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Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow PART IV.: TRANSFORMATION OF COMMODITY-CAPITAL AND MONEY-CAPITAL INTO COMMERCIAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL (MERCHANT'S CAPITAL). - Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole

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PART IV.: TRANSFORMATION OF COMMODITY-CAPITAL AND MONEY-CAPITAL INTO COMMERCIAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL (MERCHANT'S CAPITAL). - Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole [1894]

Edition used:

Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, by Karl Marx. Ed. Federick Engels. Trans. from the 1st German edition by Ernest Untermann (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co. Cooperative, 1909).

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PART IV.

TRANSFORMATION OF COMMODITY-CAPITAL AND MONEY-CAPITAL INTO COMMERCIAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL (MERCHANT'S CAPITAL).

CHAPTER XVI.

COMMERCIAL CAPITAL.

MERCHANT'S capital, or trading capital, consists of two subdivisions, namely commercial capital and financial capital, which we shall now proceed to define more in detail, so far as is necessary for the analysis of capital in its innermost structure. This is so much the more needed, as modern political economy, even in its best representatives, indiscriminately mixes trading capital with industrial capital and wholly over looks the characteristic peculiarities of the former.

The movements of commodity-capital have been analysed in volume II. The total capital of society exists always in part in commodities on the market about to be converted into money, and this part is naturally made up of ever changing elements and is continually changing in quantity. Another part exists as money on the market, ready to be converted into commodities. These portions of the total capital are perpetually passing through these metamorphoses. To the extent that this function of capital in the process of circulation becomes a special function of independent capital and becomes an established service assigned by division of labor to some particular species of capitalists, the commodity-capital becomes commercial or financial capital.

In volume II, chapter VI, under the head of cost of circulation, 2 and 3, we have explained to what extent the transportation industry, the storage and distribution of commodities in a distributable form, may be regarded as processes of production continuing within the process of circulation. These incidents in the circulation of commodity-capital are sometimes confounded with the peculiar functions of commercial or financial capital. It is true that the peculiar functions of these last-named forms of capital are sometimes practically combined with those incidental ones, but with the advancing development of social division of labor the functions of merchant's capital evolve into a distinct type and are separated from those real functions connected with those incidents in circulation. For our present purpose, which is to define the specific difference of this special form of capital, we must leave aside those other functions as irrelevant. So far as capital employed only in the process of circulation, such as commercial capital, combines at times those other functions with its specific ones, it does not appear in its typical form. We do not get its pure type, until we strip it of all incidental functions.

We have seen that the existence of capital in the shape of commodity-capital and the metamorphoses through which it passes within the sphere of circulation in its capacity as commodity-capital on the market—a series of metamorphoses expressed by buying and selling, conversion of commodity-capital into money-capital and money-capital into commodity-capital—form a phase in the process of reproduction of industrial capital, that is, a phase in its process of production as a whole. But we have also seen at the same time that it is distinguished in its function as capital of circulation from its function as productive capital. These are two different and separate forms of existence of the same capital. One portion of the total social capital is continually on the market in the form of capital of circulation, passing through those metamorphoses. For each individual capital, however, its existence as commodity-capital, and its metamorphoses in this form, represent merely ever vanishing and ever renewed points of transition, stages of transition in the continuity of its process of production. And the elements of commodity-capital on the market vary continually, being perpetually withdrawn from the market and just as perpetually returned to it as new products of the process of production.

Commercial capital is nothing else but a changed form of a portion of this capital of circulation, which exists continually on the market in the process of its metamorphoses within the sphere of circulation. We say explicitly, a portion, because a portion of the selling and buying of commodities takes place between the industrial capitalists themselves. We leave this portion entirely out of consideration in this analysis, because it contributes nothing to the definition of the concept, or to the understanding of the specific nature, of merchant's capital. Moreover, it has been exhaustively treated in volume II.

The dealer in commodities, as a capitalist, appears first on the market as the representative of a certain sum of money, which he advances in his capacity as a capitalist. He desires to transform this sum of money from its original value x into x + 8x, that is, the original sum plus his profit. But it is evident that his capital must first enter the market in the shape of money, not only on account of his capacity as a capitalist in general, but also as a trader in commodities in particular. For he does not produce any commodities. He merely trades in them, he acts as middleman in their movements, and in order to be able to trade in them, he must first buy them, must be the owner of money-capital.

Take it that a trader in commodities owns 3,000 p.st., which he invests as a trading capital. He buys with these 3,000 p.st., say, 30,000 yards of linen from some linen manufacturer, at 2 sh. per yard. Then he sells his 30,000 yards. If the annual average rate of profit is 10%, and if he makes a profit of 10% after deducting all incidental expenses, then he has converted his 3,000 p.st. into 3,300 p.st. at the end of one year. How he makes this profit is a question which we shall discuss later. At this place we merely intend to observe the form, which the movements of his capital take. He continually buys with his 3,000 p.st. linen and sells this linen; he continually repeats this operation of buying for the purpose of selling, M—C—M', the simple form of capital confined entirely to the sphere of circulation and not interrupted by the intervention of the process of production, which lies outside of its own movement and function.

What, then, is the relation of this commercial capital to the commodity-capital representing a mere passing phase of industrial capital? So far as the linen manufacturer is concerned, he has realised the value of his linen with the money of the merchant. He has thereby completed the first phase in the metamorphosis of commodity-capital, its conversion into money, and he can now, provided that circumstances remain the same, proceed to reconvert this money into yarn, coal, wages, etc., or into means of existence, etc., for the consumption of his revenue. Leaving aside the spending of his revenue, he can continue his process of production.

But while the sale of the linen, its metamorphosis into money, has taken place so far as its direct producer is concerned, it has not yet taken place so far as the linen itself is concerned. It is still on the market as a commodity-capital and awaits the completion of its first metamorphosis, awaits its sale. Nothing has happened to this linen but a change in the person of its owner. From the point of view of its own destination, of its position in the process, it is still a commodity-capital, a saleable commodity; only, it is now in the hands of the merchant instead of those of the manufacturer. The function of selling it, of serving as an agent in the first phase of its metamorphosis, has been transferred from the manufacturer to the merchant, has been converted into the particular business of the merchant, while it used to be a function, which the producer had to perform after completing the process of its production.

Now let us assume that the merchant would not succeed in disposing of those 30,000 yards of linen during the interval, which the linen manufacturer requires for the production of another lot of 30,000 yards and its marketing at 3,000 p.st. In that case, the merchant cannot buy this new lot, because he still has the old stock of 30,000 yards on hand, which he has not yet reconverted into money-capital. A stagnation then ensues, an interruption of reproduction. Of course, the linen manufacturer might have some additional money-capital in reserve, which he might convert into productive capital independently of the sale of those 30,000 yards of linen, in order to continue his process of production. But this assumption would not alter the matter. So far as the capital tied up in the 30,000 yards of linen is concerned, its process of reproduction is and remains interrupted. Here we see indeed very clearly, that the operations of the merchant are really nothing but operations which must be performed under all circumstances in order to convert the commodity-capital of the producer into money-capital, operations, which promote the functions of the commodity-capital in the process of circulation and reproduction. If a clerk of the producer were to attend exclusively to the sale, and also with the purchase, instead of an independent merchant, this connection would not be obscured for a moment.

Commercial capital, then, is nothing but the commodity-capital of the producer, which has to pass through its transformation into money and to perform its function of commodity-capital on the market. The difference is only that this incidental function of the producer is now established as the exclusive business of a special kind of capitalists, of merchants, and becomes the independent business of a special investment of capital.

This is furthermore shown in the specific form of the circulation of commercial capital. The merchant buys a commodity and then sells it: M—C—M'. In the simple circulation of commodities, or even in the circulation of commodities as it appears when a process of circulation of industrial capital, C'—M—C, circulation is promoted by the circumstance that every piece of money changes hands twice. The linen manufacturer sells his commodity, the linen, converts it into money; the money of the buyer passes into his hands. With this money he buys yarn, coal, labor, etc., he spends the same money for the purpose of reconverting the value of linen into those commodities which form the elements of production of linen. The commodity which he buys is not the same kind of commodity which he sells. He has sold products and bought means of production. But it is different with the movements of commercial capital. With his 3,000 p.st., the linen merchant buys 30,000 yards of linen. He sells the same linen for the purpose of recovering his money-capital (increased by profits) from the circulation. It is not the same pieces of money which here change places twice, but the same commodities; the linen passes from the seller into the hands of the buyer, and from the hands of the buyer, who becomes a seller, into those of another buyer. It is sold twice, and it may be sold still oftener, if a series of other merchants intervenes. And it is precisely through this repeated sale, this twofold change of place of the same commodity, that the money advanced by its first buyer for its purchase is recovered, its reflux to him promoted. In the case of C'—M—C the twofold change of place of the same money assists in the sale of one form of commodities and the purchase of another form. In the other case, M—C—M', the twofold change of place of the same commodity assists in the recovery of the advanced money from the circulation. This shows that the commodity has not been definitely sold, when it has passed from the hands of the producer into those of the merchant, and that the latter merely continues the operation of selling—or promotes the functions of commodity-capital. But it shows at the same time that the operation C—M, which represents for the productive capitalist a mere function of his capital in its transient form of commodity-capital, constitutes for the merchant the movement M—C—M', that is, a specific utilisation of his advanced money-capital. A phase in the metamorphosis of commodities here shows itself, with reference to the merchant, in the form of M—C—M', that is, as the evolution of a separate kind of capital.

The merchant sells his commodity, in this case the linen, definitely to the consumer, whether it be a productive consumer (for instance, a bleacher), or an individual consumer who uses the linen for his private needs. By this means the merchant recovers his advanced capital (with a profit), and he can then repeat his operation. If the money had served merely as a means of payment, when the merchant bought the linen from the manufacturer, for instance, if the merchant would not have had to make payment until after six weeks, he might be able to pay the manufacturer without even advancing any money-capital of his own. But if he should not have sold the goods at the end of six weeks, he would have to advance his 3,000 p.st. on the date of the expiration, instead of advancing them on delivery of the linen. And if a fall in the market-price should have compelled him to sell below his purchase price, he would have to make good the loss out of his own capital.

Now, what is it that lends to commercial capital the character of an independently operating capital, while in the hands of the producer who does his own selling, it is obviously merely a special form of his capital in some particular phase of his process of reproduction, during its sojourn in the sphere of circulation?

1) It is, in the first place, the fact that the commodity-capital completes its definite conversion into money, its first metamorphosis, its function on the market in its capacity as commodity-capital, in the hands of another agent than the producer, and that this function of commodity-capital is promoted by the operations of the merchant, by his buying and selling, so that these transactions constitute themselves into a separate and independent business distinct from the other functions of industrial capital. Through it a portion of a function, which used to be performed in circulation as a special phase of the process of reproduction, is molded into the exclusive function of an independent agent of the circulation distinct from the producer. But this alone would not be enough to give to this special business the aspect of a function of an independent capital distinct from the industrial capital in process of self-expansion. In fact, it does not assume this aspect in cases where the trade in commodities is carried on by traveling agents, or by other direct agents of the industrial capitalist. Another element is necessary to complete its special character.

2) This second element is introduced by the fact that the independent agent of circulation, the merchant, advances money-capital (his own or borrowed) in this position. The transaction which amounts for the industrial capital in process of reproduction merely to C—M, to a conversion of commodity-capital into money-capital, to a mere sale, assumes for the merchant the form M—C—M', purchase and sale of the same commodity, and thus to a reflux, by means of a sale, of the money-capital expended in a purchase.

It is always C—M, the conversion of commodity-capital into money, which assumes for the merchant the form of M—C—M, whenever he advances money for the purchase of commodities from their producers; it is always the first metamorphosis of commodity-capital, although the same transaction may amount for a producer, or for industrial capital in process of reproduction, to M—C, a reconversion of money into commodities (means of production), the second phase of this metamorphosis. For the linen producer, the first metamorphosis was C—M, the conversion of commodity-capital into money-capital. This transaction amounts for the merchant to M—C, the conversion of his money-capital into commodity-capital. Now, if he sells this linen to a bleacher, it means M—C, conversion of money-capital into productive capital, for the bleacher, which represents the second metamorphosis of his commodity-capital; while it means C—M, the sale of the linen, for the merchant. Actually the commodity-capital manufactured by the producer has now been definitely sold. This transaction, M—C—M, on the part of the merchant represents but the action of a middleman for the transaction C—M between two producers. Or let us assume, that the linen manufacturer buys with a portion of the value of the sold linen some yarn from a yarn dealer. This is M—C for him. For the merchant selling the yarn it is C—M, resale of the yarn. So far as the yarn itself is concerned, in its capacity of commodity-capital, it amounts to its definite sale, its transition from the sphere of circulation into the sphere of production by means of C—M, the definite conclusion of its first metamorphosis. Whether the merchant buys from the industrial capitalist, or sells to him, the circulation of his merchant's capital, M—C—M, always expresses but the same thing, which constitutes, from the point of view of the commodity-capital itself, a form of transition of the industrial capital in process of reproduction, C—M, the mere completion of its first metamorphosis. The M—C of the merchant's capital amounts only for the industrial capitalist to C—M, but not for the commodity-capital produced by him. It is but the transfer of the commodity-capital from the hands of the industrial capitalist to those of the agent of circulation; Not until the merchant's capital closes the transaction C—M does commodity-capital as such perform its final C—M. M—C—M amounts merely to two times C—M on the part of the same commodity-capital, two successive sales of it, which promote its last and final sale.

It is evident, then, that commodity-capital assumes in commercial capital the form of an independent class of capital through the fact that the merchant advances money-capital. This money-capital serves its purpose as capital only by attending exclusively to the conversion of commodity-capital into money-capital, and it accomplishes this by the continual purchase and sale of commodities. This is its exclusive work. This promotion of the process of circulation of industrial capital is the exclusive function of the money-capital with which the merchant operates. By means of this function he converts his money into money-capital, molds his M into M—C—M', and by the same process he converts commodity-capital into commercial capital.

So long and so far as commercial capital exists in the form of commodity-capital, from the point of view of the process of reproduction of the total social capital, it is obviously nothing else but that portion of the industrial capital in process of metamorphosis, which is still on the market and serves as commodity-capital. It is therefore only the money-capital advanced by the merchant, which is exclusively destined for purchase and sale and for this reason never assumes any other form but that of commodity-capital and money-capital, always remaining confined to the sphere of circulation. It is only this money-capital which is now to be analysed with reference to the entire process of reproduction of capital.

As soon as the producer, the linen manufacturer has sold his 30,000 yards of linen to the merchant for 3,000 p.st., he buys with the money so obtained the necessary means of production, and his capital re-enters the process of production; his process of production continues without interruption. So far as he is concerned, the conversion of his commodity into money has been accomplished. But we have already seen that the linen itself has not yet closed its metamorphosis. It has not yet been definitely reconverted into money, it has not yet passed as a use-value into productive or individual consumption. The linen merchant now represents on the market the same commodity-capital, which the linen manufacturer represented originally. So far as the manufacturer is concerned, the process of transformation has been abbreviated, but only to be continued through the hand of the merchant.

If the linen producer had to wait, until his linen had really ceased being a commodity, until it had actually passed into the hands of its final purchaser for productive or individual consumption, his process of reproduction would be interrupted. Or, if he did not wish to interrupt it, he would have had to restrict his operations, to transform a smaller portion of the value of his linen into yarn, coal, labor, etc., in short, into the elements of productive capital, and to hold back a larger portion of it as a money-reserve. While one portion of his capital would then be on the market in the shape of commodities, another would be enabled to continue in the process of production. In this way, one portion would return in the shape of money, while another would be going to market in the form of commodities. This division of capital of the individual producer is not abolished by the intervention of the merchant. But without it that portion of the capital of circulation which is held as a money reserve would have to be always greater in proportion than the portion employed as productive capital, and the scale of production would have to be restricted accordingly. Instead of that, the producer is now enabled to employ a larger portion of his capital continually in the process of production itself, and a smaller portion as a money reserve.

This is offset on the other hand by the fact that another portion of the social capital, in the shape of merchant's capital, is held continually within the sphere of circulation. It is employed for no other purpose but that of buying and selling. There seems then to have been no other change but that of the persons who hold this capital in their hands.

If the merchant, instead of buying 3,000 p.st.'s worth of linen with the intention of selling it again, were to employ these 3,000 p.st. productively himself, then the productive capital of society would be increased. It is true, that the linen producer would then have to hold back a larger portion of his capital as a money reserve, and likewise the merchant who has now been transformed into an industrial capitalist. On the other hand, if the merchant were to remain a merchant the producer would save time in selling which he could employ for the supervision of the process of production, while the merchant would have to devote his whole time to selling.

If the merchant's capital does not exceed its necessary proportions, it may be assumed

1) that as a result of division of labor, the capital devoted exclusively to buying and selling (and this includes not only the money required for the purchase of commodities, but also the money which must be invested in the labor required for running the business of the merchant, in the constant capital of the merchant, store rooms, transportation, etc.) is smaller than it would be, if the industrial capitalist had to carry on the entire commercial part of his business himself;

2) that the exclusive occupation of the merchant with this business enables the producer to convert his commodities more rapidly into money, and permits the commodity-capital itself to pass more quickly through its metamorphosis, than it would in the hands of the producer;

3) that looking upon the entire merchant's capital in proportion to the industrial capital, one turn-over of the merchant's capital may represent not only the turn-overs of many capitals in one sphere of production, but the turn-overs of a numbers of capitals in different spheres of production. The first is the case when the linen merchant, after buying with his 3,000 p.st. the product of some linen producer, sells it before the same producer can bring another lot of the same quantity to market, so that the linen merchant has to buy the product of another, or several other, linen manufacturers. When he sells this, he promotes the turn-overs of different capitals in the same sphere of production. The second is the case, if the merchant, after selling his linen, buys, for instance, some silk. In this way he promotes the turn-overs of capitals in different spheres.

In general it may be noted that the turn-over of the industrial capital is not limited merely by the time of circulation, but also by the time of production. The turn-over of merchant's capital, so far as it deals in one sort of commodities, is limited, not merely by the turn-over of one industrial capital, but by the turn-overs of all industrial capitals in the same line of production. After the merchant has bought and sold the linen of one producer, he can buy and sell that of another, before the first can bring another lot of his product on the market. The same merchant's capital may, therefore, promote successively the different turn-overs of the industrial capitals invested in a certain line of production. Its turn-over is therefore not identified with the turn-overs of one sole industrial capital, but with the turn-overs of many, and it does not take the place of but one money reserve, which one single industrial capitalist would have to hold back. The turn-over of the merchant's capital in one sphere of production is naturally determined by the total production of that sphere. But it is not determined by the limits of production or the time of turn-over of any single capital of the same sphere, so far as its time of turn-over is determined by its time of production. For instance, let us assume that A supplies a commodity, which requires three months for its production. After the merchant has bought and sold it, say, in one month, he can buy and sell the same product of some other producer. Or, after he has sold, say, the corn of some farmer, he can buy with the same money that of another and another, etc. The turn-over of his capital is limited by the mass of corn, which he can buy successively in a certain time, for instance, in one year, while the capital of the farmer is limited in its turn-over, aside from the time of circulation, by the time of production, which lasts one year.

However, the turn-over of the same merchant's capital may promote equally well the turn-overs of capitals in different lines of production.

To the extent that the same merchant's capital serves in different turn-overs to transform different commodity-capitals successively into money, buying and selling them one after another, it performs in its capacity as money-capital the same function with regard to the commodity-capital, which money in general performs by means of its turn-overs within a certain period with regard to commodities.

The turn-over of merchant's capital is not identical with the turn-over or with one single reproduction of one industrial capital of the same size; it is rather equal to the sum of the turn-overs of a number of such capitals, either in the same, or in different spheres of production. The quicker merchant's capital is turned over, the smaller is that portion of the total money-capital, which serves as merchant's capital; the slower it is turned over, the larger is that same portion. The more undeveloped production is, the larger is the sum of merchant's capital as compared to the sum of the commodities thrown into circulation; but so much smaller is it absolutely, or compared with more developed conditions. Vice versa, the opposite holds good. In such undeveloped conditions the greater part of the strict money-capital is in the hands of the merchants, whose wealth constitutes the money wealth as compared to the wealth of others.

The velocity of the circulation of the money-capital advanced by the merchant depends: 1) on the velocity with which the process of production is renewed and the different processes of production are linked together; 2) on the velocity of consumption.

It is not necessary that merchant's capital should pass merely through the above mentioned turn-over, by first buying commodities to its full amount and then selling them. The merchant may make both movements at the same time. His capital is then divided into two parts. One of them consists of commodity-capital, the other of money-capital. Here he buys and converts his money into commodities. There he sells and converts another part of his commodity-capital into money. On one side, his capital returns in the shape of money-capital, on the other it returns in the shape of commodity-capital. The larger the portion assuming one shape, the smaller the portion assuming another. This alternates and balances itself. If money is not employed merely as a medium of circulation, but also as a means of payment and in conjunction with the credit system, which develops along with it, then the money portion of the merchant's capital is reduced still more in proportion to the volume of the transactions promoted by the merchant's capital. If I buy 1,000 p.st.'s worth of wine on three months' credit, and sell all the wine for cash before the expiration of the three months, then I do not need to advance one penny for these transactions. In this case it is quite obvious that the money-capital, which here serves as merchant's capital, is nothing but industrial capital itself in the shape of money-capital, in process of reflux to itself in the shape of money. (The fact that the producer who sold 1,000 p.st.'s worth of wine on three months' credit may discount his note, which is a certificate of indebtedness of the buyer, at some bank does not alter the matter and has nothing to do with the capital of the merchant.) If market-prices should fall in the mean time by 1/10, the merchant would not only make no profit, but would recover only 2,700 p.st. instead of 3,000 p.st. He would then have to put up 300 p.st. out of his own pocket. These 300 p.st. serve merely as a reserve for balancing the difference in price. But the same applies to the producer. If he had sold at falling prices, he would likewise have lost 300 p.st., and could not begin production on the same scale without reserve capital.

The linen merchant buys 3,000 p.st.'s worth of linen from the manufacturer. The manufacturer uses 2,000 p.st. of the 3,000 to buy yarn. He buys this yarn from a yarn dealer. The money with which the manufacturer pays the yarn dealer does not belong to the linen dealer. For the latter has received commodities to this amount. It is the money-form of the manufacturer's own capital. In the hands of the yarn dealer these 2,000 p.st. now appear as returned money-capital. But to what extent are they so, in what respect do they differ from the 2,000 p.st. representing the discarded money-form of the linen and the assumed money-form of the yarn? If the yarn dealer bought on credit and sold for cash before the expiration of his time, then these 2,000 p.st. do not contain one penny of merchant's capital as distinguished from the money-form, which the industrial capital itself assumes in the course of its circulation. The commercial capital then, so far as it is not a mere form of industrial capital, held in the hands of the merchant in the shape of commodity-capital or money-capital, is nothing but that portion of the money-capital which belongs to the merchant himself and is circulated by the purchase and sale of commodities. This portion represents on a reduced scale that part of the capital advanced for production, which must always be in the hands of the industrial as a money reserve, medium of purchase, and which would always have to circulate as money-capital. This portion, in a reduced scale, is now in the hands of capitalist merchants, and performs its functions only in the process of circulation. It is that portion of the total capital which, aside from expenditures of revenue, must continually circulate on the market as a medium of purchase in order to maintain the continuity of the process of reproduction. This portion is so much smaller in comparison to the total capital, the more rapidly the process of reproduction takes place, and the more developed the function of money as a means of payment, that is, of the credit-system.38

Merchant's capital is simply capital performing its functions in the sphere of circulation. The process of circulation is a phase of the total process of reproduction. But no value is produced in the process of circulation, and, therefore, no surplus-value. Nothing takes place there but changes of form of the same mass of values. In fact, nothing occurs there but the metamorphosis of commodities, and this has nothing to do either with the creation or with the transformation of values. If surplus-value is realised by the sale of the produced commodities, it is only because that surplus-value already existed in them. In the second act, the reconversion of money-capital into commodities (elements of production), the buyer does not realise any surplus-value. He merely inaugurates the production of surplus-value by the exchange of his money for means of production and labor-power. So far as these metamorphoses cost time of circulation—a time, during which capital is not producing at all, least of all surplus-value—they limit the creation of values, and the surplus-value will express itself through the rate of profit precisely in an inverse ratio to the duration of the time of circulation. Merchant's capital, therefore, does not create any value or surplus-value, at least not directly. If it contributes toward shortening the time of circulation, it may help indirectly to increase the surplus-value produced by the industrial capitalists. To the extent that it helps to expand the market and promotes the division of labor between capitals, thereby enabling capital to work on a larger scale, its function enhances the productivity of the industrial capital and the accumulation of this capital. Inasmuch as it may shorten the time of circulation, it raises the ratio of surplus-value to the advanced capital, that is, the rate of profit. And to the extent that it confines a smaller portion of capital in the form of money-capital to the sphere of circulation, it increases that portion of capital which is engaged directly in production.

CHAPTER XVII.

COMMERCIAL PROFIT.

WE have seen in volume II, that the mere functions of capital in the sphere of circulation—the operations which the industrial capitalist must perform, first, in order to realise the value of his commodities, and secondly, in order to reconvert this value into elements of production, operations which promote the metamorphosis of the commodity-capital C'—M—C, the acts of selling and buying—produce neither value nor surplus-value. It was rather seen that the time required for this purpose, objectively so far as the commodities, subjectively so far as the capitalist is concerned, creates barriers to the production of value and surplus-value. What is true of the metamorphosis of commodity-capital in general, is, as a matter of course, not in the least altered by the fact that a part of it may assume the shape of commercial capital, or that the operations, by which the metamorphosis of commodity-capital is promoted, may become the particular business of a special class of capitalists, or the exclusive function of a portion of the money-capital. If selling and buying of commodities —and that is what the metamorphosis of the commodity-capital C'—M—C amounts to—by the industrial capitalists themselves do not create any value or surplus-value, they will certainly not become creators of value by being transferred from the industrial capitalists to other persons. Furthermore, if that portion of the total social capital, which must be continually on hand in order that the process of reproduction, instead of being interrupted, may proceed continuously—if this money-capital does not create any value or surplus-value, then it cannot acquire the faculty to do so by being continually thrown into circulation for the performance of its function by some other section of the capitalists than the industrial capitalists. We have already indicated to what extent merchant's capital may be indirectly productive, and we shall discuss this point more at length later on.

Commercial capital, then—stripped of all heterogeneous functions, such as storing, expressing, transporting, distributing, arranging, which may be connected with its true function of buying in order to sell—creates neither value nor surplus-value, but promotes only their realisation and thereby the actual exchange of commodities, their transfer from one hand to the other, the social circulation of matter. Nevertheless, since the circulating phase of industrial capital is as much a phase of the process of reproduction as production is, the capital performing its functions independently in the process of circulation must yield the average annual profit just as well as the capital performing its functions in the different lines of production. If merchant's capital were to yield a higher percentage of average profit than industrial capital, then a portion of the industrial capital would transform itself into merchant's capital. If this capital were to yield a lower average profit, then the opposite process would take place. A portion of the merchant's capital would transform itself into industrial capital. No species of capital enjoys a greater facility to change its occupation than merchant's capital.

Seeing that merchant's capital itself does not produce any surplus-value, it is evident that surplus-value appropriated by it in the shape of average profit must be a portion of the surplus-value produced by the total productive capital. But the question is now: How does the merchant's capital manage to appropriate its share of the surplus-value or profit produced by the productive capital?

It is only outward semblance that commercial profit is a mere addition to, a nominal raise of the prices of commodities above their value.

It is evident that the merchant can draw his profit only out of the price of the commodities sold by him, more even, that this profit, which he makes by the sale of his commodities, must be equal to the difference between his purchase price and his selling price, equal to the excess of the latter over the former.

It is possible, that additional costs (costs of circulation) may enter into the commodities after their purchase and before their sale, and it is also possible, that this may not happen. If such costs should be added, it is evident that the excess of the selling price over the purchase price does not represent merely profit. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume first, that no such costs are added.

For the industrial capitalist, the difference between the selling price and the purchase price of his commodities is equal to the difference between their price of production and their cost-price, or, looking upon the matter from the point of view of the total social capital, equal to the difference between the value of the commodities and their cost-price for the capitalists, and this again resolves itself into the difference between the total quantity of labor incorporated in them and the quantity of the paid labor incorporated in them. Before the commodities bought by the industrial capitalist are taken back to market as saleable commodities, they pass through the process of production, in which that portion of their price which shall be realised as profit must be created. But it is different with the trading merchant. The commodities are in his hands only so long as they are in the process of circulation. He merely continues their sale, the realisation of their price begun by the productive capitalist, and therefore he does not cause them to pass through any intermediate process, in which they can once more absorb new surplus-value. While the industrial capitalist merely realises the previously produced surplus-value or profit by means of the circulation, the merchant must not only realise his profit in and by the circulation, but he must first make it there. This seems possible in no other way than that of selling the commodities bought by him from the industrial capitalist at their prices of production, or, from the point of view of the total commodity-capital, their values, above their prices of production, by making a nominal addition to these prices, in other words by selling the total commodity-capital above its value and pocketing this excess of their nominal value over their real value. In short, it seems that he would be selling them for more than they are worth.

This method of raising prices seems easy to grasp. For instance, one yard of linen costs 2 sh. If I want to make 10% profit on my sales, I must add 1/10 to the price, I must sell one yard of linen at 2 sh. 2 2/5d. The difference between its actual price of production and its selling price is then 2 2/5d. and this represents a profit of 10% on 2 sh. This amounts to my selling one yard of linen to the buyer at a price which is in reality the price of 1 1/10 yard. Or, what amounts to the same, it is as though I sold to the buyer only 10/11 of one yard for 2 sh. and kept 1/11 for myself. In fact, I might buy back 1/11 of one yard for 2 2/5 d., if the price of one yard is 2 sh. 2 2/5d. This would be but a round-about way of sharing in the surplus-value and surplus-product by a nominal raise in the price of commodities.

This is the realisation of commercial profit by raising the price of commodities, as it appears at first glance on the surface. And it is indeed a fact that this whole conception of the rise of profit from a nominal raise in the price of commodities, or from their sale above their value, has its origin in the point of view of commercial capital.

But on closer inspection it is quickly seen that this is a mere semblance, and that, assuming capitalist production to be the prevailing mode, commercial profit cannot be realised in this manner. (It is here always a question of averages, not of exceptions.) Why do we assume that the dealer in commodities can realise his profit of 10% on his commodities only by selling them 10% above their price of production? Because we had assumed that the producer of these commodities, the industrial capitalist (who impersonates The producer before the outside world as the personification of industrial capital), had sold them to the dealer at their prices of production. If the prices paid by the dealer for commodities are equal to their prices of production, so that the price of production, or in the last instance the value, represents the cost-price for the merchant, then the excess of the latter's selling price over his purchase price—and only this difference constitutes his profit—must indeed be an excess of their commercial price over their price of production, so that in the last analysis the merchant would be selling all commodities above their values. But why did we assume that the industrial capitalist sells his commodities to the merchant at their prices of production? Or rather, what was the premise of that assumption? It was that the commercial capital did not share in the formation of the average rate of profit (and as yet we are dealing with merchant's capital only in so far as it is commercial capital.) We started necessarily from this premise in the discussion of the average rate of profit, first, because the commercial capital as such did not exist for us at that time; and secondly, because the average profit, and thus the average rate of profit, had to be first developed out of a mutual leveling of profits, or surplus-values, actually produced by the industrial capitals of the different spheres of production. But in the case of merchant's capital we are dealing with a capital which shares in the profit without participating in its production. Hence it now becomes necessary, to supplement our former presentation at this point.

Let us suppose that the total industrial capital advanced for one year is 720 c + 180 v = 900 (say million p.st.), and that s' = 100%. The product is then valued at 720 c + 180 v + 180 s. Now let us call this product, the produced commodity-capital, C. Its value, or its price of production (both are identical for the total social commodity-capital), is then 1080, and the rate of profit for the total social capital of 900 is 20%. These 20% constitute, according to our previous analyses, the average rate of profit, since the surplus-value is not calculated in this instance on this or that capital of some particular composition, but on the average composition of the total industrial capital. In short, C = 1,080, and the rate of profit = 20%. Now let us further assume that aside from these 900 of industrial capital, there are invested 100 of merchant's capital, which share in the profit, just as the industrial capital does, in proportion to their magnitude. According to our assumption, the total capital consists of 900 industrial + 100 commercial = 1,000, so that the commercial capital is 1/10 of the whole. Therefore it participates to the extent of 1/10 in the total surplus-value of 180, and by this means secures a profit at the rate of 18%. Actually, then, the profit remaining to be distributed among the other 9/10 of the total capital is only 162, which amounts likewise to 18% on the total capital of 900. In other words, the price at which C is sold by the owners of the industrial capital of 900 to the dealers is 720 c + 180 v + 162 s = 1,062. Now, if the dealer adds his average profit of 18% on his capital of 100, he sells the commodities at 1,062 + 18 = 1,080, which is their price of production, or, from the point of view of the total commodity-capital, their value, although he makes his profit only in and by the circulation, and only by an excess of his selling price over his purchase price. But nevertheless he does not sell the commodities above their value, nor above their price of production, just because he had bought them from the industrial capitalist below their value, or below their price of production.

The merchant's capital, then, plays a determining role in the formation of the average rate of profit in proportion to its pro rata magnitude in the total capital. Hence if we say in the cited case that the average rate of profit is 18%, it would be 20%, were it not for the fact that 1/10 of the total capital is merchant's capital, which implies a reduction of the rate of profit by 1/10.

This requires also a more precise and detailed definition of the price of production. By price of production we mean, now as before, that price of the commodities, which is equal to their cost (the value of the constant + variable capital contained in them) + the average profit. But this average profit is now differently determined. It is determined by the total profit produced by the total productive capital, but it is not calculated merely on this total productive capital. It is not calculated, as first assumed, so that, if the total productive capital were 900, and the profit 180, the average rate of profit would be 180/900 = 20%. It is rather calculated on the total productive + the merchant's capital, so that, if the total capital is 900 productive + 100 merchant's capital, the average rate of profit is 180/1000 = 18%. The price of production is, therefore, equal to k (the costs) + 18, instead of k + 20. In the average rate of profit, the share of the total profit falling to the merchant's capital is included. The actual value, or price of production, of the total commodity-capital is, therefore, k + p + m (where m indicates profits in merchant's capital). The price of production, or the price at which the industrial capitalist as such sells his commodities, is thus smaller than the actual price of production of commodities. Or, looking upon the matter from the point of view of the total commodity-capital, the prices at which the class of industrial capitalists sell are lower than the values of commodities. Thus, in the above case, 900 costs + 18% on 900, or 900 + 162 = 1,062.

It follows, then, that the merchant, when selling a commodity at 118 for which he paid 100 does indeed raise the price by 18%. But since this commodity, for which he paid 100, is really worth 118, he does not sell it above its value. We shall retain the price of production as more closely defined above. Then it is evident, that the profit of the industrial capitalist is equal to the excess of the price of production of his commodities over their cost-price, and that the commercial profit, as distinguished from this industrial profit, is equal to the excess of the selling price over the price of production of the commodities, which is their cost-price for the merchant; but that the actual price of the commodities is equal to their price of production plus the commercial profit. Just as the industrial capital realises only such profits as exist previously in the commodities as surplus-value, so the merchant's capital realises profits only because the entire surplus-value, or profit, has not yet been realised in the price charged for the commodities by the industrial capitalist.39 The selling price of the merchant, then, stands above his purchase price, not because the former stands above the total value, but because the purchase price stands below this value.

The merchant's capital participates in the compensation of the surplus-value to an average profit, although it does not take part in its production. So the average rate of profit implies that general deduction from surplus-value which falls to the share of merchant's capital, a deduction from the profit of the industrial capital.

From the foregoing it follows:

1) The larger the merchant's capital in proportion to the industrial capital, the smaller is the rate of industrial profit, and vice versa.
2) It was seen in the first part, that the rate of profit is always lower than the rate of the actual surplus-value, that it always expresses the intensity of exploitation too low. In the above case, 720 c + 180 v + 180 s means a rate of surplus-value of 100%, and a rate of profit of only 20%. And if the merchant's capital is included in the calculation, then the difference between the rate of surplus-value and the rate of profit becomes still greater, the latter being only 18% in the present case. In that case, the average rate of profit of the direct exploiter of labor expresses the rate of profit in lower figures than it actually represents.

Assuming all other circumstances to remain the same, the relative volume of the merchant's capital (excepting the small dealer, who represents a hermaphrodite form) will be in a reverse ratio to the velocity of its turn-over, or in a reverse ratio to the energy of the process of reproduction in general. In the process of scientific analysis, the formation of an average rate of profit appears to take its departure from the industrial capitals and their competition, and only later on does it seem to be corrected, supplemented, and modified by the intervention of merchant's capital. But in the course of historical events, the process is reversed. It is the commercial capital, which first determines the prices of commodities more or less by their values, and it is the sphere of circulation, while promoting the process of reproduction, which first affords an opportunity for the formation of an average rate of profit. The commercial profit originally determines the industrial profit. Not until the capitalist mode of production has asserted itself and the producer himself has become a merchant, is the commercial profit reduced to that aliquot part of the total surplus-value, which falls to the share of the merchant's capital as an aliquot part of the total capital engaged in the social process of reproduction.

In the analysis of the supplementary compensation of profit through the intervention of the merchant's capital it was found that no additional element for the advanced money-capital entered into the value of commodities, and that the addition to the price, by which the merchant makes his profit, was merely equal to that portion of the value of commodities, which the productive capital did not calculate, but rather left out of calculation in the price of production. The case of this money-capital is similar to that of the fixed capital of the industrial capitalist, which is not all consumed and does not pass as an element into the value of commodities. By the purchase price which the merchant pays for the commodity-capital, he replaces its price of production, M, in money. His own selling price, as we have previously shown, is equal to M + 8Delta;M, and this 8Delta;M stands for the addition to the price of commodities determined by the average rate of profit. By selling these commodities, he recovers together with this 8Delta;M his original money-capital, which he advanced for their purchase. Here, then, we see once more that his money-capital is nothing else but the commodity-capital of the industrial capitalist transformed into money-capital, and this change does not affect the magnitude of the volume of this commodity-capital any more than a direct sale to the ultimate consumer instead of the merchant would. It merely anticipates payment by the consumer. However, this is correct only on the condition, which we had hitherto assumed, that the merchant has no expenses, or that he need not advance any fixed or circulating capital during the process of metamorphosis of the commodities, of buying and selling, aside from the money-capital which he must advance for the purchase of the commodities from the producer. But this is not so in reality, as we have seen in the analysis of the costs of circulation, volume II, chapter VI. These costs of circulation represent either expenses, which the merchant has to reclaim from the other agents of the circulation, or expenses, which are due directly to his specific business.

No matter what may be the character of these costs of circulation—whether they arise from the purely mercantile nature of the business, or whether they belong to the specific costs of circulation of the merchant, or whether they represent items, which are charges for subsequent processes of production added within the process of circulation, such as expressage, transportation, storage, etc.—they always require that the merchant should have, aside from his advanced money-capital, some additional capital for the purchase and payment of such means of circulation. To the extent that this element of cost consists of circulating capital, it passes wholly as an additional element into the selling price of the commodities; to the extent that it consists of fixed capital, it is transferred in proportion to its wear and tear. It is, however, an element, which forms a nominal value, even if it does not add any real value to the commodities. Such nominal values, which do not add any real value to the commodities, are the purely mercantile costs of circulation. But whether fixed or circulating, the entire additional capital participates in the formation of the general rate of profit.

The purely commercial costs of circulation (that is, excepting the costs of transportation, shipping, storage, etc.) resolve themselves into the costs required for the purpose of realising the value of commodities, by transforming it either from commodities into money, or from money into commodities, by means of exchange. We leave entirely out of consideration any processes of production, which may eventually continue during the process of circulation, and which may exist separately from the merchant's business. In fact, the actual transport industry and shipping may be, and are, lines of occupation entirely separated from the merchant's business, and the purchaseable or saleable commodities may be stored in warehouses or other public sheds, and the cost of storage, so far as it has to be advanced by the merchant, may be charged up to him by other people. All this becomes apparent in commerce on a large scale, in which the merchant's capital assumes its purest form, unalloyed by other functions. The express owner, the railroad director, the ship owner, are not "merchants." The costs which we consider here are those of buying and selling. We have already remarked in another place that these resolve themselves into accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, correspondence, etc. The constant capital required for this purpose consists of offices, paper, postage, etc. The other costs resolve themselves into variable capital advanced for the employment of mercantile wage workers. (Expressage, cost of transportation, advances for duties, etc., may be considered as being advances made by the merchant for the purchase of commodities and entering into the purchase price to be paid by him.)

All these costs are not incurred in the production of the use-value of the commodities, but in the realisation of their exchange value. They are pure costs of circulation. They do not enter into the strict process of production, but since they enter into the process of circulation they are part of the total process of reproduction.

The only portion of these costs that interests us here is that advanced as variable capital. (Furthermore the following questions remain to be analysed: 1) How is the law, that only socially necessary labor enters into the value of commodities, enforced in the process of circulation? 2) How does accumulation represent itself in the case of merchant's capital? 3) How does merchant's capital function in the actual process of reproduction of society as a whole?)

These costs are due to the economic form of the product, that of a commodity.

Seeing that the labor time lost by the industrial capitalists themselves while directly selling commodities to one another, in other words, the circulation time of the commodities, does not add any value to these commodities, it is evident that this labor time is not endowed with any other character by transferring it from the industrial capitalist to the merchant. The conversion of commodities (products) into money, and of money into commodities (means of production) is a necessary function of industrial capital and, therefore, a necessary operation for the capitalist, who is but personified capital endowed with his consciousness and will. But these functions do not create any value, nor do they produce any surplus-value. The merchant, by performing these operations, by further promoting the functions of capital in the sphere of circulation after the productive capitalist has ceased to do so, merely steps into the shoes of the industrial capitalist. The labor time required for these operations is devoted to certain necessary operations in the process of reproduction of capital, but it adds no value to it. If the merchant did not perform these operations (did not expend the labor time required for them), he would not be using his capital as a circulation agent of industrial capital; he would not be continuing the interrupted function of the industrial capitalist, and consequently he could not participate as a capitalist, in proportion to his advanced capital, in the mass of profit produced by the class of industrial capitalists. In order to share in the mass of surplus-value, in order to expand the value of his advanced capital, the commercial capitalist need not employ any wage workers. If his business is small, he may be the only worker in it. But his wages are derived from that portion of the social profit which falls to his share through the difference between the purchase price paid by him for commodities and their actual price of production.

Under these circumstances, and assuming the merchant's advanced capital to be small, the profit realised by him may not be a bit larger, or may even be smaller, than the wages of one of the better paid skilled wage workers. In fact, there are employed, side by side with him, many commercial agents of the industrial capitalist, such as buyers, sellers, travelers, who receive the same or a higher income than he, either in the form of wages, or in the form of a check upon the profit (percentages, tantièmes) made by each sale. In the first case, the merchant pockets the mercantile profit as an independent capitalist; in the other case, the salesman, the wage laborer of the industrial capitalist, receives a portion of the profit, either in the form of wages, or in the form of a proportional share in the profit of the industrial capitalist, whose direct agent he is, while his principal pockets both the industrial and the commercial profit. But in all these cases the income of the circulation agent is derived from the merchant's profit, even though he may regard it merely as wages paid to him for the performance of his labor, or, where it does not appear in this light, though his profit may not be any larger than the wages of a better paid wage laborer. This follows from the fact that his labor is not labor producing any values.

The prolongation of the act of circulation implies for the industrial capitalist 1) a personal loss of time, to the extent that it prevents him from performing his own function as a manager of the productive process; 2) a prolonged stay of his product, in the form of money or commodities, in the process of circulation, that is, a process, in which it does not produce any value and by which the direct process of production is interrupted. If this process is not to be interrupted, production must either be restricted, or more money-capital must be advanced, in order that the process of production may proceed on the same scale. This means every time that either a smaller profit is made by the capital hitherto invested, or that additional money-capital must be advanced in order to make the same profit. All this remains unchanged, when the merchant takes the place of the industrial capitalist. Instead of the industrial capitalist, the merchant then spends this prolonged time in the process of circulation; instead of the industrial capitalist, the merchant advances additional capital for the circulation; or, what amounts to the same, instead of a large portion of the industrial capital straying off continually into the process of circulation, the capital of the merchant is wholly tied up in it; and instead of the industrial capitalist making a smaller profit, he must yield a portion of his profit wholly to the merchant. So long as merchant's capital remains within the boundaries, in which it is necessary, the only difference is that this division of the functions of capital reduces the time exclusively needed for the process of circulation, that less additional capital is advanced for this purpose, and that the loss of the total profits represented by the profits of merchant's capital is smaller than it would have been otherwise. If in the above example, a capital of 720 c + 180 v + 180 s, assisted by a merchant's capital of 100, leaves a profit of 162, or 18% for the industrial capitalist, or, in other words, implies a deduction of 18, then the additional capital required without the assistance of this independent merchant's capital would probably be 200, and the total advance to be made by the industrial capitalist would be 1,100 instead of 900, which, with a surplus-value of 180, would mean a rate of profit of only 16 4/11%.

Now, if the industrial capitalist, who acts as his own merchant, advances not only the additional capital with which he buys new commodities, before his product in process of circulation has been reconverted into money, but also capital (office expenses and wages for commercial laborers) for the realisation of the value of his commodity-capital, or, in other words, for the process of circulation, then these costs form additional capital, but they produce no surplus-value. They must be made good out of the value of the commodities. For a portion of the value of these commodities must once more be converted into these circulation costs; and no additional surplus-value is created thereby. So far as this concerns the total capital of society, it means that a portion of it must be set aside for secondary operations, which are no part of the process of creating value, and that this portion of the social capital must be continually reproduced for this purpose. This reduces the rate of profit for the individual capitalist and for the entire class of industrial capitalists, a result, which follows from every addition of auxiliary capital, whenever such capital is required for the purpose of setting in motion the same mass of variable capital.

To the extent that these additional costs connected with the business of circulating are transferred from the shoulders of the industrial to those of the commercial capitalist, the same reduction in the rate of profit takes place, only to a smaller extent and in another way. The matter now assumes the form that the merchant advances more capital than would be necessary, if these costs did not exist, and that the profit on this additional capital increases the amount of the commercial profit, so that the merchant's capital shares with the industrial capital to a greater extent in the leveling of the average rate of profit, thereby lowering the average profit. If in our above examply 50 additional capital are advanced for those costs together with a merchant's capital of 100, then the total surplus-value of 180 is distributed over a productive capital of 900 plus a merchant's capital of 150, a total of 1,050. The average rate of profit then falls to 17 1/7%. The industrial capitalists sells his commodities to the merchant at 900 + 154 2/7 = 1,054 2/7, and the merchant sells them at 1,130, namely 1080 + 50 for costs which he must recover. For the rest it must be assumed that the division between merchant's and industrial capital is accompanied by a centralisation of the expenses of commerce and, consequently, by their reduction.

The question is now: How is it with the commercial wage workers employed by the commercial capitalist, in this case by the merchant?

In one respect, such a commercial laborer is a wage laborer like others. For, in the first place, his labor-power is bought with the variable capital of the merchant, not with the money spent by him as revenue, and consequently this labor-power is not bought for private service, but for the creation of value by means of the capital advanced for it. In the second place, the value of this labor-power, and thus his wages, are determined in the same way as those of other wage workers, namely by the cost of production and reproduction of his specific labor-power, not by the product of his labor.

However, we must make the same distinction between the commercial wage worker and the wage workers directly employed by the industrial capital which we found existing between the industrial capital and merchant's capital, and thus between the industrial capitalist and the commercial capitalist. Since the merchant, as a mere agent of circulation, produces neither value nor surplus-value (for the additional value, which he adds to the commodities by his expenses, resolves itself into an addition of previously existing values, although the question here poses itself: How does he preserve the value of his constant capital?) it follows that the mercantile laborers employed in these same functions cannot very well create any direct surplus-value for him. Here, as in the case of the productive laborers, we assume that wages are determined by the value of labor-power, and that the merchant does not make money by depressing wages, so that he does not allow in his accounts for any advance of wages which he paid only in part, in other words, that he does not make money by cheating his clerks.

The difficulty in the case of the mercantile wage workers is by no means that of explaining the way in which they produce any direct profits for their employer, even though they do not create any direct surplus-value (of which profit is but a changed form.) This part of the question has already been solved by the general analysis of commercial profits. Just as the industrial capital makes profits by selling labor embodied and realised in commodities for which it has not paid any equivalent, so the merchants' capital makes profits by not paying the productive capital for all the unpaid labor incorporated in the commodities (that is, commodities in so far as the capital invested in their production functions as an aliquot part of the total industrial capital), while in selling it demands payment for this unpaid portion still contained in the commodities and not paid for by itself. The relation of the merchant's capital to the surplus-value is different from that of the industrial capital. The industrial capital produces surplus-value by the direct appropriation of the unpaid labor of others. The merchant's capital, on the other hand, appropriates a portion of this surplus-value by having this portion transferred from the industrial capital to itself.

It is only by its function of realising values that the merchant's capital serves in the process of reproduction as capital and in this capacity gets a share of the surplus-value produced by the total capital. The mass of profits depends for the individual merchant on the mass of capital, which he can invest in this process, and he can use so much more of it in buying and selling, the more unpaid labor his clerks perform. The function itself, by virtue of which the money of the merchant capitalist is capital, is largely performed by his employes. The unpaid labor of his clerks, while it does not create any surplus-value, at least appropriates surplus-value for him, which amounts to the same thing so far as results on his capital go. This unpaid labor is for him, therefore, a source of profit. Otherwise the mercantile business could never be carried on capitalistically, on a large scale.

Just as the unpaid labor of the laborer of the productive capital creates surplus-value for it in a direct way, so the unpaid labor of the commercial wage workers secures a share of this surplus-value for the merchant's capital.

Here is the difficulty: Seeing that the labor time and the labor of the merchant himself do not create any value, but only secure for him a share of already produced surplus-value, how is it with the variable capital, which he invests in the purchase of commercial labor-power? Must this variable capital be included in the expense account of advanced merchant's capital? If not, then it seems to be in contradiction with the law of the compensation of the average rate of profit; for where is there a capitalist who would advance 150, if he could place only 100 in account? If yes, it seems to be in contradiction with the nature of merchant's capital, since this class of capital does not act in the capacity of capital by setting in motion the labor of others, as the industrial capital does, but rather by performing its own work, that is, the process of buying and selling, and only for this and by this means does it transfer a portion of the surplus-value produced by the industrial capital to itself.

(Therefore the following points must be analysed: the variable capital of the merchant; the law of necessary labor in circulation; the way in which the merchant's labor preserves the value of his constant capital; the role of merchant's capital in the total process of reproduction; and finally, the two-fold materialisation in commodity-capital and money-capital on one side, and in commercial capital and financial capital on the other.)

If every merchant had only as much money as he is personally able to turn over by his own labor, there would be an infinite dissociation of merchant's capital. This dissociation would increase to the extent that productive capital, in the forward march of the capitalist mode of production, would produce and operate on a larger scale. The disproportion between the two classes of capital would increase. In proportion as capital in the sphere of production would be centralised, it would be decentralised in the sphere of circulation. The purely commercial business of the industrial capitalist, and thus his purely commercial expenses, would be infinitely expanded thereby, for he would have dealings with 1,000 capitalists at a time instead of 100. In this way, a large part of the advantage of the independent organisation of merchant's capital would be lost. Not only the purely commercial expenses, but also the other costs of circulation, sorting, expressage, etc., would grow. This applies to the industrial capital. Now let us consider the merchant's capital. In the first place, let us look at the purely commercial labors. It does not require more time to figure with large than with small numbers. But it costs ten times as much time to make 10 purchases at 100 p.st. each as it does to make one purchase at 1,000 p.st. It costs ten times as much correspondence, paper, postage, to carry on a correspondence with 10 small merchants as it does with one large merchant. A limited division of labor in a commercial office, in which one keeps books, another has charge of the treasury, a third carries on the correspondence, one man buys, another sells, another travels, etc., saves immense quantities of labor time, so that the number of workers employed in wholesale commerce stand in no proportion to the comparative size of the business. This is so, because in commerce much more than in industry the same function, whether performed on a large or a small scale, costs the same labor time. For this reason, concentration appears historically in the merchant's business before it shows itself in the industrial workshop. There are furthermore the expenses for constant capital. 100 small offices cost incomparably more than one large office, 100 small warehouses more than one large one, etc. The costs of transportation, which enter into the accounts of commercial business at least as advances, grow with this dissociation.

The industrial capitalist would have to spend more for labor and circulation in the commercial part of his business. The same merchant's capital, when distributed among many small capitalists would require more laborers for the performance of its functions, on account of this dissociation, and, besides, more merchant's capital would be needed in order to turn over the same commodity-capital.

Let us designate the entire merchant's capital directly invested in the purchase and sale of commodities by B, and the corresponding variable capital invested in wages of commercial help by b. Then B + b is smaller than it would be, if every merchant had to worry along without any assistance and without investing any capital in b. However, we have not yet overcome all difficulties.

The selling price of the commodities must suffice, 1) to pay the average profit on B + b. This explains itself by virtue of the fact that B + b represents a reduction of the original B and a smaller merchant's capital than would be required without b. But this selling price must also suffice, 2) to cover not only the additional profit on b, but to recover also the paid wages, the variable capital of the merchant. There is the difficulty. Does b form a new constituent of the price, or is it merely a part of the profit made by means of B + b, which takes on the appearance of wages only so far as the mercantile wage worker is concerned, and simply replaces the variable capital from the point of view of the merchant? In this last case, the profit made by the merchant on his advanced capital B + b would be only equal to the profit due to B according to the general rate, plus b, which he pays out in the form of wages without getting a profit on it.

The crux of the matter is, indeed, to find the limits (mathematically speaking) of b. Let us first define the difficulty exactly. Let us designate the capital invested directly in buying and selling commodities by B, the constant capital (expenses of objective materials of commerce) consumed in this function by K, and the variable capital invested by the merchant by b.

The recovery of B offers no difficulties. It simply represents for the merchant the realised purchase price, the price of production for the manufacturer. The merchant pays this price and in reselling he recovers B as a part of his selling price. Apart from this B, he also receives a profit on B, as we have previously explained. For instance, let the commodities cost 100 p.st. The profit on this may be 10%. In that case the commodities are sold at 110. These commodities cost previously 100, and the merchant's capital of 100 merely makes an additional 10 out of them.

Now let us look at K. It will at most be as large as, but in fact smaller, than that portion of the constant capital, which the producer would have to invest in the department of buying and selling, and which would be an addition to the constant capital invested by him in direct production. However, this portion must be continually recovered by the price of the commodities, or, what amounts to the same, a corresponding portion of the commodities must be continually expended in this form, must, from the point of view of the total capital of society, be continually reproduced in this form. This portion of the advanced constant capital would reduce the rate of profit just as well as the entire mass of it invested in production itself. To the extent that the industrial capitalist gives up the commercial part of his business to the merchant, he is no longer compelled to advance this part of the capital. The merchant advances it in his stead. In a way he does this but nominally, since a merchant neither produces nor reproduces the constant capital consumed by him (the cost of the objective materials of commerce). Its production appears as a specific business, or at least as a part of the business, of some industrial capitalists, who play a similar role as those, who supply the constant capital for the producers of necessities of life. The merchant recovers this constant capital and his profit on it. Both things reduce the profit of the industrial capitalist to that extent. But owing to the economies and concentration which come with a division of labor, he loses less profits than he would, if he had to advance his own capital for this purpose. The reduction of the rate of profit is smaller, because the advanced capital is smaller.

So far, then, the selling price is made up of B + K + profits on B + K. This portion of the selling price offers no further difficulties. But now b, the variable capital advanced by the merchant, enters into this consideration.

The selling price is then made up of B + K + b + profits on B + K + profits on b.

B makes good merely the purchase price and adds nothing to this price but the profit on B. K adds K itself plus a profit on K; but K + profit on K, the circulation cost advanced in the form of constant capital plus a corresponding average profit, would be larger in the hands of the industrial capitalist than it is in those of the merchant. The reduction of the average profit assumes this form: It is as though the full average profit had been calculated, after deducting B + K from the advanced industrial capital, but the deduction from this average profit for B + K paid to the merchant, so that this deduction appears as the profit of a particular class of capital, of merchant's capital.

But it is different with b + profits on b, or in the present case, where we have assumed a rate of profit of 10%, with b + (1/10)b. Here lies the real difficulty.

What the merchant buys with b, is according to our assumption nothing but commercial labor, in other words, labor required for the promotion of the functions of circulating the capital, of performing the acts C—M and M—C. But this commercial labor is that labor, which is generally necessary, in order that any capital may perform the functions of commercial capital, the conversion of commodity-capital into money and money into commodities. It is labor which realises values, but does not create any. And only to the extent that a capital performs this function—that a capitalist performs these operations with his capital—does this capital serve as commercial capital and participate in the regulation of the general rate of profit, that is, draw its dividend out of the total profit. But in b + profit on b, it looks as though labor were being paid, in the first place (for it makes no difference, whether the industrial capitalist pays the merchant for his own labor or the clerk employed by the merchant for his), and in the second place, as though it contained a profit on labor, which the merchant himself has to perform. The merchant's capital gets in the first place its b refunded, and in the second place a profit on it. This arises from the fact that it demands pay, in the first place, for work, which it performs in its capacity as merchant's capital, and that it receives, in the second place, a profit in its capacity of capital, for performing work, which is remunerated in the profit as the function of capital. This, then, is the question which we have to solve.

Now, if b would not be invested by the merchant in wages—since b is paid only for commercial labor, for labor required for the realisation of the value of commodity-capital thrown on the market by industrial capital—then the condition of the matter would be the following: In order to buy or sell anything for B = 100, the merchant would spend his time, and we will assume, that this is the only time at his disposal. The commercial labor represented by b, or 10, if paid for by a profit instead of wages, would presuppose another commercial capital of 100, which, at 10%, would be equal to b = 10. This second B of 100 would not be added to the price of commodities, but the 10% would. We should then have two operations with 100, making 200, that would buy commodities at 200 + 20 = 220.

Since merchant's capital is nothing but an independent form of a portion of industrial capital engaged in the process of circulation, all questions referring to it must be solved by representing the problem at first in that form, in which the phenomena peculiar to merchant's capital do not yet appear in an independent shape, but still in direct connection with industrial capital as one of its subdivsions. As an office separate from the workshop, the mercantile capital serves continually in the process of circulation. It is here that we must first analyse the b under consideration—in the office of the industrial capitalist himself.

The office is from the outset always infinitesimally small compared to the industrial workshop. For the rest, it is clear that the commercial operations increase to the extent that the scale of production is enlarged. These are operations, which must be continually performed for the circulation of the industrial capital, in order to sell the product existing in the shape of commodities, to convert the money so received once more into means of production, and to keep account of the whole. The calculation of prices, bookkeeping, managing funds, carrying on the correspondence, all these belong under this head. The more developed the scale of production is, the greater, if not in proportion, will be the commercial operations of industrial capital, and consequently the labor and other costs of circulation for the realisation of value and surplus-value. This necessitates the employment of commercial wage workers, who form the office staff. The expenses for these, although incurred for wages, differ from the variable capital invested in the purchase of productive labor. It increases the expenses of the industrial capitalist, the mass of capital to be advanced, without increasing the direct surplus-value. For these expenses are made for labor, which is employed only for the realisation of already created values. Like every expense of this kind, these expenses reduce the rate of profit, because the advanced capital increases, but not the surplus-value. If the surplus-value s remains constant, while the advanced capital C increases to C + 8Delta;C, then the place of the rate of profit s/C is taken by the smaller rate of profit s/(C + 8Delta;C). For this reason, the industrial capitalist endeavors to limit these expenses of circulation to a minimum, just as he does with his expenses for constant capital. Hence industrial capital does not maintain the same relations to its commercial wage laborers that it does to its productive wage laborers. The greater the number of productive wages laborers employed under otherwise equal circumstances, the more voluminous is production, the greater the surplus-value or profit. On the other hand, the larger the scale of production, the greater the quantity of value and surplus-value to be realised, the greater, in other words, the produced commodity-capital, the larger grow the absolute office expenses, even if they do not grow relatively, and give rise to some kind of division of labor. To what extent profit is the first condition for these expenses, is shown among other things by the fact, that with the increase of commercial salaries a part of them is frequently paid by a share in the profits. It is in the nature of things that labor consisting merely of intermediary operations, which are connected either with a calculation of values, or with their realisation, or with the reconversion of the realised money into means of production, a labor whose amount depends on the quantity of produced values about to be realised, should not act as cause of the respective magnitudes and masses of these values, as directly productive labor does, but as their result. The case of the other costs of circulation is similar. In order that plenty may be measured, weighed, wrapped, transported, plenty must be supplied. The amount of labor consumed in packing, transporting, etc., depends on the quantity of the commodities which are the objects of its activity, not vice versa.

The commercial laborer does not produce any surplus-value directly. But the value of his labor is determined by the value of his labor-power, that is, of its costs of production, while the application of this labor-power, its exertion, expression, and consumption, the same as in the case of every other wage laborer, is by no means limited by the value of his labor-power. His wages are therefore not necessarily in proportion to the mass of profits, which he helps the capitalist to realise. What he costs the capitalist and what he makes for him are two different things. He adds to the income of the capitalist, not by creating any direct surplus-value, but by helping him to reduce the costs of the realisation of surplus-value. In so doing, he performs partly unpaid labor. The commercial laborer, in the strict meaning of the term, belongs to the better paid classes of wage workers, he belongs to the class of skilled laborers, which is above the average. However, wages have a tendency to fall, even in proportion to the average labor, with the advance of the capitalist mode of production. This is due to the fact that in the first place, division of labor in the office is introduced; this means that only a onesided development of the laboring capacity is required, and that the cost of this development does not fall entirely on the capitalist, since the ability of the laborer is developed through the exercise of his function and increases so much faster, the more onesidedly the division of labor develops. In the second place, the necessary preparation, such as the learning of commercial details, languages, etc., is more and more rapidly, easily, generally, cheaply reproduced with the progress of science and popular education, to the extent that the capitalist mode of production organises the methods of teaching, etc., in a practical manner. The generalisation of public education makes it possible to recruit this line of laborers from classes that had formerly no access to such education and that were accustomed to a lower scale of living. At the same time this generalisation of education increases the supply and thus competition. With a few exceptions, the labor-power of this line of laborers is therefore depreciated with the progress of capitalist development. Their wages fall, while their ability increases. The capitalist increases the number of these laborers, whenever he has more value and profits to realise. The increase of this labor is always a result, never a cause of the augmentation of surplus-value.40

We see, then, that a duplication takes place here. On the one hand, the functions of commodity-capital and money-capital (which later become merchant's capital) are general forms assumed by industrial capital. On the other hand, particular capitals, and therefore a particular series of capitalists, are exclusively devoted to these functions. And these functions develop into specific spheres of enhancing the value of capital.

The commercial functions and expenses of circulation become independent only in the case of the mercantile capital. That side of industrial capital, which is devoted to the circulation, exists not only in its continuous shape of commodity-capital and money-capital, but also in the office alongside of the workshop. But it assumes an independent existence in the mercantile capital. For this capital, its office is its only workshop. The portion of capital employed in the form of expenses of circulation appears much larger in the business of the large merchant than in that of the industrial capitalist, because the offices connected with every industrial workshop are concentrated in the hands of a few merchants, and so is at the same time that portion of the capital, which would have to be invested for this purpose by the entire class of industrial capitalists. These merchants take care of the circulation and provide for the expenses incidental to its continuation.

For the industrial capital, the expenses of circulation appear as dead expenses, and so they are. For the merchant they appear as a source of his profit, which is proportional to the level of the average rate of profit, whose existence is assumed. The investment to be made by the mercantile capital for these expenses of circulation is, therefore, a productive investment. And for this reason the commercial labor which it buys is likewise immediately productive for it.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE TURN-OVER OF MERCHANT'S CAPITAL. THE PRICES.

THE turn-over of industrial capital is the combination of its time of production and time of circulation. It comprises, therefore, the process of production as a whole. The turn-over of merchant's capital, on the other hand; being in reality nothing but a movement of commodity-capital in an independent form, represents merely the first phase in the metamorphosis of commodities, C—M, as a movement of some capital returning to itself. M—C, C—M, is the turn-over of merchant's capital from the mercantile point of view. The merchant buys, converts his money into commodities, then sells, converts the same commodities back into money. And so forth in continuous repetitions. Within the circulation, the metamorphosis of industrial capital always presents itself in the form of C'—M—C''; the money realised by the sale of the produced commodities C' is used for the purchase of new means of production C''. This amounts to a practical exchange of C' for C'', and the same money thus changes hands twice. Its movement acts as an intermediary between two different kinds of commodities C' and C''. But in the case of the merchant, it is the same commodity, which changes hands twice in the process M—C—M'. It merely promotes the reflux of his money to him.

For instance, if a certain merchant's capital is 100 p.st., and the merchant buys for these 100 p.st. commodities and sells these commodities for 110 p.st., then his capital of 100 p.st. has completed one turn-over, and the number of its turn-overs in one year depends on the number of times which it can repeat this movement M—C—M'.

We leave entirely out of consideration at this point those expenses, which may be concealed in the difference between the purchase price and the selling price, since these expenses do not alter in any way the form, which we are now analysing.

The number of turn-overs of a certain merchant's capital shows evidently some analogy to the repeated cycles of money in its capacity as a mere medium of circulation. Just as the same dollar, which circulates ten times, buys ten times its value in commodities, so the same money-capital of the merchant, when turned over ten times, buys ten times its value in commodities, or realises a total commodity-capital of ten times its value, for instance a merchant's capital of 100 a value of 1,000. But there is this difference: In the circulation of money as a medium of circulation, it is the same piece of money, which passes through different hands and performs repeatedly the same function, thereby making up for the limited number of the circulating pieces of money by the velocity of its circulation. But in the case of the merchant it is the same money-capital, the same money-value regardless of the pieces of money of which it may be composed, which repeatedly buys and sells the amount of its value, thereby returning repeatedly to the same hands from which it departed as M + 8Delta; M, value plus surplus-value. This is characteristic of its turn-over as a turn-over of capital. It always withdraws more money from circulation than it threw into it. By the way, it is a matter of course that an accelerated turn-over of merchant's capital (in which the function of money as a means of payment likewise predominates whenever the credit system is developed) is accompanied by a more rapid circulation of the same quantity of money.

A repeated turn-over of commercial capital, however, never expresses anything else but a repetition of buying and selling; while a repeated turn-over of industrial capital expresses the periodicity and renovation of the entire process of reproduction (which includes the process of consumption). For the merchant's capital, this appears merely as an outward condition. The industrial capital must continually throw commodities on the market and withdraw others from it, in order that the turn-over of merchant's capital may continue rapidly. If the process of reproduction proceeds slowly in general, then the turn-over of merchant's capital does likewise. Now, it is true that the merchant's capital promotes the turn-over of the productive capital, but only in so far as it shortens the time of circulation of the latter. It has no direct influence on the time of production, which is also one of the limits of the time of turn-over of industrial capital. This is the first barrier for the turn-over of merchant's capital. In the second place, aside from the barrier formed by reproductive consumption, the turn-over of the merchant's capital is ultimately limited by the velocity and volume of individual consumption, since the entire part of commodity-capital which passes into the fund for consumption depends on that.

However, aside from the turn-overs in the world of merchants, in which one merchant always sells the same commodity to another, whereby this sort of circulation may assume the aspect of great prosperity during times of speculation, the merchant's capital abbreviates in the first place the phase C—M for the productive capital. In the second place, under the modern credit system, it disposes of a large portion of the total capital of society, so that it can repeat its purchases, even before it has definitely sold its previous purchases. And it is immaterial in this case, whether the merchant sells directly to the ultimate consumer, or whether a dozen other merchant's intervene between the first merchant and the ultimate consumer. Owing to the immense elasticity of the process of reproduction, which at any time may be driven beyond all bounds, this process finds no obstacle in production itself, or at best a very elastic one. Aside from the separation of C—M and M—C, which follows from the nature of commodities, a fictitious demand is here created. In spite of its independent status, the movement of merchant's capital is never anything else but the movement of industrial capital within the sphere of circulation. But thanks to its individualisation it moves within certain limits independently of the bounds of the process of reproduction, and thereby drives this process itself beyond its boundaries. The internal dependence and the external independence drive merchant's capital to a point, where the internal connection is violently restored by a crisis.

Hence we note the phenomenon that crises do not show themselves, nor break forth, first in the retail business, which deals with direct consumption, but in the spheres of wholesale business and banking, by which the money-capital of society is placed at the disposal of wholesale business.

The manufacturer may actually sell to the exporter, and the exporter may in his turn sell to his foreign customer, the importer may sell his raw materials to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer his products to the wholesale dealer, etc. But at some particular and unseen point, the goods may lie unsold. On some other occasion, again, the supplies of all producers and middle men may become gradually overstocked. Consumption is then generally at its best either because one industrial capitalist sets a succession of others in motion, or because the laborers employed by them are fully employed and spend more than ordinarily. With the growing income of the capitalists their expenditures increase likewise. Besides, we have seen in volume II, Part III, that a continuous circulation takes place between constant capital and constant capital (even without considering any accelerated accumulation), which is in so far independent of individual consumption, as it never enters into such consumption, but which is nevertheless definitely limited by it, because the production of constant capital never takes place for its own sake, but solely because more of this capital is needed in those spheres of production whose products pass into individual consumption. However, this may proceed undisturbed for a while, stimulated by prospective demand, and in such lines the business of merchants and industrial capitalists prospers exceedingly. A crisis occurs whenever the returns of those merchants, who sell at long range, or whose supplies have accumulated also on the home market, become so slow and meager, that the banks press for payment, or the notes for the purchased commodities become due before they have been resold. It is then that forced sales take place, sales made in order to be able to meet payments. And then we have the crash, which brings the deceptive prosperity to a speedy end.

But the superficiality and meaninglessness of the turn-over of merchant's capital are still greater, because the turn-over of one and the same merchant's capital may promote simultaneously or successively the turn-overs of several productive capitals.

Now, the turn-over of merchant's capital may not only promote the turn-overs of several industrial capitals, but also the opposite phase of the metamorphosis of commodity-capital. For instance, the merchant buys linen from the manufacturer and sells it to the bleacher. In this case, the turn-over of the same merchant's capital—in fact, the same C—M, a realisation on the linen—represents two opposite phases for two different industrial capitals. So far as the merchant sells at all for productive consumption, his C—M always means M—C for some industrial capitalist, and his M—C always C—M for some other industrial capitalist.

If we leave out of consideration, as we do in this chapter, K, the expenses of circulation, in other words, if we leave aside that portion of capital which the merchant advances apart from the money required for the purchase of commodities, it follows that 8Delta; K, the additional profit made on this additional capital, will likewise be left out. This is the strictly logical and mathematically correct mode of analysis, if we wish to study the way in which the profits and turn-over of merchant's capital affect prices.

If the price of production of 1 lb. of sugar is 1 p.st., the merchant can buy 100 lbs. of sugar with 100 p.st. If he buys and sells this quantity in the course of one year, and if the annual rate of average profit is 15% he would add 15 p.st. to 100 p.st., and 3 sh. to the price of production of 1 lb. of sugar, 1 p.st. That is, he would sell one pound of sugar at 1 p.st. 3 sh. But if the price of production of 1 lb. of sugar should fall to 1 sh., then the merchant could buy 2,000 lbs. of sugar with 100 p.st., and he could sell the sugar at 1 sh. 1 4/5 d. per lb. The annual profit on capital invested in the sugar business would still be 15 p.st. on each 100 p.st. Only he has to sell 100 lbs. in the first case, while he must sell 2,000 lbs. in the second place. The high or low level of the price of production would not have anything to do with the rate of profit. But it would have a great deal, or even a decisive deal, to do with that aliquot part of the selling price of each lb. of sugar which resolves itself in mercantile profit; in other words, it would have a great deal to do with the addition to the price which the merchant makes on a certain quantity of commodities, or products. If the price of production of a certain commodity is small, then the amount advanced by the merchant for the purchase of a certain quantity of that commodity is also small, and so is the amount of profit made by him on this quantity of cheap commodities. Or, what amounts to the same, he can buy with a certain amount of capital, for instance with 100, a large quantity of these commodities, and the total profit of 15, which he makes on 100, will be distributed in small fractions over each individual portion of this mass of commodities. The opposite takes place in the opposite case. This depends entirely on the greater or smaller productivity of the industrial capital, with whose products he trades. If we except the cases, in which the merchant is a monopolist and monopolises at the same time the production of certain goods, as did the Dutch East India Company once upon a time, we must say that there is nothing more ridiculous than the current idea that it depends on the merchant whether he wants to sell many commodities at a small profit or few commodities at a large profit on the individual commodities. The two limits of his selling price are: On one hand, the price of production of commodities, over which he has no control; on the other hand, the average rate of profit, over which he has also no control. The only thing which he has to decide is whether he wants to deal in cheap or in dear commodities, and even here the size of his available capital and other circumstances have something to say. Therefore it depends wholly on the degree of development of the capitalist mode of production, not on the good will of the merchant, what course he shall follow in this. A purely commercial company like the old Dutch East India Company, which had a monopoly of production, could imagine that it would be able to continue a method, adapted at best to the beginnings of capitalist production, under entirely changed conditions.41

The following circumstances, among others, help to maintain that popular prejudice, which, like all wrong conceptions of profit, etc., arise out of the views of pure commerce:

1) Phenomena of competition, which, however, concern merely the distribution of mercantile profit among the individual merchants in their capacity as shareholders in the total merchant's capital; such as the underselling of other merchants by one of them for the purpose of beating his competitors.
2) An economist of the caliber of Professor Roscher of Leipsic may still imagine that a change in the selling prices may be brought about by considerations of "prudence and humanity," instead of being due to a revolution in the mode of production itself.
3) If the prices of production fall on account of an increased productivity of labor, and if consequently the selling prices also fall, then the demand, and with it the market prices, often rise even faster than the supply, so that the selling prices yield more than the average profit.
4) A merchant may reduce his selling price (which amounts after all to no more than a reduction of the current profit which he adds to the price) in order to turn over a large capital more rapidly in his business.

All these things concern only competition between merchants themselves.

We have already shown in volume I, that the high or low level of the prices of commodities determines neither the mass of surplus-value produced by a certain capital nor the rate of surplus-value; it is merely true that, according to the relative quantity of commodities produced by a certain quantity of labor, the price of the individual commodity, and with it the share of surplus-value falling upon this price, is greater or smaller. The prices of every quantity of commodities are determined, so far as they correspond to their values, by the total quantity of labor incorporated in these commodities. If much labor is incorporated in few commodities, then the price of the individual commodities is low and the surplus-value contained in them is small. No matter in what proportion the labor incorporated in a commodity is divided into paid and unpaid labor, and no matter what portion of its price may represent surplus-value, it has nothing to do with the total quantity of this labor, nor, consequently, with its price. On the other hand, the rate of surplus-value does not depend on the absolute magnitude of the surplus-value contained in the price of the individual commodity, but on its relative magnitude, on its proportion to the wages contained in the same commodity. The rate of surplus-value may therefore be large, while the absolute magnitude of the surplus-value in each individual commodity may be small. This absolute magnitude of the surplus-value in each commodity depends in the first place on the productivity of labor, and only in the second place on its division into paid and unpaid labor.

Moreover, in the case of the commercial selling price, the price of production is a condition determined by external circumstances.

The high prices of commerce in former times were due 1) to the dearness of the prices of production, in other words, to the unproductivity of labor; 2) to the absence of an average rate of profit, which enabled the merchant's capital to absorb a much larger quantity of the surplus-value than would have fallen to its share, had the capitals enjoyed a greater general mobility. The cessation of this condition, in both of its aspects, is due to the development of the capitalist mode of production.

The turn-overs of merchant's capital vary in length, their numbers consequently are greater or smaller, in different lines of commerce. Within the same line of commerce, the turn-over is more or less rapid in different phases of the economic cycle. However, an average number of turn-overs, which is found by experience, takes place.

We have already noted, that the turn-over of merchant's capital differs from that of industrial capital. This follows from the nature of the case; one single phase in the turn-over of industrial capital appears as a complete turn-over of some independently constituted merchant's capital, or of a part of some such merchant's capital. This turn-over has also a different relation to the determination of profit and prices.

In the case of the industrial capital, its turn-over expresses on one hand the periodicity of reproduction, and on it depends the mass of commodities, which may be thrown on the market in a certain period. On the other hand, its time of circulation forms a barrier, which is elastic and exerts more or less of a restraint on the creation of value and surplus-value, because it exerts a pressure on the volume of the process of production. The turn-over therefore acts as a determining element on the mass of annually produced surplus-value, and thus helps to determine the average rate of profit, but it acts as a negative, not as a positive element. For the merchant's capital, however, the average rate of profit exists as a given magnitude. The merchant's capital does not directly participate in the creation of value or surplus-value, and it participates in the formation of an average rate of profit only to the extent that draws a dividend, in proportion to its size in the total social capital, out of the mass of profit produced by the industrial capital.

The greater the number of turn-overs of a certain industrial capital is under the conditions described in Volume II, Part II, the greater is the mass of profits created by it. Now, the formation of an average rate of profit distributes, the total profit among the different capitals, not in proportion to their actual participation in its direct production, but in proportion to the aliquot parts which they constitute in the total capital, that is, in proportion to their magnitudes. But this does not alter the essence of the matter. The greater the number of turnovers of the industrial capital as a whole is, the greater is the mass of profits, the mass of annually produced surplus-value, and therefore the rate of profit, always assuming other circumstances to remain unchanged. It is different with merchant's capital. For it, the rate of profit is a given magnitude, determined on one hand by the mass of profit produced by the industrial capital, on the other hand by the relative magnitude of the total merchant's capital, by its quantitative relation to the sum of capital advanced in the processes of production and circulation. The number of its turn-overs does indeed exert a determining influence on its relation to the total social capital, or on the relative magnitude of the total merchant's capital required for the circulation. For it is evident that the absolute magnitude of the total merchant's capital and the velocity of its turn-over are inversely proportioned to one another. But, all other circumstances remaining the same, the relative magnitude of the merchant's capital, or its aliquot proportion in the total social capital, is determined by its absolute magnitude. If the total social capital is 10,000, and the merchant's capital 1,000, then it is 1/10 of the total; if the total capital is 1,000, and the merchant's capital 100, it is again 1/10. To that extent, the absolute magnitude of the merchant's capital may vary, while its relative magnitude in the total social capital remains the same. But in the present case, we assume that its relative magnitude of 1/10 of the total social capital is given. This relative magnitude, again, is determined by its turn-over. If it is turned over rapidly, its absolute magnitude will be 1,000 in the first case, and 100 in the second, so that its relative magnitude will be 1/10. But if it is turned over more slowly, then its absolute magnitude may be 2,000 in the first case, and 200 in the second case. Then its relative magnitude will have increased from 1/10 to 1/5 of the total social capital. Circumstances which reduce the average turn-over of merchant's capital, for instance, the development of means of transportation, reduce to that extent the absolute magnitude of merchants' capital and thereby increase the average rate of profit. The opposite takes place, if things are reversed. A developed mode of capitalist production, compared to previous conditions, exerts a twofold influence on merchants' capital. In the first place, the same quantity of commodities is turned over with a smaller mass of actually functioning merchants' capital; for the proportion of the merchants' capital to industrial capital is reduced by the more rapid turn-over of merchants' capital and the greater velocity of the process of reproduction that is its basis. On the other hand, the development of the capitalist mode of production turns all production into a production of commodities, which puts all products into the hands of the agents of circulation. This is so much more notable, as under previous modes of production, which produced things on a small scale, a large portion of the producers sold their goods directly to the consumers or worked for their personal orders, leaving out of consideration that mass of products, which were immediately consumed by the producer himself, and that mass of services, which were performed in natura. While, therefore, under former methods of production, commercial capital represented proportionately a larger share of the commodity-capital which it turned over, it was.

1) absolutely smaller, because a disproportionately smaller part of the total product was produced in the shape of commodities, passed as commodity-capital into circulation, and fell into the hands of merchants. It was smaller, because the commodity-capital was smaller. But it was proportionately larger, not only because its turn-over was slower, and because it constituted a larger portion of the mass of commodities turned over by it, but also because the price of this mass of commodities, and consequently the merchants' capital to be advanced for it, were greater than under capitalist production on account of a lower productivity of labor, so that the same value was incorporated in a smaller mass of commodities.

2) Not alone is a larger mass of commodities produced on the basis of capitalist production (taking account also of the reduced value of these commodities), but the same mass of products, for instance, of corn, also becomes to a greater extent commodity, that is, more and more of the product becomes an object of commerce. As a consequence, not only the mass of the merchants' capital, but of all capital invested in the circulation, increases, such as capital invested in marine shipping, railroading, telegraph business, etc.;

3) However, there is one point of view, which belongs in the discussion of "competition among capitals," namely: The merchants' capital, which is not serving in any function, or serving only in part, grows with the progress of the capitalist mode of production, with the facility of its investment in retail trade, with the increase of speculation, and with the superfluity of released capital.

