Front Page Titles (by Subject) APPENDIX TO BOOK V. - The Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 2
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APPENDIX TO BOOK V. - Richard Hooker, The Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 2 
The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker with an Account of His Life and Death by Isaac Walton. Arranged by the Rev. John Keble MA. 7th edition revised by the Very Rev. R.W. Church and the Rev. F. Paget (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888). 3 vols. Vol. 2.
Part of: The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker with an Account of His Life and Death by Isaac Walton, 3 vols.
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APPENDIX TO BOOK V.
Fragments of an Answer to the Letter of certain English Protestants1 .
BOOK V. Appendix I [1.][1.]* * * * that God is2 , from whose special grace they proceed. Wherefore cursed3 , I say, be that man which believeth not as the Church of England, that without God’s preventing and helping grace we are nothing at all able to do the works of piety which are acceptable in his sight. But must the will cease to be itself because the grace of God helpeth it? That which confoundeth your understanding in this point is lack of diligent and distinct consideration, what the will of man naturally hath; what it wanteth through sin; and what it receiveth by means of grace. Aptness, freely to take or refuse things set before it, is so essential to the will, that being deprived of this it looseth the nature, and cannot possibly retain the definition, of will: “Voluntas4 , nisi libera sit, non est voluntas.” To actuate at any time the possibility of the will in that which is evil, we need no help, the will being that way over-inclinable of itself:BOOK V. Appendix I. [2.] but to the contrary so indisposed through a native evil habit1 that if God’s special grace did not aid our imbecility, whatsoever we do or imagine would be only and continually evil. So that, except we either give unto man, as the Manichees did, two souls, a good and a bad; or make him in all his resolutions to be carried by fatal necessity; or by some other new invention abrogate all contingency in the effect of man’s will; or deny him by creation to have had the faculties of reason and will; or hold him through sin translated out of the very number of voluntary agents, and changed into some other creature; or to be able to define the power of the will, and not to mingle therein that indifferency before mentioned: how should we separate from Will natural possibility and aptness to shun or follow, to choose or reject, any eligible object whatsoever? You peradventure think aptness and ableness all one: whereas the truth is, that had we kept our first ableness, grace should not need; and had aptness been also lost, it is not grace that could work in us more than it doth in brute creatures. Which distinction Hilary doth well express, saying2 , that even as the body is apt to those operations which yet it exerciseth not unless the help of such causes concur as are required to set it on work; the eyes which are apt to see all things, are unable to behold any, being either dimmed by some accident in themselves, or else compassed with outward darkness; ita et animus humanus, nisi per Fidem donum Spiritûs hauserit, habebit quidem naturam Deum intelligendi, sed lumen scientiæ non habebit. Lib. ii. De Trinit.
[2.]That axiom3 of the providence of God in general, whereby he is said to govern all things amiably according to the several condition and quality of their natures, must needs especially take place in ordering the principal actions whereunto the hand of his grace directeth the souls of men. Prescience, predestination, and grace, impose not that necessity, by force whereof man in doing good hath all freedom of choice taken from him. If prescience did impose any such necessity, seeing prescience is not only of good but of evil, then must we grant that Adam himself could not choose but sin; and that Adam sinned not voluntarily, because that which Adam did ill was foreseen. If predestination did impose such necessity, then was there nothing voluntary in Adam’s well-doing neither, because what Adam did well was predestinated. Or, if grace did impose such necessity, how was it possible that Adam should have done otherwise than well, being so furnished1 as he was with grace? Prescience, as hath been already shewed, extendeth unto all things, but causeth nothing. Predestination appointeth nothing but only that which proceedeth from God, as all goodness doth. Predestination to life, although it be infinitely ancienter than the actual work of creation, doth notwithstanding presuppose the purpose of creation; because, in the order of our consideration and knowledge, it must first have being that shall have happy being. Whatsoever the purpose of creation therefore doth establish, the same by the purpose of predestination may be perfected, but in no case disannulled and taken away. Seeing then that the natural freedom of man’s will was contained in the purpose of creating man, (for this freedom is a part of man’s nature;) grace contained under the purpose of predestinating man may perfect, and doth, but cannot possibly destroy the liberty of man’s will. That which hath wounded and overthrown the liberty, wherein man was created, as able to do good as evil, is only our original sin, which God did not predestinate, but he foresaw it, and predestinated grace to serve as a remedy. So that predestination in us also which are now sinful, doth not imply the bestowing of other natures than creation at the first gave, but the bestowing of gifts, to take away those impediments which are grown into nature through sin. Freedom of operation we have by nature, but the ability of virtuous operation by grace; because through sin our nature hath taken that disease and weakness, whereby of itself it inclineth only unto evil. The natural powers and faculties therefore of man’s mind are through our native corruption so weakened and of themselves so averse from God, that without the influence of his special grace they bring forth nothing in his sight acceptable, no not the blossoms or least buds that tend to the fruit of eternal life. Which powers and faculties notwithstanding retain still their natural manner of operation, although their original perfection be gone, man hath still a reasonable understanding, and a will thereby framable to good things, but is not thereunto now able to frame himself. Therefore God hath ordained grace, to countervail this our imbecility, and to serve as his hand, that thereby we, which cannot move ourselves, may be drawn, but amiably drawn.BOOK V. Appendix I. [3.] If the grace of God did enforce men to goodness, nothing would be more unpleasant unto man than virtue: whereas contrariwise, there is nothing so full of joy and consolation as the conscience of well-doing. It delighteth us, that God hath been so merciful unto us as to draw us unto himself, and ourselves so happy, as not to be obstinately bent to the way of our own destruction. Yet what man should ever approach unto God, if his grace did no otherwise draw our minds than Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians1 imagined? They knew no grace but external only, which grace inviteth, but draweth not: neither are we by inward grace carried up into heaven, the force of reason and will being cast into a dead sleep. Our experience teacheth us, that we never do any thing well, but with deliberate advice and choice, such as painfully setteth the powers of our minds on work: which thing I note in regard of Libertines and Enthusiasts, who err as much on the one hand, by making man little more than a block, as Pelagians on the other, by making him almost a god2 in the work of his own salvation.
[3.]In all such sentences as that which St. John’s Revelation hath, I stand at the door and knock, the Pelagian’s manner of construction, was, that to knock is the free external offer of God’s grace; to open, is the work of natural will by itself, accepting grace and so procuring or deserving whatsoever followeth. But the Catholic exposition of that and all such sentences was, that to stand and knock is indeed a work of outward grace, but to open cometh not from man’s will without the inward illumination of grace; whereupon afterwards ensueth continual augmentation thereof; not because the first concurrence of the will itself with grace, much less without, doth deserve additions after following; but because it is the nature of God’s most bountiful disposition to build forward where his foundation is once laid. The only thing that Catholic Fathers did blame, was the error of them who ascribed any laudable motion or virtuous desire tending towards heavenly things to the naked liberty of man’s will3 , the grace of God being severed from it.
BOOK V. Appendix I. [4, 5.][4.]In a word therefore, the manner of God’s operation through grace is, by making heavenly mysteries plain to the dark understanding of man, and by adding motive efficacy unto that which there presenteth itself as the object of man’s will. Howbeit, many things which the Scripture hath concerning grace will remain obscure, unless we also consider with what proportion it worketh. That which was spoken to the Apostle St. Paul did not belong unto him only, but to every communicant of grace. “My grace,” saith Christ, “is sufficient for thee1 .” Grace, excluding possibility to sin, was neither given unto angels in their first creation, nor to man before his fall; but reserved for both till God be seen face to face in the state of glory, which state shall make it then impossible for us to sin, who now sin often, notwithstanding grace, because the providence of God bestoweth not in this present life grace so nearly illustrating goodness, that the will should have no power to decline from it. Grace is not therefore here given in that measure which taketh away possibility of sinning, and so effectually moveth the will, as that it cannot.
[5.]“Behold,” saith Moses, “I have set before you good and evil, life and death2 .” Now when men are deceived and choose evil instead of good, where shall we say the defect resteth? May we plead in our own defence, that God hath not laid the way of life plain enough to be found, or that good things are so lapped up within clouds, that we have no possible means whereby to discern their goodness? Who seeth not how vain, and unto God himself how injurious, it were, thus to shift off from ourselves the blame of sin3 , and to cast it where it hath no place? We cannot therefore in defence of evil plead obscurity of that which is good.BOOK V. Appendix I. [6.]For there is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough whereby to manifest itself, if reason were diligent to search it out1 . So that our ignorance we must impute to our own slought [sic]: we suffer the gifts of God to rust, and but use our reason as an instrument of iniquity: our wits we bend not towards that which should do us good: yea oftentimes the cause of our error is, for that we study to deceive ourselves. Wisdom is easily seen of them that love her, and found of such as seek after her: she preventeth them, and strives rather to offer herself, than to answer their desires: whoso waketh unto her betimes, shall sustain no tedious labour; whoso watcheth for her, shall be soon without care. Sap. vi. 12.
[6.]Is our reason then by diligence, although unassisted with God’s grace, yet able of itself to find out whatsoever doth concern our good? Some things there are concerning our good, and yet known even amongst them to whom the saving grace of God is not known2 . But no saving knowledge possible, without the sanctifying spirit of God. You will have me tell you which way you should perceive by my writings that thus I think3 : and I fear, that if I shew you the way you will not follow it: read them with the same mind you read Mr. Calvin’s writings, bear yourself as unpartial in the one as in the other: imagine him to speak that which I do: lay aside your unindifferent mind, change but your spectacles, and I assure myself that all will be clearly true: if he make difference, as all men do, which have in them his dexterity of judgment,BOOK V. Appendix I. [7, 8.] between natural and supernatural truth and laws1 , I know that against him you will never thereupon infer, that he holdeth not the grace of God necessary unto the search of both, so far forth as they serve to our soul’s everlasting good.
[7.]To find out supernatural laws, there is no natural way, because they have not their foundation or ground in the course of nature. Such was that law before Adam’s fall, which required abstinence from the tree of knowledge touching good and evil. For by his reason he could not have found out this law, inasmuch as the only commandment of God did make it necessary, and not the necessity thereof procure it to be commanded, as in natural laws it doth. Of like nature are the mysteries of our redemption through the blood of Jesus Christ, which presupposeth the fall of Adam, and was in that respect instituted, nor would ever have been imagined by any wit of man or angel2 , had not God himself revealed the same to both. But concerning such laws and truths as have their ground in the course of nature, and are therefore termed by all men laws of nature, [they?] were necessary for Adam although he had kept, and are for us which have lost, the state of that first perfection, necessary also even in themselves. These truths and laws our first parents were created able perfectly both to have known and kept; which we can now neither fully attain without the grace of God assisting us in the search, nor at all observe availably to our salvation, except in the exercise thereof, both grace do aid, and mercy pardon our manifold imperfections. I cannot help it, good sir, if you in your angry mood will spurn at all these things, and reject them either as subtle, or as frivolous and idle matter. My meaning in them is sincere, and I thought them pertinent: to you it appeareth they seem otherwise: yet, till you be able to prove them erroneous, other defects may be forgiven if it please you: for you must think that yourself in all things cannot write to every man’s contentment, though you write well.
[8.]But in the closing up of all, if it is your pleasure that I should declare, how this discourse may stand with St. Paul’s meaning, where he saith that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, because it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be3 : That which here you call a discourse4 , is but two poor sentences5 ; the one, shewing the nature of will in itself, without consideration had either of sin or of God’s grace;BOOK V. Appendix I. [9.] the other, the evidence of goodness in itself, and the sluggishness of man’s reason to search it out. We have therefore a will, the nature whereof is apt and capable as well to receive the good as the evil; but sin is fraudulent, and beguileth us with evil under the shew of good: sloth breeding carelessness, and our original corruption sloth in the power of reason, which should discern between the one and the other. On the contrary side let precedent grace be a spur to quicken reason, and grace subsequent, the hand to give it; then shall good things appear as they are, and the will, as it ought, incline towards them. The first grace shall put in us good desires, and the second shall bring them to good effect1 . Out of which principles, if I declare the reason of that which the Apostle saith, and shall deduct from thence his words by way of conclusion, your barely objected and no way manifested surmises of contradiction, thereunto will, I hope, give place.
[9.]That which moveth man’s will, is the object or thing desired. That which causeth it to be desired, is either true or apparent goodness: the goodness of things desired is either manifest by sense, gathered by reason, or known by faith. Many things good to the judgment of sense, are in the eye of right reason abhorred as evil, in which case the voice of reason is the voice of God. So that they, who, being destitute of that spirit which should certify and give reason, follow the conduct of sensual direction, termed the wisdom of the flesh, must needs thereby fall into actions of plain hostility against God. Such wisdom neither is, nor can be, subject to his law, because perpetually the one condemneth what the other doth allow, according to that in the Book of Wisdom2 , We fools thought the life of the just madness. Again, as the wisdom of the flesh, man’s corrupt understanding and will not enlightened nor reformed by God’s spirit, is opposite and cannot submit itself unto his law, but followeth the judgment of sensuality, contrary to that which reason might learn by the light of the natural law of God: so in matters above the reach of reason, and beyond the compass of nature, where only faith is to judge by God’s revealed law what is right or good, the wisdom of the flesh, severed and divided from that spirit which converteth man’s heart to the liking of God’s truth, must needs be here as formal adversaries to him, and as far from subjection to his law as before.BOOK V. Appendix I. [10.] Yet in these cases not only the carnal and more brutish sort of men, but the wittiest, the greatest in account for secular and worldly wisdom, Scribes, Philosophers, profound disputers, are the chiefest in opposition against God: such in the primitive Church were Julian, Lucian, Porphyry, Symmachus1 , and other of the like note, by whom both the natural law of God was disobeyed, and the mysteries of supernatural truth derided.
I conclude therefore, the natural aptness of man’s will to take or refuse things presented before it, and the evidence which good things have for themselves, if reason were diligent to search it out, may be soundly and safely taught without contradiction to any syllable in that confession of the Church, or in those sentences of holy Scripture by you alleged, concerning the actual disability of reason and will, through sin, whereas God’s especial grace faileth.
[10.]And lest ignorance what I mean by the name of grace should put into your head some new suspicion, know that I do understand grace so as all the ancient Fathers did in their writings against Pelagius. For whereas the grace of Almighty God2 signifieth either his undeserved love and favour;BOOK V. Appendix I. [11.] or his offered means of outward instruction and doctrine; or thirdly, that grace which worketh inwardly in men’s hearts; the scholars of Pelagius denying original sin did likewise teach at the first, that in all men there is by nature ability to work out their own salvation. And although their profession soon after was, that without the grace of God, men can neither begin, proceed, nor continue in any good thing available unto eternal life, yet it was perceived that by grace they only meant those external incitements unto faith and godliness, which the Law, the Prophets, the Ministers, the works of God do offer; that is to say the second grace, whereby being provoked and stirred up, it is, as they supposed, in our own power to assent to seek after God, and to labour for that, which then in regard of such our willingness, God willingly doth bestow, so that partly holpen by his grace, but principally through the very defect [“desert” or “effect”?] of our own travail we obtain life.
[11.]Touching natural sufficiency without grace, Pelagius generally was withstood, and the necessity of that third kind of grace which moved the heart inwardly, they all maintained against Pelagius. Only in this, there were a number of the French especially, who went not so far, as to think with St. Augustine1 that God would bestow his grace upon any, which did not first procure and obtain it by labour proceeding from that natural ability which yet remaineth in all men. Hilary therefore, informing St. Augustine what the French churches thought thereof, declareth2 their steadfast belief to have been, that in Adam all men were utterly lost, and that to deliver them which never could have risen by their own power the way of obtaining life is offered:BOOK V. Appendix I. [12.]that they which desire health, and believe that they may be cured, do thereby obtain augmentation of faith, and the whole effect of safety. For in that it is said, “believe and live,” the one of these is required at our hands, and the other so offered, that in lieu of our willingness, if we perform what God requireth, that which He offereth is afterwards bestowed. That freedom of will we have so far only, as thereby to be able without grace to accept the medicine which God doth offer. But, saith he, we worthily abhor and condemn them which think that in any man there is remaining any spark of ability to proceed but the least step further than this, to the recovery of health.
