Jefferson and Madison were secessionists: the following considerations may perhaps make the meaning more clear 1. The idea that the Union is a compact is not at all essential to either series of resolutions; but it is the sum and substance of secession. Its elimination could have had no effect upon the former, but would have made the latter an impossibility, except as a confessed revolution. 2. The date of the resolutions was less than ten years after the inauguration of the new form of government, and at a time when the idea of a "compact" was common in political language, in judicial decisions, and elsewhere. The term was a political weapon ready for use by all political leaders of all sections, and was used without any great consideration of its full results. There is infinitely more excuse for such an error in the infancy of the nation than in 1860. 3. The belief in a real "compact" was rapidly and easily eliminated in the due course of nature during the following sixty years, as its utter uselessness became apparent, except in a single section, where the interests of slavery demanded its retention and extension to its complete logical results. Even where the word was used in other sections of the Union, it was used rather as a venerable formula, signifying a particularist feeling, than with any full sense of a meaning; and its users were as much shocked in 1860 as its earlier users would have been, when its complete consequences were forced upon them. (See NATION.)

—As a summary, it may be said that the resolutions of both series are a protest against a supposed intention of the federalists to place some restrictions upon any attempt of state legislatures to demand a national convention to sit in judgment upon the acts of the federal government; that the belief in such an intention was fostered by the federalists' use of the then novel word "sovereign," as applied to the federal government, and by their constant assertions that the federal government was the "final" judge of the extent of its own powers, thus seeming to exclude any such power in a new national convention; that both Jefferson and Madison intended, 1, to appeal to public opinion, and 2, to rouse the states for a prompt call for a national convention upon the first appearance of an attempt by congress and the president to make such legislative action penal under a new sedition law; that the word "compact" in the resolutions, though unessential, is historically false and indefensible, if used in its full sense; that, as regards Madison, it is quite clear that the word was not used in its full sense; and that, as regards Jefferson, the case is much more doubtful, but may fairly be summed up in the terms of his proposed resolutions of 1825, before referred to—a theoretical acceptance of the idea of a compact in its full sense, coupled with an intense aversion to its practical enforcement.

—See 5 Hildreth's United States, 272; 1 von Holst's United States, 144; 2 Spencer's United States, 444; 1 Schouler's United States, 423, 424 (note); 4 Elliot's Debates, 528 (Va. Res.), 532 (answers of other states). 540 (Ky. Res.), 546 (Report of 1800); 3 Jefferson's Works (edit. 1829), 452, 4: 163, 306, 344, 374, 418 (Resolutions of 1825), 422; 9 Jefferson's Works (edit. 1853), 469; 2 Randall's Life of Jefferson, 449 and App. D; 1 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 347; Hunt's Life of Livingston, 345; 2 Benton's Debates of Congress, 373; Nicolson's Debates in the Virginia Assembly of 1798; Yonge's Constitutional History of England, end of chapter iv; 1 Stephens' War Between the States, 441; Story's Commentaries, § 1289 (note); 3 Webster's Works, 448; Duer's Constitutional Jurisprudence (2d edit.), 412; 1 Adams' Works of John Adams, 561; and authorities under STATE SOVEREIGNTY; NULLIFICATION; SECESSION; DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, II.; CONSTITUTION, IV.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON

KITCHEN CABINET

KITCHEN CABINET (IN U. S. HISTORY), a coterie of intimate friends of President Jackson, who were popularly supposed to have more influence over his action than his official advisers. General Duff Green was a St. Louis editor, who in 1828 came to Washington and established the "United States Telegraph," which became the confidential organ of the administration in 1829. Major Wm. B. Lewis, of Nashville, had long been Jackson's warm personal friend, and after his inauguration remained with him in Washington, as second auditor of the treasury. Isaac Hill (see NEW HAMPSHIRE), editor of the "New Hampshire Patriot," was second comptroller of the treasury. Amos Kendall, formerly editor of the Georgetown "Argus," in Kentucky, was fourth auditor of the treasury, and became postmaster general in 1835. Others, besides these, were sometimes included under the name of "the kitchen cabinet," but these four were most generally recognized as its members.

—In 1830-31 Green took the side of Calhoun against Jackson, and his newspaper was superseded as the administration organ by the "Globe," Francis P. Blair and John C. Rives being its editors. Blair thereafter took Green's place in the unofficial cabinet.