But, assuming the relative magnitude of the merchants' capital in proportion to the social capital to be given, the difference of the turn-overs in the various lines of commerce does not affect the magnitude of the total profit falling to the share of the total merchants' capital, nor the general rate of profit. The profit of the merchant is determined, not by the mass of the commodity-capital turned over by him, but by the magnitude of the money-capital advanced by him for the promotion of this turn-over. If the yearly general rate of profit is 15%, and the merchant advances 100 p.st., which he turns over once a year, then he will sell his commodities at 115. If his capital is turned over five times per year, then he will sell a commodity-capital of 100 purchase price five times per year at 103, which will amount in one year to a commodity-capital of 500 sold 515. This constitutes the same annual profit of 15% on his advanced capital of 100 as before. If this were not so, then the merchants' capital would yield a much higher profit in proportion to the number of its turn-overs than the industrial capital, and this would be a contradiction to the law of the average rate of profit.

It follows, then, that the number of turn-overs of merchants' capital in the various lines of commerce affects the mercantile prices of commodities directly. The amount of the mercantile addition to the price, the addition of that aliquot part of the mercantile profit of a given capital which falls upon the price of production of the individual commodities, stands in an inverse ratio to the number of turn-overs, or the velocity of turn-over, of the merchants' capitals in the various lines of commerce. If a certain merchants' capital is turned over five times per year, it will add to a commodity-capital of its own value but one-fifth of the profit, which another merchants' capital of the same value, which is turned over but once per year, will add to a commodity-capital of the same value.

This modification of selling prices by the average time of turn-over of the capitals in different lines of commerce amounts to this: In proportion to the velocity of turn-over, the same mass of profits, which is determined by the annual rate of average profit for any given magnitude of merchants' capital, independently of the specific commercial character of the operations of this capital, is differently distributed over masses of commodities of the same value. For instance, if the merchants' capital is turned over five times per year, it will add 15/5 = 3% to the price of commodities, and if turned over once per year, it will add 15% to their price.

The same percentage of the commercial profit in different lines of industry, according to the proportions of their times of turn-over, increases the selling prices of commodities by different percentages calculated on their values.

On the other hand, in the case of industrial capital, the time of turn-over does not affect in any way the magnitude of the value of the individual commodities produced during that time, although it does affect the mass of value and surplus-value produced in a given time, because it affects the mass of exploited labor. This is indeed concealed and seems to be otherwise, as soon as one has an eye only to the prices of production. But this is due solely to the fact that, according to the previously analysed laws, the prices of production of the various commodities deviate from their values. As soon as we look upon the process of production in its totality, upon the mass of commodities produced by the entire industrial capital of society, we shall find the general law vindicated.

We see then, that a closer inspection of the influence of the time of turn-over on the formation of the values leads us back, in the case of the industrial capital, to the general law and to the basis of political economy, to-wit, the law that the values of commodities are determined by the labor time contained in them. But the influence of the turn-overs of merchants' capital on the mercantile prices reveals phenomena, which, without a very lengthy analysis of the connecting links, seem to point to a purely arbitrary fixing of prices. They seem to be fixed purely on the intention that a certain capital should make a definite quantity of profits in one year. Particularly it looks, on account of this influence of the turn-overs, as though the process of circulation determined by itself the prices of commodities, independently, within certain limits, of the process of production. All superficial and false conceptions of the process of reproduction as a whole arise from the point of view of merchants' capital and from the conceptions, which its peculiar movements call forth in the minds of the agents of circulation.

If it is realised—and the reader will have realised it to his great dismay—that the analysis of the actual internal interconnections of the capitalist process of production is a very complicated matter and a very protracted work; if it is a work of science to resolve the visible and external movement into the internal actual movement, then it is understood as a matter of course, that the conceptions formed about the laws of production in the heads of the agents of production and circulation will differ widely from these real laws and will be merely the conscious expression of the apparent movements. The conceptions of a merchant, a stock gambler, a banker, are necessarily quite perverted. Those of the manufacturer are vitiated by the acts of circulation, to which their capital is subject, and by the compensation of the general rate of profit.42

Competition likewise plays a completely perverted role in these heads. If the limits of value and surplus-value are given, then it is easy to understand, in what manner the competition of capitals will transform values into prices of production and further into mercantile prices, and surplus-value into average profit. But without these limits, we cannot see any reason at all, why competition should reduce the average rate of profit to such and such a level instead of some other, should make it 15% instead of 1,500%. Competition at best can only reduce the rate of profit to one and the same level. But it does not contain any element, by which this level could be determined.

From the point of view of merchants' capital, the turn-over itself takes on the guise of a determining element of prices. On the other hand, while the velocity of the turn-over of industrial capital, in so far as it enables a certain industrial capital to exploit more or less labor, exerts a determining and limiting influence on the mass of profit and thus on the average rate of profit, this rate of profit exists as an external fact for the merchants' capital, and the internal connection of this rate with the production of surplus-value is entirely obliterated. If the same industrial capital, under otherwise equal circumstances, particularly with the same organic composition, is turned over four times per year instead of twice, it produces twice as much surplus-value and, consequently, profit. And this becomes palpable, as soon and so long as this capital has the monopoly of that improved mode of production, to which it owes its accelerated turn-over. Vice versa, differences in the times of turn-over in different lines of commerce manifest themselves in such a way that the profit made on the turn-over of some given commodity-capital is in an inverse ratio to the number of turn-overs of the money-capital which turns this commodity-capital over. Small profits and quick returns appears particularly to the shopkeeper as a principle, which he follows on principle.

For the rest, it is a matter of course, that this law of turn-overs of merchants' capital holds good in each line of commerce only for the average of turn-overs made by the entire merchants' capital invested in each particular line, and always without a consideration of any succession of alternating and mutually compensating turn-overs of longer or shorter duration. The capital of A, who deals in the same line as B, may make more or less than the average number of turn-overs. This does not alter the turn-over of the total mass of merchants' capital invested in this line. But this is of decisive moment for the individual merchant or shopkeeper. He makes in this case an extra profit, just as the industrial capitalists make extra profits, if they produce under conditions more favorable than the average. If competition compels him, he can sell cheaper than his competitors without lowering his profit below the average. If the conditions, which would enable him to turn his capital over more rapidly, are themselves for sale, such as a favorable location of the shop, he can pay extra rent for it, that is to say, a portion of his surplus-profit is converted into ground rent.

CHAPTER XIX.

FINANCIAL CAPITAL.

THE purely technical movements performed by money in the process of circulation of industrial capital, and, as we may now add, of commercial capital, which assumes a part of the circulation movement of industrial capital as its own peculiar movement,—these movements, if individualised into an independent function of some particular capital that performs nothing but just this service, convert a capital into financial capital. In that case, one portion of the industrial capital, and of commercial capital, persists not only in the form of money, of money capital in general, but as money-capital, which performs only these technical functions. A definite part of the total social capital separates from the rest and individualises itself in the form of money-capital, whose capitalist function consists exclusively in performing the financial operations for the entire class of industrial and commercial capitalists. As in the case of the commercial capital, so in that of financial capital a portion of the industrial capital in process of function in circulation separates from the rest and performs these operations of the process of reproduction for all the other capital. These movements of such money-capital, then, are once more merely movements of an individualised part of industrial capital in the process of reproduction.

Capital appears as the first and last point of this movement only to the extent that capital is newly invested, as happens in accumulation. But for every capital, which is already in process, this first and last point appear merely as points of transit. To the extent that industrial capital, from the moment of its exit from the sphere of production to that of its return to it, passes through the metamorphosis C'—M—C, M represents merely the final result of one phase of this metamorphosis and becomes at once the starting point of its supplementing second phase, as we have already seen in the discussion of the simple circulation of commodities. And although the C—M of industrial capital signifies always M—C—M for the commercial capital, nevertheless the actual process for this last named capital, once that it has become engaged, is also C—M—C. But the commercial capital passes continually through and simultaneously through the acts C—M and M—C, that is to say, there is not only one capital in the stage C—M, while another is in the stage M—C, but the same capital buys continually and sells continually at the same time, on account of the continuity of the process of production. It is continually and simultaneously in both stages. While one of its parts is converted into money, to be reconverted later into commodities, another is simultaneously converted into commodities, to be reconverted into money.

Whether the money serves here as a means of circulation or of payment, depends on the form of the exchange of commodities. In both cases, the capitalist has to pay out money continually to many persons, and to receive money continually from many persons. This purely technical labor of paying money and receiving money constitutes an employment by itself, which necessitates the making of balances, the balancing of accounts, so far as money serves as a means of payment. This labor belongs to the expenses of circulation, it does not create any values. It is abbreviated by being organised as a special department of agents, or capitalists, who perform this work for all the rest of the capitalist class.

A definite portion of the capital must be continually available as a hoard, as potential money-capital. It constitutes a reserve of means of purchase, a reserve of means of payment, unemployed capital in the form of money waiting to be put to work. And one portion of the capital continually returns in this form. This requires not only the collecting, paying, and bookkeeping operations, but also the storing of a hoard, which constitutes an operation by itself. This work consists indeed in a continual conversion of a hoard into means of circulation and means of payment, and its restoration to the form of a hoard by means of money secured through sales and due payments. This continuous movement of that part of capital, which exists in the form of money, separated from the function of capital itself, this purely technical function causes its own labors and expenses, which belong to the expenses of circulation.

The division of labor brings it about, that these technical operations, which are conditioned on the functions of capital, should be performed as much as possible for the entire capitalist class by one class of agents, or capitalists, into whose hands it is concentrated as their exclusive function. We have here, as in the case of commercial capital, a division of labor in a twofold sense. It becomes a special business, and because it is performed as a special business for the money-mechanism of the whole class, it is concentrated and performed on a large scale. And then a further division of labor takes place within this special business, on one hand by a separation into various independent lines, on the other by a segmentation of the work within each office of these special lines. Large offices, many bookkeepers and cashiers, far going division of labor, disbursing of money, receiving of money, balancing of accounts, keeping of current accounts, storing of money, etc., all these things, separated from the acts that necessitate these technical operations, make of the capital advanced for these functions a financial capital.

The various operations, whose individualisation gives rise to special lines of financial business, follow from the different capacities of money itself and from its different functions, through which capital in its money-form must likewise pass.

I have pointed out on a previous occasion, that the money business in general developed originally from an exchange of products between different communes.43

The financial business, the trade with money as a commodity, developed first out of international commerce. As soon as different national coins exist, the merchants buying in foreign countries must exchange their national coins into foreign coins, and vice versa, or exchange different coins for uncoined pure silver or gold as international money. This gives rise to the business of money-exchange, which is one of the primitive foundations of modern financial business.44 Out of it developed the modern banks of exchange, in which silver (or gold) serve as world money—now called bank money or commercial money—as distinguished from current money. The business of money-exchange, so far as it consists merely of notes of payment to travelers from one money-exchanger in one country to another in another country, developed as early as Roman and Grecian times out of the simple money-exchange.

The trade with gold and silver as commodities (raw materials for the making of articles of luxury) forms the primitive basis of bullion trade, or of that trade, which promotes the functions of money as world money. These, functions, as previously explained (Volume I, chapter III, 3c), are twofold: A currency back and forth between the various national spheres of circulation for the purpose of balancing the international payments and for performing the migrations of capital in quest of interest; simultaneously with this movement, there is a movement of precious metals from their sources of production across the world market and a distribution of their supply over the various national spheres of circulation. In England, the goldsmiths still served as bankers during the greater part of the 17th century. The way in which the balancing of international accounts in the money trade is further developed, is not discussed here, any more than any points referring to the business of dealing in valuable papers, in short, we leave out of consideration all special forms of the credit system, since this does not yet concern us here.

In the shape of world money, national money strips off its local character; one national money is expressed in another, and thus all of them are finally reduced to their contents in gold or silver, while these two metals, being the two commodities circulating as world money, are simultaneously reduced to their mutual ratios, which change continually. The money trader makes this intermediate business his special occupation. Money changing and bullion trading are thus the primitive forms of the money trade, and they arise from the twofold functions of money as national money and world money.

The capitalist process of production, and commerce in general, even under precapitalist methods, imply:

1) The accumulation of money in the shape of a hoard, that is, in the present case, the accumulation of that part of capital, which must always be on hand in the form of money, as a reserve fund of means of payment and means of purchase. This is the first form of a hoard, such as it reappears under the capitalist mode of production, and as it forms in general with the development of merchants' capital, at least for the purposes of this capital. These remarks apply to national as well as international circulation. This hoard is in continuous flux, pours ceaselessly into circulation, and returns uninterruptedly from it. The second form of a hoard is now that of fallow, unemployed, capital in the form of money, including newly accumulated and not yet invested money-capital. The functions first required by this formation of a hoard are those of safekeeping, bookkeeping, etc.
2) This is connected by an expenditure of money in buying, its reception on selling, making and receiving of payments, balancing of payments, etc. The money dealer performs all these services at first as a simple cashier of the merchants and industrial capitalists.45

Dealing in money is fully developed, even in its first stages, as soon as its ordinary functions of lending and borrowing are supplemented by the credit business. Of this more in the following part, which deals with interest-bearing capital.

The bullion trade itself, the transfer of gold or silver from one country to another, is merely the result of the trade in commodities. It is determined by the quotations of bills of exchange, which express the stand of the international payments and of the rate of interest on the different markets. The bullion trader as such acts but as an intermediary between results.

In discussing the way, in which the movements and forms of money develop out of the simple circulation of commodities, we have seen (Vol. I, chap. III), that the movements of the mass of money circulating as a means of purchase and payment are determined by the metamorphosis of commodities, by the volume and velocity of this metamorphosis. And we know now, that this metamorphosis is itself but a phase in the entire process of reproduction. As for the movement of the raw materials of money—gold and silver—from their places of production, it resolves itself in a direct exchange of commodities, an exchange of gold and silver as commodities for other commodities. Hence it is as much a phase of the exchange of commodities as the securing of iron or other metals by means of exchange. And so far as the movements of precious metals on the world-market are concerned (we leave aside at this point the consideration of their movements to the extent that they express the transfer of capital by loans, a transfer, which takes place also in the shape of commodity-capital), they are quite as much determined by the international exchange of commodities as the movements of money as a national means of purchase and payment are determined by the exchange of commodities on the home market. The emigrations and immigrations of precious metals from one national sphere to another, which are caused by a depreciation of national coins, or by a double standard, are extraneous to the circulation of money as such and represent merely corrections of deviations brought about arbitrarily by state decrees. And finally, as concerns the formation of hoards, which constitute reserve funds for means of purchase and payment, either for the home trade or for foreign trade, and likewise of hoards, which represent merely a form of capital temporarily unemployed, they are both necessary precipitates of the process of circulation.

Just as the entire circulation of money, in its volume, its forms, and movements, is purely a result of the circulation of commodities which in its turn represents from the capitalist point of view only the process of circulation of capital (including the exchange of capital for revenue, and of revenue for revenue, so far as the expenditure of revenue is realised in retail trade), so it is a matter of course, that the trade in money does not promote merely the circulation of money, a mere result and phenomenon of the circulation of commodities. This circulation of money itself, as a phase in the circulation of commodities, is a fundamental requisite for the trade in money. This trade promotes merely the technical operations of money-circulation, concentrating, abbreviating, simplifying them. The trade in money does not form the hoards, but supplies the technical means by which the formation of hoards may be reduced to its economical minimum (so far as it is voluntary, that is, so far as it is not an expression of unemployed capital or of disturbances of the process of reproduction). For if the reserve funds of means of purchase and payment are managed for the capitalist class as a whole, they need not be so large as they would have to be, did each capitalist manage his own. The trade in money does not buy the precious metals, but merely promotes their distribution, as soon as the trade in commodities has bought them. The trade in money facilitates the squaring of balances, so far as money serves as a means of payment, and reduces by the artificial mechanism of these compensations the amount of money required for this purpose. But it determines neither the connections, nor the volume, of the mutual payments. For instance, the bills of exchange and checks, which are exchanged for one another in banks and clearing houses, reflect quite independent transactions and are the results of real operations. It is merely a question of a better technical compensation of these results. So far as money serves as a means of purchase, the volume and number of purchases and sales are quite independent of the money trade. This trade cannot do anything but abbreviate the technical operations that go with buying and selling, and by this means it is enabled to reduce the amount of cash money required to turn the commodities over.

The money trade in its pure form, which we consider here, that is, the money trade not complicated by the credit system, is concerned only with the technique of a certain phase of the circulation of commodities, namely with the circulation of money and the different functions of money following from its circulation.

This distinguishes the money trade essentially from the trade in commodities, which promotes the metamorphosis of commodities and their exchange, or which gives even to this process the aspect of a process of a certain capital separated from the industrial capital. While, therefore, the commercial capital has its own form of circulation, M—C—M, in which the commodity changes hands twice and thereby recovers the money, in distinction from C—M—C, in which the money changes hands twice and thereby promotes the exchange of commodities, there is no such special form of circulation, which can be demonstrated in the case of financial capital.

To the extent that money-capital is advanced by a separate class of capitalists for the technical promotion of the circulation of money—a capital representing on a reduced scale the additional capital, which the merchants and industrial capitalists must otherwise advance themselves for these purposes—the general form of capital, M—M', is found also here. By the advance of M, the advancing capitalist secures M + 8Delta;M. But the promotion of the transaction M—M' does not concern itself in this case with the objective materials, but only with the technical processes of this metamorphosis.

It is evident, that the mass of money-capital, with which the money dealers have to operate, is the money-capital of the merchants and industrial capitalists in process of circulation, and that the operations of the money dealers are merely those originally performed by the merchants and industrial capitalist.

It is equally evident, that the profit of the money dealers is nothing but a deduction from the surplus-value, since they are operating merely with already realised values (even when they have been realised in the form of creditors' claims).

As in the trade with commodities, so in that with money a duplication of functions takes place. For a portion of the technical operations connected with the circulation of money must be carried out by the dealers and producers of commodities themselves.

CHAPTER XX.

HISTORICAL DATA CONCERNING MERCHANTS' CAPITAL.

THE particular form, in which the commercial capital and financial capital accumulate money, will be discussed in the next part of this volume.

From what has gone before it follows as a matter of course that nothing can be more absurd than to consider merchants' capital, whether in the shape of commercial or of financial capital, as some particular kind of industrial capital, such as that invested in mining, agriculture, stock raising, manufacture, transportation, etc., which constitute side lines of industrial capital formed by division of social labor and thus different spheres for its investment. The simple observation, that every industrial capital, when in the circulation phase of its process of reproduction, performs in the shape of commodity-capital and money-capital the very same functions, which appear as exclusive functions of the two forms of merchants' capital, should make such a crude conception impossible. On the other hand, in commercial and financial capital the differences between the productive nature of industrial capital and its functions in the sphere of circulation are independently individualised, by transferring definite forms and functions assumed momentarily by industrial capital into independent forms and functions of separate portions of capital permanently tied up in circulation. A changed form of industrial capital is widely different from distinctions between productive capitals following from the nature of the various lines of industry.

Aside from the brutality with which the economist ordinarily handles distinctions of form, in which he is interested only so far as their material side is concerned, the vulgar economist is influenced by two other reasons in his violation of distinctions. There is, in the first place, his incapability to explain the peculiar nature of mercantile profit. In the second place, he writes for the apologetic purpose of proclaiming his opinion, that the process of production by its very nature, is the source of such forms as commodity-capital and money-capital, or later of merchants' capital and financial capital, instead of showing that they are due to the specific form of capitalist production, which is conditioned above all on the circulation of commodities and therefore of money.

If commercial capital and financial capital do not differ from the production of grain any more than this differs from stock raising and manufacture, then it is evident that production and capitalist production are one and the same thing, and that especially the distribution of the social products among the members of society for the purpose of productive or individual consumption need no more be promoted by merchants and bankers than the consumption of meat by stock raising or that of clothes by their manufacture.46

The great economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, etc., are embarrassed over mercantile capital as a special kind, since they analyse the basic form of capital, industrial capital, and take notice of capital of circulation (commodity-capital and money-capital) only to the extent that it is a phase in the process of reproduction of all capital. The rules concerning the formation of value, profit, etc., which are directly deduced from an analysis of industrial capital, do not fit merchants' capital directly. Therefore these economists leave merchants' capital entirely out of consideration and mention it only as a kind of industrial capital. Whenever they treat of it particularly, as Ricardo does in dealing with foreign commerce, they seek to demonstrate that it does not create any value (and consequently no surplus-value). But whatever is true of foreign commerce, applies also to home commerce.

Hitherto we have considered merchants' capital merely from the point of view of the capitalist mode of production, and within its limits. However, not only commerce, but also merchants' capital, is older than the capitalist mode of production. In fact, it represents historically the oldest free existence of capital.

As we have already seen that the money trade and the capital advanced for it require nothing for their existence but the presence of commerce on a large scale, and further of commercial capital, it is only the latter, which we have to consider here.

Since commercial capital is tied up in the circulation, and since its function consists exclusively in promoting the exchange of commodities, it follows that it requires no other condition for its existence—aside from undeveloped forms arising from direct barter—but those indispensable for the simple circulation of money and commodities. Or rather, the circulation of money is the condition of its existence. No matter what may be the basis on which production is carried on, which throws its products into circulation as commodities —whether it be the basis of a primitive commune, or of slave production, or of small agricultural, small bourgeois, or capitalist—the character of the products as commodities is not altered, and as commodities they have to pass through the process of exchange and through the forms incidental to it. The extremes, between which merchants' capital acts as a mediator, exist for it as given propositions, just as they do for money and its movements. The only requisite is that these extremes should be present as commodities, regardless of whether production is wholly a production of commodities, or whether only the surplus of the independent producers over the immediate needs satisfied by their production is thrown on the market. The merchants' capital promotes only the movements of these extremes, these commodities, which are premises of its own existence.

The extent to which production ministers to commerce and supplies the merchants, depends on the mode of production. It reaches its maximum under a fully developed capitalist production, in which the product is primarily produced as a commodity, not for direct subsistence. On the other hand, on the basis of every mode of production, commerce promotes the production of surplus products destined for exchange, for the purpose of increasing the enjoyments of wealth of the producers (who are here understood to be the owners of the products). Commerce impregnates production more and more with the character of a production for exchange.

The metamorphosis of commodities, their movements, consist, 1) materially, of an exchange of different commodities for one another; 2) formally, of a conversion of commodities into money by sale, and a conversion of money into commodities by purchase. And the functions of merchants' capital resolve themselves into these functions of buying and selling commodities. It promotes merely the exchange of commodities, which must be conceived at the outset as being something more than a bare exchange of commodities between direct producers. Under slavery, feudalism, vassalage, so far as primitive organisations are concerned, it is the slave holder, the feudal lord, the tribute collecting state, who are the owners and sellers of the products. The merchant buys and sells for many. In his hands are concentrated purchases and sales, and purchase and sale cease consequently to be dependent on a direct necessity of the buyer (as a merchant).

But whatever may be the social organisation of the spheres of production, whose exchange of commodities the merchant promotes, his wealth exists always in the form of money and his money always serves as capital. Its form is always M—C—M'. Money, the independent form of exchange value, is his starting point, expansion of the exchange value his independent purpose. He occupies himself with the exchange of commodities and the operations incidental to it, which are separated from production and performed by a non-producer, and this is merely a means to increase wealth and at that wealth in its most general social form, exchange value. His compelling motive and compelling end are the conversion of M into M + 8Delta;M. The transactions M—C and C—M, which promote the act M—M', appear merely as stages of transition in this conversion of M into M + 8Delta;M. This M—C—M' is the characteristic movement of merchants' capital which distinguishes it from C—M—C, the exchange of commodities between the producers themselves, which has for its ultimate end the exchange of use-values.

To the extent that production is undeveloped, the money wealth will be concentrated in the hands of merchants, will appear in the specific form of merchants' wealth.

Within the capitalist mode of production—that is, as soon as capital has seized hold of production and given to it a wholly changed and specific form—merchants' capital appears merely as a capital with a specific function. But in all previous modes of production, and so much the more production ministers to the direct wants of the producers themselves, merchants' capital appears as the capital which performs the function of capital.

There is, then, no difficulty in understanding how it is that that merchants' capital is the historical form of capital long before capital has subjected production to its control. Its existence and development to a certain level are themselves historical premises for the development of capitalist production. For they are, 1), premises for the concentration of moneyed wealth, and 2), the capitalist mode of production is conditioned on production for exchange, commerce on a large scale instead of with a few individual customers, and this requires also a merchant, who does not buy for the satisfaction of his own individual wants, but concentrates the transactions of many buyers in one commercial transaction. On the other hand, all development of merchants' capital tends to give to production more and more the character of a production for exchange and to impregnate the products more and more with the character of commodities. But the development of merchants' capital by itself is incapable of bringing about and explaining the transition from one mode of production to another, as we shall presently see.

Within capitalist production, the merchants' capital is reduced from its former independent existence to a special phase in the investment of capital in general, and the compensation of profits reduces its rate of profits to the general average. Then it serves only as an agent of productive capital. The particular social conditions, which formed together with the development of merchants' capital, are then no longer paramount. On the contrary, where merchants' capital still predominates, we find backward conditions. This is true even of one and the same country, in which, for instance, the pure merchants' towns form far better analogies with past conditions than the manufacturing towns.47

An independent and prevailing development of capital in the shape of merchants' capital signifies that production is not subject to capital, in other words, it means that capital develops on the basis of a mode of production independent and outside of it. The independent development of merchants' capital stands therefore in an inverse ratio to the general economic development of society.

The independent mercantile wealth, as a prevailing form of capital represents the independent establishment of the process of circulation as against its extremes, and these extremes are the exchanging producers themselves. These extremes remain independent of the process of circulation, just as this circulation remains independent of them. The product becomes a commodity in this case by way of commerce. It is commerce which, under such conditions, develops products into commodities; it is not the produced commodity itself which, by its movements, gives rise to commerce. Capital in the capacity of capital appears here first in the process of circulation. In the process of circulation money first develops into capital. In the circulation, the products first assume the character of exchange values, of commodities and money. Capital can and must form in the process of circulation, before it learns to control the extremes, that is, the various spheres of production between which circulation intervenes as a mediator. The circulation of money and commodities may act as an intermediary between spheres of production of widely different organisation, whose internal structure is still, predominantely adjusted to the production of use-values. This independent status of the process of circulation, by which various spheres of production are connected by means of a third link, expresses two facts. On the one hand it shows that the circulation has not yet seized hold of production, but as yet regards it as an existing fact. On the other hand, it shows that the process of production has not yet absorbed circulation and made a phase of production of it. But in capitalist production, both of these things are accomplished. The process of production rests wholly upon the circulation, and the circulation is a mere phase of transition of production, in which the product, having been created as a commodity, is realised in money and its elements of production replaced by products, which have likewise been created in the shape of commodities. That form of capital, which developed directly in circulation, the merchants' capital, appears here merely as one of the forms of capital in its process of reproduction.

The rule, that the independent development of merchants' capital is inversely proportioned to the degree of development of capitalist production, becomes particularly manifest in the history of the carrying trade, for instance, among the Venetians, Genoese, Dutch, etc., where the principal gains were not made by the exportation of the products of the home industries, but by the promotion of the exchange of products of commercially and otherwise economically undeveloped societies and by the exploitation of both spheres of production.48

Here the merchants' capital is pure, separated from the extremes, the spheres of production, between which it intervenes. This is one of the main sources of its formation. But this monopoly of the carrying trade disintegrates, and with it this trade itself, in proportion as the economic development of peoples advances, whom it exploits at each end of its course, and whose backward development formed the basis of this trade. In the carrying trade, this appears not only as the disintegration of a special line of commerce, but also as the disintegration of the supremacy of purely commercial nations and of their commercial wealth in general, which rested upon this carrying trade. This is but one of the special forms, which expresses the subordination of the commercial capital to the industrial capital with the advance of capitalist production. The manner in which merchants' capital behaves wherever it rules over production is drastically illustrated, not only by the colonial economy (the colonial system) in general, but particularly by the methods of the old Dutch East India Company.

Since the movement of merchants' capital is M—C—M', the profit of the merchant is made, in the first place, only within the process of circulation, by the two transactions of buying and selling; and in the second place, it is realised in the last transactions, the sale. It is a profit upon alienation. At first sight, a pure and independent commercial profit seems impossible, so long as products are sold at their value. To buy cheap in order to sell dear is the rule of trade. It is not supposed to be an exchange of equivalents. The conception of value is included in it only to the extent that the individual commodities all have a value and are to that extent money. In quality, they are all expressions of social labor. But they are not values of equal magnitude. The quantitative ratio, in which products are exchanged, is at first quite arbitrary. They assume the form of commodities inasmuch as they are exchangeable, that is, inasmuch as they may be expressed in terms of the same third thing. The continued exchange and the more regular reproduction for exchange reduces this arbitrariness more and more. But this applies not at once to the producer and consumer, but only to the mediator between them, the merchant, who compares the money-prices and pockets their difference. By his own movements he establishes the equivalence of commodities.

The merchants' capital is at first merely the intervening movement between extremes not controlled by it and between premises not created by it.

Just as from the mere form of the circulation of commodities, C—M—C, money rises not only as a measure of value and medium of circulation, but also as the absolute form of the commodity and thus of wealth, in the form of a hoard, so that its conservation and accumulation as money become its life's purpose, so money, in the shape of a hoard, issues from the mere form of the circulation of merchants' capital, M—C—M', as something which is preserved and increased only by its alienation.

The trading nations of the ancients existed like the gods of Epicure in the intermediate worlds of the universe, or rather like the Jews in the pores of Polish society. The trade of the first independent and highly developed merchant towns and trading nations rested as a pure carrying trade upon the barbarism of the producing nations between whom they intervened.

In the precapitalist stages of society, commerce rules industry. The reverse is true of modern society. Of course, commerce will have more or less of a reaction on the societies, between which it is carried on. It will subject production more and more to exchange value, by making enjoyments and subsistence more dependent on the sale than on the immediate use of the products. Thereby it dissolves all old conditions. It increases the circulation of money. It seizes no longer merely upon the surplus of production, but corrodes production itself more and more, making entire lines of production dependent upon it. However, this dissolving effect depends to a large degree on the nature of the producing society.

So long as merchants' capital promotes the exchange of products between undeveloped societies, commercial profit does not only assume the shape of outbargaining and cheating, but also arises largely from these methods. Leaving aside the fact that it exploits the difference in the prices of production of the various countries (and in this respect it tends to level and fix the values of commodities), those modes of production bring it about that merchants' capital appropriates to itself the overwhelming portion of the surplus-product, either in its capacity as a mediator between societies, which are as yet largely engaged in the production of use-values and for whose economic organisation the sale of that portion of its product which is transferred to the circulation, or any sale of products at their value, is of minor importance; or, because under those former modes of production, the principal owners of the surplus-product, with whom the merchant has to deal, are the slave holder, the feudal landlord, the state (for instance, the oriental despot), and they represent the wealth and luxury, which the merchant tries to trap, as Adam Smith correctly scented in that passage on feudal times, which I have quoted above. Merchants' capital in its supremacy everywhere stands for a system of robbery,49 and its development, among the trading nations of old and new times, is always connected with plundering, piracy, snatching of slaves, conquest of colonies. See Carthage, Rome, and later Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch, etc.

The development of commerce and merchants' capital brings forth everywhere the tendency toward production of exchange values, increases its volume, multiplies and monopolises it, develops money into world money. Commerce therefore has everywhere more or less of a dissolving influence on the producing organisations, which it finds at hand and whose different forms are mainly carried on with a view to immediate use. To what extent it brings about a dissolution of the old mode of production, depends on its solidity and internal articulation. And to what this process of dissolution will lead, in other words, what new mode of production will take the place of the old, does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself. In the antique world the effect of commerce and the development of merchants' capital always result in slave economy; or, according to what the point of departure may be, the result may simply turn out to be the transformation of a patriarchal slave system devoted to the production of direct means of subsistence into a similar system devoted to the production of surplus-value. However, in the modern world, it results in the capitalist mode of production. From these facts it follows, that these results were conditioned on quite other circumstances than the mere influence of the development of merchants' capital.

It follows from the nature of the case that as soon as town industry as such separates from agricultural industry, its products are from the outset commodities and require for their sale the intervention of commerce. The leaning of commerce upon the development of the towns, and, on the other hand, the dependence of the towns upon commerce, are to that extent intelligible. However, in what measure industrial development will keep step with this development, depends upon quite other circumstances. Already ancient Rome, in its later republican days, developed merchants' capital more highly than it had ever existed in the antique world, without any progress in the development of crafts, while in Corinth and in other Grecian towns of Europe and Asia Minor the development of commerce was accompanied by highly developed crafts. On the other hand, in direct opposition to the development of towns and its conditions, the trading spirit and the development of commerce are frequently found among unsettled nomadic peoples.

There is no doubt—and it is precisely this fact which has led to many wrong conceptions—that in the 16th and 17th centuries the great revolutions, which took place in commerce with the through geographical discoveries and rapidly increased the development of merchants' capital, form one of the principal elements in the transition from feudal to capitalist production. The sudden expansion of the world market, the multiplication of the circulating commodities, the zeal displayed among the European nations in the race after the products of Asia and the treasures of America, the colonial system, materially contributed toward the destruction of the feudal barriers of production. However, the modern mode of production, in its first, period, the manufacturing period, developed only in places, where the conditions for it had been previously developed during medieval times. Compare, for instance, Holland with Portugal.50 And, on the other hand, when in the 16th, and partially still in the 17th, century the sudden expansion of commerce and the creation of a new world market exerted an overwhelming influence on the overthrow of the old mode of production and the rise of the capitalistic one, this was accomplished on the basis of the already created capitalist mode of production. The world market forms itself the basis of this mode of production. On the other hand, the immanent necessity of this production to produce on an ever enlarged scale tends to extend the world market continually, so that it is not commerce in this case which revolutionises industry, but industry which continually revolutionises commerce. The commercial supremacy itself is now conditioned on the greater or smaller prevalence of the conditions for a large industry. Compare for instance, England and Holland. The history of the decline of Holland as the ruling commercial nation is the history of the subordination of merchants' capital to industrial capital. The obstacles presented by the internal solidity and articulation of precapitalistic, national, modes of production to the corrosive influence of commerce is strikingly shown in the intercourse of the English with India and China. The broad basis of the mode of production is here formed by the unity of small agriculture and domestic industry, to which is added in India the form of communes resting upon common ownership of the land, which, by the way, was likewise the original form in China. In India, the English exerted simultaneously their direct political and economic power as rulers and landlords, for the purpose of disrupting these small economic organisations.51 The English commerce exerts a revolutionary influence on these organisations and tears them apart only to the extent that it destroys by the low prices of its goods the spinning and weaving industries, which are an archaic and integral part of this unity. And even so this work of dissolution is proceeding very slowly. It proceeds still more slowly in China, where it is not backed up by any direct political power on the part of the English. The great economy and saving in time resulting from the direct connection of agriculture and manufacture offer here the most dogged resistance to the products of great industries, whose prices are everywhere perforated by the dead expenses of their process of circulation. On the other hand, Russian commerce, unlike the English, leaves the economic basis of Asiatic production untouched.52

The transition from the feudal mode of production takes two roads. The producer becomes a merchant and capitalist, in contradistinction from agricultural natural economy and the guild-encircled handicrafts of medieval town industry. This is the really revolutionary way. Or, the merchant takes possession in a direct way of production. While this way serves historically as a mode of transition—instance the English clothier of the 17th century, who brings the weavers, although they remain independently at work, under his control by selling wool to them and buying cloth from them—nevertheless it cannot by itself do much for the overthrow of the old mode of production, but rather preserves it and uses it as its premise. For example, even up to the middle of the 19th century the manufacturer in the French silk industry and in the English hosiery and lace industries was but nominally a manufacturer, and merely a merchant in point of fact, who permitted the weavers to continue their work in the old unorganized way and exerted only the control of the merchant, for whom they work in reality.53 This method is everywhere an obstacle to a real capitalist mode of production and declines with the development of the latter. Without revolutionising the mode of production, it deteriorates merely the condition of the direct producers, transforms them into mere wage workers and proletarians under worse conditions than those who have already been placed under the immediate control of capital and absorbs their surplus-labor on the basis of the old mode of production. The same conditions exist in a somewhat modified form in the London furniture industry, so far as it is carried on by handicrafts. Particularly in the Tower hamlets it is practised on a very extensive scale. The whole production is divided into numerous separate lines independent of one another. One business makes only chairs, another only tables, a third only bureaus, etc. But these lines of business themselves are run more or less like crafts, by one small master with a few journeymen. Nevertheless the output is too large to work directly for private persons. The products are bought by owners of furniture stores. On Saturdays the master sees them and sells his product, and the transaction is closed with as much haggling as is done in a pawnshop over the loan on this or that piece. The masters need this weekly sale, were it for no other reason than to buy more raw materials for next week and pay wages. Under these circumstances, they are really only middlemen between their employes and the merchants. The merchant is the real capitalist, who pockets the largest share of the surplus-value.54

A similar condition exists in the transition to manufacture from lines, which were formerly carried on as handicrafts or as sidelines to rural industries. According to the development of such small independent businesses—which may even employ machinery that admits of a craftslike operation—the transition to large scale industry takes place. The machine is driven by steam, instead of by hand. This is the case, for instance, of late in the English hosiery industry.

There is, consequently, a threefold transition. First, the merchant becomes directly an industrial capitalist. This is the case in crafts conditioned on commerce, especially industries producing luxuries, which are imported by the merchants together with the raw materials and laborers from foreign countries, as they were in Italy from Constantinople in the 15th century. In the second place, the merchant converts the small masters into his middlemen or, perhaps, buys direct from the self-producer, leaving him nominally independent and his mode of production unchanged. In the third place, the industrial becomes a merchant and produces immediately on a large scale for commerce.

In the Middle Ages, the merchant is merely the man who, as Poppe correctly says, "removes" the goods produced by the guilds or the peasants. The merchant becomes an industrial capitalist, or rather, he lets the craftsmen, particularly the small rural producers, work for him. On the other hand, the producer becomes a merchant. The master weaver, instead of receiving his wool in installments from the merchant and working for him with his journeymen buys wool or yarn himself and sells his cloth to the merchant. The elements of production pass into his process of production as commodities bought by himself. And instead of producing for the individual merchant, or for definite customers, the master cloth-weaver produces for the commercial world. The producer is himself a merchant. The merchants' capital performs no longer anything but the process of circulation. Originally the commerce was the premise for the transformation of the crafts, rural domestic industries, and feudal agriculture into capitalist enterprises. It develops the products into commodities, either by creating a market for them, or by carrying new equivalents in the form of goods to them and supplying production with new raw and auxiliary materials. In this way it opens up new lines of production, which are based at the outset upon commerce, both as concerns the production for the home and world market and as concerns conditions of production originated by the world market. As soon as manufacture gains sufficient strength, and still more large scale industry, it creates in its turn a market for itself and captures it with its commodities. Now commerce becomes the servant of industrial production, and a continual expansion of the market becomes a vital necessity for industrial production. An ever more extended wholesale production floods the existing market and thereby works continually toward a still wider expansion of the market and a bursting of its bonds. What restricts this wholesale production, is not commerce (to the extent that it expresses the existing demand), but the magnitude of the employed capital and the developed productivity of labor. The industrial capitalist always has the world market before him, compares, and must continually compare, his own cost-prices with those of the whole world, not only with those of his home market. In former periods this comparison falls almost entirely upon the shoulders of the merchants, and thereby secures for merchants' capital the supremacy over industrial capital.

The first theoretical treatment of modern modes of production—the mercantile system—started out necessarily from the superficial phenomena of the process of circulation, which are presented in an independent form by the movements of merchants' capital. Therefore it grasped only the semblance of things. This was partly due to the fact that merchants' capital is the first free mode of existence of capital in general. On the other hand, it was due to the overwhelming influence exerted by this capital during the first period of revolution of feudal production, the period of genesis of modern production. The real science of modern economy does not begin, until theoretical analysis passes from the process of circulation to the process of production. It is true, interest-bearing capital is likewise a very old form of capital. But we shall see later, why mercantilism did not take its departure from it, but assumed a controversial attitude towards it.

PART V.

DIVISION OF PROFIT INTO INTEREST AND PROFITS OF ENTERPRISE. THE INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL.

IN our first discussion of the general, or average, rate of profit in Part II of this volume, we did not have this rate before us in its complete form, since the equalisation of profit appeared there only as an equalisation between the various industrial capitals invested in different spheres. This was further supplemented in the preceding Part, in which the participation of merchants' capital in this equalisation and the commercial profit were discussed. By this means the general rate of profit and the average profit presented themselves within more circumscribed limits than before. In the further process of our analysis it should be remembered, that any future reference to the general rate of profit or to the average profit means only this latter, completed, form of the average rate. Since this rate is now the same for the industrial and the mercantile capital, it is no longer necessary, so far as this average profit is concerned, to make any distinction between industrial and commercial profit. Whether capital is invested industrially in the sphere of production, or commercially in the sphere of circulation, it yields the same average profit annually in proportion to its magnitude.

Money—which signifies here any independent expression of a certain amount of value, whether it exists actually as money or as commodities—may be converted into capital on the basis of capitalist production. By this conversion it is transformed from a given value to a self-expanding, increasing, value. It produces a profit, that is, it enables a capitalist to extract a certain amount of unpaid labor, surplus-products and surplus-value, from the laborers and to appropriate it to himself. In this way it acquires, aside from its use-value as money, an additionel use-value, namely that of serving as capital. Its use-value consists then precisely in the profit, which it produces when converted into capital. In this capacity of potential capital, of a means for the production of profit, it becomes a commodity, but a commodity of a peculiar kind. Or, what amounts to the same, capital as capital becomes a commodity.55

Take it that the average rate of profit is 20%. In that case a machine, valued at 100 p.st., employed as capital under the prevailing average conditions and with an average exertion of intelligence and adequate activity, would yield a profit of 20 p.st. In other words, a man having 100 p.st. at his disposal, holds in his hand a power by which 100 p.st. may be turned into 120 p.st., or by which a profit of 20% may be produced. He holds in his hand a potential capital of 100 p.st. If this man relinquishes these 100 p.st. for one year to another man, who uses this sum actually as capital, he gives him the power to produce a profit of 20%, a surplus-value, which costs this other nothing, for which he pays no equivalent. If this man should pay, say 5 p.st. at the close of the year to the owner of the 100 p.st., out of the produced profit, he would be paying for the use-value of the 100 p.st., the use-value of its function as capital, the function of producing 20 p.st. of profit. That part of the profit, which he pays to the owner, is called interest. It is merely another name, a special term, for a certain part of the profit, which capital in process of its function has to give up to its owner, instead of keeping it in its own pockets.

It is evident, that the possession of 100 p.st. gives to their owner the power to absorb the interest, a certain portion of the profit produced by his capital. If he did not give the 100 p.st. to the other man, then this other could not produce any profit, and could not act in the capacity of capitalist at all with reference to these 100 p.st.56

To speak in such a case of natural justice, as Gilbart is doing (see note), is nonsense. The justice of the transactions between the agents of production rests on the fact that these transactions arise as natural consequences from the conditions of production. The juristic forms, in which these economic transactions appear as activities of the will of the parties concerned, as expressions of their common will and as contracts which may be enforced by law against some individual party, cannot determine their content, since they are only forms. They merely express this content. This content is just, whenever it corresponds, and is adequate, to the mode of production. It is unjust, whenever it contradicts that mode. Slavery on the basis of capitalist production is unjust; likewise fraud in the quality of commodities.

The 100 p.st. produce the profit of 20 p.st. by functioning as capital, whether it be industrial or commercial. But the indispensable condition of this function as capital is that this money is used as capital, that this money is invested in the purchase of means of production (in the case of industrial capital), or of commodities (in the case of merchants' capital). But in order to be expended, it must be there. If A, the owner of the 100 p.st., were to spend them for his private expenses, or to keep them as a hoard, they could not be invested by B, in his capacity as a capitalist, as capital. B does not invest his own capital, but that of A. But he cannot expend the capital of A without the consent of A. Therefore it is really A, who first expends these 100 p.st. as capital, although his whole function as a capitalist is limited to this expenditure of 100 p.st. as capital. So far as these 100 p.st. are concerned, B acts in the capacity of a capitalist only because A lends him this money and thus expends it as capital.

Let us first consider the peculiar circulation of interest-bearing capital. Then we shall analyse in the second place the peculiar manner, in which it is sold as a commodity, being merely lent instead of relinquished for good.

The point of departure is the money, which A advances to B. This may be done with or without security. However, the first named form is the more ancient, with the exception of advances on commodities or on certificates of indebtedness, such as bills of exchange, bonds, etc. These special forms do not concern us here. We are dealing here with interest-bearing capital in its ordinary form.

In the hand of B, the money is actually converted into capital, passes through the process M—C—M', and returns as M' to A, as M + increment of M, where the increment of M represents the interest. For the sake of simplicity we leave out of consideration the case, in which capital stays in the hands of B for a long term and interest is paid at periodical intervals.

The movement, then, is M—M—C—M'—M'. What appears duplicated here is 1) the expenditure of the money as capital, 2) its reflux as realised capital, as M', or as M + increment of M.

In the movement of merchants' capital, M—C—M', the same commodity changes hands twice, or even more than twice, if one merchant sells to another. But every change of hand of these commodities indicates a metamorphosis, a purchase or sale of commodities, no matter how often this process may be repeated until it ends in consumption.

On the other hand, the same money changes hands twice in C—M—C, but this indicates the complete metamorphosis of the commodity, which is first converted into money and then from money back into another commodity.

But in the case of interest-bearing capital, the first change of hands of M is not a phase of either the metamorphosis of a commodity or of the reproduction of capital. It does not become so until the second change of hands, in the hands of the man acting in the capacity of a capitalist, who carries on a trade with it or transforms it into productive capital. The first change of hands of M does not express anything else in this case but its transfer, or handing over by contract, from A to B. This is a transfer, which usually takes place under certain juristic forms and stipulations.

This duplicated expenditure of money as capital, the first of which is merely a transfer from A to B, is supplemented by the duplication of its reflux. As M', or M + increment of M, it flows back out of the process to the man acting in the capacity of a capitalist. This man in his turn transfers it back to A, together with a part of the profit, of realised capital, of M + increment of M, which, however, is not equal to the entire profit, but only a part of the profit, the interest. It flows back to B only as the thing which he had invested, as capital in process of function, but as the property of A. In order that its reflux may be complete, B must return it to A. But B has not only to return the amount of the capital, he must also turn over to A a part of the profit, which he made with this capital, and this part is called interest. For A gave him this money only as a capital, that is, as a value, which is not only maintained by its movements, but brings also a surplus-value to its owner. It remains in the hands of B only so long as it is performing its function of capital. And it ceases to be capital as soon as it is returned to its owner on the stipulated date. When no longer serving as capital, it must be returned to A, who never ceased being its legal owner.

The form of lending, which is peculiar to this commodity, this capital as a commodity, and which also occurs in other transactions instead of that of sale, follows from the simple definition that capital serves here as a commodity, or that money as capital becomes a commodity.

It is necessary to make a distinction here.

We have seen in Volume II, chapter I, and recall at this point, that capital serves in the process of circulation as commodity-capital and money-capital. But in neither of these forms does capital become a commodity as capital.

As soon as the productive capital has transformed itself into commodity-capital, it must be thrown upon the market, it must be sold as a commodity. There it serves simply in the capacity of a commodity. The capitalist then appears only as a seller of commodities, just as the buyer is only a buyer of commodities. As a commodity, the product must realise its value in the process of circulation, by its sale, must assume the form of money. In this respect it is quite immaterial, whether this commodity is bought by a consumer for the purpose of subsistence, or by a capitalist as a means of production to become a part of his capital. In the act of circulation, the commodity-capital serves only as a commodity, not as capital. It is a commodity-capital, as distinguished from a simple commodity, 1), because it is pregnant with surplus-value, so that the realisation of its value is simultaneously a realisation of surplus-value. But this does not alter in any way its simple existence as a commodity, as a product of a certain price. 2) It is a commodity-capital, because its function as a commodity is a phase in its process of reproduction as capital, so that its movement as a commodity, being a part of its movement in process, is simultaneously its movement as capital. Yet it does not become capital by the act of selling as such, but only through the connection of this act with the whole movement of this definite amount of value in the capacity of capital.

In like manner it serves only as money pure and simple, when acting in the capacity of money-capital, that is, as a means of buying commodities (the elements of production). The fact that this money is at the same time money-capital, a form of capital, is not due to the act of buying, which is the service performed by it as money. It is due to the connection of this act with the total movement of capital, since this act, which it performs as money, inaugurates the capitalist process of production.

But so far as they perform any service and play any actual role in the process, commodity-capital on the market serves only as a commodity, money-capital only as money. At no time during the metamorphosis, viewed by itself, does the capitalist sell his commodities as capital to the buyer, although they represent a capital for himself, nor does he give up money to the sellers in his capacity as a capitalist. In either case he exchanges his commodities simply as commodities, and the money simply as money, as a means of purchasing commodities.

It is only in the connection with the whole process, at the moment where the point of departure appears simultaneously as the point of return, in M—M' or C—C', that capital in the process of circulation appears as capital (while it appears as capital in the process of production through the subordination of the laborer under the capitalist and the production of surplus-value). In this moment of return, however, the connection disappears. What is present is M', that is money plus increment of money (regardless of whether the amount of value increased by this increment has the form of money, commodities, or elements of production), a certain amount of money equal to the amount originally advanced plus an increment, which is the realised surplus-value. And it is precisely at this point of return, where capital exists as a realised capital, as an expanded value, that capital never passes into circulation—considering this point as a fixed point of rest, whether imaginary or real—, but rather appears to be withdrawn from circulation as a result of the whole process. Whenever it is again relinquished, it is never transferred to another as capital, but sold to him as a simple commodity, or given to him as simple money in exchange for commodities. It never appears as capital in its process of circulation, but only as a commodity or as money, and this is the only form in which it exists so far as others are concerned. Commodities and money are here capital, not inasmuch as commodities change into money, or money into commodities, not with reference to their actual relations to sellers or buyers, but only with reference to their ideal relations, that is, subjectively speaking, their relations to the capitalist himself, or objectively speaking, as elements of the process of reproduction. So far as capital is capital, it exists only in its actual function, not in the process of circulation, but only in the process of production, in the process by which labor-power is exploited.

But it is different with interest-bearing capital, and it is precisely this difference, which constitutes its specific character. The owner of money, who desires to invest his money as interest-bearing capital, transfers it to some one else, throws it into circulation, makes a commodity of it as capital. It is not a capital for himself alone, but also for others. It is not capital merely for the man who offers it for investment, but it is handed to others at the outset as capital, as a value endowed with the use-value of creating surplus-value, profit; a value which preserves itself in process and returns to its original owner, in this case the owner of money, after performing its function. It moves away from him only for a certain time, it passes for a while from the possession of its owner into that of a capitalist performing his business, it is neither given up in payment nor sold, but merely loaned. It is relinquished only with the understanding that it shall in the first place return to its point of departure after a certain time, and that it shall return, in the second place, as realised capital, a capital having actually performed its function of creating surplus-value.

Commodities, which are loaned out as capital, are loaned either as fixed or as circulating capital, according to their constitution. Money may be loaned in either form. For instance, it may be loaned as fixed capital in the form of an annuity, whereby a portion of the capital returns with the interest. Some commodities, owing to the nature of their use-values, can be loaned only as fixed capital, such as houses, ships, machines, etc. But all loan capital, whatever be its forms, and no matter in what manner the nature of its use-value may modify its return, is only a specific form of money-capital. For the thing that is loaned here is always a definite sum of money, and it is this sum on which interest is calculated. If the thing that is loaned is neither money nor circulating capital, it is paid back in the same way in which fixed capital returns. The lender receives periodically a certain interest and a portion of the consumed value of the fixed capital itself, an equivalent for the periodical wear and tear. And at the end of the stipulated term the unconsumed portion of the loaned fixed capital is returned in natura. If the loaned capital is circulating capital, it is like-wise returned in the manner peculiar to circulating capital.

The manner of reflux, then, is always determined by the actual circulation of the capital in process of reproduction and its specific kind. But so far as loan capital is concerned, its reflux assumes the form of return payments, because its advance, by which it is relinquished, has the form of loaning.

In this chapter we treat only of money-capital proper, from which the other forms of loaned capital are derived.

The loaned capital returns in a twofold way. First it returns in the process of reproduction to the capitalist performing his function, and then its return is duplicated by its transfer to the lender, the money-capitalist, in the form of a return payment to its real owner, its legal point of departure.

In the actual process of circulation the capital appears always as a commodity or as money, and its movements are always dissolved into a series of purchases and sales. In short, the process of circulation resolves itself into the metamorphosis of commodities. It is different, when we consider the process of reproduction as a whole. If we take our departure from money (and it is the same, when we start off with commodities, since we then take our departure from their value and look upon them from the point of view of money), we see that a certain sum of money is expended and returns after a certain period with an increment. This sum has preserved itself and expanded itself in the course of a certain rotation. To the extent that money is loaned as capital, it is loaned as just such a sum of money, which preserves and expands itself, returns after a certain period with an increment, and is ready to pass through the same process once more. It is not expended either as money or as a commodity, it is neither exchanged for commodities when advanced in the form of money, nor sold in exchange for money, when advanced in the form of commodities. It is expended as capital. This reflexive relation to itself, in which capital presents itself when the process of production is viewed in its entirety and as a unit, and in which money appears as self-increasing money, is here imposed upon it as its character and peculiarity without the intervention of any intermediary movement. And it is expended in this peculiar form, when it is loaned as money-capital.

A very queer conception of the role of money-capital is held by Proudhon "Gratuité du Crédit. Discussion enter M. F. Bastiate et M. Proudhon. Paris, 1850.") Loaning appears as an evil to Proudhon because it is not selling. Loaning at interest is for him "the faculty of always selling the same article over and over, and of receiving its price again and again, without ever relinquishing the ownership of the things one is selling" (page 9). The object, such as money, a house, etc., does not change owners, as it does in selling and buying. But Proudhon does not see, that no equivalent is received for money handed over as interest-bearing capital. It is true that objects are passed from one to another in every act of buying and selling, so far as they are at all processes of exchange. The ownership of the sold object is always relinquished. But its value is not given up. In selling the commodity is relinquished, but not its value, which is given in return in the form of money, or in another form which here takes the place of money, namely of certificates of indebtedness, or of titles of payment. In buying money is given away, but its value, which is recovered in the shape of commodities. The industrial capitalist holds the same value in his hands during the entire process of reproduction (except the surplus-value), only it assumes different forms.

To the extent that exchange takes place, that is, an exchange of objects, no change of value takes place. The same capitalist always holds the same value in his hands. But so long as surplus-value is produced by the capitalist, no exchange takes place. As soon as exchange takes place, the surplus-value is already incorporated in the commodities. If we do not have in mind the individual acts of exchange, but the total circulation of capital, M—C—M', we see that a definite amount of values is continually advanced, and that this amount plus the surplus-value, or the profit, is recovered from the circulation. It is true, the individual acts of exchange do not reveal the fact that they are promoting this process. And it is precisely this process of M as capital, on which the interest of the money-lending capitalist rests and from which it arises.

"In fact," says Proudhon, "the hat maker, who sells hats...receives their value, no more and no less. But the money-lending capitalist...does not recover merely his capital: he recovers more than his capital, more than he throws into circulation; he receives an interest over and above his capital." (Page 169.) The hatter stands here in the place of the productive capitalist as distinguished from a loan capitalist. Evidently Proudhon did not learn the secret, which enables the capitalist to sell commodities at their value (the equalisation of values by the prices of production is here immaterial for his conception), whereby he receives a profit in addition to the capital, which he throws into circulation. Let us assume that the price of production of 100 hats is 115 pounds sterling, and that this price of production happens to be identical with the value of the hats, which means that the capital invested in the production of hats is of the same composition as the average social capital. If the profit is 15 p.st., or 15%, then the hatter gets this profit of 15 p.st. by selling his hats at their value of 115. They cost him 100 p.st. If he has produced them with his own capital, he pockets the whole surplus of 15 p.st. If he has borrowed the capital, he may have to give up 5 p.st. for interest. This does not alter anything in the value of the hats, but only in the distribution of the surplus-value already contained in this value between different persons. Since the value of the hats is not affected by the payment of interest, it is nonsense on the part of Proudhon to say: "As in commerce the interest of capital is added to the wages of laborers in making up the price of commodities, it is impossible that the laborer should be able to buy back the product of his own labor. To live by working is a principle, which implies a contradiction under the rule of interest."57

How little Proudhon understood the nature of capital, is shown by the following statement, in which he describes the movement of capital in general as a movement peculiar to interest-bearing capital: "Since money-capital, from exchange to exchange, comes always back to its source by the accumulation of interest, it follows that re-investment is always made by the same hand and profit accrues always to the same person."

What is it, now, that remains a riddle to him in the peculiar movement of interest-bearing capital? The categories buying, price, giving up objects, and the spontaneous form, in which surplus-value appears here; in short, the phenomenon that capital as such has become a commodity, so that selling has been turned into lending and price into a share in the profit.

The return of capital to its point of departure is the most general and characteristic movement of capital in its total circulation. This is by no means a peculiarity of interest-bearing capital. Its peculiarity is rather the externalised form of its return without the intervention of any circulation. The loaning capitalist lets go of his capital, transfers it to some industrial capitalist, without receiving any equivalent. His handing over of capital is not an act of the real circulation of capital at all, but serves merely as a prelude for the industrial capitalist who effects this circulation. This first change of place of money does not express any act of metamorphosis, neither buying nor selling. Its ownership is not relinquished, because no exchange takes place, no equivalent is offered. The return of the money from the hand of the industrial capitalist to that of the loaning capitalist supplements merely the first act of handing over the capital. This capital, after having been advanced in the form of money, returns to the industrial capitalist from the process of circulation in the form of money. But as the capital did not belong to him when he expended it, neither can it belong to him on its return. The passage through the process of reproduction cannot by any means give him the ownership of this capital. Hence he must restore it to its lender. The first transfer of the capital from the hands of the lender to those of the borrower is a legal transaction, which has nothing to do with the actual process of reproduction, but merely inaugurates it. The restoration, which transfers the returned capital from the hands of the borrower back to those of the lender is another legal transaction, a supplement of the first. The first inaugurates the actual process, the second takes place after this process. The point of departure and of return, the dispensation and recovery of the loaned capital, thus appear as arbitrary movements promoted by legal transactions, which take place before and after the actual process of capital and have nothing to do with it. So far as this actual process is concerned, the industrial capitalist might as well own the capital at the outset, so that it would return to him as his property.

In the first introductory act the lender gives his capital to the borrower. In the second and closing act after the process, the borrower returns the capital to the lender. To the extent that we consider merely the transaction between these two—and leaving aside the question of interest for the present—, in other words to the extent that we have in mind only the movement of the loan capital itself between the lender and the borrower, the whole movement is comprised within these two acts (separated by a longer or shorter time, during which the process of actual reproduction of capital takes place). And this movement, this dispensing on condition of returning, constitutes per se the movement of lending and borrowing, which is a specific form of a conditional dispensation of money or commodities.

The characteristic movement of capital in general, namely the return of money to the capitalist, the return of capital to its point of departure, assumes in the case of interest-bearing capital a wholly externalised form, separated from the actual movement of which it is an expression. A lets go of his money, not in the sense of money, but of capital. This implies no transformation of the capital. It merely changes hands. Its real transformation into capital is not performed until it is in the hands of B. But it has become capital for A as soon as he has given it to B. The actual reflux of capital from the processes of production and circulation takes place only for B. But for A the reflux assumes the same form as the dispensation. The capital returns from the hands of B to those of A. Dispensing, loaning money for a certain time and recovering it with interest (surplus-value) make up the complete form of the movement, which is peculiar to interest-bearing capital as such. The actual movement of the loaned money as capital constitutes a process, which is outside of the transactions between the lender and the borrower. In these transactions the intermediate process is obliterated, invisible, not directly comprised.

Being a peculiar sort of commodity, capital has its own peculiar mode of alienation. Its return in the present case is not the expression, not the consequence or result, of a definite series of economic processes, but the outcome of a specific legal agreement between buyer and seller. The time of return depends on the duration of the process of reproduction. But in the case of interest-bearing capital, its return as capital seems to depend on the mere agreement between lender and borrower. The return of capital as a part of this agreement no longer appears as a result due to the process of reproduction, but seems to take place without depriving the loaned capital of the form of money. It is true that these transactions are actually determined by the reproductive returns. But this is not evident in the transactions themselves. Nor is it always the case in practice. If the return in reproduction does not take place at the proper time, then the borrower has to face the problem. what other resources he can call into play to fulfill his obligations towards the lender. The mere form of this capital—that is, money expended as a certain sum, A, and returning as another sum A + IA/x, after a certain lapse of time, without any other intermediate connection but this lapse of time—is but an abstract image of the actual movement of capital.

In the actual movement of capital, its return is a phase of the process of circulation. The money is first converted into means of production; the process of production transforms it into commodities; by the sale of the commodities it is reconverted into money, and in this form it returns to the hands of the capitalist, who originally advanced the capital in the form of money. But in the case of interest-bearing capital, both the alienation and the return are the results of a legal transaction between the owner of capital and another person. We see only the alienation and the return. Whatever passes during the interval is obliterated.

But since money, when advanced as capital, has the faculty of returning to the person, who expended it as capital, since M—C—M' is the immanent form of the movement of capital, for this very reason the owner of money can loan it as capital, a thing having the faculty of returning to its point of departure, of preserving its value while under way in process, and of increasing it. He loans it as capital, because it returns to its point of departure after having been transformed into capital, so that the borrower can restore it to the lender after a certain period, because he has recovered it himself.

The loaning of money as capital—its alienation on condition that it be returned after a certain time—is therefore conditioned on the requirement that this money be actually employed as capital, so that it may actually flow back to its starting point. The actual cycle of money as capital is therefore the basic condition of the legal transaction, by which the borrower has to return the money to the lender. If the borrower does not invest the money as capital, it is his own business. The lender loans it as capital, and as such it is supposed to perform the capitalist functions, which include the circulation of money-capital until it reaches once more its starting point in the form of money.

The transactions M—C and C—M' in the circulation, in which a certain amount of value serves as money or commodities, are but intermediary processes, individual phases of a whole movement. As capital, this sum passes through the whole movement M—M'. It is advanced as money, or as a sum of values in some form, and returns as a sum of values. The lender of money does not expend it in the purchase of commodities, or, if this sum of values exists in the form of commodities, he does not sell it for money, but he advances it as capital, as M—M', as a value, which returns after a certain lapse of time to its point of departure. Instead of buying and selling, he loans. This loaning, then, is the form corresponding to its alienation as capital, instead of its alienation as money or commodities. This does not mean, however, that loaning may not be used in transactions, which have nothing to do with the capitalist process of reproduction.

We have so far considered only the movements of loaned capital between its owner and the industrial capitalist. Now we shall have to inquire into interest.

The lender expends his money as capital; the amount of values, which he relinquishes into the hands of another, is capital and returns to him. But the mere return of the loan capital into his hands as the same amount would not be its reflux as capital, but merely the return of a loaned sum of values. In order to return as capital, the advanced sum of values must not only be preserved in process, but must also be expanded, must return with a surplus-value, must be recovered as M + increment of M. This increment of M is in the present case the interest. It is that portion of the average profit, which does not remain in the hands of the practicing capitalist, but falls to the share of the money capitalist.

The fact that the money capitalist expends it as capital implies that it must be restored to him as M + increment of M. Later we shall also have to consider the case, in which interest is paid in fixed intervals without the simultaneous return of the capital, whose definite return does not take place until at the end of a longer period.

What is it that the money capitalist gives to the borrower, the industrial capitalist? What does he really pass over to him? It is only this transaction of handing over money which makes of the loaning of money a lending of money as capital, that is, the lending of capital as a commodity.

It is only by this act of passing money over to another that the capital is loaned by the money lender as a commodity, or that the commodity at his disposal is given to another as capital.

What is it that is alienated in ordinary sale? It is not the value of the sold commodities, for this changes merely its form. The value exists ideally in a commodity as its price, before it passes actually into the hands of the seller as money. The same value and the same amount of value merely change their form in such a case. In one instance they exist in the form of a commodity, in another in the form of money. The thing which is actually alienated by the seller, and which for this reason passes into the individual or productive consumption of the buyer, is the use-value of the commodity, is the commodity as a use-value.

What, then, is the use-value, which the money capitalist passes over for the period of the loan and relinquishes into the hands of the borrower, the productive capitalist? It is the use-value, which the money assumes by being capable of being invested as capital and performing the functions of capital, so that it can create a definite surplus-value, the average profit (any excess or fall below this is here a matter of accident), during its process, in addition to preserving its original magnitude of value. In the case of other commodities the use-value is ultimately consumed. Their substance disappears in consequence and with it their value. But the commodity capital has the peculiarity, that the consumption of its use-value not only preserves its exchange value and its use-value, but also increases them.

It is this use-value of money as capital, this faculty of producing an average profit, which the money capitalist relinquishes to the industrial capitalist for the period, during which he yields to the latter the use of the loan capital.

The money thus loaned shows in this respect a certain analogy with labor-power in its relation to the industrial capitalist. There is only this difference, that he pays for the value of labor-power, while he simply pays back the value of the loaned capital. The use-value of labor-power consists for the industrial capitalist in the faculty that labor-power creates more value (the profit) by its consumption for the industrial capitalist. And in like manner the use-value of the loan capital appears as its faculty of preserving and increasing value.

The money-capitalist alienates indeed a use-value, and for this reason the thing which he gives away is given as a commodity. And to this extent the analogy with a commodity is complete. In the first place, it is a value, which passes from one hand to another. In the case of a simple commodity, a commodity as such, the same value remains in the hands of the buyer and seller, only it has different forms; both have the same value which they had before the transaction, the one in the form of a commodity, the other in that of money. The difference in the case of loan capital is that the money capitalist is the only one who gives away a value when loaning money; but he preserves it by means of future restoration. In the transaction of loaning only one party receives value, since only one party relinquishes value.

In the second place, it is a real use-value, which is relinquished on one side and received and consumed on the other. But it differs from the use-value of ordinary commodities in that it is itself a value, namely the excess over the value of the original capital realised by the use of money as capital. The profit is this use-value.

The use-value of the loan capital consists in being able to serve as capital and to produce in this capacity the average profit under average conditions.58

What, then, does the industrial capitalist pay, and what is, therefore, the price of the loaned capital? That which men pay as interest for the use of what they borrow is, according to Massie, a part of the profit it is capable of producing.59

What the buyer of an ordinary commodity buys is its use-value; what he pays for is its exchange value. What the borrower of money buys, is likewise its use-value as capital; but what does he pay for? Surely not for its price, or value, as in the case of ordinary commodities. No change of form takes place in the value passing between the borrower and the lender, such as takes place between the buyer and the seller, so that this value would exist in one instance in the form of money, in another instance in the form of a commodity. The sameness of the alienated and returned value shows itself here in an entirely different way. The sum of values, the money, is given away without an equivalent, and is returned after the lapse of a certain period. The lender always remains the owner of the same value, even after it has passed from his hands into those of the borrower. In the simple exchange of commodities, the money is always on the side of the buyer; but in the lending, the money is on the side of the lender. It is he, who gives away his money for a certain period, and it is the borrower, the buyer of capital, who receives it as a commodity. But this is possible only when the money serves as capital and is advanced for this purpose. The borrower borrows money as capital, as a value producing an increment. But at the moment of borrowing it is as yet only potential capital, and so is any other capital at the moment when it is advanced. Only by its use does it expand its value and realise itself as capital. But after it has become realised capital, the borrower has to return it, as a value plus a surplus-value (interest). And this interest can be only a portion of the realised profit. Only a portion, not the whole of it. For its use-value for the borrower consists in producing a profit for him. Otherwise there would not have been any alienation of its use-value on the part of the lender. On the other hand, it cannot be the whole profit which falls to the share of the borrower. Otherwise he would not be paying anything for the alienation of the use-value, and he would return the advanced money to the lender as simple money, not as a capital having realised itself. For it is realised capital only when it is M + increment of M.

Both of them expend the same sum of money as capital, the lender and the borrower. But only in the hands of the latter does it serve as capital. The profit is doubled by the double existence of the same sum of money as a capital for two persons. It can serve as a capital for both of them only by dividing the profit. That portion, which falls to the share of the lender, is called interest.

It is our assumption, that this entire transaction takes place between two kinds of capitalists, the money-capitalist and the industrial or the merchant capitalist.

It should never be forgotten, that capital as such is here a commodity, or that the commodity, which is here in question, is capital. All the relations, which become manifest here, would be irrational from the point of view of a simple commodity, or even from the point of view of capital serving as a commodity-capital in its process of reproduction. Lending and borrowing, instead of selling and buying, is here a distinction arising from the specific nature of the commodity, of capital; also that it is interest, not the price of the commodity, which is paid here. If interest is to be called the price of money-capital, it will be an irrational form of price, which is quite at variance with the conception of the price of commodities.60 The price is then reduced to its purely abstract and meaningless form, signifying a certain sum of money paid for some thing, which serves in some manner as a use-value. On the other hand, the concept of price really signifies the value of some use-value expressed in money.

To call interest the price of capital is to use at the outset an irrational expression. A commodity has here a double value, namely first a real value, and secondly a price differing from this value, while ordinarily price signifies the expression of the value in money. Money-capital is primarily but a sum of money, or the value of a certain quantity of commodities incorporated in a sum of money. If a commodity is loaned as capital, then it is only the disguised form of a sum of money. For that which is loaned as capital is not so and so many pounds of cotton, but so much money existing in the form of cotton as its value. The price of capital, therefore, refers to it as a sum of money, even if not a currency, as Mr. Torrens thinks (see above note 60). How, then, can a sum of values have a price beside its own price, that is, aside from the price expressed in their own money-form? Price is precisely the value of commodities (and this holds good also of the market-price, whose difference from value is not one of quality, but only one of quantity, since it refers only to the magnitude of the value) as distinguished from their use-value. A price which is different in quality from value is an absurd contradiction.61

Capital manifests itself as capital by its employment. The degree of its self-expansion expresses the quantitative ratio, in which it realises itself as capital. The surplus-value or profit produced by it—its rate or magnitude—is measurable only by its comparison with the value of the advanced capital. The greater or lesser self-expansion of interest- bearing capital is, therefore, only measurable by a comparison of the amount of interest, its share in the total profits, with the value of the advanced capital. While the price expresses the value of commodities, the interest expresses the self-expansion of money-capital and thus appears as the price, which the lender receives for it. This shows how absurd it is at the start to apply indiscriminately to this question the simple relations of exchange through buying and selling, as Proudhon does. For the basic premise is here that money serves as capital and may thus be transferred as capital itself, as potential capital, to another person.

Capital itself appears here as a commodity, inasmuch as it is offered on the market as the use-value of money actually handed over as capital. Its use-value consists in producing profits. The value of money or of commodities employed in the capacity of capital is not determined by their value as money or commodities, but by the quantity of surplus-value, which they produce for their owner. The product of capital is profit. On the basis of capitalist production it is merely a difference in the employment of money, whether it is expended as money or advanced as capital. Money, or commodities, are in themselves, potentially, capital, just as labor-power is potential capital. For in the first place, money may be converted into elements of production and is to that extent only an abstract expression of them, personifying their existence as values; in the second place, the material elements of wealth have the capacity of being even potentially capital, because the opposite supplement, which makes capital of them, namely wage-labor, is present on the basis of capitalist production.

The opposing social peculiarities of material wealth, its antagonism to labor in the form of wage-labor, considered apart from the process of production, are expressed even in capitalist property as such. This particular fact, when separated from the process of capitalist production itself, of which it is a constant result and, being its constant result, is its constant prerequisite, expresses itself in such a way that money and commodities alike become latent, potential, capital, so that they may be sold as capital, and that they represent in this form a command over the labor of others, a claim to the appropriation of the labor of others, so that they become self-expanding values. In this way it also becomes clearly apparent that this relation supplies the title and means for the appropriation of the labor of others, and that this is not due to any labor offered as an equivalent on the part of the capitalist.

Capital appears furthermore as a commodity, inasmuch as the division of profit into interest and profit proper is regulated by demand and supply, that is, by competition, just as are the market-prices of commodities. But in the present case the difference becomes quite as apparent as the analogy. If demand and supply balance, the market-price of commodities corresponds to their price of production. In other words, their price is then seen to be regulated by the internal laws of capitalist production, independently of competition, since the fluctuations of supply and demand do not explain anything but the deviations of market-prices from the prices of production. These deviations balance mutually, so that in the course of long periods the average market-prices correspond to the prices of production. As soon as these prices coincide, these forces cease to operate, they compensate one another, and the general law determining prices then applies also to individual cases. The market-price then corresponds even in its immediate form, and without the help of averages drawn from the movements of market-prices, to the price of production, which is regulated by the immanent laws of the mode of production itself. The same is then true of wages. If supply and demand balance, they neutralise each other's effects, and wages are then equal to the value of labor-power. But it is different with the interest on money-capital. Competition does not, in this case, determine the deviations from the rule, but there is rather no law of division except that enforced by competition, because no such thing as a "natural" rate of interest exists, as we shall see presently. By the natural rate of interest people merely mean the rate fixed by free competition. There are no "natural" limits for the rate of interest. Whenever competition does not merely determine the deviations and fluctuations, in other words, whenever a neutralisation of the opposing forces of competition puts a stop to all determination, the thing to be determined becomes a matter of arbitrary and lawless estimation. We shall dwell on this further in the next chapter.

In the case of interest-bearing capital, everything is outward appearance: The advance of capital seems a mere transfer from the lender to the borrower; the reflux of realised capital a mere transfer back to its owner, a return payment with interest from the borrower to the lender. The same holds good of the fact, due to the capitalist mode of production, that the rate of profit is not merely determined by the relation of the profit made in one single turn-over to the advanced capital-value, but also by the length of the time of turn-over itself, so that it is a question of a profit realised on the industrial capital in definite periods of time. This likewise appears in the case of interest-bearing capital in the outward fact, that a definite interest is paid to the lender for a definite period of time.

With his customary insight into the internal connection of things, the romantic Adam Müller says ("Elemente der Staatskunst," Berlin, 1809, p. 37): "In determining the prices of things, time is not considered; while in the determination of interest, it is principally time which is taken into account." He does not see that the time of production and the time of circulation enter into the determination of the price of commodities, and that this is precisely what determines the rate of profit for a given time of turn-over of capital, while the determination of profit for a certain time in its turn determines that of interest. His sagacity consists here, as it always does, in seeing the clouds of dust on the surface and having the presumption to declare this dust to be something mysterious and important.

CHAPTER XXII.

DIVISION OF PROFIT. RATE OF INTEREST. NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST.

THE object of this chapter, and in general all other phenomena of credit requiring our consideration later on, cannot here be analysed in detail. The competition between lenders and borrowers and the resulting minor fluctuations of the money-market fall outside of the scope of our inquiry. The circle described by the rate of interest during the industrial cycle requires for its presentation the analysis of this cycle itself, but this is likewise beyond our intentions for the present. The same is true of the greater or lesser approximate equalisation of the rate of interest in the world market. We merely intend here to analyse the independent form of interest-bearing capital and the individualisation of interest as differentiated from profit.

Since interest is merely a part of profit, paid according to our assumption by the industrial capitalist to the money-capitalist, the maximum limit of interest is marked by profit itself, and in that case the portion pocketed by the productive capitalist would be equal to zero. Aside from exceptional cases, in which interest might be actually larger than profit and could not be paid out of profit, one might consider as the maximum limit of interest the entire profit minus that portion (to be subsequently analysed), which resolves itself into wages of superintendence. The minimum limit of interest is wholly undefinable. It may fall to any depth. But counteracting circumstances will always appear and lift it again above this relative minimum.

"The relation between the amount paid for the use of some capital and this capital itself expresses the rate of interest, measured in money." "The rate of interest depends, 1), on the rate of profit; 2), on the proportion in which the total profit is divided between the lender and the borrower." (Economist, January 22nd, 1853.) "Since that which is paid as interest for the use of that which is borrowed is a part of the profit, which the borrowed is able to produce, this interest must always be regulated by that profit." (Massie, l. c., p. 49.)

Let us first assume, that a fixed relation exists between the total profit and that one of its parts, which has to be paid as interest to the money-capitalist. In this case it is evident, that the interest will rise or fall with the total profit, and this profit is determined by the general rate of profit and its fluctuations. For instance, if the average rate of profit were 20% and the interest one-quarter of the profit, then the rate of interest would be 5%; if the rate of profit were only 16%, the rate of interest would be 4%. With a rate of profit of 20%, the rate of interest might rise to 8%, and yet the industrial capitalist would still make the same profit as he would with the rate of profit at 16% and the rate of interest at 4%, namely 12%. If the interest should rise only to 6 or 7%, he would keep a still larger share of the profit. If the interest amounted to a constant quota of the average profit, it would follow, that to the extent that the general rate of profit would rise, the absolute difference between the total profit and the interest would increase, and to the same extent would that portion of the total profit increase, which the productive capitalist would pocket, and vice versa. Take it that the interest amounts to one-fifth of the average profit. One-fifth of 10 is 2; difference between total profit and interest 8. One-fifth of 20 is 4; difference 20-4 = 16. One-fifth of 25 is 5; difference 25-5 = 20. One-fifth of 30 is 6; difference 30-6 = 24. One-fifth of 35 is 7; difference 35-7 = 28. The different rates of interest of 4, 5, 6, 7% would in this case always represent one-fifth of the total profit. If the rates of profit are different, then different rates of interest may represent the same aliquot parts of the total profit, or the same percentage of the total profit. With such constant proportions of interest, the industrial profit (the difference between the total profit and the interest) would be so much greater, the higher the average rate of profit would be, and vice versa.

Assuming all other conditions to be equal, in other words, assuming the proportion between interest and total profit to be more or less constant, the productive capitalist will be able and willing to pay a higher or lower interest directly proportional to the level of the rate of profit.62 Since we have seen, that the height of the rate of profit is inversely proportional to the development of capitalist production, it follows that the high or low rate of interest in a certain country is to the same extent inversely proportional to the degree of industrial development, at least so far as differences in the rate of interest actually expresses differences in the rates of profit. And this mode of regulating interest applies even to its average.

In any event the average rate of profit is the ultimate limit determining the maximum limit of interest.

The fact that the rate of interest is related to the average profit will be considered more at length immediately. Whenever a certain whole, such as profit, is to be divided between two parties, the first thing to be considered is the magnitude of the whole. The magnitude of the profit is determined by its average rate. Assuming the average rate of profit, and thus the magnitude of profit, for a capital of a certain size, to be given (for instance 100), it is evident that the variations of interest will be inversely proportional to those of the profit remaining in the hands of the capitalist working with a borrowed capital. And the circumstances, which determine the amount of profit to be divided (the values produced by unpaid labor), differ widely from those, which determine its distribution between these two kinds of capitalists, and frequently produce effects in opposite directions.63

If we observe the cycles of variation, in which modern industry moves along—condition of rest, increasing activity, prosperity, overproduction, crisis, stagnation, condition of rest, etc., which fall outside of the scope of our analysis—we shall find, that a low rate of interest generally corresponds to periods of prosperity, or of extra profit, a rise of interest to the transition between prosperity and its reverse, and a maximum of interest up to a point of extreme usury to the period of crises.64 With the summer of 1843 came a period of remarkable prosperity; the rate of interest, which had still been 4½% in the spring of 1842, fell to 2% in the spring and summer of 1843;65 in September it fell even to 1½%. (Gilbart, I, p. 166); whereupon it rose to 8% and more during the crisis of 1847.

It may happen, however, that low interest is found in times of stagnation, and moderately rising interest in times of increasing activity.

The rate of interest reaches its highest point during crises, when money must be borrowed in order to meet payments at any cost. Since a rise of interest implies a fall in the price of securities, this offers at the same time a fine opportunity to people with available money-capital, who may acquire possession at cut-rate prices of such interest-bearing securities as must at least regain their average price in the regular course of things, as soon as the rate of interest falls again.66

However, there is also a tendency of the rate of interest to fall, quite independently of the fluctuations of the rate of profit. This is due to two main causes.

I. "Let us assume that capital were never borrowed for any other but productive investments, it is nevertheless possible, that the rate of interest may vary without any change in the rate of gross profits. For, as a people progresses in the development of wealth, there arises and grows more and more a class of people, who find themselves possessed of funds through the labors of their ancestors, and who can live on the mere interest on them. Many, having actively participated in business in their youth and prime, retire, in order to live quietly in their old age on the interest of the sums accumulated by them. These two classes have a tendency to increase with the growing wealth of the country; for those who start out with a moderate capital acquire more easily an independent fortune than those, who start out with little. In old and rich countries, therefore, that portion of the national capital, whose owners do not care to invest it themselves, makes up a larger proportion of the total productive capital of society than in newly settled and poor countries. How numerous is not the class of annuity-holders in England! In proportion as the class of annuity-holders increases, that of the capital loaners increases also, for they are both the same." (Ramsay, Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, p. 201)

II. The development of the credit system, and with it the continually growing control of the industrials and merchants over the money savings of all classes of society by the co-operation of bankers, and the progressive concentration of these savings into such volumes as will enable them to serve as money-capital, must also depress the rate of interest some-what. We shall discuss this more at length later.