[12.]Now although they did well maintain that we cannot finish our salvation without the assistance of inward grace; yet because they held that of ourselves by assenting to grace externally first offered, we may begin and thereby obtain the grace which perfecteth our raw and unsufficient beginnings, the French were herein as Demipelagians by St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and sundry others gainsayed, at length also condemned by the Arausican Council1 , as the Council of Milevis2 had before determined against that first opinion of Pelagius which the French themselves did condemn. So that the whole question of grace being grown amongst the ancient unto this issue, whether man may without God seek God, and without grace either desire or accept grace first offered, the conclusion of the catholic part was No, and therefore in all their writings, the point still urged is grace, both working inwardly, and preventing the very first desires, or motions of man to goodness. Which unless we every where diligently mark, there is no man but may be abused by the words whereby Pelagians and Demipelagians seem to magnify the grace of God, the one meaning only external grace, the other internal, but only to perfect that which our own good desires without grace have begun. The diviner sort of the heathens themselves saw, that their own more eminent perfections in knowledge, wisdom, valour, and other the like qualities, for which sundry of them were had in singular admiration,BOOK V. Appendix I. [13.] did grow from more than the ordinary influence which that supreme cause instilleth into things beneath. No mervaile then in the school of Christ to hear from the mouth of a principal instructor, “not I, but the grace of God which is with me.” Now amongst the heathens, which had no books whereby to know God besides the volumes of heaven and earth, that small vital odor which (as Prosper noteth1 ) breathed upon them to the end they might live, became notwithstanding the odor of death: so that even by those visible testimonies, it might be plainly perceived, how the letter killeth where the Spirit quickeneth not.
But of heathens what should we speak, sith the first grace saveth not the Church itself by virtue of the second without the third. Saving grace is the gift of the Holy Ghost, which lighteneth inwardly the minds, and inflameth inwardly the hearts of men, working in them that knowledge, approbation, and love of things divine, the fruit whereof is eternal life. In grace there is nothing of so great difficulty as to define after what manner and measure it worketh.
Fifth Article2 .[13.]Thus of the three kinds of grace; the grace whereby God doth incline towards man, the grace of outward instruction, and the grace of inward sanctification, which two work man’s inclination towards God, as the first is the well-spring of all good, and the second the instrument thereof to our good, so that which giveth effect to both in us, who have no cause at all to think ourselves worthy of either, is the gracious and blessed gift of his Holy Spirit. This is that baptism with heavenly fire, which both illuminateth and enflameth. This worketh in man that knowledge of God, and that love unto things divine, whereupon our eternal felicity ensueth. This is the grace which God3 hath given to restrain insatiable desires, to beat down those lusts, which can in no sort moderate themselves, to quench lawless fervours, to vanquish headstrong and unruly appetites, to cut off excess, to withstand avarice, to avoid riot, to join love, to strengthen the bonds of mutual affection, to banish sects, to make manifest the rule of truth, to silence heretics, to disgorge miscreants, and inviolably to observe the Gospel of Jesus Christ. “This grace” (saith Hilary1 ) “remaineth with us till the world’s end, it is the stay of our expectation, the things that are done by the gifts thereof are a pledge of our hope to come. This grace therefore we must desire, procure, and for ever entertain, with belief and observation of God’s laws.” For let the Spirit be never so prompt, if labour and exercise slacken, we fail. The fruits of the Spirit do not follow men, as the shadow doth the body, of their own accord. If the grace of sanctification did so work, what should the grace of exhortation need? It were even as superfluous and vain to stir men up unto good, as to request them when they walk abroad not to lose their shadows. Grace is not given us to abandon labour, but labour required lest our sluggishness should make the grace of God unprofitable. Shall we betake ourselves to our ease, and in that sort refer salvation to God’s grace, as if we had nothing to do with it, because without it we can do nothing? Pelagius urged labour for the attainment of eternal life without necessity of God’s grace: if we teach grace without necessity of man’s labour, we use one error as a nail to drive out another. David, to shew that grace is needful, maketh his prayer unto God, saying, “2 Set thou, O Lord, a watch before the door of my lips:” and to teach how needful our travail is to that end, he elsewhere useth exhortation, “3 Refrain thou thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile.” Solomon respecting the use of our labour giveth counsel, “4 Keep thy heart with all the custody and care that may be.” The Apostle, having an eye unto necessity of grace, prayeth, “5 The Lord keep your hearts and understandings in Christ Jesus.”
Διὸ καὶ τὸν εἰκαι̑ον τω̑ν πολλω̑ν: οὐκ ἀποδεξόμεθα λόγον, οἲ χρη̑ναί ϕασι τὴν πρόνοιαν καὶ ἀκόντας ἡμα̑ς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἄγειν, τὸ γὰρ ϕθει̑ραι ϕὐσιν οἰκ ἔστι προνοίας· ὅθεν,BOOK V. Appendix I. [14.] ὡς πρόνοια τη̑ς ἑκάστου ϕύσεως σωστικὴ, τω̑ν αὐτοκινήτων ὡς αὐτοκινήτων προνοει̑, καὶ τω̑ν ὅλων καὶ τω̑ν καθ’ ἕκαστον οἰκείως ὅλῳ καὶ ἑκάστῳ, καθ’ ὅσον ἡ τω̑ν προνοουμένων ϕύσις ἐπιδέχεται τὰς τη̑ς ὅλης καὶ παντοδαπη̑ς προνοίας ἐκδιδομένας ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ προνοητικὰς ἀγαθότητας. Dionys. pag. 338. De Div. Nomin. c. iv. § 33. [Paris. 1562.]
In sum, the grace of God hath abundantly sufficient for all. We are by it that we are, and at the length by it we shall be that we would. What we have, and what we shall have, is the fruit of his goodness, and not a thing which we can claim by right or title of our own worth. All that we can do to him cometh far behind the sum of that we owe; all we have from him is mere bounty. And seeing all that we of ourselves can do, is not only nothing, but naught; let him alone have the glory, by whose only grace, we have our whole ability and power of well-doing.
Natura et Numerus Sacramentorum.
[14.]A Sacrament is generally in true religion every admirable thing which divine authority hath taught God’s Church, either to believe or observe, as comprehending somewhat not otherwise understood than by faith: only1 in a word Sacraments are God’s secrets, discovered to none but his own people. The name being used for the most part with the 2 ancient thus at large, doth notwithstanding with some restraint of signification oftentimes in their writings likewise note those visible signs only which in the exercise of religion God requireth every man to receive, as tokens of that saving grace which himself thereby bestoweth.BOOK V. Appendix I. [15.] It is therefore required to the nature of a sacrament in this sense, First, that it be a perpetual duty in religion; and of a Christian Sacrament, that it be proper to Christian Religion: Secondly, that Christ be author thereof: Thirdly, that all men be bound to receive it: Fourthly, that it have a promise from God for the effect of some saving grace to be thereby wrought in the person of the receiver: Fifthly, that there be in it a visible sign, both betokening the grace wrought, and the death of our Saviour Christ, to us the fountain of all grace: Lastly, that all these things concerning it be apparent in holy Scripture, because they are supernatural truths which cannot otherwise be demonstrated.
[15.]True definitions are gathered by that which men consider in things particular; a man defined by that which is seen to be in all men, together with that which only men, and no other have in them. Wherefore because in Baptism and in the Eucharist only, as much as hath been before declared is most manifest, what should forbid us to make the name of a Sacrament, as St. Augustine1 doth, by way of special excellency proper and peculiar to these two, when2 the Fathers note the paucity of3Christian in comparison of Jewish Sacraments, when they teach that our4Sacraments have flowed out of the side of Christ, from whence only water and blood issued, which are resembled and represented, the one in Baptism, the other in the Supper of our Lord, it should seem by this they confined their opinion touching the number of holy sacraments, with stricter limits sometime than the Church of Rome liketh. Which therefore hath broken down those narrow pales, and made the territory of Sacraments more ample by extending the same to divers exercises moe, wherein it is not possible to prove, either that force or that necessity which in the other two is evident of itself.BOOK V. Appendix I. [16.] Yet would we not stand with them about the use of words howsoever, were it not, that by labouring to bring all unto one measure, they attribute to divers rites and ceremonies surely more than the truth can bear, by means whereof there are brought into Christian faith many intricate strifes and questions wherewith the better days of the Church were never troubled. For having made so many sacraments, it is strange to see how extremely they toil, and what pains they take, to frame every supposed Sacrament unto the general rules, which they give concerning all: wherein their dexterity and edge of wit is many times exceeding fine, but in this argument still accompanied with this error, that they speak without book, they tie not their understanding to that which they evidently learn from God, but what he delivereth in terms, framable unto different expositions, they so construe as themselves list, they wrest antiquity to the bolstering of their own construction and sentence, what things their wits can imagine possible, and draw out any thing wherewith to colour them, the same they stiffly maintain as true: they urge them as doctrines of Christian belief; if any of their own vary from them, they [have?] plaisters in a readiness to salve the matter; but for us to make question or doubt thereof, is always held a damnable heresy. Such is their partial affection, even in matters of faith, where nothing but the fear of God and conscience ought to sway.
Virtus Sacramenti et Dei Gratia.[16.]Touching Sacraments, whether many or few in number, their doctrine is, that ours both signify and cause grace: but what grace, and in what manner? By grace we always understand, as the word of God teacheth, first, his favour and undeserved mercy towards us: secondly, the bestowing of his Holy Spirit which inwardly worketh: thirdly, the effects of that Spirit whatsoever, but especially saving virtues, such as are faith, charity, and hope; lastly, the free and full remission of all our sins. This is the grace which Sacraments yield, and whereby we are all justified. To be justified, is to be made righteous. Because therefore, righteousness doth imply first remission of sins; and secondly a sanctified life, the name is sometime applied severally to the former, sometimes jointly it comprehendeth both. The general cause which hath procured our remission of sins is the blood of Christ, therefore in his blood we are justified, that is to say cleared and acquitted from all sin. The condition required in us for our personal qualification hereunto is faith. Sin, both original and actual, committed before belief in the promise of salvation through Jesus Christ, is through the mere mercy of God taken away from them which believe, justified they are, and that not in reward of their good, but through the pardon of their evil works.BOOK V. Appendix I. [17.] For albeit they have disobeyed God, yet our Saviour’s death and obedience performed in their behalf doth redound to them, by believing it they make the benefit thereof to become their own. So that this only thing is imputed unto them for righteousness, because to remission of sins there is nothing else required. Remission of sins is grace, because it is God’s own free gift; faith, which qualifieth our minds to receive it is also grace, because it is an effect of his gracious Spirit in us; we are therefore justified by faith without works, by grace without merit. Neither is it, as Bellarmine1 imagineth, a thing impossible, that we should attribute any justifying grace to Sacraments, except we first renounce the doctrine of justification by faith only. To the imputation of Christ’s death for remission of sins, we teach faith alone necessary: wherein it is not our meaning, to separate thereby faith from any other quality or duty, which God requireth to be matched therewith, but from faith to seclude in justification the fellowship of worth through precedent works as the Apostle St. Paul doth.
For in Children God exacteth but baptism unto remission of sin: in converts from infidelity, both faith and penitency before baptism: and for remission of sins actual after baptism, penitency in all men as well as faith. Nor doth any faith justify, but that wherewith there is joined both hope and love. Yet justified we are by faith alone, because there is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither martyr nor saint, no man whose works in whole or in part clear can make him righteous in God’s sight. Now between the grace of this first justification, and the glory of the world to come, whereof we are not capable, unless the rest of our lives be qualified with the righteousness of a second justification consisting in good works, therefore as St. Paul doth dispute for faith without works to the first, so St. James to the second justification is urgent for works with faith. To be justified so far as remission of sins, it sufficeth if we believe what another hath wrought for us: but whosoever will see God face to face, let him shew his faith by his works, demonstrate his first justification by a second as Abraham did: for in this verse Abraham was justified (that is to say, his life was sanctified) by works.
[17.]The Schoolmen which follow Thomas, do not only comprise in the name of justifying grace, the favour of God, his Spirit and [an?] effect of that favour,BOOK V. Appendix I. [18.] and saving virtues the effects of his Spirit, but over and besides these three a fourth kind of formal habit or inherent quality which maketh the person of man acceptable, perfecteth the substance of his mind, and causeth the virtuous actions thereof to be meritorious. This grace they will have to be the principal effects of Sacraments, a grace which neither Christ nor any Apostle of Christ did ever mention. The Fathers have it not in their writings, although they often speak of Sacraments and of the grace we receive by them. Yea they which have found it out are as doubtful as any other what name and nature they should give unto it: besides inasmuch as whatsoever doth belong to our spiritual perfection on earth, the same is complete in that grace which was first mentioned; their new scholastical invention must needs be vain and unnecessary. Let it therefore suffice us to receive Sacraments as sure pledges of God’s favour, signs infallible, that the hand of his saving mercy doth thereby reach forth itself towards us, sending the influence of his Spirit into men’s hearts, which maketh them like to a rich soil, fertile with all kind of heavenly virtues, purgeth, justifieth, restoreth the very dead unto life, yea raiseth even from the bottomless pit to place in thrones of everlasting joy.
Modus quo Sacramenta conferunt Gratiam.[18.]They pretend that to Sacraments we ascribe no efficacy, but make them bare signs of instruction or admonition; which is utterly false. For Sacraments with us are signs effectual: they are the instruments of God, whereby to bestow grace; howbeit grace not proceeding from the visible sign, but from his invisible power. “God by Sacraments giveth grace:” (saith Bernard1 :) “even as honors and dignities are given, an Abbot made by receiving a staff, a Doctor by a book, a Bishop by a ring;” because he that giveth these preeminences declareth by such signs his meaning, nor doth the receiver take the same, but with effect; for which cause he is said to have the one by the other: albeit that which is bestowed proceed wholly from the will of the giver, and not from the efficacy of the sign.
They, to derive grace in Sacraments from the very sign itself as a true coefficient with God, are so wrapped about with clouds and mists of darkness, that neither other men’s wits can follow, nor theirs lead to any manifest and plain issue. It was offensive to the elder Schoolmen1 that the Master of Sentences defined2Sacraments of the new law, to be signs which cause grace. Thomas, in defence of the Master, declared after what sort they are causes of grace, namely by producing a preparative quality in the soul, but what quality he could not tell, only his opinion was, that something doth ensue from God himself, creating the same. Which sentence of Thomas very few have allowed, but they are neither few, nor meanly accounted of, that have oppugned him in that point. Wherefore even they which at this present pretend his name, are yet of another mind than he was concerning Sacraments: inasmuch as they hold the very elements and words for causes which immediately produce grace by being moved with the hand of God till an effect infinite degrees above them in excellency proceed from them. The motion of God is, as they themselves expound it, an application of the sign together with the charge and commandment given it, to convey an intimation of his will to the soul, which presently thereupon conceiveth and bringeth forth grace, through that obedience which all creatures yield to God’s word, when they once hear it. An explication more obscure than the thing itself which they would explain; and all because they affect metaphors, where nothing but exact propriety of speech can plainly instruct.
“Aqua in Baptismo ut applicata et mota a Deo per ministrum, non solum lotionem corporis attingit, sed etiam ipsam ablutionem animæ et gratiæ productionem . . . . In quo non partem operatur Deus, et aliam partem sacramentum, sed ut fit in actionibus naturalibus, ut quando sol et homo generant hominem totum hoc et totum ille uno atque individuo opere peragunt . . . Aqua a Spiritu Sancto mota habet eandem potentiam quam ipse Spiritus Sanctus, respectu animarum nostrarum.” Allen: de Sacram. in gen. cap. 35. “Sacramenta sunt causæ efficientes, etiam physicæ, sed instrumentales; virtus autem divinitus indita non est aliqua nova qualitas inhærens, sed solum motus sive usus Dei . . . . Motio illa qua Deus movet sacramenta, est sola applicatio sacramenti ad opus . . . Educitur autem gratia de potentia animæ non naturali, sed obedientiali . . . qua potest in ea fieri et ex ea produci quicquid Deus vult.” Bellarm. de Sacram. in gen. lib. ii. cap. 11. (in substance.) [De Controv. t. iii. p. 180 C. D. 182 D. 183 C.] “Virtus Sacramentorum non est aliud quam usus seu motus quo per ministrum recte et ex institutione divina fungentem suo munere adhibentur et usurpantur a Deo principali agente ad producendum illum effectum qui est gratia.”BOOK V. Appendix I. [19.] Greg. de Valent. in 3 part. Thom. disp. 3. de Sacram. in gen. qu. 3. puncto 1. [t. iv. p. 507 C. Venet. 1600.] “Sacramentum comproducit gratiam quia intimat imperium Dei . . . Huic enim instrumento, vicem Dei tenenti, et denuntianti imperium efficax Dei, obedit subjecta creatura ut transmutetur, sicut Pro-Regi obediunt cives tanquam ipsi Regi . . . Imperium Dei, quod per scriptum aut instrumentum assumptum intimat, est simul causa physica et efficax. Omnis enim creatura etiam inanimata censetur audire et sentire imperium Dei . . . Sic in creatione Deus per imperium produxit res, in Evangelio imperavit Christus ventis ac mari . . . Atque ita Baptismum comproducere gratiam nihil aliud videtur, quam gratiam educi de potentia hominis obedientis imperio Baptismi.” Henric. Summ. lib. i. cap. 17. [p. 43, 44. Ven. 1596.] Were they not as good to say briefly that God’s omnipotent will causeth grace, that the outward sign doth shew his will, and that Sacraments implying both are thereby termed both signs and causes, which is the selfsame that we say? Their motions and intimations to make signs in themselves seem causes do amount to no more in very deed than that they are signs. And as we understand not how, so neither can they express in what manner they should be more.