—The name of "kitchen cabinet" was also used in regard to certain less known advisers of Presidents John Tyler and Andrew Johnson, but, as commonly used, refers to the administration of Jackson. The best and most easily available description of Jackson's "kitchen cabinet" is in 3 Parton's Life of Jackson, 178.

A. J.

KING

KING. The primary signification of this word is, a person in whom is vested the higher executive functions in a sovereign state, together with a share, more or less limited, of the sovereign power. The state may consist of a vast assemblage of persons, like the French or the Spanish nation, or the British people in which several nations are included; or it may be small, like the Danes, or like one of the Saxon states in England before the kingdoms were united into one; yet if the chief executive functions are vested in some one person who has also a share in the sovereign power, the idea represented by the word king seems to be complete. It is even used for those chiefs of savage tribes who are a state only in a certain loose sense of the term.

—It is immaterial whether the power of such a person is limited only by his own will, or whether his power be limited by certain immemorial usages and written laws, or in any other way; still such a person is a king. Nor does it signify whether he succeed to the kingly power by descent and inheritance on the death of his predecessor, just as the eldest son of a British peer succeeds to his father's rank and title on the death of the parent, or is elected to fill the office by some council or limited body of persons, or by the suffrages of the whole nation. Thus there was a king of Poland, who was an elected king; there is a king of England, who now succeeds by hereditary right.

—In countries where the kingly office is hereditary, some form has always been observed on the accession of a new king, in which there was a recognition on the part of the people of his title, a claim from them that he should pledge himself to the performance of certain duties, and generally a religious ceremony performed, in which anointing him with oil and placing a crown upon his head were conspicuous acts. By this last act is symbolized his supremacy; and by the anointing a certain sacredness is thrown around his person. These kinds of ceremonies exist in most countries in which the sovereign, or the person sharing in the sovereign power, is known as king; and these ceremonies seem to make a distinction between the succession of an hereditary king to his throne and the succession of an hereditary peer to his rank.

—The distinction between a king and an emperor is not one of power, but it has an historical meaning. Emperor comes from imperator, a title used by the sovereigns of the Roman empire. When that empire became divided, the sovereigns of the west and of the east respectively called themselves emperors. The emperor of Germany was regarded as a kind of successor to the emperors of the west, and the emperor of Russia (who is often called the czar) is, with less pretension to the honor. sometimes spoken of as the successor to the emperor of the east. But we speak of the emperor of China where emperor is clearly nothing more than king, and we use emperor rather than king only out of regard to the vast extent of his dominions. Napoleon usurped the title of emperor; and we now sometimes speak of the British empire, an expression which is free from objection. The word imperium (empire) was used both under the Roman emperors, and under the later republic to express the whole Roman dominion.

—The word king is of pure Teutonic origin, and is found slightly varied in its literal elements in most of the languages which have sprung from the Teutonic. The French, the Italian, the Spanish and the Portuguese continue the use of the Latin word rex, only slightly varying the orthography according to the analogies of each particular language. King, traced to its origin, seems to denote one to whom superior knowledge had given superior power, allied, as it seems to be, to know, con, can; but on the etymology, or, what is the same thing, the remote origin of the word, different opinions have been held, and the question may still be considered undetermined.

—There are other words employed to designate the sovereign, or the person who is invested with the chief power of particular states, in using which we adopt the word which the people of those states use, instead of the word king. Thus, there is the shah of Persia, the grand sultan. and formerly there was the dey of Algiers. In the United States of America certain powers are given by the federal constitution to one person, who is elected to enjoy them for four years, with the title of president. A regent is a person appointed by competent authority to exercise the kingly office during the minority or the mental incapacity of the real king; this definition, at least, is true of a regent of the British empire.

—A personage in whom such extraordinary powers have been vested must of necessity have had very much to do with the progress and welfare of particular nations, and with the progress of human society at large. When held by a person of a tyrannical turn, they might be made use of to repress all that was great and generous in the masses who were governed, and to introduce among them all the miseries of slavery. Possessed by a person of an ambitious spirit, they might introduce unnecessary quarreling among nations to open the way for conquest, so that whole nations might suffer for the gratification of the personal ambition of one. The lover of peace and truth, and human improvement and security, may have found in the possession of kingly power the means of benefiting a people to an extent that might satisfy the most benevolent heart. But the long experience of mankind has proved that for the king himself and for his people it is best that there should be strong checks in the frame of society on the will of kings, in the forms of courts of justice, councils, parliaments, and other bodies or single persons whose concurrence must be obtained before anything is undertaken in which the interests of the community are extensively involved. In constitutional kingdoms, as in England, there are controlling powers, and even in countries in which the executive and legislative power are nominally in some one person absolutely, the acts of that person are virtually controlled by the opinion of the people, a power constantly increasing as the facilities of communication and the knowledge of a people advance.