With reference to the determination of the rate of interest, Ramsay says that it "depends in part on the rate of gross profits, in part on the proportion in which this is divided into interest and profits of enterprise. This proportion depends on the competition between lenders and borrowers of capital. This competition is influenced, but not exclusively regulated, by the prospective rate of gross profits.67 Competition is not exclusively regulated thereby, because on one side many are borrowing without any intention of productive investment, and because on the other the magnitude of the total loanable capital changes with the wealth of the country, independently of any change in the gross profits." (Ramsay, 1. c., p. 206, 207.)

In order to find the average rate of interest, it is necessary, 1), to calculate the average rate of interest during its variations in the great industrial cycles; 2), to find the rate of interest in such investments as require loans of capital for a long time.

The average rate of interest prevailing in a certain country—as differentiated from the continually fluctuating market rates—cannot be determined by any law. In this sense there is no such thing as a natural rate of interest, such as economists speak of when mentioning a natural rate of profit and a natural rate of wages. Massie has justly said with reference to this (p. 49): "The only thing which any man can be in doubt about on this occasion, is, what proportion of these profits do of right belong to the borrower, and what to the lender; and this there is no other method of determining than by the opinions of borrowers and lenders in general; for right and wrong, in this respect, are only what common consent makes so." The balancing of demand and supply—assuming the average rate of profit to be a fact—does not signify anything here. Wherever else this formula serves as an excuse (and is then practically correct) it is used to find the fundamental rule, which is independent of competition and rather determines it, this rule indicating the regulating limits, or the limiting magnitudes, of competition; this formula serves particularly as a help to those, who are bounded by the horizon of practical competition, its phenomena, and the conceptions arising from them, and who try thereby to get a rather shallow grasp of the internal connections of economic conditions within the sphere of competition. It is a method by which to pass from the variations that go with competition to the limits of these variations. This is not so in the case of the average rate of interest. There is no reason by which the idea could be justified, that the average conditions of competition, a balance between lenders and borrowers, should secure for the lender a rate of interest of 3, 4, 5%, etc., on his capital, or a certain percentage of the gross profits, say 20% or 50%. Whenever competition as such determines anything in this matter, its determination is a matter of accident, purely empirical, and only pedantry or fantasticalness can attempt to represent this accidental character as something necessary.68 Nothing is more amusing than to listen in the reports of Parliament of 1857 and 1858 concerning bank legislation and commercial crises to the rambling twaddle of directors of the Bank of England, London bankers, provincial bankers, and theoretical professionals, when referring to "the real rate produced." They never get beyond such commonplaces as that "the price paid by loanable capital probably varies with the supply of such capital," that "a high rate of interest and a low rate of profit cannot exist together in the long run," and similar specious platitudes.69 Custom, legal tradition, etc., have as much to do with the determination of the average rate of interest as competition itself, so far as this rate exists not merely as an average figure, but as an actual magnitude. An average rate of profit has to be assumed as a legal rate even in many law disputes, in which interest has to be calculated. Now, if we press the inquiry, why the limits of an average rate of interest cannot be deduced from general laws, we find the answer simply in the nature of interest. It is merely a portion of the average profit. The same capital appears in two roles, as a loanable capital in the hands of the lender, and as an industrial capital, or commercial capital, in the hands of the investing capitalist. But it performs its function as capital only once, and produces profit only once. In the process of production itself, the loanable nature of this capital does not play any role. To what extent the two parties divide the profit, in which they both share, is in itself as much a purely empirical fact belonging to the realm of accident as the division of the shares of common profit of some corporative business among different share holders by percentages. In the division between surplus-value and wages, on which the determination of the rate of profit essentially rests, the decision is made by two very different elements, labor-power and capital; these are functions of two independent variables, which limit one another; and their qualitative difference is the source of the quantitative division of the produced value. We shall see later that the same takes place in the division of surplus-value between rent and profit. But nothing of the kind occurs in the case of interest. In this case the qualitative differentiation, as we shall see immediately, proceeds rather from the purely quantitative division of the same lot of surplus-value.

From what has gone before it follows that there is no such thing as a "natural" rate of interest. But while, in distinction from the general rate of profit, there is on one side no general law, by which the limits of the average interest, or average rate of interest, may be determined and differentiated from the continually fluctuating market rates of interest, because it is merely a question of dividing the gross profit between two possessors of capital under different titles, there is on the other side the fact that the rate of interest, whether it be the average or the prevalent market rate, appears as a uniform, definite and tangible magnitude in a very different way from the general rate of profit.70

The rate of interest holds a similar relation to the rate of profit as the market price of a commodity does to its value. To the extent that the rate of interest is determined by the rate of profit, it is so always by the general rate of profit, not by any specific rates of profit, which may prevail in some particular lines of industry, and still less by any extra profit, which some individual capitalist may make in some particular line of business.71 It is a fact, then, that the general rate of profit re-appears as an empirical, given, reality in the average rate of interest, although the latter is not a pure or reliable expression of the former.

It is true, that the rate of interest itself differs according to the different classes of securities offered by the borrowers and according to the length of time for which the money is borrowed; but it is uniform within every one of these classes at a given moment. This distinction, then, does not militate against a fixed and uniform shape of the rate of interest.72

The average rate of interest appears in every country for long epochs as a constant magnitude, because the general rate of profit—in spite of the continual variation of the particular rates of profit, in which a variation in one sphere is offset by an opposite variation in another sphere—varies only in long intervals. Its relative constancy is revealed in this more or less constant nature of the average rate, or common rate, of interest.

As concerns the continually fluctuating market rate of interest, it exists at any moment as a fixed magnitude, the same as the market price of commodities, because all the loanable capital as an aggregate mass is continually facing the invested capital, so that the relation between the supply of loanable capital on one side, and the demand for it on the other, decide at any time the market level of interest. This is so much more the case, the more the development and simultaneous concentration of the credit system impregnates the loanable capital with a general social character, and throws it all at one time on the market. On the other hand, the general rate of profit always exists as a mere tendency, as a movement to compensate specific rates of profit. The competition between capitalists—which is itself this movement toward an equilibrium—consists in this case in their activity of gradually withdrawing capital from spheres, in which the profit stays for a long time below the average, and in the same way taking capital into spheres, in which the profit is above the average. Or it may also consist in their distributing additional capital gradually and in varying proportions between these spheres. It is always a matter of a continual variation between supply and demand of capital with reference to different spheres, never a simultaneous mass effect, as it is in the determination of the rate of interest.

We have seen that interest-bearing capital, although a category absolutely different from a commodity, becomes a peculiar commodity, so that interest becomes its price, which is fixed at any time by supply and demand, just as the market price of an ordinary commodity is fixed. The market rate of interest, while continually oscillating, appears therefore at any moment just as constantly fixed and uniform as the prevailing market price of commodities. The money-capitalists offer this commodity, and the investing capitalists buy it and make a demand for it. This does not take place in the equalisation of profits toward a general rate of profit. If the prices of commodities in a certain sphere are below or above the price of production (leaving aside any oscillations, which are found in every business and are due to fluctuations of the industrial cycles), a balance is effected by an expansion or restriction of production. This signifies an expansion or restriction of the quantities of commodities thrown on the market by industrial capitalists, by means of immigration or emigration of capital to and from particular spheres. It is by such a compensation of the average market prices of commodities to prices of production that the deviations of specific rates of profit from the general, or average, rate of profit are corrected. This process does not, and cannot, at any time assume the appearance as though the industrial or mercantile capital as such were commodities seeking a buyer, but it does in the case of interest-bearing capital. To the extent that this process is perceptible, it is so only in the oscillations and compensations of the market prices of commodities to prices of production, not in any direct fixation of the average profit. The general rate of profit is actually determined, 1), by the surplus-value produced by the capital; 2), by the proportion of this surplus-value to the value of the total capital; and, 3), by competition, but only to the extent that this is a movement, by which capitals invested in particular spheres seek to draw equal dividends out of this surplus-value in proportion to their relative magnitudes. The general rate of profit, then, derives its determination actually from causes, which are quite different and far more profound than those of the market rate of interest, which is directly and immediately determined by the proportion between supply and demand. It is, therefore, not such a tangible and obvious fact as the rate of interest. The particular rates of interest in the different spheres of production are themselves more or less unsettled; but so far as they are perceptible, it is not their uniformity, but their differences, which appear. The general rate of profit itself appears only as the minimum limit of profit, not as the empirical and directly visible shape of the actual rate of profit.

In emphasizing this difference between the rate of interest and the rate of profit, we still leave out of consideration the following two circumstances, which favor the consolidation of the rate of interest: 1), The historical pre-existence of interest-bearing capital and the existence of a traditionally sanctioned general rate of interest; 2), the far greater direct influence exerted by the world market on the fixation of the rate of interest, independently of the economic conditions of a certain country, compared to its influence on the rate of profit.

The average profit does not appear as a directly existing fact, but merely as a final result of the compensation of opposite fluctuations, to be ascertained by analysis. Not so the rate of interest. It is, at least in its local validity, a daily fixed thing, a fact which serves even to industrial and mercantile capitals as a prerequisite and figure in their calculations. It becomes a general faculty of every sum of money of 100 pounds sterling to yield 2, 3, 4, 5%. Meteorological reports do not register the stand of the barometer and thermometer more accurately than the reports of the Bourse do the stand of the rate of interest, not for this or that capital, but for the money-capital on the market, for the available loanable capital in general.

On the money market only lenders and borrowers face one another. The commodity has the same form, money. All specific forms of capital according to its investment in particular spheres of production or circulation are here blotted out. It exists here in the undifferentiated, homogenous, form of independent value, money. The competition of the individual spheres ceases here. They are all thrown together as borrowers of money, and capital likewise faces all of them in a form, in which it is as yet indifferent to its definite investment in this or that specific manner. The character worn by industrial capital only in its movement and competition between individual spheres, the character of a common capital of a class comes into evidence here in full force by the demand and supply of capital. On the other hand, money-capital on the money market has actually that form, in which it may be distributed as a common element among the capitalists in the various spheres, regardless of its specific employment, as the requirements of production in each individual sphere may dictate. Add to this that with the development of large scale industry money-capital, so far as it appears on the market, is not represented by some individual capitalist, not by the owner of this or that fraction of the capital on the market, but assumes more and more the character of an organised mass, which is far more directly subject to the control of the representatives of social capital, the bankers, than actual production is. Under these circumstances, not only the demand for loanable capital is expressed with the full force of a class, but also its supply appears as loanable capital in masses.

These are some of the reasons, why the general rate of profit appears as a vanishing shape of mist compared to the definite rate of interest, which, while fluctuating in its magnitude, yet faces all borrowers as a fixed fact, because it varies uniformly for all of them. In like manner the variations in the value of money do not prevent it from having the same value for all commodities. In like manner the market prices of commodities fluctuate daily, yet this does not prevent them from being reported daily. In like manner, the rate of interest is regularly reported as "the price of money." It is so for the reason that capital itself is here offered in the form of money as a commodity. The fixation of its price is thus a fixation of its market price, as it is with all other commodities. Thus the rate of interest always appears as the general rate of interest, as so much for so much money, as a definite quantity. Not so the rate of profit. It may vary even within the same sphere for commodities with the same price, according to the different conditions under which different capitals produce the same commodity. For the rate of profit of the individual capital is determined, not by the market price of a commodity, but by the difference between the market-price and the cost-price. And these different rates of profit, first within the same sphere and then between different spheres themselves, can be balanced only by continual fluctuations.

(Note for later elaboration): A specific form of credit. It is known that when money serves as a means of payment instead of as a means of purchase, the commodity is transferred, but its value is not realised until later. If payment is not made until after the commodity has again been sold, then this sale does not seem to be the result of the purchase, but it is by this sale that the purchase is realised. In other words, the sale becomes a means of purchase.—Secondly; Titles to debts, bills of exchange, etc., become means of payment for the creditor.—Thirdly: The compensation of titles to debts replaces the money.

CHAPTER XXIII.

INTEREST AND PROFIT OF ENTERPRISE.

INTEREST, as we have seen in the two preceding chapters, seems to be originally, is originally, and remains in fact merely a portion of profit, of surplus-value, which the investing capitalist, whether industrial or commercial, has to pay over to the owner and lender of money-capital whenever he uses loan capital instead of his own. If he employs only his own capital, no such division of profit takes place; it is all his. In fact, to the extent that the owners of capital employ it themselves in the process of reproduction, they do not compete in the determination of the rate of interest. This alone shows that the category of interest, an impossibility without a determination of the rate of interest, is alien to the movements of industrial capital itself.

"The rate of interest may be defined to be that proportional sum which the lender is content to receive, and the borrower to pay, for a year or for any longer or shorter period for the use of a certain amount of moneyed capital...when the owner of capital employs it actively in reproduction, he does not come under the head of those capitalists, the proportion of whom, to the number of borrowers, determines the rate of interest." (Th. Tooke, History of Prices, Newmarch ed. London, 1857, II, p. 355.) It is indeed only the separation of capitalists into money-capitalists and industrial capitalists, which transforms a portion of the profit into interest, which creates the category of interest at all; and it is only the competition between these two kinds of capitalists which creates the rate of interest.

So long as capital serves in the process of reproduction—even assuming that it belongs to the industrial capitalist himself, so that he has no need of paying it back to some lender—just so long the capitalist has at his disposal as a private individual, not this capital itself, but only the profit, which he may spend as revenue. So long as his capital performs the functions of capital, it belongs to the process of reproduction, it is tied up in that process. He is indeed its owner, but this ownership does not enable him to dispose of it in some other way, so long as he uses it as capital for the exploitation of labor. It is the same with the money-capitalist. So long as his capital is loaned out and serves as money-capital, it brings him as interest a portion of the profit, but he cannot dispose of the principal. This becomes evident, whenever he loans his capital, say, for one year, or longer, and receives interest at certain stipulated times without recovering his principal. But even the return of the principal does not make any difference here. If he gets it back, then he must always loan it out again, so long as he expects it to produce the effects of capital, in this case of money-capital, for him. While he is keeping it in his own hands, it collects no interest, it does not act in the capacity of capital; and so long as it gathers interest and serves as capital, it is not in his hands. This accounts for the possibility to loan capital for all eternity. The following remarks of Tooke against Bosanquet are, therefore, entirely wrong. He quotes Bosanquet (Metallic, Paper, and Credit Currency, p. 73): "If the rate of interest were depressed to 1%, then borrowed capital would be almost on a par with owner's capital." Tooke makes the following comment on this: "That a capital borrowed at this, or even at a lower rate, should be considered as being almost on a par with one's own capital is such a strange contention, that it would hardly deserve any serious consideration, did it not come from so intelligent a writer, who is so well informed on particular points of his subject. Has he overlooked the fact, or does he hold it to be so unimportant, that his assumption implies the condition of return payment?" (Th. Tooke, An Inquiry into the Currency Principle, 2nd. edition, London, 1844, p. 80.) If interest were equal to zero, then the industrial capitalist working with a borrowed capital would be on a par with a capitalist working with his own capital. Both of them would pocket the same average profit, and capital, whether borrowed or the owner's, serves as capital only to the extent that it produces profit. The condition of return payment would not alter this in the least. The more the rate of interest approaches zero, falling, for instance, to 1%, the more borrowed capital is placed on a par with owner's capital. So long as money-capital is expected to act in the capacity of money-capital, it must always be loaned out again and again, and this must take place at the prevailing rate of interest, say 1%, and always to the same class of industrial and commercial capitalists. So long as these perform the functions of capitalists, the only difference between one working with a borrowed and one working with his own capital is that the one has to pay interest and the other has not; that the one pockets the whole profit p, and the other only p—i, profit minus interest. To the extent that the interest approaches zero, p—z becomes equal to p, and to the same extent do both capitals stand on a par. The one must pay back the capital and borrow it again; but the other, so long as his capital is expected to perform its function, must likewise advance it again and again to the process of production and cannot dispose of it freely without any dependence upon this process. The only remaining difference between the two is the obvious one that the one is the owner of his capital and the other is not.

The question which arises here is this: How is it that this purely quantitative division of profit into net profit and interest turns into a qualitative one? In other words, how is it that even the capitalist who employs only his own capital, and not a borrowed one, ranges a portion of his gross profit under the specific category of interest and calculates it separately as such? And furthermore, why is all capital, whether borrowed or not, differentiated in itself as interest-bearing capital from net profit producing capital?

It is understood that not every accidental quantitative division of profit turns in this manner into a qualitative one. For instance, some industrial capitalists associate for some business and divide the profits among themselves according to some legal agreement. Others carry on their business, each by himself, without any associate. These last do not calculate their profit under two heads, one part as individual profit, the other as profits of the company for associates who do not exist. In this case the quantitative division does not turn into a qualitative one. It takes place, when the ownership is vested accidentally in several juridical personalities. It does not take place, when this is not the case.

In order to answer this question, we must dwell a little longer on the actual point of departure of the formation of interest; that is, we must take our departure from the assumption, that the money-capitalist and the industrial capitalist really face one another, not merely as legally different persons, but as persons playing entirely different roles in the process of reproduction, or as persons in whose hands the same capital really passes through a twofold and wholly different movement. The one merely loans it, the other employs it productively.

For the productive capitalist, who works with a borrowed capital, the gross profit falls into two parts, namely into the interest to be paid by the lender and the surplus over the interest forming his own share of the profit. If the general rate of profit is given, then this last portion is determined by the rate of interest; if the rate of interest is given, then this last portion is determined by the general rate of profit. And furthermore: Whatever may be the divergence in any individual case of the gross profit, the actual magnitude of value of the total profit, from the average profit, it does not alter the fact that the portion belonging to the investing capitalist is determined by the interest, since this is fixed by the general rate of interest (aside from special legal stipulations) and assumed to be paid beforehand, before the process of production begins, and before its result, the gross profit, has been made. We have seen that the peculiar and specific product of capital is surplus-value, or more closely defined, profit. But for the capitalist working with a borrowed capital it is not the profit, but the profit minus the interest, that portion of the profit which remains for him after the interest has been deducted. This portion of the profit necessarily appears to him as the product of a capital performing its function; and so far as he is concerned it is really so, because he is the representative of capital in action. He is its personification to the extent that it is in function, and it performs its function to the extent that it is profitably invested in industry or commerce and engaged, through its employer, in such operations as are prescribed by the line of its industry. In distinction from interest, which he has to pay out of the gross profits to the lender, the remaining portion of the profit, which he pockets, necessarily assumes the form of industrial or commercial profit, or, to designate it by a term comprising both of them, the form of profit of enterprise. If the gross profit is equal to the net profit, then the magnitude of this profit of enterprise is exclusively determined by the rate of interest. If the gross profit varies from the average profit, then its difference from the average profit (after deducting the interest from both of them) is determined by all constellations causing a temporary deviation, either of the rate of profit in any particular sphere from the general rate of profit, or of the profit made by some individual capitalist in a certain sphere from the average profit of this sphere. Now, we have seen, that the rate of profit within the process of production itself does not depend merely on the surplus-value, but also on many other circumstances, for instance, on the purchase prices of the means of production, on methods more productive than the average, on economies in constant capital, etc. And aside from the price of production, it depends on special constellations of the market, and in every business transaction on the greater or lesser smartness and thrift of the individual capitalists, whether, and to what extent, a man will buy or sell above or below the price of production and thus appropriate in the process of circulation a greater or smaller portion of the total surplus-value. At any rate the quantitative division of the gross profit turns here into a qualitative one, and it does so all the more as the quantitative division itself depends on the nature of thing that is to be divided, on the manner in which the capitalist manages his capital, and on the amount of gross profit it yields for him in his capacity as active capitalist. The investing capitalist is here assumed not to be the owner of the capital. The ownership of capital is vested in the money-capitalist, who stands opposed to him. The interest, which he pays to the lender, thus appears as that portion of the gross profit, which is absorbed by the ownership of capital as such. In distinction therefrom, that portion of the profit, which falls to the share of the investing capitalist, appears then as profit of enterprise, arising solely from the operations, or functions, which he performs with the capital in the process of reproduction, particularly of those functions, which he performs as the impersonator of enterprise in industry or commerce. From his point of view, the interest appears merely as the fruit of the ownership of capital, of capital "itself" abstracted from the process of capital in reproduction, of a capital not "working," not performing its function; while profit of enterprise appears to him as the exclusive fruit of the functions, which he performs with the capital, a fruit of the movements and performances of capital, of performances, which appear to him as his own activity as differentiated from the inactivity, the non-participation, of the money-capitalist in the process of production. This qualitative separation of the two portions of gross profit, which makes interest appear as the fruit of abstract capital, of the ownership of capital outside of the process of production, and profit of enterprise as the fruit of capital performing its function in the process of production, of the active role played by the employer of capital in the process of reproduction, this qualitative separation is by no means merely a subjective point of view of the money-capitalist on one side and of the industrial capitalist on the other. It rests upon an objective fact, for the interest flows into the hands of the money-capitalist, the lender, the mere owner of capital, who represents only capital property before the process of production and outside of it; while the profit of enterprise flows only into the hands of the investing capitalist, who is not the owner of the capital.

In this way, both the industrial capitalist working with borrowed capital and the money-capitalist not working himself with his capital play a role, in which a merely quantitative division of the gross profit between two persons having two different legal titles to the same capital and to the profit produced by it turns into a qualitative division. One portion of the profit appears now as interest, as a fruit coming to capital in one of its forms; the other portion appears as a specific fruit of capital in an opposite form, and thus as profit of enterprise. One appears as the fruit of mere ownership of capital, the other as a fruit of the performance of the function of capital, as a fruit of capital in process, of the functions performed by the active capitalist. And this ossification and individualisation of the two parts of the gross profits among themselves, as though they were derived from two essentially different sources, now becomes a fixture for the entire capitalist class and the total capital. And this takes place regardless of whether the capital employed by the active capitalist is borrowed or not, and whether the capital belonging to the money-capitalist is employed by himself or not. The profit of every capital, and consequently the average profit established by a mutual compensation of capitals, is separated into two qualitatively different, separately individualised, and mutually independent parts, to wit, interest and profit of enterprise, both of which are determined by particular laws. The capitalist working with his own capital divides the gross profit into interest due to himself as its owner lending it to himself, and into profit of enterprise due to himself as an active capitalist performing his function, just as does the capitalist working with a borrowed capital. For this division, in its qualitative aspects, it becomes immaterial whether the capitalist really has to divide his profit with another or not. The employer of capital, even when working with his own capital, falls apart into two personalities, into the mere owner of capital and the employer of capital; his capital itself, with reference to the categories of profit which it yields, falls apart into capital property outside of the process of production and yielding interest of itself, and capital in the process of production yielding profit of enterprise through its function in the process.

Interest, then, becomes so firmly established, that it no longer appears as a division of gross profits, to which production is indifferent and which takes place only occasionally when the industrial capitalist works with the capital of some other man. Even when he works with his own capital, his profit is separated into interest and profit of enterprise. Thus a merely quantitative division turns into a qualitative one. It takes place without regard to the fact, whether the industrial capitalist is, or is not, the owner of the capital employed by him. It is no longer a question of different quota of profit assigned to different persons, but of two different categories of profit holding different relations to the capital, being related to different forms of capital.

It is a simple matter, in view of the foregoing remarks, to explain, why this character of qualitative separation becomes established for the total social capital and the entire capitalist class, as soon as the separation of gross profits into interest and profits of enterprise has assumed its qualitative aspect.

1) This follows from the simple empirical circumstance, that the majority of the industrial capitalists, even if in different proportional numbers, work with their own and with borrowed capital, and that the proportion between self-owned and borrowed capital changes in different periods.

2) The transformation of a portion of the gross profits into the shape of interest converts the other portion into profit of enterprise. The latter is indeed but the antagonistic form assumed by the excess of the gross profit over the interest, as soon as interest exists as an independent category. The entire analysis of the problem, how gross profit is differentiated into interest and profit of enterprise, resolves itself into the inquiry, how a portion of the gross profits becomes universally ossified and individualised in the shape of interest. Now, historically, interest-bearing capital exists as a complete, traditional form, and with it interest as a ready subdivision of the surplus-value produced by capital, long before the capitalist mode of production and the conceptions of capital and profit belonging to it existed. Thus it is that popular conception still regards money-capital, interest-bearing capital, as typical capital, as capital par excellence. Thus, also, we find up to the time of Massie the prevailing idea, that it is money as such, which is paid in interest. The fact that loaned capital yields interest, whether it is actually employed as interest or not—even when borrowed only for consumption—lends strength to the idea of the independence of this form of capital. The best proof of the independence, which interest seemed to have with reference to profit and interest-bearing capital with reference to industrial capital, during the first periods of the capitalist mode of production, is that it was not until the middle of the 18th century that Massie, and after him Hume, discovered the fact that interest is but a portion of the gross profit, and that such a discovery was necessary at all.

3) Whether the industrial capitalist works with his own or with borrowed capital, it does not alter the fact that the class of money-capitalists face him as a special class of capitalists, money-capital as an independent form of capital, and interest as the independent form of surplus-value peculiar to this specific capital.

Qualitatively speaking, interest is surplus-value supplied by the mere ownership of capital, yielded by capital as such, even though its owner remains outside of the process of reproduction. It is surplus-value realised by capital outside of its process.

Quantitatively speaking, that portion of profit, which forms interest, does not seem to be related to industrial or commercial capital as such, but to money-capital, and the rate of this portion of surplus-value, the rate of interest, fortifies this relation. For, in the first place, the rate of interest, despite its dependence upon the general rate of profit, is independently determined, and, in the second place, it appears with all its variations as a fixed, uniform, tangible and always given relation, just like the market-prices of commodities, compared to the intangible rate of profit. If all capital were in the hands of the industrial capitalists, there would be no interest and no rate of interest. The independent form assumed by the quantitative division of gross profit creates the qualitative one. If the industrial capitalist compares himself to the money-capitalist, only his profit of enterprise distinguishes him from the other man, the excess of his gross profit over the average interest, the latter being empirically given by means of the rate of interest. On the other hand, if he compares himself to the industrial capitalist working with his own, instead of borrowed capital, the other differs from him only as a money-capitalist by pocketing the interest instead of paying it over to some one else. On either side the portion of the gross profit differing from the interest appears to him as profit of enterprise, and interest itself as a surplus-value yielded by capital as such, which it would yield even without any productive employment.

This is practically correct for the individual capitalist. He has the choice, whether he wants to invest his capital as an interest-bearing one or as a productive one, regardless of whether it exists in the form of money-capital from the out-set, or whether it has to be converted into money-capital. But to make this conception a general one and apply it to the total capital of society, as some vulgar economists do, who even go so far as to regard this capital as the source of profit, is, of course, preposterous. The idea of a conversion of the total capital of society into money-capital without the existence of people, who shall buy and utilise the means of production, which form the total capital with the exception of relatively small portion existing in the shape of money, is sheer nonsense. It implies the additional nonsense, that capital could yield interest on the basis of capitalist production without performing any productive function, in other words, without producing any surplus-value, of which interest would be but a part; that the capitalist mode of production could run its course without any capitalist production. If an excessively large number of capitalists were to convert their capital into money-capital, it would result in an extraordinary depreciation of money-capital and an extraordinary fall of the rate of interest; many would at once be face to face with the impossibility of living on their interest, and would be compelled to retransform themselves into industrial capitalists. But we repeat that it is a fact for the individual capitalist. For this reason, he necessarily considers that part of his average profit, which is equal to the average interest, as a fruit of his capital as such, apart from the process of production, even when he works with his own capital; and he differentiates from this portion, from this interest, that surplus of the gross profit, which constitutes his profit of enterprise.

4) (A blank in the manuscript.)

We have seen that that portion of the profit, which the investing capitalist has to pay to the mere owner of borrowed capital, converts itself into the independent form of a portion of profit, which all capital as such, whether borrowed or not, yields under the name of interest. How large that portion shall be is determined by the quotation of the average rate of interest. Its origin does not show itself any more in anything but the fact that the investing capitalist, when owner of his capital, no longer competes in the determination of the rate of interest, at least not actively. The purely quantitative division of profit between two persons having different legal titles to it has turned into a qualitative division, which seems to arise from the nature of capital and profit itself. For, as we have seen, as soon as a portion of the profit generally assumes the form of interest, the difference between the average profit and the interest, or the portion of profit exceeding the interest, assumes a form antagonistic to interest, that of profit of enterprise. These two forms, interest and profit of enterprise, exist only as opposites. They are not reduced to the surplus-value, of which they represent proportional parts cast in different moulds, but are merely referred to one another. Because one portion converts itself into interest, the other portion appears as profit of enterprise.

By profit we always mean average profit here, since the variations of individual profit and of profit in different spheres, due to the fluctuations of the competitive struggle and other circumstances affecting the distribution of the average profit, or surplus-value, do not concern us in this analysis. This applies quite generally to the foregoing inquiry.

Interest is then net profit, as Ramsay calls it, which capital as such yields, either for the mere lender remaining outside of the process of reproduction, or for the owner employing his capital productively. For this latter capitalist also, capital yields this net profit, not in his capacity as a productive capitalist, but of money-capitalist and lender of his own capital as an interest-bearing one to himself as an investing capitalist. Just as the conversion of money, and of value in general, into capital is the constant result of capitalist production, so its existence in the form of capital is its constant prerequisite. By its ability to transform itself into means of production, it commands continually unpaid labor and thereby transforms the process of production and circulation of commodities into a production of surplus-value for its owner. Interest is, therefore, merely the expression of the fact, that value in general, in other words, value representing materialised labor in its general social form, or value assuming the form of means of production in the actual process of production, faces living labor-power as an independent power, and is a means of appropriating unpaid labor; and that it is such a power, because it represents the property of another in opposition to the laborer. But on the other hand, this opposition to wage-labor is obliterated in the form of interest; for interest-bearing capital as such has not wage-labor, but productive capital for its object. The lending capitalist faces as such the capitalist performing his actual function in the process of reproduction, not the wage-worker, who is expropriated from the means of production under capitalist production. Interest-bearing capital represents capital as ownership compared to capital as a function. But to the extent that capital does not perform its function, it does not exploit the laborers and does not come into opposition to labor.

On the other hand, profit of enterprise is not in opposition to wage-labor, but only to interest.

1) Assuming the average profit to be given, the rate of profit on enterprise is not determined by wages, but by the rate of interest. It is high or low inversely as the rate of interest is.73

2) The investing capitalist derives his claim to profits of enterprise, and consequently the profit of enterprise itself, not from his ownership of capital, but from its production function as distinguished from the form, in which it is only inert property. This appears as an obviously existing contrast, whenever he is working with a borrowed capital, so that interest and profits of enterprise each go to different persons. The profit of enterprise arises from the function of capital in the process of reproduction, it is a result of the operations by which the investing capitalist promotes this function of industrial and commercial capital. But to be a representative of invested capital is not a sinecure like the representation of interest-bearing capital. On the basis of capitalist production, the capitalist directs the processes of production and circulation. The exploitation of productive labor requires exertion, whether he performs it himself or has it performed by some one else in his name. In distinction from interest, his profit of enterprise appears to him as independent of the ownership of capital, it seems to be the result of his function as a non-proprietor—a laborer.

Under these circumstances his brain necessarily conceives the idea, that his profit of enterprise, far from being in opposition to wage-labor and representing only the unpaid labor of others, is rather itself wages of labor, wages of superintendence of labor. These wages are superior to those of the common laborer, 1) because they pay for more complicated labor, 2) because the capitalist pays them to himself. The fact that his function as a capitalist consists in creating surplus-value, which is unpaid labor, and to create it under the most economical conditions, is entirely forgotten over the contrast, that the interest falls to the share of the capitalist, even if he does not perform any capitalist function and is merely the owner of capital; and that, on the other hand, the profit of enterprise falls to the share of the investing capitalist, even if he is not the owner of the capital, which he employs. The antagonistic form of the two parts, into which profit, or surplus-value is divided, leads him to forget, that both parts are surplus-value, and that this division does not alter the nature, origin, and living conditions of surplus-value.

In the process of reproduction, the investing capitalist represents capital as the property of another in opposition to the wage-laborers, and the money-capitalist, represented by the investing capitalist, shares in the exploitation of labor. The fact, that the investing capitalist can perform his function or employ means of production as capital only as the personification of the means of production in opposition to the laborers, is forgotten over the antagonism between the function of capital in the process of reproduction and the mere ownership of capital outside of the process of reproduction.

In fact, the forms assumed by the two parts of profit, of surplus-value, when divided into interest and profit of enterprise, do not express their relation to labor, because their relation refers only to themselves and to the profit, or rather to the surplus-value as a whole compared to them as parts of this unit. The proportion in which the profit is divided, and the different legal titles, by which this division is sanctioned, are based on the assumption that profit is already in existence. If, therefore, the capitalist is the owner of the capital, which he employs, he pockets the whole profit, or surplus-value. It is immaterial to the laborer, whether the capitalist pockets the whole profit, or whether he has to pay over a part of it to some other person, who has a legal claim to it. The reasons for dividing the profit among two kinds of capitalists thus turn surreptitiously into reasons for the existence of the surplus-value to be divided, which the capital as such draws out of the process of reproduction quite apart from any subsequent division. Seeing that the interest is opposed to the profit of enterprise, and the profit of enterprise to the interest, that they are both opposed to one another, but not to labor, it follows that both profit of enterprise plus interest, in other words, the total profit, and further the surplus-value, are derived—from what? From the antagonistic form of its two parts! But the profit is produced, before this division takes place, and before there can be any mention of it.

Interest-bearing capital stands the test of such only to the extent that borrowed money is actually converted into capital, and that a surplus is produced with it, of which the interest is a part. But this does not militate against the fact, that the faculty of drawing interest is innate in it outside of the process of production. So does labor-power evince its faculty of producing value only so long as it is employed and materialised in the labor-process; yet this does not argue against the fact, that labor-power is potentially a faculty of creating values, which does not arise out of the mere process of production, but is rather antecedent to it. As a faculty creating value, it is bought. One might also buy it without setting it to work productively. It may be used for purely personal ends, for instance, for personal service, etc. So it is with capital. It is the borrower's affair, whether he employs it as capital, actually setting in motion its inherent faculty of producing surplus-value. What he pays, is in either case the surplus-value inherently latent in the commodity capital.

Let us now consider profit of enterprise more in detail.

Since the specific social faculty of capital under capitalist production, that of being property in the hands of one and yet commanding the labor-power of another, becomes fixed, so that interest appears as a part of the surplus-value produced by capital in this interrelation, the other part of the surplus-value, the profit of enterprise, must necessarily appear as derived, not from capital as such, but from the process of production, separated from its social faculty, which is already expressed as a distinct mode of existence by the term interest in capital. Now, separated from capital, the process of production is simply a labor-process. Hence the industrial capitalist as differentiated from the owner of capital does not appear, in this case, as a functionary of capital, but as a functionary separated from capital, as a simple agent of the labor-process, as a laborer, and specifically as a wage-laborer.

Interest itself expresses precisely the existence of the conditions of labor in the form of capital, in their social antagonism to labor, and in their transformation into personal powers in opposition to labor and dominating it. Interest represents the mere ownership of capital as a means of appropriating the products of the labor of others. But it represents this character of capital as something, which belongs to it outside of the process of production, and which is not by any means a result of the specifically capitalist nature of this process of production itself. Interest places this process in such a light, that it does not seem opposed to labor, but rather without any relation to labor and simply the relation of one capitalist toward another. It thus assumes a form which places it outside of the relation of capital toward labor, and renders it indifferent toward this relation. In interest, then, which is that specific form of profit, in which the antagonistic character of capital assumes an independent form, this is done in such a way, that the antagonism here appears completely obliterated and left out of consideration. Interest is a relation between two capitalists, not between a capitalist and a laborer.

On the other hand, this form of interest bestows upon the other portion of profit the qualitative form of profit of enterprise, and, further on, of wages of superintendence. The specific functions, which the capitalist as such has to perform, and which precisely differentiate him from the laborer and bring him into opposition to the laborer, are presented as mere functions of labor. He creates surplus-value, not because he performs the work of a capitalist, but because he also works aside from his capacity as a capitalist. This portion of surplus-value is thus no longer surplus-value, but its opposite, an equivalent for labor performed. Owing to the fact that the estranged character of capital, its antagonism to labor, has been relegated to a place outside of the actual process of exploitation, namely to the interest-bearing capital, this process of exploitation itself appears as a simple labor process, in which the exploiting capitalist performs merely a different kind of labor than the laborer. In this way the labor of exploitation and the exploited labor both appear as labor, as identical. The labor of exploitation is labor just as well as the labor which is exploited. It is the interest which represents the social form of capital, but it does so in a neutral and indifferent way. It is the profit of enterprise which represents the economic function of capital, but it does so in a way, which takes no cognizance of the definite capitalist character of this function.

In the present case, what passes in the consciousness of the capitalist is quite similar to what passes in the case of the fluctuations for which the capitalist makes allowance in the equalisation of the average profits, as indicated in part II of this volume. These compensating causes, which exert a determining influence on the distribution of the surplus-value, are distorted by the capitalist conception into originating causes and subjective justifications of profit itself.

The conception of profit of enterprise in the shape of wages of superintendence of labor, arising from the antagonism of profit of enterprise to interest, is further strengthened by the fact, that a portion of the profit may indeed be separated, and is separated in reality, as wages, or rather the reverse, that a portion of the wages appear under capitalist production as a separate portion of the profit. Already Adam Smith indicated, that this portion assumes its pure form, independently of profit and wholly separated from it (as the sum of interest and profit of enterprise), and likewise separated from that portion of the profit, which remains in the shape of profit of enterprise after the deduction of the interest, in the salary of the superintendent in those lines of business, whose size, etc., permits a sufficient division of labor to justify a special salary for the labor of a superintendent.

The labor of superintendence and management will naturally be required whenever the direct process of production assumes the form of a combined social process, and does not rest on the isolated labor of independent producers.74 It has, however, a double nature.

On one side, all labors, in which many individuals cooperate, necessarily require for the connection and unity of the process one commanding will, and this performs a function, which does not refer to fragmentary operations, but to the combined labor of the workshop, in the same way as does that of a director of an orchestra. This is a kind of productive labor, which must be performed in every mode of production requiring a combination of labors.

On the other side, quite apart from any commercial department, this labor of superintendence necessarily arises in all modes of production, which are based on the antagonism between the laborer as a direct producer and the owner of the means of production. To the extent that this antagonism becomes pronounced, the role played by superintendence increases in importance. Hence it reaches its maximum in the slave system.75 But it is indispensable also under the capitalist mode of production since then the process of production is at the same time the process by which the capitalist consumes the labor-power of the laborer. In like manner, the labor of superintendence and universal interference by the government in despotic states comprises both the performance of the common operations arising from the nature of all communities and the specific functions arising from the antagonism between the government and the mass of the people.

In the works of ancient writers, who have the slave system under their eyes, both sides of the labor of superintendence are as inseparably combined in theory as they were in practice. So it is also in the works of the modern economists, who regard the capitalist mode of production as the absolute mode of production. On the other hand, as I shall show immediately by an example, the apologists of the modern slave system utilise the labor of superintendence quite as much to justify slavery, as the other economists do to justify the wage system.

The villicus in Cato's time: "At the head of the rural slave community (familia rustica) stood the manager (villicus, derived from villa), who took receipts and made expenditures, bought and sold, received instructions from the master, gave orders and meted out punishment in his absence....The manager occupied naturally a freer position than the other slaves; the Magonian books advise to permit him to marry, raise children, and have his own funds, and Cato recommends that he be married with the female manager; he alone probably had any prospects of being liberated by the master for good behavior. For the rest, all of them formed one common economy....Every slave, including the manager himself, was supplied with his necessities at the expense of his master, in definite periods according to fixed rates, and he had to get along on that. The quantity varied according to labor, and for this reason the manager, whose work was lighter than that of the other slaves, received a smaller ration than the others." (Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, second edition, 1856, I, p. 808-810.)

Aristotle: "For the master proves himself such not in the buying, but in the employing of slaves." (The capitalist proves himself such, not by the ownership of capital, which gives him the power to buy labor-power, but in the employment of laborers, nowadays of wage laborers in the process of production.) "But there is nothing great about this knowledge. For whatever the slave must be able to perform, the master must be able to order. Whenever the masters are not compelled to drudge at superintendence, the manager assumes this honor, while the masters attend to affairs of state or study philosophy." (Aristotle, Republic, Bekker edition, Book I, 7.)

Aristotle says in plain words, that rulership on the political and economic field imposes upon the powers that be the functions of government, and that they must understand the art of consuming labor-power. And he adds, that this labor of superintendence is not a matter of great moment, and that for this reason the master, who is wealthy enough, leaves the "honor" of this drudgery to an overseer.

The labor of management and superintendence arising out of the servitude of the direct producers has often been quoted in justification of this relation, not because it is a function due to the nature of all combined social labor, but because it is due to the antagonism between the owner of means of production and the owner of mere labor-power, regardless of whether this labor-power is bought by buying the laborer himself, as it is under the slave system, or whether the laborer himself sells his labor-power, so that the process of production is the process by which capital consumes his labor-power. And exploitation, the appropriation of the unpaid labor of others, has quite as often been represented as the reward justly due to the owner of capital for his labor. But it was never better defended than it was by a champion of slavery in the United States, a certain lawyer O'Connor, at a meeting held in New York, on December 19th, 1859, under the slogan of "Justice for the South." "Now, Gentlemen," he said amid great applause, "nature itself has assigned this condition of servitude to the negro. He has the strength and is fit to work; but nature, which gave him this strength, denied him both the intelligence to rule and the will to work. (Applause.) Both are denied to him! And the same nature, which denied him the will to work, gave him a master, who should enforce this will, and make a useful servant of him in a climate, to which he is well adapted, for his own benefit and that of the master who rules him. I assert that it is no injustice to leave the negro in the position, into which nature placed him; to put a master over him; and he is not robbed of any right, if he is compelled to labor in return for this, and to supply a just compensation for his master in return for the labor and the talents devoted to ruling him and to making him useful to himself and to society."

Now, the wage-laborer, like the slave, must have a master, who shall put him to work and rule him. And assuming this relation of master and servant to exist, it is quite proper to compel the wage-laborer to produce his own wages and also the wages of superintendence, a compensation for the labor of ruling and superintending him, "a just compensation for his master in return for the labor and talents devoted to ruling him and to making him useful to himself and to society."

The labor of superintendence and management arising out of the antagonistic character and rule of capital over labor, which all modes of production based on class antagonisms have in common with the capitalist mode, is directly and inseparably connected, also under the capitalist system, with those productive functions, which all combined social labor assigns to individuals as their special tasks. The wages of an epitropos, or régisseur, as he used to be called in feudal France, are entirely differentiated from the profit and assumes the form of wages for skilled labor, whenever the business is operated on a sufficiently large scale to warrant paying such a manager, although our industrial capitalists do not "attend to affairs of state or study philosophy" for all that.

That not the industrial capitalists, but the industrial managers are "the soul of our industrial system," has already been remarked by Mr. Ure.76 So far as the commercial part of the business is concerned, we have said as much as was necessary in the preceding part of this volume.

The capitalist mode of production itself has brought matters to such a point, that the labor of superintendence, entirely separated from the ownership of capital, walks the streets. It is, therefore, no longer necessary for the capitalist performs the labor of superintendence himself. A director of an orchestra need not be the owner of the instruments of its members, nor is it a part of his function as a director, that he should have anything to do with the wages of the other musicians. The co-operative factories furnish the proof, that the capitalist has become just as superfluous as a functionary in production as he himself, in his highest developed form, finds the great real estate owner superfluous. To the extent that the labor of the capitalist is not the purely capitalistic one arising from the process of production and ceasing with capital itself, to the extent that it is not limited to the function of exploiting the labor of others, to the extent that it rather arises from the social form of the labor-process as a combination and co-operation of many for the purpose of bringing about a common result, to that extent it is just as independent of capital as that form itself, as soon as it has burst its capitalistic shell. To say that this labor as a capitalistic one, as a function of the capitalist is necessary, amounts merely to saying that the vulgar economist cannot conceive of the forms developed in the womb of capitalist production separated and freed from their antagonistic capitalist character. Compared to the money-capitalist the industrial capitalist is a laborer, but a laboring capitalist, an exploiter of the labor of others. The wages which he claims and pockets for this labor amount exactly to the appropriated quantity of another's labor and depend directly upon the rate of exploitation of this labor, so far as he takes the trouble to assume the necessary burdens of exploitation. They do not depend upon the degree of his exertions in carrying on this exploitation. He can easily shift this burden to the shoulders of a superintendent for moderate pay. After every crisis one may see plenty of ex-manufacturers in the English factory districts, who for low wages superintend their own former factories as managers of the new owners, who are frequently their creditors.77

The wages of superintendence, both for the commercial and the industrial manager, appear completely separated from the profits of enterprise in the co-operative factories of the laborers as well as in capitalistic stock companies. The separation of the wages of superintendence from the profits of enterprise, which is at other times accidental, is here constant. In the co-operative factory the antagonistic character of the labor of superintendence disappears, since the manager is paid by the laborers instead of representing capital against them. Stock companies in general, developed with the credit system, have a tendency to separate this labor of management as a function more and more from the ownership of capital, whether it be self-owned or borrowed. In the same way the development of bourgeois society separates the functions of judges and administrators from feudal property, whose prerogatives they were in feudal times. Since the mere owner of capital, the money-capitalist, has to face the investing capitalist, while money-capital itself assumes a social character with the advance of credit, being concentrated in banks and loaned by them instead of by its original owners, and since, on the other hand, the mere manager, who has no title whatever to the capital, whether by borrowing or otherwise, performs all real functions pertaining to the investing capitalist as such, only the functionary remains and the capitalist disappears from the process of production as a superfluous person.

From the public accounts of the co-operative factories in England78 it is manifest, that the profit, after the deduction of the wages of the superintendent, which form a part of the invested capital the same as the wages of the other laborers, was higher than the average profit, although they paid occasionally a much higher interest than the private factories. The cause of the greater profit was in all these cases a greater economy in the use of constant capital. What interests us particularly here is the fact that here the average profit (= interest + profit of enterprise) presents itself actually and palpably as a magnitude, which is wholly separated from the wages of superintendence. Since the profit was here higher than the average profit, the profit of enterprise was also higher than the current one.

The same fact is revealed by some capitalist stock companies, such as joint stock banks. The London and Westminster Bank paid in 1863 annual dividends of 30%, the Union Bank of London and others 15%. Aside from the salary of the director, the interest paid for deposits is here deducted from the gross profit. The high profit is explained in this case by the small proportion of the paid-up capital to the deposits. For instance, in the case of the London and Westminster Bank, it was in 1863: Paid-up Capital 1,000,000 pounds sterling; deposits 14,540,275 pounds sterling. In that of the Union Bank of London, 1863: Paid-up capital 600,000 pounds sterling; deposits 12,384,173 pounds sterling.

The confounding of the profit of enterprise with the wages of superintendence or management was due originally to the antagonistic form assumed toward interest by the surplus over the interest. It was further promoted by the apologetic intention to represent profit, not as a surplus-value derived from unpaid labor, but as wages of the capitalist himself for labor performed by him. This was met on the part of the socialists by the demand, that profit should actually be reduced to what it pretended to be theoretically, namely mere wages of superintendence. And this demand was all the more disagreeable to the apologists of the capitalists, as these wages of superintendence, like all other wages, found on one hand their level and fixed market-price to the extent that a numerous class of industrial and commercial superintendents was formed,79 while on the other hand these wages fell, like all wages for skilled labor, with the general development, which reduces the cost of production of specifically trained labor-power.80 With the development of co-operation on the part of the laborers, of stock enterprises on the part of the bourgeoisie, even the last pretext for the confusion in matters of profit of enterprise and wages of management was removed, and profit appeared also in practice what it was undeniably in theory, mere surplus-value, a value for which no equivalent was paid, realised unpaid labor. It was then seen that the investing capitalist really exploits labor, and that the fruit of his exploitation, when he worked with a borrowed capital, was divided into interest and profit of enterprise, a surplus of profit over interest.

On the basis of capitalist production, a new swindle develops in stock enterprises with the wages of management. It consists in placing above the actual director a board of managers or directors, for whom superintendence and management serve in reality only as a pretext for plundering stockholders and amassing wealth. Very interesting details concerning this are found in "The City or the Physiology of London Business; with Sketches on 'Change, and the Coffee Houses, London. 1845."Here is a sample: "What bankers and merchants gain by being on the boards of eight or nine different companies, may be seen from the following illustration: The private account of Mr. Timothy Abraham Curtis, handed in by the court of bankruptcy on his failure, showed an income of 8,900 pounds sterling per year under the head of directorships. Since Mr. Curtis had been a director of the Bank of England and of the East Indian Company, every stock company was happy to secure him as a director." (P. 82.)—The remuneration of the directors of such companies for each weekly meeting is at least one guinea. The proceedings of the court of bankruptcy show, that these wages of superintendence are as a rule inversely proportioned to the actual superintendence performed by these nominal directors.

CHAPTER XXIV.

EXTERNALISATION OF THE RELATIONS OF CAPITAL IN THE FORM OF INTEREST-BEARING CAPITAL.

IN the interest-bearing capital, the relations of capital assume their most externalised and most fetish-like form. We have here M—M' money creating more money, self-expending value, without the process intermediate between these two extremes. In the merchants' capital, M—C—M', there is at least the general form of the capitalistic process, although it clings to the sphere of circulation, so that profit appears merely as profit from selling; but it is at least seen to be the product of a social relation, not the product of a mere thing. The form of merchants' capital presents at least the aspect of a process, of a unity of antagonistic phases, of a movement divided into two transactions, namely into the purchase and sale of commodities. This is obliterated in M—M', the form of interest-bearing capital. For instance, if 1,000 pounds sterling are loaned by some capitalist, when the rate of interest is 5%, then the value of 1,000 pounds sterling as a capital for one year is C + Ci', C standing for the capital and i' for the rate of interest. In the present case this would mean 5%, or 5/100 or 1/20, and 1,000 + 1,000 times 1/20 = 1,050 pounds sterling. The value of 1,000 pounds sterling as capital is 1,050 pounds sterling, that is, capital is not a simple magnitude. It is a relation of magnitudes, a relation of principal sum, as a given value, to itself as a self-expanding value, as a principal sum having produced a surplus-value. And we have seen that capital assumes this form of a directly self-expanding value for all investing capitalists, whether they work with their own or with a borrowed capital.

M—M'. We have here the original starting point of capital, we have money in the formula M—C—M' reduced to its two extremes M—M', in which M' stands for M + increment of M, money creating more money. It is the primal and general formula of capital concentrated into a meaningless summary. It is capital perfected, a unity of the process of production and process of circulation, yielding a certain surplus-value in a certain period of time. In the form of interest-bearing capital this appears spontaneously without any intervention of the processes of production and circulation. Capital appears as a mysterious and self-creating source of interest, a thing increasing itself. The Thing (money, commodity, value) is now capital even as a mere thing, and capital appears as a mere thing. The result of the entire process of reproduction appears as a faculty inherent in the thing itself. It depends on the owner of the money, which represents the universal exchange-form of commodities, whether he wants to spend it as money or loan it as capital. In the interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish is elaborated in its pure state, it is self-expanding value, money generating money, and in this form it does not carry any more scars of its origin. The social relation is perfected into the relation of a thing, of money, to itself. Instead of the actual transformation of money into capital, only an empty form meets us here. As in the case of labor-power, so here in the case of interest-bearing capital the use-value of money becomes that of creating value, and at that a greater value than it contains itself. Money as such is potentially self-expanding value and is loaned as such, and loaning is the form of sale for this peculiar commodity. It becomes a faculty of money to generate value and yield interest, just as it is a faculty of a pear tree to bear pears. And the money lender sells his money as such an interest-bearing thing. But that is not all. The actually invested capital, as we have seen, presents itself in such a light, that it seems to yield the interest, not as a capital performing its function, but as a capital in itself, as money-capital.

And still something else becomes perverted. While interest is only a portion of the profit, that is, of surplus-value, which the investing capitalist squeezes out of the laborer, it looks now on the contrary as though the interest were the typical fruit of capital, the primal thing, and profit, in the shape of profit of enterprise, a mere accessory and by-product of the process of reproduction. Thus the fetish form of capital and the conception of a fetish capital are perfect. In M—M' we have the void form of capital, the perversion and individualisation of the relations of production in their highest degree. The interest-bearing form is the simple form of capital, in which it is assumed to be antecedent to its own process of reproduction. It is the faculty of money, or of a commodity, to expand its own value independently of reproduction, a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form.

For vulgar political economy, which desires to represent capital as a spontaneous source of value and its creation, this mystic form is, of course, a great boon. It is a form, in which the source of profit is no longer discernible, and in which the result of the capitalist process of production receives an independent existence apart from this process.

It is not until capital becomes money-capital, that it can assume the form of a commodity, whose self-expanding faculty has a definite price, which is quoted in the current rate of interest.

As an interest-bearing capital, in its direct form of interest-bearing money-capital (the other forms of interest-bearing capital, which do not concern us here, are derived from this one and require its existence), capital assumes its pure fetish form, M—M' as a subject and a saleable thing. In the first place, its continual existence as money gives to it a form, in which all its functions are obliterated and its real elements invisible. For money is precisely that form, in which the distinctions of commodities as use-values are concealed, and with them the distinctions of the industrial capital consisting of these commodities and their conditions of production. It is that form, in which value, in the present case capital, exists as an independent exchange-value. In the process of reproduction of capital, the money-form is but a transient one, a mere passing link. But on the money-market, capital always exists in this form. In the second place, the surplus-value produced by it, which has here again the form of money, appears as inherent in it. Like the growing of trees, so the breeding of money appears as an innate quality of capital in the form of money-capital.

In the interest-bearing capital, the movement of capital is contracted. The intervening process is omitted. In this way a capital of 1,000 appears with the fixed faculty of being of itself 1,100 and converting itself after a certain period into 1,100, just as wine in a cellar improves its use-value after a certain period. Capital is then a thing, which is of itself capital. The money is then pregnant. As soon as it has been loaned, or invested in the process of reproduction (when it yields interest to its owner separate from profit of enterprise for his function as investing capitalist), the interest accumulates, whether it be awake or asleep, at home or abroad, day or night. In the interest-bearing money capital, then, the fervent wish of the hoarding miser is fulfilled (and all capital is money-capital, so far as the expression of its value is concerned, or is considered as the expression of money-capital).

It is this inherent dwelling of interest in money-capital as a thing (and this is the aspect here assumed by the production of surplus-value by capital), which engages Luther's attention so much in his naive thundering against usury. After demonstrating, that interest may be demanded, when failure to pay back a loan to a lender, who has to meet a certain payment himself, caused a loss to him, or when he might have made a profit on a bargain, for instance in buying a garden, but lost it for the reason that the borrower failed to return the loan on time, Luther continues: "Now that I have loaned you 100 guilders, you make good my double loss due to the fact that I could not pay on one side and not buy on the other, so that I had to lose on both sides, and this is called double interest, for loss sustained and gain stopped....Having heard that John lost on his loan of 100 guilders and demands just damages, they rush in and charge double interest on every 100 guilders, which interest was only charged for the loss due to nonpayment and to inability to make a profit on a bargain, just as though every 100 guilders could naturally grow double interest, so that whenever they have 100 guilders, they loan them out and charge for two losses, which they have not at all sustained....Therefore you are a usurer, who takes damages out of his neighbor's money for an imaginary loss that you did not sustain at all, and which you can neither prove nor calculate. This sort of loss is called by the jurists not true, but fantastical interest. It is a loss of which each dreams for himself....It will not do to say that you might incur a loss, because I might not have been able to pay or buy. That would be making something out of a thing that is not so, a thing that is uncertain into a thing that is absolutely sure. Such usury would eat up the world in a few years....If the lender accidentally incurs a loss, without his fault, he may demand damages for it, but it is different in trade and just the reverse. There they scheme to profit at the expense of their needy neighbors, how to amass wealth and get rich, to be lazy and idle and live in luxury on the labor of others, without any care, danger and loss. To sit behind the stove and let my 100 guilders gather wealth for me in the country and yet keep them in my pocket, because they are only loaned, without any danger or risk, my friend, who would not like to do that!" (Martin Luther, An die Pfarherrn wider den Wucher zu predigen, etc., Wittenberg, 1540.)

The idea of capital as a self-reproducing and thereby self-expanding value, lasting and growing eternally by virtue of its inherent power—by virtue of the hidden faculties of the scholastics—has led to the fabulous fancies of Dr. Price, which far outdo the fantasies of the alchemists; fancies, in which Pitt seriously believed and which he used as pillars of his financial administration in his laws concerning the sinking fund.

"Money bearing compound interest grows at first slowly; but since the rate of increase is constantly accelerated, it becomes so fast after a while as to defy all imagination. A penny, loaned at the birth of our Savior at compound interest at 5%, would already have grown into a larger amount than would be contained in 150 million globes, all of solid gold. But loaned at simple interest, it would have grown only to 7 sh. 4½ d. in the same time. Hitherto our government has preferred to improve its finances in the latter instead of in the former way."81

He flies still higher in his "Observations on Reversionary Payments, etc., London, 1782." There we read: "1 sh. invested at the birth of our Savior" (presumably in the Temple of Jerusalem) "at 6% compound interest would have grown to a larger amount than the entire solar system could contain, if it were transformed into a globe of the diameter of the orbit of Saturn." "A state need never to be in difficulties on this account; for with the smallest savings it can pay the largest debt in as short a time as its interests may demand." (P. 136.) What a pretty theoretical introduction to the national debt of England!

Price was simply dazzled by the enormousness of the figures arising from geometrical progression. Since he regarded capital, without taking note of the conditions of reproduction and labor, as a self-regulating automaton, as a mere number increasing itself (just as Malthus did with men in their geometrical progression), he could imagine that he had found the law of its growth in the formula s = c(1 + i)Ñ, in which s stands for the sum of capital plus compound interest, c for the advanced capital, i for the rate of interest expressed in aliquot parts of 100, and n for the number of years in which this process takes place.

Pitt takes this mystification of Price quite seriously. In 1788 the House of Commons had resolved to raise one million pounds sterling for the public benefit. According to Price, in whom Pitt believed, there was, of course, nothing better than to tax the people, in order to "accumulate" this sum after raising it, and thus to spirit the national debt away by the mystery of compound interest. "The above resolution of the House of Commons was soon followed up by Pitt with a law, which ordered the accumulation of 250,000 pounds sterling, until, with the expired annuities, the fund should have grown to 4,000,000 pounds sterling annually." (Act 26, George III, chap. 22.) In his speech of 1792, in which Pitt proposed that the amount devoted to the sinking fund be increased, he mentioned among the causes of the commercial supremacy of England machines, credit, etc., as "the most wide-spread and enduring cause of accumulation." This principle, he said, was completely developed in the work of Smith, that genius, etc....And this accumulation, he continued, was accomplished by laying aside at least a portion of the annual profit for the purpose of increasing the principal, which was to be employed in the same manner next year, and which thus yielded a continual profit. By the help of Dr. Price, Pitt thus converted Smith's theory of accumulation in an increase of popular wealth by means of the accumulation of debts, and in this way he gets into the pleasant progress of infinite loans, made for the purpose of paying loans.

Already Josiah Child, the father of modern banking, tells us that 100 pounds sterling at 10% will produce in 70 years by compound interest 102,400 pounds sterling. Traité sur le commerce, etc., par J. Child, traduit, etc., Amsterdam et Berlin, 1754, p. 115. Written in 1669.)

How thoughtlessly the conception of Dr. Price is applied by modern economists, is shown by the following passage of the "Economist": "Capital, with compound interest on every portion of capital saved, is so all-engrossing that all the wealth in the world from which income is derived, has long ago become interest of capital....all rent is now the payment of interest on capital previously invested in the land." (Economist, July 19th, 1859.) In its capacity of interest-bearing capital capital claims the ownership of all wealth which can ever be produced, and everything it has received so far is but an instalment for its all-engrossing appetite. By its innate laws, all surplus-labor belongs to it, which the human race can ever perform. Moloch.

In conclusion we present the following hodge-podge of the romantic Müller: "Dr. Price's immense increase of compound interest, or of the self-accelerating forces of man, presuppose an undivided or unbroken order for several centuries, if they are to produce such enormous effects. As soon as capital is divided, cut up into several independently growing slips, the total process of accumulating forces begins anew. Nature has distributed the progression of power over a course of about 20 to 25 years, which fall on an average to the share of every laborer (!). After the lapse of this time the laborer leaves his track and must transfer the capital accumulated by the compound interest of labor to a new laborer, having to distribute it as a rule among several laborers or children. These must first learn to vitalise and employ their share of capital, before they can draw any actual compound interest out of it. Furthermore, an enormous quantity of capital gained by bourgeois society is accumulated for many years, even in the most restless communities, and is not employed for any immediate expansion of labor, but rather entrusted to another individual, a laborer, a bank, a state, under the term of a loan, whenever a considerable amount has been gathered together. And in that case the one who receives it sets the capital into actual motion and draws compound interest out of it, so that he can easily agree to pay simple interest to the lender. Finally the laws of consumption, greed, waste, oppose those immense progressions, in which the forces of man and their products might increase, if the law of production or thrift were alone effective." (A Müller, 1. c., II, p. 147-149.)

It is impossible to concoct a more hair-raising nonsense in a few lines. Leaving aside the droll confusion of laborer and capitalist, of value of labor-power and interest of capital, etc., the decrease of compound interest is supposed to be explained by lending capital at compound interest. This procedure of our Müller is characteristic of romanticism in all fields. It is made up of current prejudices, skimmed from the most superficial semblance of things. This false and trivial substance is then supposed to be "uplifted" and rendered poetical by a mystifying mode of expression.

The process of accumulation of capital may be conceived as an accumulation of compound interest in the sense that that portion of the profit (surplus-value), which is reconverted into capital, and serves to absorb more surplus-value, may be called interest. But

1) Aside from all accidental irregularities, a large part of the available capital is continually depreciated in the course of the process of reproduction, because the value of the commodities is not determined by the labor-time originally spent in their production, but by the labor-time spent in their reproduction, and this decreases continually in consequence of the development of the productivity of social labor. On a higher stage of development of the social productivity all available capital appears therefore as the result of a relatively short time of reproduction, instead of as the result of a long process of saving capital.82

2) As we have proven in Part III of this volume, the rate of profit decreases in proportion as the accumulation of capital and the productivity of social labor corresponding to it increase, since these two express themselves precisely in a relative and progressive decrease of the variable portion of capital as compared to the constant. In order to produce the same rate of profit, when the constant capital set in motion by one laborer increases tenfold, the surplus labor time would have to increase tenfold, and soon the total labor time, and finally the full 24 hours of a day, would not suffice, even if wholly appropriated by capital. The idea that the rate of profit does not decrease is, on the other hand, the basis of the progression of Price, as it is in general the basis of "all-engrossing capital with compound interest."83

By the identity of surplus-value with surplus-labor a qualitative limit is imposed upon the accumulation of capital. This is formed by the total working day, the prevailing development of the productive forces and of the population, which limit the number of the simultaneously exploitable working days. But if surplus value is conceived of in the meaningless form of interest, then the limit is merely quantitative and defies all fantasy.

Now, in the interest-bearing capital the idea of a capitalist fetish is perfected, the idea, which attributes to the accumulated product of labor, and at that in the fixed form of money, the power of creating surplus-value by its inherent secret qualities, in a purely automatic manner, and in geometrical progression, so that the accumulated product of labor, as the "Economist" thinks, has long discounted all the wealth of the world for all times as belonging to it and coming to it by right. The product of past labor, the past labor itself, is here pregnant in itself with a portion of present or future living surplus-labor. We know, on the contrary, that as a matter of fact the preservation, and to that extent the reproduction, of the value of the products of past labor is only the result of their contact with living labor; and secondly, that the control exerted by the products of past labor over living surplus-labor lasts only as long as the relations of capital, which rest on the definite social relation, in which past labor dominates independently over living labor.

CHAPTER XXV.

CREDIT AND FICTITIOUS CAPITAL.

AN exhaustive analysis of the credit system and of the instruments created by it for its own use (credit money, etc.) is beyond the scope of our plan. We merely wish to dwell here upon a few particular points, which are necessary for a characterisation of the capitalist mode of production in general. To this end we shall deal only with commercial and bank credit. The connection between the development of this form of credit and that of public credit is not considered here.

I have shown previously (in volume I, chapter III, 3 b.), in what manner the function of money as a medium of payment, and consequently a relation of creditors and debtors, is formed among the producers of commodities and the traders, as the outcome of the simple circulation of commodities. With the development of commerce and of the capitalist mode of production, which has an eye only to the circulation, this natural basis of the credit system is extended, generalised, elaborated. Money serves here on the whole merely as a means of payment, that is to say, commodities are not sold for money, but for a written promise to pay for them at a certain date. We may comprise all these promises to pay for brevity's sake under the general category of bills of exchange. Such bills of exchange in their turn circulate as means of payment until the day on which they fall due; and they form commercial money in the strict meaning of the term. To the extent that they ultimately balance one another by the compensation of credits and debts, they serve absolutely as money, since no transformation into actual money takes place. Just as these mutual advances of the producers and merchants to one another form the real foundation of credit, so their instrument of circulation, the bill of exchange, forms the basis of credit money proper, of bank notes, etc. These do not rest upon the circulation of money, whether it be metallic money or government paper money, but upon the circulation of bills of exchange.

W. Leatham, a banker of Yorkshire, writes in his "Letters on the Currency," 2nd edition, London, 1840: "I find, that the total amount in bills of exchange for the entire year 1839 was 528,493,842 pounds sterling" (he assumed that the foreign bills of exchange composed about one-fifth of the whole) "and the amount of bills of exchange simultaneously current in the same year to 132,123,460 pounds sterling" (p. 56). "The bills of exchange make up a greater part of the amount in circulation than all the rest together" (p. 3). "This enormous superstructure of bills of exchange rests (!) upon a basis formed by the amount of bank notes and gold; and if in the course of events this basis is too much contracted, its solidity, and even its existence, become endangered" (p. 8). "Estimating the entire circulation" (he means of the bank notes) "and the amount of the obligations of all banks for which immediate payment may be demanded, I find a sum of 153 millions, whose conversion into gold might be demanded according to law, and to offset it only 14 millions in gold to satisfy this demand" (p. 11). The bills of exchange cannot be placed under control, unless the superfluity of money and the low rate of interest, or discount, can be prevented, which create a part of them and encourage this dangerous expansion. It is impossible to decide, how much of them is due to actual business, for instance, to real purchases and sales, and what part of them is fictitious and consists only of prolonged bills, that is, when a bill of exchange is drawn for the purpose of taking up a current one before it becomes due, and thus of creating fictitious capital by the manufacture of mere means of circulation. In times of superfluous and cheap money I know this is done to an enormous degree" (p. 43, 44). J. W. Bosanquet, Metallic, Paper, and Credit Currency, London, 1842: The average amount of the payments settled on every business day in the Clearing House (where the London bankers mutually exchange the due bills and filed checks) exceeds 3 millions of pounds sterling, and the daily supply of money required for this purpose is little more than 200,000 pounds sterling (p. 86). [In the year 1889, the total turn-over of the Clearing House amounted to 7,618 and ¾ millions of pounds sterling, which, in 300 business days, averages 25 and ½ millions of pounds sterling daily.—F. E.] "Bills of exchange are undoubtedly currency, independent of money, inasmuch as they transfer property from hand to hand by endorsement" (p. 92). "On an average it may be assumed that every circulating bill of exchange bears two endorsements, and that on an average every bill thus performs two payments, before it becomes due. Accordingly it seems that alone by endorsement the bills of exchange promoted a transfer of property to the amount of twice 528 millions, or 1,056 millions of pounds sterling, more than 3 millions daily, in the course of the year 1839. It is, therefore, certain the bills of exchange and deposits together, by transferring property from hand to hand and without the assistance of money, perform the functions of money to a daily amount of at least 18 millions of pounds sterling" (p. 93).

Tooke says the following about credit in general: "Credit, in its simplest expression, is the well or ill-founded confidence, which induces one man to entrust to another a certain amount of capital, in money or in commodities estimated at a certain value, which amount is always payable after the lapse of a definite time. Where the capital is loaned in money, that is, in bank notes, or in a cash credit, or in a check upon some correspondent, an addition of so and so many per cent. upon the returnable amount is made for the use of the capital. With commodities, whose money value has been agreed upon by the parties concerned, and whose transfer constitutes a sale, the stipulated sum, which is to be paid, includes a compensation for the use of the capital and for the risk assumed until the time of payment. Written agreements to pay on definite days are generally given for such credits. And these transferable obligations, or promises, form the means by which the lenders, when they find an opportunity to use their capital, either in the shape of money or commodities, are generally enabled to borrow or buy more cheaply, their own credit being strengthened by that of the second name upon the bill of exchange." Inquiry into the Currency Principle, (p. 87.)

Ch. Coquelin, Du Crédit et des Banques dans l' Industrie. Revue des deux Mondes, 1842, tome 31: "In every country the majority of the credit transactions takes place in the circle of the industrial relations themselves...the producer of the raw material advances it to the capitalist, who works it up, and receives from him a promise to pay on a certain day. The manufacturer, having completed his share of the work, in his turn advances his product on similar conditions to another manufacturer, who has to manipulate it farther, and in this way credit extends more and more, from one to the other, down to the consumer. The wholesale dealer gives to the retail dealer commodities on credit, while he receives himself credit from a manufacturer or commission agent. All borrow with one hand and lend with the other, sometimes money, but more frequently products. In this manner an incessant exchange of credits, combining and crossing in all directions, takes place in the industrial relations. The development of credit consists precisely in the multiplication and growth of these mutual credits, and here is the real seat of its power."

The other side of the credit system is connected with the development of the money trade, which, of course, keeps step under capitalist production with the development of the trade in commodities. We have seen in the preceding part (chapter XIX), how the care of reserve funds of business men, the technical operations of receiving and issuing money, of international payments, and thus of the bullion trade, are concentrated in the hands of the money traders. Borrowing and lending money becomes their particular business. They step as middlemen between the actual lender and the borrower of capital. Generally speaking, the banking business on this side consists of concentrating the loanable money-capital in the banker's hands in large masses, so that in place of the individual money lender the bankers face the industrial capitalists and commercial capitalists in the capacity of representatives of all money lenders. They become the general managers of the money-capital. On the other hand, they concentrate the borrowers against all lenders, and borrow for the entire world of commerce. A bank represents on one hand the centralisation of money-capital, of the lenders, and on the other the centralisation of the borrowers. Its profit is generally made by borrowing at a lower rate of interest than it loans.

The loanable capital, of which the banks dispose, flows to them in various ways. In the first place, since they are the cashiers of the industrial capitalists, there is concentrated into their hands the money-capital, which every producer and merchant must have as a reserve fund, or which he receives in payment. These funds are thus converted into loanable capital. In this way the reserve fund of the commercial world, being concentrated into a common treasury, is reduced to its necessary minimum, and a portion of the money-capital, which would otherwise slumber as a reserve fund, is loaned and serves as interest-bearing capital. In the second place, the loanable capital of the banks is formed by the deposits of the money-capitalists, who entrust them with the business of loaning it. Furthermore, with the development of the bank system, and particularly as soon as they pay interest on deposits, the money savings and the temporarily unemployed money of all classes are deposited with them. Small amounts, each by itself incapable of acting in the capacity of money-capital, are combined into large masses and thus form a money power. This aggregation of small amounts must be distinguished as a specific effect of the bank system from its intermediate position between the money-capitalists proper and the borrowers. Finally, the revenues, which are but gradually consumed, are also deposited with the banks.

The loan is made (we refer here only to the commercial credit in the strict meaning of the term) by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by converting them into money before they come due, and by advances in various forms: direct advances on personal credit, Lombard loans on interest-bearing papers, government papers, stocks of all kinds, furthermore advances on bills of lading, dock warrants, and other certified titles of ownership in commodities, and by overdrawing on their deposits, etc.

The credit given by a banker may assume various forms, for instance, that of exchanges on other banks, checks on them, opening of credit in the same way, finally, in the case of banks entitled to issue notes, the bank notes of the bank itself. A bank note is nothing but a draft upon the banker, payable at any time to the bearer, and substituted by the banker for private drafts. This last form of credit appears particularly important and striking to the layman, first, because this form of credit money steps from the mere commercial circulation into the general circulation and serves as money there, and in the second place, because in most countries the principal banks issuing notes represent a queer mixture of national and private banks and thus have actually the national credit to back them up and give to their notes the character of a more or less legal tender, for in this case it is apparent, that the thing which the banker handles is credit itself, since a bank note stands only for a circulating token of credit. But the banker also deals in all other forms of credit, even when he advances cash money deposited with him. In fact, a bank note simply represents the coin of wholesale trade, and it is always the deposit, which carries the most weight with banks. The best proof of this is furnished by the Scotch banks.

The special credit institutions, and the particular forms of banks, do not require any further consideration for our purposes.

The banks have a twofold business.... 1) To collect capital from those, who have no immediate use for it, and to distribute it and transfer it to others, who can use it. 2) To receive deposits from the incomes of their customers and to pay them whatever amount they may require of this deposit for the expenses of consumption. The former is circulation of capital, the latter circulation of currency.—The one is a concentration of capital on one side, and its distribution on the other; the other is a management of the circulation for the local needs of the vicinity.—Tooke, Inquiry into the Currency Principle, p. 36, 37.—We shall revert to this passage later, in chapter XXVIII.

Reports of Committees. Vol. VIII., Commercial Distress. Vol. II., Part I., 1847-48, Minutes of Evidence. (Subsequently quoted as Commercial Distress, 1847-48.) In the forties, when discounting bills of exchange in London, bills of exchange of one bank were often drawn on another instead of bank notes. (Testimony of J. Pease, provincial banker, No. 4636 and 4656.) According to the same report, the bankers were in the habit of giving such bills of exchange in payment to their customers, as soon as money grew tight. If the party receiving them demanded bank notes, he had to discount this bill of exchange once more. This amounted to a privilege of making money for the banks. Messieurs Jones, Lloyd and Co., made payments in this way "since time immemorial," as soon as money was scarce and the rate of interest above 5%. The customer was glad to get such banker's bills, because bills of Jones, Lloyd and Co. could be easier discounted than his own; these bills often passed through twenty to thirty hands. (Ibidem, No. 901 to 904, 905.)

All these forms serve to make a claim to payments transferable.—There is scarcely one form, which credit may assume, in which it has not at times performed the functions of money; whether this form is that of a bank note, or of a bill, or of a check, the process is essentially the same and the result is essentially the same. Fullarton, On the Regulation of Currencies, 2d edition, London, 1845, p. 38.—Bank notes are the small currency of credit. p. 51.—

The following is from J. W. Gilbart The History and Principles of Banking, London, 1834: The capital of a bank consists of two parts, the invested capital and the banking capital, which is borrowed (p. 11 et seq.). The banking capital, or borrowed capital, is maintained in three ways: 1) through the acceptance of deposits; 2) through the issuing of the bank's own notes; 3) through the drawing of bills. If some one is willing to loan me 100 p.st. for nothing, and I loan these 100 p.st. to some one else at 4%, I shall make 4 p.st. by this transaction in the course of one year. Likewise if some one is willing to accept my promise to pay and to return it to me at the end of the year and to pay me 4% for it, just as though I had given him 100 p.st. by this transaction, I make 4 p.st. by it; and again, if a man in a country town brings me 100 p.st. on the condition that I shall pay this amount to some third person in London after the lapse of 21 days, all the interest I may draw in the meantime on this money will be my profit. This is an objective summary of the operations of a bank and of the way in which a banking capital is created by deposits, bank notes and bills of exchange (p. 117). The profits of a banker are generally proportionate to the amount of his borrowed or banking capital. In order to determine the actual profit of a bank, the interest on the first investment of capital must be deducted from the gross profits. The remainder is the banking profit (p. 118). The advances of a banker to his customers are made with the money of other people (p. 146). Precisely those bankers, who do not issue any bank notes, create a banking capital by discounting bills of exchange. They increase their deposits by their discounting operations. The London banks discount only for those firms, that keep a deposit in account with them (p. 119). A firm discounting bills of exchange in its bank and having paid interest upon the whole amount of these bills must leave at least a portion of this amount in the hands of the bank without receiving any interest on it. In this way the banker receives a higher rate of interest than the current one on the advanced money and creates for himself a banking capital by means of the surplus remaining in his hands. (p. 120.)—Economising of reserve funds, deposits, checks: The deposit banks economise by a transfer of credit accounts the use of the circulating medium and transact business of a large volume with a small amount of actual money. The money thus released is employed by the banker in making advances to his customers by means of discounts, etc. Hence the transfer of credit enhances the effectiveness of the deposit system (p. 123). It is immaterial, whether the two customers, that deal with one another, keep their accounts with the same or with different bankers. For the bankers exchange their checks among themselves in the Clearing House. By means of transfers the deposit system might be extended to such a degree that it would do away entirely with the use of metal money. If every one were to keep a deposit account in the bank and to make payments by means of checks then such checks would be the only circulating medium. In this case the assumption would have to be that the bankers hold the money in their hands, otherwise the checks would have no value (p. 124). The centralisation of the local transactions in the hands of the banks is promoted, 1) by branch banks. The provincial banks have branch establishments in the smaller towns of their district the London banks in the different quarters of the city. 2) By agencies. Every provincial bank has its agent in London, in order to pay its notes or bills there and to receive money, which is paid down by inhabitants of London for the account of people living in the provinces. (p. 127.) Every banker gathers in the notes of the others and holds them. In every large city they meet once or twice a week and exchange their notes. The balance is paid by a check on London. (p. 134.) The purpose of banks is to facilitate business. Whatever facilitates business, facilitates also speculation. Business and speculation are so closely linked in some cases, that it is difficult to tell where business stops and speculation begins. Wherever there are banks, capital can be obtained more easily and cheaply. The cheapness of capital promotes speculation, just as the cheapness of beer and meat promotes gluttony and drunkenness (p. 137, 138). Since the banks issuing their own notes always pay in these notes, it may seem as though their discount business were transacted exclusively with the capital made in this way, but this is not so. A banker may very well pay all the bills discounted by him with his own notes, and yet nine-tenths of the bills in his possession may represent actual capital. For while he may have given only his own paper money for these bills, it need not stay in the circulation until these bills become due. The bills may be running for three months, while the notes may return in three days. (p. 172.) The overdrawing of accounts by customers is a regular business practice. This is indeed the purpose, for which cash credit is granted. Cash credits are not granted on personal security, but on deposit of collateral papers (p. 174, 175). A capital advanced on bonded wares has the same effect as though it had been advanced in discounting bills. If a man borrows 100 p.st on his goods as a security, it is the same as though he had sold them for a bill of exchange of 100 p.st. and discounted this bill with his banker. But this advance enables him to hold his goods over for a better condition of the market and to avoid sacrifices, which he would have had to make, in order to obtain money for urgent purposes (p. 180, 181).

The Currency Question Reviewed, etc., p. 62, 63: It is here indisputably true that the 1,000 p.st. which I deposit to-day with A are issued to-morrow and deposited with B. The day after to-morrow it may be issued once more by B and form a deposit with C, and so forth infinitely. The same 1,000 p.st. of money may, therefore, multiply themselves into an absolutely indeterminable sum of deposits by a series of transfers. Hence it is possible that nine-tenths of all deposits in England may have no other existence but that in the entries of the banker's books, of whom every one stands good for his part of them. In Scotland, for instance, the money in circulation (and mostly paper money at that) never exceeds 3 million p.st., while the deposits amount to 27 millions. So long as no general and sudden demand is made for the return of the deposits (a run on the bank), the same 1,000 p.st., traveling backward, may balance an equally indeterminable sum with the same facility. Since the same 1,000 p.st., with which I balance to-day my debt with some business man, may balance to-morrow his debt with some other business man, and the day after to-morrow balance this man's account, and so forth infinitely, it follows that the same 1,000 p.st. may pass from hand to hand and from bank to bank and balance any imaginable sum of deposits.

[We have seen, that Gilbart knew even in 1834 that "whatever facilitates business facilitates speculation, both being so intimately linked in many cases, that it is difficult to tell, where business stops and speculation begins." If the securing of advances on unsold commodities is facilitated more and more, then more and more of such advances are taken, and in the same proportion increases the temptation to manufacture commodities, or throw already manufactured ones upon distant markets, for no other immediate purpose than that of obtaining advances of money on them. To what extent the entire business world of a country may be seized by such a swindle, and what it finally comes to, may be studied in the history of English business during the years 1845 to 1847, which furnishes a flagrant example. There we can see what credit can accomplish. Before we mention some of the most conspicuous cases, we must make a few preliminary remarks.

About the close of 1842 the pressure, which had crushed English industry almost without interruption since 1837, began to weaken. During the following two years the demand of the foreign countries for products of English industry increased still more. The year 1845 to 1846 marked the period of greatest prosperity. In 1843 the opium war had opened the doors of China to English commerce. The new market offered a convenient excuse for the further expansion of already extended industries, particularly of the cotton industry. "How can we ever produce too much? We have to clothe 300 millions of people." Thus spoke a Manchester manufacturer to the writer in those days. But all the newly erected factory buildings, steam engines, spinning and weaving machines did not suffice to absorb the surplus-value, which poured into them from Lancashire. With the same passion, which was exhibited in the expansion of production, the building of railroads was undertaken. Here the longing of manufacturers and merchants for speculation found its first satisfaction, as early as the summer of 1844. Stock was underwritten to the full extent possible, that is, so far as the money went to cover the first payments. The idea was that a way would be found in due time to get the missing amount. But when further payments were due (Question 1059, C. D. 1848-57, indicates that the capital invested in railroads in 1846-47 amounted to 75 million p.st.), it was necessary to resort to credit, and as a rule the actual business of the firm itself had to add its drop of blood.