The Tenth Article1touching Predestination.
[19.]To make up your first decade of Articles, you cast yourself headlong into a gulf of bottomless depth, God’s unsearchable purpose, his eternal predestination and will; moved as you pretend thereunto by words of mine concerning a general inclination in God towards all men’s safety, and yet an occasioned determination of the contrary to some men’s everlasting perdition and woe. Wherein how strange your proceedings are, I willingly forbear to lay open before you, till it be first made manifest touching man’s eternal condition of life and death not only that there is in the will of God that very difference which you in no wise can digest, but further also how the same distinction doth as a ground sustain and pass as a strong principle throughout all the parts of that doctrine, which delivereth rightly the predestination of Saints: whereinto because you compel me to enter, I may not in a cause of so great moment spare any requisite labour and pain: but, God’s most gracious Spirit assisting me, declare to the uttermost of my slender and poor skill what I think is true.
To begin therefore with that foundation which must here be laid, forasmuch as the nature of the matter in question is contingent, neither can be understood as it ought unless we foreconceive the difference between things contingent, and such as come necessarily to pass;BOOK V. Appendix I. [20.] let it be first of all considered what the truth is in this point.
I. The difference between things contingent and necessary.[20.]We have not for the course of this world any one more infallible rule, than that besides the highest cause wherein all dependeth, there are inferior causes, from which, since the first creation, all things (miraculous events excepted) have had their being. The nature of which inferior causes is exprest in the nature of their effects: for if the cause be uniform and constant in operation, the effects of that cause are found always like themselves: if it be variable, they alter and change. And by this we are led to distinguish things necessary from contingent, respecting how diversly they issue from their true immediate peculiar and proper causes1 .
Of which causes we have perfect sensible experience, we know and see in what sort they work; and we are thereby out of doubt that all things come not necessarily to pass, but those effects are necessary which can be no other than they are, by reason that their next and nearest causes have but one only way of working; from which as it is not in their power to swerve, so they are not subject to any impediment by opposition, nor unto change by addition of any thing which may befall them more at one time than at another, nor to defect by losing any such habilitie or complement as serveth to further them in that they do.
On the other side, those contingent, which in regard of the very principal inferior causes whereupon they depend, are not always certain; inasmuch as the causes whereof they come, may divers ways vary in their operation. Things aptest to suffer are always least certain in that they do. Again, whatsoever hath any thing contrary unto itself, the same, when it meeteth therewith, is evermore subject to suffering, and so in doing consequently hindered. For the more subject that causes are to impediment or let, the further their effects are off from the nature of things necessary. And apparent it is, that some things do bring forth perpetually the same effects; whereby it appeareth they are never hindered; some things, the same effects commonly, yet not always.BOOK V. Appendix I. [21, 22.] Some things do that at one time or other, which they never or very seldom do again: some things at all times are equally uncertain what their issue or event will be till they come to pass. In which variety of contingents, that which altereth not often differeth but little from that which possibly cannot alter. The greatest part of things in this world have a mixture of causes necessary with contingent; so that where both kinds concur unto any one effect, the effect doth follow the weaker side and is contingent; inasmuch as the nature of every effect is according to the nature of those causes totally presupposed which do give it being; and therefore if the causes be in part contingent, the effect through their uncertainty is likewise made doubtful. Whereupon some, considering how far this mixed contingency of causes reacheth, have imagined all things in the world to be casual: others on the contrary part, because they evidently see how unvariable and uniform the principal causes of all things are, deny that any thing is subject to such indefinite contingency as we imagine. But most manifest it is, that some causes, in regard of those effects which follow from them, have δύναμιν ἀντιϕάσεως, a possibility to produce or not produce the same. And whatsoever doth in that sort issue from any cause, it is in relation thereunto contingent. So that contingency and necessity of events do import a different kind or manner of operation in the causes out of which they spring.
[21.]The motion of the sun is a necessary effect of the sun, because it is not in the power and possibility of the sun to move or not to move. But the walking of Socrates is a thing which either might be, or not, therefore this effect is contingent. In like manner, for living creatures to be endued with sense, and for men to have the faculty of reason, is necessary; it is a thing which proceedeth originally from that disposition of causes in the bosom of nature, which disposition changeth not: and therefore it no where falleth out that we find a living creature without sense, or a man, and the faculty of reason wanting. Contrariwise, to be learned or virtuous, because some men have attained and not all, it appeareth that these two qualities in man proceed from no natural or necessary cause, they are contingent, and do happen only. Things necessary have definite and set causes; whereas the causes of things contingent are indefinite. The future effects of causes contingent are only τὰ μέλλοντα, things not present, and such as either may be, or not till the time that they come to pass: but of necessary causes the future effects are τὰ ἐσομένα, such as must be.
[22.]To be, and not to be, are terms of contradiction which never fall together into one and the same thing: but where the one of them taketh place, the other utterly is excluded.BOOK V. Appendix I. [22.] Things no way subject to not being are therefore necessary; and things altogether uncapable of being are impossible: contingent those things which sith they may as well be, as not be, are consequently neither necessary nor impossible, of an indifferent constitution between both: for during the time while as yet they are not, it is but possible that they shall be; when once they are, their not being is then impossible. It being therefore presupposed that things which before were but possible, are now actually fallen out, they are by virtue of this supposal become necessary, as far as concerneth the bare and naked act of their being, which is irrevocable, howsoever the manner of their efficiency were contingent, and such as might have before been hindered from taking effect. So that apparently we see how those things which only are possible beforehand, and only casual at the time when they come to pass, do for the time forward so long as they shall endure, continue necessary, not absolutely necessary, yet necessary by virtue of this supposal, that they have attained actual being. For where the one term of contradiction taketh place, that there the other should take place at the same time, is a thing impossible. The being therefore of all things that actually are is necessary, because then of their not being there is no possibility; unless we should grant that one and the same thing may together be and not be. Whereupon it followeth, that when contingents are said to have δύναμιν ἀντιϕάσεως, a possibility unto either term of contradiction, this only is true while they yet remain in that indefinite power of causes out of which they may either grow or not grow. Again, it followeth that to things casual two properties are incident; the one, that while as yet they are future, no wit of man can either determinately affirm or deny they shall be: the other, that being made once actual, they are then so necessary, that God himself cannot possibly cause them not to have been. And it thirdly followeth, that whereas contingency is especially considered between effects and efficient causes; which causes efficient are either natural or voluntary agents: natural, if in them there be no power to stay or refrain their own actions; voluntary, if they be lords and masters of that they do: the effects of the one are contingent only by means of external concurrents with them, not in all times and places alike: the effects of the other, both that way contingent, and also in regard of the very perfection which is incident into the nature of those agents, and implieth as it were a kind of authority and power to take which part itself listeth in a contradiction, and of two opposite effects, to give being unto either. Wherefore not only to our seemings, (as some men of great understanding and knowledge have imagined,) but even according to truth itself, and by the plain different efficacy of those causes, whereby things are really brought to pass, we may conclude, that some are by natural constitution necessary, and must needs fall out, (the course of nature being presupposed,) as fire cannot but consume the stubble thrown into it, except God’s omnipotent power overrule the course of nature: some things contrariwise are casual or contingent; contingent I say in their own nature, and not so judged only by us through ignorance of the manner how their causes work. Things contingent are certain as touching the circumstance of time when, and place where, they have once their being. But in respect of the cause which produceth them, they have no certainty. So that although we be not of any thing more sure, than that he doth walk, whom we presently behold walking: yet if we refer this effect to the cause out of which it groweth, that is to say, to the will of him which moveth himself, there is not any thing less necessary. For if nothing change more easily than in such cases the will of man, by reason of the manifold incitements and stays whereto it is subject; is it not plain that of all effects in a manner the most contingent are our own particular actions: and yet of the will of man itself, there are some operations necessary, as we see, in that all men without exception desire happiness; some for the most part so constant, that easily they alter not, as appeareth by things done through a settled virtuous or vicious habit of the mind; some altogether doubtful and either way indifferent, as the voluntary motions which grow from outward occasions happening unawares. This is it which maketh counsels and deliberations intricate. For which cause, in matter of consultation, we account them wisest, to whom through experience, the most approved principles of action are so familiarly known, and by particular notice the matter whereof they deliberate so throughly seen into, that having considered both the one and the other, they are able to forecast the surest effects that causes subject to so great variety will in likelihood of reason bring forth. It is therefore the doubtfulness of things contingent that sharpeneth man’s industry to seek out the likeliest means of bringing them to good effect, and the providence of God which giveth success thereunto, as he in his wisdom seeth meet. But the events of this world, though we all behold alike, yet touching the manner how they come to pass, all are not of one mind; but some impute whatsoever happeneth to irresistible destiny; others avoiding this, have imagined every thing left to the loose uncertainty of fortune and chance.BOOK V. Appendix I. [23.] Between which two extremities of error, the only true mean is that doctrine of divine providence.
II. That God’s eternal and infallible foresight of all things maketh not all things to be of necessity.[23.]In things ordered by this providence, it is especially to be considered, that the foreknowledge which he hath of all things1 , (for his eternal prescience is as a large volume wherein they are all exactly registered,) doth not make all things to be of necessity; although, forasmuch as in God himself there can be no error, it must needs be that every thing will come to pass, which he foreseeth as really future, whether it be necessary or contingent.
When things are necessary according to their own natural constitution; as a good tree must needs bring forth good fruit, and of necessity every tree fruit according to his kind; this, for distinction’s sake, we call a real necessity. On the other side, when God foretelleth, or foreseeth any future thing, it followeth of necessity, that so it shall be, because otherwise God were deceived. And yet, that which is so foreseen may haply be in itself a thing casual; as the treason of Judas, the fall of Peter, and such like events, which when Christ had foreshewed, could not in truth or reason choose but accordingly follow. This necessity is not real, because the things brought to pass be contingent. We term it therefore a necessity in reason, because it followeth only by way of necessary sequel from a presupposal of God’s foresight. He seeth it will be, ergo it shall be. His prescience then doth not take away casualties, nor make all things in the world subject to inevitable necessity; but such he foreseeth them as they are of their own natures when they come to pass. Whensoever we find therefore in Scripture divine predictions, the declarations of God’s foreknowledge alleged, whether it be before they take effect, or after, this is perpetually true in them all, they are alleged as arguments, proofs, and testimonies, only, that so it would be, but never as causes imposing a real necessity on that which is foreshewed. Prescience, as prescience, hath in itself no causing efficacy. Again, what the book of God’s knowledge doth comprehend, the same both wholly in one sum and every part thereof distinctly lieth at all times alike open in his sight2 ; which notwithstanding is no let, but that those things which he by his knowledge together beholdeth, we may rightly and truly distinguish, that we may consider them by order, one going before another as their mutual dependency and coherence requireth.BOOK V. Appendix I. [24.]
Of God’s will touching all things that are; of his will to create and govern the world, not considered as being evil, and of the first beginning of evil in the world.[24.]For as the eye of divine knowledge readeth all things which are written in that book, so the hand of his will subscribeth unto all things which are effected, though not unto all things after one and the same manner. There are which think, that whereas knowledge is either an apprehension of things themselves already being, or else a foresight of them when as yet they are not brought forth; this latter kind of knowledge doth ever presuppose in God a definite ordination and appointment of every thing which cometh to pass in the world. So that the reason which they give why he knoweth all things, is, because he appointeth how all things both great and small shall happen, from the motion of the highest orb of heaven, to the least mote in the sun, or spark which the fire casteth. Others grant, that there is not indeed the least casualty which can fall out till the world’s end unto him unknown. But the cause which they render, why God cannot in things casual and contingent be deceived, is not always the certainty of his own appointment, but his eminent and incomprehensible kind of knowledge, his deep insight into all things, inasmuch as he perfectly understandeth, not only what they are, or what they shall be, but also whatsoever would grow from them through copulation and concurrence, with all the circumstances which moe than ten thousand such worlds can yield. One small experiment whereof there is in the history of David1 ; which one may serve for example sake instead of many; David being in Keilah, and hearing that Saul’s purpose was to surprise the city, asked counsel of the mouth of the Lord, Will Saul come down as thy servant hath heard? and the Lord said, He will come down: Then said David, Will the lords of Keilah deliver me up and the men that are with me into Saul’s hand? And the Lord said, They will deliver thee up. David, by his speedy departure thence, stayed both these events, though God foresaw and foretold both, as indeed both would have come to pass if his removal had not defeated the bent of their secret dispositions. But by this it 1 appeareth, that the foresight which God hath of all things proveth not his foreappointment of all things which are foreseen; because he foreseeth as well what might be and is not, as what is or shall be. All reasonable creatures know, and can foresignify what themselves appoint to do. But his peculiar honour is, to see beforehand infallibly every thing that may come to pass, yea although it never do; and therefore much more, every circumstance of all things which indeed fall out, whether himself be author of them, and have ordained them to be, or no.BOOK V. Appendix I. [25.] Wherefore, as all men of knowledge grant, that God is himself no author of sin; so no man will deny, but that God is able to foresee and foretell what sin, as what righteousness either may be, or will be in men1 , and that consequently there are many things in his sight certain to be brought to pass, which himself did never foreordain. And yet we must of necessity grant that there could be no evil committed, if his will did appoint or determine that none should be.
[25.]We are therefore to note certain special differences in God’s will. God being of infinite goodness by nature, delighteth only in good things: neither is it possible that God should alter in himself this desire, because that without it he were not himself. But from this natural inclination of his will, unless it be some way or other determined, there cometh no certain particular effect. Wherefore, as God hath a natural bent only, and infinitely, unto good; and hath likewise a natural power to effect whatsoever himself willeth: so there is in God an incomprehensible wisdom, according to the reasonable disposition whereof his natural or general will restraineth itself as touching particular effects. So that God doth determine of nothing that it shall come to pass, otherwise than only in such manner as the law of his own wisdom hath set down within itself. Many things proceed from the will of God, the reasons whereof are oftentimes to us unknown. But unpossible it is that God should will any thing unjust, or unreasonable, any thing against those very rules whereby himself hath taught us to judge what equity requireth: for out of all peradventure there are no antinomies with God. The laws of action which he teacheth us, and the laws which his own wisdom chooseth to follow, are not the one repugnant to the other. The concealed causes of his secret intents overthrow not the principles which Nature or Scripture, the true interpreters of his wisdom, have disclosed to the whole world: and by virtue whereof, to our great contentment of mind, yea to his everlasting praise and glory, we are able in many things to yield abundantly sufficient reason for the works of God, why and how it is most just which God willeth. In those things therefore, the reasonable coherence whereof with the will of Almighty God we are not able to comprehend, we must with learned ignorance admire; and not, with an ignorant pride of wit, censure, judge, or control God, who is, as 2 Tertullian by very fit comparison inferreth, even best then when we least see how, and just to the level of his own reason, when the reach of ours cometh most short.BOOK V. Appendix I. [26.] So that in all things our duty is with meekness to submit ourselves, and humbly to adore that wisdom, the depth whereof forasmuch as we cannot sound, what are we that we should presume to call him to account of his purposes, by way of contre-plea or opposition1 ?
[26.]The determinations of the will of God are most free, and his will most freely determining itself ere ever any thing was, giveth being unto all things that are. His determinate will affirmatively considered, as granting passage to that which wisdom seeth meet, is either positive, or but permissive2 . He willeth positively whatsoever himself worketh; He willeth by permission that which his creatures do: He only assisting the natural powers which are given them to work withal, and not hindering or barring the effects which grow from them. Whereunto we may add that negative or privative will also, whereby he withholdeth his graces from some, and so is said to cast them asleep whom he maketh not vigilant3 ; to harden them whom he softeneth not; and to take away that, which it pleaseth him not to bestow.