—Nothing can be more various than the constitutional checks in different states on the kingly power, or as it is more usually called in England, the royal prerogative. Such a subject must be passed over in an article of confined limits such as this must be, else in speaking of the kingly dignity it might have been proper to exhibit how diversely power is distributed in different states, each having at its head a king. But the subject must not be dismissed without a few observations on the kingly office (now by hereditary descent discharged by a queen) as it exists in the British empire.

—The English kingly power is traced to the establishment of Egbert, at the close of the eighth century, as king of the English. His family is illustrated by the talents and virtues of Alfred, and the peacefulness and piety of Edward. On his death there ensued a struggle for the succession between the representative of the Danish kings, who for a while had usurped upon the posterity of Egbert, and William then duke of Normandy. It ended with the success of William at the battle of Hastings, A. D. 1066.

—This is generally regarded as a new beginning of the race of English kings, for William was but remotely allied to the Saxon kings. In his descendants the kingly office has ever since continued; but though the English throne is hereditary, it is not hereditary in a sense perfectly absolute, nor does it seem to have been ever so considered. When Henry I. was dead, leaving only a daughter, named Maud, she did not succeed to the throne; and when Stephen died, his son did not succeed, but the crown passed to the son of Maud. Again, on the death of Richard I. a younger brother succeeded, to the exclusion of the son and daughter of the deceased. Then ensued a long series of regular and undisputed successions; but when Richard II. was deposed, the crown passed to his cousin, Henry of Lancaster, son of John of Gaunt, son of Edward III., though there were descendants living of Lionel, duke of Clarence, who was older than John among the children of Edward III. When the rule of Henry VI. became weak, the issue of Lionel advanced their claim. The struggle was long and bloody. It ended in a kind of compromise, the chief of the Lancastrian party taking to wife the heiress of the Yorkists. From that marriage have sprung all the later kings, and the principle of hereditary succession remained undisturbed till the reign of King William III., who was called to the throne on the abdication of James II., when an act was passed excluding the male issue of James, the issue of his sister the duchess of Orleans, and the issue of his aunt the queen of Bohemia, with the exception of her youngest daughter the Princess Sophia and her issue, who were Protestants. On the death of Queen Anne this law of succession took effect in favor of King George I., son of the Princess Sophia.

—Now the heir succeeds to the throne immediately on the decease of his predecessor, so that the king, as the phrase is, never dies. The course of descent is to the sons and their issue, according to seniority; and if there is a failure of male issue, the crown descends to a female. The person who succeeds by descent to the crown of England, succeeds also to the kingly office in Scotland and Ireland, and in all the possessions of the British empire.

—At the coronation of the king he makes oath to three things that he will govern according to law; that he will cause justice to be administered; and that he will maintain the Protestant church.

—His person is sacred. He can not by any process of law be called to account for any of his acts. His concurrence is necessary to every legislative enactment. He sends embassies, makes treaties, and even enters into wars without any previous consultation with parliament. He nominates the judges and other high officers of state, the officers of the army and navy, the governors of colonies and dependencies, and the bishops, deans and some other dignitaries of the church. He calls parliament together, and can at his pleasure prorogue or dissolve it. He is the fountain of honor; all hereditary titles are derived from his grant. He can also grant privileges of an inferior kind, such as markets and fairs.

—This is a very slight sketch of the powers that belong to the kings of England; but the exercise of any or all of these powers is practically limited. The king can not act politically without an agent, and this agent is not protected by that irresponsibility which belongs to the king himself, but may be brought to account for his acts if he transgresses the law. The agents by whom the king acts are his ministers, whom the king selects and dismisses at his pleasure; but practically he can not keep a ministry which can not command a majority in the house of commons; and virtually, all the powers of the crown, which make so formidable an array upon paper, are exercised by the chief minister, or prime minister, for the time. The king now does not even attend the cabinet councils; and the power which in theory belongs to his kingly office, and in fact in earlier periods was exercised by him, is now become purely formal. But though the king of England has lost his real power, he has obtained in place of it perfect security for his person, and for the transmission to his descendants of all the honor and respect due to the head of an extensive and powerful empire.