In most cases the actual business was already overburdened. The enticing and high prices had misled people into far greater operations than the available cash justified. It was so easy, and cheap besides, to get credit. The bank discount was low. In 1844 it was 1¾ to 2¾%, in 1845 until October it was less than 3%, then it rose for a little while to 5% (until February 1846), then it fell once more to 3¼% in December 1846. The bank had in its cellars a supply of gold of unusual dimensions. All inland quotations stood higher than ever before. Why should a man let this fine opportunity pass by? Why shouldn't he go in for all he was worth? Why not send to the foreign markets, that longed for English goods, all the commodities that could be manufactured? And why should not the manufacturer himself pocket the double gain arising from the sale of yarn and fabrics to the Far East, and from the sale, in England, of the back freight received in their stead?

Thus arose the system of mass consignments, by virtue of advances, to India and China, and this soon developed into a system of consignments purely for the sake of getting advances, as described more at length in the following notes. This had to lead inevitably to an overcrowding of the markets and to a crash.

This crash came as the aftermath of a crop failure in 1846. England, and still more, Ireland, required enormous imports of means of subsistence, particularly of corn and potatoes. But the countries that supplied these things could be paid only to a very small degree in products of English industry. They had to be paid in precious metals. This took at least nine millions of gold to foreign countries. Of this amount of gold fully seven and a half millions came out of the cash treasury of the Bank of England, whose freedom of action on the money market was seriously impaired thereby. The other banks, whose reserves are deposited with the Bank of England, which reserves are practically identical with those of the Bank of England, were thus compelled to cut down their own money accommodations. The rapidly and easily flowing stream of payments became clogged, first here and there, then universally. The banking discount, which had still been 3 to 3½% in January of 1847, rose to 7% in April, when the first panic broke out. Then a temporary lull came in summer, lowering this discount to 6½ and 6 %. But when the new crop failed likewise, the panic broke out afresh and more violently. The official minimum discount of the Bank rose in October to 7%, in November to 10%, in other words, the overwhelming mass of checks could be discounted only at outrageous rates of interest, or not at all. The general stopping of payments brought about the bankruptcy of several of the first firms and of very many medium-sized and small firms. The Bank itself was in danger of ruin from the shrewd Bank Acts imposing the limitations of 1844. In this emergency the government yielded to the universal demand and suspended these Bank Acts on October 25, thereby taking off the absurd legal fetters thrown around the Bank. Now the Bank was enabled to throw its supply of bank notes into circulation without any interference. The credit of these bank notes being practically guaranteed by the credit of the nation, and thus unimpaired, the shortness of money was immediately relieved in the most effective manner. Of course, quite a number of hopelessly caught large and small firms failed nevertheless even then, but the climax of the crisis had passed, the banking discount fell once more to 5% in September, and in the course of 1848 that renewed business activity was resumed, which took the edge off the revolutionary movements on the continent in 1849, and which inaugurated in the fifties a formerly unknown industrial prosperity and ended—in the crash of 1857.—F. E.]

I. A document issued by the House of Lords in 1848 gives information concerning the depreciation of government papers and bonds during the crisis of 1847. According to it the depreciation of October 23, 1847, compared to the stand of values in February of the same year, amounted to 93,824,217 pounds sterling in English government bonds, 1,358,288 pounds sterling in dock and canal stock, and to 19,579,820 pounds sterling in railroad stocks, a total of 114,762,325 pounds sterling.

II. With reference to the swindle in East Indian business, in which it was no longer a question of making drafts, because commodities had been bought, but rather of buying commodities in order to be able to make out discountable drafts which should be convertible into money, the "Manchester Guardian" of November 24, 1848, remarks that Mr. A in London instructs a Mr. B to buy from the manufacturer C in Manchester commodities for shipment to a Mr. D. in East India. B pays C in six-months-drafts to be made by C on B. B secures himself by six-months-drafts on A. As soon as the goods are shipped, and the bill of lading mailed, A makes out six-months-drafts on D. The buyer and shipper thus get possession of funds many months before the goods are actually paid for. And it was a common custom to renew the drafts when due under the pretense of allowing time for turn-over in such a protracted business. Unfortunately the losses in this business did not lead to its restriction, but to its extension. In proportion as the interested parties grew poor their need of making purchases increased, in order to find in new advances a compensation for capital lost in previous speculations. Purchases were then no longer regulated by supply and demand, but became the most important feature in the financial operations of a shaky firm. But this is only one side of the picture. What happened in the export of manufacturing goods here, occurred in the purchase and shipment of goods on the other side. Firms in India, which had credit enough to get their checks discounted, bought sugar, indigo, silk or cotton, not because the purchase prices as compared with the latest London quotations promised a profit, but because previous drafts on a London firm would soon be due and would have to be covered. What was simpler than to buy a cargo of sugar, to pay for it in ten-months-drafts on the London firm, and to send the bills of lading by overland mail to London? Less than two months later the bills of lading of these barely shipped goods, and thus the goods themselves, were pawned in Lombard Street, and the London house came into the possession of money eight months before the bills of exchange made out for these goods were due. And all this passed off smoothly, without interruption or difficulties, so long as the discounting firms found enough money to advance on bills of lading and dock warrants, and to discount the drafts of Indian firms on select firms of Mincing Lane to unlimited amounts.

[This fraudulent procedure remained in vogue so long as the goods from and to India had to sail around the Cape. But since they pass through the Suez Canal this method of creating fictitious capital has lost its foundation, thanks to steam navigation and the shortening of the trip. And when the telegraph reported the stand of the Indian market to the English and that of the English market to the Indian business man on the same day, this method was completely killed. F. E.]

III. The following is from the previously quoted report on Commercial Distress, 1847-48: In the last week of April, 1847, the Bank of England informed the Royal Bank of Liverpool, that it would henceforth reduce its discount business with the latter bank by one-half. This communication had a very disastrous effect, because the payments in Liverpool had lately been made far more in bills of exchange than in cash, and because the merchants, who ordinarily carried much cash money to the bank for the purpose of squaring their notes, had been able to bring only checks of late, which they had received themselves for their cotton and other products. This had assumed large proportions and caused the business difficulty. The endorsed checks, which the bank had to turn into cash for the merchants, had mostly been made out by outsiders, and had so far been balanced generally by the payments received for the products. The checks which the merchants now brought in place of the former cash were bills of exchange for different lengths of time and of different kinds, a considerable number being bank checks for three months from date, the majority being checks for cotton. These bills of exchange, when bank checks, had been endorsed by London bankers, the others were endorsed by merchants in Brasilian, American, Canadian, West Indian, etc., business... The merchants did not draw on one another, but the customers in the home country, who had bought products in Liverpool, covered them by drafts on London banks, or drafts on other firms in London, or on drafts of some one else. The communication of the Bank of England caused a shortening of the running time of checks drawn against sales of foreign products, which used to run frequently longer than three months. (p. 26, 27.)

The period of prosperity in England, from 1844 to 1847 was, as described above, connected with the first great railroad swindle. The above-named report makes the following statements concerning the influence of this swindle on business in general: In April, 1847, nearly all commercial firms had begun to starve their business more or less, by investing a part of their commercial capital in railroads (p. 41.)—Loans were also made by private parties, bankers and insurance companies at a high rate of interest, for instance, at 8% (p. 66). These large advances of these business firms to railroads caused them to take up in their turn too much capital from banks on discount checks, by which to carry on their own business (p. 67.—(Question): Would you say that the payments on railroad stocks contributed much to the pressure which burdened the money market in April and October 1847? (Answer): I believe that they hardly contributed anything to the pressure in April. In my opinion they had rather strengthened than weakened the bankers going on into April, and perhaps even into the summer. For the actual employment of the money followed by no means as rapidly as the deposits; as a result most of the banks had a rather large amount of railroad stocks in their hands in the beginning of the year. [This is corroborated by numerous statements of bankers in C. D. 1848-57.] This gradually melted away in summer and was considerably smaller on December 31. One cause of the pressure in October was the gradual decrease of the railroad funds in the hands of bankers; between April 22, and December 31, the balances of railroads in our hands were reduced by one-third. This effect was produced by railroad deposits in all of Great Britain; they have gradually stripped the banks of deposits (p. 43, 44).—Samuel Gurney (Chief of the ill-famed firm of Overend Gurney 8 Co.) says likewise: In 1846 there was a much greater demand for capital for railways, but it did not raise the rate of interest. There was a condensation of small sums into larger masses, and these larger masses were consumed in our market; so that on the whole the effect was to throw more money on the money market of the city, not so much to take it out.

A. Hodgson, Director of the Liverpool Joint Stock Bank, shows to what extent bills of exchange may form a reserve for bankers: It was our custom to hold at least nine-tenths of all our deposits, and all money received from our customers, in our bill books in the shape of bills of exchange, which fell due from day to day...so much so, that the amount of bills due daily during the time of the crisis almost equaled the amount of demands for payment made on us every day (p. 53).

Speculative Bills.—No. 5092. "By whom were the bills of exchange (against sold cotton) mainly endorsed?"—(R. Gardner, the cotton manufacturer mentioned several times in this work): "By produce jobbers; one trader buys cotton, transfers it to some jobber, draws checks on this jobber, and gets these bills discounted."—No. 5094. "And these bills of exchange go to the Liverpool banks and are discounted by them?"—"Yes, and also by others....Had not this accommodation existed, which was mainly allowed by the Liverpool banks, cotton would have been, in my opinion, from 1½ d to 2 d per pound cheaper last year."—No. 600. "You said that an enormous number of bills of exchange was in circulation, drawn by speculators upon cotton jobbers in Liverpool; does the same apply to your advances on bills of exchange for other colonial products than cotton?"—(A. Hodgson, banker in Liverpool): "It refers to all kinds of colonial products, but most particularly to cotton."—No. 601. "Do you, as a banker, try to keep away from bills of exchange of this sort?"—"Not at all; we regard them as legitimate bills when kept within moderate bounds....This sort of bills is often prolongued."

Swindle in the East Indian and Chinese Market, 1847.—Charles Turner (Chief of one of the first East Indian firms in Liverpool): "We all know the occurrences, which have taken place in the matter of business to Mauritius and similar businesses. The jobbers were accustomed to make advances on goods, not only after their arrival, for the covering of the bills of exchange drawn for these goods, which is quite in order, and advances on bills of lading...they have also made advances on the product before it had been shipped, and in some cases before it had been manufactured. For instance, I had, in one case in Calcutta, bought bills of exchange amounting to 6-7,000 pounds sterling; the proceeds of these goods went to Mauritius in order to assist in planting sugar there; the bills came to England, and more than half of them were protested; then, when the shipments of sugar finally arrived, by which these bills were to have been paid, it was found that this sugar had already been pawned to third parties, before it had been shipped, or even before it had been boiled (p. 78). Now the goods for the East Indian market must be paid to the manufacturer in cash; but this does not mean much, for if the buyer has some credit in London, he draws on London and discounts the drafts in London, where the discount is now low; he pays the manufacturer with the money so obtained...it takes at least twelve months before a shipper of goods to India receives his return shipment...a man with ten or fifteen thousand pounds sterling going into Indian business would secure credit from some London house to a considerable amount; he would give to this house 1% and draw on it with the understanding, that the proceeds of the goods sent to India are to be sent to this London house; but the tacit understanding on both sides is that the London house shall not have to make any advances of cash; in other words, the drafts are prolongued until the return shipments arrive. The bills of exchange are discounted in Liverpool, Manchester, London, some of them are held by Scotch banks" (p. 79).—No. 730. "There is a firm, which recently failed in London; the examination of its books revealed the following condition of affairs: Here is one firm in Manchester, and another in Calcutta; they opened a credit with the London firm for 200,000 pounds sterling; that is, the business friends of this Manchester firm, who sent consignments of goods from Glasgow and Manchester to the firm in Calcutta, drew on the London house up to the sum of 200,000 pounds sterling; at the same time the understanding was, that the Calcutta firm would also draw on the London firm up to the sum of 200,000 pounds sterling; these bills of exchange were sold in Calcutta, other bills of exchange were bought with the proceeds, and these were sent to London in order to enable the firm there to pay the first drafts made by the Glasgow or Manchester firm. In this way this firm sent bills of exchange amounting to 600,000 pounds sterling into the world."—No. 971. "At present, when a firm in Calcutta buys a ship's cargo (for England) and pays for it with its own drafts on its London correspondent, and when the bills of lading are sent here, these bills of lading are used immediately for the purpose of securing advances in Lombard Street; hence they have eight months time in which to make use of the money before their correspondents have to pay the drafts."—

IV. In the year 1848 a secret committee of the Upper House was in session on an investigation of the causes of the crisis of 1847. The testimony of the witnesses before this committee was not published, however, until 1857 (Minutes of Evidence, taken before the Secret Committee of the H. of L. appointed to inquire into the Causes of Distress, etc., 1857; quoted as C. D. 1848-57). Here Mr. Lister, the Director of the Union Bank of Liverpool, testified among other things to the following: 2444. "There was, in the spring of 1847, an unwarranted extension of credit...because business men transferred their capital from their business to railroads and nevertheless wanted to continue their business on the old scale. Every one thought probably at first that he could sell the railroad stocks at a profit and thus replace the money in the business. He found, perhaps, that this was impossible, and then secured credit in his business where he paid cash formerly. This gave rise to an extension of credit."

2500. "These bills of exchange, on which the banks that had accepted them incurred losses, were they bills mainly for corn or for cotton?...They were bills for products of all kinds, corn, cotton and sugar, and products of all sorts. There was at that time nothing, with the exception of oil, perhaps, that did not fall in price."—2506. "A jobber, who accepts a bill of exchange, does not do so without being sufficiently secured, also against a fall in the price of the commodity which serves as a security."

2512. "Two kinds of bills of exchange are drawn for products. To the first kind belongs the original draft, which is made out on the other side on the importer....The drafts which are made out in this way for products are frequently due before the goods arrive. For this reason the merchant who has not enough money when the products arrive, must pawn them to some broker until he can sell them. Then a draft of the other kind is immediately drawn on the broker by the Liverpool merchant, on the strength of those products...it then becomes the business of the banker to ascertain, whether he has those goods and to what extent he has made advances on them. He must convince himself, that the broker has security, in order to make good eventual losses."

2516. "We receive also bills of exchange from foreign countries....Some one buys on the other side a bill of exchange on England, and sends it to some firm in England; we cannot tell by looking at this bill, whether it has been drawn reasonably or unreasonably, whether it represents products or wind."

2533. "You said that foreign products of nearly all kinds are sold at a heavy loss. Do you believe, that this was due to unwarranted speculations in these products?"—"It arose from a very large import, while no adequate consumption existed to take care of it. From all indications the consumption fell off considerably."—2537. "In October...products were almost unsaleable."

How it is that a general scramble for safety is made at the critical stage of a crisis is explained in the same report by an expert of the first order, the worthy and crafty Quaker, Samuel Gurney of Overend Gurney 8 Co.: 1262. "When a panic reigns, a business man does not ask himself, how profitably he can invest his bank notes, or whether he will lose 1 or 2% in the sale of his treasury notes or 3% bonds. Once that he is under the suggestions of fright, he cares nothing about gain or loss; he gets himself into a safe place, the rest of the world may do what it pleases."

V. Concerning the mutual unmasking of two markets Mr. Alexander, a merchant in the East Indian trade, testifies before the Committee of the Lower House on the Bank Acts of 1857 (quoted as B. C. 1857): 4330. "At present, if I invest 6 shillings in Manchester, I get 5 shillings back in India; if I invest 6 shillings in India, I get 5 shillings back in London." In this way the Indian market is exposed by England, and the English by India. And this took place in the summer of 1857, barely ten years after the bitter experience of 1847!

CHAPTER XXVI.

ACCUMULATION OF MONEY-CAPITAL. ITS INFLUENCE ON THE RATE OF INTEREST.

"IN England, a steady accumulation of additional wealth takes place, which has a tendency to assume ultimately the form of money. But next to the desire to acquire money, the most insistent desire is that of disposing of it by some kind of investment bringing interest or profit; for money as money does not bring wealth. Unless, therefore, a gradual and adequate extension of the field of investment takes place simultaneously with this steady accession of additional capital, we must be exposed to periodical accumulations of money seeking investment, which will be of greater or smaller importance according to circumstances. For a long series of years the national debt was the great means of absorbing the superfluous wealth of England. Since it reached its maximum in 1816 and no longer acts as an absorbent, every year a sum of at least 27 millions has been seeking other fields of investment. Moreover, various return payments of capital were made....Enterprises which require a large capital for their execution and make an opening from time to time for the excess of unemployed capital...are absolutely necessary, at least in our country, in order to take care of the periodical accumulations of the superfluous wealth of society, which cannot find room in the ordinary fields of investment." (The Currency Question Reviewed, London, 1845, p. 32.) Of the year 1845 the same work says: "Within a very short period the prices have leaped upward from the lowest point of depression....The 3% national debt stands almost at par....The gold in the vaults of the Bank of England exceeds all former amounts stored away there. Stocks of all kinds are quoted at prices, which are unheard of in almost every case, and the rate of interest has fallen so much, that it is nearly nominal....All these are proofs that another heavy accumulation of unemployed wealth exists in England, that another period of speculative overheating is imminent." (Ibidem, p 35.)

"Although the import of gold is not a reliable indication of profit in foreign commerce, nevertheless a part of this import of gold, in the absence of any other explanation, represents on its face such a profit." (J. G. Hubbard, The Currency and the Country, London, 1843, p. 41.) Take it that in a period of good steady business, profitable prices, and well supplied circulation of money, a crop failure gives rise to an export of 5 millions of gold and to an import of corn to the same amount. The circulation" (meaning, as we shall see immediately, the unemployed money-capital, not the medium of circulation. F. E.) "is reduced by the same amount. The private individuals may still possess means of circulation to the same amount, but the deposits of the merchants in the banks, the outstanding balances of the banks with their money brokers, and the reserves in their treasuries will all be reduced, and the immediate result of this reduction to the amount of the unemployed capital will be a rise in the rate of interest, say from 4% to 5%. Since business is sound, confidence is not shaken, but credit will be valued more highly." (Ibidem, p. 42.) "If the prices of commodities fall universally, the superfluous money flows back to the banks in the form of increased deposits, the plethora of unemployed capital reduces the rate of interest to a minimum, and this condition of affairs lasts until either higher prices or a brisker business call the slumbering money into service, or until it has been absorbed by investment in foreign securities or foreign commodities." (P. 68.)

The following extracts are once more taken from the parliamentarian report on Commercial Distress, 1847-57.—In consequence of the crop failure and famine of 1846-47 a heavy import of means of subsistence was necessary. "Hence a great excess of imports over exports....Hence a considerable drain of money from banks, and an increased demand upon the discount brokers from people who had bills of exchange to discount; the brokers began to inspect the bills of exchange more closely. The accommodation hitherto granted was seriously restricted, and weak houses failed. Those who relied wholly upon credit went to the wall. This increased the already marked unrest; bankers and others found, that they could not be as certain as formerly of transforming their bills of exchange and other securities into bank notes, in order to fulfill their obligations; they restricted the accommodation still more and frequently refused it altogether; they locked their bank notes up in many instances, in order to meet their own future obligations; they preferred not to let go of them at all. The unrest and confusion increased daily, and without the letter of Lord John Russel the general bankruptcy was imminent." (P. 74-75.) The letter of Russel suspended the Bank Acts.—The previously mentioned Charles Turner testifies: "Some firms had large means, but they were not available. Their entire capital was tied up in real estate in Mauritius, or in indigo or sugar factories. Once that they had contracted obligations for 5 or 600,000 pounds sterling, they had no means free for the payment of bills of exchange, and finally it was seen, that they could pay their bills of exchange only by means of credit, and so far as that went." (P. 81.)—The aforesaid S. Gurney said: "At present (1848) there prevails a contraction of business and a great plethora of money.—No. 1763. I do not believe that it was a lack of capital, which drove the rate of interest so high; it was the alarm, the difficulty of obtaining bank notes."

In 1847 England paid at least nine million pounds sterling in gold to foreign countries for imported means of subsistence. Of this amount seven and a half millions came from the bank of England and one and a half million from other sources. (P. 245.)—Morris, the Governor of the Bank of England: "On October 23, 1847, the public funds and the canal and railroad stocks were already depreciated by 114,752,225 million pounds sterling." (P. 312.) The same Morris, when questioned by Lord G. Bentinck: "Is it not known to you that all capital invested in papers and products of all kinds was depreciated in the same way, that raw materials, cotton, silk, wool were sent to the continent at the same cut prices, and that sugar, coffee and tea were auctioned off in forced sales?"—"It was inevitable that the nation should make considerable sacrifices, in order to counteract the drain of gold caused by the enormous imports of means of subsistence."—"Don't you believe that it would have been better to touch the eight million pounds sterling stored in the vaults of the bank, instead of trying to recover the gold with such sacrifices?"—"I do not believe that."—Now to the commentaries on this heroism. Disraeli questions Mr. W. Cotton, the Director and former Governor of the Bank of England. "What was the dividend received by the stockholders of the bank in 1844?"—"It was 7% for that year."—"And the dividend for 1847?"—"Nine per cent."—"Does the bank pay the income tax for its stockholders in the current year?"—"Yes, Sir."—"Did it do so in 1844?"—"No, Sir."84 —"Then this Bank Act (of 1844) worked very much to the advantage of the stockholders....The result is, then, that since the introduction of the new Act the dividend of the stockholders has risen from 7% to 9%, and that the income tax is now also paid by the bank, while formerly it had to be paid by the stockholders?"—"That is quite right."—(No. 4356-4361.)

Concerning the formation of hoards in banks during the crisis of 1847, Mr. Pease, a provincial banker, has the following to say: 4605. "As the bank was compelled to raise its rate of interest more and more, the apprehension grew universally; the rural banks increased the quantities of money in their possession and likewise the amounts of their notes; and many of us, who would ordinarily carry only a few hundred pounds in gold or bank notes, stored up at once thousands in cash boxes and desks, since there was great uncertainty concerning the discount and the possibility of circulating bills of exchange on the market; and consequently a universal accumulation of hoards ensued."—A member of the Committee remarks: 4691. "Accordingly, whatever may have been the cause during the last 12 years, the result was certainly more in favor of the Jew and the money broker than in favor of the productive class in general."

To what extent a money broker exploits times of crisis, is revealed by Tooke: "In the metal ware business of Warwickshire and Staffordshire very many orders were rejected in 1847, because the rate of interest, which the manufacturer had to pay for discounting his bills of exchange, would have more than swallowed his entire profit." (No. 5451.)

Let us now take another report of Parliament, the Report of the Select Committee on Bank Acts, communicated from the Commons to the Lords, 1857 (quoted further along as B. C. 1857). In it Mr. Norman, Director of the Bank of England and a leading light among the champions of the Currency Principle, is questioned as follows:

3635. "You said you were of the opinion, that the rate of interest depends, not on the mass of bank notes, but on the demand and supply of capital. Would you state, what you comprise under the head of capital, outside of bank notes and hard cash?"—"I believe the general definition of capital is: Commodities or services used in production.—3636. "Do you include all commodities in the term capital, when you speak of the rate of interest?"—"All commodities used in production."—3637. "You include all that in the term capital, when you speak of the rate of interest?"—"Yes, Sir. Let us assume that a cotton manufacturer needs cotton for his factory, then he will probably secure it by obtaining an advance from his banker, and with the money so obtained he will go to Liverpool and buy. What he really needs is cotton; he does not need the bank notes or the money except as means of getting the cotton. Or he may need the means to pay his laborers; then he again borrows notes and pays the wages of his laborers with them; and the laborers on their part need food and shelter, and the money is a means of paying for them."—3638. "But interest is paid for this money?"—"Yes, Sir, in the first instance; but take another case. Take it that he buys the cotton on credit, without getting any advance from the bank; then the difference between the price for cash payment and the price on credit at the time when payment is due is the measure of the interest. There would be interest even if no money existed."

This self-complacent rubbish is quite worthy of this pillar of the Currency Principle. First the brilliant discovery, that bank notes or gold are means of buying something, and that they are not borrowed for their own sake. And this is supposed to explain, that the rate of interest is regulated, by what? By the demand and supply of commodities, that were so far known to regulate only the market prices of commodities. But very different rates of interest are compatible with the same market prices of commodities.—But now take another look at this slyness. He hears the correct remark: "But interest is paid for this money?" and this, of course, implies the question: "What has the interest, which the banker receives, who does not deal in commodities at all, to do with these commodities? And do not manufacturers receive money at the same rate of interest, although they invest it in widely different markets, that is, in markets, in which widely different conditions of demand and supply prevail, so far as the commodities used in production are concerned?" And all that this solemn genius has to say in reply to these questions, is that the manufacturer, who buys cotton on credit, pays interest, the measure of which is "The difference between the price for cash payment and the price on credit at the time when payment is due." Vice versa. The prevailing rate of interest, whose regulation the genius Norman is asked to explain, is the measure of the difference between the cash price and the credit price to the time of due payment. First the cotton is to be sold to its cash price, and this is determined by the market price, which is itself regulated by the condition of supply and demand. Say that the price is 1,000 pounds sterling. This concludes the transaction between the manufacturer and the cotton broker, so far as buying and selling is concerned. Now a second transaction is added. This takes place between the lender and the borrower. The value of 1,000 pounds sterling is advanced to the manufacturer in the shape of cotton, and he has to repay it in money, say, in three months. And the interest for 1,000 pounds sterling, determined by the market rate of interest, forms the addition over and above the cash price. The price of cotton is determined by supply and demand. But the price of the advance of the value of cotton, of 1,000 pounds sterling for three months, is determined by the rate of interest. And this fact, that the cotton itself is thus transformed into money-capital, proves to Mr. Norman that interest would exist, even if no money existed. If there were no money at all, there would certainly be no general rate of interest.

There is, in the first place, the vulgar conception of capital as "commodities used in production." So far as these commodities serve as capital, their value as capital compared to their value as commodities is expressed in the profit, which is made out of their productive or mercantile employment. And the rate of profit has under all circumstances something to do with the market price of the bought commodities and their supply and demand, although it is determined besides by circumstances of quite a different kind. And there is no doubt that the rate of interest is generally limited by the rate of profit. But Mr. Norman is precisely asked to tell us how this limit is determined. It is determined by the supply and demand of money-capital as distinguished from the other forms of capital. Now one might ask furthermore: How are the demand and supply of money-capital determined? It is doubtless true, that a tacit connection exists between the supply of commodity-capital and the supply of money-capital, and also that the demand of the industrial capitalist for money-capital is determined by the actual conditions of real production. Instead of giving us information on this point, Norman offers us the sage opinion, that the demand for money-capital is not identical with the demand for money as such, and this wisdom is advanced for no other reason than that behind him. Above Overstone and other Currency prophets always stands the bad conscience, which makes them aware that they are trying to make capital of the mere medium of circulation by the artificial method of legislative interference and to raise the rate of interest.

Now to Lord Overstone, alias Samuel Jones Loyd, who is asked to explain, why he takes 10% for his "money," because the "capital" in the country is so scarce.

3653. "The fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from one of two causes: From a change in the value of capital" [excellent! Value of capital, generally speaking, signifies precisely the rate of interest! A change in the rate of interest is thus made to arise from a change in the rate of interest. The phrase 'value of capital' never signifies anything else theoretically, as we have shown in another place. Or, if Lord Overstone means the rate of profit by the phrase 'value of capital,' then this deep thinker comes back to the position that the rate of interest is regulated by the rate of profit!]" or from a change in the sum of money available in the country. All great fluctuations of the rate of interest, great either in duration or in the extent of the fluctuations, may be clearly traced to changes in the value of capital. There can be no more striking illustration of this fact than the rise of the rate of interest in 1847 and again in the two last years (1855-56); the lesser fluctuations of the rate of interest, which arise from a change in the quantity of the available money, are small in duration and extension. They are frequent, and the more frequent they are, the more effectively they accomplish their purpose." This purpose is no other than that of making bankers like Overstone rich. Friend Samuel Gurney expresses himself very naively on this point before the Committee of Lords, C. D. 1848. "Are you of the opinion, that the great fluctuations of the rate of interest, which took place last year, were advantageous to the bankers and money brokers, or not?"—"I believe they were advantageous to the money brokers. All fluctuations of business are advantageous to the knowing men."—1325. "Should not the banker ultimately lose through the high rate of interest owing to the pauperisation of his best customers?"—"No, Sir, I do not think that this result prevails to any appreciable degree."—There you can see what talk will do.

We shall recur to the question of the influence of the quantity of available money on the rate of interest later on. But we must note right here that Overstone once again takes one thing for another in this case. The demand for money-capital in 1847 (there was no worry on account of scarcity of money, or the "quantity of available money," as he called it, before October) increased for various reasons, such as the dearness of corn, rising cotton prices, unsaleable sugars through overproduction, railroad speculation and slumps, overcrowding of foreign markets with cotton goods, the above described forced export to and import from India for the purpose of mere swindling with bills of exchange. All these things, the over-production in industries as well as the underproduction in agriculture, in other words, widely different causes, led to an increased demand for money-capital in the shape of credit and money. The increased demand for money-capital had its causes in the course of the productive process itself. But whatever may have been the causes, it was the demand for money-capital which brought about the rise in the rate of interest, in the value of money-capital. If Overstone means to say that the value of money-capital rose because it rose, he is simply repeating himself. But if he means by "value of capital" a rise in the rate of profit which caused a rise in the rate of interest, we shall see immediately that this was not the case here. The demand for money-capital, and consequently the "value of capital," may rise even though the profit may decrease; as soon as the relative supply of money-capital decreases, its "value" increases. Overstone wants to establish the fact that the crisis of 1847, and the high rate of interest going with it, had nothing to do with the "quantity of available money," that is, with the regulations of the Bank Acts of 1844 which he had inspired; but as a matter of fact this crisis had something to do with these things, so far as the fear of exhausting the bank reserve—a creation of Overstone—added a money panic to the crisis of 1847-48, But this is not the main point here. There was a dearth of money-capital, caused by the excessive volume of operations compared to the available means and brought to an eruption by disturbances in the process of production due to a crop failure, overcapitalisation of railroads, over-production, particularly of cotton goods, swindling practices in the Indian and Chinese business, speculation, superfluous imports of sugar, etc. What the people, who had bought corn at 120 shillings per quarter, lacked when it fell to 60 shillings, were the 60 shillings which they had paid too much and the corresponding credit for that amount in the Lombard advance on corn. It was by no means the lack of bank notes that prevented them from transforming their corn into money at its old price of 120 shillings. The same things applied to those who had bought sugar to such an excess that it became almost unsaleable. It applies likewise to the gentlemen who had tied up their floating capital in railroads and relied on credit to make up for it in their "legitimate" business. To Overstone all this is expressed in "a moral sense of the enhanced value of his money." But this enhanced value of money-capital had its direct counterpart on the other side in the shape of the depreciated money-value of the real capital (commodity-capital and productive capital). The value of capital in one form rose, because the value of capital in the other forms fell. Overstone, however, seeks to identify these two kinds of value of different sorts of capital in one sole value of capital in general, and he does it by opposing both of them to a scarcity of the medium of circulation, of available money. But the same amount of money-capital may be loaned with very different quantities of medium of circulation.

Take, for instance, his example of the year 1847. The official bank rate of interest stood at 3 to 3½% in January; 4 to 4½% in February. In March it was generally 4%. April (panic) 4 to 7½%. May 5 to 5½%. June on the whole 5%. July 5%. August 5 to 5½%. September 5% with trifling variations of 5¼, 5½, 6%. October 5, 5½, 7%. November 7 to 10%. December 7 to 5%.—In this case the interest rose, because the profits decreased and the money-values of commodities fell enormously. If Overstone says here that the rate of interest rose in 1847, because the value of capital rose, he cannot mean anything else by "value of capital" but the value of money-capital, and this is precisely the rate of interest and nothing else. But later the cloven hoof appears and the value of capital is identified with the rate of profit.

As for the high rate of interest in 1856, Overstone was indeed ignorant of the fact that this was partially a symptom of the supremacy of credit jobbers, who paid interest, not from their profit, but with the capital of others; he maintained even a few months before the crisis of 1857 that "business is quite sound."

He testifies furthermore: 3722. "The conception that the business profit is destroyed by raising the rate of interest is highly erroneous. In the first place, a rise in the rate of interest is rarely of long duration; in the second place, if it is of long duration and considerable, it is in the nature of things a rise in the value of capital, and why does the value of capital rise? Because the rate of profit has risen."—Here, then, we learn at last, what the meaning of "value of capital" is. We remark, by the way, that the rate of profit may hold itself at a high level for a long time, and yet the industrial capitalist's profit may fall and the rate of interest rise to a point where it swallows the greater portion of the profit.

3724. "The raise of the rate of interest was a result of the enormous expansion of business in our country, and of the great rise in the rate of profit; and if complaint is made, that the raised rate of interest destroys these two things, which were its own cause, it is a logical absurdity, which one does not know how to characterise."—This is just as logical as though he had said: The increased rate of profit was the result of the raise of prices by speculation, and if complaint is made, that the raise of prices destroys its own cause, namely speculation, it is a logical absurdity, etc. That anything can ultimately destroy its own cause, is a logical absurdity only for the usurer, who is in love with the high rate of interest. The greatness of the Romans was the cause of their conquests, and their conquests destroyed their greatness. Wealth is the cause of luxury, and luxury has a destructive influence upon wealth. The wiseacre! The idiocy of the present bourgeois world cannot be characterised more markedly than by the respect, which the "logic" of the millionaire, of this dunghill aristocrat, commanded in all England. By the way, even if high profits and an expansion of business may be the cause of a high rate of interest, a high rate of interest is for that reason by no means a cause of high profit. The question is precisely, whether such a high rate of interest (as was seen actually during the crisis) did not continue, or even reach its climax, after the high rate of profit had long gone the way of the flesh.

3718. "As for a great increase of the rate of discount, it is a circumstance, which arises entirely from the increased value of capital, and the cause of this increased value of capital, I believe, may be discovered by every one with perfect clearness. I have already mentioned the fact, that during the 13 years, which this Bank Act was in force, the commerce of England grew from 45 to 120 million pounds. Consider all the events implied by this brief statement in figures, consider the enormous demand for capital, which such a gigantic increase of commerce carries with it, and consider at the same time, the natural source of this great demand, namely the annual savings of the country, have been consumed during the last three or four years by unprofitable expenditures for purposes of war. I confess, I am surprised, that the rate of interest is not much higher; or in other words, I am surprised, that the shortage of capital in consequence of these gigantic operations is not much more stringent, than you have found it to be."

What a wonderful mixture of words on the part of our logician of usury! Here he is again with his increased value of capital! He seems to imagine, that on one side this enormous expansion of the process of reproduction took place, an accumulation of real capital, and that on the other side a "capital" existed, for which an "enormous demand" arose, in order to accomplish this gigantic increase of commerce! Was not this enormous increase of production itself this increase of capital, and if it created a demand, did it not also create the supply, including an increased supply of money-capital? If the rate of interest rose so high, it did so merely because the demand for money-capital increased still more rapidly than its supply, which means, in other words, that the expansion of industrial production carried with it a greater volume of its transactions on a credit basis. That is to say, the actual industrial expansion caused an increased demand for "accommodation," and this last demand is evidently what our banker means by the "enormous demand for capital." It was surely not the expansion of this mere demand for capital, which raised the export business from 45 to 120 million pounds sterling. And again, what does Overstone mean when he says, that the annual savings of the country swallowed by the Crimean War form the natural source of the supply for this great demand? In the first place, how did England get its accumulations from 1792 to 1815, which was a far greater war than the little Crimean War? In the second place, if the natural source dries up, from what source did capital flow then? It is well known that England did not ask for any loans from foreign countries. But if there is an artificial source aside from the natural one, it would be a very peculiar method for a nation to utilise the natural source in war and the artificial one in business. But if only the old money-capital was available, could it double its effectiveness through a high rate of interest? Mr. Overstone thinks evidently that the annual savings of the country (which were supposed to have been consumed in this case) are converted only into money-capital. But if no real accumulation, that is, no real expansion of production and augmentation of the means of production, took place, what good would the accumulation of debtor's claims in money on this production do?

The increase in the "value of capital," which follows from a high rate of profit, is mistaken by Overstone for an increase, which follows from a greater demand for money-capital. This demand may increase for reasons, which are quite independent of the rate of profit. He quotes himself some examples, which show that it rose in 1847 as a result of the depreciation of real capital. He means by the value of capital now real capital now money-capital, just as it may suit his purpose.

The dishonesty of our banking lord, and his narrow minded banker's point of view, which he aggravates by posing as a schoolmaster, are further revealed by the following: 3728. "You said, that in your opinion the rate of discount is of no particular significance for the merchant; will you kindly state what you regard as an ordinary rate of profit?"—Mr. Overstone declares that it is "impossible" to answer this question.—3729. "Suppose the average rate of profit to be from 7 to 10%; in that case, a change in the rate of discount from 2% to 7 or 8% must appreciably affect the rate of profit, must it not?" [This question confounds the rate of industrial profit with the average rate of profit and overlooks the fact, that this last rate of profit is the common source of interest and industrial profit. The rate of interest may leave the average rate of profit untouched, but not the industrial profit.] Overstone replied: "In the first place, business men will not pay a rate of discount, which takes away most of their profits beforehand; they will rather close up their business." [Yes, if they can do so without ruining themselves. So long as their profit is large, they pay the discount, because they are willing, and when profit is low, they pay the discount because they must.] "What does discount mean? Why does a man discount a bill of exchange?...Because he desires to obtain a larger capital." [Hold on! Because he desires to anticipate the return of his tied-up capital in the form of money and to avoid the stopping of business; because he must meet due payments. He demands additional capital only when business is good, or when he speculates on another man's capital, though business may be bad. The discount is by no means a mere device to expand business.] "And why does he wish to obtain command of a greater capital? Because he wants to invest this capital; and why does he want to invest this capital? Because it is profitable; but it would not be profitable for him, if the discount were to swallow his profit."

This self-complacent logician assumes that bills of exchange are discounted only for the purpose of expanding business, and that business is expanded, because it is profitable. The first assumption is wrong. The ordinary business man discounts, in order to anticipate the money-form of his capital and thereby to keep his process of reproduction in flow; not in order to expand his business or secure additional capital, but in order to balance the credit which he gives by the credit which he takes. And if he wants to expand his business on credit, the discounting of bills will do him little good, because it is merely the transformation of capital, which he has already in his hands, from one form into another; he will rather take up a direct loan for a long time. Only the credit swindler will get his fraudulent bills of exchange discounted for the purpose of expanding his business, in order to cover one rotten business by another; not for the purpose of making profits, but of getting possession of the capital of another man.

After Mr. Overstone has thus identified discount with the borrowing of additional capital [instead of identifying it with the transformation of bills of exchange representing capital into money], he beats at once a retreat, when the thumbscrews are applied to him.—3730. "Must not merchants, once that they are engaged in business, continue their operations for a certain period of time in spite of a temporary increase in the rate of interest?"—Overstone: "There is no doubt, that in any single transaction, if a man can get hold of capital at a low rate of interest instead of a high rate of interest, taking the matter from this narrow point of view, that it is pleasant for him."—But it is a very wide point of view, which enables Mr. Overstone now to understand by "capital" all of a sudden only his banker's capital, and to assume that the man, who discounts a bill of exchange with him, is a man without capital, just because his capital exists in the form of commodities, or because the money-form of his capital is a bill of exchange, which Mr. Overstone converts into another money-form.

3732. "With reference to the Bank Act of 1844, can you state what was the approximate relation of the rate of interest to the gold reserve of the bank; is it true, that, if the gold in the bank amounted to 9 or 10 millions, the rate of interest was 6 or 7%, and when it amounted to 16 millions, the rate of interest was about 3 or 4%?" [The cross-examiner wants to compel him to explain the rate of interest, so far as it is influenced by the amount of gold in the bank, by the rate of interest, so far as it is influenced by the value of capital.]—"I do not say, that this is the case...but if it is, then we should in my opinion resort to still more stringent measures than those of 1844; for if it should be true, that the greater the quantity of gold the lower the rate of interest, then we should go to work, according to this view of the matter, and increase the gold reserve to an unlimited amount, and then we should reduce the rate of interest to zero."—The cross-examiner Cayley, unmoved by this poor joke, continues: 3733. "If this were so, assuming that 5 millions in gold were returned to the bank, then in the course of the next six months the gold reserve would amount to 16 millions, and assuming that the rate of interest should fall thus to 3 or 4%, how could one maintain, that the fall in the rate of profit was due to a great slump in business?"—"I said the recent great increase in the rate of interest, not the fall in the rate of interest, is intimately connected with the great expansion of business."—But what Cayley says is this: If a rise of the rate of interest together with a contraction of the gold reserve, is an indication of an expansion of business, then a fall of the rate of interest together with an expansion of the gold reserve, must be an indication of a contraction of business. Overstone has no answer to this.—3736. Question: "I note that Your Lordship said that money is an instrument for securing capital." [This is precisely a mistake, this conception of money as an instrument; it is a form of capital.] "During a decrease of the gold reserve (of the Bank of England) does not the difficulty consist rather in the fact that capitalists cannot get any money?"—Overstone: "No, it is not the capitalists, it is the non-capitalists, who seek to obtain money, in order to carry on the business of people, who are not capitalists."—Here he declares point blank, that manufacturers and merchants are not capitalists, and that the capital of the capitalist is only money-capital.—3737. "Are the people who draw bills of exchange no capitalists?"—"The people who draw bills of exchange are probable capitalists and probably not."—Here he is stuck.

He is then asked, whether the bills of exchange of merchants do not represent the commodities, which they have sold or shipped. He denies, that these bills represent the value of the commodities just exactly as a bank note represents gold. (3740 and 41.) This is a little insolent.

3742. "Is not the purpose of the merchant that of obtaining money?"—"No; to obtain money is not the purpose of drawing a bill of exchange; to obtain money is the purpose of discounting the bill."—The drawing of bills of exchange is a conversion of commodities into a form of credit-money, just as the discounting of bills of exchange is the conversion of credit-money into other money, namely bank notes. At any rate Mr. Overstone admits here, that the purpose of discounting is to obtain money. A while ago he said that discounting was a means, not of transforming capital from one form into another, but of obtaining additional capital.

3742. "What is the great desire of the business world under the pressure of a panic, such as occurred according to your testimony in 1825, 1837 and 1839; do they want to secure possession of capital or of legal tender money?"—"They want to obtain command of capital, in order to continue their business."—Their purpose is to obtain means of payment for due bills of exchange on themselves, on account of the prevailing lack of credit, so that they may not have to get rid of their commodities below price. If they have no capital at all themselves, then they receive with the means of payment at the same time capital, because they receive value without giving an equivalent. The desire to obtain money as such consists always in the wish to transform value from the form of commodities or creditor's claims into money. Hence also, aside from crisis, the great difference between the borrowing of capital and discount, the last being a mere transformation of money claims from one shape into another, or into real money.

[I take the liberty, in my capacity of editor, to interpolate a few remarks here.]

With Norman as well as Loyd-Overstone the banker always figures as a man, who advances "capital" to others, and his customers appear as people, who demand "capital" from him. Thus Overstone says, that people have bills of exchange discounted through him, "because they wish to obtain capital" [3729], and that it is pleasant for such people to "obtain command of capital" at a "low rate of interest" [3730]. "Money is an instrument for obtaining capital" [3736], and during a panic the great desire of the business world is to "obtain command of capital" [3743]. All the confusion of Loyd and Overstone notwithstanding they reveal at least the fact that they call the thing, which the banker gives to his customer, capital, and that this is a thing formerly not in the possession of the customer, but advanced to him in addition to the one already in his hands.

The banker has become so well accustomed to figure as the distributor [through loans] of the social capital available in the form of money, that he considers every function, by which he hands out money, as loaning. All the money which he pays out appears to him as a loan. If the money is directly loaned, it is literally true. If it is invested in the discounting of bills, then it is in fact advanced by himself until the bill becomes due. In this way the conception grows upon him that he cannot make any payments without loaning money to somebody. And these are loans, not merely in the sense that every investment of money, which has for its object the taking of interest or profit, is economically considered an advance of money, which the owner of money in his capacity as a private individual makes to himself in his capacity as an entrepreneur. They are loans in the definite sense that the banker loans to his customer a sum of money, which constitutes an addition to the capital already held by him.

It is this conception, which, transferred from the banker's office to political economy, has created the confusing controversy, whether the thing, which the banker loans to his customer in the shape of cash money, is capital or mere money, medium of circulation or currency. In order to decide this fundamentally simple controversy, we must place ourselves in the position of a customer of a bank. It depends what this customer wants and receives.

If the bank allows to its customer a loan on his own private credit, without any security on his part, then the matter is clear. He certainly receives in that case an advance of a definite amount in addition to the capital so far invested by him. He receives this advance in the form of money; it is not merely money, but money-capital.

If on the other hand, he receives an advance on depositing securities, etc., then this is money paid to him on condition that he pay it back, but it is not capital. For the securities also represent capital, and at that of a larger amount than the money advance upon them. The recipient of the advance receives less capital-value than he deposits as a security; hence the advance is not additional capital for him. He does not agree to this transaction, because he needs capital—for he has this in his securities—but because he needs money. Therefore we have in this case an advance of money, not of capital.

If the loan is granted by discounting bills, then even the form of an advance disappears. The transaction is then purely one of buying and selling. The bill passes by endorsement into the possession of the bank, while the money passes into the possession of the customer. There is no question of any return payment on either side. If a customer buys with a bill of exchange or some similar instrument of credit cash money, it is no more an advance than it is if he buys cash money with other commodities, such as cotton, iron, corn. Still less can this be called an advance of capital. Every purchase and sale between merchant and merchant transfers capital. But an advance of capital takes place only then, when a bill is a fraudulent one, which does not represent any commodities at all, and no banker will take such a bill, if he is aware of its nature. In the regular discounting business the customer of the bank does not, therefore, receive any advance, either of capital or of money, but he receives money for sold commodities.

The cases, in which the customer demands capital from a bank and receives it are thus very plainly distinguished from those, in which he merely receives an advance of money or buys it from the bank. And since particularly Mr. Loyd Overstone very rarely advanced any funds without collateral [he was the banker of my firm in Manchester] it is very evident that his beautiful descriptions of the great quantities of capital loaned by the generous bankers to the manufacturers in need of capital are gross inventions.

In chapter XXXII Marx says practically the same thing: "The demand for means of payment is a mere demand for convertibility into money, so far as merchants and producers have good securities to offer; it is a demand for money-capital whenever there is no collateral, so that an advance of means of payment gives to them not only the form of money, but also the equivalent, whatever be its form, with which to make payment."—And again in chapter XXXIII: "Under a developed system of credit, when the money is concentrated in the hands of the bankers, it is they, at least nominally, who make advances of money. This advance does not refer to the money already in circulation. It is an advance made to circulation, not an advance of capital circulated by it."—Likewise Mr. Chapman, who ought to know, corroborates this conception of the discounting business: B. C. 1857: "The banker has the bill, the banker has bought the bill." Evid. Question 5139.

We shall return to this subject in chapter XXVIII.—F. E.] 3744. "Will you kindly describe, what you really mean by the term capital?"—Overstone: "Capital consists of various commodities, by means of which trade is carried on; there is a fixed capital and there is a circulating capital. Your ships, your docks, your wharves are fixed capital, your means of subsistence, your clothes, etc. are circulating capital."

3745. "Has the drain of gold to foreign countries injurious consequences of England?"—"Not so long as one combines this term with a rational meaning." [Then follows the old Ricardian theory of money]..."in the natural condition of things the money of the world distributes itself among the various countries of the world in certain proportions; these proportions are such, that with such a distribution [of money] the commerce between any one country on one side and all other countries on the other side is one of mere exchanges; but there are disturbing influences, which affect this distribution from time to time, and when these influences arise, a portion of the money of a given country flows off to other countries." 3746. "You are now using the term 'money'. If I understood you correctly on former occasions, you called this a loss of capital."—"What was it that I called a loss of capital?"—3747. "The export of gold."—"No, I did not say that. If you treat gold as capital, then it is doubtless a loss of capital; it is a giving away of a certain portion of precious metal, of which the world money consists."—3748. "Did you not say before that a change in the rate of discount is a mere indication of a change in the value of capital?"—"Yes."—3749. "And that the rate of discount in general changes with the gold reserve in the Bank of England?"—"Yes, but I have already stated that the fluctuations of the rate of interest, which arise from a change in the quantity of money" [so this is what he calls the quantity of gold actually existing] "are very significant...."

3750. "Then do you mean to say that a decrease of capital has taken place, when a longer, but still temporary, raise of the discount above the ordinary quotation has taken place?"—"A decrease in a certain sense of the word. The relation between capital and the demand for it has changed; but it may be only through an increased demand, not through a decrease in the quantity of capital."—

[But capital was for him precisely money or gold, and a little before that he had explained the rise of the rate of interest by a rise of the rate of profit, which was due to an expansion, not to a contraction of business or capital.]

3751. "What kind of capital is it that you have particularly in mind here?"—"That depends entirely on what sort of a capital that every one needs. It is the capital which a nation has at its disposal in order to carry on its business, and if this business is doubled, a great increase must occur in the demand for that capital with which it is to be carried on." [This shrewd banker doubles first the business and then the demand for capital with which it is to be doubled. He never sees anything else but his customer, who asks Mr. Loyd for more capital by which to double the volume of his business.]—"Capital is like any other commodity;" [but according to Mr. Lloyd capital is nothing else but the totality of commodities] "it changes its price" [that is, the commodities change their price twice, one as commodities and the second time as capital] "according to supply and demand."

3752. "The fluctuations in the rate of discount are in a general way connected with the fluctuations of the gold reserve in the vaults of the bank. Is this the capital to which you refer?"—"No."—3753. "Can you give an example, showing when a great supply of capital was accumulated in the Bank of England and at the same time the rate of discount stood high?"—"In the Bank of England it is not capital that is accumulated, but money."—3754. "You testified that the rate of interest depends on the quantity of capital; will you kindly state, what kind of capital you mean, and whether you can quote an example, where a great supply of gold was held in the bank and at the same time the rate of interest was high?"—"It is very probable" [aha!] "that the accumulation of gold in a bank may coincide with a low rate of interest, because a period of low demand for capital" [namely money-capital; the time to which reference is made here, 1844 and 1845, was a period of prosperity] "is a period, in which naturally the means or instrument, by which capital is commanded, can accumulate."—3755. "You think, then, that no connection exists between the rate of discount and the quantity of gold in the bank vaults?"—"A connection may exist, but it is not a connection on principle;" [but his Bank Act of 1844 made it precisely a principle of the Bank of England to regulate the rate of interest by the quantity of gold in its possession] "there may be a coincidence of time,"—3758. "Do you intend to say that the difficulty of the merchants in this country, during times of scarcity of money due to a high rate of interest consists of obtaining capital, and not in obtaining money?"—"You are throwing together two things, which I do not bring together in this form; the difficulty consists in getting capital, and it also consists in getting money....The difficulty of obtaining money, and the difficulty of obtaining capital, is the same difficulty considered at two different stages of its development."—Here the fish is caught once more. The first difficulty is to discount a bill of exchange, or to obtain a loan on security of commodities. It is the difficulty of converting capital, or a commercial equivalent for capital, into money. And this difficulty expresses itself, among other things, in a high rate of interest. But after the money has been obtained, in what does the second difficulty consist if it is merely a question of paying, has any one any difficulty in getting rid of his money? And if it is a question of buying, where has any one ever had any difficulty in times of crisis in buying anything? Supposing, for the sake of argument, that this should refer to the specific case of a dearth in corn, cotton, etc., this difficulty should become apparent only in the price of these commodities, not in that of money-capital, that is, not in the rate of interest; but the difficulty, so far as it refers to the price of commodities, is overcome by the fact that our man now has the money to buy them.

3760. "But a higher rate of discount is an increased difficulty of obtaining money, is it not?"—"It is an increased difficulty of obtaining money, but it is not the money, the possession of which is essential; it is only the form" [and this form brings profits into the pockets of the banker] "in which the increased difficulty of obtaining capital presents itself under the complicated relations of a civilised condition."

3763. Overstone's reply: "The banker is the middle man, who receives on one side deposits, and on the other side uses these deposits by entrusting them, in the form of capital, to the hand of persons, who etc."

Here we have at last what he calls capital. He converts money into capital by "entrusting" it, or, less euphemistically, by loaning it out at interest.

After Mr. Overstone has stated, that a change in the rate of discount is not essentially connected with a change in the quantity of gold reserve in the bank, or in the quantity of available money, but that there is at best only a coincidence in time, he repeats:

3804. "If the money in the country is reduced by export, its value rises, and the Bank of England must adapt itself to this change in the value of money;" [that is, the value of money as capital, in other words, the rate of interest, for the value of money as money, compared with commodities, remains the same] "this is technically expressed by the words, that it raises the rate of interest."

3819. "I never throw the two together." Meaning money and capital, for the simple reason, that he never distinguishes them.

3834. "The very large sum, which had to be paid out for the necessary subsistence of the country [for corn in 1847] and which was, indeed, capital."

3841. "The fluctuations in the rate of discount have doubtless a very close connection to the condition of the gold reserve [of the Bank of England], for the condition of the gold reserve is the indicator of the increase or decrease of the quantity of money existing in a country; and in proportion as the money in a country increases or decreases, the value of money falls or rises, and the bank rate of discount will adapt itself to that."—Here, then, he admits what he denied once for all in No. 3755-3842. "There is a close connection between the two." Meaning between the quantity of gold in the issue department and the reserve of notes in the banking department. Here he explains the change in the rate of interest by the change in the quantity of money. But what he says is wrong. The reserve may decrease, because the circulating money in the country may increase. This is the case, when the public takes more notes and the metal reserve does not decrease. But in that case the rate of interest rises, because then the banking capital of the Bank of England is limited by the Acts of 1844. But he dare not mention this, since this law provides, that these two departments shall not have anything in common.

3859. "A high rate of profit will always create a great demand for capital; a great demand for capital will raise its value."—Here, we have at last the connection between a high rate of profit and a demand for capital, as Overstone conceives it. Now, a high rate of profit prevailed in 1844-45, for instance, in the cotton industry, because raw cotton was and remained cheap while the demand for cotton goods was strong. The value of capital [and according to a previous statement Overstone calls capital that which every one needs in his business], in the present case the value of raw cotton, was not increased for the manufacturer. Now the high rate of profit may have induced some cotton manufacturer to take up money for the expansion of his business. Thereby the demand for money-capital rose, and nothing else.

3889. "Gold may be money or not, just as paper may be a bank note or not."

3896. "Do I understand you correctly, then, that you abandon the statement, which you applied in 1840, to the effect that fluctuations in the circulating notes of the Bank of England should be governed by the fluctuations in the quantity of the gold reserve?"—"I abandon it in so far...that according to the present condition of our knowledge we must add to the circulating notes those other notes, which are deposited in the bank reserve of the Bank of England."—This is superlative. The arbitrary provision, that the bank may make out as many paper notes as it has gold in the treasury and 14 millions more, implies, of course, that its issue of notes fluctuates with the fluctuations of the gold reserve. But since "the present condition of our knowledge" shows clearly, that the mass of notes, which the bank can manufacture according to this (and which the issue department transfers to the banking department), and which circulating between the two departments of the Bank of England and fluctuate with the fluctuations of its gold reserve, does not determine the circulation of bank notes outside of the walls of the Bank of England, and this last circulation becomes a matter of indifference for the administration of the bank, and the circulation between the two departments of the bank, which shows its difference from the real circulation in the reserve, becomes alone essential. For the outside world this internal circulation is significant only, because the reserve indicates, how close the bank is getting to the legal maximum of its issue of notes, and how much the customers of the bank can still receive from the banking department.

The following is a brilliant example of Overstone's bad faith:

4243. "Does the quantity of capital fluctuate, in your own opinion, to such an extent from one month to another, that its value is changed thereby in the way that we have observed during the last years in the fluctuations of the rate of discount?"—"The proportion between demand and supply of capital may undoubtedly fluctuate even in short intervals....If France announces to-morrow, that it will take up a very large loan, it will undoubtedly cause at once a great change in the value of money, that is, the value of capital, in England."

4245. "If France announces, that it will suddenly need 30 millions worth of commodities for some purpose or other, a great demand will arise for capital, to use the more scientific and simpler expression,"

4246. "The capital, which France might want to buy with its loan, is one thing; the money, with which France buys this, is another thing; is it the money, which changes its value, or not?"—"We are coming back to the old question, and that, I believe, is better suited for the study room of a scientist than for this committee room."—And with this he retires, but not into the study room.85

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE ROLE OF CREDIT IN CAPITALIST PRODUCTION.

The general remarks, which the credit system so far elicited from us, were the following:

I. Its necessary development, for the purpose of procuring the compensation of the rate of profit, or the movements of this compensation, upon which the entire capitalist production rests.

II. Reduction of the cost of circulation.

1) One of the principal expenses of the circulation is money itself, so far as its represents value itself. It is economized by credit in three ways.

A. It is entirely eliminated in a large portion of the transactions.

B. The circulation of the circulating medium is accelerated.86 This coincides partly with the statement to be made under 2). On one hand, the acceleration is technical; that is, with the same number and quantity of actual transfers of commodities for consumption, a smaller quantity of money or tokens of money performs the same service. This is connected with the technique of the banking business. On the other hand, credit accelerates the velocity of the circulation of money.

C. Replacement of gold money by paper.

2) Acceleration, by credit, of the individual phases of circulation or of the metamorphoses of commodities, and with it an acceleration of the process of reproduction in general. (On the other hand credit permits keeping the acts of buying and selling farther apart and thus serves as a basis for speculation.) Contraction of the reserve funds, which may be studied from two sides; on one side as a reduction of the circulating medium, on the other as a reduction of that part of capital, which must always exist in the form of money.87

III. Formation of stock companies. By means of these:

1) An enormous expansion of the scale of production and enterprises, which were impossible for individual capitals. At the same time such enterprises as were formerly carried on by governments are socialised.
2) Capital, which rests on a socialised mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and labor-powers, is here directly endowed with the form of social capital (a capital directly associated individuals) as distinguished from private capital, and its enterprises assume the form of social enterprises as distinguished from individual enterprises. It is the abolition of capital as private property within the boundaries of capitalist production itself.
3) Transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into a mere manager, an administrator of other people's capital, and of the owners of capital into mere owners, mere money-capitalists. Even if the dividends, which they receive, include the interest and profits of enterprise, that is, the total profit (for the salary of the manager is, or is supposed to be, a mere wage of a certain kind of skilled labor, the price of which is regulated in the labormarket, like that of any other labor), this total profit is henceforth received only in the form of interest, that is, in the form of a mere compensation of the ownership of capital, which is now separated from its function in the actual process of reproduction in the same way, in which this function, in the person of the manager, is separated from the ownership of capital. The profit now presents itself (and not merely that portion of it, which derives its justification as interest from the profit of the borrower) as a mere appropriation of the surplus-labor of others, arising from the transformation of means of production into capital, that is, from its alienation from its actual producer, from its antagonism as another's property opposed to the individuals actually at work in production, from the manager down to the last day laborer.

In the stock companies the function is separated from the ownership of capital, and labor, of course, is entirely separated from the ownership of means of production and of surplus-labor. This result of the highest development of capitalist production is a necessary transition to the reconversion of capital into the property of the producers, no longer as the private property of individual producers, but as the common property of associates, as social property outright. On the other hand it is a transition to the conversion of all functions in the process of reproduction, which still remain connected with capitalist private property, into mere functions of the associated producers, into social functions.

Before we proceed any further, we call attention to the following fact, which is economically important: Since profit here assumes purely the form of interest, enterprises of this sort may still be successful, if they yield only interest, and this is one of the causes, which stem the fall of the rate of profit, since these enterprises, in which the constant capital is so enormous compared to the variable, do not necessarily come under the regulation of the average rate of profit.

[Since Marx wrote the above, new forms of industrial enterprises have developed, which represent the second and third degree of stock companies. The daily increasing speed, with which production may to-day be intensified on all fields of great industry, is offset on the other hand by the ever increasing slowness, with which the markets for these increased products expand. What the great industries turn out in a few months, can scarcely be absorbed by the markets in years. Add to this the system of protective tariffs, by which every industrial country shuts itself off from all others, particularly from England, and which increases home production still more by artificial means. The results are a chronic overproduction, depressed prices, falling or disappearing profits; in short, the long cherished freedom of competition has reached the end of its tether and is compelled to announce its own palpable bankruptcy. This is shown by the fact, that the great captains of industry of a certain line meet for the joint regulation of production by means of a kartel. A committee determines the quantity to be produced by each establishment and distributes ultimately the incoming orders. In some cases even international kartels were formed temporarily, for instance, one uniting the English and German iron producers. But even this form of socialisation did not suffice. The antagonism of interests between the individual firms broke through the agreement quite frequently and restored competition. This led in some lines, where the scale of production permitted it, to the concentration of the entire production of this line in one great stock company under one joint management. In America this has been accomplished several times; in Europe the greatest illustration is so far the United Alkali Trust, which has brought the entire Alkali production of the British into the hands of one single business firm. The former owners of the individual works, more than thirty, have received the tax value of their entire establishment in shares of stock, totalling about 5 million pounds sterling, which represent the fixed capital of the trust. The technical management remains in the same hands, but the business management is centralised in the hands of the general management. The floating capital, amounting to about one million pounds, was offered to the public for subscription. The total capital is, therefore, 6 million pounds sterling. In this way competition in this line, which forms the basis of the entire chemical industry, has been replaced in England by monopoly, and the future expropriation of this line by the whole of society, the nation, has been well prepared.—F. E.]

This is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within capitalist production itself, a self-destructive contradiction, which represents on its face a mere phase of transition to a new form of production. It manifests its contradictory nature by its effects. It establishes a monopoly in certain spheres and thereby challenges the interference of the state. It reproduces a new aristocracy of finance, a new sort of parasites in the shape of promoters, speculators and merely nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by means of corporation juggling, stock jobbing, and stock speculation. It is private production without the control of private property.

IV. Aside from the stock company business, which represents an abolition of capitalist private industry on the basis of the capitalist system itself and destroys private industry in proportion as it expands and seizes new spheres of production, credit offers to the individual capitalist, or to him who is regarded as a capitalist, absolute command of the capital of others and the property of others, within certain limits, and thereby of the labor of others.88 A command of social capital, not individual capital of his own gives him command of social labor. The capital itself, which a man really owns, or is supposed to own by public opinion, becomes purely a basis for the superstructure of credit. This is true particularly of wholesale commerce, through whose hands the greatest portion of the social product passes. All standards of measurement, all excuses which are more or less justified under capitalist production, disappear here. What the speculating wholesale merchant risks is social property, not his own. Equally stale becomes the phrase concerning the origin of capital from saving, for what he demands is precisely that others shall save for him. [In this way all France saved recently one and a half billion francs for the Panama Canal swindlers. In fact the entire Panama swindle is here correctly described, fully twenty years before it happened.—F. E.] The other phrase of the abstention is slapped in the face by his luxury, which now becomes a means of credit by itself. Conceptions, which still have some meaning on a less developed stage of capitalist production, become quite meaningless here. Both success and failure lead now simultaneously to a centralisation of capital, and thus to an expropriation on the most enormous scale. This expropriation extends here from the direct producers to the smaller and smallest capitalists themselves. It is first the point of departure of the capitalist mode of production; its complete accomplishment is the aim of this production. In the last instance it aims at the expropriation of all individuals from the means of production, which cease with the development of social production to be means of private production and products of private production, and which can henceforth be only means of production in the hands of associated producers, their social property, just as they are social products. However, this expropriation appears under the capitalist system in a contradictory form, as an appropriation of social property by a few; and credit gives to these few more and more the character of pure adventurers. Since property here exists in the form of shares of stock, its movements and transfer become purely a result of gambling at the stock exchange, where the little fish are swallowed by the sharks and the lambs by the wolves. In the stock companies the antagonism against the old form becomes apparent, in which social means of production are private property; but the conversion to the form of shares of stock still remains ensnared in the boundaries of capitalism; hence, instead of overcoming the antagonism between the character of wealth as a social one and as private wealth, the stock companies merely develop it in a new form.

The co-operative factories of the laborers themselves represent within the old form the first beginnings of the new, although they naturally reproduce, and must reproduce, everywhere in their actual organisation all the shortcomings of the prevailing system. But the antagonism between capital and labor is overcome within them, although only in the form of making the associated laborers their own capitalists, that is, enabling them to use the means of production for the employment of their own labor. They show the way, in which a new mode of production may naturally grow out of an old one, when the development of the material forces of production and of the corresponding forms of social production has reached a certain stage. Without the factory system arising out of the capitalist mode of production the co-operative factory could not develop, nor without the credit system arising out of the same mode of production. The credit system is not only the principal basis for the gradual transformation of capitalist private enterprises into capitalist stock companies, but also a means for the gradual extension of co-operative enterprises on a more or less natural scale. The capitalist stock companies as well as the co-operative factories may be considered as forms of transition from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with this distinction, that the antagonism is met negatively in the one, positively in the other.

So far we have considered the development of the credit system, and the latent abolition of capitalist property implied by it, mainly with reference to industrial capital. In the following chapters we shall consider credit with reference to interest-bearing capital as such, both the effect of interest on this capital and the form which it assumes thereby; and on this point we shall have to make a few more specific remarks of economic significance.

For the present we have this to say:

The credit system appears as the main lever of overproduction and overspeculation in commerce solely because the process of reproduction, which is elastic in its nature, is here forced to its extreme limits, and is so forced for the reason that a large part of the social capital is employed by people who do not own it and who push things with far less caution than the owner, who carefully weighs the possibilities of his private capital, which he handles himself. This simply demonstrates the fact, that the production of values by capital based on the antagonistic nature of the capitalist system permits an actual, free, development only up to a certain point, so that it constitutes an immanent fetter and barrier of production, which are continually overstepped by the credit system.89 Hence the credit system accelerates the material development of the forces of production and the establishment of the world market. To bring these material foundations of the new mode of production to a certain degree of perfection, is the historical mission of the capitalist system of production. At the same time credit accelerates the violent eruptions of this antagonism, the crises, and thereby the development of the elements of disintegration of the old mode of production.

Two natures, then, are immanent in the credit system. On one side, it develops the incentive of capitalist production, the accumulation of wealth by the appropriation and exploitation of the labor of others, to the purest and most colossal form of gambling and swindling, and reduces more and more the number of those, who exploit the social wealth. On the other side, it constitutes a transition to a new mode of production . It is this ambiguous nature, which endows the principal spokesmen of credit from Law to Isaac Pereire with the pleasant character of swindlers and prophets.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE MEDIUM OF CIRCULATION (CURRENCY) AND CAPITAL. TOOKE'S AND FULLARTON'S CONCEPTION.

THE distinction between currency and capital, drawn by Tooke,90 Wilson, and others, which indiscriminately confounds the differences between the medium of circulation as money, as money-capital, and as interest-bearing capital (moneyed capital in English parlance), refers to two things.

The currency circulates on the one hand as coin (money), so far as it promotes the expenditure of revenue, in the transactions between the individual consumers and the retail merchants. In this category belong all merchants, who sell to the consumers, that is, the individual consumers as distinguished from the productive consumers or producers. Here money circulates in the function of coin, although it continually replaces capital. A certain portion of the money in a certain country is continually devoted to this function, although this portion consists of perpetually varying pieces of individual coin. On the other hand, so far as money promotes the transfer of capital, either as a means of purchase (means of circulation), or as a means of payment, it is capital. It is, therefore, neither its function as a means of purchase, nor that as a means of payment, which distinguishes it from coin, for it may act as a means of purchase also between dealer and dealer, so far as they buy on cash terms one another, and it may serve as a means of payment also between dealer and consumer, so far as credit is given and the revenue consumed before it is paid. The difference, then, is in fact that between the money-form of revenue and the money-form of capital, but not that between currency and capital, for a certain quantity of money circulates in the transactions between dealers as well as those between consumers and dealers. It is, therefore, equally a currency (circulation) in both functions. In Tooke's conception, confusion is introduced into this question in various ways.

1) By confounding the definite distinctions of the two functions;
2) By intermingling with it the question of the quantity of money circulating together in both functions;
3) By intermingling with it the question of the relative proportions of the quantities of currency circulating in the two functions, and thus in the two spheres of the process of reproduction.

I. Confounding the Definite Distinctions.

Money is said to be currency in the one form, and capital in the other. To the extent that money serves in the one or the other function, be it for the realisation of revenue or the transfer of capital, it performs its duty in buying and selling or in paying, as a means of purchase or payment, and in the wider meaning of the word as currency. The further purposes, to which it is devoted in the accounts of its spender or recipient, who may use it as capital or revenue, do not alter anything in this matter, and this is demonstrated by two facts. Although the kinds of money circulating in the two spheres are different, yet the same price of money, for instance a five pound note, passes from one sphere to the other and performs alternately both functions; this is inevitable for the simple reason, that the retail merchant can give to his capital the form of money which he receives from customers. It may be assumed, that the small change has its center of gravitation in the domain of retail trade; the retail dealer needs it continually to give change and receives it back continually in the payments of his customers. But he also receives money, that is, coin in that metal, which serves as a standard of value, for instance, in England one pound coins, or even bank notes, particularly notes of small denominations, such as five and ten pound notes. These gold coins and notes, with whatever small change he has to spare, are deposited by the retail dealer every day, or every week, in his bank, and he pays for his purchases by drawing checks on his deposits. But the same gold coins and bank notes are continually withdrawn from the bank, indirectly or directly (for instance, small change by manufacturers for the payment of wages), by the entire public in its capacity as consumer, and flow continually back to the retail dealers, for whom they realise in this way a portion of their capital, and at the same time their revenue, again and again. This last circumstance is important, and it is wholly overlooked by Tooke. Only where money is expended as money-capital, in the beginning of the process of reproduction (Book II, Part I), does capital-value exist purely as such. For in the produced commodities there is contained not merely capital, but also surplus-value; they are not capital alone, but also newly produced capital, capital pregnant with the source of revenue. What the retail dealer gives away for the money returning to him, his commodities, constitutes for him capital plus profit, capital plus revenue.

Furthermore, the circulating small change, when returning to the retail dealer, rehabilitates for him the money-form of his capital.

The difference between circulation as a circulation of revenue and a circulation of capital cannot, therefore, be presented as a difference between currency and capital without creating confusion. This mode of expression is due in the case of Tooke to the fact, that he simply places himself in the position of a banker issuing his own bank notes. The amount of his notes, which is continually in the hands of the public and serves as currency (even if consisting of ever different notes) costs him nothing but paper and printing. They are circulating certificates of indebtedness made out in his own name (bills of exchange), but they bring him money and thus serve as a means of expanding his capital. But they differ from his capital, whether this be his own or borrowed capital. This implies for him a specific distinction between currency and capital, which, however, has nothing to do with the definite definition of terms as such, least of all with those made by Tooke in this case.

The different terms denoting specific functions—whether it be the money form of revenue or of capital—do not change anything in the primal character of money as a medium of circulation; it retains this character, no matter whether it performs the one function or the other. It is true, that money serves more as a medium of circulation in the strict meaning of the term (coin, means of purchase) in its character as the money-form of revenue, on account of the incoherency of the purchases and sales, and because the majority of the spenders of revenue, the laborers, can buy relatively little on credit, while in the transactions of the business world, where the medium of circulation constitutes the money-form of capital, money serves mainly as a means of payment, partly on account of the concentration, partly on account of the prevailing credit system. But the distinction between money as a means of payment and a means of purchase (currency) refers to money itself; it is not a distinction between money and capital. The distinction is not one between currency and capital, merely because more copper and silver circulates in the retail business, and more gold in wholesale business, so that there is a difference between copper and silver on one side, and gold on the other.

II. Introducing the Question of the Quantity of Money Circulating Together in Both Functions.

To the extent that money circulates, either as a means of purchase or as a means of payment, no matter in which one of the two spheres and independently of its function of realising revenue or capital, the quantity of its circulating mass is regulated by the laws developed previously in the discussion of the simple circulation of commodities, Book I, Chapter III, 2 b. The degree of the velocity of circulation, in other words, the number of repetitions of the same function as means of purchase and payment by the same pieces of money in a given period of time, the mass of simultaneous purchases and sales, or payments, the sum of the prices of the circulating commodities, finally the balances of payments to be spared in the same period, determine in either case the mass of the circulating money, of currency. Whether the money so serving represents capital or revenue for the paying or receiving party, is immaterial, and does not alter the matter in any way. Its mass is simply determined by its function as a medium of purchase and payment.

III. Introduction of the Question of the Relative Proportions of the Quantities of Currency Circulating in Both Functions and Thus in Both Spheres of the Process of Reproduction.

Both spheres of circulation are connected internally, for on the one hand the mass of the revenues to be spent expresses the volume of consumption, and on the other hand the magnitude of the masses of capital circulating in production and commerce express the volume and velocity of the process of reproduction. Nevertheless the same circumstances have a different effect, working even in opposite directions, upon the quantities of the money circulating in both spheres or functions, or on the quantities of currency, as the English express it in banking parlance. And this gives a new justification for the absurd distinction of Tooke between capital and currency. The fact, that the gentlemen of the Currency Theory confound two different things, is by no means a good reason for making two different conceptions out of this confusion.

In times of prosperity, great expansion, acceleration and intensity of the process of reproduction, the laborers are fully employed. Generally there is also a rise of wages which makes in a slight measure for their fall below the average level in the other periods of the commercial cycle. At the same time the revenue of the capitalists grow considerably. Consumption increases universally. The prices of commodities also rise regularly, at least in various essential lines of business. Consequently the quantity of the circulating money grows at least within certain limits, since the increasing velocity draws certain barriers around the quantity of the currency. Since that portion of the social revenue, which consists of wages, is originally advanced by the industrial capitalist in the form of variable capital, and always in the form of money, he requires more money in times of prosperity for his circulation. But we must not take this into account twice. We must not count it first as money required for the circulation of the variable capital, and a second time as money required for the circulation of the revenue of the laborers. The money paid to the laborers as wages is spent in retail trade and returns about once a week as a deposit of the retail dealers to the banks, after it has negotiated various intermediary deals in smaller cycles. In times of prosperity the reflux of money proceeds smoothly for the industrial capitalists, and thus the need of money facilities does not increase for the reason that they have to pay more wages, but rather require more money for the circulation of their variable capital.

The final result is, that the mass of currency required for the expenditure of revenue increases decidedly in periods of prosperity.

As for the currency, which is necessary for the transfer of capital for the exclusive use of the capitalists, a period of brisk business is at the same time a period of most elastic and easy credit. The velocity of currency between capitalist and capitalist is regulated directly by credit, and the mass of the currency required for the making of payments and even for cash purchases decreases proportionately. It may increase absolutely, but it decreases under these circumstances relatively, compared to the expansion of the process of reproduction. On the one hand greater amounts of payments are handled without the intervention of any money at all; on the other hand, owing to the great vivacity of the process, the same quantities of money have a greater velocity, both as means of purchase and payment. The same quantity of money promotes the reflux of a greater number of individual capitals.

On the whole, the currency of money in such periods appears full, although its second portion (the transfer of capital) is at least relatively contracted, while its first portion (the expenditure of revenue) is absolutely expanded.

The refluxes express the reconversion of commodity-capital into money, M—C—M', as we have seen in the discussion of the process of reproduction in Volume II, Part I. Credit renders the reflux in the form of money independent of the time of actual reflux, both for the industrial capitalist and the merchant. Both of them sell on credit; their commodities are gotten rid of, before they resume for them the form of money by returning them really in this form. On the other hand they buy on credit, and in this way the value of their commodities is reconverted either into productive capital or commodity-capital even before this value has been transformed into real money, before the price of commodities is due and paid for. In such periods of prosperity the reflux passes off smoothly and easily. The retail dealer pays the wholesale dealer in collateral, the wholesaler pays the manufacturer in the same way, the manufacturer in like manner the importer of the raw material, and so forth. The appearance of rapid and more secure turn-overs maintains itself always for a certain period after they are past in reality, since the turn-overs of credit take the place of the real ones as soon as credit is well under way. The banks begin to scent danger, as soon as their customers deposit more bills of exchange than money. See the above testimony of the Liverpool bank director.

On a previous occasion I have remarked: "In periods of prevailing credit, the rapidity of circulation of money grows faster than the prices of commodities, while in times of declining credit the prices of commodities fall slower than the rapidity of circulation." (Critique of Political Economy, 1859, p. 135-136.)

In a period of crisis the condition is reversed. Circulation No. I contracts, prices fall, likewise wages of labor; the number of employed laborers is reduced, the mass of transactions decreases. On the other hand, the need of accommodation in the matter of money increases in circulation No. II in proportion as credit decreases. We shall return to this point immediately.

There is no doubt that, with the decrease of credit which goes with the clogging of the process of reproduction, the mass of circulation No. I required for the expenditure of revenue is contracted, while that of No. II required for the transfer of capital is expanded. But it remains to be analysed, to what extent this statement coincides with the following maintained by Fullarton and others: "A demand for capital on loan and a demand for additional circulation are quite distinct things, and not often found associated." (Fullarton, l. c. p. 82, title of chapter 5.)91

In the first place it is evident, that in the first of the two cases mentioned above, during times of prosperity, when the mass of the circulating medium increases, the demand for it must also increase. But it is likewise evident, that a manufacturer, who draws more or less of his deposit out of a bank in gold or banknotes, because he has more capital to expand in the form of money, does not increase his demand for capital, but merely his demand for this particular form, in which his capital is expended. The demand refers only to the technical form, in which his capital is thrown into circulation. It is well known that a different development of the credit system implies for the same variable capital, or the same quantity of wages, a greater mass of means of circulation (currency) in one country than in another, for instance, more in England than in Scotland, more in Germany than in England. In like manner the same capital invested in agriculture, in the process of reproduction, requires different quantities of money in different seasons for the performance of its function.

But the contrast drawn by Fullarton is not correct. It is by no means the strong demand for loans, as he says, which distinguishes the period of depression from that of prosperity, but the ease with which this demand is satisfied in periods of prosperity, and the difficulties which it meets after a depression has become a fact. It is precisely the enormous development of the credit system during a period of prosperity, hence also the enormous development of the demand for loan capital and the readiness with which the supply meets it in such periods, which brings about a shortage of credit during the period of depression. It is not, therefore, the difference in the size of the demand for loans which characterises both periods.

As we have remarked previously, both periods are primarily distinguished by the fact that in periods of prosperity the demand for currency between consumers and dealers pre-dominates, and in periods of depression that for currency between capitalists. In a period of depression the former decreases, the latter increases.

What appears as the essential mark to Fullarton and others is the phenomenon, that in such periods, in which the securities in the hand of the Bank of England are on the increase, its circulation of notes is decreasing, and vice versa. Now the level of the securities expresses the volume of the pecuniary accommodation, the volume of the discounted bills of exchange and of the advances on marketable collateral. Thus Fullarton says in the above passage (footnote 91) that the securities in the hands of the Bank of England vary generally in the opposite direction from its circulation of banknotes, and this corroborates the doctrine long held by private banks to the effect that no bank can increase its issue of banknotes beyond a certain point determined by the needs of the public; but if a bank wants to make advances beyond this limit, it must take them out of its capital, that is, it must either realise on securities or utilise deposits which it would otherwise have invested in securities.

This reveals at the same time what Fullarton means by capital. What does capital signify here? It means that the bank can no longer make advances with its own banknotes, promissory notes that cost it nothing, of course. But what does it make payments with in that case? With the sums realised by the sale of securities in reserve, that is, government bonds, stocks, and other interest-bearing papers. And what is this money that it gets in return for the sale of such papers? Gold or banknotes, so far as the last named are legal tender, such as those of the Bank of England. What the bank advances, is under all circumstances money. This money now constitutes a part of its capital. This is evident in the case that it advances gold. If it advances notes, then these notes represent capital, because it has given up some actual value, interest-bearing papers, for them. In the case of private banks the notes secured by them through the sale of securities cannot be anything else, in the main, but notes of the Bank of England or their own notes, since others would hardly be taken in payment for securities. If it is the Bank of England itself, its own notes, which it receives in return, cost it capital, that is, interest-bearing papers. By this means it withdraws its own notes from the circulation. If it reissues these notes, or issues new ones in their stead to the same amount, they represent capital. And they do so equally well, when such notes are used for advances to capitalists, or when they are used later on for investment in securities, as soon as the demand for such pecuniary accommodation decreases. In all these cases the term capital is employed only from the banker's point of view, and it means that the banker is compelled to loan more than his mere credit.

It is well known that the Bank of England makes all its advances in its own notes. Now, if the bank note circulation of this Bank decreases nevertheless in proportion as the discounted bills of exchange and collateral in its hands, and thus its advances, increase—what becomes of the notes thrown into circulation by it, how do they return to the Bank?