But above all things, we are to note what God willeth simply of his own voluntary inclination, and what by occasion of something precedent, without the which there would be in God no such will. That which he willeth determinately of his own accord, is not only to himself always good, but in such sort good that he chooseth it, maketh it his end, taking pleasure and delight in it, as being utterly without hurt. That which he willeth by occasion, is also to his own good. For how should God will hurt to himself? Yet so far is this inferior to the other, that because it is joined with harm to a part of his noblest creatures, it cometh in that respect from the will of God as it were with a kind of unwillingness.
In all this God determineth nothing which tendeth so to his own glory, but that it also maketh for the good of the works of his hands, especially the good of reasonable creatures either severally considered, or else jointly as in one body. God doth not so much as permit that evil which he some way or other determineth not to convert even to their good, as well as unto his own glory. He turneth to good that which was never by himself intended nor desired.BOOK V. Appendix I. [27.] It is not therefore said of Judas simply, It had been good had he never been; but it had been good for that man if he never had been. And in what kind soever it be, the will of God’s absolute determination is always fulfilled1 .
The creation and [governance2 ] of the world not yet considered as being evil. And touching the first beginning of evil in the world.[27.]Wherefore to come to the operations of [or?] effects of God’s will, because his eternal and incomprehensible being is so all-sufficient, as nothing could move him to work, but only that natural desire which his goodness hath to shew and impart itself, so the wisest of the very heathens themselves, which have acknowledged that he made the world, know that no other reason thereof can be yielded but this, his mere goodness, which is likewise the cause, why it cannot be, but that the world which he hath created, he should love so far forth, as it is the workmanship of his hands.
Seeing then that good is before evil, both in dignity and in nature (for we cannot without good define and conceive what evil is); and of good things that come to pass by the will of God, the first is the end which his will proposeth, and that end is to exercise his goodness of his own nature, by producing effects wherein the riches of the glory thereof may appear: forasmuch as all other effects are grounded upon the first existence or being of that which reviveth [receiveth?] them: the first determination of God for the attainment of his end, must needs be creation, and the next unto it governance. For that he which created should govern, and that he which made should guide, seemeth reasonable in all men’s eyes. Whereupon we come to observe in God two habilities or powers; his power to create, and his power to rule: in regard of the one, we term him our God, in respect of the other, our Lord and King. As God, Creator or Father of all, he hath no will but only to be gracious, beneficial, and bountiful. As Lord, both mercy and wrath come from him: mercy of his own accord, and wrath by occasion offered: but his providence, the root of both, is over all. All things have their beginning from him, by him their continuance, and in him their end. In power he ordereth them, but yet with gentleness: mightily, but yet in amiable manner3 . So that under him they feel no unpleasant constraint: framed they are to his inclination without violence to their own4 : such is the course of his heavenly regiment, such his wisdom to overrule forcibly without force.BOOK V. Appendix I. [28.] The providence of God is both general over the kinds of things, and such also as extendeth unto all particulars in each kind.
Of things created, the noblest and most resembling God are creatures endued with the admirable gift of understanding. St. Augustine1 comparing the first matter whereof all things are made with these last and worthiest works of God’s hands, saith of the one, it is little above the degree of nothing; the other, little inferior to God the creator of all. If God, then, clothe the lilies of the field, and provideth food for the birds of the air, should we think that his providence hath not always an especial care, as well of each particular man, as of mankind, and that for our greatest good every way, unless some great thing occasion the contrary? the work of creation itself therefore, and the government of all things simply according to the state wherein they were made, must be distinguished from that which sin, arising afterwards, addeth unto the government of God, lest we run into their error, who blinde [blend?] even with God’s very purpose of creation, a reference to eternal condemnation and death.
[28.]Concerning his intended work of creation and government simply in itself considered, by the effects which are seen it may in part be understood what his secret purposes were, and that amongst sundry other more hidden determinations which were in God, these for example’s sake are manifest, amiably to order all things, and suitably with the kinds, degrees, and qualities of their nature: not to be wanting unto reasonable creatures in things necessary for the attainment of their end: to give unto angels and men happiness in the nature of a reward; to leave them endued with sufficient ability in the hands of their own will1 : to enjoin them their duty, to shew them the danger which they might avoid, and must sustain if they did not avoid.
It being therefore the will of God to make reasonable creatures the liveliest representations of his own perfection and glory; he assigned unto angels and men a state of the greatest happiness to be acquired by actions of most dignity, proceeding from the highest degree of excellency, that any created nature was to receive from him. To angels and men there was allotted a threefold perfection, a perfection of the end whereunto they might come, eternal life; a perfection of duty, whereby they should come, which duty was obedience; and a perfection of state or quality for performance of that duty. The first was ordained, the second required, and the third given. For presupposing that the will of God did determine to bestow eternal life in the nature of a reward, and that rewards grow from voluntary duties1 , and voluntary duties from free agents; it followeth, that whose end was eternal life, their state must needs imply freedom and liberty of will. A part therefore of the excellency of their nature was the freedom of their will; and in this respect necessary, that he whose will was to govern them in justice should strictly tie them to the constant observation of requisite offices, by the possibility as well of endless perdition and woe, if they fell away, as of like felicity [if?] they continued for a time, that which they ought and might have done. Out of the liberty wherewith God by creation endued reasonable creatures, angels and men, there ensued sin through their own voluntary choice of evil, neither by the appointment of God, nor yet without his permission. Not by appointment, for it abhorreth from the nature of God, to be outwardly a sharp and severe prohibitor, and underhand an author of sin. Touching permission, if God do naturally hate sin, and by his knowledge foresee all things, wherefore did not his power prevent sin, that so his natural desire might be satisfied? Because, in wisdom, (whereupon his determinate will dependeth,) he saw it reasonable and good, to create both angels and men perfectly free, which freedom being a part of their very nature, they could not without it be that which they were: but God must have left them uncreated if not endued with liberty of mind. Angels and men had before their fall the grace whereby they might have continued if they would without sin: yet so great grace God did not think good to bestow on them, whereby they might be exempted from possibility of sinning; because this latter belongeth to their perfection, who see God in fulness of glory, and not to them, who as yet serve him under hope. He saw it reasonable also to grant them power touching all events of their liberty, to shew them how they might use it to their own everlasting good. But if, himself having thus with great good reason determined, his power should after have interposed itself for the hinderance of their choice either in good or evil; as to hinder them the one way, could not have stood with the purity of righteousness, so the other way to let them, had been against that constancy of wisdom, which is in him, whose greatness nothing doth more beseem, than to be one and the same for ever, and not to stop the events of mutability in his creatures, by changing his own decrees for their sakes with mutability in himself.BOOK V. Appendix I. [29.] Consider (saith Tertullian1 ) what divine fidelity requireth, and thou wilt never marvel, although for preservation of that which was according to the will of God, his power hindered not that which was greatly against his will.
[29.]We see therefore how sin entered into the world. The first that sinned against God was Satan. And then through Satan’s fraudulent instigation man also. The sin of devils grew originally from themselves without suggestion or incitement outwardly offered them. They2 kept not the state of that first beginning which they had from God; and as our Saviour himself saith of them3 , they stood not in the truth, whereby it may be very probably thought, that the happiness even of angels depended chiefly upon their belief in a truth which God did reveal unto them: The truth of that personal conjunction which should be of God with men. For Christ, although a Redeemer only unto men, might notwithstanding be revealed unto angels as their Lord, without any reference at all to sin, which the knowledge of Christ a Redeemer doth necessarily presuppose. So that man, their inferior by degree of nature, they must in Christ the Son of God advanced unto so great honour adore. Which mystery the too great admiration of their own excellency being so likely to have made incredible, it is unto us the more credible, that infidelity through pride was their ruin. As also envy maketh them ever sithence the first moment of their own fall, industrious, as much as in them lieth, to work ours, which they can only do as solicitors and instigators. Our sin therefore in that respect excuseth us not, but we are therewith justly charged as the authors of it ourselves. Touching God, though he stop it not, he neither coveteth nor appointeth it, he no way approveth, he no way stirreth, or tempteth any creature unto it. It is as natural unto God to hate sin, as to love righteousness.
Amongst the Jews, two hundred years before Christ, there were, as it seemed, [seemeth?] men which fathered sin and iniquity upon God’s ordinance: under the Apostles there is some shew that the like was broached4 . The Valentinians, the Marcionites, and the Manichees being persuaded, as the truth is, that one and the same God cannot wish, love, or approve, both virtue and vice, both good and evil, ascribed willingly the one to that God most just and righteous, whom we all worship:BOOK V. Appendix I. [30.] but vainly imagined that the other had grown from some other God of equal power and of contrary disposition. Of late the Libertines have reduced both unto God again, they have left no difference between good and evil, but in name only. They make all things in God’s sight to be alike; God the worker, man but his instrument; and our perfection to consist only in casting out that scrupulosity, conscience, and fear, which we have of one thing more than another. Of all which heretical devices the fountain is that secret shame1 wherewith our nature in itself doth abhor the deformity of sin, and for that cause study by all means how to find the first original of it elsewhere. But for as much as the glory of God hath been defended, first by Jesus the son of Sirach2 against blasphemers in his time; by St. James3 against the wicked of the Apostles’ days; against the Valentinians and afterwards by Irenæus4 ; by Tertullian against the Marcionites; against the Manichees by St. Augustin; and against Libertines last of all by Calvin5 : to whose industry alone we owe the refutation of their impiety; we may well presume that of this the whole Christian world is agreed, all denying God to be one author of sin.
What the will of God is touching man, the sin of the world being presupposed.[30.]It appeareth hitherto how God’s creation is an effect of the will of God, which had no subject at all to work upon, but of nothing made all things, and gave them that being, wherein it rejoiced God to behold the first fruits of his own benignity. The subject of his providence simply considered, were all things in the state of their first creation, and amongst them reasonable creatures to be further advanced to a state of supernatural happiness, in such sort as those laws required which the wisdom of God saw meet for itself to follow. The laws of his providence we term such general rules, as it pleaseth God to follow in governing the several kinds of things, and especially in conducting reasonable creatures unto the end for which they were made. And because in the subject of his providence over reasonable creatures, there is now an addition of sin which was not before considered, the laws of his general providence, in regard of this addition, are somewhat different from such as have been already noted.BOOK V. Appendix I. [31.] For as nature draweth love from God, so corruption of nature procureth hatred, it being as natural to him to abhor that which defaceth his handywork, as to delight in the absolute perfection which himself hath given. So that sin hath opened now in God every way of wrath which before was shut. Sin hath awakened justice, which otherwise might have slept. Wrath and justice we attribute to God, by reason of those effects of punishment which God inflicteth. The first rule therefore of providence now, is, that sin do not go altogether unpunished in any creature; whereupon it followeth, that seeing all men universally are sinful, punishment hath also fallen upon all. Some are, after this life, tormented with eternal flames, yet here permitted to live at ease till the hour of death come. Some, during life, never free from miscries, whose state after is perpetual joy: some, neither in this world, nor in the world to come, pardoned; but the death of all is argument sufficient that none escapeth it, both [in both?] altogether without touch. For death even in new-baptized infants, yea in Saints, in Martyrs, we must acknowledge to be a punishment; a punishment which God inflicteth, in judgment, and not in fury, but yet a punishment. It was a branch of the error of Pelagius, to think our mortality no punishment inflicted by the hand of the supreme Judge, but a part of that state and condition, which, as Creator, he hath imposed on mankind1 .
[31.]That justice which worketh by way of revenge, proportioneth punishment unto sin. And sin hath two measures whereby the greatness thereof is judged. The object, God, against whom; and the subject, that creature in whom sin is. By the one measure, all sin is infinite, because he is infinite whom sin offendeth: for which cause there is one eternal punishment due in justice unto all sinners. In so much that if it were possible for any creature to have been eternally with God, and co-eternally sinful, it standeth with justice by this measure to have punisht that creature from eternity past, no less than to punish it unto future eternity. And therefore the sin [time?] which cometh between the birth and death of such as are to endure this punishment, is granted them by dispensation as it were, and toleration, at God’s hand2 . From the other measure, which is according to the subject of sin, there are in that eternity of punishment varieties, whereby may be gathered a rule much built upon in holy Scripture: That degrees in wickedness have answerable degrees in the weight of their endless punishment.
But lest only wrath and justice should take effect, love and mercy be without exercise, by reason of sin, God hath not suffered the preparations of eternal life to be thus frustrated altogether as concerning man, but chosen rather to remit on his own part much of that, which extremity and rigour of justice might require, being contented to condescend unto favourable conditions: and except it be where incurable malice, on the part of the sinful themselves, will not suffer mercy with such conditions to take place, leadeth still to eternal life, by an amiable course, framed even according to the very state wherein we now are. He is not wanting to the world in any necessary thing for the attainment of eternal life, though many things be necessary now, which according to our first condition we needed not. He bestoweth now eternal life as his own free and undeserved gift; together also with that general inheritance and lot of eternal life, great varieties of rewards proportioned to the very degrees of those labours, which to perform he himself by his grace enableth. He leaveth us not as Adam in the hands of our own wills, at once endued with ability to stand of our own accord, but because that ability is altogether lost, he putteth into our souls continually new strength, the paths of our duty he layeth before us, and directeth our steps therein, he giveth warning whereby to know, and wisdom also whereby to prevent the fearful hazards whereinto our souls, being left to themselves, would assuredly fall: that permanent wrath which is for ever, he turneth away; from temporal punishments altogether, and especially from natural death, though none young nor old be exempted, yet his mercy which endureth for ever towards some, turneth both life and death and all things unto their everlasting good. So that from punishments in this world there can be no certain collection drawn, either to clear or condemn men, as being in degree of sin according to that we see them sustain here more or less, but only that in general our punishments prove we all have sinned, because without sin we should never have suffered any thing unpleasant or grievous to nature. And the reason why temporal punishments, declaring all to be sinners, do not argue that they always have sinned most, who suffer most in this present life, is because those things which here we suffer are not still inflicted by the hand of God’s revengeful justice, as in the world to come they are. And therefore, after this life, it standeth much more firm, The heavier punishment, the greater sin. In the act of sinning, God hath the place of a meer patient. For all sin is against God, and therefore all sinners termed his enemies.BOOK V. Appendix I. [32.] As for the punishment which his will determineth upon them, it is the consequent of their iniquity, and their iniquity the cause of it.
[32.]If therefore we look upon the rank or chain of things voluntarily derived from the positive will of God, we behold the riches of his glory proposed as the end of all, we behold the beatitude of men and angels ordained as a mean unto that end, graces and blessings in all abundance referred as means unto that happiness, God to be blessed for evermore, the voluntary author of all those graces. But concerning the heaps of evils which do so overwhelm the world, compare them with God, and from the greatest to the least of them, he disclaimeth them all. He refuseth utterly to be intituled either Alpha, or Omega, the beginning, or the end, of any evil. The evil of sin is within the compass of God’s prescience, but not of his predestination, or fore-ordaining will. The evil of punishment is within the compass of God’s fore-appointed and determining will, but by occasion of precedent sin. For punishments are evil, because they are naturally grievous to him which must sustain them. Yet in that they proceed from justice thereby revenging evil, such evils have also the nature of good; neither doth God refuse, but challenge it as an honour, that he maketh evil doers which sow iniquity to reap destruction, according to that in the Prophet Jeremy1 , There is no evil in the city, which I the Lord have not done. God therefore, with the good evil of punishment, revengeth the evil good of sin. Sin is no plant of God’s setting. He seeth and findeth it a thing irregular, exorbitant, and altogether out of course. It is unto him an occasion of sundry acts of mercy, both an occasion and a cause of punishment: by which mercy and justice, although God be many ways greatly glorified, yet is not this glory of God any other in respect of sin than only an accidental event. We cannot say therefore truly, that, as God to his own glory did ordain our happiness, and to accomplish our happiness appoint the gifts of his grace: so he did ordain to his glory our punishment, and for matter of punishment our sins. For punishment is to the will of God no desired end, but a consequent ensuing sin: and, in regard of sin, his glory an event thereof, but no proper effect. Which answereth fully that repining proposition, If man’s sin be God’s glory, why is God angry?
As therefore sin hath entered into the nature of man, notwithstanding the general will of God’s inclination to the contrary: so the same inclination of will in him for the good of man doth continue still, notwithstanding sin.BOOK V. Appendix I. [33.] For sin altereth not his nature, though it change ours. His general will, and the principal desire whereunto of his own natural bent he inclineth still, is, that all men may enjoy the full perfection of that happiness, which is their end. Signs of the general inclination of God, are all promises which he maketh in holy Scripture, all the Precepts which he giveth of godliness and virtue, all Prohibitions of sin and threatenings against offenders, all counsels, exhortations, admonitions, tolerations, protestations, and complaints. Yea all the works of his merciful providence, in upholding the good estate of the world, are signs of that desire, which the Schoolmen therefore term his signified will1 : Damascen, the principal will of God2 . And according to this will, he desireth not the death, no not of the wicked3 , but rather that they might be converted and live. He longeth for nothing more than that all men might be saved.