BOHN.

KING

KING, Rufus, was born at Scarborough, Mass. (now in Maine), March 24, 1755, and died at Jamaica, N. Y., April 29, 1827. He was graduated at Harvard in 1777, was a Massachusetts delegate to the continental congress 1784-6, and removed to New York in 1788. He was United States senator (federalist) 1789-96, and minister to Great Britain 1796-1803. His support of the war of 1812 made him United States senator 1813-25, and he was again appointed minister to Great Britain 1825-6. From 1800 until 1812 he was the regular federalist candidate for vice-president. (See FEDERAL PARTY, II.)

KING, William Rufus

KING, William Rufus, vice-president of the United States in 1853, was born in Sampson county, N. C., April 7, 1786, and died at Cahawba, Ala., April 18, 1853. He was graduated at the university of North Carolina in 1803, studied law, was a democratic member of congress from Alabama 1811-16, United States senator 1819-44, minister to France 1844-6, and United States senator 1846-53. In 1852 he was elected vice-president (see DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, V.), and died soon after taking the oath of office.

KNIGHTS OF THE ORDER OF ST. CRISPIN

KNIGHTS OF THE ORDER OF ST. CRISPIN. The workmen employed in the manufacture of boots and shoes numbered more than a hundred thousand when Newell Daniels, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, projected the organization of a trades union, designed, among other things, to secure good wages, and to prevent the increase of the number of workmen beyond the needs of the community. The first lodge of this order was organized in Milwaukee, March 1, 1867, and was composed of English-speaking members exclusively. Another lodge, composed of Germans, was immediately organized in the same city. After this, the order spread with great rapidity over the United States and Canada. In 1869 it numbered 83,000 members. It consisted, 1, of the international grand lodge, which perfected its organization in 1868 at Rochester, New York; 2, of state (or province) grand lodges, of which as many as eighteen were formed; and 3, of subordinate lodges, which were formed in almost every city or town in which boots and shoes were made to any considerable extent. Grand lodges were established in Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Maryland, Kentucky, California and Louisiana, and in Ontario and New Brunswick. In 1870 the grand lodge of Massachusetts was incorporated by the legislature; and in the case of Snow vs. Wheeler (113 Mass Rep. 179), the supreme judicial court of that state decided that a lodge could maintain a suit in equity for its funds against persons having such funds in their possession; although it had decided, in the case of Walker vs Cronin (107 Mass Rep, 159), that an action could be maintained for damages sustained by an employer by reason of a combination to prevent men from continuing in his employ. This order was not long in existence. Conflicts of jurisdiction arose between the international lodge and the grand lodges, and, in addition to the difficulties incident to trades unions in general, special difficulties arose from the diversity of the elements that composed this order, and from the greatness of the number of its members. The last meeting of the international lodge was held in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1873, soon after which the order became extinct. It was partially revived in 1876, and participated in the strikes of 1877 and 1878; but by the close of 1878 it had passed out of existence. The Daughters of St. Crispin were a female branch of the order, which flourished in the eastern, middle and western states in 1870 and 1871, but soon collapsed. Unlike many other trades unions, this order sought for the improvement of that great mass of laborers who are below themselves. Having the ten-hour system among themselves, by custom, without the aid of law, they nevertheless gave a zealous support to the agitation for a ten-hour law for cotton and woolen manufactories; and it was largely through their action that the Massachusetts legislature was induced to enact the ten-hour law of 1874.

C. C.

KNOW-NOTHING PARTY

KNOW-NOTHING PARTY. (See AMERICAN PARTY.)

KU-KLUX KLAN

KU-KLUX KLAN (IN U. S. HISTORY), a secret, oath-bound organization, otherwise known as "The Invisible Empire," "The White League," "The Knights of the White Camellia," or by other names, formed in the southern states during the reconstruction period, for the primary purpose of preventing the negroes, by intimidation, from voting, or holding office. Until the abolition of slavery necessity compelled a rigid policing of the black population by official or volunteer guards. (See SLAVERY.) The origin of the "ku-klux" order was in all probability a revival of the old slave police, at first sporadic, to counteract the organization of "loyal leagues," or "Lincoln brotherhoods," among the negroes, and afterward epidemic, as the process of reconstruction by congress began to take clear form.