If the demand for money accommodation arises from an unfavorable national balance of trade and implies an export of gold, the matter is very clear. The bills of exchange are discounted in banknotes. The banknotes are exchanged by the bank itself, in its issue department, which issues gold for them, and this gold is exported. It is as though it were to pay out gold directly, without the intervention of notes, on discounting the bills. Such an increased demand, which may amount to from seven to ten million pounds sterling, naturally does not add a single five-pound note to the inland circulation of the country. Now, if it is said, that the Bank of England advances capital in this case, but not currency, it may mean two things. In the first place it may mean, that the bank does not advance credit, but actual values, a part of its own capital, or of capital deposited with it. In the second place it may mean that it does not advance money for inland, but for international circulation. It advances world money, and money for this purpose must always assume the form of a hoard in its metallic body. In this shape money does not merely represent the form of value, but value itself, whose money-form it is. Although this gold represents capital, both for the bank and the exporting money dealer, both financial and commercial capital, yet the demand for it does not come as a demand for capital, but as a demand for the absolute form of money-capital. This demand arises precisely at the moment, when the foreign markets are overcrowded with unsalable English commodity-capital. What is wanted, then, is capital, but not in its capital as capital. What is wanted is capital in the shape of money, in the shape in which money serves as international world money; and this is its original form of precious metal. The exports of gold are not, as Fullarton, Tooke, etc., claim, a mere question of capital. They are a question of money, even if this be money in one specific function. This fact that it is not a question of inland currency, as the advocates of the Currency Theory maintain, does not prove, as Fullarton and others think, that it is a question of mere capital. It is a question of money in the form in which money is an international means of payment. "Whether that capital" (that is, the purchase price for the one million quarters of foreign wheat required after a crop failure in the home country) "is transmitted in merchandise or in specie, is a point which in no way affects the nature of the transaction," (Fullarton, 1. c., p. 131) but affects essentially the question, whether an export of gold takes place or not. Capital is transferred in the form of precious metals, because it either cannot be transferred at all in the shape of commodities, or only at a great loss. The fear, which the modern banking system has of gold exports, exceeds anything ever dreamt by the monetary system, which considered precious metals as the only true wealth. Take, for instance, the following cross-examination of the Governor of the Bank of England, Morris, before the Parliamentary Committee on the crisis of 1847-48: Question 3846. "When I speak of the depreciation of stocks and fixed capital, is it not known to you that all capital invested in papers and products of all kinds was depreciated in the same way, that raw materials, cotton, silk, wool, were sent to the continent at the same cut prices, and that sugar, coffee and tea were auctioned off in forced sales."—"It was inevitable that the nation should make considerable sacrifices, in order to counteract the drain of gold caused by the enormous imports of means of subsistence,"—3848. "Don't you believe that it would have been better to touch the eight million pounds sterling stored in the vaults of the bank, instead of trying to recover the gold with such sacrifices?"—"I do not believe that,"—It is gold which here stands for the only true wealth.

Fullarton quotes the discovery of Tooke, that "with only one or two exceptions, and those admitting of satisfactory explanation, every remarkable fall of the exchange, followed by a drain of gold, that has occurred during the last half century, has been coincident throughout with a comparatively low state of the circulating medium, and vice versa." (Fullarton, p.121). This discovery proves that such drains of gold occur generally after a period of excitement and speculation, as "a signal of a collapse already commenced...an indication of overstocked markets, of a cessation of the foreign demand for our productions, of delayed returns, and, as the necessary sequel of all these, of commercial discredit, manufactories shut up, artisans starving, and a general stagnation of industry and enterprise." (p.129.) This is at the same time the best rebuttal of the claim of the advocates of the Currency Theory, that a full circulation drives out bullion and a low circulation attracts it. On the other hand, while the Bank of England generally carries a strong gold reserve during a period of prosperity, this hoard is generally formed during the spiritless and stagnating period, which follows after a storm.

All this wisdom concerning the drains of gold, then, amounts to saying that the demand for international media of circulation and payment differs from the demand for national media of circulation and payment (and this implies the self-evident fact that "the existence of a drain does not necessarily imply any diminution of the internal demand for circulation," as Fullarton says on page 112 of his work); and that the sending abroad of precious metals and their throwing into international circulation is not identical with the throwing of notes or specie into the internal circulation. For the rest I have shown on a previous occasion, that the movements of a hoard in the shape of a reserve fund for international payments has nothing to do as such with the movements of money as a medium of circulation. It is true that the question is complicated by the fact that the different functions of a hoard, which I have developed from the nature of money, are here placed upon the shoulders of one sole reserve fund, that is, the function of money as a reserve fund for payments of due bills in the interior business; the function of a reserve fund of currency; finally, the function of a reserve fund of world money. It follows from this that under certain circumstances a drain of gold from the Bank to the internal market may be combined with a like drain to the international market. The question is further complicated by the fact that this reserve fund has been loaded with the additional function of serving as a fund for guaranteeing the convertibility of bank notes in countries, in which the credit system and credit money are developed. And on top of all this comes the concentration of the national reserve fund in one single central bank, and, secondly, its reduction to the smallest possible minimum. This explains Fullarton's plaint (p.143): "One cannot contemplate the perfect silence and facility with which variations of the exchange usually pass off in continental countries, compared with the state of feverish disquiet and alarm always produced in England whenever the treasure in the bank seems to be at all approaching to exhaustion, without being struck with the great advantage in this respect which a metallic currency possesses."

However, if we leave aside the question of the drain of gold, how can a bank issuing notes, like the Bank of England, increase the amount of the money accommodation granted by it without increasing its issue of bank notes?

So far as the bank itself is concerned, all the notes outside of its walls, whether they circulate or rest in private treasures, are in circulation, that is, not held in its own possession. Hence, if the bank extends its discounting and lombarding business, its advances on securities, all the bank notes issued for that purpose must flow back to it, for otherwise they would increase the volume of circulation, a thing which is not supposed to happen. This return of notes may take place in two ways.

First: The bank pays to A notes for securities; A pays with these notes for bills of exchange due to B, and B deposits these notes once more in this bank. This closes the circulation of these notes, but the loan remains. ("The loan remains, and the currency, if not wanted, finds its way back to the issuer." Fullarton, p. 97.) The notes, which the bank loaned to A, have now returned to it; but it still remains the creditor of A, or whoever may have been drawn upon by A in discounting his bills, and it remains the debtor of B for the amount of values expressed in these notes, and B thus has a claim upon a corresponding portion of the capital of the bank.

Secondly: A pays to B, and B himself, or C who receives them from B, pays with these notes bills due to the bank, directly or indirectly. In that case the bank is paid in its own notes. This concludes the transaction (excepting the return of this payment by A to the bank).

In what respect, now, shall the loan of the bank to A be regarded as a loan of capital, or as a loan of mere currency?92

[This depends on the nature of the loan itself. Three cases must be distinguished.

First Case.—A receives from the bank the amounts loaned on his own personal credit, without giving any security for them. In this case he does not merely receive means of payment, but also without a doubt some new capital, which he may invest and employ as an additional capital in his business until the day of settlement.

Second Case.—A has given to the bank securities, national bonds, or stocks as collateral, and received for them, say, two-thirds of their value in the shape of a cash loan. In this case he has received means of payment needed by him, but no additional capital, for he entrusted to the bank a larger capital-value than he received from it. But this larger capital-value was, on the one hand, unavailable for the momentary needs of A, because it was invested as interest-bearing capital in a certain form and could not serve as means of payment; on the other hand, A had reasons of his own for not wanting to convert this capital-value directly into means of payment by selling it. His securities served, among other ends, as a reserve capital, and to that end he set them in motion. The transaction between A and the bank, therefore, consists in a mutual transfer of capital, but in such a way, that A does not receive any additional capital (on the contrary, less capital!) although he receives means of payment which he needs. For the bank, on the other hand, this transaction constitutes a temporary fixation of money-capital in the form of a loan, a conversion of money-capital from one form into another, and this conversion is precisely the essential function of the banking business.

Third Case.—A has had a bill of exchange discounted by the bank, and received its value in cash after the deduction of the discount. In this case he has sold to the bank a money-capital which does not represent ready cash for the same amount in the shape of ready cash. He has sold his running bill for cash money. The bill is now the property of the bank. It does not alter the matter that the last endorser of the bill, A, is responsible to the bank for it in default of payment. He shares this responsibility with the other endorsers and with the first writer of the bill, all of whom are responsible to him. In this case, then, we have not any loan to deal with, but only an ordinary sale and purchase. For this reason A has not to make any return payments to the bank. It covers itself by cashing the bill when it becomes due. Here, also, a transfer of capital has taken place between A and the bank, in exactly the same way, which holds good in the sale and purchase of any other commodity, and for this very reason A did not receive any additional capital. What he needed and received were means of payment, and he received them by having the bank convert one form of his money-capital, his bill, into another, money.

It is only the first case, in which there can be any question of a real loan of capital; in the second and third cases the matter can be so regarded only in the sense that every investment of capital implies an advance of capital. In this sense the bank advances capital to A; but for A it is money-capital at best in the sense that it is a portion of his capital in general. And he does not want and use it as a capital specifically. It is specifically a means of payment for him. Otherwise every ordinary sale of commodities, by which means of payment are secured, might be considered as a loan received.—F. E.]

In the case of private banks issuing notes we have this difference: If its notes remain neither in the local circulation, nor return to it in the form of deposits, or in payment for due bills of exchange, then these notes fall into the hands of people, who compel the private bank to cash these notes in gold or in notes of the Bank of England. In that event its loan represents indeed an advance of notes of the Bank of England, or, what amounts to the same thing for the private bank, of gold, in other words, of a portion of its banking capital. The same holds good in the case that the Bank of England itself, or some other bank, which has a fixed legal maximum for its issue of notes, must sell securities for the purpose of withdrawing its own notes from circulation and giving them out once more in the shape of loans; in that case the bank's own notes represent a portion of its mobilised banking capital.

Even if the circulation were purely metallic, it would be possible, first, that the drain of gold [Marx evidently refers here to a drain of gold that would, at least partially, go to foreign countries.—F.E.] might empty the treasury, while, secondly, its loans on securities might grow considerably, but flow back to it in the form of deposits, or of payments on due bills of exchange (since the gold is principally demanded from the bank for the payment of balances in the settlement of previous transactions); so that, on one side, the total treasure of the bank would be decreasing with an increase of securities in its hands, while it would be holding the same amount, which it possessed formerly as owner, in the capacity of debtor of its customers, who made deposits, and the total quantity of currency would be decreasing.

Our assumption so far has been, that the loans are made in notes, so that they carry with them a momentary, but immediately disappearing, increase of the issue of notes. But this is not necessary. Instead of paper note, the bank may open a credit account for A, in which case this A, a debtor of the bank, appears in the role of an imaginary depositor. He satisfies his creditors with checks on the bank, and the recipient of these checks passes them on to his own banker, who exchanges them for the checks running against him in the clearing house. In this case no intervention of notes takes place at all, and the entire transaction is confined to the fact that the bank collects its own debt in a check drawn on itself, since its actual recompense consists in its claim on A. In this case the bank has loaned to A a portion of its own banking capital, its own credit to him.

To the extent that this demand for pecuniary accommodation is a demand for capital, it is so only for money-capital. It is capital only from the point of view of the banker, namely gold (in the case of gold exports to foreign countries) or notes of the National Bank, which a private bank can obtain only by purchase against securities, and which, therefore, represent capital for it. Or, again, it is a case of interest-bearing papers, government bonds, stocks, etc., which must be sold in order to obtain gold or banknotes. Such papers, however, if they are government bonds, are capital only for the buyer, for whom their purchase price represents a capital invested in them. By themselves they are not capital, but merely claims on loans. If they are mortgages, they are mere claims on future ground rent. And if they are shares of stocks, they are mere titles of ownership, which entitle the holder to a share in future surplus-values. All these things are no real capital, they form no constituent parts of capital, nor are they values in themselves. By similar transactions money belonging to the bank may be transformed into deposits, so that the bank, instead of being the owner of this money, owes it to some customer and holds it under a different title of ownership. While this is important as a phenomenon for the bank, yet it does not alter anything in the mass of capital existing in a certain country, or even of money-capital. Capital stands here only for money-capital, and if it is not available in the actual form of money, it stands for a mere title on capital. This is a very important fact, since a scarcity of, and urgent demand for, banking capital is confounded with a decrease of actual capital, which is in such cases rather abundant in the form of means of production and products and swamps the markets.

It is, therefore, easy to explain, how it is that the mass of securities received by a bank as collateral increases, so that the growing demand for pecuniary accommodation can be satisfied by the bank, while the total mass of currency remains the same or decreases. This total mass is held in check during such periods of money stringency in two ways: 1) By a drain of gold; 2) by a demand for money in its capacity of a mere means of payment, when the issued bank notes return immediately, or when the transactions pass off without the intervention of notes by means of book credit; the payments are thus made wholly by a transaction of credit, and the settlement of these payments was the only purpose of this transaction. It is a peculiarity of money, when it serves merely to square balances of payments (and in times of crises loans are taken up for the purpose of paying, not of buying; for the purpose of winding up previous transactions, not of beginning new ones), that its circulation is but small, even where balances are not squared by mere operations of credit, without any intervention of money, so that, when there is a heavy demand for pecuniary accommodation, an enormous quantity of such transactions can take place without expanding the circulation. But the mere fact, that the circulation of the Bank of England remains stable or decreases simultaneously with a heavy satisfaction of money-accommodation on its part, does not prove without further ceremony, as Fullarton, Tooke and others assume (owing to their mistake to the effect that pecuniary accommodation is identical with taking up capital on loan as additional capital), that the circulation of money (of banknotes) in its function as a means of payment does not increase and extend. While the circulation of notes as means of purchase is decreasing in periods of business depression, when such a heavy accommodation is necessary, their circulation as means of payment may increase, and the aggregate amount of the circulation, the sum of the notes functioning as means of purchase and payment, may remain stable or may even decrease. The currency in its capacity as a means of payment, of banknotes immediately returning to the bank issuing them, is not a currency in the eyes of those economists.

If the circulation as a means of payment were to increase at a higher rate than it decreases as a means of purchase, the aggregate currency would increase, although the money serving in the capacity of a means of purchase would have decreased considerably in quantity. And this actually happens in periods of crisis, when credit collapses completely, so that commodities and securities are unsalable and bills of exchange cannot be discounted, and nothing goes any more but cash money. Since Fullarton and others do not understand, that the circulation of notes as means of payment is the characteristic mark of such periods of money stringency, they treat this phenomenon as accidental. "With respect again to those examples of eager competition for the possession of banknotes, which characterise seasons of panic and which may sometimes, as at the close of 1825, lead to a sudden, though only temporary, enlargement of the issues, even while the efflux of bullion is still going, these, I apprehend, are not to be regarded as among the natural or necessary concomitants of a low exchange; the demand in such cases is not for circulation" (he should say circulation as a means of purchase) "but for hoarding, a demand on the part of alarmed bankers and capitalists which arises generally in the last act of the crisis" (that is, for a reserve of means of payment) "after a long continuation of the drain, and is the precursor of its termination." (Fullarton, p. 130.)

In the discussion of money as a means of payment (Volume I, chapter III, 3 b) we have already explained, in what manner, when the chain of payments is suddenly interrupted, money turns from its ideal form into a material and at the same time absolute form of value as compared to the commodities. This was illustrated by some examples (footnotes on pages 156 and 157). This interruption itself is partly an effect, partly a cause of the insecurity of credit and of the circumstances accompanying it, such as overcrowding of markets, depreciation of commodities, interruption of production, etc.

But it is evident, that Fullarton transforms the difference between money as a means of purchase and money as a means of payment into the mistaken conception of a difference between currency and capital. This is due to the narrow minded banker's conception of circulation.

It might be asked, finally: What is it that is missing in such periods of stringency, capital or money in its function as a means of payment? And this is a well known controversy.

In the first place, so far as the stringency is marked by a drain of gold, it is evident that what is demanded is the international means of payment. But money in its character of international means of payment is gold in its metallic actuality, as a quantity of values in itself, as a mass of values. It is at the same time capital, capital not as commodity-capital, but as money-capital, capital not in the form of commodities but in the form of money (and at that of money in the eminent meaning of the term, in which it exists as a universal world market commodity). It is not a question of a contrast between a demand for money as a means of payment and a demand for capital. The contrast is rather between capital in its money-form and its commodity-form; and the form which is here demanded and which can alone perform any function here, is its money-form.

Aside from this demand for gold (or silver) it cannot be said that there is a dearth of capital in such periods of crisis. Under extraordinary circumstances, such as a corn famine or a cotton famine, etc., this may be the case; but these are not necessary or regular companions of such periods; and the existence of such a lack of capital cannot be assumed, without further ceremony, from the mere fact, that there is a heavy demand for pecuniary accommodation. On the contrary. The markets are overcrowded and swamped with commodities. Evidently it is not the lack of commodity-capital which causes the stringency. We shall return to this question later.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE COMPOSITION OF BANKING CAPITAL.

IT is now necessary to find out more accurately, what are the constituent elements of banking capital.

We have just seen, that Fullarton and others transform the distinction between money as a means of circulation and money as a means of payment (or eventually as world money, whenever it is a question of gold drains) into a distinction between currency and capital.

The peculiar role played by capital in this instance brought it about, that this banker's economics taught as insistently that money is indeed capital par excellence as the enlightened economics taught that money is not capital.

In subsequent analysis we shall demonstrate, that in such cases money-capital is confounded with moneyed capital in the sense of interest-bearing capital, while in the first named sense money-capital is but a transient form of capital as distinguished from the other forms of capital, commodity-capital and productive capital.

The banking capital consists 1) of cash money, gold or notes; 2) securities. These again may be divided into two parts: Commercial bills, bills of exchange, which run for some time, become due, and the cashing (discounting) of which is the essentially profitable business of the banker; and public securities, such as government bonds, treasury notes, stocks of all kinds, in brief, interest-bearing papers, which are essentially different from bills of exchange. Mortgages may also be classed with this part. The capital composed of these various constituents is again divided into the banker's business capital, and into the deposits, which form his banking capital, or borrowed capital. In the case of banks with an issue of notes these must be counted also. We leave the deposits and notes out of consideration for the present. It is evident, that nothing is altered in the actual constituents of banking capital (money, bills of exchange, deposits), whether these different elements represent the banker's own capital or deposits, the capital of other people. The same division would remain, whether he were to carry on his business with his own capital alone or with no other but deposited capital.

The form of the interest-bearing capital is responsible for the fact, that every determined and regular revenue of money appears as interest on some capital, whether it be due to some capital or not. The money revenue is first converted into interest, and with the interest comes also the capital, from which it is drawn. In like manner every sum of money appears as capital in connection with the interest-bearing capital, as long as it is not spent as revenue; that is, it appears as principal compared to the possible or actual interest which it may yield.

The matter is simple. Let the average rate of interest be 5% annually. A sum of 500 pounds sterling would then yield 25 pounds sterling, if converted into interest-bearing capital. Every fixed annual income of 25 pounds sterling may then be considered as interest on a capital of 500 pounds sterling. This, however, is and remains a purely illusory conception, except the case in which the source of the 25 pounds sterling, whether it be a mere title of ownership or claim of indebtedness, or an actual element of production, such as real estate, is directly transferable or assumes a form, in which it becomes transferable. Let us choose a government debt and wages for an illustration.

The state has to pay to his creditors annually a certain amount of interest for the money loaned from them. In this case the creditor cannot call on the state to give up the principal. He can merely sell his claim, his title of ownership. The capital itself has been consumed, spent by the state. It does not exist any longer. What the creditor of the state possesses is 1) a certificate of indebtedness from the state, amounting, say, to 100 pounds sterling; 2) this certificate gives to the creditor a claim upon the annual revenues of the state, that is, the annual tax revenue, to a certain amount, say, 5 pounds, or 5%; 3) the creditor may sell this certificate at his discretion to some other person. If the rate of interest is 5 %, and the security given by the state is good, the owner A of this certificate can sell it, as a rule, at its value of 100 pounds sterling to B; for it is the same to B, whether he loans 100 pounds sterling at 5 % annually, or whether he secures for himself by the payment of 100 pounds sterling an annual tribute from the state to the amount of 5 pounds sterling. But in all these cases the capital, the progeny of which (interest) is paid by the state, is illusory, fictitious capital. Not only does the amount loaned to the state exist no longer, but it was never intended at all to be invested as capital, and only by investment as capital could it have been transformed into a self-preserving value. For the original creditor A, the share of interest from taxes falling to him annually represents so much interest on his capital, just as a certain share of the spendthrift's fortune does for the usurer, although in either case the loaned amount was not invested as capital. The possibility of selling his claim on the revenues of the state represents for A the possible return of his principal. As for B, his capital, from his own private point of view, is invested as interest-bearing capital. So far as the transaction is concerned, B has simply taken the place of A by buying the latter's claim on the state's revenue. This transaction may be multiplied ever so often, the capital of the state debt remains a purely fictitious one, and from the moment that the certificates would become unsalable, the fiction of this capital would disappear. Nevertheless this fictitious capital has its own movements, as we shall see presently.

The capital of the national debt appears as a minus, and interest-bearing capital generally is the mother of all crazy forms, so that, for instance, debts may appear in the eyes of the banker as commodities. Now let us look at wages. Wages are here conceived as interest, so that labor-power stands for capital, which yields this interest. For instance, if the wages for one year amount to 50 pounds sterling, and the rate of interest is 5%, the annual labor-power is equal to a capital of 1,000 pounds sterling. The insanity of the capitalist mode of conception reaches its climax here. For instead of explaining the self-expansion of capital out of the exploitation of labor-power, the matter is reversed and the productivity of labor-power itself is this mystic thing, interest-bearing capital. In the second half of the 17th century this used to be a favorite conception (for instance with Petty) but it is used even nowadays in good earnest by vulgar economists and more particularly by German statisticians.93

Unfortunately two disagreeable facts mar this conception. In the first place, the laborer must work, in order to secure this interest. In the second place, he cannot transform the capital-value of his labor-power into cash by transferring it. On the contrary, the annual value of his labor-power is equal to his average annual wages, and his labor has to make good to the seller of his labor-power this same value plus a surplus-value, the increment added by his labor. Under a slave system the laborer has a capital-value, namely his purchase price. And when he is rented out, the renter has to pay, in the first place, the interest on this purchase price, and must furthermore make good the annual wear and tear of the capital.

The forming of a fictitious capital is called capitalising. Every periodically repeated income is capitalised by calculating it on the average rate of interest, as an income which would be realised by a capital at this rate of interest. For instance, if the annual income is 100 pounds sterling and the rate of interest 5%, then these 100 pounds sterling would represent the annual interest on 2,000 pounds sterling, and these 2,000 pounds sterling are regarded as the capital-value of the legal title of ownership upon these 100 pounds sterling annually. For him who buys this title of ownership these 100 pounds sterling of annual income represent indeed the interest on his capital at 5%. All connection with the actual process of self-expansion of capital is thus lost to the last vestige, and the conception of capital as something which expands itself automatically is thereby strengthened.

Even when the certificate of indebtedness—the security—does not represent a purely fictitious capital, as it does in the case of state debts, the capital-value of such papers is nevertheless wholly illusory. We have seen previously in what manner the credit system creates associated capital. The papers are considered as titles of ownership, which represent this capital. The stocks of railroads, mines, navigation companies, and the like, represent actual capital, namely the capital invested and used in such ventures, or the amount of money advanced by the stockholders for the purpose of being used as capital in such ventures. This does not exclude the possibility that they may become victims of swindle. But this capital does not exist twofold, it does not exist as the capital-value of titles of ownership on one side and as the actual capital invested, or to be invested, in those ventures on the other side. It exists only in this last form, and a share of stock is merely a title of ownership on a certain portion of the surplus-value to be realised by it. A may sell this title to B, and B may sell it to C. These transactions do not alter anything in the nature of the case. A or B then have their title in the shape of capital, but C has his capital merely in the shape of a title on the surplus-value to be realised by the stock capital.

The independent movement of the value of these titles of ownership, not only of government bonds but also of stocks, adds weight to the illusion that they constitute a real capital by the side of that capital, or that title, upon which they may have a claim. For they become commodities, whose price has its own peculiar movements and is fixed in its own way. Their market value is determined differently from their nominal value, without any change in the value of the actual capital, which expands, of course. On the one hand their market value fluctuates with the amount and security of the yields, on which they have a claim. If the nominal value of a share of stock, that is, the invested sum originally represented by this share, is 100 pounds sterling, and the enterprise pays 10%, instead of 5%, then their market-value, other circumstances remaining the same, rises to 200 pounds sterling, so long as the rate of interest is 5%, for when capitalised at 5%, it now represents a fictitious capital of 200 pounds sterling. He who buys it for 200 pounds sterling receives a revenue of 5% on this investment of capital. If the success of the venture is such as to diminish the income from it, the reverse takes place. The market value of these papers is in part fictitious, as it is not determined merely by the actual income, but also by the expected income, which is calculated in advance. But assuming the self-expansion of the actual capital to proceed at a constant rate, or, where no capital exists, as in the case of state debts, the annual income to be fixed by law and otherwise sufficiently secured, the price of such securities rises and falls inversely as the rate of interest. If the rate of interest rises from 5% to 10%, then a security guaranteeing an income of 5 pounds sterling will represent only a capital of 50 pounds sterling. If the rate of interest falls from 5% to 2½%, then the same security will represent a capital of 200 pounds sterling. Its value is always but its capitalised income, that is, its income calculated on a fictitious capital of so many pounds sterling at the prevailing rate of interest. In times when there is a stringency of money on the market these securities will, therefore, fall in price for two reasons: First, because the rate of interest rises, and secondly, because they are thrown in large quantities upon the market for the purpose of getting ready cash. This drop in their price takes place independently of the fact, whether the income guaranteed to their owner by these papers is constant, as it is in the case of government bonds, or whether the self-expansion of the actual capital, which they represent, for instance in industrial enterprises, is subject to interruptions such as interfere with the process of reproduction. In this last eventuality the two causes of depreciation mentioned above are joined by a third one. As soon as the storm is over, the papers rise once more to their former level, unless they represent failures or swindles. Their depreciation in times of crisis serves as a potent means of centralising money.94

To the extent that the depreciation or appreciation of such papers is independent of the movements of the value of actual capital represented by them, the wealth of the nation is just as great before as after their depreciation. "On October 23, 1847, the public funds and the canal and railroad stocks were already depreciated by 114,752,225 pounds sterling." So said Morris, the Governor of the Bank of England, in his testimony before the Committee on Commercial Distress, 1847-48. Unless this depreciation implied an actual stopping of production and of traffic on canals and rails, or a suspension of pending enterprises in the beginning stages, or a throwing away of capital in positively worthless ventures, the nation did not grow poorer by one cent through the bursting of this bubble of fictitious capital.

In all countries of capitalist production, there exists an enormous quantity of so-called interest-bearing capital, or moneyed capital, in this form. And accumulation of money-capital signifies to a large extent nothing else but an accumulation of such claims on production, an accumulation of the market-price, the illusory capital-value, of these claims.

A part of the banking capital is invested in these so-called interest-bearing papers. This is itself a portion of the reserve capital, which does not perform any function in the actual business of banking. The greater portion of these papers consists of bills of exchange, that is, promises to pay made by industrial capitalists or merchants. For the money lender these papers are interest-bearing, in other words, when he buys them, he deducts interest for the time which they still have to run. This is called discounting. It depends on the prevailing rate of interest, how much of a deduction is made from the sum for which the bill calls.

The last part of the capital of a banker consists of his money reserve in gold and notes. The deposits, unless tied up by agreement for a certain time, are always at the disposal of the depositors. They are in a state of continual fluctuation. But while one depositor withdraws his, another brings his in, so that the general average amount of deposits fluctuates little during periods of normal business.

The reserve funds of the banks, in countries with capitalist production, always express on an average the magnitude of the money existing in the shape of a hoard, and a portion of this hoard in its turn consists of papers, mere drafts upon gold, which have no value in themselves. The greater portion of the banking capital is, therefore, purely fictitious and consists of certificates of indebtedness (bills of exchange), government securities (which represent spent capital), and stocks (claims on future yields of production). And it should not be forgotten, that the money-value of capital represented by these papers in the strongboxes of the banker is itself fictitious, even of those which are checks for guaranteed incomes, such as public bonds, or titles on actual capital, like industrial stocks, and that this value is regulated differently than that of the actual capital, which they represent at least in part; or, when they stand for mere claims on the output of production, and not for capital, that the claim on the same amount is expressed in a continually changing fictitious money-capital. In addition to this it must be noted, that this fictitious capital represents largely, not his own capital, but that of the public, which makes deposits with him, either with or without interest.

Deposits are always made in money, in gold or notes, or in checks upon these. With the exception of the reserve fund, which is contracted or expanded in proportion to the requirements of actual circulation, these deposits are in fact always in the hands, on one side, of the industrial capitalists and merchants, whose bills of exchange are discounted with them, and who receive advances out of them; on the other side, they are in the hands of dealers in securities (exchange brokers), or in the hands of private parties, who have sold their securities, or in the hands of the government (in the case of treasury notes and new loans). The deposits themselves play a double role. On the one hand, as we have just mentioned, they are loaned out as interest-bearing capital and are not found in the cash boxes of the banks, but figure merely in their books as credits of the depositors. On the other hand they figure as such book entries to the extent that the mutual credits of the depositors in the shape of checks on their deposits are balanced against one another and so recorded. In this procedure it is immaterial, whether these deposits are entrusted to the same banker, who can thus balance the various credits against each other, or whether this is done in different banks, who mutually exchange checks and pay only the balances to one another.

With the development of the credit system and of interest-bearing capital all capital seems to double, or even treble, itself by the various modes, in which the same capital, or perhaps the same claim on a debt, appears in different forms in different hands.95

The greater portion of this "money-capital" is purely fictitious. All the deposits, with the exception of the reserve fund, are merely credits placed with the banker, which however, never exist in deposit. To the extent that they serve in the Giro business, they perform the function of capital for the bankers, after these have loaned them out. They pay to one another their mutual checks upon the nonexisting deposits by balancing their mutual accounts.

Adam Smith says justly with regard to the role played by capital in the loaning of money: "Even in the money business the money is merely a check transferring from one hand to another such capitals as are not used by the owners. These capitals may be almost to any amount larger than the amount of money, which serves as an instrument of their transfer. The same pieces of money serve successively in many different loans, likewise in many different purchases. For instance, A lends to W 1,000 pounds sterling, with which W immediately buys from B 1,000 pounds sterling worth of commodities. Since B himself has no immediate use for this money, he lends the identical pieces of money to X, who immediately buys from C commodities worth 1,000 pounds sterling. In the same way and for the same reason C lends this money to Y, who again buys with it commodities from D. In this way the same pieces of gold or paper may serve in the course of a few days in the promotion of three different loans and three different purchases, each one of which has a value equal to the full amount of these pieces. What the three moneyed men, A, B and C have transferred to the three borrowers, W, X and Y, is the power to make these purchases. In this power consists both the value and the usefulness of these loans. The capital loaned out by these three moneyed men is equal to the value of the commodities that can be bought with it, and it is three times greater than the value of the money with which these purchases are made. Nevertheless all these loans may be perfectly safe, since the commodities bought with them by the different debtors are employed in such a way, that they will in time bring an equal value in gold or paper money with a profit to boot. And just as the same pieces of money may serve in the promotion of different loans to an amount exceeding their own value three times, or even thirty times, just so may they serve successively as means of return payment." (Book II, chapter IV.)

Since the same piece of money may perform different purchases, according to the velocity of its circulation, it may just as well perform the service of different loans, for the purchases take it from one hand to another, and a loan is but a transfer from one hand to another without the intervention of a purchase. To every seller his money represents the changed form of his commodities. Nowadays, when every value is expressed as the value of capital, it represents in the various loans different capitals, and this is but another way of saying that it can realise different commodity-values successively. At the same time it serves as a medium of circulation, in order to transfer the material capitals from hand to hand. In the transaction of loaning it does not pass from hand to hand as a medium of circulation. So long as it remains in the hands of the lender, it is in his hands not a medium of circulation, but the existing value of his capital. And in this form he transfers it when loaning it to another. If A had loaned the money to B, and B to C; without the intervention of purchases, then the same money would not represent three capitals, but only one, only one capital-value. How many capitals it actually represents depends on the number of times in which it performs the service of the embodied value of different commodity-capitals.

The same thing which Adam Smith says of loans in general applies also to deposits, since these are merely another name for loans, which the public gives to the bankers. The same pieces of money may serve as instruments for any number of deposits.

"It is undoubtedly true, that the 1,000 pounds sterling, which some one deposits today with A, are again issued tomorrow and become a deposit with B. The day after, paid away by B, they may form a deposit with C, and so forth infinitely. The same 1,000 pounds sterling may, therefore, by a number of transfers, multiply themselves into an absolutely indeterminable sum of deposits. It is, therefore, possible, that nine-tenths of all the deposits in the United Kingdom have no existence, save for the entries in the books of bankers registering them, who have to square accounts in due time....Such was the case in Scotland, where the currency of money never exceeded 3 million pounds sterling, while the deposits amounted to 27 millions. Unless a general run be made on the banks on account of these deposits, the same 1,000 pounds sterling, traveling backwards, might easily balance an equally indeterminable sum. Since the same 1,000 pounds sterling, with which some one pays today his debt to some dealer, may tomorrow settle this dealer's debt to some merchant, and next day the debt of the merchant to his bank, and so forth without end, the same 1,000 pounds sterling may also wander from hand to hand and from bank to bank, and balance any conceivable amount of deposits." (The Currency Question Reviewed, pp. 162, 163.)

Just as everything is duplicated and triplicated in this credit system and commuted into a mere fiction, so the same applies to the "reserve fund," where one would at last hope to grasp something solid.

Listen once more to Mr. Morris, the Governor of the Bank of England: "The reserves of the private banks are in the hands of the Bank of England in the form of deposits. The first effects of an export of gold seem to strike only the Bank of England; but it would just as well influence the reserves of the other banks, since it means an export of a part of the reserves, which they have deposited in our bank. In the same way it would influence the reserves of all provincial banks." (Commercial Distress 1847-48.) Ultimately, then, the reserve funds actually dissolve themselves into the reserve fund of the Bank of England.96

However, this reserve fund again has a double existence. The reserve fund of the banking department of the Bank of England is equal to the excess of the notes, which the Bank is authorised to issue, over the notes in circulation. The legal maximum of the note issue is 14 million pounds sterling (for which no metallic reserve is required; it is the approximate amount owed by the state to the Bank) plus the amount of the precious metals in the Bank. If the supply of precious metals in the Bank amounts to 14 million pounds sterling, the Bank can issue 28 millions in notes, and if 20 millions of these are in circulation, the reserve fund of the banking department is 8 million pounds sterling. These 8 million pounds sterling are, in that case, legally the banking capital at the disposal of the Bank, and at the same time the reserve fund for its deposits. If an exportation of gold takes place now, by which the supply of precious metals in the Bank is reduced by 6 millions—notes to this amount must be destroyed at the same time—then the reserve of the banking department would fall from 8 millions to 2 millions. On the one hand, the Bank would raise its rate of interest considerably; on the other hand, the banks having deposits with it, and the other depositors, would observe a large decrease of the reserve fund covering their own credits in the Bank. In 1857 four of the largest stock banks of London threatened to call in their deposits, and thereby bankrupt the banking department, unless the Bank of England would secure a "government script" suspending the Bank Acts of 1844.97

In this way the banking department might fail, while a certain number of millions (for instance, 8 millions in 1847) are held in its issue department to secure the convertibility of its circulating notes. But this security is once more illusory.

"The greater portion of the deposits, for which the bankers themselves have no immediate demand, passes into the hands of the bill brokers, who in return give to the banker security for his loan by means of commercial bills, which they have already discounted for people in London or in the provinces. The bill broker is responsible to the banker for the return payment of this money at call; and these transactions are of such an enormous volume, that Mr. Neave, the present Governor of the Bank of England, said in his testimony: We know that one broker had 5 millions, and we have reason to assume, that another had between 8 and 10 millions; another had 4, another 3½, a third more than 8. I speak of deposits with the brokers." (Report of Committee on Bank Acts, 1857-58, p. 5, section 8.)

"The London bill brokers...carried on their enormous business without any reserve in cash; they relied upon the incomes from the successively due bills, or when it came to the worst, upon their power to secure from the Bank of England loans on depositing bills discounted by them."—Two firms of bill brokers in London suspended payments in 1847; both resumed business later. In 1857 they suspended again. The liabilities of one of these firms amounted in 1847 in round figures to 2,683,000 pounds sterling with a capital of 180,000 pounds sterling; its liabilities in 1857 were 5,300,000 pounds sterling, while its capital apparently was not more than one-quarter of what it had been in 1847. The liabilities of the other firm were both times between 3 or 4 millions, while its capital amounted to no more than 45,000 pounds sterling. (Ibidem, p. XXI, section 52.)

CHAPTER XXX.

MONEY-CAPITAL AND ACTUAL CAPITAL, I.

THE only difficult questions, which we are now approaching in the matter of the credit system, are the following:

First: The accumulation of the money-capital strictly so-called. To what extent is it, and is it not, an indication of an actual accumulation of capital, that is, of reproduction on an enlarged scale? The so-called plethora of capital, an expression used only with reference to the interest-bearing capital, is it only a peculiar way of expressing industrial overproduction, or does it constitute a separate phenomenon alongside of it? Does this plethora, or this excessive supply of money-capital, coincide with the existence of stagnating masses of money (bullion, gold coin and bank notes), so that this superfluity of actual money is an expression and phenomenon of that plethora of loan capital?

Secondly: To what extent does a stringency of money, that is, a scarcity of loan capital, express a real lack of actual capital (commodity-capital and productive capital)? To what extent does it coincide, on the other hand, with a lack of money as such, a lack of currency?

So far as we have hitherto considered the peculiar form of accumulation of money-capital and of money wealth in general, it resolved itself into an accumulation of claims of ownership upon labor. The accumulation of the capital of the national debt has been revealed to mean merely an increase of a class of state creditors, who have the privilege of a first claim upon the revenues.98

In these facts, by which even an accumulation of debts may appear as an accumulation of capital, the perfection of the reversal accomplished by the credit system becomes apparent. These certificates of indebtedness, which are issued in place of the originally loaned and long spent capital, these paper duplicates of destroyed capital, serve for their owners as capital to the extent that they are salable commodities and may, therefore, be reconverted into capital.

The titles of ownership upon company business, railroads, mines, etc., are indeed, as we have seen, titles on actual capital. But they do not imply any control of this capital. It cannot be called in. They merely convey legal titles to a portion of the surplus-value to be produced by it. But these titles become likewise paper duplicates of the actual capital, as though a bill of lading were to acquire a value separate from the cargo and simultaneously with it. They become nominal representatives of a capital that does not exist. For the actual capital exists simultaneously and does not change hands by the transfer of those duplicates. They assume the form of interest-bearing capital, because they not only safeguard a certain income, but also make it possible to secure possession of their capital-value in the shape of a return-payment when sold. To the extent that the accumulation of these papers expresses the accumulation of railroads, mines, steamships, etc., it indicates the expansion of the actual process of reproduction, just as the expansion, say, of a tax list indicates the expansion of the taxed objects, for instance, of movable property. But as duplicates serving themselves as commodities for sale and this circulating as capital-values they are illusory, and their value may fall or rise independently of the value of the actual capital, upon which they represent a claim. Their value, that is, their quotation at the Stock Exchange, necessarily has a tendency to rise with a fall in the rate of interest, so far as this fall, independently of the peculiar movements of money-capital, is due merely to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall; so that this imaginary wealth, which has originally a nominal value for each of its aliquot parts, expands for this reason alone in the course of capitalist production.99

Gain and loss through fluctuations in the price of these titles of ownership, and their centralisation in the hands of railroad kings, etc., naturally becomes more and more a matter of gambling, which takes the place of labor as the original method of acquiring capital and also assumes the place of direct force. This sort of imaginary money wealth does not merely constitute a very considerable part of the money wealth of private people, but also of banking capital, as we have already indicated.

In order to settle this point without delay, we mention the idea, that one might also mean by the accumulation of money-capital the accumulation of wealth in the hands of bankers (money lenders by profession), acting as middle men between private money-capitalists on one side and the state, communities, and reproducing borrowers on the other. For the entire vast extension of the credit system, and of all credit in general, is exploited by them as though it were their private capital. These fellows possess capital and incomes always in the form of money or of direct claims upon money. The accumulation of the wealth of this class may proceed in a direction very different from actual accumulation, but it proves at any rate, that this class pockets a good deal of the real accumulation.

Let us reduce the inquiry to narrower limits. Government bonds, like stocks and other securities of all kinds, are spheres of investment for loanable capital, for capital intended to bear interest. They are forms of loaning such capital. But they are not the loan capital itself, which is invested in them. On the other hand, so far as credit plays a direct role in the process of reproduction: what the industrial capitalist or the merchant need when wishing to have a bill discounted or a loan granted is neither stocks nor government bonds. What they need is money. They pawn or sell those securities, when they cannot secure money in any other way. It is the accumulation of this loan capital, with which we have to deal here, and more particularly of the loanable money-capital. We are not here concerned in the loans of houses, machines, or other fixed capital. Nor are we concerned in loans, which industrials and merchants make to one another in the shape of commodities and within the circle of the process of reproduction. We must, indeed, investigate this point still farther before we proceed. But we are concerned exclusively in loans of money, which are made by bankers, as middle men, to industrials and merchants.

Let us, then, analyse first the commercial credit, that is, the credit which the capitalists engaged in reproduction give to one another. It forms the basis of the credit system. Its representative is the bill of exchange, a certificate of indebtedness whose payment is due at a certain date, a document of deferred payment. Every one gives credit with one hand and takes it with the other. Let us leave aside, for the present, the banking credit, which constitutes another, quite different, element. To the extent that these bills in their turn circulate among the merchants as means of payment, by endorsement from one to another, without the intervention of discount, it is merely a transfer of a claim of indebtedness from A to B, and does not alter anything in the general connection. It merely places one man into the position of another. And even in this case the liquidation may take place without the intervention of money. The spinner A, for instance, has to pay a bill of exchange to the cotton broker B, and he has to pay a bill to the importer C. Now, if C also exports yarn, which happens often enough, he may buy yarn from A on a bill of exchange, and the spinner A may guarantee the broker B with the broker's own bill paid by C to A, whereby at best a balance may have to be settled. The entire transaction then promotes merely the exchange of cotton and yarn. The exporter represents but the spinner, the cotton broker the cotton planter.

In the cycle of this commercial credit we must note two things:

First: The settlement of these mutual claims of indebtedness depends upon the reflux of capital, that is, of C—M, which is merely deferred. If the spinner has received a bill of exchange from a cotton goods manufacturer, then this manufacturer can pay, when he has sold the cotton goods, which he has on the market. If the corn speculator has made out a bill of exchange on his dealer, then the dealer can pay the money, if the corn has meanwhile been sold at the expected price. These payments, then, depend upon the smooth run of the reproduction, that is, the process of production and consumption. But since the credits are mutual, the solvency of one depends upon the solvency of another; for in making out his bill of exchange every one may have counted either on the reflux of the capital in his own business or on the reflux of the capital in anothers business, who has to pay him for a bill of exchange drawn in the meantime. Aside from the prospect of returns, the payment is possible only by means of reserve capital, which the writer of the bill has at his command, in order to meet his obligations in case the returns should be delayed.

Secondly: This credit system does not do away with the necessity of cash payments. For a large portion of the expenses must always be paid in cash, such as wages, taxes etc. Furthermore, capitalist B, who has received from C a bill of exchange in place of cash payment, may have to pay his own due bill to D before the bill of C becomes due, and so he must have ready cash. A rotation of such completeness as that assumed above in the reproduction from cotton planter to cotton spinner and vice versa will be an exception; as a rule reproduction will be infringed at many points. We have seen in the discussion of the process of reproduction, volume II, Part III, that the producers of constant capital exchange partly constant capital among each other. In such a case the bills of exchange may be balanced against one another more or less. The same may be the case in the ascending line of production, where the cotton broker draws on the cotton spinner, the spinner on the manufacturer of cotton goods, the manufacturer on the exporter, the exporter on the importer (who may be an importer of cotton). But the cycle of these transactions is not completed simultaneously, and the series of claims is not turned around backward in the same way. For instance, the claim of the spinner on the weaver is not settled by the claim of the coal dealer on the machine builder. The spinner never has any counterclaims in his business on the machine manufacturer, because his product, yarn, never enters as an element into the process of reproduction of the machine maker. Such claims must, therefore, be settled by money.

The limits of this commercial credit, considered by itself, are 1), the wealth of the industrials and merchants, that is, their command of reserve capital in case of delayed returns; 2) these returns themselves. These may be delayed in time or the prices of commodities may fall in the meantime or the commodities may become momentarily unsalable through a clogging of the markets. The longer the bill runs, the larger must be the reserve capital, and the greater is the possibility of an infringement or retardation of the returns through a fall of prices or an overstocking of markets. And, furthermore, the returns are so much less secure, the more the original transaction was conditioned upon speculation on the rise or fall of the prices of commodities. But it is evident, that with the development of the productive power of labor, and thus of production on a large scale, 1) the markets expand and move a greater distance from the place of production; 2) that credits must be prolonged in consequence; 3) that the speculative element must thus more and more dominate the transactions. Production on a large scale and for distant markets throws the total product into the hands of commerce; but it is impossible, that the capital of a nation should be doubled in such a way, that commerce by itself would be able to buy up the entire national product with its own capital and to sell it again. Credit is, therefore, indispensable here. Credit must grow in volume with the growing volume of value in production, and it must grow in the matter of time with the increasing distance of the markets. A mutual interaction takes place here. The development of the process of production extends the credit, and credit leads to an extension of industrial and commercial operations.

Looking upon this credit separate from banking credit, it is evident that it grows with an increasing volume of industrial capital itself. Loan capital and industrial capital are here identical. The loaned capitals are commodity-capitals, intended either for ultimate individual consumption, or for the replacement of the constant elements of productive capital. What appears as loan capital in this case is always capital existing in some definite phase of the process of reproduction, but passing through sale and purchase from one hand to the other, while its equivalent is not paid to the buyer until later at some stipulated time. For instance, the cotton passes into the hands of the spinner in exchange for a bill of exchange, the yarn into the hands of the manufacturer of cotton goods in exchange for another bill, the cotton goods into the hands of the merchant for another bill, from the hands of the merchant into those of the exporter for another bill, from the hands of the exporter for another bill into those of some merchant in India, who sells the goods and buys indigo instead, etc. During this passage from hand to hand the cotton accomplishes its metamorphosis into cotton goods, and the cotton goods are finally transported to India and exchanged for indigo, which is shipped to Europe and enters there into the reproductive process. The various phases of the process of reproduction are here promoted by the credit, without any payment on the part of the spinner for the cotton, on the part of the manufacturer of cotton goods for the yarn, on the part of the merchant for the cotton goods, etc. In the first acts of this process the commodity, cotton, goes through its different phases of production, and this transition is promoted by credit. But as soon as the cotton has received its ultimate form as a commodity, the same commodity-capital passes on through the hands of different merchants, who promote its transportation to distant markets, and the last of the merchants finally sells these commodities to the consumer and buys other commodities in their stead, which passes either into consumption or into the process of reproduction. Here, then, we have to distinguish two sections: In the first, credit promotes the actual successive phases in the production of the same article; in the second, it promotes merely the passage of the finished article from the hands of one merchant into those of another, including its transportation, in other words, the act C—M. Yet the commodity is even here at least in a process of circulation, that is, in a phase of the process of reproduction.

It follows, then, that it is never unemployed capital, which is loaned here, but capital, which must change its form in the hands of its owner and which exists in such a form, that it is merely commodity-capital for him, that is, capital which must be reconverted into its original form, and for the present, at least, into money. It is, therefore, the metamorphosis of the commodity, which is here promoted by credit; not merely C—M, but also M—C and the actual process of reproduction. Much credit within the reproductive cycle does not signify (banker's credit excepted) much unemployed capital, which is offered for loans and looking for profitable investment. It means rather much employment for capital in the process of reproduction. Credit promotes here, 1) so far as the industrial capitalists are concerned, the transition of industrial capital from one phase into another, the connection of the related and dove-tailing spheres of production; 2) so far as the merchants are concerned, it promotes the transportation and the passage of commodities from one hand to another until their definite sale for money or their exchange for other commodities.

The maximum of credit is here identical with the fullest employment of industrial capital, that is, the utmost exertion of its reproductive power without regard to the limits of consumption. These limits of consumption are extended by the exertions of the process of reproduction itself. On one hand this increases the consumption of revenue on the part of laborers and capitalists, on the other it is identical with an exertion of productive consumption.

So long as the process of reproduction is in flow and the reflux assured, this credit lasts and extends, and its extension is based upon the extension of the process of reproduction itself. As soon as a stoppage takes place, in consequence of delayed returns, overstocked markets, fallen prices, there is a superfluity of industrial capital, but it is in a form, in which it cannot perform its functions. It is a mass of commodity-capital, but it is unsalable. It is a mass of fixed capital, but largely unemployed through the clogging of reproduction. Credit is contracted, 1) because this capital is unemployed, that is, stops in one of its phases of reproduction, not being able to complete its metamorphosis; 2) because confidence in the continuity of the process of reproduction has been shaken; 3) because the demand for this commercial credit decreases. The spinner, who restricts his production and has a mass of unsold yarn in stock, does not need to buy any cotton on credit; the merchant does not need to buy any commodities on credit, because he has more than enough of them.

Hence, if this expansion is disturbed, or even the normal exertion of the process of reproduction infringed, credit also becomes scarce; it is more difficult to get commodities on credit. It is particularly the demand for cash payment and the caution observed toward sales on credit which are characteristic of that phase of the industrial cycle, which follows a crash. In the crisis itself, when every one has things to sell, cannot sell them, and yet must sell them, if he would secure means of payment, it is not the mass of the unemployed and investment seeking capital, but rather the mass of capital tied up in his process of reproduction, that is greatest just when the lack of credit is most felt (and the rate of discount highest in banking credit). The hitherto invested capital is then, indeed, unemployed, because the process of reproduction lags. Factories are closed, raw materials accumulate, finished products swamp the market as commodities. Nothing is more erroneous, therefore, than to blame a scarcity of productive capital for such a condition. It is precisely at such times that there is a superabundance of productive capital, partly so far as the normal, but temporarily contracted, scale of reproduction is concerned, partly with regard to the paralysed consumption.

Let us suppose that the whole society is composed only of industrial capitalists and wage workers. Let us furthermore make exceptions of fluctuations of prices, which prevent large portions of the total capital from reproducing themselves under average conditions and which, owing to the general interrelations of the entire process of reproduction, such as are developed particularly by credit, must always call forth general stoppages of a transient nature. Let us also make abstraction of the bogus transactions and speculations, which the credit system favors. In that case, a crisis could be explained only by a disproportion of the consumption of the capitalists and the accumulation of their capitals. But as matters stand, the reproduction of the capitals invested in production depends largely upon the consuming power of the non-producing classes; while the consuming power of the laborers is handicapped partly by the laws of wages, partly by the fact that it can be exerted only so long as the laborers can be employed at a profit for the capitalist class. The last cause of all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as compared to the tendency of capitalist production to develop the productive forces in such a way, that only the absolute power of consumption of the entire society would be their limit.

A real lack of productive capital, at least among capitalistically developed nations, can be said to exist only in times of general crop failures, either in the principal means of subsistence, or in the principal raw materials of industry.

However, in addition to this commercial credit we have the money credit strictly so-called. The loans of the industrials and merchants among one another go hand in hand with loans made to then by the banker and money lender in the form of money. In the discounting of bills of exchange the loan is but nominal. A manufacturer sells his product for a bill of exchange and gets this bill discounted at some bill broker's. In reality this broker loans only the credit of his banker, and this banker loans to the broker the money of his depositors, made up of the industrial capitalists and merchants themselves, of drawers of ground rent and other unproductive classes, but also of laborers (in saving banks). In this way every industrial manufacturer and merchant gets around the necessity of keeping a large reserve fund and being dependent upon his actual returns. On the other hand the whole process becomes so complicated, partly by the making of bogus checks, partly by operations with commodities for the mere purpose of writing bills of exchange, that the semblance of a solid business and a smooth run of returns may persist even after returns come in only at the expense of swindled money lenders or swindled producers. Thus the business appears almost too sound just on the eve of a crash. The best proof of this is furnished, for instance, by the Reports on Bank Acts of 1857 and 1858, in which all bank directors, merchants, in short, all the summoned experts, with Lord Overstone at their head, congratulated one another on the prosperity and soundness of business—just one month before the eruption of the crisis of August, 1857. And, queer enough, Tooke in his History of Prices passes through the same illusion as the historian of every crisis. Business is always thoroughly sound and the campaign in full swing, until the collapse suddenly overtakes them.

We revert now to the accumulation of money-capital.

Not every augmentation of loanable capital indicates a real accumulation of capital or expansion of the process of reproduction. This becomes most evident in the phase of the industrial cycle following immediately after a crisis, when loanable capital lies fallow in masses. In such moments, in which the process of production is restricted (production in the English industrial districts was reduced by one-third after the crisis of 1847), prices of commodities at their lowest level, the spirit of enterprise paralysed, the rat of interest is low, and it indicates then merely an increase of loanable capital precisely because the industrial capital has been laid lame. It is quite obvious, that less currency is required, when the prices of commodities have fallen, the number of transactions decreased, and the capital invested in wages contracted; that, on the other hand, additional money is required for the function of world money after the debts to foreign countries have been settled either by the exportation of gold or by bankruptcies; that, finally, the volume of the business of discounting bills diminishes with the number and amounts of bills of exchange. Hence the demand for loanable capital, either in the form of means of circulation or of means of payment (the investment of new capital being out of the question for a while), decreases and it becomes relatively abundant. At the same time, the supply of loanable capital increases also positively under such circumstances, as we shall see later.

Thus "a reduction of transactions and a great super-abundance of money" prevailed after the crisis of 1847 (Commercial Distress, 1847-48, Evidence No. 1664.) The rate of interest was very low on account of the "almost complete annihilation of commerce and nearly utter absence of a possibility of investing money" (1. c., p. 45, Testimony of Hodgson, Director of the Royal Bank of Liverpool). What nonsense those gentlemen concocted (and Hodgson is one of the best of them) in order to explain these facts, may be seen from the following phrase: "The stringency (1847) arose from an actual reduction of the money-capital in the country, caused partly by the necessity of paying for the imports from all quarters of the globe in gold, and partly by the conversion of floating capital into fixed." How the conversion of circulating capital into fixed capital should reduce the money-capital of a country is unintelligible. For in the case of railroads, e.g., in which capital was mainly invested at that time, neither gold nor paper are used up for viaducts and rails, and the money for the railroad stocks, to the extent that it had been deposited for subscriptions, performed exactly the same functions as any other money deposited in banks and even increased the loanable money-capital temporarily, as shown above. But to the extent that it had been spent for construction, it circulated in the country as a means of circulation and payment. Only so far as fixed capital cannot be exported, so that with the impossibility of its export the available capital secured by returns from exported articles is eliminated, including the returns in bullion or cash, might the money-capital be affected. But English export articles were likewise piled up in masses on the foreign markets without being salable. It is true, the floating capital of the merchants and manufacturers of Manchester, etc., who had tied up a portion of their normal business capital in railroad stocks and were therefore dependent upon loan capital for the continuation of their business, had become fixed, and they had to put up with the consequences. But it would have been the same, if the capital belonging to their business, but withdrawn from it, had been invested, say, in mines instead of railroads, mining products like iron, coal, copper being themselves floating capital.

The actual reduction of available money-capital through crop failure, corn imports, and gold exports constituted an event that had nothing to do with the railroad swindles.—"Nearly all commercial firms had begun to starve their business more or less, in order to invest the money in railroads."—The very extensive loans, which were made to railroads by commercial firms, misled the latter to depend far too much through the discounting of bills upon the banks and to carry on the commercial business in this way" (the same Hodgson, 1. c., p. 67). "In Manchester immense losses were sustained through speculation in railroads" (R. Gardner, previously mentioned in volume I chapter XV, 3, c, p. 449, American edition, and in other places, Evidence No. 4877, 1. c.).

One of the principal causes of the crisis of 1847 was the colossal overcrowding of the markets and the unbounded swindle in the East Indian trade with commodities. But there were also other circumstances, which bankrupted very rich firms in this line: "They had plenty of means, but these could not be made available. Their entire capital was tied up in real estate in Mauritius, or in indigo and sugar factories. After they had assumed obligations to the tune of 5-600,000 pounds sterling, they had no means at hand to pay their bills of exchange, and finally it was found that, in order to pay their bills, they would have to rely entirely upon credit" (Ch. Turner, great East Indian merchant in Liverpool, No. 730, 1. c.).—See furthermore Gardner, No. 4872, 1. c.: Immediately after the Chinese treaty such great prospects for a tremendous extension of our trade with China were held out to this country, that many large factories were built expressly for this business, for the purpose of manufacturing the cotton goods mainly demanded in the Chinese markets, and these were added to all our already existing factories."—4874. "How did this business come out?"—"Most disastrously, so that it defies almost every description; I do not believe, that of all the shipments to China in 1844 and 1845 more than two-thirds of the amount have ever returned; tea being the principal article of return export, and such great prospects having been held out to us, we manufacturers counted without fail on a large reduction of the tea tax."—And now, naively expressed, comes the characteristic confession of faith of the English manufacturer: "Our trade with a foreign market is not limited by its capacity of consuming our products, it is rather limited here at home by our capacity of consuming the products, which we receive in return for our industrial products." (The relatively poor countries, with whom England trades, are supposed to be able to pay for and consume any amount of English products, but unfortunately wealthy England cannot digest the products sent in return.)—4876. "At first I shipped a few commodities out, and these were sold at a loss of about 15% in the full conviction that the price, at which my agents could buy tea, would yield so large a profit through its sale here, that this loss would be made good; but instead of making a profit, I lost sometimes 25% and even as much as 50%."—4877. "Did the manufacturers export for their own account?"—"Principally; the merchants, it seems, saw very soon that they did not make anything, and they encouraged the manufacturers to make consignments rather than to participate in them themselves."—In 1857, on the other hand, the losses and failures fell mainly upon the merchants, since the manufacturers left to them the task of overcrowding the foreign markets "for their own account."

An expansion of the money-capital arising from the fact that in consequence of the expansion of the banking business a former private hoard or coin reserve may be converted into loanable capital for a short while, does not indicate a growth of the productive capital any more than the increasing deposits of the London stock banks, as soon as they began to pay interest on deposits. (See the example of Ipswich farther along, where in the course of a few years immediately preceding 1857 the deposits of the capitalist farmers were quadrupled.) So long as the scale of production remains the same, this expansion leads only to an abundance of the loanable money-capital compared to the productive. Hence the rate of interest is low.

After the process of reproduction has again reached that state of prosperity, which precedes that of overexertion, the commercial credit once more arrives at a great expansion, which has then indeed for its "sound" basis a flow of easy returns and more extended production. In this state the rate of interest is still low, although it rises above its minimum. This is in fact the only time, of which it may be said, that a low rate of interest, and consequently a relative abundance, of loanable capital, coincide with a real expansion of industrial capital. The facility and regularity of the returns, together with an extensive commercial credit, secures the supply of loan capital in spite of the increased demand for it, and prevents the level of the rate of interest from rising. Moreover, those knights now appear in large numbers, who work without any reserve capital, or even without any capital at all and operate wholly on a credit basis. To this is added the great expansion of the fixed capital of all forms, and the inauguration of vast masses of new enterprises of wide scope. The interest now rises to its average level. It arrives once more at its maximum, as soon as the new crisis comes in, when credit suddenly stops, payments are suspended, the process of reproduction is delayed, and a superabundance of industrial capital is unemployed, with the above-mentioned exceptions, while there is an almost absolute lack of loan capital.

On the whole, then, the movements of loan capital, as expressed in the rate of interest, tend in a direction opposite to that of industrial capital. That phase in which a low rate of interest rising just above its minimum coincides with an "improvement" and a growing confidence after a crisis, and particularly that phase, in which the rate of interest reaches its average level, midway between its minimum and maximum, are the only two periods in which an abundance of loan capital is available simultaneously with a great expansion of industrial capital. But at the beginning of the industrial cycle a low rate of interest coincides with a contraction, and at the end of an industrial cycle a high rate of interest coincides with a superabundance, of industrial capital. The low rate of interest, which indicates an "improvement," shows that commercial credit requires the assistance of banking credit but to a slight degree, because it still stands on its own legs.

The industrial cycle is of such a character, that the same cycle must periodically reproduce itself, once that the first impulse has been given.100

In the condition of lassitude production sinks below the level, which it had reached in the preceding cycle, and for which the technical basis has now been laid. During prosperity, the middle period, it continues to develop on this basis. In the period of overproduction and swindle it exerts the productive forces to the utmost, even beyond the capitalistic limits of the process of production.

That means of payment are scarce during the period of crisis, goes without saying. The convertibility of bills of exchange has substituted itself for the metamorphosis of commodities themselves, and so much more so at such times, as a portion of the firms operates purely on credit. An ignorant and mistaken legislation, such as that of 1844-45, may intensify a money crisis. But no manner of bank legislation can abolish a crisis.

In a system of production, in which the entire connection of the process of reproduction rests upon credit, a crisis must obviously occur through a tremendous rush for means of payment, when credit suddenly ceases and nothing but cash payment goes. At first glance, therefore, the whole crisis seems to be merely a credit crisis and money crisis. And in fact it is but a question of the convertibility of bills of exchange into cash money. But the majority of these bills represent actual sales and purchases, and it is the extension of these far beyond the demands of society which is at the bottom of the whole crisis. At the same time an enormous quantity of these bills represents mere swindles, and this becomes apparent now, when they burst. There are furthermore unlucky speculations made with the money of other people. Finally there are commodity-capitals, which have either become depreciated or unsalable or returns that can never more be realized. This entire artificial system of forced expansion of the process of reproduction cannot, of course, be remedied by having some bank, like the Bank of England, give to the swindlers the needed capital in the shape of paper notes and buy up all the depreciated commodities at their old nominal values. Moreover, everything appears turned upside down here, since no real prices and their real basis appear in this paper world, but only bullion, metal coin, notes, bills of exchange, securities. Particularly in the centers, in which the whole money business of the country is crowded together, like London, this reversion becomes apparent; the entire process becomes unintelligible. It is not quite so in the industrial centers.

By the way, we make the following remarks about the superabundance of industrial capital, which shows itself during crises: The commodity-capital is in itself also a money-capital, that is, a definite sum of money expressed in the price of the commodities. As a use-value it is a definite quantity of useful objects, and there is a superfluity of them at the time of the crisis. But as a money-capital in itself, as a potential money-capital, it is subject to continual expansion and contraction. On the eve of a crisis, and during its sway, commodity-capital in its capacity as a potential money-capital is contracted. It represents less money-capital for its owner and his creditors (likewise as a security for bills of exchange and loans), than it did at the time when it was bought and when the discounts and loans made on it were transacted. If this is the meaning of the contention, that the money-capital of a country is reduced in times of stringency, it is identical with the statement, that the prices of commodities have fallen. Such a collapse of prices merely balances their inflation in preceding periods.

The incomes of the unproductive classes and of those, who live on fixed incomes, remain for the greater part stationary during the inflation of prices going hand in hand with an overproduction and overspeculation. Hence their consuming capacity diminishes relatively, and with it their ability to reproduce that portion of the total reproduction, which should enter normally into consumption. Even though their demand should remain nominally the same, it decreases actually.

With reference to the imports and exports we remark, that all countries become successively implicated in a crisis, and that then it becomes evident, that all of them, with few exceptions, have exported and imported too much, so that there is a balance of payment against all of them. The trouble, therefore, is not with the balance of payment. For instance, England suffers from an export of gold. It has imported too much. But at the same time all other countries are overcrowded with English goods. They have also imported too much, or too much have been imported into them. (There is, indeed, a difference between that country, which exports on credit, and those countries, which export little or nothing on credit. But in that case, these last countries import on credit; and this is not the case only when commodities are sent to them on consignment.) The crisis may first break out in England, in that country which gives most of the credit and takes least of it, because the balance of payment due, which must be squared immediately, is against it, even though the general balance of trade is for it. This is explained partly by the credit which it has granted, partly by the mass of capitals loaned to foreign countries, so that a large quantity of returns come back to it in the shape of commodities, aside from actual trade returns. (However, the crisis broke out sometimes in America, that country in which most of the trade and capital credit is taken from England.) The crash in England, introduced and accompanied by an export of gold, settles England's balance of payment, partly by a bankruptcy of its importers (about which more is said farther on), partly by throwing off a portion of its commodity-capital at cut prices to foreign countries, partly by the sale of foreign securities, the purchase of English securities, etc. Now it is the turn of some other country. The balance of payment was momentarily in its favor. But now the time normally allowed between the balance of payment and balance of trade has been reduced by the crisis or entirely abolished. All payments are now supposed to be made immediately. The same thing is now repeated here. England now has a return of gold, the other country an export of gold. What appears in one country as excessive imports, appears in the other as excessive exports, and vice versa. But overimports and overexports have taken place in all countries (we are not alluding now to any crop failures, but to a general crisis); that is, there has been a general overproduction, promoted by credit and the inflation of prices that goes with it.

In 1857, the crisis broke out in the United States. An export of gold from England to America followed. But as soon as the inflation in America collapsed, the crisis broke out in England and the gold export went from America to England. The same took place between England and the continent. The balance of payment is in times of general crisis against every nation, at least against every commercially developed nation, but always the one succeeding the other, like firing in squads, as soon as the turn of each comes for making payments. And once the crisis has broken out, say, in England, it compresses the succession of these terms of payment into a very short period. It then becomes evident, that all these nations have simultaneously overexported (and overproduced) and overimported (and overtraded), that prices were inflated in all of them, and credit overdrawn. And the same collapse follows in all of them. The phenomenon of gold exports then shows itself successively in all of them, and proves by this very generality, 1), that the gold exports are but an evidence of a crisis, not its cause; 2), that the succession, in which the gold exports take place in different countries, indicates only the time when their turn has come to settle their affairs, the time when the crisis seizes them and causes an eruption of its latent forces.

It is characteristic for the English economic writers—and the economic literature worth mentioning since 1830 resolves itself mainly into a literature on currency, credit, crisis—that they look upon the exports of precious metals in times of crisis, in spite of the alteration of quotations on bills, merely from the standpoint of England, as a purely national phenomenon, and completely close their eyes against the fact, that all other European banks raise their rate of interest, when their own bank raises its in times of crisis, and that, when the cry of distress over the exports of gold is raised in their country today, it is taken up in America tomorrow and in Germany and France the day after.

In 1847, "the obligations of England had to be fulfilled" [mostly for corn]. "Unfortunately they were mostly fulfilled by bankruptcies." [The wealthy England got its breath by bankruptcies in its obligations toward the Continent and America.] "But so far as they were met by bankruptcies, they were fulfilled by the export of precious metals." (Report of Committee on Bank Acts, 1857.) In other words so far as a crisis is intensified by bank legislation, this legislation is a means of cheating the corn-exporting countries in periods of famine, robbing them first of their corn and then of the money for the corn. A prohibition of the export of corn in such periods and in such countries, which are themselves suffering more or less from stringencies, is, therefore, a very rational measure to thwart the above plan of the Bank of England for "meeting obligations on corn imports by bankruptcies." It is in that case much better that the corn producers and speculators should lose a portion of their profit for the good of their own country than their capital for the good of England.

It follows from the above, that the commodity-capital largely loses its capacity of representing potential money-capital during a crisis, and during periods of business depression in general. The same is true of fictitious capital, interest-bearing papers, so far as they circulate in the stock exchanges as money-capital. Their price falls with a rise of interest. It falls furthermore through a general lack of credit, which compels their owner to throw them in masses on the market, in order to secure money. It falls, finally, in the case of stocks, partly in consequence of the spurious character of the enterprises which they represent, partly in consequence of a decrease of the revenues, for which they constitute drafts. The fictitious capital is enormously reduced in times of crisis, and with it the power of its owners to loan money on it in the market. However, the reduction of the money denomination of these securities in the stock exchange quotations has nothing to do with the actual capital which they represent, but very much indeed with the solvency of their owners.

CHAPTER XXXI.

MONEY-CAPITAL AND ACTUAL CAPITAL. II.
(Continued.)

WE have not yet come to the end of the question, to what extent the accumulation of capital in the form of loanable money-capital coincides with the actual accumulation, the expansion of the process of reproduction.

The conversion of money into loanable money-capital is a far simpler matter than the transformation of money into productive capital. But two things should be distinguished here.

1). The mere conversion of money into money-capital;
2.) The conversion of capital or revenue into money, which is turned into loan capital.

It is only the last named point, which can imply a positive accumulation of loan capital connected with an actual accumulation of industrial capital.

1. Conversion of Money into Loan Capital.

We have already seen, that an accumulation of loan capital to the point of oversaturation may take place, which is connected with productive accumulation only to the extent that it stands in the opposite proportion to it. This is the case in two phases of the industrial cycle, namely first during the time, when the industrial capital in both its forms of productive and commodity-capital is contracted, that is, at the beginning of the cycle after a crisis; and secondly at the time, when the improvement begins without, however, demanding as yet very much bank credit for commercial capital. In the first case the money-capital, which was formerly employed in production and commerce, appears as unemployed loan capital; in the second case it appears employed to an increasing degree, but at a very low rate of interest, because then the industrial and commercial capitalist prescribes the conditions for the money capitalist. The superabundance of loan capital expresses in the first case a stagnation of industrial capital, and in the second a relative independence of commercial credit from banking credit, based on the fluidity of the returns, a short term of credit, and a preponderance of operations with one's own capital. The speculators, who count on the credit capital of other people, have not yet appeared upon the field; the people, who work with their own capital, are still far removed from an approximation to operations based purely on credit. In the first named phase the superfluity of loan capital is the direct opposite of the expression of actual accumulation. In the second phase it coincides with a renewed expansion of the process of reproduction, accompanies it, but is not its cause. The superabundance of loan capital is already decreasing, is only a relative one compared to the demand. In both cases the expansion of the actual process of accumulation is promoted by it, since the low interest, which coincides in the first case with low prices, in the second with slowly rising prices, increases that portion of the profit, which is transformed into profits of enterprise. This takes place still more when interest rises to its average level during the height of the period of prosperity, when it has grown, but not in the same proportion as profit.

We have seen, on the other hand, that an accumulation of loan capital may take place without any actual accumulation, by mere technical means, such as an expansion and concentration of the banking system, a saving in the currency reserve, or in the reserve fund of private means of payment, which are then always converted into loan capital for a short time. Although this loan capital, which is also called floating capital for this reason, retains the form of loan capital only for short periods (and discount is supposed to be given for short periods only), it flows continually back and forth. If one withdraws it, another brings it along. The mass of loanable money-capital grows thus quite independently of the actual accumulation (we speak here quite generally of short-lived loans on bills and deposits, not of loans for a number of years).

B. C. 1857. Question 501. "What do you mean by floating capital?"—Answer of Mr. Weguelin, Governor of the Bank of England: "It is capital available for money loans on short time."...(502) Notes of the Bank of England...of the provincial banks, and the amount of money existing in the country.—Question: "It does not seem, from the testimony submitted to this Committee, provided you mean by floating capital the active circulation" [of the notes of the Bank of England] "as though there were any very considerable fluctuation in this active circulation?" [But there is a great difference, whether this active circulation is loaned by the money lender or advanced by the reproductive capitalist himself.] Weguelin's answer: "I include in the floating capital the reserves of the bankers, in which there is considerable fluctuation."—That is to say, there is considerable fluctuation in that portion of the deposits, which the bankers have not loaned out again, but which figures as their reserve, and for the greater part also as the reserve of the Bank of England, where they are deposited. Finally the same gentleman says that floating capital is bullion, that is, bullion and hard cash (503).—It is truly wonderful, what a different meaning and different form all economic categories receive in this credit jargon of the money market. Floating capital is there the term for circulating capital, which is, of course, quite another thing, money is capital, bullion is capital, bank notes are currency, capital is a commodity, debts are commodities, and fixed capital is money invested in papers that are salable with difficulty!

"The stock banks of London...have increased their deposits from 8,850,774 pounds sterling in 1847 to 43,100,724 pounds sterling in 1857....The evidences and testimonies placed before this Committee permit the conclusion, that a great part of this immense amount is derived from sources, which were formerly not available for this purpose; and that the custom of opening an account with the banker and depositing money with him has extended to numerous classes, that formerly did not invest their capital(!) in this manner. Mr. Rodwell, President of the Association of Provincial Private Banks" [distinguished from stock banks] "and delegated by it to testify before this Committee, states that in the region of Ipswich this custom has quadrupled of late among the capitalist farmers and small business men of that district; that nearly all farmers, even those paying only 50 pounds sterling of rent annually, now have deposits in banks. The mass of these deposits, of course, finds its way to employment in business, and gravitates particularly toward London, the center of commercial activity, where they are first employed in discounting bills and in making other loans to the customers of London Bankers. But a large portion of them, which the bankers themselves cannot use immediately, pass into the hands of bill brokers, who give to the bankers commercial bills in their stead, which they have already discounted once before for people in London and in the provinces." (B. C. 1858, p. 8.)

In giving loans to the bill broker on bills which this broker has discounted once, the banker practically discounts them again; but in reality very many of these bills have already been rediscounted by the bill broker, and he rediscounts new bills with the very same money, with which the banker rediscounts the bills of the bill broker. What this leads to is shown by the following passage: "Extensive fictitious credits have been created by accommodation bills and blank credits, and this was very much facilitated by the procedure of the provincial stock banks, that discounted such bills and then had them rediscounted by bill brokers in the London market, and at that solely on the strength of the bank's credit, without regard to the further quality of the bills." (L. c.)

Concerning this rediscounting and the help which these purely technical increase of loanable capital lends to credit swindlers, the following extract from the "Economist" is instructive: "During many years capital" [namely loanable money-capital] "accumulated in some districts of the country more rapidly then it could be employed, while in others the means of its investment grew faster than the capital itself. While the bankers in the agricultural districts thus found no opportunity to invest their deposits profitably and safely in their own region, those in the industrial districts and the commercial cities had more demand for capital than they could supply. The effect of these different conditions in the various districts has led in recent years to the rise and startlingly rapid extension of a new class of firms engaged in the distribution of capital, who, although generally called bill brokers, are in reality bankers on the very largest scale. The business of these firms is to assume, for definitely agreed periods and at definitely fixed interest, the surplus-capital of the banks in districts in which it could not be employed, just like the temporarily idle funds of stock companies and great commercial firms, and to loan this money at a higher rate of interest to the banks in districts where capital is more in demand; as a rule by rediscounting the bills of their customers....In this way Lombard Street became the great center, in which the transfer of unemployed capital takes place from one part of the country, where it cannot be usefully employed, to another where it is in demand; and this applies to the different parts of the country as well as to similarly situated individuals. Originally these transactions were almost exclusively limited to borrowing and lending on collateral acceptable to banks. But in proportion as the capital of the country increased rapidly and was more and more economised by the erection of banks, the funds at the disposal of discounting firms became so large that they undertook to make advances, first on dock warrants (storage bills on commodities in docks) and then also on bills of lading representing products that had not even arrived, although sometimes, if not regularly, bills of exchange had already been drawn against them at the produce brokers. This practice soon changed the entire character of the English business. The facilities thus offered by Lombard Street gave to the produce brokers in Mincing Lane a greatly enforced position; these gave in turn the entire advantage to the importing merchants; these last took so much advantage of it that, whereas 25 years previous a taking of credit on his bills of lading or even his dock warrants would have ruined the credit of a merchant, this practice became so general, that it may be considered as the rule, and no longer, as 25 years ago, as a rare exception. Yea, this system has been extended so far, that large sums have been taken up in Lombard Street on bills of exchange drawn against the still growing crops of distant colonies. The result of such accommodations was, that the import merchants expanded their foreign transactions and tied up their floating capital, with which they had hitherto carried on their business, in the most execrable of investments, colonial estates, over which they could exert little or no control. Thus we see the direct concatenation of credits. The capital of the country, which is collected in our agricultural districts, is laid down in small amounts as deposits in country banks, and centralised for investment in Lombard Street. But it has been utilised, first, for the extension of business in our mining and industrial districts by rediscounting bills on banks there; furthermore also for granting greater accommodations to importers of foreign products by loans on warrants and bills of lading, whereby the 'legitimate' merchants' capital of firms in foreign and colonial business was released and made available for the most abominable kinds of investment in transmarine estates." (Economist, 1847, p. 1334.)

This is the "beautiful concatenation of credits." The rural depositor imagines to deposit only with his banker, and imagines furthermore that, when his banker lends to others, it is done to private persons whom he knows. He has not the slightest suspicion, that this banker places his deposit at the disposal of some London bill broker, over whose operations neither of them have the slightest control.

How great public enterprises, such as railroads, may momentarily increase the loan capital, owing to the circumstance that the deposited amounts always remain at the disposal of the bankers for a certain time until they are really used, we have already seen.

By the way, the mass of the loan capital is quite different from the quantity of the currency. By the quantity of the currency we mean here the sum of all bank notes and all hard cash existing and circulating in a country, including the bullion of precious metals. One portion of this quantity forms the reserves of the banks, an ever changing magnitude.

"On November 12, 1857" [the date of the suspension of the Bank Acts of 1844], "the total reserve of the Bank of England, including all branch banks, amounted to only 580,751 pounds sterling; the sum of the deposits amounted at the same time to 22,500,000 pounds sterling, of which nearly 6,500,000 pounds sterling belonged to London bankers." (B. C., 1858, p. LVII.)

The variations of the rate of interest (aside from those occurring in long periods, or from the difference of the rate of interest in different countries; the first named are conditioned in variations of the general rate of profit, the last named on differences in the rates of profit and on the development of credit) depend upon the supply of loan capital (all other circumstances, state of confidence, etc., being equal,) that is, of the capital loaned in the form of money, hard cash, and notes; this is distinguished from industrial capital, which in the shape of commodities is loaned by means of commercial credit among the agents of reproduction themselves.

However, the mass of this loanable capital is different from and independent of the mass of the circulating money.

If 20 pounds sterling were loaned five times per day, a money-capital of 100 pounds sterling would be loaned, and this would imply at the same time that these 20 pounds sterling would besides have to serve at least four times as means of purchase or payment; for if this were to take place without the intervention of purchase and payment, so that this sum would not represent at least four times the converted form of capital (commodities including labor-power), it would not be a capital of 100 pounds sterling, but only five claims of 20 pounds sterling each.

In countries with a developed credit we may assume, that all money-capital available for loaning exists in the form of deposits with banks and money lenders. This holds good at least for the business in a general way. Moreover, in times of good business, before speculation proper breaks loose, when credit is easy and confidence growing, the greater portion of the functions of circulation is settled by a simple transfer of credit, without the intervention of metal or paper money.

The mere possibility of large amounts of deposits with a relatively small quantity of currency, depends, solely:

1) Upon the number of purchases and sales, which the same piece of money performs;
2) The number of its return wanderings, in which it goes back to the bankers as a deposit, so that its repeated function as a means of payment and purchase is promoted through its renewed conversion into a deposit. For instance, a small dealer deposits weekly with his banker 100 pounds sterling in money; the banker pays with this a portion of a deposit to a manufacturer; this man in his turn pays it over to some laborers; these pay the small dealer with it, who deposits it again in the bank. The 100 pounds sterling deposited by this dealer have, therefore, served, first, in paying to a manufacturer a portion of his deposit; secondly, in paying some laborers; thirdly, in paying the dealer himself, fourthly, in depositing another portion of the money-capital of the same small dealer; for at the end of twenty weeks, provided that he does not have to draw any of his money out of the bank, he would have deposited 2,000 pounds sterling in the bank by means of the same 100 pounds sterling.

To what extent this money-capital is unemployed, is shown only in the inward and outward movements of the banking reserves. Therefore, Mr. Weguelin, Governor of the Bank of England in 1857, concludes that the gold of the Bank of England is the "only" reserve capital.—1258. "In my opinion the rate of discount is actually determined by the amount of unemployed capital existing in the country. The amount of unemployed capital is represented by the reserve of the Bank of England, which is in fact a gold reserve. Hence, when gold is exported, the amount of unemployed capital in the country is diminished and the value of the remaining parts is thereby increased."—1364. "The gold reserve of the Bank of England is in fact the central reserve, or the cash fund, on the basis of which the entire business of the country is carried on....It is this fund, or this reservoir, upon which the effect of the foreign quotations on 'Change always fall." (Report on Bank Acts, 1857.)

For the accumulation of the actual, this is, productive and commodity-capital, the statistics of exports and imports furnish a measure. These show always that during the decennial cycles of the period of development of British industry from 1815 to 1870 the maximum of the last time of prosperity always reappears before the crisis, whereupon it rises to a new and far higher maximum.

The actual or declared value of the exported products of Great Britain and Ireland in the prosperous year 1824 was 40,396,300 pounds sterling. The amount of the exports falls thereupon with the crisis of 1825 below this sum and fluctuates between 35 and 39 millions annually. With the return of prosperity in 1834 the amount of exports rises above the former maximum to 41,649,191 pounds sterling, and reaches in 1836 the new maximum of 53,368,571 pounds sterling. In 1837 it falls again to 42 millions, so that the new minimum stands higher than the old maximum, and fluctuates thereupon between 50 and 53 millions. The return of prosperity lifts the amount of exports in 1844 to 58,500,000 pounds sterling, a rise far above the maximum of 1836. In 1845 it reaches 60,111,082 pounds sterling; then it falls to something over 57 millions in 1846, reaches in 1847 almost 59 millions, in 1848 about 53 millions, rises in 1849 to 63,500,000, in 1853 to nearly 99 millions, in 1854 to 97 millions, in 1855 to 94,500,000, in 1856 almost 116 millions, and reaches a maximum of 122 millions in 1857. It falls in 1858 to 116 millions, rises already in 1859 to 130 millions, in 1860 to nearly 136 millions, in 1861 only 125 millions (the new minimum is here again higher than the former maximum), in 1863 to 146,500,000.