[33.]He that willeth the end, must needs will also the means whereby we are brought unto it. And one [our?] fall in Adam being presupposed, the means now which serve as causes effectual by their own worth to procure us eternal life, are only the merits of Jesus Christ, without whom no heathen by the law of nature, no Jew by the law of Moses, was ever justified. Yea it were perhaps no error to affirm, that the virtue of the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ being taken away, the Jew by having the law, was farther removed from hope of salvation and life, than the other by wanting the law: if it be true which Fulgentius4 hath, that without the graces of belief in Christ, the law doth more heavily condemn being known, than unknown: because by how much the ignorance of sin is made less, by so much his guiltiness that sinneth is greater.BOOK V. Appendix I. [34.] And St. Paul’s own doctrine is1 , that the law, severed from Christ, doth but only aggravate sin. God being desirous of all men’s salvation, according to his own principal or natural inclination, hath in token thereof for their sakes whom he loved, bestowed his beloved Son. The selfsame affection was in Christ himself, to whom the wicked at the day of their last doom will never dare to allege for their own excuse, That he which offered himself as a sacrifice to redeem some, did exclude the rest, and so made the way of their salvation impossible. He paid a ransom for the whole world; on him the iniquities of all were laid; and, as St. Peter plainly witnesseth, he bought them which deny him, and which perish because they deny him2 . As in very truth, whether we respect the power and sufficiency of the price given; or the spreading of that infection, for remedy whereof the same was necessary; or the largeness of his desire which gave it; we have no reason but to acknowledge with joy and comfort, that he tasted death for all men: as the Apostle to the Hebrews noteth3 . Nor do I think that any wound did ever strike his sacred heart more deeply, than the foresight of men’s ingratitude, by infinite numbers of whom that which cost him so dear would so little be regarded; and that made to so few effectual through contempt, which he of tender compassion in largeness of love had provided to be a medicine sufficient for all. As therefore the gospel itself, which Christ hath commanded to preach unto all creatures, is an apparent effect of his general care and providence: so Christ, the principal matter therein contained and taught, must needs likewise have been instituted by the selfsame general providence to serve for a most sufficient remedy for the sin of mankind, although to ordain in whom particularly it shall be forceable and effectual be an act of special or personal providence.
The cause of God’s (sic).[34.]But if God would have all men saved, and if Christ through such his grace have died for all men, wherefore are they not all saved? God’s principal desire touching man’s happiness is not always satisfied. It is on all sides confest, that his will in this kind oftentimes succeedeth not; the cause whereof is a personal impediment making particular men uneable [uncapable?] of that good which the will of his general providence did ordain for mankind. So that from God, as it were by a secondary kind of will, there groweth now destruction and death, although otherwise the will of his voluntary inclination towards man would effect the contrary. For the which cause the Wise Man directly teacheth, that death is not a thing which God hath made or devised with intent to have so many thousands eternally therein devoured: that condemnation is not the end wherefore God did create any man, although it be an event or consequent which man’s unrighteousness causeth God to decree. The decree of condemnation is an act of hatred; the cause of hatred in God is not his own inclination thereunto: for his nature is, to hate nothing which he hath made; therefore the cause of this affection towards man must needs be in man some quality whereof God is himself no author. The decree of condemnation is an act of divine justice. Justice doth not purpose punishment for an end, and faults as means to attain that end: for so it should be a just thing to desire that men might be unjust: but justice always presupposing sin which it loveth not, decreeth punishment as a consequent wherein it taketh otherwise no pleasure. Finally, if death be decreed as a punishment, the very nature of punishment we know is such as implieth faultiness going before; without which we must give unto it some other name, but a punishment it cannot be. So that the nature of God’s goodness, the nature of justice, and the nature of death itself, are all opposite to their opinion, if any will be of opinion, that God hath eternally decreed condemnation without the foresight of sin as a cause. The place of Judas was locus suus, a place of his own proper procurement. Devils were not ordained of God for hell-fire, but hell-fire for them; and for men, so far forth as it was foreseen, that men would be like them. There are speeches in Scripture, where we read of Christ himself laid in Sion as a stone to stumble at, and a rock to make men fall: of the wicked created to the day of wrath, fashioned to destruction, fore-ordained to condemnation. But the words are ambiguous. For inasmuch as ends and events have this common, that they are the last thing which befalleth, therefore the same phrase of speech doth usually serve in both. But our understanding must distinguish where the one is meant, and not the other. Where we say that man is born to die, we mean that death is the event of his birth. When we teach that Christ died to redeem the world, we mean that the end of his death was redemption. The determination of God therefore touching reprobates, is of Damascen1 termed aptly enough a consequent will, forasmuch as it presupposeth in man a just and deserved cause leading him who is most holy thereunto.BOOK V. Appendix I. [35.]
[35.]There is not in this life any cross or calamity, be it never so short, but when we suffer it at the hands of God, his own most sacred will directeth us unto sin as the very root out of which originally it groweth: and because we are sinful, therefore the burden under which we groan, we impute to none but to ourselves only. Now if all the miseries, plagues, and torments of the whole world could be laid upon one back and th . . . [that to endure?] as long as a million of worlds, should he be able (one succeeding another) to continue: what were this unto those torments, which, when they have worn out that time oftener doubled and multiplied than any number can comprehend, are not one jot nearer to an end, than they were when they first begun, but are still to endure even as long as there is in heaven a God of power to extend them further? And shall we think that to these torments he hath for the only manifestation of his power adjudged by an eternal decree the greatest part of the very noblest of all his creatures, without any respect of sin foreseen in them? Lord, thou art just and severe, but not cruel. And seeing all the ancient Fathers of the Church of Christ have evermore with uniform consent agreed, that reprobation presupposeth foreseen sin, as a most just cause whereupon it groundeth itself: sin at the least original in them whose portion of eternal punishment is easiest, as they that suffer but the only loss of the joys of heaven: sin of several degrees in them whose plagues accordingly by the same act of reprobation were proportioned: let us not in this case of all other remove the limits and bounds which our fathers before us have set.
But seeing all unrighteousness is of its own nature offensive to God, and in that whole mass which containeth, together with Satan and his retinue, Adam and Adam’s natural posterity without exception of any one, we find from the first to the last none in whom there is not unrighteousness, either actual, or at the least original; shall we therefore conclude that death and condemnation are even as largely decreed as sin is itself spread? Behold mercy hath found a way how to triumph over justice, love how to bury the cause of hatred, grace how to save that which unrighteousness would destroy. There is an act of God’s most favourable determination,P. 30.2 which the Apostle usually termeth the good pleasure of Almighty God, by which good pleasure the first chosen to eternal life is Christ Jesus, for his own worthiness’ sake; with and under him the elect angels which had no spot nor blemish foreseen; in and through him no small number of men also,BOOK V. Appendix I. [36.] taken out of the flames of that general combustion, to be made vessels of his honour, partakers of his felicity and bliss, inheritors of his indefeasible glory; angels elect in Christ the Lord, men in Christ the physician of the world, the decree of God being ever as certain touching the very least of these, as it is of the angels themselves, yea of Christ Jesus, if he, they, and we, be all elect before the foundations of the world were laid, and the election of all three an act of God’s unchangeable will.
[36.]When Pelagius, to the utter overthrow of soundness in Christian belief, had denied that man is born in original sin, and taught that every man hath in himself power to accomplish his own salvation by himself, or at least to merit what help soever besides he should need to receive at the hands of God: St. Augustin, to repress so intolerable insolency, pride, and presumption against God, was drawn by degrees from the consideration of that which man doeth by way of duty towards God, to the contemplation of that which God did by way of secret decree and purpose concerning man before the foundations of the world were laid. For whereas Pelagius did make merit the cause of grace, St. Augustin derived graces from the well-spring of God’s eternal predestination. His opinion was, at the first1 , that God foreseeing who would believe and who would not, did for their belief’s sake choose the one sort, and reject the other for their incredibility [sic]: that unto them whose belief he foresaw, the grace of well doing was also fore-ordained; the rest, forsaken, left, and given over to be hardened in their own impiety: that faith was the cause of all men’s election, the Spirit of sanctification, bestowed on the elect, to the end they might bring forth the fruit of good works, and obtain the reward of eternal life. But the error of Pelagius, after examined, gave him occasion to retract this sentence2 , which maketh faith to prevent grace, and the election of God to follow upon the foresight of our virtue.BOOK V. Appendix I. [37.] His latter judgment therefore was, that the whole body of mankind, in the view of God’s eternal knowledge, lay universally polluted with sin, worthy of condemnation and death: that over the mass of corruption there passed two acts of the will of God: an act of favour, liberality, and grace, choosing part to be made partakers of everlasting glory; and an act of justice, forsaking the rest, and adjudging them to endless perdition, these vessels of wrath, those of mercy, which mercy is to God’s elect so peculiar, that to them and to none else (for their number is definitely known, and can neither be increast nor diminished) to them it allotteth immortality and all things thereunto appertaining; them it predestinateth, it calleth, justifieth, glorifieth them, it poureth voluntarily that spirit into their hearts, which spirit so given is the root of their very first desires and motions, tending to immortality: as for others, on whom such grace is not bestowed, there is justly assigned, and immutably to every of them, the lot of eternal condemnation1 .
[37.]The first publication of these things, never before descended into, troubled exceedingly the minds of many2 . For a time they rested silent, as if some thunder from heaven had astonisht them, till at the length a part of the clergy of Marseilles in France, and when the ice was once broken, sundry others begun to doubt3 , both that grace and that predestination, which St. Augustin the glory of those times had delivered. Their scruple touching grace, was, whether God bestow his Spirit before it be askt, laboured and sought for, or else after4 : 2. touching predestination, whether certain be absolutely ordained unto life, or every man living capable thereof, and no man’s predestination so necessary but that he may perish, neglecting the means whereby salvation must be attained, and may neglect the means if he will5 . Prosper, at that time a man of very good account in France; and Hilary, whose learning was no whit less, his authority and place in the Church greater1 , both devoted to St. Augustin: the one2 , persuaded of the opinion, but not sufficiently instructed to defend it, the other loath3 to dissent, yet fearful also to be over hastily carried; these sent into Africa their letters most effectually and largely written, omitting no part of that respect which St. Augustin’s dignity and quality did well deserve; neither concealing from him what questions and doubts had grown upon his former writings. For their own satisfaction they desired to learn how they might soundly maintain, that grace doth begin, continue, and finish the work of man’s salvation, without taking away that natural freedom4 , whereby we know the will unconstrainedly always worketh. 2. Again, which way it should be safest to deliver the doctrine of immutable predestination both to glory and to grace; that neither the Fathers might be rejected, with whom his former did more agree5 , than his latter opinion, nor yet exhortations to godliness and virtue be the less regarded6 , as things unnecessary for them, who in such sort are already ordained to life, and unprofitable for them which are not; whereby it appeareth that as yet it was not clear in St. Augustin’s books whether the grace and predestination which he taught would enforce an absolute necessity of belief and salvation, such as the Schoolmen call necessitatem consequentis1 ; which indeed would have taken away freewill, and made all instructions and exhortations superfluous. This gave occasion of writing afterwards many treatises2 , whereby (as commonly in such cases it falleth out) some were mervailous well pleased, some waxed fiercer and bolder to contradict. Not long after the rising of these flames3 , St. Augustin dieth without any equal in the Church of Christ from that day to this. This defence Prosper undertook and sustained with all constancy for the space of thirty-six years4 following. In which time, being aided by Pope Cælestin5 and Leo6 , he much weakened the Pelagian heresy, and lived not only to see the open recantation of Julian1 then best learned on that part,BOOK V. Appendix I. [38.] against whom before St. Augustin had written, but also to frame and to set down with his own hand those Canons which being agreed upon by the Arausican Synod2 , St. Augustin’s opinion touching grace prevailed for ever after, and the contrary was clean crusht.
[38.]Prosper’s successor3 was one Faustus, not in wit and industry, nor eloquence inferior unto Prosper, only behind him in soundness of faith. He therefore refelleth Pelagius4 as touching sufficiency of nature in itself without grace, to the end that with less suspicion he might notwithstanding defend with Pelagius5 , that grace is not given without the merit of present labour, and endeavour to obtain the same. But the wound, which Pelagius in both had received, was incurable. Fulgentius6 therefore after Prosper’s death, oppugned whatsoever Faustus either wrote or did, in that cause against St. Augustin; by means whereof their doctrine could not prevail, as otherwise it might have done. But in the matter of grace, they were utterly overthrown. Nevertheless1 being loath that the world should think they had for no just cause contended, whereas they had amongst them one Lucidus a priest, very earnest in defence of absolute predestination, and thereby fallen into divers absurdities, which St. Augustin, the master whom he pretended to follow, had never held; him when Faustus had brought to be of another mind, they assembled a Synod2 , whereat some twenty and six Bishops met together, gave their sentence against his opinions, and took the recantation of Lucidus, submitting his former judgment to the order of this their Synod, and pronouncing3 accursed openly, 1. all such as either with Pelagius save man by man’s mere labour, or as others by predestination though labour want: 2. all such as hold, that no man perisheth but for original sin only: 3. or, that God’s foreknowledge presseth down into hell: 4. or, that God is wanting to all them which perish, rather than they wanting to themselves: 5. or, that vessels of contumely cannot rise to be vessels of honour, though they would: 6. or, that Christ did not die for all men, neither would have all men saved. Wherein it clearly appeareth, that the first of these rehearsed articles condemneth Pelagianism only so far forth as Faustus approved it not: the rest of the articles would closely insinuate, that Lucidus by following St. Augustin’s doctrine against Pelagius in that point, (where Faustus was himself a Pelagian,) had fallen into those absurdities and follies, which now he forsakes.BOOK V. Appendix I. [39.] But by this we see how the question about both grace and predestination, being first set on foot by St. Augustin, was afterwards both followed with and against him, as men’s capacities and other accidents gave occasion at that time. But surely his judgment of predestination was far enough from such phrenetical opinions, as, in that Fathers’ synod, Lucidus did renounce1 . 1. Predestination, as St. Augustin himself taught it, doth no way diminish the great necessity of labour required at our hands: nor 2. import that original sin is the only cause of destruction or exprobation [sic]; nor 3. that God’s foreknowledge is a cause why any man doth perish: nor 4. that the grace of God is withheld from any man but justly and deservedly: 5. nor that any man in whom [sic] desire and endeavour to be saved, can be a vessel of contumely and wrath: nor 6. that Christ did ever purpose and determine to exclude any from the benefit of his death, but whom their own incurable wickedness doth worthily exclude.
[39.]To proceed therefore with the rest: we have seen the general inclination of God towards all men’s everlasting happiness notwithstanding sin: we have seen that this natural love of God towards mankind, was the cause of appointing or predestinating Christ to suffer for the sins of the whole world: we have seen that our Lord, who made himself a sacrifice for our sins, did it in the bowels of a merciful desire that no man might perish: we have seen that God nevertheless hath found most just occasion to decree the death and condemnation of some: we have seen that the whole cause, why such are excluded from life, resteth altogether in themselves: we have seen that the natural will of God being inclined towards all men’s salvation, and his occasioned will having set down the death but of some in such consideration as hath been shewed;BOOK V. Appendix I. [40.] it must needs follow, that of the rest there is a determinate ordinance, proceeding from the good pleasure of God, whereby they are, and have been, before all worlds, predestinated heirs of eternal bliss. We have seen that in Christ the Prince of God’s elect all worthiness was foreseen; that in the elect angels there was not foreseen any matter for just indignation and wrath to work upon; that in all other God foresaw iniquity, for which an irrevocable sentence of death and condemnation might most justly have past over all. For it can never be too often inculcated, that touching the very decree of endless destruction and death, God is the judge from whom it cometh, but man the cause of which it grew. Salvation contrariwise and life proceedeth only both from God and of God. We are receivers through grace and mercy, authors, through merit and desert, we are not, of our own salvation. In the children of perdition, we must always remember that of the Prophet1 , Thy destruction, O Israel, is of thyself, lest we teach men blasphemously to cast the blame of all their misery on God. Again, lest we take to ourselves the glory of that happiness, which if he did not voluntarily and freely bestow, we should never be made partakers thereof; it must ever in the election of saints be remembered, that to choose is an act of God’s good pleasure, which presupposeth in us sufficient cause to avert, but none to deserve it. For this cause, whereas St. Augustin had sometimes been of opinion that God chose Jacob and hated Esau, the one in regard of belief, the other of infidelity, which was foreseen, his mind he afterwards delivered thus2 : “ ‘Jacob I have loved,’ behold what God doth bestow freely: ‘I have hated Esau,’ behold what man doth justly deserve.”