—The various moving causes which led to the reconstruction of southern state governments by congress are elsewhere given. (See RECONSTRUCTION.) When the preparations for reconstruction had gone far enough to make it reasonably certain that negro suffrage was to be the law in the south, the opposition, hopeless of open revolt, took the shape of this secret society. Attempts have been made to date its origin back to 1866, under the rule of Governor Brownlow in Tennessee; but the most probable date is early in 1867. The constitution mentioned below dates the first election of the order in May, 1867. The place of its origin is entirely unknown, and it was probably at first a congeries of associations in different states, originated without concert and from a common motive, and finally growing together and forming one combined organization in 1867. No authentic account of its origin, founder or date has come to light.

—A "prescript," or constitution, of the order, discovered in 1871, shows an attempt to imitate the machinery of masonic and other similar societies. The name of the order is not given; its place is always filled by stars (* *). A local lodge is called a "den"; its master the "cyclops," and its members "ghouls." The county is a "province," and is controlled by a "grand giant" and four "goblins." The congressional district is a "dominion," controlled by a "grand titan" and six "furies." The state is a "realm," controlled by a "grand dragon" and eight "hydras." The whole "empire" is controlled by a "grand wizard" and ten "genii." The banner of the society was "in the form of an isosceles triangle, five feet long and three feet wide at the staff; the material yellow with a red scalloped border about three inches in width; painted upon it, in black, a Draco volans, or flying dragon, with the motto Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." The origin, designs, mysteries and ritual were never to be written, but were to be communicated orally. The dress of the members, when in regalia, is not given, but is known to have been mainly a hood covering the head, with holes for the eyes and mouth, and descending low upon the breast; fantastic or horrible figures according to the owner's ingenuity; in other respects the ordinary dress.

—A more effective plan could hardly have been devised with which to attack a race which was superstitious, emotional, and emasculated by centuries of slavery. Before it had been tried very long the cry of "ku-klux" was sufficient to break up almost any negro meeting at night; the suspicion that disguised horsemen were abroad at night was sufficient to keep every negro in his own cabin; and the more virile and courageous of their number, who had become marked as leaders, were left to whipping, maiming or murder at the hands of the "ghouls" without any assistance from their cowering associates. By day the negroes would fight, and often did so; by night the "ku-klux" had the field to themselves.

—So long as the attacks of the order were confined to the negroes there was little need of any means more violent than whipping. A more difficult problem was that of the "carpet-baggers" and "scalawags," who with the negroes made up the republican party in the south. The "carpet-baggers" were northern men, whose interests in the south were supposed to be limited to the contents of their carpet-bags; the "scalawags" were southerners who, either from conviction or from interest, had joined the republican party and taken part in reconstruction. Neither of these classes was easily to be terrorized, and in their cases the order very easily drifted into murder, secret or open. Before the end of its third year of existence the control of the order had slipped from the hands of the influential men who had at first been willing, through it, to suppress what seemed to be the dangerous probabilities of negro suffrage, and had been seized by the more violent classes who used its machinery for the gratification of private malice, or for sheer love of murder. Even before the appointment of the final congressional investigating committee in 1871, the order had "departed from its political work, and gone into murder for hire and robbery." It had thus become dangerous to the very men who had at first tacitly or openly sanctioned its existence, and open attempts to suppress it were only checked by a fear of being classed among the "scalawags."

—Throughout the winter of 1870-71 the ku-klux difficulties in the south were debated in congress, and a joint investigating committee was appointed by the two houses, March 21. Two days afterward a message from President Grant informed congress that the condition of affairs in the south made life and property insecure and interfered with the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue; and asked that congress would enact measures to suppress the disorders. The result was the passage of the so-called "force bill," April 20, 1871. Its provisions were as follows: 1, it gave federal courts cognizance of suits against any one who should deprive another of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution, "any law, regulation, custom or usage of a state to the contrary notwithstanding"; 2, it denounced punishment by fine, imprisonment, or both, against any conspiracy of two or more persons to overthrow, put down, destroy, or levy war against the government of the United States, to delay the execution of federal laws, or to deter any one from voting, holding office, or acting as a witness or juror in a federal court; 3, in case the state authorities were unable or unwilling to suppress disorders intended to deprive any class or portion of the people of their constitutional rights, it authorized the president to employ the federal land and naval forces or militia to suppress the disorders, and 4, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "during the continuance of such rebellion against the United States," the trial provision of the act of March 3, 1863, to remain in force (see HABEAS CORPUS); 5, it authorized federal judges to exclude from juries persons whom they should judge to be in complicity with such conspiracy; 6, it gave a civil remedy to injured parties against persons who, having knowledge of conspiracy and power to prevent injuries being done, should neglect or refuse to do so; and 7, it confirmed former civil rights legislation. The habeas corpus section was to remain in force only until the end of the next regular session.