Of course, the same thing might be demonstrated in the case of imports, which show the extension of the market; but we are here concerned only in the scale of production. [Of course, this holds good of England only for the time of its actual industrial monopoly; but it applies quite generally to the whole complex of countries with modern great industries, so long as the world market is still expanding.—F. E.]

Conversion of Capital or Revenue into Money that is Transformed into Loan Capital.

We will consider the accumulation of money-capital here in so far as it is not an expression, either of a relaxation in the flow of credit, or of greater economy, whether it be an economy in the actually circulating medium or in the reserve capital of the agents engaged in reproduction.

Aside from these two cases, an accumulation of money-capital may arise through extraordinary imports of gold, such as those of 1852 and 1853 resulting from the output of the new Australian and Californian mines. This gold was deposited in the Bank of England. The depositors took notes instead, which they did not at once redeposit in banks. By this means the circulating medium was unusually increased. (Testimony of Weguelin, B. C. 1857, No. 1329.)

The Bank strove to utilise these deposits by lowering its discount to 2%. The mass of gold accumulated in the Bank rose during six months of 1853 to 22 or 23 millions.

The accumulation of all capitalists lending money naturally takes place always in the form of direct money, whereas we have seen that the actual accumulation of industrial capitalists is accomplished, as a rule, by an increase of the elements of reproductive capital itself. Hence the development of the credit system and the enormous concentration of the money-lending business into the hands of great banks must by itself alone accelerate the accumulation of loanable capital, as a form distinguished from actual accumulation. This rapid development of loan capital is, therefore, a result of actual accumulation, for it is a consequence of the development of the process of reproduction, and the profit that forms the source of accumulation for these money-capitalists is but a deduction from the surplus-value, which the reproductive capitalists filch from production (and it is at the same time a portion of the interest on the savings of others). The loan capital accumulates at the expense of both the industrial and commercial capitalists. We have seen that in the unfavorable phases of the industrial cycle the rate of interest may rise so high, that it temporarily devours the whole profit in particularly handicapped lines of business. At the same time the prices of the public securities and other securities also fall. It is at such times that the money-capitalists buy up these depreciated papers in masses, which soon regain their former level in later phases or rise above it. Then they are sold again and a portion of the money-capital of the public appropriated through them. That portion, which is not sold yields a higher interest, because it was bought below price. But the money-capitalists convert all profits made by them and reconverted into capital first into loanable money-capital. An accumulation of such money-capital, as distinguished from the actual accumulation that is its mother, takes place, obviously, even if we consider only the money-capitalists, bankers, etc., by themselves, that is, an accumulation of this particular class of capitalists. And it must grow with every expansion of the credit system such as goes with the expansion of the process of reproduction.

If the rate of interest is low, then the depreciation of the money-capital falls principally upon the depositors, not upon the banks. Before the development of stock banks three-fourths of all deposits rested in the English banks without returning any interest. If interest is now paid on them, it amounts to at least 1% less than the current rate of interest.

As for the money accumulation of the other classes of capitalists, we leave aside that portion of it, which is invested in interest-bearing papers and accumulates in this form. We consider merely that portion, which is thrown upon the market as loanable money-capital.

In the first place, we have here that portion of the profit, which is not spent as revenue, but intended for accumulation, yet at the same time not immediately of any use for the industrial capitalists in their own business. This profit exists originally in the form of commodity-capital, a part of whose value it constitutes, and is realised with it in money. Now, if it is not reconverted into the production elements of commodity-capital (we leave out of consideration for the present the merchant, whom we shall have to discuss separately), then it must remain for a while in the form of money. This mass increases with the mass of capital itself, even when the rate of profit declines. That portion, which is to be spent as revenue, is gradually consumed, but forms in the meantime a loan capital of the banker in the form of a deposit. Thus even the growth of that portion of profit, which is spent as revenue, expresses itself in a gradual and continually repeated accumulation of loan capital. The same is true of that other portion, which is intended for accumulation. With the development of the credit system, then, and its organisation, even the increase of revenue, that is, of the consumption of the industrial and commercial capitalists, expresses itself as an accumulation of loan capital. And this holds good of all revenues which are consumed gradually, in other words, of ground rent, wages in their higher form, incomes of unproductive classes, etc. All of them assume for a certain time the form of a money revenue and are, therefore, convertible into deposits and thus into loan capital. All revenue, whether it be intended for consumption or accumulation, so long as it exists in some form of money, is a part of the value of commodity-capital transformed into money, and is, for this reason, an expression and result of the actual accumulation, but not the productive capital itself. When a spinner has exchanged his yarn for cotton, while he has exchanged that portion, which forms his revenue, for money, then the real existence of his industrial capital is the yarn, which has passed into the hands of the weaver or, perhaps, of some private consumer, and this yarn is the existence of both the capital-value and surplus-value contained in it, whether it be intended for reproduction or consumption. The magnitude of the surplus-value transformed into money depends upon the magnitude of the surplus-value contained in the yarn. But as soon as it has been transformed into money, this money is but the existence of the value of this surplus-value. And as such it becomes an element of loan capital. To this end nothing more is required than that it should be transformed into a deposit, if it had not been loaned out by its owner. But in order to be reconverted into productive capital, it must have reached a certain minimum limit.

CHAPTER XXXII.

MONEY-CAPITAL AND ACTUAL CAPITAL. III.
(Concluded.)

THE mass of the money thus reconverted into capital is a result of the voluminous process of reproduction, but considered by itself, as loanable money-capital, it is not itself a mass of reproductive capital.

The most important point of our presentation so far is, that the expansion of that part of the revenue which is intended for consumption (leaving out of consideration the laborer, because his revenue is equal to the variable capital) represents itself in the first instance as an accumulation of money-capital. The accumulation of money-capital, therefore, presents a factor, which is essentially different from the actual accumulation of industrial capital; for that portion of the annual product, which is intended for consumption, does not become capital in any way. One portion of it replaces capital, namely the constant capital of the producers of means of consumption, but to the extent that it is actually converted into capital, it exists in the natural form of the revenue of the producers of this constant capital. The same money, which represents the revenue and serves merely for the promotion of consumption, is regularly transformed into loanable money-capital, for a certain time. So far as this money represents wages, it is at the same time the money-form of the variable capital; and so far as it replaces the constant capital of the producers of means of consumption, it is the money-form temporarily assumed by their constant capital and serves for the purchase of the natural elements of the constant capital to be replaced by them. Neither in the one nor in the other form does it express in itself any accumulation, although its mass increases with the volume of the process of reproduction. But it performs temporarily the function of loanable money, of money-capital. In this respect the accumulation of money-capital must reflect a greater accumulation of capital than is actually existing, owing to the fact that the extension of individual consumption, being promoted by money, appears as an accumulation of money-capital, whereby it furnishes the money-form for the actual accumulation of money opening new investments of capital.

The accumulation of money, then, expresses in part nothing else but the fact that all money, into which the industrial capital is transformed in the course of its cycle, assumes the form, not of money advanced by the reproductive capitalists, but of money borrowed by them; so that indeed the advance of money necessary in the process of reproduction appears as an advance of borrowed money. On the basis of commercial credit one capitalist loans indeed to another the money required for the process of reproduction. But this assumes now the form of a transaction, in which the banker, who receives the money as a loan from one portion of the reproductive capitalists, lends it to another portion of these reproductive capitalists, so that the banker appears in the role of a dispenser of blessings; at the same time the disposition of this capital drifts wholly into the hands of the banker in his capacity as a middleman.

A few special forms of accumulation of money-capital still remain to be mentioned. Capital is releases, for instance, by a fall in the price of the elements of production, raw materials, etc. If the industrial capitalist cannot expand his process of reproduction immediately, then a portion of his money-capital is expelled from the cycle as superfluous and converted into loanable money-capital. In the second place, capital in the form of money is released especially by the merchant, whenever any interruption of his business takes place. If the merchant has disposed of a series of transactions and cannot begin a new series on account of such interruptions until later, then his realised money represents for him but a hoard, superfluous capital. But at the same time it represents directly an accumulation of loanable money-capital. In the first case, the accumulation of money-capital expresses a repetition of the process of reproduction under more favorable conditions, an actual release of a portion of formerly tied up capital, in other words, an opportunity for expanding the process of reproduction with the same amount of money. But in the other case it expresses merely an interruption in the flow of transactions. However, in both cases it is converted into loanable money-capital, represents its accumulation, influences equally the money-market and the rate of interest, although it expresses a promotion of the accumulation in the actual process in one case and its obstruction in the other. Finally an accumulation of money-capital is brought about by that section of people, who have made their little pile and have withdrawn from reproduction. In proportion as more profits are made in the course of the industrial cycle, their number increases. In their case the accumulation of loanable money-capital expresses on the one hand an actual accumulation (considering its relative volume), and on the other hand the extent of the transformation of industrial capitalists into mere money-capitalists.

As for the other portion of profit, which is not intended to be consumed as revenue, it is converted into money-capital only when it is not immediately able to find a place for investment in the expansion of the productive sphere in which it has been made. This may be due to two causes. Either the sphere of production may be saturated with capital. Or it may be because accumulation must first have reached a certain volume, before it can serve as capital, according to the proportions of the investment of new capital required in this particular sphere. Hence it is converted for a while into loanable money-capital and serves in the expansion of production in other spheres. Assuming all other circumstances to remain unaltered, the mass of profits required for reconversion into capital will depend on the mass of profits made and thus on the extension of the process of reproduction itself. But if this new accumulation meets with difficulties in its employment, through a lack of spheres for investment, due to the overcrowding of the lines of production and an oversupply of loan capital, then such a plethora of loanable money-capital proves merely that capitalist production has its limits. The subsequent swindle with credit proves, that no positive obstacle stands in the way of the employment of this superfluous capital. The obstacle is merely one immanent in its laws of self-expansion, namely the limits in which capital can expand itself as such. A plethora of money-capital does not necessarily indicate an overproduction, nor even a lack of spheres of investment for capital.

The accumulation of loan-capital consists simply in the fact that money is precipitated as loanable money. This process is very different from an actual transformation into capital; it is merely the accumulation of money in a form, in which it may be invested as capital. But this accumulation may, as we have shown, indicate facts, which are greatly different from actual accumulation. So long as actual accumulation is continually expanding, this extended accumulation of money-capital may be partly its result, partly the result of circumstances, which accompany it but are quite different from it, partly also the result of impediments to actual accumulation. Since accumulation of loan-capital is swelled by such circumstances, which are independent of actual accumulation but nevertheless accompany it, there must be a plethora of money-capital in definite phases of the cycle for this reason alone, if for no other, and this plethora must develop with the organisation of credit. And simultaneously with it must also develop the necessity of driving the process of production beyond its capitalistic limits, by overproduction, excessive commerce, extreme credit. And this must take place in forms that call forth a reaction.

So far as accumulation of money-capital from ground rent, wages, etc., is concerned, it is superfluous to discuss that here. Only one thing must be mentioned, namely that the business of actual saving and abstinence (by people forming hoards), to the extent that it furnishes elements of accumulation, is left in the division of labor, which comes with the progress of capitalist production, to those who receive the smallest share of such elements, and who frequently enough lose even their savings, as do the laborers when banks fail. On the one hand the capital of the industrial capitalist is not "saved" by himself, but he has command of the savings of others in proportion to the magnitude of his capital; on the other hand the money-capitalist makes of the savings of others his own capital, and of the credit, which the reproductive capitalists give to one another, and which the public gives to them, a source for enriching himself. The last illusion of the capitalist system, to the effect that capital is the fruit of ones own labor and saving, is thereby destroyed. Not only does profit consist of the appropriation of other people's labor, but the capital, with which this labor of others is set in motion and exploited, consists of other people's property, which the money-capitalist places at the disposal of the industrial capitalist, at the same time exploiting the latter in his turn.

A few remarks remain to be made about credit-capital.

How often the same piece of money may figure as a loan capital, depends, as we have previously indicated.

1) On the question, how often it realises the value of commodities by sale or purchase, thereby transferring capital, and furthermore on the question, how often it realises revenue. How often it gets into other hands as a realised value, either of capital or of revenue, depends, therefore, obviously, upon the volume and mass of the actual transactions;
2) On the economy of payments and on the development and organisation of credit-system;
3) On the concatenation and velocity of action of the credits, so that a deposit set down at one point starts off immediately as a loan at another.

Even assuming that the form, in which loan capital exists, is merely that of actual money, of gold or silver, of that commodity whose substance serves as a measure of value, a large portion of this money-capital is necessarily purely fictitious, that is a title to some value just as the tokens of value. So far as money functions in the cycle of capital, it forms indeed for the moment a money-capital; it is rather exchanged for the elements of productive capital, or paid out as a medium of circulation in the realisation of revenue, and cannot, therefore, convert itself into loan capital for its owner. But so far as it is converted into loan capital, and the same money repeatedly represents loan capital, it is evident that it exists only at one point in the form of metallic money; at all other points it exists only in the form of title on capital. The accumulation of these titles, according to our analysis, arises from the actual accumulation, that is, from the transformation of the values of commodity-capital, etc., into money; but nevertheless the accumulation of these titles as such differs from the actual accumulation, from which it arises, and from the future accumulation, from which it arises, and from the future accumulation (the new process of production), which is promoted by the loaning of this money.

In the first instance loan capital exists always in the form of money,101 later as a title on money, since the money, in which it originally existed, is now held in the hand of the borrower as actual money. For the lender it has been transformed into title on money, a title of ownership. The same mass of actual money may, therefore, represent very different masses of money-capital. Mere money, whether it represent realised capital or realised revenue, becomes a loan capital through the simple act of loaning, by its conversion into a deposit, if we look upon the general form under a developed credit system. The deposit is a money-capital for the depositor. But in the hands of the banker it may be only a potential money-capital, which lies fallow in his strongbox instead of that of its owner.102

With the growth of material wealth grows the class of money-capitalists; on one side the number and the wealth of retiring capitalists living on their incomes increases; on the other hand the development of the credit system is promoted, and with it the number of bankers, money lenders, financiers, etc.

With the development of the available money-capital grows also the mass of interest-bearing papers, government bonds, stocks, etc., as we have shown previously. At the same time grows also the demand for available money-capital, since the jobbers, who speculate in these securities, play a prominent role on the money-market. If all the purchases and sales of these papers were only an expression of actual investments of capital, it would be correct to say, that they can have no influence on the demand for loan capital, since, when A sells his paper, he draws exactly as much money as B puts into the paper. But even if the paper itself exists, though not the capital (at least not as money-capital) originally represented by it, it always creates to that extent a demand for such money-capital. But at any rate it is then money-capital, which was previously at the disposal of B and is not at the command of A.

B.A. 1857. No. 4886. "Is it in your opinion a correct statement of the causes determining the rate of discount, when I say that it is regulated by the quantity of capital existing on the market, which is available for the discounting of commercial bills, as distinguished from other kinds of securities?" [Chapman]: "No, I hold that the rate of interest is affected by all convertible securities of current character; it would be wrong to limit the question simply to the discounting of bills; for when there is a strong demand for money on consols [deposited] or even treasury notes, as was strongly the case of late, and at a much higher than the commercial rate of interest, it would be absurd to say that our commercial world is not influenced by it; it is very essentially touched by it."—4890. "When good and current securities, such as bankers accept, are on the market, and the owners take up money on them, it has surely an effect on the commercial world; for instance, I cannot expect that a man should give me his money at 5% on a commercial bill, when he can lend this money out at the same time at 6% on consols, etc.; it affects us in the same way; nobody can expect of me that I should discount his bills at 5½%, when I can lend my money out at 6%."—4892. "Of people, who buy securities as fixed investments of capital for 2,000, or 5,000, or 10,000 pounds sterling, we do not speak as though they had any essential influence upon the money-market. When you ask me for the rate of interest on [a deposit of] consols, I speak of people, who transact business to the amount of hundreds of thousands, of so-called jobbers, who underwrite large amounts of public loans, or buy them on the market, and who must hold these papers until they can get rid of them at a profit; these people must take up money for this purpose."

With the development of the credit system great concentrated money-markets are created, such as London, which are at the same time the main seats of trade in such securities. The bankers place the money-capital of the public in masses at the disposal of this unsavory crowd of dealers, and thus this breed of gamblers multiplies. "Money is generally cheaper at the stock exchange than anywhere else," says the incumbent of the Governor's chair of the Bank of England in 1848 before the secret Committee of Lords, C. D. 1848, printed, 1857, No. 219.)

In the discussion of the interest-bearing capital we have already shown, that the average interest for a long period of years, other circumstances remaining the same, is determined by the average rate of profit; this does not mean profits of enterprise, which are themselves nothing but profit minus interest.

It has also been mentioned, and will be further analysed in another place, that the variations of commercial interest, that is, of interest calculated by the money lenders for discounts and loans within the commercial world, meet in the course of the industrial cycle a phase, in which the rate of interest exceeds its minimum and reaches its average level, which it exceeds later, and that this movement is a result of a rise in profits.

However, two things must be noted here.

First: When the rate of interest stays up for a long time (we are speaking here of the rate of interest of a certain country, for instance England, where the average rate of interest is a fact for a certain long time, and presents itself also in the interest paid on loans for a long period, called private interest), it is an evident proof of the fact, that the rate of profit is high during this period, but it does not prove necessarily, that the rate of profits of enterprise is high. This last distinction is more or less removed for capitalists, who operate mainly with their own capital; they realise the high rate of profit, since they pay their own interest. The possibility of a high rate of interest of long duration is present when the rate of profit is high; this does not refer, however, to the phase of the actual stringency. But it is possible, that this high rate of profit may leave but a low rate of profit of enterprise, after the high rate of interest has been deducted. The rate of profit of enterprise may shrink, while the high rate of profit continues. This is possible, because the enterprises must be continued after they have once been started. During this phase operations are carried on to a large extent with a pure credit capital (capital of other people); and the high rate of profit may be speculative, prospective, in some places. A high rate of interest may be paid with a high rate of profit, while profit of enterprise is declining. It may be paid (and this is done in part during times of speculation), not out of the profit, but out of the borrowed capital of another, and this may continue for a long time.

Secondly: The expression, that the demand for money-capital, and with it the rate of interest, grows, while the rate of profit is high, is not the same as that which is to the effect that the demand for industrial capital grows and with it the rate of interest is high.

In times of crisis the demand for loan capital, and with it the rate of interest, reach their maximum; the rate of profit, and with it the demand for industrial capital, are almost gone. In such times every one borrows only for the purpose of paying, in order to settle previously contracted obligations. On the other hand, in times of renewed activity after a crisis, loan capital is demanded for the purpose of buying, and for the purpose of transforming money-capital into productive and commodity-capital. And then it is in demand either by the industrial capitalist or the merchant. The industrial capitalist invests it in means of production and in labor-power.

The rising demand for labor-power can never be by itself a cause for a rising rate of interest, so far as this is determined by the rate of profit. A higher wage is never a cause of higher profits, although it may be one of the consequences of higher profits, in some particular phases of the industrial cycle.

The demand for labor-power may increase, because the exploitation of labor takes place under especially favorable circumstances, but the rising demand for labor-power, and thus for variable capital, does not in itself increase the profit; it rather lowers it to that extent. But the demand for variable capital may nevertheless increase with the demand for labor-power, and to that extent the demand for money-capital, and this may raise the rate of interest. The market price of labor-power then rises above its average, more than the average number of laborers are employed, and the rate of interest rises at the same time, because the demand for money-capital rises under such circumstances. The rising demand for labor-power makes this commodity dearer like any other, increases its price, but not the profit, which rests mainly upon the relative cheapness of just this commodity. But it raises under the given assumptions also the rate of interest, because it increases the demand for money-capital. If the money-capitalist, instead of loaning the money, should transform himself into an industrial capitalist, then the fact that he has to pay more for labor-power would not increase his profit, but would rather decrease it in proportion. The constellation of conditions may be such, that his profit may rise nevertheless, but it will be in spite of the fact that he pays more for labor-power, and not because of it. This last circumstance, so far as it increases the demand for money-capital, is on the other hand sufficient to raise the rate of interest. If wages should rise for some reasons while the constellation is unfavorable, then the rise in wages would lower the rate of profit, but raise the rate of interest in proportion as it would increase the demand for money-capital.

Leaving the question of labor aside, the thing called "demand for capital" by Overstone consists only in a demand for commodities. The demand for commodities raises their price, either because it may rise above the average, or because the supply of commodities may fall below the average. If the industrial capitalist or the merchant must now pay 150 pounds sterling for the same mass of commodities for which he used to pay 100 pounds sterling, he would have to borrow 150 pounds sterling whereas he had to borrow but 100 pounds sterling formerly, and if the rate of interest were 5%, he would now have to pay 7½ pounds sterling of interest as against 5 pounds sterling of former times. The mass of the interest to be paid by him would rise because he now has to borrow more capital.

The whole attempt of Mr. Overstone consists in pretending that the interests of loan capital and of industrial capital are identical whereas his Bank Acts are precisely calculated to exploit the difference of these interests for the benefit of money-capital.

It is possible, that the demand for commodities, in case their supply has fallen below average, does not absorb any more money-capital than formerly. The same sum, or perhaps a smaller one, has to be paid for their total value, but a smaller quantity of use-values is received for the same sum. In this case the demand for loanable money-capital will remain the same, and the rate of interest will not rise, although the demand for commodities would have risen as compared to their supply, and consequently the price of commodities would have become higher. The rate of interest cannot be touched, unless the total demand for loan capital increases, and this is not the case under the above assumption.

The supply of an article may also fall below average, as it does in case of crop failures of corn, cotton, etc., and the demand for loan capital may increase, because the speculation in these commodities calculates on a rise in their prices and the first means of making them rise is to curtail for a while a portion of their supply on the market. But in order to pay for the bought commodities without selling them, money is secured by means of the commercial bill system. In this case the demand for loan capital increases, and the rate of interest may rise in consequence of this attempt to prevent by artificial means the supply of this commodity to the market. The higher rate of interest expresses in that case an artificial reduction of the supply of commodity-capital.

On the other hand the demand for an article may rise, because its supply has increased and the article stands below its average price.

In this case the demand for loan-capital may remain the same or may even fall, because more commodities can be had for the same sum of money. A speculative formation of a supply might also occur, either for the purpose of taking advantage of a favorable moment for the ends of production, or in expectation of a future rise in prices. In this case the demand for loan capital might grow, and the rise in the rate of interest would then be an expression of an investment of capital in the formation of an extra supply of elements of productive capital. We consider here merely that demand for loan capital, which is influenced by the demand and supply of commodity-capital. We have explained on a previous occasion, that the changing condition of the process of reproduction in the phases of the industrial cycle has its effect upon the supply of loan capital. The trivial statement to the effect that the market rate of interest is determined by the supply and demand of (loan) capital, is shrewdly mixed up by Overstone with his own assumption, according to which loan capital is identical with capital in general, and in this way he tries to transform the usurer into the only capitalist and his capital into the only capital.

In times of stringency the demand after loan capital is a demand for means of payment and nothing else; it is by no means a demand for money as a means of payment. The rate of interest may rise very high at the same time, regardless of whether real capital, that is, productive and commodity-capital, exists in abundance or is scarce. The demand for means of payment is a mere demand for convertibility into money, to the extent that the merchants and producers can offer good security; it is a demand for money-capital in so far as it is not this other, in other words, so far as an advance of means of payment gives them not merely the form of money, but also the equivalent which they lack for making payment in whatever form. This is the point, where both sides of the current theory are right and wrong in their opinion about crisis. Those who say that there is merely a lack of means of payment, have either the owners of bona fide securities alone in view, or they are fools who believe that it is the duty and power of banks to transform all bankrupt swindlers into solvent and solid capitalists by means of pieces of paper. Those who say that there is merely a lack of capital, are either harping on words, since in such times there is a mass of inconvertible capital in consequence of over-imports and overproduction, or they are referring only to such knights of credit as are now placed in conditions, where they cannot any longer get other people's capital for their operations, and who now demand that the bank should not only help them to pay for the lost capital, but also enable them to continue their swindling.

It is a basic principle of capitalist production, that the money, as an independent form of value, must stand opposed to commodities, or that exchange-value must assume an independent form in money, and this is possible only by making of one definite commodity the material, whose value measures all other commodities, so that it thus becomes the general commodity, the commodity par excellence as distinguished from all other commodities. This must become evident in two respects, particularly among capitalistically developed nations, who substitute other things for large masses of money, partly through credit operations, partly through credit money. In times of stringency, when credit shrinks or ceases entirely, money suddenly becomes the only means of payment and the only true existence of absolute value as opposed to all other commodities. Hence a universal depreciation of commodities, difficulty or even impossibility of transforming them into money, that is, into their own purely phantastic form. In the second place, credit money itself is but money in so far as it absolutely takes the place of actual money to the amount of its nominal value. With the export of gold its own convertibility becomes problematical, that is, its identity with actual money. Hence forcible measures, raising of the rate of interest, etc., for the purpose of safeguarding the conditions of this convertibility. This may be carried more or less to excess by mistaken legislation, resting upon false theories of money and enforced upon the nation by the interests of the money dealers, of Overstone and his like. The basis, however, is given with the basis of the mode of production itself. A depreciation of credit money (not to mention its imaginary depreciation) would unsettle all existing relations. The value of commodities is therefore sacrificed, for the purpose of safeguarding the phantastic and independent existence of this value in money. As money-value it is secured only so long as money itself is secure. For the sake of a few millions of money many millions of commodities must therefore be sacrificed. This is inevitable under capitalist production and constitutes one of its beauties. In former modes of production this does not occur, because on the narrow basis, upon which they move, neither credit nor credit money can develop to any extent. So long as the social character of labor appears as the money-existence of commodities, and thus as a thing outside of actual production, money crises are inevitable, either independently of crises or intensifying them. On the other hand it is obvious that, so long as the credit of a bank is not shaken, it will alleviate the panic in such cases by increasing the credit money, and intensify it by contracting this money. All history of modern industry shows that metal would indeed be required only for the balancing of international commerce, whenever its equilibrium is disturbed momentarily, if only national production were properly organised. That the inland market does not need any metal even now is shown by the suspension of cash payments of the so-called national banks, that resort to this expedient whenever extreme cases require it as the sole relief.

In the case of two individuals it would be ridiculous to say that both of them have a balance of payment against one another in their mutual transactions. If they are mutually creditors and debtors of one another, it is evident that to the extent that their claims do not balance, one must be the creditor and the other the debtor for the remainder. But in the case of nations this is by no means so. And that it is not so is acknowledged by all economists through the statement, that the balance of payment may be for or against a nation, even if its balance of trade must ultimately be settled. The balance of payment differs from the balance of trade in so far as payment is a balance of trade which must be settled at a definite period. What crises accomplish is the crowding of the difference between the balance of payment and the balance of trade into a short time; and the definite conditions, which develop in the nation suffering from a crisis and facing the term when payment becomes due, carry with them such a contraction of the time of settlement. These conditions are, first the shipping away of precious metals; then the throwing away of consigned commodities; the exportation of commodities for the purpose of getting rid of them or of securing loans on them in the home market; the rising of the rate of interest, the calling in of credits, the falling of securities, the selling out of foreign securities, the attraction of foreign capital for investment in these depreciated securities, and finally bankruptcy, which settles a mass of obligations. While this is going on, metal is often sent for some time into the country, where a crisis has broken out, because bills of exchange on it are unsafe and payment is best made in metal. This is further explained by the fact that in the case of a country like Asia all capitalist nations are generally direct or indirect debtors of it at the same time. As soon as these different circumstances exert their full effect upon the other involved nation, it likewise begins its export of gold and silver on account of the expiration of the date of payment, and the same phenomena are repeated.

In commercial credit the interest, being the credit price as distinguished from the cash price, enters only in so far into the price of commodities as the bills of exchange have a longer running time than the ordinary. Otherwise it does not. And this is explained by the fact that every one takes credit with one hand and gives it with the other. [This does not agree with my experience. F. E.] But so far as discount in this form enters into consideration here, it is not regulated by this commercial credit, but by the money-market.

If the demand and supply of money-capital, which determine the rate of interest, were identical with the demand and supply of actual capital, as Overstone maintains, then the interest would be simultaneously high or low according to different commodities, or different phases of the same commodity (raw material, partly finished product, finished product). In 1844 the rate of interest of the Bank of England fluctuated between 4% from January to September to 2½ and 3% from November to the end of the year. In 1845 it was 2½, 2¾, 3% from January to October, and between 3 and 5% during the remaining months. The average price of fair Orleans cotton was 6¼ d. in 1844 and 4 7/8 d. in 1845. On March 3, 1844, the cotton supply in Liverpool was 627,042 bales, and on March 3, 1845, it was 773,800 bales. To judge by the low price of cotton, the rate of interest should have been low in 1845, and it was indeed for the greater part of this time. But to judge by the yarn the rate of interest should have been high, for the prices were relatively and the profit absolutely high. From cotton at 4 d. per pound a yarn could be spun in 1845 with a spinning cost of 4 d. (No. 40 good second mule twist), or a total cost of 8 d. to the spinner, which he could sell in September and October 1845 at 10½ or 11½ d. per pound. (See the testimony of Wylie farther on.)

This whole question may be decided by the following considerations:

A supply and demand of loan capital would be identical with a demand and supply of capital in general (although this last phrase is absurd; for the industrial or commercial capitalist a commodity is a form of his capital, yet he never asks for capital as such, but only for this particular commodity as such, buys and sells it as a commodity, corn or cotton, regardless of the role which it has to play in the rotation of his capital), if there were no money lenders, and if in their stead the lending capitalists were in possession of machinery, raw materials, etc., which they would rent or loan just as houses are now, to the industrial capitalists, who are themselves part owners of these things. Under such circumstances the supply of loan capital would be identical with the supply of elements of production for the industrial capitalist, and of commodities for the merchant. But it is evident, that then the division of profit between the lender and borrower would depend primarily upon the proportion, in which this capital is loaned and in which it is the property of the one who employs it.

According to Mr. Weguelin (B. A. 1857) the rate of interest is determined by "the mass of unemployed capital" (252); it is "but an index of the mass of unemployed capital seeking investment" (271); later this unemployed capital becomes a "floating capital" (485) and by this he means " notes of the Bank of England and other means of circulation in the country, for instance the notes of provincial banks and the coins existing in the country....I include in the floating capital also the reserves of the banks" (502,503), and later he includes also gold bullion (503). Thus the same Mr. Weguelin says that the Bank of England has a great influence upon the rate of interest in times, when "we" (the Bank of England) actually have the greater portion of the unemployed capital in our hands (1198), while according to the above testimony of Mr. Overstone the Bank of England "is no place for capital." Mr. Weguelin further says: "In my opinion the rate of discount is regulated by the quantity of the unemployed capital in the country. The quantity of unemployed capital is represented by the reserve. of the Bank of England, which is in fact a metal reserve. Hence when the metal hoard is reduced, it reduces the quantity of unemployed capital in the country and consequently raises the value of the remaining quantity." (1258.) J. Stuart Mill says, 1102: "The Bank is compelled, in order to keep its banking department solvent, to do its utmost to fill the reserve of this department, hence as soon as it finds that a drain begins, it must secure its reserve and either reduce its discounts or sell securities."—The reserve, so far as only the banking department is concerned, is a reserve for the deposits only. According to the Overstones the banking department is supposed to act only as a banker, without regard to any "automatic" issue of notes. But in times of actual stringency this institution, independently of the reserve of the banking department, which consists only of notes, keeps a sharp eye on the metal reserve, and must do so, if it would not fail. For in proportion as the metal reserve dwindles, disappears also the reserve of bank notes, and no one should know this better than Mr. Overstone, who has so wisely arranged this by his Bank Acts of 1844.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE CURRENCY UNDER THE CREDIT SYSTEM.

"THE great regulator of the velocity of circulation is credit. This explains, why a sharp stringency in the money-market generally coincides with a full circulation." (The Currency Question Reviewed, p. 65.) This is to be taken in a double sense. On one hand all methods, which save currency, are based upon credit. On the other hand, take, for instance, a 500 pound note. A gives it today to B in payment for a bill of exchange; B deposits it on the same day in his bank; his banker discounts with it on the same day a bill of exchange for C; C pays it to his bank, the bank gives it to the bill broker as a loan, etc. The velocity with which this note circulates here in purchases and sales is promoted by the velocity with which it always returns to some one in the form of a deposit and passes over to some one else in the form of a loan. The mere economising of the currency appears most highly developed in the Clearing House, the mere exchange of due bills of exchange, and the function of money preferentially as a means of payment for balancing mere remainders. But the existence of these bills rests itself upon credit, which the industrials and merchants mutually give to each other: If this credit declines, so does the number of bills, particularly of long time ones, and consequently also the effectiveness of this method of balancing accounts. And this economy, which consists in the elimination of money from the transactions, and which rests entirely upon the function of money as a means of payment, which in its turn rests again upon credit, can be only of two kinds (aside from the more or less developed technique in the concentration of these payments): Mutual claims of indebtedness, represented by bills of exchange or checks, are balanced either by the same banker, who merely transcribes the claim from the account of one to that of another, or by different bankers squaring accounts against each other.103

The concentration of 8 to 10 million bills of exchange in the hands of one bill broker, such as the firm of Overend, Gurney 8 Co., was one of the principal means of expanding the scale of these balances locally. By this economy the effectiveness of the currency is increased, so far as a smaller quantity of it is required for the mere balancing of accounts. On the other hand the velocity of the money circulating as currency (by which it is likewise economised) depends entirely upon the flow of purchases and sales, or also on the concatenation of payments, so far as they are made successively in money. But credit promotes and increases the velocity of currency. A single piece of money, for instance, may perform only five rotations, and remains for a certain time in each hand, as a mere medium of circulation, without the intervention of credit, when A, its original owner, buys from B, then B from C, then C from D, then D from E, then E from F, that is, when its transition from one hand to another is due only to actual sales and purchases. But when B deposits the money received from A in his bank and his banker issues it in the discounting of bills to C, and he buys from D, and D deposits it in his bank, and his banker lends it to E, who buys from F, then even its velocity as a mere medium of circulation (means of purchase) is promoted by several credit operations: the depositing of this money by B in his bank, the discounting of his banker for C, the depositing of D in his bank, and the discounting of this banker for E; four credit operations. Without these credit operations the same piece of money would not have performed five purchases successively in a given time. The fact that it changed hands without the promotion of actual sales and purchases, by deposits and discounts, has here accelerated its change of hands in the series of actual transactions.

We have seen previously, that one and the same bank note may be a deposit in different banks. It may also form different deposits in the same bank. The banker discounts with the note, which A has deposited, the bill of B, and B pays it over to C, who deposits the same note in the same bank that issued it.

We have already demonstrated in the discussion of the simple circulation of commodities (Volume I, Chapter III, 2), that the mass of the actually circulating money, assuming the velocity of currency and the economy of payments to be given, is determined by the prices of commodities and the mass of transactions. The same law rules the circulation of notes.

In the following table, the annual averages of the notes of the Bank of England are set down, so far as they were in the hands of the public, namely the amounts of 5 and 10 pound notes, those of 20 to 100 pound notes, and those of the larger notes between 200 and 1000 pounds sterling; together with the percentages of the total circulation supplied by each one of these classes. The amounts stand for thousands, the last three figures being left out.

 5-10 P. 20-100 200-1000  
YEARNOTES%P. NOTES%P. NOTES%TOTALS
18449,26345.75,73528.35,25326.020,241
18459,69846.96,08229.34,94228.620,723
18469,91848.95,77128.54,59022.620,286
18479,59150.15,49828.74,06621.219,155
18488,73248.35,04627.94,30723.818,085
18498,69247.25,23428.54,77724.318,403
18509,16447.25,58728.84,64624.019,398
18519,36248.85,55428.54,55723.419,473
18529,83945.06,16128.25,85626.821,856
185310,69947.36,39328.25,54124.522,653
185410,36351.05,91028.54,23420.520,709
185510,62853.65,70628.93,45917.519,793
185610,68054.45,64528.73,32416.919,648
185710,65954.75,56728.63,24116.719,467

(B. A. 1858, p. I, II.) The total mass of circulating bank notes has, therefore, positively decreased from 1844 to 1857, although the commercial business had more than doubled, as indicated by exports and imports. The smaller bank notes of 5 and 10 pounds sterling increased, as the table shows, from 9,263,000 in 1844 to 10,659,000 pounds sterling in 1857. And this took place simultaneously with the very heavy increase in the gold circulation of that time. On the other hand, there was a decrease of the notes of higher denominations (200 to 1000 pounds sterling) from 5,856,000 in 1852 to 3,241,000 pounds sterling in 1857, a decrease of more than 2½ millions. This is explained as follows: "On June 8, 1854, the private bankers of London permitted the stock banks to take part in the erection of the Clearing House, and soon after that the final clearing was established in the Bank of England. The daily balances were settled by transcribing them on the accounts, which the different banks keep in the Bank of England. By the introduction of this system the notes of high denomination, which the banks formerly used for balancing their mutual accounts, have become superfluous." (B. A. 1858, p. V.)

To what a small minimum the use of money in wholesale trade has been reduced, may be seen in the table published in Volume I, Chapter III, page 157, footnote 1, which was furnished to the Committee on Bank Acts by Morrison Dillon 8 Co., one of the largest of those London firms, from whom a small dealer can buy his entire stock of commodities of all kinds.

According to the testimony of W. Newmarch before the B. A. 1857, No. 1741, still other circumstances contributed to the economy in currency: The penny postage, the railroads, the telegraphs, in short, the improved means of communication; so that England can now carry on a five to six times larger business with about the same circulation of bank notes. It is also declared to be due to a marked degree to the withdrawal of the notes of a higher denomination than 10 pounds sterling from the circulation. This appears to him as a natural explanation for the fact that in Scotland and Ireland, where also one pound notes circulate, the circulation of notes has risen by about 31% (1747). The total circulation of bank notes in the United Kingdom, including the one pound notes, is said to be 39 millions (1749). The gold circulation 70 millions (1750). In Scotland the circulation of notes was 3,120,000 pounds sterling in 1834; 3,020,000 pounds sterling in 1844; and 4,050,000 pounds sterling in 1854 (1752).

From these facts alone it is evident, that it lies by no means with the banks issuing notes to increase the number of circulating notes, so long as these notes are at all times exchangeable for money. [Inconvertible bank notes are not taken into consideration at all here; inconvertible bank notes can become universal means of circulation only under conditions, in which they are actually backed up by national credit, as is the case of Russia at present. In that case they fall under the laws of the inconvertible national paper money, which have been developed already in Volume I, Chapter III, 2, c, Coin and Symbols of Value.—F. E.]

The quantity of circulating notes is regulated by the requirements of commerce, and every superfluous note wanders back immediately to the issuing party. Since in England only the notes of the Bank of England circulate universally as the legal means of payment, we may neglect at this point the slight and merely local circulation of the provincial banks.

In B. A. 1858 Mr. Neave, Governor of the Bank of England testifies: No. 947. Question: "Whatever measures you may take, the amount of notes, you say, remains the same, that is, about 20 million pounds sterling?"—Answer: "In ordinary times the wants of the public seem to require about 20 million pounds sterling."—At certain periodically recurring times each year this is increased by one or one and half millions. If the public needs more, they can always, as I said, get them from the Bank of England."—948. "You said that during the panic the public did not want to allow you to reduce the amount of the notes; will you state your reasons?"—"In times of panic the public, it seems to me, has full power to secure notes; and of course, so long as the Bank has any obligation, the public can take notes from the Bank on this obligation."—949. "It seems, then, that at all times about 20 million notes of the Bank of England are required?"—"20 million notes in the hands of the public; it changes. It is 18½, 19, 20 millions, etc.; but on an average you may say 19-20 millions."

Testimony of Thomas Tooke before the Committee of Lords on Commercial Distress (C. D. 1848-57) No. 3094: "The Bank has no power to expand the amount of its notes in the hands of the public at its own arbitrary will; it has the power to reduce the amount of notes in the hands of the public, but only by means of a very forcible operation."

J. C. Wright, for 30 years a banker in Nottingham, having explained at length the impossibility, that a provincial bank should be able to set more notes into circulation than the public needs, says of the notes of the Bank of England: (C. D. 1848-57) No. 2844: "I know of no limit" (for the issue of notes) "for the Bank of England, but every surplus of the circulation will pass over into the deposits and thus assume another form."

The same holds good for Scotland, where almost nothing but paper circulates, because there as well as in Ireland one pound notes are also in vogue and "the Scotch hate gold." Kennedy, Director of a Scotch bank, declares that banks cannot even contract their circulation of notes, and is "of opinion that, so long as inland transactions require notes or gold in order to be carried on, the bankers must furnish as much currency as these transactions need—either on demand of their depositors or otherwise....The Scotch banks can contract their business, but they cannot exert any control over their issue of notes." (Ibidem, No. 3446-48.) In like manner Anderson, Director of the Union Bank of Scotland, answers question No. 3678, asked ibidem: "Does the system of mutually exchanging notes" [among the Scotch banks] "prevent an overissue of notes on the part of the individual bank?"—"Yes; but we have a more effective means than the exchange of notes" [which has really nothing to do with this, but does indeed guarantee the ability of the notes of each bank to circulate throughout all of Scotland], "and that is the general custom in Scotland of keeping a bank account; every one who has any money at all has also an account in some bank and turns in daily all the money which he does not need immediately for himself, so that at the end of every business day all the money is in the banks, except what each carries in his pockets."

The same applies to Ireland, as shown by the testimony of the Governor of the Bank of Ireland, MacDonnell, and the Director of the Provincial Bank of England, Murray, before the same Committee.

The circulation of notes is just as independent of the state of the gold reserve in the cellars of the bank, which guarantees the convertibility of these notes, as it is of the will of the Bank of England. "On September 18, 1846, the circulation of the notes of the Bank of England was 20,900,000 pounds sterling and its metal reserve was 16,273,000 pounds sterling; on April 5, 1847, the circulation was 20,815,000 pounds sterling and the metal reserve was 10,246,000 pounds sterling. Hence no contraction of the currency took place in spite of the export of 6 million pounds sterling of precious metal." (J. G. Kinnear, The Crisis and the Currency, London, 1847, p. 5.) Of course, this applies only to the conditions which prevail in England at present, and even there only so far as legislation does not decide differently concerning the relation between the issue of notes and the metal reserve.

Hence only the requirements of business itself exert an influence on the quantity of circulating money—notes and gold. In the first instance the periodical fluctuations, which repeat themselves every year, should be noted here, regardless of the general condition of business, so that for 20 years "in a certain month the circulation is high, in another low, and in a third definite month a middle point occurs." (Newmarch, B. A. 1857, No. 1650.)

For instance, in August of every year a few millions, generally in gold, pass from the Bank of England into inland circulation, in order to pay the expenses of the harvest; since the principal payments to be made here are wages, bank notes are less serviceable in England for this purpose. By the close of the year this money has returned to the Bank. In Scotland there are almost nothing but one pound notes instead of Sovereigns; in this case, then, it is the circulation of notes which is expanded during the aforesaid term, and at another, that is, twice a year, in May and November, by about 3 or 4 millions; within fourteen days the reflux begins, and it is almost completed in one month. (Anderson, l. c., No., 3595-3600.)

The circulation of the notes of the Bank of England also experiences every quarter a momentary fluctuation on account of the quarterly payment of the "dividends," that is, the interest on the national debt by which bank notes are first withdrawn from circulation and then once more distributed between the public. But they return very soon. Weguelin (B. A. 1857, No. 38) states that this fluctuation of the circulation of notes amounts to two and half millions. Mr. Chapman of the notorious firm of Overend, Gurney 8 Co., however, calculates the disturbance created by this fluctuation in the money market at a far higher figure. "If you take 6 or 7 millions for taxes out of the circulation, for the purpose of paying dividends with them, there must be somebody, who places this amount within reach in the meantime." (B. A. 1857, No. 5196.)

Far more considerable and lasting are the fluctuations in the amount of the currency corresponding to the various phases of the industrial cycle. Let us listen to another member of that firm, the worthy Quaker Samuel Gurney (C. D. 1848-57, No. 2645): "At the end of October (1847) there were 20,800,000 pounds sterling in notes in the hands of the public. At that time a great difficulty prevailed in the matter of securing bank notes in the money market. This arose from the general apprehension that it would not be possible to secure them on account of the limitation of the Bank Acts of 1844. At present [March, 1848] the amount of bank notes in the hands of the public is...17,700,000 pounds sterling, but as there is no commercial alarm now, this is much more than is needed. There is no banker or no money dealer in London, who has not more bank notes than he can use."—2650. "The amount of bank notes...out side of the keeping of the Bank of England forms a totally inadequate exponent of the actual state of the circulation, unless one considers at the same time...the condition of the commercial world and of credit."—2651. "The feeling that we have a surplus at the present amount of currency in the hands of the public arises to a large degree from our present condition of great stagnation. With high prices and a brisk business 17,700,000 pounds sterling would give us a feeling of shortness."

[So long as the condition of business is such, that the returns on the loans given come in regularly and credit remains unshaken, the expansion and contraction of the currency depends simply upon the requirements of the industrials and merchants. Since gold does not enter into consideration in the wholesale trade, at least in England, and the circulation of gold aside from the fluctuations with the seasons, may be regarded as a rather constant magnitude for a long time, the circulation of the notes of the Bank of England forms a sufficiently accurate measure of these changes. In a dull period after a crisis the circulation is smallest, with the reanimation of the demand comes also a greater demand for currency, which increases with the rising prosperity; the quantity of currency reaches its culminating point in the period of overtension and overspeculation—suddenly the crisis breaks out and over night the bank notes, yesterday still so plentiful, have disappeared from the market and with them the discounters of bills, the lenders of money on securities, the buyers of commodities. The Bank of England is called on for help—but even its powers are soon exhausted, the Bank Act of 1844 compels it to contract its circulation of notes at the very moment when all the world cries out for notes, when the owners of commodities cannot sell and yet are supposed to pay and are ready to make any sacrifice, if they can only secure bank notes. "During the alarm," says the abovementioned banker Wright, l. c. No. 2930, "the country needs twice as much currency as in ordinary times, because the medium of circulation is stored up by bankers and others."
As soon as the crisis breaks out, it is henceforth only a question of means of payment. But since every one is dependent upon the other for the coming in of these means of payment, and no one knows whether the other will be able to meet his payments when due, a stampede takes place for the means of payment available on the market, that is, the bank notes. Every one accumulates as many of them as he can secure, and thus the notes disappear from the circulation on the very day when they are needed most. Samuel Gurney (C. D. 1848-57, No. 1116) states that the amount of bank notes brought under lock and key in a moment of such terror in October 1847 to have been 4 to 5 million pounds sterling.—F. E.]

In this connection, a special interest attaches to the cross-examination of the associate of Gurney, the aforementioned Chapman, before the B. A. of 1857. I reproduce its principal contents summarily, although it touches also upon certain other points, which we shall have to analyse later.

Mr. Chapman has the following to say:

4963. "I do not hesitate to say, that I do not consider it right, that the money market should be in the power of any one individual capitalist (such as exist in London), who can create an enormous scarcity of money and a stringency, when the circulation just happens to be low....That is possible...there is more than one capitalist, who can take notes to the amount of one or two million pounds sterling out of the currency, when it suits his purpose."—4995. A great speculator can sell one or two million pounds worth of consols and thus take the money out of the market. Something similar to this has happened quite recently, "it creates a very violent crisis."—

4967. The notes are then indeed unproductive. "But that is nothing, when it serves a great purpose; its great purpose is to throw down the prices of funds, to create a money stringency, and to do that is quite within his power."—An illustration: One morning there was a great demand for money in the Money Exchange; nobody knew its cause; somebody asked Chapman to lend him 50,000 pounds sterling at 7%. Chapman was astonished, his rate of interest was much lower; he accepted. Soon after that the man returned, took up another 50,000 pounds sterling at 7½%, then, 100,000 at 8%, and wanted still more at 8½%. Then even Chapman became frightened. Later it was found out that suddenly a considerable sum of money had been withdrawn from the market. But, says Chapman, "nevertheless I had loaned out a considerable amount of money at 8%; I was afraid to go farther; I did not know what was coming."

It must not be forgotten, that, although 19 to 20 millions in notes are continually supposed to be in the hands of the public, nevertheless that portion of notes, which actually circulates, and on the other hand that portion, which is held unemployed by the banks as a reserve, continually differ considerably from one another. If this reserve is large, and therefore the actual circulation small, it means from the point of view of the money-market, that the circulation is full, money is plentiful; if the reserve is small, and the actual circulation full, then the language of the money-market says that the circulation is low, money is scarce, that is to say, the portion representing unemployed loan capital is small. A real expansion or contraction of the circulation in such a way, that it remains independent of the phases of the industrial cycle and leaves unchanged the amount needed by the public, occurs only for technical reasons, for instance, on the dates when taxes are due or the interest on a national debt. When taxes are paid, notes and gold beyond the ordinary amount flow into the Bank of England and practically contract the circulation without regard to its needs. The reverse takes place when the interest on the national debt is paid. In the first case, loans are demanded from the bank in order to secure currency. In the last case, the rate of interest falls in the private banks on account of the momentary growth of their reserves. This has nothing to do with the absolute mass of currency, but only with the banking firm that sets this currency into circulation, and for whom this process represents itself as a loaning of loan capital, the profit of which it pockets.

In the one case there is a temporary displacement of the circulating medium, which the Bank of England balances by short loans at low interest shortly before the quarterly taxes or the quarterly dividends on the nationel debt become due; The issue of these supernumerary notes first fills up the gap caused by the payment of the taxes, while their return to the bank soon after brings back the excess of notes thrown into circulation by the payment of dividends to the public.

In the other case a low or full circulation means simply a different distribution of the same mass of currency into active circulation and deposits, which serve as an instrument of loans.

On the other hand, if the number of notes is increased by a flow of gold into the Bank of England, then these notes assist in the discounting of bills outside of the bank and return to it by the payment of loans, so that the absolute mass of the circulating notes is but momentarily increased.

If the circulation is full on account of the expansion of business (which may take place even though prices be relatively low), then the rate of interest may be relatively high on account of the demand for loan capital in consequence of rising profits and increased new investments. If it is low, on account of the contraction of business, or, perhaps, on account of a great fluidity of credit, then the rate of interest may be low even though prices be high. (See Hubbard.)

The absolute quantity of the circulation has a determining influence on the rate of interest only in times of stringency. The demand for a full circulation may either express merely a demand for means of hoarding (aside from the reduced velocity of the circulation of money and that of the conversion of the same identical pieces of money into loan capital) owing to lack of credit, as was the case in 1847, when the suspension of the Bank Acts did not cause any expansion of the circulation, but sufficed to draw forth the hoarded notes and to throw them into circulation. Or it may be that more means of circulation are actually required under prevailing circumstances, as was the case in 1857, when the circulation actually expanded for some time after the suspension of the Bank Acts.

Otherwise the absolute mass of the circulation has no influence upon the rate of interest, since the circulation, assuming the economy and velocity of the currency to be constant, is determined in the first place by the prices of commodities and the mass of the transactions (one of these elements generally paralysing the action of the other), and in the second place by the state of credit, whereas it does not by any means exert any reverse influence on the state of credit; and, finally, since the prices of commodities and interest have not necessarily any connection with each other.

During the Bank Restriction Act (1797-1820) there was a superfluity of currency, the rate of interest was always much higher than it became since cash payments were resumed. Later it fell rapidly with the restriction of the issue of notes and rising quotations of bills. In 1822, 1823, and 1832 the general circulation was low, and so was the rate of interest. In 1824, 1825, and 1836 the circulation was full and the rate of interest rose. In the summer of 1830 the circulation was full, the rate of interest low. Since the discoveries of gold the gold circulation of all Europe has expanded, the rate of interest risen. The rate of interest, then, does not depend upon the quantity of the circulating money.

The difference between the issue of currency and loans of capital is best shown in the real process of reproduction. We have seen, there (Volume II, Part III), in what manner the different component parts of the production are exchanged for one another. For instance, the variable capital consists substantially of the means of subsistence of the laborers, a portion of their own product. But this is paid over to them piecemeal in money. The capitalist has to advance this, and it depends very much on the organization of the credit system, whether he can pay out the new variable capital next week with the old money, which he paid out last week. The same holds good with regard to the acts of exchange between the different component parts of the total social capital, for instance, between the articles of consumption and the means of production of articles of consumption. The money for their circulation must, as we have seen, be advanced by one or both of the exchanging parties. It remains thereupon in the circulation, but returns after the consummation of the exchange always to him who advanced it, since it had been advanced by him in excess of his actually employed industrial capital (Volume II, Chapter XX.). Under a developed credit system, when the money is concentrated in the hands of the banks, it is they, at least nominally, who advance it. This advance refers only to the money existing in circulation. It is an advance of currency, not of the capitals, which the credit system circulates.

Chapman 5062. "There may be times, when the bank notes in the hands of the public constitute a very large amount, and yet none may be had." Money exists also during a panic. But every one takes good care not to convert it into loanable capital; every one holds on to it for the purpose of meeting real payments.

5099. "The banks in the rural districts send their unemployed surplus to you and other London firms?"—"Yes."—5100. "On the other hand, the factory districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire have bills of exchange discounted by you for business purposes?"—"Yes."—5101. "So that in this way the superfluous money of a certain district is utilised for the requirements of another district?"—"Quite right."

Chapman says that the custom of the banks to invest their surplus money-capital for a short time in consols and treasury notes has decreased considerably of late, since the custom has been introduced to loan this money at call, reclaimable from day to day. For his own person he considers the purchase of such papers as very impracticable for his business. He prefers to invest his surplus money-capital in good bills of exchange, a part of which becomes due every day, so that he can always be sure of knowing how much ready money he can count on from day to day. [5001 to 5005.]

Even the growth of exports assumes more and more for every country, but particularly for the country granting the credit, the aspect of an increasing demand on the inland money-market, which is not felt, however, until the time of stringency. In times of increasing exports the manufacturers usually draw bills of exchange of long duration on the export merchant who receives consignments of British goods. (5126.)—5127. "It is not frequently the case, that an agreement exists, to renew these bills from time to time?"—[Chapman:] "This is a matter which they keep secret; we should not admit any such bills....It may surely take place, but I cannot say anything about this." [The innocent Chapman.] 5123. "When a great increase takes place in the exports, such as that of last year which alone amounted to 20 million pounds sterling, does not that in itself lead to a large demand for capital in order to discount bills representing these exports?"—"Undoubtedly."—5130. "Since England as a rule gives credit to foreign countries for all its exports, would not that imply the absorption of a corresponding additional capital for the time it lasts?"—"England gives an enormous credit; but in return it takes credit for its raw materials. Drafts as are made out against us by America always for sixty days, and by other countries for ninety days. On the other hand we give credit; when sending goods to Germany, we give two or three months."

Wilson asks Chapman (5131), whether bills on England are not drawn simultaneously with the loading of these raw materials and colonial goods destined for importation, and whether these bills do not arrive together with the bills of lading. Chapman thinks so, but does not know anything about these "commercial" transactions, and suggests that more expert men be asked.—In the export to America, says Chapman, the "commodities are symbolised in transit"; this gibberish signifies that the English export merchant draws against his goods on one of the great American banking firms in London by means of a bill of exchange running for four months, and this firm receives collateral from America.

5136. "Are not negotiations with far distant countries carried on by the merchant, who waits for his capital until the goods are sold?"—"There may be some firms of great private wealth, who are able to invest their own capital without taking advances on goods; but these goods are mainly transformed into advances by the endorsement of well known firms.—5137. "These firms are established in...London, Liverpool, and elsewhere."—5138. "It makes no difference, then, whether the manufacturer has to give up his own money, or whether he gets some merchant in London or Liverpool to advance it; it always remains an advance made in England?"—"Quite right. The manufacturer has to do with this only in a few cases" [but in 1847 in almost every case]. "For instance, a dealer in manufactured goods, in Manchester, buys commodities and ships them through a responsible firm in London; as soon as the London firm has convinced itself, that everything has been packed as per agreement, he draws a bill running for six months on this London firm against these commodities bound for India, China, or some other country; then the banking world comes in and discounts this bill for him; so that about the time, when he has to pay for these commodities...."—5139. "But even if this dealer now has the money, the banker had to advance it to him first?"—"The banker has the bill of exchange; the banker has bought the bill; he utilises his banking capital in this form, that is in the discounting of commercial bills." [Hence even Chapman does not regard the discounting of bills as an advance of money, but as a purchase of commodities.—F. E.]—5140. "But still this constitutes always a part of the demands on the money-market in London?"—"Undoubtedly; this is the essential occupation of the money-market and of the Bank of England. The Bank of England is just as glad to get these bills as we, it knows that they are a good investment."—5141. "In this way, in proportion as the export business grows, the demand in the money-market grows likewise?"—"In proportion as the prosperity of the country grows, we" [the Chapmans] "partake in it."—5142. "If, then, the various fields of investment of capital expand suddenly, the natural consequence is a rise of the rate of interest?"—"There is no doubt of it."

In 5143 Chapman cannot "quite understand, that with our large exports we had so much use for gold."

In 5144 the venerable Wilson asks: "Cannot it be that we are giving more credit on our exports than we are taking on our imports?"—"For myself, I should doubt this point. If any one gets accepts on his Manchester goods shipped to India, you cannot accept for less than ten months. We had, and this is quite certain, to pay America for its cotton some time before India paid us; but what effect this has, to analyse that is a very fine point."—5145. "When we, as we did last year, had an increase in the exports of manufactured goods to the amount of 20 million pounds sterling, we must have had before that a very considerable increase in the imports of raw materials" [and even in this way overexports are identical with overimports, and overproduction with over-commerce] "in order to produce this increased quantity of goods?"—"Undoubtedly; we must have had a very considerable balance to pay; that is, the balance must have been against us at the time, but in the long run the quotations of bills of exchange with America are in our favor, and we have received for some time large shipments of precious metals from America."

5148. Wilson asks the arch usurer Chapman, whether he does not regard his high interest as a sign of great prosperity and a high rate of profit. Chapman, evidently surprised at the naïveté of this sycophant, assents to this, of course, but is sincere enough to add the following clause: "There are some, who cannot help themselves in any other way; they have obligations to fulfill, and they must fulfill them, whether it be profitable or not; but if it lasts" [the high rate of interest] "it would indicate prosperity."—Both of them forget that a high rate of interest may also indicate that, as it did in 1857, the roving knights of credit are infesting the country, and that these gentlemen can afford to pay a high interest, because they pay it out of other people's pockets (whereby they take part in the fixing of the rate of interest for all others) and meanwhile live in grand style on anticipated profits. At the same time this may indeed result in a very profitable business for manufacturers and others. The returns become wholly deceptive by the loan system. This explains also the following statements, which require no explanation so far as the Bank of England is concerned, because it discounts at a lower rate than others when the rate of interest is high.

5156. "I may well say," says Chapman, "that the amounts of our discounts are at their maximum at the present, when we had a high rate of interest for such a long time." [Chapman said this on July 21, 1857, a few months before the crash.]—5157. "In 1852" [when the rate of interest was low] "they were not so high by far." For the business was indeed a great deal sounder then.

5159. "If the market were overflowing with money...and the banking discount low, we should have a decrease of bills of exchange....In 1852 we were in an entirely different phase. The exports and imports of the country were then nothing as compared to the present."—5161. "Under this high rate of discount our discounting business is as high as in 1854." [When the rate of interest was from 5 to 5½%.]

Very amusing is that part of the testimony of Chapman, in which he shows that his class regard the money of the public indeed as their property and pretend to have a right to having the bills discounted by them always converted. The ingenuousness of the questions and answers is great. It becomes the duty of legislation to make the bills accepted by large firms always convertible; to take pains that the Bank of England should under all circumstances continue to give discount to the bill brokers. And yet three of these bill brokers failed in 1857 for about 8 millions, while their own capital was infinitesimal compared to their debts.—5177. "Do you mean to say by this that in your opinion they" [that is bills accepted by the Barings or Loyds] "should be convertible by compulsion, in the way that a note of the Bank of England is now convertible into gold by compulsion?"—"I am of the opinion, that it would be a very lamentable thing, if it were not discountable; a very extraordinary situation, that a man would have to suspend payment, because he holds accepts by Smith, Payne 8 Co., to Jones, Loyd 8 Co., and cannot discount them."—5178. "Is not an accept of the Barings an obligation, to pay a certain amount of money when the bill becomes due?"—"That is quite right; but Messrs. Baring, if they undertake such an obligation, like every merchant who accepts such an obligation, do not dream in the least that they shall have to pay in Sovereigns; they figure on paying in the Clearing House."—5180. "Do you mean, then, that a sort of machinery should be thought out, by means of which the public would be empowered to receive money before the bill becomes due, by having somebody else discount it?"—"No, not by the accepting party; but if you mean to say that we shall not have the possibility to have commercial bills discounted, then we must change the whole constitution of things."—5182. "You believe, then, that it" [a commercial bill] "should be convertible into money, exactly like a note of the Bank of England must be convertible into gold?"—"Very decidedly, under certain circumstances."—5184. "You believe, then, that the institutions of currency should be arranged in such a way that a commercial bill of undoubted solidity should at all times be convertible in money like a bank note?"—"That I believe."—5185. "You do not go so far as to say either the Bank of England or anybody else should be compelled by law to convert it?"—"I go indeed so far as to say that if we make a law for the regulation of the currency, we should take steps to prevent the possibility of inland commercial bills becoming inconvertible, to the extent that such bills are undoubtedly solid and legitimate."—This is the convertibility of the commercial bill against the convertibility of bank notes.

5189. "The money dealers of the country represent in fact only the public."—So did Mr. Chapman later before the jury in the Davison case. See the Great City Frauds.

5196. "During the quarterly terms" [when the dividends are paid] "it is...absolutely necessary, that we should turn to the Bank of England. If you take 6 or 7 millions out of the revenue of the state in anticipation of the dividends, somebody must be there, who will in the meantime advance this amount."—[In this case it is a question of a supply of money, not of capital or loan capital.]

5169. "Every one familiar with our commercial world must know that if we are in such circumstances that treasury notes become unsalable, that obligations of the East Indian Company are completely useless, that the best commercial bills cannot be discounted, a great apprehension must reign among those whose business places them in a position where they must make payment immediately on simple demand in customary currency, and this is the case with all bankers. The effect of this is then that everybody doubles his reserves. Now just look what the effect of this is in the whole country, when every country banker, of whom there are about 500, has to instruct his London correspondent to remit to him 5,000 pounds sterling in bank notes. Even if we take such a small amount as this for an average, which is quite absurd, we arrive at 2½ million pounds sterling, which are withdrawn from circulation. How are they to be replaced?"

On the other hand the private capitalists, etc., who have money do not care to let go of it at any interest, for they say, according to Chapman, 5194: "We prefer to have no interest at all rather than to be in doubt, whether we can get the money when we need it."

5173. "Our system is this: We have 300 million pounds sterling worth of obligations, the payment of which in coin of the realm may be demanded at any moment; and this coin of the realm, if we use all of it for this purpose, amounts to 23 million pounds sterling, or thereabout; is not that a condition, which may throw us into convulsions at any moment?" Hence we have in times of crisis the sudden change of the credit system into a monetary system.

Aside from the panic in the home market during crises, there can be any mention of the quantity of money only in so far as it concerns metal, which is the world money. And this is precisely what Chapman excludes; he speaks only of 23 millions in bank notes.

The same Chapman, 5218. "The original cause of the disturbance of the money-market" [in April and later in October] "was undoubtedly in the quantity of money required for the regulation of the quotations of bills of exchange, in consequence of the extraordinary imports of the year."

In the first place, this reserve of world market money had then been reduced to its minimum. In the second place it served at the same time as a security for the convertibility of the credit money, the bank notes. It combined in this way two quite different functions, which, however, proceed both of them from the nature of money, since real money is always world money, and the credit money always rests upon the world money.

In 1847, without the suspension of the Bank Acts of 1844, "the Clearing Houses could not have carried on their business." (5221.)

That Chapman nevertheless had a suspicion of the coming crisis, is shown by the following statement: 5236. "There are certain conditions of the money-market (and the present one is not far removed from that), in which money is very difficult, and one has to have recourse to a bank."

5239. "As for the amounts taken by us out of the bank on Friday, Saturday and Monday, October 19, 1847, we should have been only too grateful on the following Wednesday, if we could have gotten back the bills of exchange; the money returned to us immediately after the panic was over."—On Tuesday, October 23, the Bank Acts were suspended, and this broke the crisis.

Chapman believes (5274) that the bills running simultaneously on London amounted to 100 or 120 million pounds sterling. This did not include the local bills on provincial places.

5287. "While in October, 1856, the amount of the notes in the hands of the public rose to 21,155,000 pounds sterling, there was nevertheless a very extraordinary difficulty in raising money; although the public had so much in its hands, we could not get our fingers on it."—This was due to the fear, caused by the panic, in which the Eastern Bank found itself for a time (March 1856).

5190-92. As soon as the panic is over, "all bankers who make their profits out of interest begin at once to employ their money."

5302. Chapman does not explain the unrest going with the decrease of the bank reserve out of the apprehension concerning the deposits, but attributes it to the fact that all those, who suddenly may be compelled to pay large sums of money, know very well that they may be driven to seek their last refuge in the bank, when a panic seizes the money-market; and "when the bank has a very small reserve, it is not glad to receive us; on the contrary."

By the way it is nice to observe the way in which the reserve dwindles away as a really existing magnitude. The bankers keep a minimum for their current business either in their own hands or with the Bank of England. The bill brokers hold the "loose bank money of the country" without any reserve. And the Bank of England has nothing to offset its debt for deposits but the reserves of bankers and others, together with some public deposits, etc., which it permits to be drained to its very lowest level, for instance to 2 millions. Aside from these 2 millions of paper, then, this whole swindle has no other reserve but the metal reserve in times of crisis (and this reduces the reserve, because the notes, which come in to replace outgoing metal, must be annulled), and thus every reduction of this reserve by the expenditure of gold increases the crisis.

5306. "If no money were available to settle the balances in the Clearing House, I do not see that we could do anything else but to come together and make our payments in first drafts, checks on the Treasury Department, Smith, Payne 8 Co., etc."—5307. "That is to say, if the government should fail to supply you with means of circulation, you would create one for yourself?"—"What are we going to do? The public comes in and takes the circulating medium out of our hands; it does not exist."—5308. "Then you would simply do in London what is done in Manchester every day?"—"Yes."

Particularly good is the reply of Chapman to a question asked by Cayley, a Birmingham man of the Attwood school, with regard to Overstone's conception of capital. 5315. "It has been stated before this Committee, that it is not money, but capital, which is demanded in a panic like that of 1847; what is your opinion on this?"—"I do not understand you; we deal only in money; I don't understand what you mean."—5316. "If you mean thereby" [namely by commercial capital] "the mass of money belonging to himself, which a man has in his business, if you call that capital, it forms generally a very small part of the money, with which he operates in his transactions by means of the credit given to him by the public"—that is, by the intervention of the Chapmans.

5339. "Is it from lack of wealth that we suspend our cash payments?—By no means....We have no lack of wealth, but we move under a most artificial system, and when we have an immense superincumbent demand for our medium of circulation, it may lead to conditions, which prevent us from securing this medium of circulation. Should the entire commercial industry of the country be laid lame on this account? Should we close all avenues of employment?—5338. "Should the question be asked, what we want to maintain, whether the cash payments or the industry of the country, I know which of the two I should drop."

Concerning the hoarding of bank notes "with the intention of intensifying the panic, or drawing advantages from its results" [5358] he says that this may be done easily. Three large banks would be sufficient. 5383. "Should it not be known to you, a man familiar with the great firms of our metropolis, that capitalists utilise these crises to make enormous profits out of the ruin of those, who fall victims?"—"There can be no doubt of it."—And we may well believe Mr. Chapman on this score, although he finally broke his own neck in the attempt of making "enormous profits out of the ruin of his victims." For while his associate Gurney says "Every change in business is advantageous for him who is posted," Chapman says: "The one portion of society knows nothing about the other; there is, for instance, the manufacturer, who exports to the continent, or who imports his raw material, he knows nothing of the other, who deals in gold bullion." (5046.)—And thus it happened, that one fine day Gurney and Chapman themselves "were not posted" and went into an ill-famed bankruptcy.

We have seen previously, that the issuing of notes does not signify an advance of capital in all cases. The following testimony of Tooke before the C. D. Committee of Lords, 1848, proves merely that an advance of capital, even if accomplished by the bank by an issue of new notes, does not signify straightway an increase in the number of circulating notes.

3099. "Do you believe, that the Bank of England could extend its loans considerably, without bringing about an increased issue of notes?"—"There are abundant facts at hand to prove this. One of the most striking examples was in 1835, when the Bank made use of the West Indian deposits and of the loan from the East Indian Company to increase its loans to the public; at the same time the amount of notes in the hands of the public actually decreased somewhat....Something similar to this is noticeable in 1847 at the time of the paying of the railroad deposits in the Bank; the securities [in discount and deposits] rose to about 30 millions, while no appreciable effect took place on the amount of notes in the hands of the public."

Aside from the bank notes the wholesale trade has another medium of circulation, which is far more valuable to it, namely the bills of exchange. Mr. Chapman showed us, how essential it is for a regular flow of business that good bills of exchange should be taken in payment everywhere and under all conditions. If bills of exchange are no longer good, what in the world is to be done? How do these two media of circulation stand towards one another?

Gilbart says on this score: "The restriction of the amount of the circulation of notes increases regularly the amount of the circulation of bills of exchange. The bills are of two kinds—commercial bills and banker's bills—if money becomes scarce, then the money lenders say: "You draw on us and we will endorse," and when a provincial banker discounts a bill for some customer, he does not give him cash money, but his own draft for 21 days on his London agent. These bills serve as a medium of circulation." (G. W. Gilbart, An Inquiry into the Causes of the Pressure, etc., p. 31.)

This is corroborated in a somewhat modified form by Newmarch, B. A. 1857, No. 1426: "There is no connection between the fluctuations in the amount of the circulating bills and those of the circulating bank notes...the only rather uniform result is...that as soon as a stringency in the money-market occurs, such as is indicated by a raising of the rate of discount, the volume of the circulation of bills is considerably increased and vice versa."

However, the bills of exchange written in such times are by no means only the short bank bills mentioned by Gilbart. On the contrary, they are largely bills of accommodation, which represent no real business at all, or at least only transactions made for the purpose of drawing bills of exchange on them; we have given sufficient illustrations of both. Hence the "Economist" (Wilson) says in comparing the security of such bills with that of bank notes: "Bank notes payable on presentation can never stay out in excess, because the excess would always return to the bank for exchange, while two-months drafts may be issued in great superabundance, as there is no means of controlling their issue until they become due, when they may have been replaced by others. That a nation should admit the security of the circulation of bills payable at some future date, but raise doubts against a circulation of paper money payable on presentation, is completely unintelligible to us." (Economist, 1847, p. 572.)

The quantity of the circulating bills is, therefore, like that of the bank notes, merely determined by the requirements of commerce; in ordinary times the circulation of bills running in the fifties together with about 39 millions in bank notes amounted to about 300 millions, and from 100 to 120 millions of this were made out on London alone.

The volume of the circulation of bills has no influence on the circulation of notes, and is influenced by the latter only in times of stringency of money, when the quantity of bills increases and their quality deteriorates. Finally, at the time of a crisis, the circulation of bills fails completely; no man can make use of a promise to pay, since every one wants to accept only cash payment; only the bank note retains, at least so far in England, its ability to circulate, because the nation with its total wealth backs up the Bank of England.

We have seen that even Mr. Chapman, though himself a magnate of the money-market in 1847, complained bitterly, that there were a few large money-capitalists in London strong enough to carry disorder into the whole money-market at any given moment and thereby to bleed the smaller money dealers. There were several large sharks of this kind, he said, who could considerably intensify a stringency, by selling one or two millions worth of consols and thereby taking an equal amount of bank notes (and at the same time of available loan capital) out of the market. To transform a stringency into a panic by the same maneuver, the joint action of three large firms would be sufficient.

The greatest capital power in London is, of course, the Bank of England, which, however, is prevented by its position as a semi-government institution from making too brutal a use of its power. Nevertheless it also knows enough about ways and means of making money, particularly since the Bank Acts of 1844.

The Bank of England has a capital of 14,553,000 pounds sterling, and commands besides about 3 million pounds sterling of a "Remainder," that is, undistributed profits, and furthermore all moneys collected by the government for taxes, etc., which must be deposited there until they are needed. Add to this the amount of other deposits, about 30 million pounds sterling in ordinary times, and the bank notes issued without a reserve, and we shall find that Newmarch made a rather conservative estimate, when he said (B. A. 1857, No. 1889): "I have convinced myself, that the total amount of the funds employed continually in the [London] money-market may be estimated at about 120 million pounds sterling; and of these 120 millions the Bank of England commands a very considerable portion, about 15 to 20%."

So far as the Bank issues notes, which are not covered by the metal reserve in its vaults, it creates symbols of value, that form not only currency, but also additional, even if fictitious, capital for it to the nominal amount of these unprotected notes. And this additional capital yields an additional profit for it.—In B. A. 1857, Wilson asks Newmarch, No. 1563: "The circulation of a bank's own notes, that is, on an average the amount remaining in the hands of the public, forms an addition to the effective capital of that bank, does it not?"—"Assuredly."—1564. "All profits, then, which the bank derives from this circulation, is a profit arising from credit, not from a capital actually owned by it?"—"Assuredly."

The same is true, of course, of the private banks issuing notes. In his answers Nos. 1866 to 1868 Newmarch considers two-thirds of all bank notes issued by them (the last third has to be covered by a metal reserve in these banks) as "a creation of so much capital," because hard cash is saved to this amount. The profit of the banker may not be larger than that of other capitalists, notwithstanding all this. The fact remains, however, that he draws the profit out of this national saving of hard cash. The fact that a national saving becomes a private profit does not shock the bourgeois economist in the least, since profit is under all circumstances the appropriation of national labor. Is there anything more insane than, for instance, the Bank of England in 1797 to 1817, whose notes have credit only by the backing of the state, taking payment from the state, and from the public, in the form of interest on government loans for the power, granted to it by the state, to transform these same notes from paper into money and then to loan them to the state?

The banks have still other means of creating capital. According to the same Newmarch the provincial banks, as mentioned above, have the habit of sending their superfluous funds (that is, notes of the Bank of England) to London bill brokers, who send them discounted bills of exchange in return. With these bills the bank serves its customers, since it follows the rule not to issue the bills of exchange received from its local customers any more, in order that the business transactions of these customers may not become known in their own neighborhood. These bills received from London do not only serve for the purpose of being issued to customers, who have to make payments direct to London, unless these customers should prefer to get the bank's own draft on London; they serve also for the settlement of payments in the province, for the endorsement of the bankers secures local credit for them. In Lancashire, for instance, all the local banks' own notes and a large portion of the notes of the Bank of England, have been crowded out of the circulation by such bills. (Ibidem, 1568 to 1574.)

We see here, then, how the banks create credit and capital, 1) by the issue of their own notes, 2) by writing out drafts on London running as long as 21 days but paid to them in cash immediately on being written, and 3) by paying out discounted bills of exchange, which are endowed with credit primarily and essentially by endorsement through the bank, at least for the local district.

The power of the Bank of England is shown in its regulation of the market rate of interest. In times of normal business it may happen, that the Bank cannot prevent a moderate drain of gold from its metal reserve by raising the rate of discount,104 because the demand for means of payment is satisfied by the private banks, stock banks and bill brokers, who have gained considerably in capital power during the last thirty years. In that case the Bank of England must use other means. But for critical moments, the statement made by Banker Glyn (of Glyn, Mills, Currie 8 Co.) before the C. D. 1848-57 still holds good:—1709. "In times of great stringency in the country the Bank of England commands the rate of interest."—"In times of extraordinary stringency...when the discounts of the private bankers or brokers are relatively restricted, they fall to the Bank of England, and then it has the power to fix the market rate of interest."

It is true, that the Bank of England, being a public institution under government protection, cannot exploit its power ruthlessly, in the same way that private institutes may. For this reason Hubbard says before the Banking Committee B. A. 1857, No. 2844: "Is it not true, that when the rate of discount is highest, the Bank of England gives the cheapest service, and when lowest, then the brokers are the cheapest?"—"That will always be the case, for the Bank of England never comes down as low as its competitors, and when the rate is highest, it never goes quite so high."

But nevertheless it is a serious event in business life, when the Bank of England draws the screw tighter in times of crisis, as the saying is, that is, when it raises the rate of interest, which is already above the average, still higher. "As soon as the Bank of England tightens the screw, all purchases for export into foreign countries cease...the exporters wait, till the depression of prices has reached its lowest point, and only then and not before do they buy. But when this point is reached, the quotations have once more become settled—gold ceases to be exported, before this lowest point of the depression is reached. Purchases of commodities for export may possibly bring back a part of the money sent abroad, but they come too late to prevent the drain." (G. W. Gilbart, An Inquiry into the Causes of the Pressure on the Money Market, London, 1840, p. 37.)—"Another effect of the regulation of the currency by means of foreign quotations on bills of exchange is that it brings about an enormous rate of interest in times of crisis." (L. c., p. 40.)—"The costs arising out of the restoration of the quotations on bills of exchange fall upon the productive industry of the country, whereas in the course of this process the profit of the Bank of England is positively increased by the fact that it continues its business with a smaller amount of precious metal." (L. c., p. 52.)

But, says friend Samuel Gurney, "These great fluctuations of the rate of interest are advantageous for the bankers and money dealers—all fluctuations in business are advantageous for him who is posted." And even though the Gurneys skim the cream off the ruthless exploitation of the precarious condition of business, whereas the Bank of England cannot do this with the same liberty, nevertheless it also makes quite nice profits—not to mention the private profits, which of their own account fall into the lap of the directors, who have an exceptional opportunity to understand the general condition of business. According to a statement made before the Lord's Committee of 1817 on the matter of the resumption of specie payments these profits of the Bank of England for the entire period from 1797 to 1817 stood as follows:

Bonuses and increased dividends...7,451,136
New stock divided among proprietors...7,276,500
Increased value of capital...14,553,000
Total...29,280,636

on a capital of 11,642,100 pounds sterling in 19 years. (D. Hardcastle, Banks and Bankers, 2nd edition, London, 1843, p. 120.) If we estimate the total profits of the Bank of Ireland, which also suspended specie payments in 1797, by the same principle, we obtain the following result:

Dividends as by returns due 1821...4,736,085
Declared bonus...1,225,000
Increased assets...1,214,800
Increased value of capital...4,185,000
   Total...11,360,885

on a capital of 3 million pounds sterling. (Ibidem, p. 163.)

Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its center in the so-called national banks and the great money lenders and usurers about them, is an enormous centralisation, and gives to this class of parasites a fabulous power, not only to despoil periodically the industrial capitalists, but also to interfere into actual production in a most dangerous manner—and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it. The Acts of 1844 and 1845 are proofs of the growing power of these bandits, who are joined by the financiers and stock jobbers.

Should any one still dream that these honorable bandits exploit national and international production only in the interest of production and of the exploited themselves, he will surely be taught better by the following homily on the high moral dignity of the bankers: "The bank establishments are religious and moral institutions. How often has not the fear of being seen by the vigilant and disapproving eye of his banker deterred the young business man from seeking the society of noisy and extravagant friends? How anxious he is to stand well in the estimation of the banker, to appear always respectable! The knit brow of the banker has more influence over him than the moral preaching of his friends; does he not tremble to be suspected of being guilty of fraud or of the least false statement, for fear of causing suspicion, in consequence of which his banking accommodation might be restricted or cancelled? The advice of the banker is more important to him than that of the clergyman." (G. M. Bell, a Scotch bank director, in The Philosophy of Joint Stock Banking, London, 1840, pp. 46 and 47.)

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CURRENCY PRINCIPLE AND THE ENGLISH BANK LAWS OF 1844.