[40.]It remaineth therefore that we come now unto those things about ourselves, which by God’s own appointment are means of bringing his desire, and our Saviour’s merit, finally to that effect, which they both covet. Christ is a mean unto God for us. But this sufficeth not, unless there be also the means of application which God requireth, the decree of whose good pleasure, touching man’s salvation, includeth both the one and the other. Christ in himself hath that cup of life, which is able to do all men good. Sed si non bibitur, non medetur, saith Prosper3 , if we taste not, it heals not. There are means which God hath appointed towards us, means to be in us, and means which are to proceed from us. The mean towards us, is that grace, whereby we are outwardly called, and chose into the fellowship of God’s people. The Jews were persuaded, that God, for the love he bare unto Abraham’s integrity and virtue, did, in lieu of his obedience and faithful service, make him the root of a sanctified generation of men on earth; and that God bringeth no man to life, which is not either born, or else adopted the son of Abraham: circumcised also as he was, and consequently tied to all the laws which Abraham’s posterity received at the hands of Moses. For which cause the very Christian Jews themselves were offended when they saw that the Apostles did impart the grace of external vocation to the Gentiles, and never tie them to any such conditions. It seemed new and strange in their eyes, that the nations which so long had lived in ignorance, idolatry, and utter contempt of God, should, notwithstanding all their wickedness, now, not as proselytes, but universally without any bond of subjection to the law of Moses, be received into favour, and his ancient elect people be shaken off. This gave the Apostle occasion to enter into many mysteries, and to handle with a bleeding heart things, which his own very pen even trembleth sometimes to set down. But concerning the grace of their outward vocation to the means of eternal life, he which asketh, “Hath any man given unto God first, and soe by desert made him a debtor,” though for horror’s [honour’s?] sake he name not Abraham, must notwithstanding needs mean, that the adoption of him and his seed, to be a sanctified generation, a church visible to God on earth, the glory of his residence and miraculous presence amongst them, the covenants, law, service, promises, with other the like spiritual prerogatives, as to [be?] the father of a race of so many holy patriarchs, and to be Christ’s own principal progenitor, was more than God could owe unto Abraham. Yet not so much, but that they, which were of this line and posterity, might afterwards, in time to come, by virtue of these preeminencies, afford matter for the building of that ark, which the Gentiles should enter into, and they themselves, in the deluge of their own infidelity, perish: God towards them being deservedly just, and towards the nations of the world undeservedly merciful. For we must note, there is an election, the grace whereof includeth their temporary benefit, that are chosen, and there is an election that includeth their eternal good.BOOK V. Appendix I. [41.] By temporary I do not understand any secular or worldly blessing, of which nature God bestowed plenty upon that people; but I mean such spiritual favours, as albeit they tend to everlasting felicity, yet are not themselves everlastingly continued, neither are inwardly infused, but outwardly bestowed graces, as all those preeminencies were upon the nations of the Jews, and that through God’s mere mercy towards them. God, by the laws of his providence, hath stinted the degrees and measures of that outward grace, which from time to time he hath offered. To the Jews that was given, which to all other nations of the world besides was denied; according to that of the Prophet in the Psalm1 , God hath not so dealt with every nation, neither have the people knowledge of his ways, in such sort, degree, and measure, as that only people had. Of the later age of the world it is said, God did never so discover the holy mysteries of his saving truth, since the beginning of the world, as to us they are now manifested2 : this abundance of grace, which God hath now poured out, doth not argue that to Israel grace was wanting, because it was less. Nec de illa cura Dei quæ Patriarcharum filiis proprie præsidebat conjiciendum est gubernacula Divinæ misericordiæ cæteris omnibus [hominibus] fuisse subtracta. Qui quidem in comparatione electorum videntur abjecti, sed nunquam sunt manifestis . . . . beneficiis abdicati3 . God left not himself without testimony amongst them4 ; what testimony, saith Prosper5 ; Quod est hoc testimonium, quod semper Domino deservivit, et nunquam de ejus bonitate ac potestate conticuit, nisi ipsa totius mundi inenarrabilis pulchritudo, et inenarrabilium beneficiorum ejus dives et ordinata largitio; per quæ humanis cordibus quædam æternæ legis tabulæ præbebantur, ut in paginis elementorum ac voluminibus temporum communis et publica divinæ institutionis doctrina legeretur.
[41.]If it be therefore demanded, why the Jews had the law of God, and not the Gentiles in former times? or why afterward those outward means of conversion, which prevailed nothing with Corazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum6 , were not bestowed upon Tyre and Sidon, or upon Sodom, where they had been able to take effect as our Saviour himself witnesseth? or why his disciples for a time were forbidden to preach to Gentiles and Samaritans7 , till first they had gone to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, with whom they spent their labour in vain? or why the Apostles were hindered by the Spirit1 , when they meant to have preached in Asia: why stayed, when their purpose was towards Bithynia for the same intent; and yet that grace not denied altogether unto those countries, but deferred only? what should we answer touching these things, but that God hath made of one blood2 all mankind, to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, and hath assigned the times which were ordained before, together with the seasons, bounds, and limits, as of all things, so of grace itself, which whensoever it least shineth, ministereth always if not sufficient light to guide in the way of life, yet competent to give men that introduction, which clearer light would make complete, but that too much love of one kind of darkness or other hath been the world’s perpetual impediment, and to some a cause, not only of having the offer of [more?] grace withdrawn clean, but the very former possession of less also taken from them.
That thus it stood with the Jewish nation, that all those spiritual favours of grace which God had bestowed upon them were voluntary: that his choice of the Jews before others hereunto was free, and on their part without desert: that he in his promise made to their fathers remained steadfast, but the true construction thereof they did not conceive, because they were obstinate and would not understand: finally, that whereas the light, which their fathers would have greatly rejoiced to see, had presented itself to them, and was rejected; if God did now depart from them being thus repelled, and were content to be found of the Gentiles, who sought not him, but he them; as the one had no cause to grudge, so neither had the other any to boast: all this the Apostle proveth in the ninth, the tenth, and eleventh to the Romans. At the length, in consideration that they sometimes were a people, whom God so wonderfully did affect; a people, to whom he had given so many privileges, honours, preeminences, above the rest of the whole world; a people, with whose forefathers he had made so many covenants and leagues of mercy: a people, for whose advancement so mighty nations had been quelled; a people, for whose defence the angels had taken arms, the sun and moon been stayed in their course: a people, that had filled heaven with so many Patriarchs, Prophets, Saints, Martyrs; a people, that had been the well-spring of life to all nations: a people, the top of whose kindred sitteth at the right hand of God, and is the author of salvation unto all the world:—these things considered in such sort, as we may think an apostolic spirit did consider them after long discourse against them; the question is moved, Hath God then clean cast off his people? Not his people eternally chosen.BOOK V. Appendix I. [42.] Be it far from us so to think. But is there no hope that the very nation itself shall recover what it now hath lost? Have they stumbled to the end they might fall? God forbid. Nay, their fall hath occasioned salvation to arise unto the Gentiles, and the Gentiles not unlikely to be a mean of restoring salvation unto them again. That as now they are losers to our gain, so in time our gain may be their abundance. And as we, being sometimes unbelievers, have at the length obtained mercy; so they at the length may find mercy, although they be now unbelievers, and thus God, who is all-merciful, become merciful towards all1 . “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his footsteps how impossible to be traced out!”
This may suffice touching outward grace, whereby God inviteth the whole world to receive wisdom, and hath opened the gates of his visible Church unto all, thereby testifying his will and purpose to have all saved, if the let were not in themselves.
[42.]The inward mean, whereby his will is to bring men to eternal life, is that grace of his Holy Spirit, which hath been spoken of already at large, in the article that concerneth free-will. Now from whom this inward grace is either withheld altogether, or withdrawn, such, being left to themselves, wax hard and obdurate in sin. Touching the manner of their obduration, it hath been ever on all sides confest, that the malice of man’s own heart doth harden him, and nothing else. Therefore in the Psalm it is said2 , harden not your own hearts. In Jeremy3 , Thou hast stricken them, but they have not sorrowed; thou hast consumed them, and they have refused to receive correction: they have made their faces harder than stones. And in the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans4 , Thou, according to thine own hardness and heart impenitent, heapest up to thyself wrath. But some difference there is, by reason that all have not alike defined after what sort God himself worketh in this action. It cannot be denied that they take occasion at the very goodness of God to strengthen themselves in malice. His mercy towards Abel hardened Cain: and his mercy towards Israel, the Ægyptians5 : yea, the mercy which is shewed towards them hardeneth them. I saw the prosperity of the wicked, saith David1 , they are not troubled nor plagued like others, they have more than heart can wish; therefore they are proud, cruel, blasphemous, they set their mouths even against heaven. Pharaoh in misery confesseth sin2 , whereupon God in lenity withdrawing his plague, sin and hardness of heart return, both in him and his: whereby it hath been by some3 inferred, that God hath no other hand in the obduration of such, but only so far forth as their malice doth abuse his lenity, and turn it unto their own evil. St. Augustin and others considering more deeply, that God himself had said touching Pharaoh, I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might work these my miracles amongst them, conceived, that God did hereby somewhat more than only foretell what hurt the Ægyptians would take occasion to do themselves, by the very good which he intended to do for them. It seemed therefore probable, that God who eternally had foreseen what Pharaoh was, and what himself did purpose to work concerning Pharaoh, declared to Moses4 that which was in Pharaoh’s heart, namely, an obstinate will, that the people should not go whither God required. And concerning himself thus far to Moses also God did reveal5 what his own determinations were. At first, that Pharaoh’s malice and obstinacy he would turn to the good of the whole world. And secondly, that the grace of his Holy Spirit, which softeneth inwardly the hearts of men, and whereby they are driven to obedience, should not in this action be given, either to Pharaoh or to any of his servants;—I will harden them;—so that to Pharaoh’s obduration, it plainly appeareth there did concur, not only on his part malice, but also from God himself a prohibition or restraint of grace; which restraint generally being an act, not of policy, but of severity in God, there is no doubt but Pharaoh did otherwise1 deserve the same, even as they all do, to whom divine grace is denied. This of the Gentiles St. Paul witnesseth2 : Knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful: therefore God also gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts. Of the Jews David said3 , Let their table be made a snare, and a net, and a stumblingblock for a recompense unto them. And of them in the Church of Christ, whom the like befalleth, God’s own testimony is as plain: Because they received not the law [love?] of the truth, that they might be saved, therefore God shall send them strange [strong?] delusions to believe lies4 . For seeing the natural will of God desireth to impart unto all creatures all goodness, so far as they are by the laws of his providence capable thereof; it cannot be chosen but in that respect his desire is, that all men were capable of inward grace, because without grace there is no salvation. Now there are that have made themselves incapable of both, thousands there have been, and are, in all ages, to whose charge it may truly be laid, that they have resisted the Holy Ghost, that the grace which is offered, they thrust from them; and do thereby, if not in word, yet in effect, pronounce themselves unworthy of everlasting life, and of all effectual helps thereunto belonging5 . And for this cause, that will of God which sin occasioneth to decree the just condemnation of many, is by the same necessity enforced to leave many unto themselves, where the greatness of sin hath constrained him to set down the sentence of death. That first act of justice draweth after it the second, whereupon their dereliction ensueth, an example whereof for temporal punishment we have Heli’s sons:BOOK V. Appendix I. [43.] and not only them, but that whole nation whereof it was said to the prophet Esay1 , Make the heart of this people fat: make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes: lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and convert, and be healed. Then said I, O Lord, how long? And he answered, Till the cities be wasted without inhabitants, and the houses without men, and the land utterly desolate. If it be demanded, wherefore grace preventeth not, at the least wise, such sin, as draweth after it both obduration and condemnation? I demand again, What if the malice of the greatest part do come so near diabolical iniquity, that it overmatcheth the highest measure of divine grace, which the laws of the providence of God have assigned unto men on earth? Should God obtrude unto swine pearls of that value? In such, (saith Fulgentius2 ,) God beginneth that judgment with dereliction, which torments in the world to come shall finish. And lest any man should think but some one of St. Augustin’s followers amongst many were thus persuaded, we have Prosper also of the same mind; who speaking in the person of all, saith3 , “When we read of certain given over to their own lusts, or forsaken of God and hardened, our professed construction thereof is, that such are so dealt with in regard of their grievous sins. For by reason of their crimes going before, they did owe to themselves a kind of penalty; which so punisheth them, that now they continually incur further guiltiness, and make themselves daily more punishable. Being thus persuaded, we neither complain of the judgment of God, or ask why he casteth off such as deserve to be left; and we give thanks for that mercy wherewith he safely keepeth them, which cannot say they deserve to be kept.” St. Augustin himself to like effect4 , Cum aliis præparetur voluntas a Domino, aliis non præparetur; discernendum est utique quid veniat de misericordia, quid de judicio.
[43.]Final obduration therefore is an argument of eternal rejection, because none continue hardened to the last end, but lost children. And the cause why that Spirit, which softeneth others, forsaketh them, is their own malice. In consideration whereof the Apostle which acknowledgeth, that touching the gifts of external grace, there can be on man’s part no reason why Abraham’s posterity was so much loved above others: or why in Abraham’s own race, God hated Esau, and loved Jacob: or why he now loveth all the nations of the earth, as effectually as ever Abraham’s seed: or again, why Pharaoh, of all other wicked persons in the world, should be taken and made a spectacle of God’s power: the Apostle, which in these cases fleeth to that absolute sovereignty which God hath over all things, as the potter over his own clay; yieldeth notwithstanding oftentimes [sic] of God’s justice in those whom personally he adjudgeth to eternal death, and from whom he withholdeth finally his inward grace, yea even where he standeth most upon the absolute power of God1 , is it not in defence of God’s righteousness? God preserveth [preferreth?] Jacob the younger brother before Esau which was the elder, and declareth this his purpose, when as yet the children were unborn, and had neither done good nor evil, for no other intent, as it seemeth, discovering so soon his determination, but only that the Jews might thereby know, that what he did was merely to fulfil the purpose of his own good pleasure, in choosing them: and how he chose neither them, nor any of all their predecessors, for their works or worthiness sake, but of mere mercy. What then, shall we say, hath God herein shewed himself unjust2 towards either part? Touching the one, it must be confest, his mercies are his own to bestow wheresoever himself will3 . And concerning the other, because men shall no way better discern their own cause, than by beholding it in other men’s persons; let Pharaoh’s4 example be their glass to look him [in?]. If Esau’s posterity complain, that when so many others before and after him, notwithstanding their evil quality, did yet enjoy those rights, which the course of nature, and the custom of the world gave them, he (rather than others) should be deprived of that prerogative: let them be given to understand, that God hath his full and free scope to take at any time, in any age, out of any race, such as, justly being hateful in his sight, may be made patterns of severity to the world, as others are of clemency5 . And therefore, as we can yield no reason, why of all other wicked tyrants in Egypt, Pharaoh alone and the people under him should be made such a tragical spectacle: so neither are we able to shew any cause, why mercy may not do good where it will; and wheresoever it will, justice may withhold good.BOOK V. Appendix I. 44.