—Oct. 12, 1871, President Grant issued a preliminary proclamation calling on members of illegal associations in nine counties of South Carolina to disperse and surrender their arms and disguises within five days. Five days afterward another proclamation issued, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus in the counties named. Arrests, to the number of 200, were at once made, and the more prominent persons implicated were prosecuted to conviction. In other parts of the south the organization was rapidly run to death, the most effectual provision being that which gave federal judges power to exclude suspected persons from juries. It is probable that the order was completely overthrown before the end of January, 1872.

—The generic name of "ku-klux troubles," however, was still applied to the political and race conflicts which still continued in the south. The name was made more odious by the report of the joint congressional investigating committee, Feb. 19, 1872, in thirteen volumes, covering about 7,000 printed pages of testimony, which had been taken during the previous year. It only lacks such a collation and comparison of evidence as that of the English chief justice in the Tichborne case to make it one of the most valuable sources of information as to the social condition of the south during the reconstruction period. The reports of the majority and minority of the committee do not supply the need, for both are rather partisan than judicial. The majority (republican) report considered the issue between anarchy and law in the southern states fairly made up; the minority (democratic) report, while it did not deny that "bodies of armed men have, in several of the states of the south, been guilty of the most flagrant crimes," held that the perpetrators had no political significance, nor any support by the body of the people. The latter report seems to have been the more nearly correct at the time it was made, but only because the order itself had already become dangerous to both friends and foes. A line of citations from the volumes of the report is given below, from which the reader may learn the general features and purposes of the order.

—At the following session of congress, May 17. 1872, a bill to extend the habeas corpus section of the "ku-klux" act for another session was taken up in the senate and passed. May 28, an attempt to suspend the rules in the house, so as to consider the bill, was lost, two-thirds not voting for it; and the bill was not further considered by the house.

—The attempt to check negro suffrage in the south by the irresponsible action of disguised men, was practically abandoned after 1871. From that time such attempts were confined to open action, the presence of organized parties of whites at negro meetings, and the employment of every engine of the law by an active, determined and intelligent race. The results were the overthrow of the reconstructed state government in every southern state before 1878 (see INSURRECTION, II.; and the names of the states, particularly MISSISSIPPI and SOUTH CAROLINA) and the formation of the so-called "solid south" (See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY, VI.) The indications, however, are very strong in 1882 that the "color line" in the south, if not already broken, will soon be broken, and that the white vote of the south will soon be divided into opposing parties, each determined on maintaining unimpaired the rights of its share of the colored vote. (See RECONSTRUCTION)

—See Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, Report No. 22, part 1, 42d Congress, 2d Session, Feb. 19, 1872, as follows: 1:1, report of the majority (republican); 1:101, of the subcommittee on election laws; 1:289, of the minority (democratic); 1:589, journal of the committee; 13:35, constitution of the order; 8:452, probable origin; 2:208, 232, 11:274, 12:778, 1159 (cut), disguises; 4:653. oaths; 11:385, definition of "scalawag"; 7:764, definition of "carpet-bagger"; the most useful testimony to the reader is that of James L. Orr, South Carolina (3:1), D C. Forsyth, J. B. Gordon, and Carleton B. Cole, Georgia (6:19, 854, and 7:1182), Peter M. Dox, Lionel W. Day, and Wm. S. Mudd, Alabama (8:428, 590, and 10:1745). John A. Orr and G. W. Wells, Mississippi (12:697, 1147), and N. B. Forrest, Tennessee (13:3); Ku-Klux Trials (1871); the act of April 20, 1871, and proclamations of Oct. 12 and 17, are in 17 Stat. at Large 13, App. iii. (Nos. 3, 4).

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

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K

KANSAS

KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL

KENTUCKY

KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS

KITCHEN CABINET

KING

KING

KING, William Rufus

KNIGHTS OF THE ORDER OF ST. CRISPIN

KNOW-NOTHING PARTY

KU-KLUX KLAN