[In a former work105 the theory of Ricardo on the value of money as related to the prices of commodities has been analysed; we can, therefore, confine ourselves here to the indispensable. According to Ricardo, the value of metallic money is determined by the labor time incorporated in it, but only so long as the quantity of money stands in the right proportion to the quantity and price of the commodities to be handled. If the quantity of the money rises above this proportion, its value falls, the prices of commodities rise; if its quantity falls below the normal proportion, then its value rises and the prices of commodities fall—assuming all other circumstances to remain unchanged. In the first case the country, in which this excess of gold exists, will export the depreciated gold and import commodities; in the second case the gold will flow to those countries, in which it is held above its value, while the depreciated commodities flow from these countries to other markets, where they can obtain normal prices. "Since gold itself may become, both as coin and bullion, a token of value of greater or smaller magnitude than its bullion value, it is self-evident that convertible bank notes in circulation have to share the same fate. Although bank notes are convertible, i.e. their real value and nominal value agree, the aggregate currency consisting of metal and of convertible notes may appreciate or depreciate according as to whether it rises or falls, for reasons already stated, above or below the level determined by the exchange-value of the commodities in circulation and the bullion value of gold....This depreciation, not of paper as compared with gold, but of gold and paper together, or of the aggregate currency of a country, is one of the principal discoveries of Ricardo, which Lord Overstone and Co. pressed into their service and made a fundamental principle of Sir Robert Peel's Bank legislation of 1844 and 1845." (L. c. p. 241.)
We need not repeat here the demonstration of the incorrectness of this Ricardian theory, which is given in the same place. We are here merely interested in the way in which Ricardo's theses were elaborated by that school of bank theorists, who dictated the above named Bank Acts of Peel.
"The commercial crises of the nineteenth century, namely, the great crises of 1825 and 1836, did not result in any new developments in the Ricardian theory of money, but they did furnish new applications for it. They were no longer isolated economic phenomena, such as the depreciation of the precious metals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which interested Hume, or the depreciation of paper money in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which confronted Ricardo; they were the great storms of the world market in which the conflict of all the elements of the capitalist process of production discharge themselves, and whose origin and remedy were sought in the most superficial and abstract sphere of this process, the sphere of money-circulation. The theoretical assumption from which the school of economic weather prophets proceeds, comes down in the end to the illusion that Ricardo discovered the laws governing the circulation of purely metallic currency. The only thing that remained for them to do was to subject to the same laws the circulation of credit and bank note currency.
"The most general and most palpable phenomenon in commercial crises is the sudden general decline of prices following a prolonged general rise. The general decline of prices of commodities may be expressed as a rise in the relative value of money with respect to all commodities, and the general rise of prices as a decline of the relative value of money. In either expression the phenomenon is described but not explained....The different wording leaves the problem as little changed as would its translation from German into English. Ricardo's theory of money was exceedingly convenient, because it lends to a tautology the semblance of a statement of casual connection. Whence comes the periodic general fall of prices? From the periodic rise of the relative value of money. Whence the general periodic rise of prices? From the periodic decline of the relative value of money. It might have been stated with equal truth that the periodic rise and fall of prices is due to their periodic rise and fall....The tautology once admitted as a statement of cause, the rest follows easily. A rise of prices of commodities is caused by a decline of the value of money and a decline of the value of money is caused, as we know from Ricardo, by a redundant currency, i.e., by a rise of the volume of currency over the level determined by its own intrinsic value and the intrinsic value of the commodities. In the same manner, the general decline of prices of commodities is explained by the rise of the value of money above its intrinsic value in consequence of an inadequate currency. Thus, prices rise and fall periodically, because there is periodically too much or too little money in circulation. Should a rise of prices happen to coincide with a contracted currency, and a fall of prices with an expanded one, it may be asserted in spite of those facts that in consequence of a contraction or expansion of the volume of commodities in the market which cannot be proved statistically, the quantity of money in circulation has, although not absolutely, yet relatively increased or declined. We have seen that according to Ricardo these universal fluctuations must take place even with a purely metallic currency, but that they balance each other through their alternations; thus, e.g., an inadequate currency causes a fall of prices, the fall of prices leads to an export of commodities abroad, this export causes again an import of gold from abroad, which, in its turn, brings about a rise of prices; the opposite movement taking place in case of a redundant currency, when commodities are imported and money is exported. But, since in spite of these universal fluctuations of prices which are in perfect accord with Ricardo's theory of metallic currency, their acute and violent form, their crisis form, belongs to the period of advanced credit, it is perfectly clear that the issue of bank notes is not exactly regulated by the laws of metallic currency. Metallic currency has its remedy in the import and export of precious metals, which immediately enter circulation and thus, by their influx or efflux, cause the prices of commodities to fall or rise. The same effect on prices must now be exerted by banks by the artificial imitation of the laws of metallic currency. If gold is coming in from abroad it proves that the currency is inadequate, that the value of money is too high and the prices of commodities too low, and, consequently, that bank notes must be put in circulation in proportion to the newly imported gold. On the other hand, notes have to be withdrawn from circulation in proportion to the export of gold from the country. That is to say, the issue of bank notes must be regulated by the import and export of the precious metals or by the rate of exchange. Ricardo's false assumption that gold is only coin, and that therefore all imported gold swells the currency, causing prices to rise, while all exported gold reduces the currency, leading to a fall of prices, this theoretical assumption is turned into a practical experiment of putting in every case an amount of currency in circulation equal to the amount of gold in existence. Lord Overstone (the banker Jones Loyd), Colonel Torrens, Norman, Clay, Arbuthnot and a host of other writers, known in England as the adherents of the 'Currency Principle,' not only preached this doctrine, but with the aid of Sir Robert Peel succeeded in 1844 and 1845 in making it the basis of the present English and Scotch bank legislation. Its ignominious failure, theoretical as well as practical, following upon experiments on the largest national scale, can be treated only after we take up the theory of credit." (L. c. pages 255 to 259.)
The critique of this school was furnished by Thomas Tooke, James Wilson (in the "Economist" of 1844 to 1847) and John Fullarton. But how incompletely they themselves had seen through the nature of gold, and how unclear they were about the relation of money and capital, we have shown several times, particularly in chapter XXVIII of this volume. We quote here merely a few instances in connection with the transactions of the Committee of the Lower House of 1857 concerning Peel's Bank Acts (B. C. 1857).—F. E.]

J. G. Hubbard, former Governor of the Bank of England, testifies:—2400. "The effect of the gold exports...absolutely does not touch prices of commodities. It does, however, affect very much the prices of securities, because in proportion as the rate of interest changes, the values of the commodities impersonating this interest must necessarily be strongly affected."—He presents two tables covering the years 1834 to 1843 and 1844 to 1853, which prove that the movement of prices of fifteen of the most important commercial articles was quite independent of the export and import of gold and of the rate of interest. On the other hand they prove a close connection between the export and import of gold, which is indeed the "representative of our capital seeking investment," and the rate of interest.—"In 1847 a very large amount of American securities was transferred back to America, also Russian securities to Russia, and other continental papers to the countries from which we derived our imports of corn."

The fifteen principal articles mentioned in the following tables of Hubbard are: Cotton, cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, wool, wool cloth, flax, linen, indigo, raw iron, white sheet metal, copper, tallow, sugar, coffee, silk.

lf0445-03_figure_006
lf0445-03_figure_007

Hubbard remarked with reference to this: "Just as in the 10 years from 1834 to 1843, so in the years from 1844 to 1853 fluctuations in the gold of the bank were accompanied in every case by an increase or decrease of the loanable value of the money advanced at a discount; and on the other hand the changes in the prices of inland commodities showed a complete independence from the amount of the currency, as shown by the gold fluctuations of the Bank of England." (Bank Acts Report, 1857, II, pages 290 and 291.)

Since the demand and supply of commodities regulates their market-prices, it becomes evident here, that Overstone is wrong when he identifies the demand for loanable capital (or rather the discrepancies of its supply from demand), as expressed by the rate of discount, with the demand for actual "capital." The contention that the prices of commodities are regulated by the fluctuations in the quantity of the currency is now concealed under the phrase that the fluctuations in the rate of discount express fluctuations in the demand for actual material capital, as distinguished from money-capital. We have seen that both Norman and Overstone actually made this contention before the same Committee, and that especially the latter was compelled to take refuge in very lame subterfuges, until he was finally cornered. (Chapter XXVI.) It is indeed the old fib that changes in the quantity of gold existing in a certain country, by increasing or reducing the quantity of the medium of circulation in that country, must raise or lower the prices of commodities in this country. If gold is exported, then, according to this currency theory, the prices of commodities must rise in the country importing this gold, and this must enhance the value of the exports of the gold exporting country on the market of the gold importing country; on the other hand, the value of the exports of the gold importing country would fall on the markets of the gold exporting country, while it would rise in the home country, which receives the gold. But in fact the reduction of the quantity of gold raises only the rate of interest, whereas an increase in the quantity of gold lowers the rate of interest; and were it not for the fact that the fluctuations of the rate of interest are taken into account in the determination of cost-prices, or in the determination of demand and supply, the prices of commodities would be wholly unaffected by them.

In the same report N. Alexander, Chief of a great Indian firm, expresses himself in the following manner on the heavy drains of silver to India and China about the middle of the fifties, partly in consequence of the Chinese Civil War, which checked the sale of English fabrics in China, and partly of the epidemic among silk worms in Europe, which reduced the output of silk in Italy and France considerably:

4337. "Is the drain toward China or India."—"They send the silver to India, and with a goodly portion of it they buy opium, all of which goes to China in order to form a fund for the purchase of silk; and the condition of the markets in India (in spite of the accumulation of silver there) makes it more profitable for the merchant to send out silver than to send fabrics or other English factory goods."—4338. "Did not a heavy drain come out of France, by which we secured the silver?"—"Yes, a very heavy one."—4344. "Instead of importing silk from France and Italy, we ship it there in large quantities, both Bengal and Chinese."

In other words, silver, the money metal of that continent, was sent to Asia instead of commodities, not because the prices of commodities had risen in the country which had produced them (England), but because prices had fallen on account of overimport in that country which received them; and this in spite of the fact that the silver was received by England from France and had to be paid partly in gold. According to the Currency Theory prices should have fallen by such imports in England and risen in India and China.

Another illustration. Before the Lords' Committee (C. D. 1848-1857), Wylie, one of the first Liverpool merchants, testifies as follows:—1994. "At the end of 1845 there was no better paying business and none that yielded greater profits [than cotton spinning]. The supply of cotton was large and good, workable cotton could be had at 4 d. per pound, and such cotton could be spun into good second mule twist No. 40 at about 8 d. total expense to the spinner. This yarn was sold in large quantities in September and October, 1845, and equally large contracts made for delivery at 10½ and 11½ d. per pound, and in some instances the spinners realised a profit which equalled the purchase price of the cotton."—1996. "The business remained profitable until the beginning of 1846."—2000. "On March 3, 1844, the cotton supply [672,042 bales] was more than double of what it is today [on March 7, 1848, when it was 301,070 bales], and yet the price was 1¼ d. per pound dearer." [6¼ d. as against 5 d.]—At the same time yarn, good second mule twist No. 40, had fallen from 11½ to 12 d. to 9½ d. in October and 7¾ d. at the end of December, 1847; yarn was sold at the purchase price of the cotton from which it had been spun (Ibidem, No. 2021 and 2023). This proves the selfinterest of Overstone's wisdom to the effect that money is supposed to be "Dearer" when capital is "scarce." On March 3, 1844, the bank rate of interest stood at 3%; in October and November, 1847, it rose to 8 and 9% and was still 4% on March 7, 1848. The prices of cotton were depressed far below that price which corresponded to the condition of the supply, by the complete stopping of sales and the panic with its correspondingly high rate of interest. The consequence of this was on the one hand an enormous decrease of the imports in 1848, and on the other a decrease of production in America; consequently a new rise in cotton prices in 1849. According to Overstone the commodities were too dear, because there was too much money in the country.

2002. "The recent deterioration in the condition of the cotton industry is not due to the lack of raw materials, since the price is lower, although the supply of raw cotton is considerably reduced." But Overstone tangles himself up in a nice confusion of the price, or value, of commodities, with the value of money, that is, the rate of interest. In his reply to question 2026, Wylie sums up his general judgment of the Currency Theory, on which Cardwell and Sir Charles Wood based in May, 1847, their contention that it would be necessary "to carry the Bank Act of 1844 out in its full scope."—"These principles seem to me to be of a nature to give to money an artificially high value and to all commodities a ruinously low value."—He says furthermore concerning the effects of this Bank Act on business in general: "Since four months' bills of exchange, which are the regular drafts of manufacturing towns on merchants and bankers for purchased commodities intended for export to the United States, could no longer be discounted except at great sacrifices, the carrying out of orders was prevented to a large degree, until after the Government Letter of October 25." [Suspension of Bank Acts], "when these four months' bills became once more discountable." (2097.)—We see, then, that the suspension of this Bank Act was felt as a relief also in the provinces.—2102. "Last October [1847] nearly all American buyers, who purchase commodities here, immediately curtailed their purchases as much as possible; and when the news of the dearth of money reached America, all new orders stopped."—2134. "Corn and sugar were special cases. The corn market was affected by the crop prospects, and sugar was affected by the enormous supplies and imports."—2163. "Of our money obligations to America...many were liquidated by forced sales of consigned goods, and many, I fear, were liquidated by bankruptcies here."—2196. "If I remember correctly, as much as 70% interest was paid on our Stock Exchange in October, 1847."

[The crisis of 1837, with its protracted aftereffects, which were followed in 1842 by a regular aftercrisis, and the self-interested blindness of the industrials and merchants, who would not notice any overproduction to save their lives— for such a thing was a nonsense and an impossibility according to vulgar economy—had ultimately accomplished that confusion of thought, which permitted the Currency School to put their dogma into practice on a national scale. The Bank legislation of 1844 and 1845 was passed.

The Bank Act of 1844 divides the Bank of England into an issue department for notes and a banking department. The issue department receives securities, principally government debts, to the amount of 14 millions and the entire metal treasure, which shall consist of not more than one-quarter in silver, and issues notes to the full amount of both of them. To the extent that these are not in the hands of the public, they are held in the banking department and form its ever ready reserve together with the small amount of coin required for daily use (about one million). The issue department gives to the public gold for notes and notes for gold; the remainder of the transactions with the public is carried on by the banking department. The private banks authorised in England and Wales to issue their own notes retain this privilege, but their issue of notes is fixed; if one of these banks stops issuing its own notes, then the Bank of England may raise its uncovered amount of notes by two-thirds of the deposited allowance; in this way its allowance rose by 1892 from 14 to 16½ million pounds sterling (exactly 16,450,000 pounds sterling).

For every five pounds in gold, then, which leave the bank treasury, a five pound note returns to the issue department and is destroyed; for every five sovereigns going into the treasury a new five pound note passes into circulation. In this way Overstone's ideal paper circulation, which follows strictly the laws of metallic circulation, is practically carried out, and by this means crises are forever made impossible, according to the claims of the Currency advocates.

But in reality the separation of the Bank into two independent departments robbed the management of the possibility of disposing freely of its entire available means in critical moments, so that cases might occur, in which the banking department might be confronted with a bankruptcy, while the issue department still possessed several millions in gold and its entire 14 millions of securities untouched. And this could take place so much more easily, as there is one period in almost every crisis, when heavy exports of gold flow to foreign countries, which must be covered in the main by the metal reserve of the bank. But for every five pounds in gold, which then go to foreign countries, the circulation of the home country is deprived of one five pound note, so that the quantity of the currency is reduced precisely at a time, when the largest quantity of it is most needed. The Bank Act of 1844 thus directly challenges the commercial world to think betimes of laying up a reserve fund of bank notes on the eve of a crisis, in other words, to hasten and intensify the crisis; by this artificial intensification of the demand for money accommodation, that is for means of payment, and its simultaneous restriction of the supply, which take effect at the decisive moment, this Bank Act drives the rate of interest to a hitherto unknown hight; hence, instead of doing away with crises, the Act rather intensifies them to a point, where either the entire commercial world must go to pieces, or the Bank Act. Twice, on October 25, 1847, and on November 12, 1857, the crisis had risen to this culmination; then the government released the Bank from its limitation in the matter of issuing notes, by suspending the Act of 1844, and this sufficed in both cases to break the crisis. In 1847 the assurance sufficed, that bank notes would again be issued for first class securities, in order to bring to light the 4 to 5 millions of hoarded notes and throw them back into circulation; in 1857 the issue of notes exceeding the legal amount did not quite reach one million, and this was out for a very short time.

It may also be noted that the legislation of 1844 still shows traces of a recollection of the first twenty years of the nineteenth century, the time of the suspension of specie payments of the bank and the depreciation of notes. The fear that the notes might lose their credit is still plainly visible. But this is a very groundless fear, since already in 1825 the issue of some discovered old supply of one pound notes, which had been out of circulation, broke the crisis and proved, that even then the credit of the notes remained unshaken in times of the most universal and strong distrust. And this is easily explained. For the entire nation backs up these symbols of value with its credit.—F. E.]

Let us now listen to a few statements on the effect of the Bank Act. John Stuart Mill believes that the Bank Act of 1844 kept down overspeculation. Happily this wise man spoke on June 12, 1857. Four months later the crisis had broken out. He literally congratulates the "bank directors and the commercial public in general" on the fact that they "understand the nature of a commercial crisis far better than formerly, and the very great injury which they inflict upon themselves and the public by promoting overspeculation." (B. C., 1857, No. 2031.)

Wise Mr. Mill thinks that, if one pound notes are issued "as loans to manufacturers and others, who pay wages...then the notes may get into the hands of others who spend them for purposes of consumption, and in this case the notes constitute in themselves a demand for commodities and may temporarily tend to promote a raise in prices." Mr. Mill assumes, then, that the manufacturers will pay higher wages, because they pay them in paper instead of gold? Or does he believe that when a manufacture receives his loan in 100 pound notes and changes them for gold, then these wages would constitute less of a demand than they would when paid at the same time in one pound notes? And does he not know that, for instance, in certain mining districts wages were paid in notes of local banks, so that several laborers together received a five pound note? Does this increase the demand for them? Or will the bankers advance money to the manufacturers more easily in small than in large notes, and make the loan larger?

[This peculiar fear of one pound notes on the part of Mill would be inexplicable, if his whole work on political economy did not show his eclecticism, which recoils from no contradictions. On the one hand he agrees in many things with Tooke against Overstone, on the other hand he believes in the determination of the prices of commodities by the quantity of the existing money. He is thus by no means convinced, that, all other circumstances remaining unchanged, a sovereign wanders into the vaults of the Bank for every one pound note issued. He fears that the quantity of the currency could be increased and thereby depreciated, that is, the prices of commodities might be enhanced. This and nothing else is concealed behind his above-mentioned apprehension.—F. E.]

Concerning the bipartition of the Bank, and the excessive precaution to safeguard the cashing of notes, Tooke expresses himself before the C. D. 1848-57 as follows:

The greater fluctuations of the rate of interest in 1847, as compared with 1837 and '39, are due merely to the separation of the Bank into two departments (3010).—"The security of the banknotes was not affected, neither in 1825, nor in 1837 nor in 1839 (3015).—The demand for gold in 1825 aimed only to fill out the vacant space created by the complete disavowal of the one pound notes of the provincial banks; this vacant space could be filled out only by gold, until the Bank of England also issued one pound notes (3022).—In November and December, 1825, not the least demand existed for gold to export (3023).

"As for a disavowal of the Bank at home and abroad, a suspension of the payment of dividends and deposits would have much more serious consequences than a suspension of payment on bank notes (3028).

3035. Would you not say that every circumstance, which would in the last instance endanger the convertibility of the bank notes, might create new and serious difficulties in a moment of commercial stringency?—"Not at all."

In the course of 1847 "an increased issue of notes might, perhaps, have contributed to replenish the gold reserve of the Bank, as it did in 1825." (3058).

Before the Committee on B. A. 1857, Newmarch testifies: 1357. "The first bad effect...of this separation of the two departments (of the Bank) and of the necessarily resulting bipartition of the gold reserve was that the banking business of the Bank of England, that is, that entire branch of its operations, which brought it into direct touch with the commerce of the country, was continued with only one-half of its former reserve. In consequence of this division of the reserve it happened that, as soon as the reserve of the banking department shrank in the least, the Bank was compelled to raise its rate of discount. This reduced reserve thus caused a series of abrupt changes in the rate of discount."—"Of such changes there have been since 1844" [until June, 1857] "some 60 in number, whereas they amounted to hardly one dozen before 1844 within a similar period."

Of special interest is the testimony of Palmer, who was a director of the Bank of England since 1811 and for a while its Governor, before the Lords' Committee on C. D. 1848-57:

828. "In December, 1825, the Bank had retained only about 1,100,000 pounds sterling in gold. At that time it would have failed inevitably, if this act had existed then [meaning the Act of 1844]. In December it issued, I believe, 5 or 6 million notes in one week, and this relieved the panic of that time considerably."

825. "The first period [since July 1, 1825], when the present bank legislation would have collapsed, if the Bank had attempted to carry its hitherto initiated transactions through, was on February 28, 1837. There were then from 3,900,000 to 4,000,000 pounds sterling in the possession of the Bank, and it would have retained no more than 650,000 pounds sterling in reserve. Another period is 1839, and it lasted from July 9 to December 5."—826. "What was the amount of the reserve in this case?"—"The reserve was minus altogether 200,000 pounds sterling on September 5. On November 5, it rose to about 1 or 1½ millions."—830. "The Act of 1844 would have prevented the Bank from assisting the American business in 1837."—"Three of the principal American firms failed....Nearly every firm in the American business was ruled out of credit, and if the Bank had not come to the rescue, I do not believe that more than one or two firms could have maintained themselves."—836. "The panic of 1837 is not to be compared with that of 1847. That of 1837 confined itself mainly to the American business."—838. (At the beginning of June the management of the Bank discussed the question, how to remedy the panic.) "Whereupon some of the gentlemen defended the view...that the correct principle would be to raise the rate of interest, so that the prices of commodities would fall; in brief, to make money dear and commodities cheap, by which the foreign payment would be accomplished."—906. "The introduction of an artificial limitation of the powers of the Bank by the Act of 1844, in place of the old and natural limit of its powers, that is, the actual amount of its metal supply, makes business artificially difficult and thus effects prices in a way which was quite unnecessary without this Act."—968. "Under the effect of the Act of 1844 the metal reserve of the Bank, under ordinary circumstances, cannot be reduced materially below 9½ millions. This would create a pressure on prices and credit, which would bring about such a change in the foreign exchange rates, that the gold imports would rise and increase the amount of gold in the issue department."—996.

"Under the present limitation you [the Bank] have not command of silver which is required in times when silver is needed in order to affect foreign rates."—999. "What was the purpose of the rule limiting the silver supply of the Bank to one-fifth of its metal reserve?"—"I cannot answer this question!"

The purpose was to make money dearer; so was, aside from the Currency Theory, the separation of the two bank departments and the compulsion for Scotch and Irish banks to hold gold in reserve for the issue of notes beyond a certain amount. This brought about a decentralisation of the national metal supply, which rendered this supply less able to correct unfavorable bill rates. All these rules aim at a raise of the rate of interest: That the Bank of England shall not issue notes beyond 14 millions except against its gold reserve; that the banking department shall be managed like an ordinary bank, pressing the rate of interest down when money is plentiful and driving it up when money is scarce; the limitation of the silver supply, the principal means of rectifying the rates of bills on the continent and in Asia! the rules concerning the Scotch and Irish banks, who never need any money for export and yet must keep it now under the pretence of an actually imaginary convertibility of their notes. The fact is that the Act of 1844 caused for the first time in 1857 a run on the Scotch banks for gold. Nor did the new bank legislation make any distinction between a drain of gold toward foreign countries and a drain to inland markets, although their effects are evidently different. Hence the continual great fluctuations of the market rate of interest. With reference to silver Palmer says twice, No. 992 and 994, that the Bank can buy silver for notes only when the rates on bills are favorable to England, so that silver is superfluous; for (1003) "the only purpose for which a considerable portion of the metal reserve may be kept in silver is that of facilitating foreign payments during the time when the rates on bills are against England."—1008. "Silver is a commodity which, being money in all the rest of the whole world, is for this reason the most fitting commodity...For this purpose" [payments abroad]. "Only the United States have taken exclusively gold during recent times."

In his opinion the Bank would not have to raise the rate of interest above its old level of 5% in times of stringency, so long as no unfavorable bill rates draw the gold to foreign countries. Were it not for the Act of 1844, the Bank would then be able to discount all first class bills presented to it without any difficulty. [1018 to 20.] But with the Act of 1844, and in the condition, in which the Bank was in October, 1847, "there was no rate of interest which the Bank could ask from creditable firms, which they would not have paid willingly in order to continue their payments." And this high rate of interest was precisely the purpose of the Act.

1029. "I must make a great distinction between the effect of the rate of interest on the foreign demand [for precious metal] and a raise of the rate of interest for the purpose of stemming a rush on the bank during a period of lacking credit inland."—1023. "Before the act of 1844, when the rates were in favor of England, and unrest, yea, a positive panic, reigned in the country, no limit was set to the issue of notes, by which alone this condition of stringency could be relieved."

So speaks a man who had sat 39 years in the management of the Bank of England. Let us now hear a private banker, Twells who had been an associate of Spooner, Attwoods 8 Co. since 1801. He is the only one among all the witnesses before the B. C. 1857, who gives us an insight into the actual condition of the country and who sees the approach of the crisis. For the rest he is a sort of Little-Shilling-Man from Birmingham, for his associates, the brothers Attwood, are the founders of this school. (See A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 100.) He testifies: 4488. "How do you think the Act of 1844 has operated?"—"Should I answer you as a banker, I would say that it has operated splendidly, for it has furnished to the bankers and [money-] capitalists of all sorts a rich harvest. But it has operated very badly for the honest and thrifty business man, who needs steadiness in discount, in order that he may make his arrangements with confidence....It has made the lending of money a very profitable business."—4489. The Bank Act "Enables the London Stock Bank to pay to its stockholders 20 to 22%?"—"One of them paid recently 18%, and I believe another 20%; they have good grounds for standing determinedly by the Bank Act."—4490. "Small business men and respectable merchants, who have no large capital...it pinches them hard....The only means which I have of learning this is such a surprising quantity of their drafts, which are not paid. These drafts are always small, about 20 to 100 pounds sterling, many of them are not paid and go back for lack of payment to all parts of the country, and this is always a sign of stringency among—the small dealers."—4494. He declares that the business is not profitable now. His following remarks are important, because he saw the latent existence of the crisis, when none of the others suspected it as yet.

4494. "The prices in Mincing Lane keep up pretty well so far, but nothing is sold, one cannot sell anything at any price; one maintains himself at the nominal price."—4495 He relates the following case: A Frenchman sends to a broker in Mincing Lane commodities for 3,000 pounds sterling for sale at a certain price. The broker cannot make the price, the Frenchman cannot sell below his price. The commodities remain unsold, but the Frenchman needs money. The broker therefore makes him an advance of 1,000 pounds sterling in such a way, that the Frenchman draws a check of 1,000 pounds sterling for three months on the broker with his commodities for a security. At the end of the three months the bill becomes due, but the commodities are still unsold. The broker must then pay for the bill, and although he has security for 3,000 pounds sterling, he cannot raise them and gets into difficulties. In this way one drags down another.—4496. "As for the heavy exports—when the business is depressed in the home market, it calls for the necessarily a heavy export."—4497. "Do you believe that the home consumption has decreased?"—"Very considerably—quite enormously—the small dealers are the best authority in this."—4498. "Nevertheless the imports are very large; does not that indicate a strong consumption?"—"Yes, if you can sell; but many warehouses are full of these things; in the example, which I have just related, 3,000 pounds sterling worth of commodities have been imported, which are unsalable."

4514. "If money is dear, would you say that capital is then cheap?"—"Yes, sir."—This man, then, is by no means of Overstone's opinion that a high rate of interest is the same as dear capital.

The following shows how the business is carried on now.—4516...."Others go in very heavily, do an enormous business in exports and imports, far beyond the limit to which their capital entitles them; there cannot be the least doubt about this. These people may be lucky in this; they may make great fortunes by some lucky stroke and pay up everything. This is in a large measure the system, by which nowadays a considerable portion of the business is carried on. Such people are willing to lose 20, 30 and 40% on a shipment; the next transaction may bring it back to them. If they fail in one thing after another, they are gone; and that is precisely the case which we have seen often enough of late; business firms have failed, without leaving one shilling's worth of assets."

4791. "The low rate of interest [during the last ten years] militates indeed against the bankers, but without laying the business books before you, I should have much difficulty in explaining to you, how much higher the profit [his own] is now than formerly. When the rate of interest is low, in consequence of excessive issues of notes, we have considerable deposits; when the rate of interest is high, it brings us direct profits."—4794. "When money may be had at a moderate rate of interest, we have more demand for it; we loan more; it works this way [for us, the bankers]. When it rises, we get more for it than when it is cheap; we get more than we ought to have."

We have seen that the credit of the notes of the Bank of England is considered impregnable by all experts. Nevertheless the Bank Act absolutely ties up nine to ten millions in gold for the convertibility of these notes. The sacredness and inviolability of this reserve is here carried much farther than among the hoard makers of olden times. Mr. Brown (Liverpool) testifies, C. D. 1848-57, 2311: "Concerning the good derived at that time from this money [the metal reserve in the issue department], it might just as well have been thrown into the sea; for not the least bit of it could be used, without breaking the Act of Parliament."

The building contractor, E. Capps, the same one who has been mentioned once before, and whose testimony is borrowed also to illustrate the modern building system in London (Volume II, chapter XII, pages 266 and 267), sums up his opinion of the Bank Act of 1844 in the following way (B. A. 1857): 5508. "You are, then, in general of the opinion that the present system [of bank legislation] is a very apt institution for bringing the profits of industry periodically into the money bag of the usurer?"—"That is my opinion. I know that it has worked that way in the building business."

We have already mentioned that the Scotch banks were pushed by the Bank Act of 1845 into a system approaching the English. They were placed under the obligation to hold gold in reserve for their issue of notes beyond a limit fixed for each bank. What the effect of this was, may be seen from the following testimony before the Bank Committee, 1857.

Kennedy, Director of a Scotch bank: 3375. "Was there anything in Scotland that might be called a circulation of gold, before the introduction of the Act of 1845?"—"Nothing of the kind."—3376. "Has an additional circulation of gold ensued since then?"—"Not in the least; the people dislike gold."—3450. "The sum of about 900,000 pounds sterling in gold, which the Scotch banks must keep since 1845, are in my opinion merely injurious and "absorb unprofitably an equal portion of the capital of Scotland."

Furthermore Anderson, Director of the Union Bank of Scotland: 3558. "The only heavy demand for gold made on the part of the Scotch banks upon the Bank of England occurred on account of the foreign rates of exchange?"—"That is so; and this demand is not reduced by the fact that we keep gold in Edinburgh."—3590. "So long as we deposited the same amount of securities in the Bank of England" [or in the private banks of England] "we have the same power as before to create a drain of gold from the Bank of England."

Finally we quote an article from the "Economist" (Wilson): "The Scotch banks keep unemployed amounts of cash with their London agents; these keep them in the Bank of England. This gives to the Scotch banks, within the limits of these amounts, command over the metal reserve of the bank, and here it is always in the place where it is needed, when foreign payments are to be made."—This system was disturbed by the Act of 1845: "In consequence of the act of 1845 for Scotland a strong outpour of gold coin from the Bank of England has taken place lately, in order to meet a mere possible demand in Scotland, which would probably never occur.—Since that time a considerable amount finds itself tied up regularly in Scotland, and another considerable amount is continually under way between London and Scotland. If a time comes when a Scotch banker expects an increased demand for his notes, a box of gold is sent on from London; if this time is past, the same box goes back to London, generally without having been opened." (Economist, October 23, 1847.)

[And what does the father of the Bank Act, Banker Samuel Jones Loyd, alias Lord Overstone, say to all this?
He repeated even in 1848 before the Lords' Committee on C. D. that "a money stringency and a high rate of interest, caused by a lack of sufficient capital, cannot be relieved by an increased issue of bank notes" (1514), in spite of the fact that the mere permission to increase the issue of notes, given by the government letter of October 25, 1847, had sufficed to break the point of the crisis.
He sticks to the idea that "the high rate of interest and the depressed condition of the manufacturing industry was the necessary consequence of the reduction of the material capital available for industrial and commercial purposes" (1604). And yet the depressed condition of the manufacturing industry had for months consisted in the fact that the material commodity-capital was filling the warehouses to overflowing and was almost unsalable; so that for this reason the material productive capital was wholly or partly fallow, in order not to produce still more unsalable commodity-capital.
And before the Bank Committee of 1857 he said: By a strict and prompt adherence to the principles of the Act of 1844 everything has passed off with regularity and ease, the money system is secure and unshaken, the prosperity of the country is undisputed, the public confidence in the Act of 1844 is daily gaining in strength. If this Committee desires still further practical proofs of the soundness of the principles on which this act rests, and of the beneficent consequences which it has guaranteed, then the true and sufficient answer is this: Look about you; consider the present condition of the business of this country; consider the satisfaction of the people; consider the wealth and prosperity of all classes of society; and then, after you have seen all this, this Committee will be able to decide, whether it will prevent a continuation of an Act, under which such success has been obtained." (B. C. 1857, No. 4189.)
To this song of praise, which Overstone emitted before the Committee on July 14, replied the song of defiance on November 12, of the same year, in the shape of the letter to the management of the Bank, in which the government suspended the miracle-working law of 1844, in order to save what could still be saved.—F. E.]

CHAPTER XXXV.

PRECIOUS METALS AND RATES OF EXCHANGE.

I. The Movements of the Gold Reserve.

CONCERNING the hoarding of notes in times of stringency we remark, that in such cases the hoarding of precious metals is repeated, which used to be resorted to in restless times during the most primitive conditions of society. The Act of 1844 is interesting in its effects for the reason that it seeks to transform all the precious metals existing in a certain country into currency; it seeks to identify a discharge of gold with a contraction of the currency and an incoming flood of gold with an expansion of the currency. And so it happened that the experiment proved the contrary. With one sole exception, which we shall mention immediately, the quantity of the circulating notes of the Bank of England never reached the maximum, since 1844, which it was authorized to issue. And the crisis of 1857 proved, on the other hand, that this maximum does not suffice under certain circumstances. From November 13, to 30, 1857, a daily average of 488,830 pounds sterling circulated above this maximum (B. A. 1858, p. XI). The legal maximum was at that time 14,475,000 pounds sterling plus the amount of the metal reserve in the vaults of the bank.

Concerning the outgoing and incoming tide of precious metals the following remarks are made:

1) A distinction should be made between the back and forth movements of the metal within the districts which do not produce any gold and silver, and on the other hand, between the flow of gold and silver from their sources of production to the different other countries and the distribution of this additional metal among these other countries.

Before the gold mines of Russia, California and Australia exerted their influence, the supply since the beginning of the nineteenth century sufficed only to replace the wornout coins, to satisfy the demand for articles of luxury, and to promote the exports of silver to Asia.

However, the silver exports of Asia increased extraordinarily since that time, owing to the Asiatic trade with America and Europe. The silver exported from Europe was largely replaced by the additional supply of gold. In the second place, a portion of the newly imported gold was absorbed by the internal money-circulation. It is estimated that up to 1857 about 30 millions in gold were added to the internal circulation of England.106 Furthermore, the average volume of the metal reserves in all central banks of Europe and America increased since 1844. The increase of the inland money circulation also carried with it the circumstance, that in the period of stagnation following upon the panic the bank reserves grew more rapidly than before in consequence of the larger quantity of gold coins thrown out of inland circulation and held in a state of rest. Finally the consumption of precious metals for articles of luxury increased since the discovery of new gold deposits in consequence of the growing wealth.

2) Between the countries that do not produce any gold and silver, precious metals flow back and forth; the same country continually imports some, and just as continually exports some. It is only the predominance of this movement in one direction or the other which decides whether there is in the last instance a drain or an addition, since the merely oscillating and frequently parallel movements largely neutralise one another. But for this reason, so far as this result is concerned, the continuity and the mainly parallel course of both movements is overlooked. It is always assumed that a plus in the imports or a plus in the exports of precious metals appears only as an effect and concomitant of the proportion between the imports and exports of commodities, whereas they are at the same time an expression of the proportion between the exports and imports of precious metals themselves, independent of the trade of commodities.

3) The predominance of the imports over the exports, and vice versa, is measured on the whole by the increase or decrease of the metal reserve in the central banks. To what extent this scale of measurement is more or less exact, depends, of course, primarily on the degree to which the banking business in general is centralised. For on this premise turns the question, to what extent the precious metal hoarded in the so-called national banks represents the national metal reserve at all. But assuming this to be the case, the scale of measurement is not exact, because an additional import may be absorbed under certain circumstances by the inland circulation and the growing consumption of gold and silver in the making of articles of luxury; furthermore, because without an additional import a withdrawal of gold coin for inland circulation may take place and thus the metal reserve may decrease, even without a simultaneous increase of the export.

4) An export of metals assumes the aspect of a drain, when the movement continues for a long time, so that the decrease represents the tendency of the movement and depresses the metal reserve of the bank considerably below its average level, down to about its average minimum. This minimum is in so far more or less arbitrarily fixed, as it is differently determined in every individual case by the legislation concerning the backing of notes, etc., by cash. Concerning the quantitative limits, which such a drain may reach in England, Newmarch testified before the Committee on B. A., 1857, Evidence No. 1494: "To judge by experience, it is very unlikely that the drain of metal as a result of some fluctuation in the foreign business will exceed three or four million pounds sterling."—In 1847 the lowest level of the gold reserve of the Bank of England, on October 23, showed a minus of 5,198,156 pounds sterling as compared to that of December 26, 1846, and a minus of 6,453,748 pounds sterling as compared to the highest level on August 29, 1846.

5) The functions of the metal reserve of the so-called national banks, which functions, however, do not by themselves regulate the magnitude of this reserve, for it may grow through a mere paralisation of internal commerce, are threefold: 1) It is a reserve fund for international payments, in one word a reserve fund of world money; 2) it is a reserve fund for the alternately expanding and contracting metal circulation of the inland markets; 3) it is a reserve fund for the payment of deposits and for the convertibility of notes, and this part of its function is connected with the function of the bank and has nothing to do with the functions of money as mere money. It may, therefore, also be touched by conditions, which affect every one of these three functions. As an international fund it, may be touched by the balance of payment, no matter by what causes this may be determined, and whatever may be its proportion to the balance of trade. As a reserve fund for the metal circulation of the inland market it may be touched by its expansion or contraction. The third function, that of a fund guaranteeing the convertibility of the notes, while it does not determine the independent movements of the metal reserve, has a double effect. If notes are issued, which replace the metallic money in the inland circulation (which may also consist of silver in countries where silver is a measure of value), then the second function of the reserve fund is eliminated. And a portion of the precious metal, which performed its function, will permanently wander into foreign countries. In this case no withdrawal of metallic money for inland circulation takes place, and this does away at the same time with the temporary augmentation of the metal reserve by the immobilised part of the circulating metal coin. Furthermore, if a minimum of a metal reserve must be kept under all circumstances, it affects in a peculiar way the results of a drain or an addition of gold; it affects that part of the reserve, which the bank is compelled to maintain under all circumstances, or that part, which it seeks to get rid of as useless at a certain time. If the circulation were purely metallic and the banking system concentrated, the bank would have to consider its metal reserve likewise as a security for the payment of its deposits, and a drain of metal might then cause such a panic as was witnessed in Hamburg in 1857.

6) With the exception of 1837, the real crisis broke out always after the rates of exchange had been altered, that is, as soon as the import of precious metal had increased over the export.

In 1825 the real crash came after the drain of gold had ceased. In 1839 a drain of gold took place without bringing a crash. In 1847 the drain of gold ceased in April and the crash came in October. In 1857 the drain of gold to foreign countries had ceased since the beginning of November, and the crash did not come until later in November.

This stands out particularly in the crisis of 1847, when the drain of gold ceased already in April, after causing a slight preliminary crisis, and the real business crisis did not come until October.

The following evidence was given before the Secret Committee of the House of Lords on Commercial Distress, 1848. This evidence was not printed until 1857 (also quoted as C. D. 1848-57).

Evidence of Tooke. In April, 1847, a stringency arose, which strictly speaking equalled a panic, but was of relatively short duration and not accompanied by any commercial failures of importance. In October the stringency was far more intensive than at any time during April, an almost unheard of number of commercial failures taking place (2196).—In April the rates of exchange, particularly with America, compelled us to export a considerable amount of gold in payment for unusually large imports; only by an extreme effort did the bank stop the drain and drive the rates higher (2197).—In October the rates of exchange favored England (2198).—The change in the rates of exchange had begun in the third week of April (3000).—They fluctuated in July and August; since the beginning of August they always favored England (3001).—The drain of gold in August arose from a demand for internal circulation.

J. Morris, Governor of the Bank of England: Although the rate of exchange favored England since August, 1847, and an import of gold had taken place in consequence, the metal reserve of the bank decreased nevertheless. "2,200,000 pounds sterling went out to the country, as a result of inland demand." (137)—This is explained on the one hand by an increased employment of laborers in railroad construction, on the other by a "desire of the bankers to possess their own gold reserve in times of crisis." (147.)

Palmer, Ex-Governor and since 1811 a Director of the Bank of England: 684. "During the entire period from the middle of April, 1847 to the day of the suspension of the Bank Act of 1844 the rates of exchange were in favor of England."

The drain of metal, which created in April, 1847, an independent money panic, was here, as always, but a precursor of the crisis and had already been turned back, when the crisis broke out. In 1839 a heavy drain of metal took place, for corn, etc., while the business was strongly depressed, but without any crisis and money panic.

7) As soon as the universal crises have spent themselves, the gold and silver, aside from an addition of new precious metals from the sources of production, distributes itself once more in such proportions as it showed in the form of the individual reserve of the various countries in a condition of equilibrium. Other circumstances remaining the same, its relative magnitude in every country will be determined by the role of that country in the world market. It flows away from the country which had more than its normal portion into some other country. These movements of outgoing and incoming metal restore merely its original distribution among the various national reserves. This redistribution, however, is brought about by the effects of different circumstances, which will be mentioned in our treatment of rates of exchange. As soon as the normal distribution is once more a fact, a stage of growth follows first, and then again a drain. [This last sentence applies, of course, only to England, as the center of the world's money market.—F.E.]

8) The drains of metal are generally a symptom of a change in the condition of foreign commerce, and this change in its turn is a premonition that conditions are approaching a crisis.107

9) The balance of payment may favor Asia against Europe and America.108

An import of precious metals takes place to a point of predominance in two phases. On the one hand it takes place in the first phase of a low rate of interest, which follows upon a crisis and expresses a restriction of production; and then in the second phase, in which the rate of interest rises, without, however, attaining its medium level. This is the phase, in which returns come easy, commercial profit is large, and therefore the demand for loan capital does not grow in proportion to the expansion of production. In both phases, in which loan capital is relatively abundant, the superfluous addition of capital existing in the form of gold and silver, a form in which it can primarily serve only as loan capital, must seriously affect the rate of interest and with it the tone of the whole business.

On the other hand, a drain, a continued and heavy outpour of precious metals, takes place as soon as the returns are no longer easy, the markets overstocked, and the seeming prosperity held up only by credit; in other words, as soon as a very much increased demand for loan capital exists and the rate of interest has, for this reason, reached at least its medium level. Under these circumstances, which are reflected by the drain of precious metals, the effect of the continued withdrawal of capital in a form, in which it is directly loanable money-capital, is considerably intensified. This must have a direct influence on the rate of interest. But instead of restricting the credit business, the rise of the rate of interest extends it and leads to an overstraining of all its resources. This period, therefore, precedes the crash.

Newmarch is asked, B. A. 1857, No. 1520: "The amount of the circulating bills of exchange, then, rises with the rate of interest?"—"It seems so."—1522. "In quiet, ordinary times the ledger is the actual instrument of exchange; but when difficulties arise, for instance, if the discount rate of the Bank is raised under circumstances such as I have mentioned...then the transactions resolve themselves quite of their own account into the drawing of bills; these bills are not only better suited to serve as a legal evidence of the making of some business transaction, but they are also better adapted to the purpose of making other purchases, and they are above all useful as a means of credit for taking up capital."—This is further intensified by the fact that as soon as signs of threatening conditions induce the bank to raise its rate of discount, which implies the possibility that the bank may at the same time cut down the running time of the bills to be discounted by it, the general apprehension is spread, that this will grow worse. Every one, and first of all the credit swindler, will therefore strive to discount the future and have as many means of credit as possible at his command when the critical time comes. The above-mentioned reasons, then, amount in fact to this, that it is not the mere quantity of the imported or exported precious metals which exerts its influence in this capacity but that this quantity works its effect, first, by the specific character of precious metals of being capital in the form of money, and secondly, that it works like a feather, which, added to the weight on the scales, suffice to incline the occillating balance definitely to one side, that is, it works this effect, because it arises under conditions, when a little excess decides in favor of one side or the other. Without these reasons it would be quite inexplicable, why a drain of gold amounting to about five or eight million pounds sterling, and this is the limit according to present experience, should be able to exert any considerable influence. This small minus or plus of capital, which seems insignificant even compared to the 70 million pounds in gold which circulate on an average in England, is a vanishing magnitude in a production of such volume as the English.109

But it is just the development of the credit and banking business, which tends on the one hand to press all money-capital into the service of production (or what amounts to the same, to convert all money incomes into capital), and which on the other hand reduces the metal reserve to a minimum in a certain phase of the cycle, so that it can no longer perform the functions for which it is intended. It is the developed credit and banking system, which creates this oversensitiveness of the whole organism of the reserve below or above its average level is a relatively insignificant matter. On the other hand, even a very considerable drain of gold is relatively ineffective, unless it arises in the critical period of the industrial cycle.

In this explanation we have not considered the cases, in which a drain of gold takes place as a result of crop failures, etc. In this case the great and sudden disturbance of the equilibrium of production, whose expression this drain is, requires no further explanation of its effects. These effects are so much greater, the more such a disturbance begins in a period, in which production works under high pressure.

We have also left out of consideration the function of the metal reserve as a security for the convertibility of the bank notes and as the cardinal point of the credit system. The central bank is the pivot of the credit system. And the metal reserve in its turn is the pivot of the bank.110

The transition from the credit system to the monetary system is necessary, as I have already shown in Volume I, chapter III, under the head of "Means of Payment." That the greatest sacrifices of real wealth are necessary, in order to maintain the metallic basis in a critical moment, has been admitted by both Tooke and Loyd-Overstone. The controversy turns merely around a plus or minus, and around the more or less rational treatment of the inevitable.111 A certain quantity of metal, insignificant compared with the total production, is admitted to be the pivotal point of the system. Hence its beautiful theoretical dualism, aside from the appalling demonstration of this character in its capacity as the pivotal point of crises. So long as enlightened bourgeois economy treats of "Capital" in its official capacity, it looks down upon gold and silver with the greatest disdain, considering them as the most immaterial and useless forms of wealth. But as soon as it treats of the banking system, everything is reversed, and gold and silver become capital par excellence, for whose preservation every other form of capital and labor is to be sacrificed. But how are gold and silver distinguished from other forms of wealth? Not by the magnitude of their value, for this is determined by the quantity of labor materialised in them; but by the fact that they represent independent incarnations, expressions of the social character of wealth. [The wealth of society exists only as the wealth of private individuals, who are its owners. It shows its social capacity only in the fact that these individuals exchange the qualitatively different use-values mutually for the satisfaction of their wants. Under the capitalist production they can do so only by means of money. Thus the wealth of the individual is realised as a social wealth only by means of money. In money, in this thing, the social nature of this wealth is incarnated.—F. E.] This social existence assumes the aspect of a world beyond, of a thing, matter, commodity, by the side of and outside of the real elements of social wealth. So long as production is in a state of flux, this is forgotten. Credit, likewise, in its capacity as a social form of wealth, crowds money out and usurps its place. It is the faith in the social character of production, which gives to the money-form of products the aspect of something disappearing and ideal. But as soon as credit is shaken—and this phase always appears of necessity in the cycles of modern industry—all the real wealth is to be actually and suddenly transformed into money, into gold and silver, a crazy demand, which, however, necessarily grows out of the system itself. And all the gold and silver, which is supposed to satisfy these enormous demands, amounts to a few millions in the cellars of the Bank.112

In the effects of the gold drains, then, the fact that production as a social process is not subject to social control is strikingly emphasized by the existence of the social form of wealth outside out of it as a separate thing. The capitalist system of production, it is true, shares this with former systems of production, so far as they rest on the trade with commodities and private exchange. But only in it does this become apparent in the most striking and grotesque form of the most absurd contradiction and nonsense, because, in the first place, production for the direct use of the producers is most completely abolished under the capitalist system, so that wealth exists only as a social process expressed by the interrelations of production and circulation; and in the second place, because capitalist production forever strives to overcome this metallic barrier, the material and phantastic barrier of wealth and its movements, in proportion as the credit system develops, but forever breaks its head on this same barrier.

In the crisis the demand is made, that all bills of exchange, securities, and commodities shall be simultaneously convertible into bank money, and this whole bank money consists of gold.

II. The Rate of Exchange.

[The barometer for the international movement of the money metals is the rate of exchange. If England has more payments to make to Germany than Germany to England, the price of marks, expressed in sterling, rises in London, and the price of sterling, expressed in marks, falls in Hamburg and Berlin. If this overbalance of monetary obligations of England toward Germany is not equalised, for instance, by over purchases of Germany in England, the sterling price for marks on bills of exchange on Germany must rise to a point, where it will pay to send metal (gold coin or bullion) from England to Germany in payment of obligations, instead of sending bills of exchange. This is the typical course of things.
If this export of precious metals assumes a larger scope and lasts longer, then the English bank reserve is touched, and the English money market, with the bank of England at the head, must take precautionary measures. These consist mainly, as we have already seen, in the raising of the rate of interest. When the drain of gold is considerable, the money market is always difficult, that is, the demand for loan capital in the form of money exceeds the supply by far, and the raising of the rate of interest follows quite naturally from this; the rate of discount fixed by the Bank of England corresponds to this condition and asserts itself on the market. However, there are cases, when the drain of metal is due to other than the ordinary combinations of business (for instance, to loans of foreign states, investment of capital in foreign countries, etc.), when the London money market in that respect does not justify such an effective raise of the rate of interest; in that case the Bank of England must first make money "scarce" by heavy loans in the "open market" and thus create artificially a condition, which justifies a raise of the rate of interest, or renders it necessary; a maneuver, which becomes from year to year more difficult for it.—F. E.]

How this raising of the rate of interest affects the rates of exchange, is shown by the following testimony before the Committee of the Lower House concerning bank legislation in 1857 (quoted as B. A., or B. C., 1857.)

John Stuart Mill: 2176. "When the business has become difficult...a considerable fall in the price of securities takes place...foreigners order the buying of railroad shares here in England, or English owners of foreign railroad shares sell them to foreign countries...to that extent the transfer of gold is avoided."—2182. "A large and rich class of bankers and dealers in securities, by whom the equalisation of the rate of interest and the equalisation of the commercial barometric pressure between the different countries is generally accomplished...is always on the lookout for the purchase of securities, which promise a rise in price...the proper place to buy them will be the country which sends gold abroad."—2183. "These investments of capital took place to a large extent in 1847, enough to reduce the drain of gold."

J. G. Hubbard, Ex-Governor, and since 1838 a Director of the Bank of England: 2545. "There are a large number of European securities...which have a European circulation in all the various money markets, and these papers, as soon as they fall by one or two per cent. in one market, are at once brought up in order to be transferred to markets, where their value has still maintained itself."—2565. "Are not foreign countries considerably in debt to merchants in England?"—..."Very considerably."—2566. "The collection of these debts might, therefore, suffice by itself to explain a very large accumulation of capital in England?"—"In the year 1847 our position was finally restored by our drawing a line through so and so many millions, which America and Russia formerly owed to England." [England owed these same countries at the same time "so and so many millions" for corn and did not forget to "draw a line" also through the greater portion of these by the bankruptcy of the English debtors. See the report on Bank Acts, 1857, in chapter XXX of this work.]—2572. "In 1847 the rate of exchange between England and Petersburg stood very high. When the government letter was issued, which authorized the Bank of England to issue bank notes without adhering to the legally prescribed limit of 14 millions [beyond the gold reserve], the condition was that the discount should be kept at 8%. At that moment, and at that rate of discount, it was a profitable business to have gold shipped from Petersburg to London and to lend it out after its arrival at 8% until the three months' bills of exchange should become due, which had been drawn against the sold gold."—2573. "In all operations with gold many points must be taken into consideration; it depends on the rate of exchange and on the rate of interest, at which money may be invested until the bills drawn against it become due."

III. Rate of Exchange with Asia.

The following points are important, partly because they show that England must take refuge to other countries, when its rate of exchange with Asia is unfavorable. These are countries, whose imports from Asia are paid by way of England. On the other part they are important, because Mr. Wilson makes once more the silly attempt here, to identify the effect of an export of precious metal on the rates of exchange with the effect of an export of capital in general upon these rates; the export being in either case not for the purpose of paying or buying, but of investing capital. In the first place it goes without saying, that whether so and so many millions of pounds sterling are sent to India in precious metals or railroad rails, in order to be invested in railroads there, these are merely two different forms of transferring the same amount of capital to another country. And this is a form of transfer, which does not enter into accounts of the ordinary mercantile businesses, and for which the exporting country expects no other returns than later on the annual revenue from the income of these railroads. If this export is made in the form of precious metal, it will exert a direct influence upon the money market and with it upon the rate of interest of the country exporting this precious metal, at least under the previously outlined conditions, if not necessarily under all circumstances, since precious metal is directly loanable money-capital and the basis of the entire money-system. This export also affects directly the rate of exchange. For precious metal is exported only for the reason and to the extent that the bills of exchange, say, on India, which are offered in the London money market, do not suffice for the making of these extra payments. In other words, there is a demand for Indian bills of exchange which exceeds their supply, and so the rates turn for a time against England, not because it is in debt to India, but because it has to send extraordinary sums to India. In the long run such a shipment of precious metal to India must have the effect of increasing the Indian demand for British goods, because it indirectly increases the consuming power of India for European goods. But if the capital is shipped in the shape of rails, etc., it cannot have any influence on the rates of exchange, since India has no return payment to make for it. For the same reason this need not have any influence on the money market. Wilson seeks to establish the fact of such an influence by declaring that such an extra expenditure will bring about an extra demand for money accommodation and will thus influence the rate of interest. This may be the case; but to maintain that it must take place under all circumstances is totally wrong. No matter whether the rails are shipped and laid on English or Indian soil, they represent nothing else but a definite expansion of English production in a definite sphere. To contend that an expansion of production, even to a large volume, cannot take place without driving the rate of interest higher, is absurd. The money accommodation may grow, that is, the amount of business transacted by operations of credit; but these operations may increase also while the rate of interest remains unchanged. This was actually the case during the railroad mania in England during the forties. The rate of interest did not rise. And it is evident, that, so far as actual capital, in this case commodities, are concerned, the effect on the money market will be just the same, whether these commodities are intended for foreign countries or for inland consumption. A difference could be discovered only in the case that the investment of capital on the part of England in foreign countries would have a restraining influence upon its commercial exports, that is, exports for which payment must be made in return, or to the extent that these investments of capital are general symptoms indicating the overstraining of credit and the beginning of swindling operations.

In the following Wilson asks questions and Newmarch answers them.

1786. "You said before, with reference to the silver demand for Eastern Asia, that in your opinion the rates of exchange with India are in favor of England, in spite of the considerable wealth of metal continually sent to Eastern Asia; have you any reasons for this?"—" To be sure....I find that the actual value of the exports of the United Kingdom to India amounted to 7,420,000 pounds sterling in 1851; to this must be added the amount of the bills of exchange of the India House, that is, the funds which the East Indian Company draws from India for the payment of its own expenses. These drafts amounted in that year to 3,200,000 pounds sterling; so that the total exports of the United Kingdom to India amounted to 10,620,000 pounds sterling. In 1855 the actual value of the exports of commodities had risen to 10,350,000 pounds sterling; the drafts of the India House were 3,700,000 pounds sterling; the total exports therefore 14,050,000 pounds sterling. For 1851, I believe, we have no means of ascertaining the actual value of the imports of commodities from India to England; but we have for 1854 and 1855. In 1855 the entire actual value of these imports of commodities from India to England was 12,670,000 pounds sterling and this sum, compared to the 14,050,000 pounds sterling, leaves a balance in favor of England, in the direct commerce between the two countries, amounting to 1,380,000 pounds sterling."

Thereupon Wilson remarks that the rates of exchange are also touched by the indirect commerce. For instance, the exports from India to Australia and North America are covered by drafts on London, and therefore affect the rate of exchange quite in the same way as though the commodities had gone directly from India to England. Furthermore, when India and China are taken together, the balance is against England, since China has continually heavy payments to make to India for opium, and England has to make payment to China, and the amounts go by this circuitous route to India. (1787, 1788.)

1789. Wilson asks now, whether the effect on the rates of exchange will not be the same, no matter whether the capital goes out in the form of iron rails or locomotives, or in the form of metal coin. Newmarch gives the correct answer: The 12 million pounds sterling, which have been sent during the last years to India for railroad construction served to buy an annual income, which India has to pay at regular terms to England. So far as any immediate effect on the precious metal market is concerned, the investment of 12 million pounds sterling can exert any influence only to the extent that metal had to be sent out for an actual investment in money.

1797. Weguelin asks: "If no returns are made for these rails, how can it be said that they affect the rate of exchange?"—"I do not believe that that portion of the expenditure, which is sent abroad in the form of commodities, affects the stand of the rates of exchange...the stand of the rates between two countries is, one may say exclusively, affected by the quantity of the obligations or bills of exchange offered in opposition to them in another country; that is the rational theory of the rate of exchange. As for the shipment of those 12 millions, they were in the first place subscribed here; now, if the business were such, that these entire 12 millions would be deposited in cash in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras...this sudden demand would strongly affect the price of silver, just as would be the case if the East India Company were to announce tomorrow, that it would increase its drafts from 3 millions to 12 millions. But one-half of these 12 millions is invested...in the purchase of commodities in England...iron rails and lumber and other materials...it is an investment of English capital, in England itself, for a certain kind of commodities to be shipped to India, and that ends the matter."—1798. Weguelin: "But the production of these commodities of iron and wood required for the railroads produces a heavy consumption of foreign commodities, and this could affect the rate of interest, could it not?"—"Assuredly."

Wilson thinks now, that iron largely represents labor, and that the wages paid for this labor largely represent imported goods (1799), and then he asks further:

1801. "But speaking quite generally: If the commodities, which have been produced by means of the consumption of these imported commodities, are sent out in such a way, that we do not receive any returns for them, either in products or otherwise, would not that have the effect of making the rates of exchange unfavorable for us?"—"This principle is exactly what happened in England during the time of the great railway enterprises [1845]. For three or four years in succession you invested 30 million pounds sterling in railroads and almost the whole in wages. You have maintained during three years in the construction of railroads, locomotives, cars, stations, a greater number of people than in all factory districts together. These people...expended their wages in the purchase of tea, sugar, liquor and other foreign commodities; these commodities must be imported; but it is certain that during the time that this great investment was being made, the rates of exchange between England and other countries were not materially disturbed. No drain of precious metal took place, on the contrary, rather an addition."

1802. Wilson insists that with a settled balance of trade and par rates between England and India the extra shipment of iron and locomotives "must affect the rate of exchange." Newmarch cannot see it that way, so long as the rails are sent out as an investment of capital and India has no payment to make for them in one form or another; he adds: "I agree with the principle that no country can in the long run have an unfavorable rate of exchange with all countries, with whom it deals; an unfavorable rate of exchange with one country necessarily produces a favorable one with another."—Wilson retorts with this triviality: 1803. "But would not a transfer of capital be the same, whether the capital were sent in this form or that?"—"So far as an indebtedness is concerned, yes."—1804. "Then, whether you send out precious metal or commodities, the effect of railroad construction in India on the market of capital here would be the same and would increase the value of capital just as though the whole had been sent out in precious metal?"

If the prices of iron did not rise, it was certainly a proof that the "value" of the "capital" contained in the rails had not been increased. What is wanted is the value of money-capital, of the rate of interest. Wilson would like to identify money-capital with capital in general. The simple fact is, primarily, that 12 millions for Indian railroads are subscribed in England. This is a matter which has nothing directly to do with the rates of exchange, and the destination of the 12 millions is also immaterial for the money market. If the money market is in good condition, it need not produce any effect at all on it, just as the English railroad subscriptions in 1844 and 1845 left the money market untouched. If the money market is already somewhat difficult, then the rate of interest might indeed be affected by it, but certainly only in an upward direction, and this would have a favorable effect for England on the rates of exchange according to Wilson's theory, that is, it would work against the tendency to export precious metal; if not to India, then to some other country. Mr. Wilson jumps from one thing to another. In question 1802 the rates of exchange are supposed to be affected, in question 1804 the "value of capital," two very different things. The rate of interest may affect the rates of exchange, and the rates may affect the rate of interest, but the rate of interest may be stable while the rates of exchange fluctuate, and the rates of exchange may be stable while the rate of interest fluctuates. Wilson cannot understand, that the mere form, in which capital is shipped abroad, should make such a difference in the effect, that is, that the difference in the form of capital should have such an effect, not to mention its money form, which runs very much counter to the enlightened economy. Newmarch answers Wilson's question onesidedly inasmuch as he does not point out that he has jumped so suddenly and without reason from the rate of exchange to the rate of interest. Newmarch answers question 1804 uncertainly and doubtfully: "No doubt, if 12 millions are to be raised, it is immaterial, so far as the general rate of interest is concerned, whether these 12 millions are to be sent out in precious metals or in materials. I believe, however" [a fine transition, this however, when he intends to say the exact opposite] "that this is not quite immaterial" [it is immaterial, but, however, it is not material] "because in the one case the six million pounds sterling would return immediately; in the other case they would not return so quickly. Therefore it would make some" [what definiteness!] "difference, whether the six millions were invested here at home or sent entirely abroad." What does he mean by saying that the six millions would return immediately? To the extent that the six million pounds sterling have been spent in England, they exist in rails, locomotives, etc., which are shipped to India, whence they do not return, and their value returns very slowly through a sinking fund, whereas six millions in precious metals may return very quickly in their natural form. To the extent that six millions have been spent in wages, they have been consumed; but the money, in which they were paid, circulates in the country the same as ever or forms a reserve. The same is true of the profits of the producers of iron rails and of that portion of the six millions which makes good their constant capital. This ambiguous phrase of the return of values is used by Newmarch only in order to avoid saying directly: The money has remained in the country, and so far as it serves as loanable money-capital the difference for the money-market (aside from the possibility that the circulation might have swallowed more hard cash) is only this, that it is spent for the account of A instead of B. An investment of this kind, where the capital is transferred to other countries in commodities, not in precious metals, cannot affect the rate of exchange, unless the production of these exported commodities requires an extra-import of other foreign commodities, and this, at any rate, does not affect the rate of exchange with the country in which the exported capital is invested. This production is not intended to settle for this extra import. The same takes place in every export on credit, no matter whether it be intended for investment as capital or for ordinary purposes of commerce. Besides, such an extra import may also cause a reaction in the way of an extra demand for English goods, for instance, on the part of the colonies or of the United States.

Before that Newmarch said that owing to the drafts of the East India Company the exports from England to India were larger than the imports. Sir Charles Wood cross-examines him on this score. This excess of the English exports to India over the imports from India is actually due to imports from India, for which England does not pay any equivalent. The drafts of the East India Company (now of the British government) resolve themselves into a tribute levied on India. For instance, in 1855 the imports from India to England amounted to 12,670,000 pounds sterling; the English exports to India amounted to 10,350,000 pounds sterling; balance in India's favor 2,250,000 pounds sterling. "If the matter were exhausted with this, then these 2,250,000 pounds sterling would have to be remitted to India in some form. But then come the invitations from the India House. The India House announces that it is in a position to issue drafts on the different presidencies in India to the amount of 3,250,000 pounds sterling. [This amount was levied for the London expenses of the East India Company and for the dividends due to the stockholders.] And this liquidates not merely the balance of 2,250,000 pounds sterling, which arose in a business way, but gives besides a surplus of one million." (1917.)

1922. Wood: "Then the effect of these drafts of the India House is not to increase the exports to India, but to reduce them to that extent?" [He means to say to reduce the necessity of covering the imports from India by exports to India to the same amount.] Mr. Newmarch explains this by saying that the British export for these 3,700,000 pounds sterling a "good government" to India (1925). Wood, knowing very well the kind of "good government" exported to India by the British, having been Minister to India, replies correctly and ironically: 1926. "Then the exports, which, as you say, are caused by the India House drafts, are exports of good government, and not of commodities."—Since England exports a good deal "in this way" in the shape of "good government" and for investment of capital in foreign countries, things which are quite independent of the ordinary run of business, tributes which consist either in payment for "good government" or in revenues from capital invested in the colonies or elsewhere, tributes for which it does not have to pay any equivalent, it is evident, that the rates of exchange are not affected, when England simply consumes these tributes without making any exports in return for them. Hence it is also evident that the rates of exchange are not affected, when it reinvests these tributes, not in England, but productively or unproductively in foreign countries; for instance, when it sends ammunition to the Crimea with them. Moreover, to the extent that the imports from abroad pass into the revenue of England—of course, they must first have been paid, either in the form of tributes for which no equivalent return is made, or by exchanging things for these tributes before they have been paid, or by the ordinary course of commerce—England can either consume them or reinvest them as capital. Neither the one nor the other thing touches the rates of exchange, and this is what Wilson overlooks. Whether a domestic or a foreign product forms a part of the revenue—and this last case requires merely an exchange of domestic for foreign products—the consumption of this revenue, be it productive or unproductive, alters nothing in the rates of exchange, even though it may alter the scale of production. The following remarks should be judged by the foregoing explanation:

1934. Wood asks Newmarch, how the shipment of war supplies to the Crimea would affect the rates of exchange with Turkey. Newmarch replies: "I do not see, that the mere shipment of war supplies would necessarily affect the rates of exchange, but the shipment of precious metals would surely affect these rates." In this case he distinguishes capital in the form of money from capital in other forms. But now Wilson asks:

1935. "If you promote an export on a large scale of some article for which no corresponding import takes place, you do not pay the foreign debts, which you have contracted by your imports, and for this reason you must affect the rates of exchange by these transactions, since the foreign debts are not paid, because your export has no corresponding import.—This is true of countries in general." [Mr. Wilson forgets, that there are very considerable imports into England, for which no corresponding exports have ever taken place, except in the form of "good government" or of formerly exported capital for investment; at any rate imports which do not pass into the regular commercial movement. But these imports are again exchanged, for instance, for American products, and the fact that American goods are exported without any corresponding imports does not alter the fact that the value of these imports may be consumed without any equivalent return abroad; they have been received without being balanced by any corresponding exports, and may also be used up without entering into the balance of trade. On the other hand, if these imports have already been paid by you, for instance, by credit given to foreign countries, then no debt is contracted through this, and the question has nothing to do with the international balance; it resolves itself into productive and unproductive expenditures, no matter whether the products so used are domestic or foreign.]

This lecture of Wilson's amounts to saying that every export without a corresponding import is at the same time an import without a corresponding export, because foreign, hence imported, commodities enter into the production of the exported article. The assumption is that every export of this kind is based on some unpaid import, or creates it, resulting in a debt to a foreign country. This is wrong, even aside from the two following circumstances. 1) England receives imports free of charge, for which it pays no equivalent, such as a portion of its Indian imports. It may exchange these for American imports, and may export the latter without any imports to counterbalance them; but at any rate, so far as this value is concerned, it has only exported something that did not cost it anything. 2) England may have paid for imports, for instance American imports, which form additional capital; if it consumes these unproductively, for instance, using them as war materials, this does not constitute any debt towards America and does not affect the rates of exchange with America. Newmarch contradicts himself in numbers 1934 and 1935, and Wood calls his attention to this, in number 1938: "If no portion of the commodities employed in the manufacture of articles, which we export without receiving any returns [war materials], comes from the country into which these articles are sent, how does that touch the rate of exchange with that country? Suppose that commerce with Turkey is in the ordinary condition of equilibrium; how is the rate of exchange between us and Turkey affected by the export of war materials to the Crimea?"—Here Newmarch loses his equanimity; he forgets that he has answered the same simple question correctly in No. 1934, and says: "We have, it seems to me, exhausted the practical question, and we are now getting into a very high region of metaphysical discussion."

[Wilson has still another version of his claim, that the rate of exchange is affected by every transfer of capital from one country to another, no matter whether this takes place in the form of precious metals or of commodities. Wilson knows, of course, that the rate of exchange is affected by the rate of interest, particularly by the relation of the rates of interest current in any two countries whose rates of exchange are under discussion. If he can now demonstrate that any surplus of capital, and in the first place commodities of all kinds, including precious metals, contribute their share to influencing the rate of interest, then he makes a step nearer to his goal; a transfer of any considerable portion of this capital to some other country must then change the rate of interest in both countries, in opposite directions, and this must alter in a secondary way the rate of exchange between both countries.—F. E.]

He says, then, in the "Economist," 1847, page 475, which he edited at that time:

1) "It is evident, that such a surplus of capital, indicated by large supplies of all kinds, including precious metals, must lead necessarily, not only to lower prices of commodities in general, but to a lower rate of interest for the use of capital."
2) "If we have a stock of commodities on hand, large enough to supply the country for the coming two years, then a command of these commodities for a given period may be had at a much lower rate than if it would last only for two months."
3) All loans of money, in whatever form they may be made, are merely transfers of the command over commodities from one to another. If, therefore, commodities are superabundant, then the money interest must be low, if they are scarce, it must be high."
4) "If commodities come in more abundantly, the number of sellers compared to the number of buyers must increase, and in proportion as the quantity exceeds the needs of the direct consumers, an ever larger portion must be stored up for later use. Under these circumstances an owner of commodities will sell at lower conditions on future payment, or on credit, than he would if he were sure that his whole stock would be sold within a few weeks."

Our comment on sentence No. I, is that a strong addition to the precious metals may be made while production is simultaneously contracted, which is always the case in the period after a crisis. In the subsequent phase precious metals may come in from countries that produce above all precious metals; the imports of other commodities are generally balanced by the exports during this period. In these two phases the rate of interest is low and rises but slowly; we have already explained the reason for this. This low rate of interest may be explained everywhere without any influence of any "Large supplies of any kind." And how is this influence to take place? The low price of cotton, for instance, renders possible the high profits of the spinners, etc. Now why is the rate of interest low? Surely not, because the profit, which may be made on borrowed capital, is high. But simply and solely, because under existing conditions the demand for loan capital does not grow in proportion to this profit; in other words, because loan capital has a different movement than industrial capital. What the "Economist" wants to prove is exactly the reverse, namely that the movements of loan capital are identical with those of industrial capital.

Comment on sentence No. 2). If we reduce the absurd assumption of a stock for two years ahead to a point where it begins to take on some meaning, it signifies that the markets are overstocked. This would cause a falling of prices. Less would have to be paid for a bale of cotton. This would by no means justify the conclusion, that the money which is to be used for the payment of this cotton, is more easily borrowed. For this depends on the condition of the money market. If money can be borrowed more easily, it can be so only because the commercial credit is in such shape, that it has to make less use of bank credit than ordinarily. The commodities overcrowding the market are means of subsistence or means of production. The low price of both increases in this case the profit of the industrial capitalist. Why should these low prices depress the rate of interest, unless it be through the contrast (not the identity) between the abundance of industrial capital and the scarcity of the demand for loan capital? The circumstances are such, that the merchant and the industrial capitalist can more easily give credit to one another; owing to this facilitation of commercial credit, neither the industrial nor the merchant need much bank credit; hence the rate of interest can be low. This low rate of interest has nothing to do with the increase of precious metals, although both of them may run parallel to each other and the same causes, which bring about the low prices of articles of import, may also produce a surplus of precious metals. If the import market were really overcrowded, it would prove a decrease of the demand for imported articles, and this would be inexplicable at low prices, unless it be attributed to a contraction of industrial production at home; but this, again, would be inexplicable, so long as there is an over importation at low prices. All these absurdities are brought forward for the purpose of proving that a fall of prices is identical with a fall of interest. Both things may, indeed, exist side by side. But if they do, it will be an expression of the opposite directions, in which the movement of industrial capital and of loan capital takes place. It will not be an expression of their identity.

Comment on sentence No. 3). Why money interest should be low, when commodities exist in abundance, is hard to understand, even after the foregoing remarks. If commodities are cheap, then I need, say, only 1,000 pounds sterling instead of 2,000 pounds sterling for a definite quantity which I may want to buy. But perhaps I might invest 2,000 pounds sterling nevertheless, and thus buy twice the quantity which I could have bought formerly. In this way I expand my business by advancing the same capital, which I may have to borrow. I buy 2,000 pounds sterling's worth of commodities, the same as before. My demand on the money market therefore remains the same, even though my demand on the commodity-market rises with the fall of the prices of commodities. But if this demand for commodities should decrease, that is, if production should not expand with the fall of the prices of commodities, a thing contrary to all laws of the "Economist," then the demand for loanable money-capital would be decreasing, although the profit would be increasing. But this increasing profit would create a demand for loan capital. For the rest, the low stand of the prices of commodities may be due to three causes. First, to a lack of demand. In that case the rate of interest is low, because production is paralyzed, not because commodities are cheap, since this cheapness is but an expression of that paralysis. In the second place, it may be due to a supply which is excessive compared to the demand. This may be the result of an overcrowding of markets, etc., which may lead to a crisis, and may go hand in hand with a high rate of interest during a crisis; or it may be the result of a fall in the value of commodities, so that the same demand may be satisfied at lower prices. Why should the rate of interest fall in the last case? Because the profits increase? If this should be due to the fact that less money-capital is required for the purpose of obtaining the same productive or commodity-capital, it would merely prove that profit and interest stand in an inverse proportion to one another. Certainly this general statement of the "Economist" is wrong. Low money prices of commodities and a low rate of interest do not necessarily go together. Otherwise the rate of interest would be lowest in the poorest countries, in which the money prices of commodities are lowest, and highest in the richest countries, in which the money prices of products of agriculture are highest. In a general way the "Economist" admits: If the value of money falls, it exerts no influence on the rate of interest. 100 pounds sterling bring 105 pounds sterling the same as ever. If the 100 pounds sterling are worth less, so are the 105 pounds sterling or the 5 pounds interest. This relation is not affected by the appreciation or depreciation of the original sum. Considered as a value, a definite quantity of commodities is equal to a definite sum of money. If this value rises, it is equal to a larger sum of money; the reverse takes place when it falls. If the value is 2,000, then 5% of it is 100; if it is 1,000, then 5% of it is 50. This does not alter anything in the rate of interest. The rational part of this matter is merely that a greater pecuniary accommodation is required, when it takes 2,000 pounds sterling to buy the same quantity of commodities, which may be bought for 1,000 pounds sterling at some other time. But this shows at this point merely that profit and interest are inversely proportionate to one another. For profit rises with the cheapness of the elements of constant and variable capital, whereas interest falls. But the reverse may also take place, and does often take place. For instance, cotton may be cheap, because no demand exists for yarn and fabrics; and cotton may be relatively dear, because a large profit in the cotton industry creates a great demand for it. On the other hand the profits of the industrials may be high, just because the price of cotton is low. That list of Hubbard's proves that the rate of interest and the prices of commodities pass through mutually independent movements, whereas the movements of the rate of interest adapt themselves closely to those of the metal reserve and the rates of exchange.

Says the "Economist": "If, therefore, commodities are superabundant, then the money interest must be low." It is just the reverse which takes place during crises; the commodities are superabundant, not convertible into money, and therefore the rate of interest is high; in another phase of the cycle the demand for commodities is large, hence returns are easy, while prices of commodities are rising at the same time, and the rate of interest is low on account of the easy returns. "If they [the commodities] are scarce, it must be high." Once more the opposite is true in times of depression after a crisis. Commodities are scarce, absolutely speaking, not merely with reference to the demand; and the rate of interest is low.

Comment on sentence No. 4). It is pretty evident that an owner of commodities, provided he can sell them at all, will get rid of them at a lower price when the market is overcrowded than he will when there is a prospect of a rapid exhaustion of the existing supply. But why the rate of interest should fall on that account is not so clear.

If the market is overcrowded with imported commodities, the rate of interest may rise as a result of an increased demand for loan capital on the part of their owners, who may wish to escape the necessity of throwing their commodities on the market. On the other hand, the rate of interest may fall, because the fluidity of commercial credit may keep the demand for bank credit relatively low.

The "Economist" mentions the rapid effect on the rates of exchange in 1847, as a consequence of the raising of the rate of interest and other circumstances exerting a pressure on the money market. But it should not be forgotten, that the gold continued to be drained off until the end of April, in spite of the turn in the rates of exchange; a change did not take place in this until the beginning of May.

On January 1, 1847, the metal reserve of the Bank was 15,066,691 pounds sterling; the rate of interest 3½%; rates of exchange for three months on Paris 25.75; on Hamburg 13.10; on Amsterdam 12.3¼. On March 5th the metal reserve had dwindled to 11,595,535 pounds sterling; the discount had risen to 4%; the rate of exchange fell to 25.67½ for Paris; 13.9¼ for Hamburg; 12.2½ for Amsterdam. The drain of gold continued. See the following table:

Date 1847Precious Metal Reserve of the Bank of EnglandMoney MarketHighest Three Monthly Rates
   ParisHamburgAmsterdam
March 2011,231,630Bk. Dc. 4%25.67½13.9¾12.2½
April 310,246,630Bk. Dc. 5%25.8013.1012.3½
April 109,867,053Money very scarce25.9013.10 1/312.4½
April 179,329,941Bk.Dc. 5.5%26.02½13.10¾12.5½
April 249,213,890Pressure26.0513.1312.6
May 19,337,716Increasing Pressure26.1513.12¾12.6½
May 89,588,759Highest Pressure26.27½13.15½12.7¾

In 1847 the total exports of precious metals from England amounted to 8,602,597 pounds sterling.

Of this amount theUnited States received...3,226,411poundssterling
 France...2,479,892poundssterling
 Hansa Towns...958,781poundssterling
 Holland...247,743poundssterling

In spite of the change in the rates at the end of March the drain of gold continued for another full month, probably to the United States.

"We see here" [says the "Economist," 1847, p. 984], "how rapidly and strikingly the raising of the rate of interest exerted its effect, together with the subsequent money panic, in correcting an unfavorable rate of exchange and turning the tide of gold, so that it flowed once more into England. This effect was produced quite independently of the balance of payment. A higher rate of interest produced a lower price of securities, of English as well as foreign ones, and caused large purchases of them for foreign accounts. This increased the sum of the bills of exchange drawn by way of England, while on the other hand, at the high rate of interest, the difficulty of obtaining money was so great, that the demand for these bills of exchange fell, while their sum rose. It was for the same reason that orders for foreign goods were annulled and the investment of English capital in foreign securities realised and the money taken to England for investment. For instance, we read in the "Rio de Janeiro Prices Current" of May 10: "The rate of exchange" [on England] "has experienced a new setback, caused mainly by a pressure on the market for remittances for the realisations on considerable purchases of [Brazilian] government bonds for English account." English capital, which had been invested in foreign countries in various securities, when the rate of interest was very low here, was thus taken back when the rate of interest had risen.

IV. England's Balance of Trade.

India alone has to pay 5 millions in tribute for "good government," interest and dividends of British capital, etc., not counting the sums sent home annually by officials as savings of their salaries, or by English merchants as a part of their profit in order to be invested in England. Every British colony has to make large remittances continually for the same reason. Most of the banks in Australia, West India, Canada, have been founded with English capital, and the dividends are payable in England. In the same way England owns many foreign securities, European, North and South American, on which it draws interest. In addition to this it is interested in foreign railroads, canals, mines, etc., with the corresponding dividends. Remittance on all these items is made almost exclusively in products, in excess of the amount of the English exports. What goes to foreign countries from England to owners of English securities and to be consumed by Englishmen abroad, is a vanishing quantity in comparison.

The question, so far as it concerns the balance of trade and the rates of exchange, is "at every given moment a question of time. As a rule...England gives large credits on its exports, while its imports are paid in cash. In certain moments this difference of habit has considerable influence on the rates of exchange. At a time when our exports increase very considerably, as in 1850, there must take place a continual expansion in the investment of British capital...in this way remittances of 1850 may be made against goods exported in 1849. But if the exports of 1850 exceed those of 1849 by more than 9 millions, the practical effect must be that more money is sent abroad, to this amount, than returned in the same year. And in this way an effect is produced on the rates of exchange and the rate of interest. But as soon as business is depressed by a crisis, and our exports are greatly reduced, the remittances due for large exports of former years considerably exceed the value of our imports; consequently the rates turn in our favor, capital rapidly accumulates in the home country, and the rate of interest falls." (Economist, January 11, 1851.)

The foreign rates of exchange may be altered:

1) In consequence of a momentary balance of payment, no matter to what cause this may be due, whether it be a purely mercantile one, or the investment of capital abroad, or government expenditures, wars, etc., so far as cash payments are made to foreign countries.
2) In consequence of a depreciation of money in a certain country, whether it be metal or paper money. This is purely nominal. If one pound sterling should represent only half as much money as formerly, it would naturally be counted as 12.5 francs instead of 25 francs.
3) When it is a question of the rate of exchange between countries, one of which uses silver, the other gold as "money," the rate of exchange depends upon the relative fluctuations of value of these two metals, since these fluctuations necessarily alter the parity between them. An illustration of this were the rates of exchange in 1850; they were against England, although its export rose enormously. But nevertheless no drain of gold took place. This was the result of a momentary rise in the value of silver as against that of gold. (See Economist, November 30, 1857.)

The parity of the rate of exchange is for one pound sterling: on Paris 25.20 francs; Hamburg 13 marks banko 10.5 shillings;113 Amsterdam 11 florins 97 centimes. In proportion as the rate of exchange on Paris exceeds 25.20 francs, it becomes more favorable to the English debtor of France, or the buyer of French commodities. In either case he needs less pounds sterling in order to accomplish his purpose.—In more remote countries, where precious metals are not easily obtained, when bills of exchange are scarce and insufficient for the remittances to be made to England, the natural effect is a raising of the prices of such products as are generally shipped to England, a greater demand arising for them, in order to send them to England in place of bills of exchange; this is often the case in India.