[44.]This may suffice for satisfaction of minds willing to submit themselves unto that which is reasonable. But there are, 1 whose stubborn spirits will even in spite and rancour hereupon stormingly reply, “What cause then hath God to be offended with their obduration, on whom it is not his will to bestow his mollifying grace? if it be his will to harden by withholding grace, how should we withstand it?” It doth not altogether offend God, that the works of his providence are discoursed, argued, and disputed of. For in Job, in David, in Jeremie, in Abacuk, in sundry others, God taketh it not in evil part, to be urged and seriously pressed by arguments. But with this affection of mind, O man, who art thou that openest thy mouth to upbraid God2 ? Suppose (which yet is false) that there were nothing in it, but only, “so God will have it:” suppose God did harden and soften, choose and cast off, make honourable and detestable, whom himself will, and that without any cause moving him one way or other; are we not all in his hands as clay3 ? If thus God did deal, what injury were it?P. 39. q. How much less now, when they, on whom his severity worketh, are not found, like the clay, without form, as apt to receive the best shape as any other, but are in themselves, and by their own disposition, fashioned for destruction and for wrath4 , whom notwithstanding he suffereth to enjoy many honours in this present world, (as both Esau and Pharaoh did,) and that very rigour, which they here sustain, proceedeth not of any delight that God doth take in afflicting them, whom it is likely his hand altogether would have spared, as it doth sundry others here5 , had it not so fallen out in them, that their punishment did appear needful for the clearer manifestation of God’s mercy towards the vessels which himself had formed for glory. His hatred towards Esau declareth towards Jacob the greater love: by Pharaoh’s destruction, the salvation of Israel was the more marvellous. And was there any thing that could more manifest the riches of the glory of God, in bestowing grace on the Gentiles6 , than the exercise of his justice, in withdrawing the same from the Jews, a small remnant of them excepted? We may therefore conclude, that of all the good we receive, mercy is the only cause. And albeit sin be the true original cause of all the evil which we suffer: yet, touching those punishments for sin, which justice in this world imposeth, it is not always in regard of greater sins, that special plagues do sometimes light rather on one man’s head than another.BOOK V. Appendix I. [45.] Esau’s sin did deserve his deprivation: Pharaoh’s sin, his overthrow: the sin of the Jews, their obduration. Yet the cause why, of so many first-born, Esau at that time, should lose his birthright, was rather a merciful eye towards Jacob, than a rigorous towards Esau. The cause why, (the Israelites’ four hundred years of thraldom being expired,) the justice of God did shew itself in Pharaoh, came of mercy and love to themward1 .P. 136. The cause, why God did then strike Israel especially with blindness, when the happy hour of the Gentiles was come, our part is rather to search, in the bosom of undeserved clemency towards us, than in the depth of that justice which their iniquity kindled. This I take to be the natural and true meaning of the Apostle’s whole disputation, tending to the abatement of the Jews’ evil, which was envy; and of the pride, which was to be feared in the Gentiles, at that time.
[45.]One thing further also we must note, touching obduration: That there may be in man such malice, as maketh him the child of eternal death, and yet not always such cause, as induceth God perpetually to withhold his inward grace: which difference between the act of reprobation and obduration is the more necessary to be well observed, in regard of those things, which the Scripture hath concerning sin against the Holy Ghost, and the sin of apostasy after grace. For we need not doubt of the cause of reprobation in them, touching whom the Apostle hath said2 , they crucify again unto themselves the Son of God, and make a mock of him. And yet, that in them God did not always see cause to withhold his Holy Spirit, appeareth, in as much as the same men were once enlightened, and had been partakers of the heavenly gift of the Holy Ghost, and had tasted of the good word of God, and of the power of the world to come. On the other side, perpetuity of inward grace belongeth unto none, but eternally foreseen elect, whose difference from castaways, in this life, doth not herein consist, that the one have grace always, the other never: but in this, that the one have grace that abideth, the other either not grace at all, or else grace which abideth not.
I demand then (saith the Apostle) hath God rejected his people? No; we must distinguish; There is a visible election of people, which the world seeth, according whereunto of old the Jews, and now all the nations of the world are elect. But besides this external election, there are, out of the body of these elect, others, invisibly and eternally chosen in Christ, before the foundations of the world were laid.BOOK V. Appendix I. [46.] In him Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, in him all that indeed appertain unto God were chosen. To him all are given; yea given (as he to whom they are given witnesseth) with purpose of custody and safety, for ever1 : “This is the Father’s will, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.” Whereupon St. Paul, touching them, inferreth, God hath not cast away his people, his eternally elect, that people which he knew before. For that which the outward body of Israel hath deservedly lost, the body of the election of grace hath obtained, in it the promises of God take effect: the rest are hardened2 .
[46.]But is it our desert, for which we have gotten that, which they by desert have foregone? We deserve God’s grace, no more than the vessel doth deserve the water, which is put into it. Only we are vessels endued with sense, we are not dead, and altogether without feeling of that we receive: our obstinate resistance may hinder that infusion, which nothing in us could procure, or purchase. We are sick as others, yet others not cured as we are. Is the cause in ourselves? No more than the cause of health is in them, which recover health, being restored thereunto by practice of art, offered voluntarily, and neither sought for, nor desired. Such is that grace, which the elect find. Neither are we to marvel, if the same be withheld from them, which have both the offer of health, and the very physician also, that maketh the offer. Though grace therefore be lost by desert, yet [it] is not by desert given. It cometh not, in lieu of travail, to him, which willeth or runneth, but, by way of guest, from him, whose purpose is to shew mercy.
For whom he hath known before as his own, with determination to be for ever merciful unto them, those he hath, in the same determination, predestinated to be of our [one?] stamp or character, which is the image of his own Son, in whom, for that cause, they are said to be chosen. Men, thus predestinated in his secret purpose, have their actual vocation or adoption likewise intended unto that fellowship or society which is invisible, and really his true catholic Church, through the grace of the Spirit of Christ given them. Whom his will is effectually to gather unto the society of saints, by the Spirit of Christ, them he hath purposed as effectually to justify through Christ’s righteousness; whom to justify, them to glorify3 , both here, with that beauty of holiness, which the law of Christ prescribeth, and hereafter, as well in body as in soul, with that honour of eternal happiness, which our Lord doth himself enjoy: and till they may enjoy it also, which are his, turneth all things to the help and furtherance of this their good1 : even as all things were converted to good in Christ, than which there cannot be a greater glory.
So that all his foreknown elect are predestinated, called, justified, and advanced unto glory, according to that determination and purpose, which he hath of them: neither is it possible that any other should be glorified, or can be justified, and called, or were predestinated, besides them, which, in that manner, are foreknown: whereupon we find in Scripture the principal effects of God’s perpetually during favour applied only unto them. In that prayer for eternal life, which our Saviour knew could not be made without effect, he excepteth them, for whom he knew his sufferings would be frustrate, and commendeth unto God his own2 ; they are the blessed of God, for whom he ordained his kingdom3 ; to their charge nothing can be laid4 : of them those words of the wise man are meant5 , That none can diminish what God will save. Their temptations God will not suffer to exceed the strength or measure of that grace, which himself hath given. That they should be finally seduced, and clean drawn away from God, is a thing impossible. Such as utterly depart from them, were never of them.
It followeth therefore, 1. That God hath predestinated certain men, not all men. 2. That the cause, moving him hereunto, was not the foresight of any virtue in us at all. 3. That to him the number of his elect is definitely known. 4. That it cannot be but their sins must condemn them, to whom the purpose of his saving mercy doth not extend. 5. That to God’s foreknown elect final continuance of grace is given. 6. That inward grace, whereby to be saved, is deservedly not given unto all men. 7. That no man cometh unto Christ, whom God, by the inward grace of his Spirit, draweth not. 8. And that it is not in every, no not in any man’s own mere ability, freedom, and power, to be saved, no man’s salvation being possible without grace6 . Howbeit, God is no favourer of sloth; and therefore there can be no such absolute decree, touching man’s salvation as on our part includeth no necessity of care and travail1 , but shall certainly take effect, whether we ourselves do wake or sleep2 .Of the necessity of labour to concur on our part with the will of God in justifying and sanctifying his elect, that in the end they may be glorified.
APPENDIX, NO. II.
AN EXCELLENT LETTER, WRITTEN BY MR. G. CRANMER TO MR. R. H.
Printed in the year 16421 .
February, 15982 .
BOOK V. Appendix II. [1.][1.]WHAT posterity is likely to judge of these matters concerning church discipline, we may the better conjecture, if we call to mind what our own age, within few years, upon better experience hath already judged concerning the same. It may be remembered that at first, the greatest part of the learned in the land were either eagerly affected, or favourably inclined that way. The books then written for the most part savoured of the disciplinary style: it sounded every where in pulpits, and in the common phrase of men’s speech: the contrary part began to fear they had taken a wrong course; many which impugned the discipline, yet so impugned it, not as not being the better form of government, but as not so convenient for our state, in regard of dangerous innovations thereby likely to grow. One man3 alone there was, to speak of, (whom let no suspicion of flattery deprive of his deserved commendation,) who in the diffidence of the one part, and courage of the other, stood in the gap, and gave others respite to prepare themselves to their defence; which by the sudden eagerness and violence of their adversaries had otherwise been prevented. Wherein God hath made good unto him his own emprese, Vincit qui patitur1 : for what contumelious indignities he hath at their hands sustained, the world is witness;BOOK V. Appendix II. [2.] and what reward of honour above his adversaries God hath bestowed upon him, themselves (though nothing glad thereof) must needs confess. Now of late years the heat of men towards the Discipline is greatly decayed: their judgments begin to sway on the other side: the learned have weighed it and found it light; wise men conceive some fear, lest it prove not only not the best kind of government, but the very bane and destruction of all government. The cause of this change in men’s opinions may be drawn from the general nature of error, disguised and clothed with the name of truth; which is mightily and violently to possess men at first, but afterwards, the weakness thereof being by time discovered, to lose that reputation which before it had gained. As by the outside of an house the passers by are oftentimes deceived, till they see the conveniency of the rooms within; so by the very name of discipline and reformation men were drawn at first to cast a fancy towards it, but now they have not contented themselves only to pass by and behold afar off the fore-front of this reformed house; they have entered in, even at the special request of the master workmen and chief builders thereof; they have perused the rooms, the lights, the conveniences; they find them not answerable to that report which was made of them, nor to that opinion which upon report they had conceived. So as now the discipline which at first triumphed over all, being unmasked, beginneth to droop and hang down her head.
[2.]This cause of change in opinion concerning the discipline, is proper to the learned, or to such as by them have been instructed: another cause there is more open and more apparent to the view of all, namely, the course of practice which the reformers have had with us from the beginning. The first degree was only some small difference about cap and surplice2 , but not such as either bred division in the church, or tended to the ruin of the government then established. This was peaceable; the next degree more stirring. Admonitions were directed to the parliament in peremptory sort against our whole form of regiment: in defence of them, volumes were published in English, in Latin3 ; yet this was no more than writing. Devices were set on foot to erect the practice of the discipline without authority4 : yet herein some regard of modesty, some moderation was used.BOOK V. Appendix II. [3.] Behold, at length it brake forth into open outrage, first in writing by Martin: in whose kind of dealing these things may be observed. 1. That whereas T. C. and others his great masters had always before set out the discipline as a queen, and as the daughter of God1 , he contrariwise to make her more acceptable to the people, brought her forth as a vice upon the stage2 . 2. Which conceit of his was grounded (as may be supposed) upon this rare policy, that seeing the discipline was by writing refuted, in parliament rejected, in secret corners hunted out and descried, it was imagined that by open railing (which to the vulgar is commonly most plausible) the state ecclesiastical might have been drawn into such contempt and hatred, as the overthrow thereof should have been most grateful to all men, and in a manner desired of the common people. 3. It may be noted (and this I know myself to be true) how some of them, although they could not for shame approve so lewd an action, yet were content to lay hold on it to the advancement of their cause3 , acknowledging therein the secret judgments of God against the Bishops, and hoping that some good might be wrought thereby for his Church, as indeed there was, though not according to their construction. For, 4. contrary to their expectation, that railing spirit did not only not further, but extremely disgrace and prejudice their cause, when it was once perceived from how low degrees of contradiction at first, to what outrage of contumely and slander they were at length proceeded, and were also likely further to proceed.
[3.]A further degree of outrage was in fact. Certain prophets4 did arise, who deeming it not possible that God should suffer that undone which they did so fiercely desire to have done, namely, that his holy saints, the favourers and fathers of the discipline5 , should be enlarged, and delivered from persecution; and seeing no means of deliverance ordinary, were fain to persuade themselves that God must needs raise some extraordinary means: and being persuaded of none so well as of themselves, they forthwith must needs be the instruments of this great work. Hereupon they framed unto themselves an assured hope, that, upon their preaching out of a peasecart1 , all the multitude would have presently joined unto them, and in amazement of mind have asked them, Viri fratres, quid agimus? whereunto it is likely they would have returned an answer far unlike to that of St. Peter, “Such and such are men unworthy to govern, pluck them down; such and such are the dear children of God, let them be advanced.” Of two of these men2 it is meet to speak with all commiseration, yet so that others by their example may receive instruction, and withal some light may appear what stirring affections the discipline is like to inspire, if it light upon apt and prepared minds.
Now, if any man doubt of what society they were, or if the reformers disclaim them, pretending that by them they were condemned, let these points be considered. 1. Whose associates were they before their entering into this frantic passion? whose sermons3did they frequent?BOOK V. Appendix II. [4.]whom did they admire? 2. Even when they were entering into it, Whose advice did they require1? and when they were in, whose approbation? whom advertised they of their purpose? whose assistance by prayers did they request? But we deal injuriously with them to lay this to their charge; for they reproved and condemned it. How? did they disclose it to the magistrate, that it might be suppressed? or were they rather content to stand aloof and see the end of it, and loath to quench the Spirit? No doubt these mad practitioners were of their society, with whom before, and in the practice of their madness they had most affinity. Hereof read Dr. Bancroft’s book2 .
[4.]A third inducement may be to dislike of the discipline, if we consider not only how far the reformers themselves have proceeded, but what others upon their foundations have built3 . Here come the Brownists in the first rank, their lineal descendants, who have seized upon a number of strange opinions; whereof although their ancestors the reformers were never actually possessed, yet by right and interest from them derived, the Brownists and Barrowists hath [have?] taken possession of them. For if the positions of the reformers be true, I cannot see how the main and general conclusions of Brownism should be false. For upon these two points, as I conceive, they stand. 1. That because we have no church1 , they are to sever themselves from us2 . 2. That without civil authority they are to erect a church of their own3 . And if the former of these be true, the latter I suppose will follow. For if above all things men be to regard their salvation, and if out of the Church there be no salvation; it followeth, that if we have no church, we have no means of salvation, and therefore separation from us, in that respect, both lawful and necessary: as also that men so separated from the false and counterfeit church are to associate themselves unto some church; not to ours; to the popish much less; therefore to one of their own making. Now the ground of all these inferences being this, that in our church there is no means of salvation, is out of the reformers’ principles most clearly to be proved. For wheresoever any matter of faith unto salvation necessary is denied, there can be no means of salvation: but in the church of England, the discipline, by them accounted a matter of faith, and necessary to salvation, is not only denied, but impugned, and the professors thereof oppressed: Ergo. Again, (but this reason perhaps is weak,) every true church of Christ acknowledgeth the whole gospel of Christ: the discipline, in their opinion, is a part of the Gospel1 , and yet by our Church resisted: Ergo. Again, the discipline is essentially united to the Church: by which term, essentially, they must mean either an essential part, or an essential property. Both which ways it must needs be, that where that essential discipline is not, neither is there any church. If therefore between them and the Brownists there should be appointed a solemn disputation, whereof with us they have been oftentimes so earnest challengers: it doth not yet appear what other answer they could possibly frame to these and the like arguments, wherewith they might be pressed, but fairly to deny the conclusion (for all the premises are their own2 ), or rather ingeniously [ingenuously?]1 to reverse their own principles before laid, whereon so foul absurdities have been so firmly built.BOOK V. Appendix II. [5.] What further proofs you can bring out of their high words, magnifying the discipline, I leave to your better remembrance: but above all points, I am desirous this one should be strongly enforced against them, because it wringeth them most of all, and is of all others (for aught I see) the most unanswerable. You may notwithstanding say that you would be heartily glad these their positions might so be salved as the Brownists might not appear to have issued out of their loins; but until that be done, they must give us leave to think that they have cast the seed whereout these tares are grown.
[5.]Another set of men there is, which have been content to run on with the reformers for a time, and to make them poor instruments of their own designs. These are a sort of godless politics2 , who perceiving the plot of discipline to consist of these two parts, the overthrow of episcopal, and erection of presbyterial authority, and that this later can take no place till the former be removed, are content to join with them in the destructive part of discipline, bearing them in hand, that in the other also they shall find them as ready. But when time shall come, it may be they would be as loath to be yoked with that kind of regiment, as now they are willing to be released from this. These men’s ends in all their actions is τὸ ἴδιον, their pretence and colour, reformation. Those things which under this colour they have effected to their own good, are, 1. By maintaining a contrary faction, they have kept the clergy always in awe, and thereby made them more pliable and willing to buy their peace.BOOK V. Appendix II. [6.] 2. By maintaining an opinion of equality among ministers, they have made way to their own purposes for devouring cathedral churches and bishops’ livings. 3. By exclaiming against abuses in the Church they have carried their own corrupt dealings in the civil state more covertly. For, such is the nature of the multitude, they are not able to comprehend many things at once, so as being possessed with dislike or liking of any one thing, many other in the mean-time may escape them without being perceived. 4. They have sought to disgrace the clergy in entertaining a conceit in men’s minds, and confirming it by continual practice, that men of learning, and specially of the clergy, which are employed in the chiefest kind of learning, are not to be admitted, or sparingly admitted to matters of state; contrary to the practice of all well-governed commonwealths, and of our own till these late years.