An unfavorable rate of exchange, or even a drain of gold, may take place, when there is a great abundance of gold in England, a low rate of interest, and a high price of securities.

In the course of 1848 England received large quantities of silver from India, since good bills of exchange were rare and mediocre ones were not easily accepted, in consequence of the crisis of 1847 and the great lack of credit in the Indian business. All this silver, when hardly arrived, quickly found its way to the continent, where the revolution caused a formation of hoards at all points. The same silver largely made the trip back to India in 1850, since the stand of the rates of exchange made this profitable.

The monetary system is essentially Catholic, the credit system essentially Protestant. "The Scotch hate gold." In the form of paper the monetary existence of commodities has only a social life. It is Faith that makes blessed. Faith in money-value as the imminent spirit of commodities, faith in the prevailing mode of production and its predestined order, faith in the individual agents of production as mere personifications of selfexpanding capital. But the credit system does not emancipate itself from the basis of the monetary system any more than Protestantism emancipates itself from the foundations of Catholicism.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

PRECAPITALIST CONDITIONS.

INTEREST bearing capital, or usurer's capital, as we may call it in its ancient form, belongs like its twin brother, commercial capital, to the antediluvian forms of capital, which long precede the capitalist mode of production and are found in the most diverse economic formations of society.

The existence of usurer's capital requires merely that at least a portion of the products should be converted into commodities, and that money with its various functions should have developed along with the trade in commodities.

The development of capital attaches itself to that of merchant's capital, more particularly to financial capital. In ancient Rome, starting from the last stages of the republic, when manufacture stood far below its ancient average development, merchants' capital, financial capital, and usurers' capital had reached their highest point within that ancient form.

We have seen that hoarding necessarily appears with money. But the professional hoarder does not become important until he becomes transformed into a usurer.

The merchant borrows money in order to make a profit with it, in order to use it as capital, that is, to spend it as such. Hence the money lender stands in the same relation to him in former stages of society as he does to the modern capitalist. This specific relation was felt also by the Catholic universities. "The universities of Alcala, of Salamanca, of Ingolstadt, of Freiburg in the Breisgau, Mayence, Cologne, Treves, one after another recognized the legality of interest for commercial loans. The first five of these approbations were deposited in the archives of the Consulate of the city of Lyons and published in the appendix of the Traité de l'usure et des intérêts, at Lyons, by Bruyset-Ponthus." (M. Augier, Le Crédit Public, etc., Paris, 1842, p. 206.)

In all forms, in which slave economy (not the patriarchal kind, but that of later Grecian and Roman times) serves as a means of amassing wealth, where money is a means of appropriating the labor of others by purchase of slaves, land, etc., there money becomes useful as capital, brings interest, for the reason that it may be so invested.

However, the most characteristic forms, in which usurers' capital exists in times antedating capitalist production, are two. I say purposely characteristic forms. The same forms repeat themselves on the basis of capitalist production, but as mere subordinate forms. They are then no longer the forms which determine the character of interest-bearing capital. These two forms are: First, usury by lending money to extravagant persons of the higher classes, particularly to land owners; secondly, usury by lending money to the small producer who is in possession of his own means of employment, which includes the artisan, but more particularly the peasant, since under precapitalist conditions, so far as they permit of independent individual producers, the peasant class must form the overwhelming majority.

Both the ruin of rich land owners by usury and the spoilation of the small producers leads to the formation and concentration of large money-capitals. But to what extent this process does away with the old mode of production, as happened in modern Europe, and whether it places in its stead the capitalist mode of production, depends entirely upon the stage of historical development and the circumstances surrounding it.

Usurers' capital as the characteristic form of interest-bearing capital corresponds to the predominance of small scale production, of selfemploying peasants and small craft masters. When the laborer is confronted by the means of employment and by the product of labor in the shape of capital, as he is under the capitalist mode of production, he has no occasion to borrow any money as a producer. When he does any borrowing of money, he does it to secure personal necessities, for instance, at the pawnshop. But wherever the laborer is the owner, whether actual or nominal, of his means of employment and of his product, he is confronted as a producer by the capital of the money lender, which stands in his way as a usurer's capital. Newman expresses the matter weakly, when he says that the banker is respected while the usurer is hated and despised, because the banker lends to the rich, whereas the usurer lends to the poor. (J. W. Newman, Lectures on Political Economy, London, 1851, p. 44.) He overlooks the fact that the difference of two modes of social production and of the corresponding social orders intervenes here and that the matter is not exhausted by the distinction between rich and poor. On the contrary, the usury which sucks the life out of the small producer goes hand in hand with the usury which sucks the rich owner of large estates dry. As soon as the usury of the Roman patricians had completely ruined the Roman plebeians, the small peasants, this form of exploitation had an end and slave economy undisguised took the place of small peasant economy.

Under the form of interest the whole of the surplus over the necessary means of subsistence (the amount of what becomes wages later on) of the producers may here be devoured by usury (this assumes later the form of profit and ground rent), and hence it is very absurd to compare the level of this interest, which assimilates all the surplus-value with the exception of the share claimed by the state, with the level of the modern rate of interest, which gives to the interest normally no more than a part of the surplus-value. Such a comparison forgets that the wage worker gives to the capitalist, who employs him, profit, interest and ground rent, that is, the whole surplus-value produced by him. Carey makes this absurd comparison in order to show, how advantageous the development of capital and the fall in the rate of interest, that goes with it, is for the laborer. When it is said that the usurer, not content with squeezing the surplus-labor out of his victim, gradually acquires possession of the means of employment, house and land, of this victim and is thus continually engaged in expropriating him, it is forgotten that this complete expropriation of the laborer from his means of employment is not a result which the capitalist mode of production seeks to accomplish, but rather the established condition from which it starts out. The wage slave is barred from becoming a creditor's slave just as the real slave was, at least in his capacity as a producer. The wage slave may eventually become a creditor's slave in his capacity as a consumer. Usurer's capital in this form, in which it appropriates indeed all surplus-labor of the direct producers, does not alter the mode of production. The ownership, or at least the possession of the means of employment by the producers, and small scale production corresponding to this, are its essential prerequisites. Here capital does not subordinate labor to itself directly, and does not confront the laborer as industrial capital, while usurer's capital merely impoverishes this mode of production, paralyzes the productive forces instead of developing them, and at the same time perpetuates these miserable conditions, in which the social productivity of labor is not developed at the expense of labor itself, as it is under the capitalist mode of production.

On the one hand, usury thus exerts an undermining and destructive influence on ancient and feudal wealth and ancient and feudal property. On the other hand it undermines and ruins small peasants' and small burghers' production, in short all forms, in which the producer still appears as the owner of his conditions of production. Under the developed capitalist mode of production, the laborer is not the owner of his means of employment, of the field which he cultivates, of the raw materials which he works up, etc. But under this system the separation of the producer from the means of employment is the expression of an actual revolution of the mode of production itself. The individual laborers are brought together in large workshops for the purpose of a division of labor, which dovetails one man's activity into another's. The tool becomes a machine. The mode of production no longer permits this dislocation of the means of production, which goes with small property, nor does it permit the isolation of the laborer himself. Under the capitalist mode of production, usury can no longer separate the producer from his means of production, for the simple reason that they have already been separated.

Usury centralises money wealth, where the means of production are disjointed. It does not alter the mode of production, but attaches itself to it as a parasite and makes it miserable. It sucks its blood, kills its nerve, and compels reproduction to proceed under even more disheartening conditions. Hence the popular hatred against usurers, which was most pronounced in the ancient world, where the ownership of the means of production by the producer himself was at the same time the basis of the political conditions, of the independence of the citizen. To the extent that slavery prevails, or to the extent that the surplus product is consumed by the feudal lord and his retinue, while either the slave owner or the feudal lord fall into the clutches of the usurer, the mode of production remains the same. Only, it becomes harder on the laborer. The indebted slave holder or feudal lord becomes more oppressive, because he is himself more oppressed. Or he makes finally room for the usurer, who becomes a landed proprietor or a slave holder himself, like the knights in ancient Rome. Into the place of the old exploiters, whose exploitation was more or less patriarchal, because it was largely a means of political power, steps a hard, money-mad parvenue, But the mode of production itself is not altered thereby.

Usury works revolutionary effects in all precapitalist modes of production only so far as it destroys and dissolves those forms of property, which form the solid basis of the political organisation, and which must be continually reproduced in order that the political organisation may endure. Under the Asiatic forms usury may last for a long time, without producing anything else but economic disintegration and political rottenness. Not until the other prerequisites of capitalist production are present, does usury become a means of assisting in the formation of the new mode of production, by ruining the feudal lord and small scale production on the one hand, and centralising the means of production into capital on the other.

In the Middle Ages no country had any general rate of interest. The Church forbade all lending at interest from the outset. Laws and courts protected loans but very little. Interest was so much higher in individual cases. The limited circulation of money, the necessity of making most payments in cash, compelled people to borrow money, so much more the less the business of exchanging money was developed. There was a great deal of difference, both in the rates of interest and the conceptions of usury. In the time of Charlemagne it was considered usury to charge 100%. In Lindau on Lake Boden some resident burghers took 216 2/3% in 1348. In Zurich the City Council decreed that 43 1/3% should be the legal rate of interest. In Italy 40% had to be paid sometimes, although the ordinary rate did not exceed 20% from the 12th to the 14th century. Verona ordered that 12½% should be the legal rate. Emperor Frederick II. fixed the rate at 10%, but only for Jews. He did not care to speak for the Christians. In the Rhine provinces 10% was the rule as early as the 13th century. (Hüllmann, Geschichte des Städtewesens, II, pp. 55-57.)

Usurer's capital uses a capital's method of exploitation without its mode of production. This state of affairs repeats itself also inside of bourgeois economy, in backward lines of industry or in those lines, which resist the transition to the modern mode of production. For instance, if we wish to compare the English rate of interest with the Indian, we should not take the rate of interest of the Bank of England, but rather that, say, of the lenders of small machinery to small producers in domestic industry.

Usury as an enemy of consuming wealth is historically important inasmuch as it is itself a process generating capital. Usurer's capital and merchant's wealth promote the formation of moneyed wealth independent of landed property. The less products assume the character of commodities, and the less exchange-value seizes the whole breadth and depth of production, the more does money appear as real wealth, that, is, as wealth in general compared to its limited existence in use-values. This is the basis of hoarding. Aside from money as world money and a hoard, it assumes the absolute form of commodities particularly as a means of payment. And it is especially its function as a means of payment, which develops interest and with it money-capital. What squandering and corrupting wealth wants is money as such, money as a means of buying everything (also as a means of paying debts). The small producer needs money above all to make payments. (The conversion of tithes in kind and service in kind to landlords and to the state into money rent and money taxes plays a great role in this.) In either case money is used as money proper. On the other hand hoarding becomes real only in this way, and thus fulfills the dreams of the usurer. What the owner of a hoard demands is not capital, but money as such; but by means of interest he converts his hoard of money into capital for himself, that is, into a means of grabbing surplus-labor in part or entirely, and with it securing a hold on a part of the requirements of production itself, even though this may remain separate from him as a nominal property of others. Usury lives apparently in the pores of production in the same way as the gods live in the spaces between worlds according to Epicurus. Money is obtainable so much harder, the less products assume the general form of commodities. Hence the usurer acknowledges no other barrier but the capacity or resistive power of those who need money. In small peasants' and small burghers' production money serves as a means of purchase mainly, whenever the laborer (who is still to a predominant extent the owner of his means of production under these modes of production) loses his means of employment by accident or by extraordinary upheavals, or at least does not become able to recover them in the ordinary course of reproduction. Means of subsistence and raw materials constitute the essential part of these requirements of production. If these become dearer, it may be impossible to reproduce them out of the returns for the product, just as mere crop failures may prevent the peasant from reproducing his seed grain in its natural form. The same wars, by which the Roman patricians ruined the plebeians, by compelling them to serve as soldiers and thus preventing them from reproducing the requirements of their productive activity and making paupers of them (and pauperization, depletion or loss of the prerequisites of reproduction is here the predominent form), filled the sheds and cellars of the patricians with looted copper, the money of that time. Instead of giving to the plebeians directly the necessary commodities, grain, horses, cattle, they loaned to them this copper, for which they had no use themselves, and availed themselves of this condition for the purpose of enforcing enormous interest by usury, thereby turning the plebeians into their debtor slaves. Under the reign of Charlemagne the Frankish peasants were likewise ruined by wars, so that nothing remained to them but to become serfs instead of debtors. In the Roman empire it happened frequently that famines caused the sale of children, or the voluntary sale of free men by themselves, into slavery to the rich. So much for general turning points. In individual cases the maintenance or loss of the requirements of production on the part of the small producers depend on a thousand accidents, and everyone of such accidents or losses signifies impoverishment and becomes an opening, into which the parasite of usury may enter. The mere death of a cow may render the small producer unable to renew his reproduction on the former scale. Then he falls into the clutches of the usurer, and once he is in the usurer's power he never extricates himself.

The typical great and peculiar domain of the usurer, however, is the function of money as a means of payment. Every payment of money, ground rent, tribute, tax, etc., which becomes due at a certain date, carries with it the necessity of securing money for such a purpose. Hence usury attaches itself from the days of the ancient Romans to those of modern times to the tax renters, the fermiers généraux, the receveurs généraux. Furthermore, commerce and the extension of commodity-production carry with them the separation of purchase and payment by an interval of time. The money has to be on the spot at a definite date. In what manner this may lead to circumstances, in which the money-capitalist and usurer may merge into one even nowadays, is shown by the modern money panics. This same usury, however, becomes one of the principal means of further developing the necessity of using money as a means of payment, by getting the producer ever more deeply into debt and destroying his usual means of payment in such a way that the burden of interest makes even his normal reproduction impossible. In that case usury sprouts up out of money as a means of payment and extends this function of money into its own peculiar domain.

The development of the credit system takes place as a reaction against usury. But this should not be misunderstood, nor interpreted in the manner of the ancient writers, the church fathers, Luther, or the older socialists. It signifies no more and no less than the subordination of interest-bearing capital to the conditions and requirements of the capitalist mode of production.

On the whole, interest-bearing capital under the modern credit-system is adapted to the conditions of the capitalist mode of production. Usury as such does not merely perpetuate itself, but is even freed by nations with a developed capitalist production from those fetters, which were imposed upon it by the old legislation. Interest-bearing capital retains the form of usurer's capital in its transactions with such persons or classes, or those in such circumstances, as do not borrow in the sense corresponding to the capitalist mode of production, or in which borrowing cannot take place in that sense. This applies to borrowing from individual want at the pawnshop; to lending money for the purpose of squandering on the part of wealthy spendthrifts; or to borrowing money on the part of producers who are not capitalist producers, such as small farmers, craftsmen, etc., who are still the owners of their own requirements of production; finally to borrowing on the part of capitalist producers, who still operate on such a small scale, that they approach those self-employing producers.

What distinguishes the interest-bearing capital, so far as it is an essential element of the capitalist mode of production, from usurer's capital is in no way the nature or the character of this capital itself. It is merely the altered conditions, under which it operates, and consequently the totally changed character of the borrower, who transacts business with the money lender. Even in cases where a man without wealth receives credit in his capacity as an industrial or merchant, it is done for the confident expectation, that he will perform the function of a capitalist and appropriate some unpaid labor with the borrowed capital. He receives credit in his capacity as a potential capitalist. This circumstance, that a man without wealth, but with energy, solidity, ability and business sense may become a capitalist in this way, is very much admired by the apologists of the capitalist system, and the commercial value of each individual is pretty accurately estimated under the capitalist mode of production. Although this circumstance continually brings an unwelcome number of new soldiers of fortune into the field and into competition with the already existing individual capitalists, it also secures the supremacy of capital itself, expands its basis, and enables it to recruit ever new forces for itself out of the lower layers of society. In a similar way the circumstance, that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages formed its hierarchy out of the best brains of people without regard to estate, birth, or wealth, was one of the principal means of fortifying priest rule and suppressing the laity. The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the most prominent men of a ruled class, the more solid and dangerous is its rule.

Instead of the anathema against interest-bearing capital in general, it is on the contrary its explicit recognition, from which the initiators of the modern credit system take their start.

We are not speaking here of such reactions against usury, as tried to protect the poor against it, like the Monts-de-piété (1350 in Sarlins of the Franche-Comté, later in Perugia and Savona of Italy, 1400 and 1479). These are remarkable mainly because they show the irony of history, which turns pious wishes into their very opposite as soon as they are realised. According to a moderate estimate the English working class pays 100% to the pawnshops, those modern successors of the Monts-de-piété.114 Neither are we speaking of the credit phantasies of a man like Dr. Hugh Chamberleyne or John Briscoe, who attempted during the last decade of the 17th century to emancipate the English aristocracy from usury by means of a country bank with paper money based on real estate.115

The credit associations, which were established in the 12th and 14th centuries in Venice and Genoa, arose from the need of marine commerce and wholesale trade connected with it to emancipate themselves from the domination of ancient usury and from the monopolists of the money business. The fact that the bona fide banks, which were founded in those city-republics, assumed at the same time the shape of institutions for public credit, from which the state received loans on future tax revenues, is explained by the circumstance that the merchants forming such associations were the prominent men of those states and as much interested in emancipating their state as themselves from the exactions of usurers,116 and at the same time getting a better and more secure control of the states themselves. Hence, when the Bank of England was being planned, the Tories raised the objection: "Banks are republican institutions. Flourishing banks exist in Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, and Hamburg. But who ever heard of a Bank of France or Spain?"

The Bank of Amsterdam, in 1609, did not mark an epoch in the development of the modern credit system any more than that of Hamburg in 1619. It was purely a bank for deposits. The checks issued by the bank were indeed merely receipts for the deposited, coined and uncoined, precious metal, and circulated only with the endorsement of those who received them. But in Holland commercial credit and dealing in money had developed together with commerce and manufacture, and the interest-bearing capital had been subordinated to industrial and commercial capital by the course of development itself. This showed itself even in the lowness of the rate of interest. And Holland was considered in the 17th century as the model country of economic development, as England is now. The monopoly of old-style usury, based on poverty, had been overthrown in that country of its own weight.

During the entire 18th century Holland is pointed out as an example and the cry raised for a compulsory lowering of the rate of interest (and legislation acted on this hint), in order to subordinate the interest-bearing capital to the commercial and industrial capital, instead of maintaining the reverse condition. The main spokesman of this movement is Sir Josiah Child, the father of normal English bankerdom. He declaims against the monopoly of the usurers in much the same way that the wholesale clothing manufacturer Moses 8 Son do when posing as the leaders of the fight against the monopoly of the private tailors. This Josiah Child is at the same time the father of English stock jobbing. Thus he, the autocrat of the East India Company, defends its monopoly in the name of free trade. About Thomas Manley ("Interest of Money Mistaken") he says: "As the champion of the timid and trembling band of usurers he erects his batteries at that point, which I have declared to be the weakest...he denies point blank that the low rate of interest is the cause of wealth and vows that it is merely its effect." Traités sur le Commerce, etc., 1669, translated in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1754.) "If it is commerce that enriches a country, and if a lowering of interest increases commerce, then a lowering of interest or a restriction of usury is doubtless a fruitful primary cause of the wealth of a nation. It is not at all absurd to say that the same thing may be simultaneously a cause under certain circumstances, and an effect under others." (L. c., p. 55.) "The egg is the cause of the hen, and the hen is the cause of the egg. The lowering of interest may cause an increase of wealth, and the increase of wealth may cause a still greater reduction of interest." (L. c., p. 156.) "I am the defender of industry and my opponent defends laziness and sloth." (P. 179.)

This violent fight against usury, this demand for the subordination of the interest-bearing under the industrial capital, is but the herald of the organic creations, that establish these prerequisites of capitalist production in the modern banking system, which on the one hand robs usurer's capital of its monopoly by concentrating all fallow money reserves and throwing them on the money-market, and on the other hand limits the monopoly of the precious metals themselves by creating credit-money.

The same opposition to usury, the demand for emancipation of commerce, industry and of the state from usury, which we observe here in the case of Child, will be found in all writings on banking during the last third of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries. With them go also colossal illusions about the miraculous effects of credit, the abolition of the monopoly of precious metals, their displacement by paper, etc. The Scotchman William Patterson, the founder of the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland, is by all odds Law the First.

Against the Bank of England all goldsmiths and pawn-brokers raised a howl of rage. (Macaulay, History of England, IV., p. 499.) During the first ten years the Bank had to struggle with great difficulties; great enmity from without; its notes were only accepted far below their nominal value...the goldsmiths (in whose hands the trade with precious metals served as a basis of a primitive banking business) intrigued considerably against the Bank, because their business was reduced by it, their discount lowered, and their business with the government had fallen into the hands of this antagonist. (J. Francis, l. c., p. 73.)

Even before the establishment of the Bank of England a plan for a national bank of credit was suggested in 1683, which had for its purpose, among others, "that business men, when they possess a considerable quantity of goods, may deposit their goods with the assistance of this bank and take up a credit on their tied-up supplies, employ their hands, and increase their business, until they find a good market, instead of selling at a loss." After many difficulties this Bank of Credit was erected in Devonshire House in Bishopsgate Street. It made loans to industrials and merchants on security of deposited goods to the amount of three quarters of their value, in bills of exchange. In order to make these bills of exchange marketable, a number of people in each branch of business were organised into a society, from whom every possessor of such bills should be able to get goods with the same facility as though he were to offer them cash payment. This bank did not do a flourishing business. Its machinery was too complicated, the risk too great in case of a depreciation of commodities.

If we go by the real content of those writings, which accompany and promote theoretically the formation of the modern credit system in England, we shall not find anything in them but the demand for a subordination of interest-bearing capital, and of loanable means of production in general, under the capitalist mode of production as one of its prerequisites. On the other hand, if we cling to the mere phraseology, we shall be frequently surprised by their agreement, down to the very expressions, with the banking and credit illusions of the Saint-Simonists.

Just as the cultivateur in the writings of the physiocrats does not signify the actual tiller of the soil, but the great land owner, so the travailleur with Saint-Simon, and continuing on through his disciples, does not signify the laborer, but the industrial and commercial capitalist. "A travailleur (worker) needs help, backers, laborers; he looks for such as are intelligent, able, devoted; he puts them to work, and their labor is productive." (Religion saint-simonienne, Économie politique et Politique. Paris, 1831, p. 104.)

In fact, one should not forget that only in his last work, Le Nouveau Christianisme, does Saint-Simon speak directly for the working class and declare their emancipation to be the end of his efforts. All his former writings are, indeed, mere glorifications of modern bourgeois society against feudal society, or of industrials and bankers against marshals and jurist law-makers of the Napoleonic era. What a difference compared with the contemporaneous writings of Owen!117

Among his followers, like wise, the industrial capitalist remains the travailleur par excellence, as the above quoted passage indicates. After reading their writings critically, one will not be surprised, that the realization of their dreams of banks and the upshot of their critique materialised in the Crédit mobilier founded by the Ex-Saint-Simonist Emile Pereire. This form of credit could become prevalent only in a country like France, where neither the credit system nor great industries had become developed to a modern scale.

In the following passage of the "Doctrine de Saint-Simon, Exposition, Première année, 1828-29" (Third edition, Paris, 1831), the germ of the Crédit mobilier is already contained. It is easy to understand, that the banker can lend money more cheaply than the capitalist and the private usurer. The bankers are, therefore, "able to procure tools to the industrials far more cheaply, that is, at a lower interest than the real estate owners and capitalists can, who may be more easily mistaken in their choice of borrowers." (P. 202.) But the authors themselves add in a footnote: "The advantage that would follow from an intervention of bankers between the idle and the travailleurs is often balanced, or even annulled, by the opportunities offered by our disorganized society to Egoism, which may manifest itself in various forms of fraud and charlatanry. The bankers often come between the idle and the travailleurs for the purpose of exploiting both of them to the injury of society." Travailleur means here industrial capitalist. For the rest it is a mistake to consider the means at the command of banks merely as means of idle people. In the first place the banks hold that portion of capital, which industrials and merchants own temporarily in the form of unemployed money, as a money reserve or as capital to be invested. It is idle capital, but not capital of idle people. In the second place the banks hold that portion of the revenues and savings of all kinds which is to be temporarily or permanently accumulated. Both things are essential for the character of the banking system.

But it should never be forgotten, that money, in the first place, in the form of precious metals, remains the basis from which the credit system naturally can never detach itself. In the second place, it must be kept in mind that the credit system has for its premise the monopoly of the social means of production in the hands of private people (in the form of capital and landed property), that it is itself on the one hand an immanent form of the capitalist mode of production, and on the other hand one of the impelling forces of the development of this mode of production to its highest and ultimate form.

The banking system, so far as its formal organisation and centralisation is concerned, is the most artificial and most developed product turned out by the capitalist mode of production, a fact already expressed in 1697 in "Some Thoughts of the Interests of England." This accounts for the immense power of such an institution as the Bank of England over commerce and industry, although their actual movements remain quite outside of its sphere and it is passive toward them. It presents indeed the form of universal bookkeeping and of a distribution of products on a social scale, but only the form. We have seen that the average profit of the individual capitalist, or of every individual capital, is determined, not by the surplus-labor appropriated at first hand by each capital, but by the total quantity of surplus-labor appropriated by the total capital, whereof each individual capital receives a dividend as an aliquot part of the total capital. This social character of capital is promoted and fully realised by the complete development of the credit and banking system. On the other hand this goes still farther. It places at the disposal of the industrial and commercial capitalists all the available, or even potential, capital of society, so far as it has not been actively invested, so that neither the lender nor the user of such capital are its real owners or producers. This does away with the private character of capital and implies in itself, to that extent, the abolition of capital. By means of the banking system the distribution of capital as a special business, as a social function, is taken out of the hands of the private capitalists and usurers. But at the same time banking and credit thus become the most effective means of driving capitalist production beyond its own boundaries, and one of the most potent instruments of crises and swindle.

The banking system shows, furthermore, by putting different forms of circulating credit in the place of money, that money is in reality nothing but a special expression of the social character of labor and its products, so that this character, as distinguished from the basis of individual production, must present itself in the last analysis as a thing, as a peculiar commodity by the side of the other commodities.

Finally, there is no doubt that the credit system will serve as a powerful lever during the transition from the capitalist mode of production to the production by means, of associated labor; but only as one element in connection with other great organic revolutions of the mode of production itself. On the other hand, the illusions concerning the miraculous power of the credit and banking system, as nursed by some socialists, arise from a complete lack of familiarity with the capitalist mode of production and the credit system as one of its forms. As soon as the means of production have ceased to be converted into capital (which includes also the abolition of private property in land), credit as such has no longer any meaning. This was understood also by the advocates of Saint-Simonism. But so long as the capitalist mode of production lasts, interest-bearing capital as one of its forms also continues and constitutes actually the basis of the credit system. Only that sensational writer, Proudhon, who wanted to perpetuate the production of commodities and yet abolish money118 , was capable of dreaming of a crédit gratuit, this monster which was supposed to realise the pious wish of small capitalist production.

In the "Religion saint-simonienne, Économie et Politique," we read on page 45: "Credit serves the purpose, in a society in which some own the instruments of industry without the ability or the will to employ them, and in which other industrious people have no instruments of labor, of transferring these instruments in the easiest manner possible from the hands of the former, their owners, to the hands of the others who know how to use them. Note that this definition regards credit as a result of the way in which property is constituted." Therefore credit disappears with this constitution of property. We read, furthermore, on page 98, that the present banks "consider it their business to yield to that movement which is started by the transactions taking place outside of their domain, not to give them an impulse on their part; in other words, the banks perform the role of capitalists in their transactions with those travailleurs, to whom they loan money." The idea that the banks themselves should take the lead and distinguish themselves "through the number and usefulness of the organised establishments and of the promoted works" (p. 101) contains the Crédit mobilier in embryo. In the same way Charles Pecqueur demands that the banks (or what the Saint-Simonists call a Système général des banques) "should rule production." Pecqueur is essentially a Saint-Simonist, only much more radical. He desires that "the credit institute...should control the entire movement of national production."—"Try to create a national credit institute, which shall advance means to propertyless talent and merit, without, however, knitting these borrowers by compulsion into a close solidarity in production and consumption, but on the contrary rather enabling them to determine their own exchanges and production. In this way you will accomplish only what the private banks accomplish even now, that is, anarchy, a disproportion between production and consumption, the sudden ruin of one, and the sudden enrichment of another; so that your institute will never get any farther than the point of producing a great deal of welfare for one, which amounts to a great deal of suffering endured by another...only that you will have given to the wage laborers assisted by you the means of competing among one another in the same way that their capitalist masters do now." (Ch. Pecqueur, Théorie Nouvelle d' Économie Sociale et Politique, Paris, 1842, p. 434.)

We have seen that merchants' capital and interest-bearing capital are the most ancient forms of capital. In the nature of the case, interest-bearing capital assumes in the popular conception the form of capital par excellence. In the case of merchants' capital, the activity of a middle man is performed, no matter whether it be rated as cheating, labor, or anything else. But in the case of interest-bearing capital the self-reproducing character of capital, the self-expansion of value, the production of surplus-value, surrounds itself with the qualities of the the occult. This accounts for the fact that even a part of the political economists, particularly in countries in which industrial capital is not yet fully developed, as in France, cling to interest-bearing capital as the fundamental form of capital and regard, for instance, ground rent merely as a modified form of it, because the form of lending predominates also in it. In this way the internal articulation of the capitalist mode of production is completely misunderstood, and the fact is entirely overlooked that land, like capital, is loaned only to capitalists. Of course, natural means of production, such as machines, business buildings, etc., may also be loaned instead of money. But they always represent a certain sum of money, and the fact that not only interest, but also wear and tear has to be paid for them, is due to their use-value, the specific natural form of these elements of capital. The thing which decides in this case is whether they are loaned to the direct producers, which would imply the non-existence of the capitalist mode of production, at least in the sphere in which this takes place, or whether they are loaned to the industrial capitalists, which is the basic assumption under the capitalist mode of production. It is still more improper and meaningless to drag the lending of houses, etc., for individual consumption into this part of the discussion. That the working class is swindled to an enormous extent, in this way as well as in others, is an evident fact; but this is done also by the retail dealer, who sells them means of subsistence. It is a secondary exploitation, which runs parallel with the primary one taking place in the process of production itself. The distinction between selling and loaning is quite immaterial in this case and merely formal, and cannot appear as essential to any one, unless he be wholly unfamiliar with the actual condition of the problem.

Both usury and commerce exploit the various modes of production. They do not create it, but attack it from the outside. Usury tries to maintain it directly, in order to be able to exploit it ever anew, but it is conservative and makes it only more miserable. The less the elements of production enter the process of production as commodities and come out of it as commodities, the more does their descent from money appear as a separate act. The more significant the role played by circulation in the social reproduction, the more does usury flourish.

That moneyed wealth develops as a special kind of wealth means with reference to usurer's capital that it collects all its claims in money. It develops so much more in any country, the more the mass of production limits itself to natural services, etc., that is, to use-values.

To that extent usury has a double effect. First, it frames up an independent moneyed wealth by the side of the merchant class. In the second place it appropriates to itself the prerequisites of labor, that is, it ruins the owners of the old requisites of production. Thus it becomes a powerful lever for the formation of the requirements of industrial capital.

Interest in the Middle Ages.

In the Middle Ages the population was purely agricultural. And there, as under feudal rule, commerce can be but small and consequently profit but slight. Hence the laws against usury were justified in the Middle Ages. Moreover, in an agricultural country one has rarely any occasion for borrowing money, except when reduced by poverty and misery....Henry VIII limits interest to 10%, Jacob I. to 8%, Charles II, to 6%, Anne to 5%....In those days the money-lenders, if not legally, were at least in fact monopolists, and therefore it was necessary to place them under restriction like other monopolists....In our times the rate of profit regulates the rate of interest; in those times the rate of interest regulated the rate of profit. If the money-lender loaded a heavy rate of interest on the merchant, then the merchant had to add a higher rate of profit to the price of his commodities. Consequently a large sum of money was taken out of the pockets of the buyers in order to put it into the pockets of the money-lenders. (Gilbart, History and Principles of Banking, pp. 164, 165.)

"I have been told that 10 gulden are now taken annually on every Leipsic fair, that is 30 on each hundred; some add the Neuenburg fair and make it 40 per hundred; whether that is so, I don't know. For shame, where the devil is that going to end?...Whoever has now 100 florins at Leipsic, takes 40 annually, which is the same as devouring one peasant or burgher each year. If one has 1,000 florins, he takes 400 annually, which means devouring a knight or a rich noble per year. If one has 10,000 florins, he takes 4,000 per year, which means devouring a rich count each year. If one has 100,000 florins, as the great merchants must have, he takes 40,000 annually, which means devouring one great rich prince each year. If one has 1,000,000 florins, he takes 400,000 annually, which means devouring one great king each year. And he does not run any risks, either in his person or his wares, does not work, sits near his fireplace and roasts apples; so might a petty robber be sitting at home and devour a whole world in ten years." (Bücher vom Kaufhandel und Wucher, 1524. Luther's Works, Wittenberg, 1589, Part VI.)

"Fifteen years ago I wrote against usury, when it had spread so alarmingly, that I did not hope for any improvement. Since then it has become so proud, that it does not care to be classed as a vice, sin, or shame, but gets itself praised as a pure virtue and honor, just as though it were doing people a great favor and Christian service. What are we going to do now that shame has become honor and vice virtue? (Martin Luther, An die Pfarherrn wider den Wucher zu predigen. Wittenberg,1540.)

Jews, Lombards, usurers and bloodsuckers were our first bankers, our original bank sharks, their character being such as to be called almost infamous....They were joined by the London goldsmiths. On the whole...our original bankers...were a very bad crowd, they were greedy usurers, stony-hearted vampires. (J. Hardcastle, Banks and Bankers. Second edition, London, 1843, pages 19 and 20.)

The example given by Venice (in the matter of establishing a bank) was quickly imitated; all sea towns, and in general all towns which had made a name for themselves by their independence and their commerce, founded their first banks. The return of their ships, which often took a long time, led inevitably to the custom of giving credit, which was further intensified by the discovery of America and the commerce with it. (This is one of the main points.) The freighting of ships made the taking of heavy loans necessary, a thing already occuring in ancient Athens and Greece. In 1380 the Hansa town of Bruges had an insurance company. (M. Augier, l. c., pages 202 and 203.)

To what extent the making of loans to land owners, and to wealth consumers in general, still prevailed in the last third of the 17th century, even in England, before the development of the modern credit system, may be seen in the works of Sir Dudley North, among others. He was not only one of the first English merchants, but also one of the most prominent theoretical economists of his time. And he says: The money loaned among our people at interest is not even to a tenth part given to business people for carrying on their affairs; it is loaned for the greater part for articles of luxury, and for the expenditures of people, who, although great real estate owners, nevertheless spend money faster than is made by their real estate; and since they hate to sell their estates, prefer to mortgage them. (Discourses upon Trade. London, 1691, pages 6 and 7.)

Poland in the 18th century: "Warsaw did a great business in exchange, which, however had for its principal basis and aim the usury of its bankers. In order to secure money, which they might lend to spendthrift nobles at 8% and more, they sought and obtained abroad an exchange credit in blank, that is, it had no commerce with commodities at all for a foundation, but the foreign endorser of the bill stood it patiently, so long as the returns from swindling with bills of exchange did not fail. However, they paid heavily for this by the bankruptcies of men like Tapper and other highly respected Warsaw bankers." (J. G. Büsch, Theoretisch-praktische Darstellung der Handlung, etc., third edition, Hamburg, 1808, volume II, pages 232 and 233.)

Advantage of the Prohibition of Interest for the Church.

"The taking of interest had been forbidden by the church. But the sale of property for the purpose of getting out of a tight place had not been forbidden. It had not even been forbidden to transfer property for a certain period to the money lender as a security, until such time as the debtor should repay his loan, so that the money lender might have the use of the property as a reward for the absence of his money....The church itself and the various corporations and communes belonging to it derived much profit from this practice, particularly during the period of the crusades. This brought a very large portion of the national wealth into the possession of the so-called 'dead hand,' all the more so because the Jews were barred from engaging in such usury, the possession of such fixed liens not being concealable....Without the ban on interest the churches and cloisters would never have become so rich." (L. c., p. 55.)

[38.][38] In order to be able to classify merchant's capital as a productive capital, Ramsay confounds it with the transportation industry and calls commerce "the transport of commodities from one place to another." (An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, p. 19.) The same mistake was committed by Verri in his Meditazionisull' Economia Politica, § 4, and by Say in his Traite d'Economie Politique, I, 14, 15. In his Elements of Political Economy, J. P. Newman says: "In the existing economical arrangements of society, the very act which is performed by the merchant of standing between the producer and the consumer, advancing to the former capital and receiving products in return, and handing over these products to the latter, receiving back capital in return, is a transaction which both facilitates the economical process of the community, and adds value to the products in relation to which it is performed (P. 174)." The producer and the consumer thus save time and money through the intervention of the merchant. This service requires an advance of capital and labor, and must be rewarded, "since it adds value to the products, for the same products, in the hands of the consumers, are worth more than in the hands of the producers." And so commerce appears to him, as it does to Mr. Say, as "strictly an act of production" (P. 175). This view of Newman is fundamentally wrong. The use-value of a commodity is greater in the hands of the consumer than in those of the producer, because it is realised by the consumer. For the use-value of a commodity does not serve its end until this commodity enters the sphere of consumption. So long as it is in the hands of the producer, it exists only potentially. But one does not pay twice for a commodity, one does not pay first for its exchange value, and then an extra price for its use-value. By paying for its exchange-value, I appropriate its use-value. And its exchange value is not in the least increased by transferring it from the hand of the producer or middleman to that of the consumer.

[39.][39] John Bellers.

[40.][40] How well this prognosis of the fate of the commercial proletariat, written in 1865, has stood the test can be corroborated by hundreds of German clerks, who, trained in all commercial operations and acquainted with three or four languages, in vain offer their services in London City at 25 shillings per week, far below the wages of a good machine maker. A blank of two pages in the manuscript indicates, that this point was to be further elaborated. For the rest, we refer the reader to volume II, chapter VI (The Expenses of Circulation), where various things belonging under this head have already been discussed.—F. E.

[41.][41] "Profit, on the general principle, is always the same, whatever be price; keeping its place like an incumbent body on the swelling or sinking trade. As, therefore, prices rise, a tradesman raises prices; as prices fall, a tradesman lowers price." (Corbet, An Inquiry into the Causes, etc., of the Wealth of Individuals. London, 1845, p. 15.) Here, as in the text of our work generally, we speak only of ordinary commerce, not of speculation. The analysis of speculation, as well as everything else pertaining to the division of mercantile capital, falls outside of the circle of our inquiry. "The profit of trade is a value added to capital which is independent of price, the second (speculation) is founded on the variation in the value of capital or in price itself." (L. c., p. 12.)

[42.][42] It is a very naive, but also very correct remark that "Surely the fact that one and the same commodity may be had from different sellers at considerably different prices is frequently due to mistakes of calculation." (Feller and Oldermann, Das Ganze der kaufmannischen of Arithmetik, 7. Aufl., 1859.) This shows how purely theoretical, that is abstract, the determination of prices becomes.

[43.][43] Critique of Political Economy, p. 53.

[44.][44] "The great differences of coins themselves, as concerns their grain, and their coinage by many privileged princes and towns, necessitated the establishment of a business, which should enable merchants to use local money wherever any compensation between different coins was necessary. In order to be able to make cash payments, merchants who traveled to a foreign market provided themselves with uncoined pure silver, or perhaps with gold. In the same way they exchanged the money received by them in local markets for uncoined silver or gold, when they prepared to return home. The business of exchanging money, the exchange of uncoined precious metals for local coins, and vice versa, thus became a widespread and paying business." (Hullmann, Stadtewesen des Mittclalters. Bonn, 1826-29, I, p. 437.) "Banks of exchange do not owe their name to the fact that they issue bills of exchange,...but to the fact that they used to exchange coins. Long before the establishment of the Amsterdam Bank of Exchange in 1609, there existed in the Dutch merchant towns money changers and exchange houses, even exchange banks....The business of these money changers consisted in exchanging the numerous varieties of coin, that were brought into the country by foreign traders, for the current coin of the realm. Gradually their circle of activity extended....They became the bankers and cashiers of modern times. But the government of Amsterdam saw a danger in the combination of the cashier business with the exchange business, and in order to meet this danger, it was resolved to establish a large institution, which should be able to perform both the cashier and the exchange operations. This institution was the famous Amsterdam Bank of Exchange of 1609. In like manner, the exchange banks of Venice, Genoa, Stockholm, Hamburg, owe their origin to the continual necessity of changing money. Of all these, the Hamburg Exchange is the only one that is still doing business, because the need of such an institution is still felt in that merchants' town, which has no Mint of its own. Etc." (S. Vissering, Handboek van Praktische Staathuishoudkunde. Amsterdam, 1860, I, 247.)

[45.][45] "The institution of cashiers has probably nowhere preserved its original and independent character so pure as in the Dutch merchant towns (see on the origin of the cashier business in Amsterdam, E. Lusac, Hollands Rykdom, part III). Its functions partly coincide with those of the old Amsterdam Bank of Exchange. The cashier receives from the merchants, who employ his services, a certain amount of money, for which he opens a 'credit' for them in his books. Furthermore they send him their due bills, which he collects for them and credits to their account. On the other hand, he makes payments on their notes (Kassiers brieffes) and charges their accounts with their current bills. He charges a small provision for these credits and debits, which yields him a corresponding remuneration for his labor only by the amount of business, which he can turn over between them. If payments are to be balanced between two merchants, who both deal with the same cashier, then such payments are simply settled by booking them mutually, while the cashiers balance their mutual claims from day to day. The cashier's business, then, consists at bottom of this promotion of payments. Therefore it excludes industrial enterprises, speculations, and the opening of blank credits; for it must be a rule in this business that the cashier makes no payment to any one keeping an account with him above his credit." (Vissering, l. c., p. 134.) On the banking associations of Venice: "The requirements and locality of Venice, where the carrying of cash is more inconvenient than in other places, induced the large merchants of that town to found banking associations under due safeguards, supervision, and management. The members of such an association deposited certain sums, on which they drew checks for their creditors, whereupon the paid sum was deducted on the page of the debtor in the book kept for that purpose and added to the sum, which was credited in the same book to the creditor. This is the first beginning of the socalled giro banks. These associations are indeed old. But if they are attributed to the 12th century, they are confounded with the State Loan Institute, which was established in 1171." (Hüllmann, l. c. 550.)

[46.][46] Smart Mr. Roscher has figured out that, since certain people designate trade as a mediation between producers and consumers, "one" might just as well designate production itself as a mediation of consumption (between whom?), and this implies, of course, that the merchants' capital is as much a part of the productive capital as agricultural and industrial capital. In other words, because I can say, that man can mediate his consumption only by means of production (and he has to do this even without getting his education at Leipsic), or that labor is required for the appropriation of the products of nature (which might be called a mediation), it follows, that a mediation arising from a specific form of production—a real mediation—has the same absolute character and rank of a necessity. The word mediation settles everything. Moreover, the merchants are not mediators between producers and consumers (leaving out of consideration consumers which do not produce), but mediators of the exchange of products of producers among themselves. They are but middle men in an exchange, which in a thousand cases takes place without them.

[47.][47] Mr. W. Kiesselbach (in his "Der Gang des Welthandels im Mittelalter," 1860) is indeed still living in the conceptions of a world, in which the merchants' capital is the general form of capital. He has not the least inkling of the modern meaning of capital, any more than Mommsen has, when he speaks in his history of Rome of "capital" and "the rule of capital." In modern English history, the commercial estate proper and the merchant towns are also political reactionaries and in league with the landed and financial aristocracy against industrial capital. Compare, for instance, the political role of Liverpool as against Manchester and Birmingham. The complete rule of industrial capital was not acknowledged by English merchants' capital and moneyed interests until after the abolition of the duties on corn, etc.

[48.][48] The inhabitants of merchant towns imported refined manufactured goods and expensive articles of luxury from rich countries, and thus offered incentives to the vanity of the large landowners, who eagerly bought these goods and paid large quantities of raw materials from their lands for them. Thus the commerce of a large part of Europe during this period consisted in an exchange of the raw materials of one country for the manufactured products of some industrially developed country. As soon as this taste became general and created a considerable demand, the merchants, in order to save the expenses of freight, began to establish similar manufactures in their own countries. (Adam Smith, Book III, chapter III.)

[49.][49] "Now there is among merchants much complaint about the nobles or robbers, because they must trade under great danger and run the risk of being kidnapped, beaten, blackmailed, and robbed. If they suffered these things for the sake of justice, the merchants would be saintly people...But since such great wrong and unchristian thievery and robbery are committed all over the world by merchants, and even among themselves, is it any wonder that God should procure that such great wealth, gained by wrong, should again be lost or stolen, and they themselves hit over their heads or made prisoners?...And the princes should punish such unjust bargains with due rigor and take care that their subjects shall not be so outrageously abused by merchants. Because they don't do so, God employs knights and robbers, and punishes through them the merchants for the wrongs committed, and uses them as his devils, just as he plagues Egypt and all the world with devils, or persecutes with enemies. In the same way he beats one boy through another, without thereby insinuating that knights are any the less robbers than merchants, although the merchants daily rob the whole world, while a knight may rob one or two once or twice in a year." "Go by the word of Esau: Thy princes have become the companions of robbers. For they hang the thieves, who have stolen a gulden or a half gulden, but they associate with those, who rob all the world and steal with greater assurance than all others, that the proverb may remain true: Great thieves hang little thieves; and as the Roman senator Cato said: Mean thieves lie in prisons and stocks, but public thieves are clothed in gold and silks. But what will God say finally? He will do as he said to Ezekiel, he will amalgamate princes and merchants, one thief with another, like lead and iron, as when a city burns down, leaving neither princes nor merchants." (Martin Luther, Bücher vom Kaufhandel und Wucher. Vom Jahr, 1527.)

[50.][50] How overweening fishing, manufacture, and agriculture were as a basis in the development of Holland, aside from other circumstances, has already been explained by writers of the 18th century, for instance, by Massic. In contradistinction to the former view, which underrated the volume and importance of the commerce of Asia, of antiquity, and of the Middle Ages, it has now become the custom to overestimate it extraordinarily. The best remedy against this conception is a study of the imports and exports of England in the beginning of the 18th century and their comparison with modern imports and exports. And yet this 18th century commerce was incomparably greater than that of any former trading nation. (See Anderson, History of Commerce.)

[51.][51] If any nation's history, then it is the history of the English management of India which is a string of unsuccessful and really absurd (and in practice infamous) experiments in economics. In Bengal they created a caricature of English landed property on a large scale; in southeastern India a caricature of small allotment property; in the Northwest they transformed to the utmost of their ability the Indian commune with common ownership of the soil into a caricature of itself.

[52.][52] Since Russia has begun making frantic exertions to develop its own capitalist production, which is exclusively dependent upon its home market and the neighboring Asiatic states, this is also gradually changing.—F. E.

[53.][53] The same is true of the ribbon and basting makers and silk weavers in the Rhine districts. Near Crefeld even a railroad has been built for the intercourse of these rural hand weavers with the "manufacturer" in the city, but has later been tied up, together with the handloom weavers themselves, by the mechanical weaving industry.—F. E.

[54.][54] This system has been developed since 1865 on a still larger scale. Details concerning it are contained in the First Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System, London, 1888.—F. E.

[55.][55] At this place, some passages should be quoted, in which the economists conceive the matter in this way. "You (the Bank of England) are very large dealers in the commodity capital?" is a question presented to a director of this bank on the witness stand. (See Report on Bank Acts, H. of C., 1857.)

[56.][56] "That a man, who borrows money with the intention of making a profit on it, should give a portion of the profit to the lender, is a self-understood principle of natural justice." (Gilbart, The History and Principles of Banking, London, 1834, p. 163.)

[57.][57] "A house," "money," etc., are not to be loaned as "capital," if Proudhon can have his way, but to be sold as "commodities...at cost-price" (page 44). Luther stood somewhat higher than Proudhon. He knew at least that the making of profits does not depend on the manner of lending or buying: "They turn buying also into usury. But this is really too much for one bite. We must first confine ourselves to one thing, usury in lending, and after we shall have stopped that (after judgment day), we will not fail to preach against usury in buying." (Martin Luther. An die Pfarherrn wider den Wucher zu predigen, Wittenberg, 1525.)

[58.][58] The equitableness of taking interest depends not upon a man's making or not making profit, but upon its being capable of producing profit, if rightly employed. (An Essay on the Governing Causes of the Natural Rate of Interest, wherein the sentiments of Sir W. Petty and Mr. Locke, on that head, are considered. London, 1750. P. 49.) The author of this anonymous work is J. Massie.

[59.][59] Rich people, instead of employing their money themselves...let it out to other people for them to make profit of, reserving for the owners a proportion of the profits so made. (L. c., p. 23.)

[60.][60] "The expression 'value' applied to currency has three meanings...secondly, currency actually in hand, compared with the same amount of currency, which will come in at some later day. Then its value is measured by the rate of interest, and the rate of interest determined by the ratio between the amount of loanable capital and the demand for it." (Colonel R. Torrens: On the Operation of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, etc., 2nd. ed., 1847.)

[61.][61] "The ambiguity of the term 'value of money' or 'of the currency,' when employed indiscriminately as it is, to signify both value in exchange for commodities and value in use of capital, is a constant source of confusion." (Tooke: Inquiry into the Currency Principle, p. 77.) The main confusion (implied by the question itself) that value as such (interest) should be considered as the use-value of capital, has escaped Tooke.

[62.][62] "The natural rate of interest is governed by the profits of trade to particulars." (Massie, l. c., p. 51.)

[63.][63] At this place the manuscript contains the following statement: "The course of this chapter shows, that it is preferable, before analysing the laws of the distribution of profits, to ascertain first the way in which the division of quantities becomes one of quality. In order to make a transition to this end from the preceding chapter, nothing is needed but the provisional assumption, that interest is a certain indefinite portion of the profit.

[64.][64] "In the first period, immediately after a time of depression, money is plentiful without any speculation; in the second period money is plentiful and speculation flourishing; in the third period speculation begins to let up and money is in demand; in the fourth period money is scarce and the depression starts in." (Gilbart, l. c., p. 144.)

[65.][65] Tooke explains this by "the accumulation of surplus capital necessarily accompanying the scarcity of profitable employment for it in previous years, by the release of hoards, and by the revival of confidence in commercial prospects." (History of Prices from 1839 till 1847. London, 1848, p. 54.)

[66.][66] "An old customer of a banker was refused a loan upon a 200,000 pounds sterling bond; when about to leave to make known his suspension of payment, he was told there was no necessity for the step, under the circumstances the banker would buy the bond at 150,000 pounds sterling." (The Theory of the Exchanges. The Bank Charter Act of 1844, etc. London, 1869, p. 80.)

[67.][67] Since the rate of interest is on the whole determined by the average rate of profit, extraordinary swindling may often go hand in hand with a low rate of interest. Instance the railroad swindle in the summer of 1844. The rate of interest of the Bank of England was not raised to 3% until October 16th, 1844.

[68.][68] For instance, J. G. Opdyke, in his "Treatise on Political Economy" (New York, 1851) makes a very unsuccessful attempt to explain the general extension of a rate of interest of 5% by eternal laws. Still more naively proceeds Mr. Karl Arnd in "Die naturgemässe Volkswirthschaft gegenüber dem Monopoliengeist und dem Kommunismus, etc., Hanau, 1845." There we may read: "In the natural course of the production of goods there is only one phenomenon, which, in the fully settled countries, seems to be destined to regulate in some measure the rate of interest; this is the proportion, in which the quantities of wood of the European forests increase through their annual new growth. This new growth takes place, quite independently of their exchange value, at the rate of 3 or 4 to 100." (How queer that the trees should arrange for their new growth independently of their exchange value!) "According to this a fall of the rate of interest below its present level in the richest countries cannot be expected." Page 124. (He means, because the new growth of the trees is independent of their exchange value, even though their exchange value may depend on their new growth.) This deserves to be called "the primordial rate of forest interest." Its discoverer has made further meritorious contributions in this work to "our science" as the "philosopher of the dog tax."

[69.][69] The Bank of England raises and lowers the rate of its discount, always, of course, with due consideration of the rate prevailing in the open market, according to the imports and exports of gold. "By which gambling in discounts, by anticipation of the alterations in the bank rate, has now become half the trade of the great heads of the money centre"—that is, of the London money market. (The Theory of the Exchanges, etc., p. 113.)

[70.][70] "'The price of commodities fluctuates' continually; they are all made for different uses; the money serves for all purposes. The commodities, even those of the same kind, differ according to quality; cash money is always of the same value, or at least is assumed to be so. Thus it happens that the price of money, which we designate by the term interest, has a greater stability and uniformity than that of any other thing." (J. Steuart, Principles of Political Economy, French translation, 1789, IV, p. 27.)

[71.][71] "This rule of dividing profits is not, however, to be applied particularly to every lender and borrower, but to lenders and borrowers in general...remarkably great and small gains are the reward of skill and the want of understanding, which lenders have nothing at all to do with; for as they will not suffer by the one, they ought not to benefit by the other. What has been said of particular men in the same business is applicable to particular sorts of business; if the merchants and tradesmen employed in any one branch of trade get more by what they borrow than the common profits made by other merchants and tradesmen of the same country, the extraordinary gain is theirs, though it required only common skill and understanding to get it; and not the lenders,' who supplied them with money...for the lenders would not have lent their money to carry on any business or trade upon lower terms than would admit of paying so much as the common rate of interest; and therefore they ought not to receive more than that, whatever advantage may be made by their money." (Massie, 1. c., p. 50, 51.)

[72.][72] [Bank rate 5%. Market rate of discount 60 days' drafts, 5 3/8%. The same for 3 months' drafts 3½%. The same for 6 months' drafts 3 5/16%. Loans to bill brokers, day to day, 1 to 2%. The same for one week 3%. Last rate for fortnightly loans to stockholders 4¾ to 5%. Deposit allowance (banks) 3½%. The same (discount houses) 3 to 3¼%. How large this difference may be for one and the same day is shown by the preceding figures of the rate of interest of the London money market on December 9th, 1889, taken from the city article of the Daily News of December 10th. The minimum is 1%, the maximum 5%. F. E.]

[73.][73] "The profits of enterprise depend upon the net profits of capital, not the latter upon the former." (Ramsay, l. c., p. 214. Net profits with Ramsay always mean interest.)

[74.][74] "Superintendence is here (in the case of the farm owner) completely dispensed with." (J. E. Cairnes, The Slave Power, London, 1862, p. 48.)

[75.][75] "If the nature of the work requires that the workmen (namely the slaves) should be dispersed over an extended area, the number of overseers, and, therefore, the cost of the labor which requires this supervision, will be proportionately increased." (Cairnes, l. c., p. 44.)

[76.][76] A. Ure, Philosophy of Manufactures, French translation, 1836, I, p. 68, where this Pindarus of the manufacturers at the same time testifies that most of the manufacturers have not the slightest understanding of the mechanism, which they set in motion.

[77.][77] In one case known to me, after the crisis of 1868, a bankrupt manufacturer became the paid wage-laborer of his own former employes. This factory was operated after the bankruptcy of its owner by a laborers' co-operative, and its former owner was employed as manager.—F. E.

[78.][78] The accounts quoted here go no farther than 1864, since the above was written in 1865.—F. E.

[79.][79] "Masters are laborers as well as their journeymen. In this character their interest is precisely the same as of their men. But they are also either capitalists, or the agents of capitalists, and in this respect their interest is decidedly opposed to the interest of the workmen." (P. 27.) "The wide spread of education among the journeymen mechanics of this country diminishes daily the value of the labor and skill of almost all masters and employers by increasing the number of persons who possess their peculiar knowledge." (P. 30, Hodgskin, Labor defended against the Claims of Capital, etc., London, 1825.)

[80.][80] "The general relaxation of conventional barriers, the increased facilities of education tend to bring down the wages of skilled labor instead of raising those of the unskilled." (J. St. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed., London, 1849, I, p. 463.)

[81.][81] Richard Price, An Appeal to the Public on the subject of the National Debt, 2nd ed., London, 1772. He cracks the naive joke: "A man must borrow money at simple interest, in order to increase it at compound interest." (R. Hamilton, An Inquiry into the Rise and Progress of the National Debt of Great Britain, 2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1814.) According to this, borrowing would be the safest means for private people to gather wealth. But if I borrow 100 pounds sterling at 5% annual interest, I have to pay 5 pounds at the end of the year, and even if the loan lasts for 100 million years, I have meanwhile only 100 pounds to loan every year and 5 pounds to pay every year. I can never manage by this process to loan 105 pounds sterling when borrowing 100 pounds sterling. And how am I going to pay the 5 pounds? By new loans, or, if it is the state, by new taxes. Now, if the industrial capitalist borrows money, and his profit amounts to 15%, he may pay 5% interest, spend 5% for his private expenses (although his appetite grows with his income), and capitalise 5%. In this case, 15% are the premise on which 5% interest may be paid continually. If this process continues, the rate of profit, for the reasons indicated in former chapters, will fall from 15% to, say, 10%. But Price forgets wholly that the interest of 5% pre-supposes a rate of profit of 15%, and assumes it to continue with the accumulation of capital. He does not take note of the process of accumulation at all, but thinks only of the loaning of money and its return with compound interest. How that is accomplished is immaterial to him, since for him it is the innate faculty of interest-bearing capital.

[82.][82] See Mill and Carey, and Roscher's mistaken commentary on them.

[83.][83] "It is clear, that no labor, no productive power, no ingenuity, and no art, can answer the overwhelming demands of compound interest. But all saving is made from the revenue of the capitalist, so that actually these demands are constantly made and as constantly the productive power of labor refuses to satisfy them. A sort of balance is, therefore, constantly struck." (Labour defended against the Claims of Capital, p. 23. By Hodgskin.)

[84.][84] In other words, formerly the dividend was first determined and then the income tax deducted on payment of the dividend to the individual stockholder; but after 1844 the income tax was first paid out of the total profit of the bank, and then the dividend paid "free of income tax." The same nominal percentages are therefore higher in the latter case by the amount of the tax.—F. E.

[85.][85] Further remarks on Overstone's confusion of terms in the matter of capital will be found at the close of chapter XXXII.

[86.][86] The average circulation of notes of the Bank of France was 106,538,000 francs in 1812 and 101,205,000 francs in 1818; while the circulation of money, the total amount of all receipts and payments, was 2,837,712,000 francs in 1812 and 9,665,030,000 francs in 1818. The activity of the circulation in France in 1818 compared to that of 1812 was therefore, as 3 to 1. The great regulator of the velocity of the circulation is credit...This explains, why a heavy pressure on the money-market generally coincides with a full circulation." (The Currency Question Reviewed, etc., p. 165.) "Between September, 1833, and September, 1843, nearly 300 banks were established in Great Britain, which issued their own notes, the consequence was a restriction of the circulation of notes by two and a half millions, it was 36,035,244 pounds sterling at the end of September, 1833, and 33,518,544 pounds sterling at the end of September, 1843." (L. c., p. 53.) "The wonderful activity of the Scotch circulation enables it to transact with 100 pounds sterling the same amount of business, which requires 420 pounds sterling in England." (L. c., p. 55. This last statement refers only to the technical side of the operation.)

[87.][87] "Before the establishment of banks the amount of capital required for the function of the circulating medium was always greater than the actual circulation of commodities demanded." Economist, 1845, p. 238.

[88.][88] See for instance, in the Times the list of business failures of a critical year like 1857, and compare the private property of the bankrupts with the amount of their debts. "In truth the purchasing power of people, who have capital and credit, exceeds by far anything conceivable by those who have no practical acquaintance with speculative markets." (Tooke, Inquiry into the Currency Principle, p. 73.) "A man who has the reputation of having enough capital for his regular business, and who enjoys good credit in his line, if he has sanguine ideas concerning the rising constellation of the articles carried by him, and if he is lucky in the beginning and course of his speculation, may make purchases of a truly enormous extent compared to his capital" (Ibidem, p. 136). "The manufacturers, merchants, etc., all carry on transactions which exceed their capital by far...Capital is to-day rather the basis, on which a good credit is built up, than the limit of the transaction of any commercial business." (Economist, 1847, p. 333.)

[89.][89] Th. Chalmers.

[90.][90] The business of bankers, setting aside the issue of promissory notes payable on demand, may be decided into two branches, corresponding with the distinction pointed out by Dr. (Adam) Smith of the transactions between dealers and dealers, and between dealers and consumers. One branch of the bankers' business is to collect capital from those who have no immediate employment for it, and to distribute or transfer it to those who have. The other branch is to receive deposits of the incomes of their customers, and to pay out the amount, as it is wanted for expenditure by the latter in the objects of their consumption....the former being a circulation of capital, the latter of currency." Tooke, Inquiry into the Currency Principle, p. 36. The former is "the concentration of capital on the one hand and the distribution of it on the other," the latter is "administering the circulation for local purposes of the district." Ibidem, p. 37. The correct conception is far more approached in the following passage from Kinnear: "Money is used to accomplish two essentially different operations. As a medium of exchange between dealer and dealer it is the instrument, by which transfers of capital are accomplished; that is, the exchange of a certain amount of capital in money for an equal amount of capital in commodities. But money expended in the payment of wages and in the purchase and sale between dealer and consumer is not capital, but revenue; that portion of the revenue of the community, which is used for daily expenditures. This money circulates continually in daily use, and it is this alone, which is strictly called currency. Advances of capital depend exclusively on the will of the bank or other capitalists, for there are always borrowers to be found; but the amount of currency depends on the needs of the community, within which the money circulates for the purpose of daily expenditure." (J. G. Kinnear, The Crisis and Currency. London, 1847.)

[91.][91] "It is a great error, indeed, to imagine that the demand for pecuniary accommodation (i.e. for the loan of capital) is identical with a demand for additional means of circulation, or even that the two are frequently associated. Each demand originates in circumstances peculiarly affecting itself, and very distinct from one another. It is when everything looks prosperous, when wages are high, prices on the rise, and factories busy, that an additional supply of currency is usually required to perform the additional functions inseparable from the necessity of making larger and more numerous payments: whereas it is chiefly in a more advanced stage of the commercial cycle, when difficulties begin to present themselves, when markets are overstocked, and returns delayed, that interest rises, and a pressure comes upon the Bank for advances of capital. It is true that there is no medium through which the Bank is accustomed to advance capital except that of promissory notes; and that, to refuse the notes, therefore, is to refuse the accommodation. But the accommodation once granted, everything adjusts itself in conformity with the necessities of the market; the loan remains, and the currency, if not wanted, finds its way back to the issuer. Accordingly, a very slight examination of the Parliamentary Returns may convince any one, that the securities in the hand of the Bank of England fluctuate more frequently in an opposite direction to its circulation than in concert with it, and the example, therefore, of that great establishment furnishes no exception to the doctrine so strongly pressed by the country bankers, to the effect that no bank can enlarge its circulation, if that circulation be already adequate to the purposes to which a banknote currency is commonly applied; but that every addition to its advances, after that limit is passed, must be made from its capital, and supplied by the sale of some of its securities in reserve, or by abstinence from further investment of such securities. The table compiled from the Parliamentary Returns for the interval between 1833 and 1840, to which I have referred in a preceding page, furnishes continued examples of this truth; but two of these are so remarkable that it will be quite unnecessary for me to go beyond them. On the third of January, 1837, when the resources of the Bank were strained to the uttermost to sustain credit and meet the difficulties of the money-market, we find its advances on loan and discount carried to the enormous sum of 17,022,000 pounds sterling, an amount scarcely known since the war, and almost equal to the entire aggregate issues which, in the meanwhile, remain unmoved at so low a point as 17,076,000 pounds sterling! On the other hand, we have, on the fourth of June, 1833, a circulation of 18,892,000 pounds sterling, with a return of private securities in hand, nearly, if not the very lowest on record for the last half-century, amounting to no more than 972,000 pounds sterling!" (Fullarton, l. c., pages 97 and 98.) That a demand for pecuniary accommodation need not be identical by any means with a demand for gold (what Wilson, Tooke and others call capital) may be seen by the following testimony of Mr. Weguelin, Governor of the Bank of England): "The discounting of bills to this amount" (one million per day for three successive days) "would not reduce the reserve" (of banknotes), unless the public should demand a greater amount of active circulation. The notes issued in the discounting of bills would flow back by way of banks and by means of deposits. Unless such transactions have for their purpose the export of gold, or unless a panic reigns in the inland market, of such character as to cause the public to hold on to the notes instead of depositing them in the banks, the reserve would not be touched by such tremendous transactions. "The Bank can discount one and a half millions daily, and this takes place continually, without touching its reserve in the least. The notes come back as deposits, and the only change that takes place is the mere transfer from one account to the other." (Report on Bank Acts, 1857.) Evidence No. 241,500. The notes serve here merely as means of transferring credit accounts

[92.][92] The passage following here is unintelligible in the original in this connection, and it has been worked over by the editor and inclosed in brackets. In another connection this point has already been touched upon in chapter XXVI.—F. E.

[93.][93] "The laborer has a value as capital, which is found by considering the money-value of his annual wages as income from interest...By capitalising the average daily wages at 4% we find the average value of an agricultural laborer of the male sex to be: German Austria, 1500 Thalers; Prussia, 1500; England, 3750; France, 2000; Interior Russia, 750 Thalers." Von Reden, Vergleichende Kulturstatistik. Berlin, 1848, p. 134.

[94.][94] [Immediately after the February Revolution, when commodities and securities were extremely depreciated and utterly unsaleable, a Swiss merchant in Liverpool, Mr. R. Zwilchenbart—who told my father about it—cashed all his belongings traveled with his cash to Paris and went to Rothschild, offering to do a joint business with him. Rothschild looked at him fixedly, rushed towards him, caught both his shoulders in his hands and asked: "Have you money in your possession?" "Yes, Baron." "Then you are my man." And both of them made a great haul.—F. E.]

[95.][95] [This duplication and triplication of capital has developed considerably further in recent years, for instance through financial trusts, which already occupy a column of their own in the London bank reports. A society is organised for the purchase of a certain class of interest-bearing papers, say, of foreign government bonds, English municipal or American public bonds, railroad stocks, etc. The capital, for instance, 2 million pounds sterling, is secured by stock subscriptions. The Board of Directors buys the desired values up, or speculates more or less actively in them, and distributes the annual amounts of interest as dividends among the stockholders, after deducting the expenses. Furthermore, some stock companies have adopted the custom of dividing the ordinary shares into two classes, preferred and deferred. The preferred receive a fixed rate of interest, say 5%, provided that the total profit permits it; if there is anything left after that, the deferred get it. In this way the "solid" investment of capital is more or less separated by preferred shares from the speculation with the deferred shares. Since a few large enterprises have been unwilling to adopt this new mode, the expedient has been resorted to of organising new companies, that invest one or several millions of pounds sterling in shares of the first company and then issue new shares to the amount of the nominal value of the first shares, but make half of them preferred and the other half deferred. In this case the original shares are doubled, by serving as a basis for a new issue of shares.—F. E.]

[96.][96] To what extent this has since increased is proved by the following official tabulation of the bank reserves of the fifteen largest London banks in November, 1892, taken from the Daily News of December 15, 1892:

NAME OF BANKLIABILITIESCASH RESERVEPERCENTAGES
City...£9,317,629£746,5518.01
Capital and Counties...11,392,7441,307,48311.47
Imperial...3,987,400447,15711.21
Lloyds...23,800,9372,966,80612.46
London 8 Westminster...24,671,5593,818,88515.50
London 8 S. Western...5,570,268812,35313.58
London Joint Stock...12,127,9931,288,97710.62
London 8 Midland...8,814,4991,127,28012.79
London 8 County...37,111,0353,600,3749.70
National...11,163,8291,426,22512.77
National Provincial...41,907,3844,614,78011.01
Parrs 8 the Alliance...12,794,4891,532,70711.93
Prescott 8 Co...4,041,058538,51713.07
Union of London...15,502,6182,300,08414.84
Williams, Deacon 8 Manchester, etc.10,452,3811,317,62812.60
  Total...£232,655,823£27,845,80711.97

Of this sum of almost 28 millions of reserve, at least 25 millions are deposited in the Bank of England, and at most 3 millions of cash in the strongboxes of the 15 banks themselves. But the cash reserve of the banking department of the Bank of England never exceeded 16 millions during that same November of 1892.—F. E.]

[97.][97] The suspension of the Bank Acts of 1844 permitted to the Bank to issue any quantity of bank notes regardless of any backing by the gold reserve in its possession; to create, in this way, an arbitrary quantity of fictitious money-capital made of paper, and use it for the purpose of making loans to banks, exchange brokers, and through them to commerce.

[98.][98] The public funds are nothing else but an imaginary capital, which represents that portion of the annual revenue, which is set aside to pay the debt. A capital of the same amount has been spent; it is this which serves as a denominator for the loan, but it is not this which is represented by the public funds; for this capital does not exist any longer. However, new wealth must be created by the work of industry; a portion of this wealth is annually set aside in advance for those, who have loaned that wealth, which has been spent; this portion is taken by means of taxes from those who produce it, and is given to the creditors of the state, and, according to the customary proportion between capital and interest in this country, an imaginary capital is assumed of the same magnitude as that which could give rise to the annual income which these creditors are to receive. Sismondi, Nouveaux Principles, II, p. 230.

[99.][99] A portion of accumulated loanable money-capital is indeed merely an expression of the industrial capital. For instance, when England, in 1857, had invested 80 million pounds sterling in American railroads and other enterprises, this investment was transacted almost throughout by the export of English commodities for which the Americans did not have to make payment in return. The English exporter drew bills of exchange for these commodities on America, the English stock subscribers bought these bills and used them to pay the amount of their stock subscriptions to America.

[100.][100] [I have already stated in another place, that a change has taken place in the character of commercial crises since the last great universal one. The acute form of the periodical process, with its former decennial cycle, seems to have given way to a more chronic, long drawn, alternation between a relatively short and slight business improvement and a relatively long, undecided, depression, both of them differently distributed over the various industrial countries. But perhaps it is merely a matter of a prolongation of the duration of the cycle. In the childhood of world commerce, 1815-1847, it can be shown that a crisis occurred about every fifth year; from 1847-1867 the cycle is decidedly decennial; is it possible, that we are now in the preparatory stage of a new world crash of unparalleled vehemence? Many things seem to indicate this. Since the last great universal crisis of 1867 many profound changes have taken place. The colossal extension of the means of transportation and communication—seagoing steamers, railroads, electric telegraphs, the Suez Canal—have made a real world market a fact. The former monopoly of England in industry has been matched by a number of competing industrial countries; infinitely greater and varied fields have been opened in all parts of the world for the investment of superfluous European capitals, so that it is far more distributed, and local overspeculation may be more easily overcome. By means of these things, the old breeding grounds of crises and opportunities for the growth of crises have been eliminated or strongly reduced. At the same time competition in the internal markets recedes before Kartels and trusts, while it is restricted in the international market by protective tariffs, with which all great industrial countries, England excepted, surround themselves. But these protective tariffs are nothing but preparations for the ultimate general industrial war, which shall decide the supremacy on the world market. Thus every element, which works against a repetition of the old crises, carries the germ of a far more tremendous future crisis in itself.—F. E.]

[101.][101] B. A. 1857. Testimony of Twells, banker, 4516. "As a banker, do you deal in capital or in money?"—"We deal in money."—4517. "How are the deposits paid into your bank?"—"In money."—4518. "How are they paid out?"—"In money."—"Might it be said, then, that they are anything else but money?"—"No."

Overstone (see chapter XXVI) tangles himself up continually between "capital" and "money." Value of money signifies with him also interest, in so far as it is determined by the mass of money; value of capital is supposed to be interest, so far as it is determined by the demand for productive capital and the profit made by it. He says, 4140. "The use of the term capital is very dangerous."—4148. "The gold exports from England are a reduction of the quantity of money in the country, and this must naturally cause an increased demand in the money-market in general" [but not in the capital-market, according to this]—4112. "In proportion as money leaves the country its quantity in the country is diminished. This diminution of the quantity remaining in the country creates an increased value of this money" [this signifies originally in his theory an increase in the value of money as money through a contraction of the currency, as compared to the values of commodities; in other words, an increase in the value of money is the same as a fall in the value of commodities. But since meanwhile even he has been convinced beyond peradventure, that the mass of the circulating money does not determine prices, it is now the contraction of money as a medium of circulation, which is supposed to raise its value as interest bearing capital, and thus the rate of interest]. "And this increased value of the still remaining money checks the export and continues, until it has brought back as much money as is necessary to restore the equilibrium."—A continuation of Overstone's contradictions follows later.

[102.][102] At this point the confusion starts in to the effect that both of these things are "money," namely the deposit as a claim to a payment from the banker, and the deposited money in the hands of the banker. Banker Twells, before the Committee on Bank Acts of 1857, takes the following example: "I start in business with 10,000 pounds sterling. With 5000 pounds sterling I buy commodities and place them in my stock. The other 5000 pounds sterling I deposit with some banker, in order to draw upon them as I need them. But I still consider the total as my capital, although 5000 pounds sterling exist in the form of a deposit or money." (4528)—This gives rise to the following nice debate.—4531. "Well, you have given your 5000 pounds sterling in bank notes to somebody else"—"Yes, Sir."—4532. "Then he has 5000 pounds sterling in deposits?"—"Yes, Sir."—4533. "And you have 5000 pounds sterling in deposits?"—"Quite right."—4534. "He has 5000 pounds sterling in money, and you have 5000 pounds sterling in money?"—"Yes, Sir."—4535. "But it is ultimately nothing but money?"—"No, Sir." This confusion is due, partly to the circumstance, that A, who has deposited 5000 pounds sterling, can draw on them and dispose of them as though he still had them. To that extent they serve him as a potential capital. In all cases, in which he draws on them, he destroys his deposit to that extent. If he draws out real money, and his own money has already been loaned to some one else, he is not paid with his own money, but with that of some other depositor. If he pays a debt to B with a check on his banker, and if banker of A has also a check on the banker of B, so that the two bankers merely exchange checks, then the money deposited by A has performed the function of money twice; first, in the hands of him who received the money deposited by A; secondly, in the hands of A himself. In this second function it is a balancing of claims of indebtedness (the claim of A on his banker, and the claim of this banker on the banker of B) without the intervention of money. Here the deposit acts twice as money, namely once as real money, and then as a claim on money. Mere titles to money may take the place of money only by a balancing of claims of indebtedness.

[103.][103] Average number of days, during which a bank note remained in circulation:

Year5 p. Note10 p. Note20-100 p.200-500 p.1000 p.
1798?2362093122
18181481371211813
1846797134128
185670582797

Tabulation made by Marshall, Cashier of the Bank of England, in Report on Bank Acts, 1857, II, Appendix, p. 301-302.

[104.][104] In the general meeting of the stockholders of the Union Bank of London, on January 17, 1894, President Ritchie relates that the Bank of England raised the discount in 1893 from 2½% in July to 3 and 4% in August, and when it lost fully 4½ million pounds sterling in gold in spite of this, it raised the rate of interest to 5%, whereupon gold flowed back to it and the bank rate was reduced to 4% in September and 3% in October. But this bank rate was not recognized in the market. "When the bank rate was 5%, the market rate was 3½% and the rate for money 2½%; when the bank rate fell to 4%, the rate of discount was 2 3/8% and the money rate 1¾%; when the bank rate was 3%, the rate of discount was 1½% and the money rate a trifle lower." (Daily News, January 18, 1894.)—F. E.

[105.][105] Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Berlin, 1859, pages 236 and following.

[106.][106] What effect this had on the money market, is shown by the following testimony of Newmarch: 1509. "Toward the close of 1853 considerable apprehension was felt by the public; in September the Bank of England raised its discount three times in succession...in the first days of October...a considerable degree of anxiety and alarm showed itself among the public. These apprehensions and this restlessness were largely alleviated before the end of November, and were almost wholly removed by the arrival of five millions in precious metal from Australia. The same thing was repeated in the fall of 1854, when almost six millions in precious metals arrived in October and November. And in the fall of 1855, a time of excitement and restlessness, the same thing was repeated on the arrival of about eight millions in precious metals during the months of September, October and November. At the end of 1856 we find the same thing takes place. In short, I could very well appeal to the experience of nearly every member of this committee as to whether we have not become accustomed to see a natural and complete remedy for a financial stringency in the arrival of a gold ship."

[107.][107] According to Newmarch, a drain of gold to foreign countries may arise from three causes: 1) from purely commercial conditions, that is, if the imports have exceeded the exports, as was the case during the time from 1836 to 1844, and again in 1847, principally a heavy import of corn; 2) from a desire to secure the means for the investment of English capital in foreign countries, as in 1857 for railroads in India; and 3) from a necessity of making definite expenditures in foreign countries, as in 1853 and 1854 for purposes of war in the Orient.

[108.][108] 1918. Newmarch. "If you take India and China together, if you take into account the transactions between India and Australia, and the still more important ones between China and the United States, and in these instances the business is a three-cornered one and the equilibration takes place through our intervention...then it is correct that the balance of trade was not only against England, but also against France and the United States."—(B. A., 1857.)

[109.][109] See, for instance, the ridiculous answer of Weguelin, who says that five millions of drained gold is so much capital less, and who attempts to explain in this way certain phenomena, which do not appear when the actual industrial capital is infinitely more raised or depressed in price, expanded or contracted. On the other hand, it is just as ridiculous to attempt to explain these phenomena directly as symptoms of an expansion or contraction of the mass of real capital (that is, the material elements of capital).

[110.][110] Newmarch, B. A., 1857, No. 1364: "The metal reserve in the Bank of England is in fact...the central reserve or the central metal board, on the basis of which the entire business of the country is carried on. It is so to say the cardinal point, around which the entire business of the country has to turn; all other banks in the country consider the Bank of England as the central treasury, or the reservoir, from which they have to draw their reserves of hard cash; and the effect of the foreign rates of exchange falls always precisely upon this treasury and this reservoir."

[111.][111] "Practically, therefore, both Tooke and Loyd would meet an excessive demand for gold by a premature limitation of credits by raising the rate of interest and reducing advances of capital. Only Loyd causes by his illusion inconvenient and even dangerous [legal] limitations and rules." (Economist, 1847, p. 1417.)

[112.][112] "You quite agree that there is no other way to modify the demand for gold than by raising the rate of interest?"—Chapman, associate member of the great bill brokers' firm of Overend Gurney 8 Co.: "That is my opinion. If our gold falls to a certain point, the best we can do is to ring the alarm bell at once an to say: We are on the decline, and whoever sends gold abroad, must do so at his own peril."—B. A. 1857, Evidence No. 5057.

[113.][113] Old style German money, now discarded.—TRANSLATOR.

[114.][114] "It is in consequence of frequent pawning and redeeming within the same month, and of pawning one article in order to redeem another, and of thus obtaining a small difference in money, that the pawnshop interest becomes so excessive. In London there are 240 authorized pawnshop owners, and in the provinces about 1450. The employed capital is estimated at about one million. It is turned over at least three times per year, and every time at an average of 33½%; so that the lower classes of England pay 100% annually for the temporary loan of one million, aside from losses due to lapses of pawned articles." (J. J. Tuckett, A History of the Past and Present State of the Labouring Population. London, 1846, I, p. 114.)

[115.][115] Even in the titles of their works they state as their principal purpose "the general welfare of the landed proprietors, the great appreciation of the value of real estate, the liberation of the nobility and of the gentry, etc., from taxation, the augmentation of their annual income, etc." Only the usurers were to lose, those worst enemies of the nation, who had done more injury to the nobility and yeomanry than an army of invasion from France could have done.

[116.][116] "Charles II. of England, for instance, still had to pay enormous interest of usury and agios to the gold smiths" (the precursors of the bankers), "as much as 20 to 30%." A business so profitable induced "the gold smiths to make more and more loans to the King, to anticipate the entire income on taxes to get a lien on every concession of Parliament in the way of money as soon as it had been made, also to compete against one another in buying up and giving pawn on bills, orders and tallies, so that in reality all incomes of the state passed through their hands." (John Francis, History of the Bank of England, London, 1848, I p. 31.) "The erection of a bank had been suggested several times before that. It was at last a necessity" (L. c., p. 38). "The bank was a necessity for the government itself, sucked dry by usurers, in order to obtain money at a reasonable rate of interest, on the security of parliamentary concessions." (L. c., p. 59 and 60.)

[117.][117] Marx would surely have modified this passage considerably, if he had worked his manuscript over. It was inspired by the role of the ex-Saint-Simonists under the second empire in France, where just at the time when Marx wrote the above the world-redeeming credit-phantasies of this school, by force of history as irony, were being realised in the shape of a swindle of a magnitude never witnessed before. Later Marx spoke only with admiration of the genius and encyclopedic brain of Saint-Simon. The peculiarity of this writer in ignoring the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that was just then coming into existence in France, and of counting that part of the bourgeoisie, which was active in production, among the travailleurs, corresponds to Fourier's conception, who wanted to reconcile capital and labor. This explains itself out of the economic and political conditions of France in those days. The fact that Owen was more farseeing in this respect is due to his different environment, for he lived in a period of industrial revolution and of class antagonism which were becoming acute.—F. E.

[118.][118] Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847.—Karl Marx, Critique of Political Economy, p. 107.