[6.]A third sort of men there is, though not descended from the reformers, yet in part raised and greatly strengthened by them, namely, the cursed crew of Atheists1 . This also is one of those points, which I am desirous you should handle most effectually, and strain yourself therein to all points of motion and affection, as in that of the Brownists, to all strength and sinews of reason. This is a sort most damnable, and yet by the general suspicion of the world at this day most common. The causes of it, which are in the parties themselves, although you handle in the beginning of the fifth book, yet here again they may be touched; but the occasions of help and furtherance which by the reformers have been yielded unto them, are as I conceive, two; senseless preaching, and disgracing of the Ministry; for how should not men dare to impugn that which neither by force of reason nor by authority of persons is maintained? But in the parties themselves these two causes I conceive of Atheism. 1. More abundance of wit than judgment, and of witty than judicious learning; whereby they are more inclined to contradict any thing, than willing to be informed of the truth. They are not therefore men of sound learning for the most part, but smatterers; neither is their kind of dispute so much by force of argument, as by scoffing. Which humour of scoffing and turning matters most serious into merriment, is now become so common, as we are not to marvel what the Prophet means by “the seat of scorners,” nor what the Apostles by foretelling of “scorners to come:” our own age hath verified their speech unto us.BOOK V. Appendix II. [7.] Which also may be an argument against these scoffers and Atheists themselves, seeing it hath been so many ages ago foretold, that such men the later days of the world should afford; which could not be done by any other spirit save that whereunto things future and present are alike. And even for the main question of the resurrection, whereat they stick so mightily, was it not plainly foretold that men should in the later times say, “Where is the promise of his coming?” Against the creation, the ark, and divers other points, exceptions are said to be taken; the ground whereof is superfluity of wit without ground of learning and judgment.
A second cause of Atheism is sensuality, which maketh men desirous to remove all stops and impediments of their wicked life: among which because religion is the chiefest, so as neither in this life without shame they can persist therein, nor (if that be true) without torment in the life to come; they whet their wits to annihilate the joys of heaven, wherein they see (if any such be) they can have no part; and likewise the pains of hell, wherein their portion must needs be very great. They labour therefore not that they may not deserve those pains, but that, deserving them, there may be no such pains to seize upon them. But what conceit can be imagined more base than that man should strive to persuade himself even against the secret instinct (no doubt) of his own mind, that his soul is as the soul of a beast, mortal and corruptible with the body? Against which barbarous opinion their own Atheism is a very strong argument. For were not the soul a nature separable from the body, how could it enter into discourse of things merely spiritual, and nothing at all pertaining to the body? Surely the soul were not able to conceive any thing of heaven, no not so much as to dispute against heaven and against God, if there were not in it somewhat heavenly, and derived from God.
[7.]The last which have received strength and encouragement from the reformers, are Papists; against whom although they are most bitter enemies, yet unwittingly they have given them great advantage. For what can any enemy rather desire than the breach and dissension of those which are confederates against him? Wherein they are to remember, that if our communion with papists in some few ceremonies do so much strengthen them, as is pretended, how much more doth this division and rent among ourselves; especially seeing it is maintained to be, not in light matters only, but even in matter of faith and salvation? Which over-reaching speech of theirs, because it is so open to advantage both for the Barrowist and the Papist, we are to wish and hope for, that they will acknowledge it to have been spoken rather in heat of affection, than with soundness of judgment;BOOK V. Appendix II. [8.] and that through their exceeding love to that creature of discipline which themselves have bred, nourished, and maintained, their mouth in commendation of her did somewhat overflow.
[8.]From hence you may proceed (but the means of connexion I leave to yourself) to another discourse, which I think very meet to be handled either here or elsewhere at large: the parts whereof may be these: 1. That in this cause between them and us, men are to sever the proper and essential points and controversy, from those which are accidental. The most essential and proper are these two: overthrow of episcopal, erection of presbyterial authority. But in these two points whosoever joineth with them is accounted of their number; whosoever in all other points agreeth with them, yet thinketh the authority of bishops not unlawful, and of elders not necessary, may justly be severed from their retinue. Those things therefore which either in the persons, or in the laws and orders themselves are faulty, may be complained on, acknowledged and amended; yet they no whit the nearer their main purpose. For what if all errors by them supposed in our Liturgy were amended, even according to their own hearts’ desire; if non-residence, pluralities, and the like, were utterly taken away; are their lay-elders therefore presently authorized, their sovereign ecclesiastical jurisdiction established?
But even in their complaining against the outward and accidental matters in church-government, they are many ways faulty. 1. In their end which they propose to themselves. For in declaiming against abuses, their meaning is not to have them redressed, but by disgracing the present state, to make way for their own discipline. As therefore in Venice, if any senator should discourse against the power of their senate, as being either too sovereign or too weak in government, with purpose to draw their authority to a moderation, it might well be suffered; but not so, if it should appear he spake with purpose to induce another state by depraving the present: so in all causes belonging either to church or commonwealth, we are to have regard what mind the complaining part doth bear, whether of amendment, or of innovation, and accordingly either to suffer or suppress it. Their objection therefore is frivolous, “Why, may not men speak against abuses?” Yes, but with desire to cure the part affected, not to destroy the whole. 2. A second fault is in their manner of complaining, not only because it is for the most part in bitter and reproachful terms, but also because it is unto the common people, judges incompetent and insufficient, both to determine any thing amiss, [and] for want of skill and authority to amend it.BOOK V. Appendix II. [9.] Which also discovereth their intent and purpose to be rather destructive than corrective. 3. Thirdly, those very exceptions which they take, are frivolous and impertinent. Some things indeed they accuse as impious: which if they may appear to be such, God forbid they should be maintained. Against the rest it is only alleged, that they are idle ceremonies without use, and that better and more profitable might be devised. Wherein they are doubly deceived: for neither is it a sufficient plea to say, “This must give place, because a better may be devised;” and in our judgments of better and worse, we oftentimes conceive amiss, when we compare those things which are in device with those which are in practice: for the imperfections of the one are hid, till by time and trial they be discovered; the others are already manifest and open to all.
But last of all (which is a point in my opinion of great regard, and which I am desirous to have enlarged) they do not see that for the most part when they strike at the state ecclesiastical, they secretly wound the civil state. For personal faults, what can be said against the church, which may not also agree to the commonwealth? In both states men have always been and will be always men, sometimes blinded with error, most commonly perverted by passions: many unworthy have been and are advanced in both, many worthy not regarded. As for abuses which they pretend to be in the laws themselves, when they inveigh against non-residence; do they take it a matter lawful or expedient in the civil state, for a man to have a great and gainful office in the north, himself continually remaining in the south? He that hath an office let him attend his office. When they condemn plurality of livings spiritual to the pit of hell, what think they of infinite [infinity?] of temporal promotions? By the great philosopher (Pol. lib. ii. cap. 9.1 ) it is forbidden as a thing most dangerous to commonwealths, that by the same man many great offices should be exercised. When they deride our ceremonies as vain and frivolous, were it hard to apply their exceptions even to those civil ceremonies, which at the coronation, in parliament, and all courts of justice, are used? Were it hard to argue, even against circumcision, the ordinance of God, as being a cruel ceremony: against the passover, as being ridiculous; shod, girt, a staff in their hand, to eat a lamb?
BOOK V. Appendix II. [10.]To conclude: You may exhort the clergy, (or what if you direct your conclusion not to the clergy in general, but only to the learned in or of both universities?) you may exhort them to a due consideration of all things, and to a right esteem and valuing of each thing in that degree wherein it ought to stand: for it oftentimes falleth out, what men have either devised themselves, or greatly delighted in, the price and the excellency thereof they do admire above desert. The chiefest labour of a Christian should be to know, of a minister to preach Christ crucified; in regard whereof not only worldly things, but things otherwise precious, even the discipline itself is vile and base: whereas now, by the heat of contention and violence of affection, the zeal of men towards the one hath greatly decayed their love to the other. Hereunto therefore they are to be exhorted, to preach “Christ crucified,” the mortification of the flesh, the renewing of the spirit; not those things which in time of strife seem precious, but passions being allayed, are vain and childish.
end of vol. ii.
[1 ][For an account of these Fragments, published for the first time in 1836, see the preface to the first volume. Archdeacon Cotton, to whom the readers of Hooker are indebted, not only (in conjunction with Dr. Elrington) for the discovery and verification of these and other fragments, but also for the labour of preparing them for the press, states that “they are in the hand of an amanuensis, the same who copied the ‘Sermon on Pride,’ which they immediately follow, the folios being bound up in the volume in the exact order in which they are here given.”]
[2 ][The passage in the Christian Letter, to which Hooker is here addressing himself, is p. 11, art. 5. “Of freewill. The Church of England professeth this ground of faith, ‘Without the grace of God (which is by Christ) preventing us, that we will, and working together while we will, we are nothing at all able to do the works of pietie pleasing and acceptable unto God.’ You to our understanding write clean contrarie: namely, ‘there is in the will of man naturallie that freedome, whereby it is apt to take or refuse anie particular object whatsoever, being presented unto it.’ ”]
[3 ][i. e. Anathema. In the same sense Jackson, Works, iii. 788. “His curse be upon him who will not unfeignedly acknowledge the absolute infiniteness as well of His power as of His goodness,” vol. xi. p. 376. Oxf. edit.]
[4 ][S. Aug. de Lib. Arbitr. iii. 8. “Voluntas nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate. Porro quia est in potestate, libera est nobis.” t. i. p. 613 F.]
[1 ]Gen. vi. 5.
[2 ][De Trin. ii. 35. p. 806 D. E. ed. Bened. “Ut enim natura humani corporis cessantibus officii sui causis erit otiosa; nam oculis, nisi lumen aut dies sit, nullus ministerii erit usus; ut aures, nisi vox sonusve reddatur, munus suum non recognoscent: ut nares, nisi odor fragraverit, in quo officio erunt nescient; non quod his deficiet natura per causam, sed usus habetur ex causa: ita et animus, &c.”]
[3 ][Wisdom of Sol. viii. 1. διοικει̑ τὰ πάντα χρηστω̑ς. Tho. Aquin. Summa cont. Gent. iv. 56. “Sicut cæteris rebus, ita homini Deus providet secundum ejus conditionem.”]
[1 ][See Bishop Bull’s English Works, iii. 305-360.]
[1 ]“Quid est attrahere, nisi prædicare, nisi Scripturarum consolationibus excitare, increpationibus deterrere, desideranda proponere, intentare metuenda, judicium comminari, præmium polliceri?” Faust. de lib. Arbitr. lib. i. c. 17. [in Bibl. Patr. Paris. 1610. t. iv. p. 822.]
[2 ][So Lord Bacon; “deaster quidam.” Medit. Sacræ, de Hæres. Works, x. 329. Lond. 1803. But see also Davison on Prophecy, p. 478. ed. 1824.]
[3 ]“Nudæ libertati arbitrii remota Dei gratia.” Prosp. con. Colla. c. 8. [ad calc. Cassian. ed. Atrebati (Arras) 1628, p. 889. The passage objected to in Cassian is, “In his omnibus et gratia Dei et libertas nostri declaratur arbitrii; et quia etiam suis interdum motibus homo ad virtutum appetitus possit extendi, semper vero a Domino indigeat adjuvari.” Prosper answers, “Et ubi est, quod regulari definitione præmissum est, Non solum actuum, verum etiam cogitationum bonarum a Deo esse principium, qui et incipit quæ bona sunt et exsequitur et consummat in nobis? Ecce hic etiamsi bonis cœptis necessarium Dei fateris auxilium, ipsos tamen laudabiles motus appetitusque virtutum, remota gratia Dei, nudæ libertati adscribis arbitrii: ut boni salubresque conatus nequeant quidem proficere nisi Deus adjuvet; possint tamen, etiamsi non a Deo inspirentur, incipere.”]
[1 ][2 Cor. xii. 9.]
[2 ][Deut. xxx. 15.]
[3 ]“Vide rationes quibus peccatores seducti delinquant,” Philo Jud. p. 109. [πάντα γὰρ, τὸ του̑ λόγου δὴ του̑το, κινου̑σι λίθον, ϕάσκοντες, οὐκ οἰκία ψυχη̑ς τὸ σω̑μα; διὰ τί οὐ̑ν οἰκίας, ὡς μὴ γένοιτο ἐρείπιος, οὐκ ἐπίμελησόμεθα; οὐκ ὀϕθαλμὸς καὶ ὡ̑τα καὶ ὁ τω̑ν ἄλλων χορὸς αἰσθήσεων ὥσπερ ψυχη̑ς δοροϕόροι καὶ ϕίλοι; συμμάχους οὐ̑ν καὶ ϕίλους οὐκ ἐν ἴσῳ τιμητέον ἑαυτοι̑ς; ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ ἀπολαύσεις, καὶ τὰς παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον τέρψεις, τοι̑ς τεθνεω̑σιν ἢ τοι̑ς μηδὲ γενομένοις τὸ παράπαν ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τοι̑ς ζω̑σιν ἡ ϕύσις ἐδημιούργει; . . . τοιουτονί τινα δόλιχον ἀπομηκύναντες λόγῳ, νικᾳ̑ν τοὺς οὐκ εἰωθότας σοϕιστευειν ἔδοξαν·] “Causa cur tales rationes prævalent non est obscuritas sed imbecilitas naturæ.” ib. [αἰτία δὲ τη̑ς νικη̑ς, οὐκ ἡ τω̑ν περιγεγενημένων ἰσχὺς, ἀλλ’ ἡ περὶ ταυ̑τα τω̑ν ἀντιπάλων ἀσθένεια.] Ib. “Causa imbecilitatis imperitia,” p. 143. [ἁρμόττει δὲ τούτοις πα̑σιν, ἀρχομένοις, προκόπτουσι, τετελειωμένοις, βιου̑ν ἀϕιλονείκως, καὶ μὴ τῳ̑ τω̑ν σοϕιστω̑ν ἐπαποδύεσθαι πολέμῳ· . . . εἰ γὰρ εἰς του̑τον ἀϕίξονται τὸν ἀγω̑να, πρὸς ἐμπειροπολέμους ἰδιω̑ται, παντελω̑ς ἁλώσονται.] “Imperitiæ segnitia: offert n. sese sapientia volentibus eam acquirere: causa est segnitiæ originalis corruptela: corruptelæ hujus medicina gratia.”
[1 ][See E. P. i. vii. 7.]
[2 ]“Vultis Deum ex animæ ipsius testimonio comprobemus, quæ licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus primis [pravis] circumscripta, licet libidinibus et concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis diis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, et sanitatem suam patitur, et Deum &c. [et sanitatem suam patitur, et Deum nominat.”] Tertull. cont. Gent. [c. 17. Compare the treatise De Testimonio Animæ.]
[3 ][See Chr. Letter, p. 11. “Shew us . . . how your positions agree with our church and the Scriptures. If you say you understand reason and will helped by the grace of God, then tell us how we may perceive it by your writing, which putteth difference betwixt naturall and supernaturall truth and laws.”
[1 ][See his Institutions, i. 3.]
[2 ][See Ephes. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.]
[3 ]Rom. viii. 7.
[4 ][Ch. Letter, p. 11. “May we not suspect that your whole discourse is subtle and cunning?” And p. 12. “Shew us the true meaning of St. Paul, and how he fitteth your discourse in this place, namely when he saith, Rom. viii. 7, &c.”]
[5 ][See E. P. i. vii. 6. “There is in the will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it.” And vii. 7. “There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search it out.”]
[1 ][See Collect for Easter Day.]
[2 ][V. 4.]
[1 ][See especially among his Epistles, lib. x. 54, the memorial addressed to Theodosius and Valentinian for the restoration of the altar of Victory. It may be read in St. Ambrose’s works, t. ii. 828. ed. Bened. and St. Ambrose’s answer, p. 833.]
[2 ]Vide Thomam, 1, 2. qu. 109, art. 2. “De Gratia. Deus respectu boni actus eliciendi a libero arbitrio potest infundere triplex auxilium. 1. Auxilium universale sicut causa prima influit in secundam, qui influxus modificatur in secunda causa secundum materiam causæ secundæ. Aliter enim recipitur in causa naturali, aliter in causa libera. In causa naturali sic influit, quod cooperatur ei determinate ad unum: causæ m. liberæ cooperatur ad opposita secundum quod ea sese determinat; quare hoc auxilium est necessarium in omni actu liberi arbitrii tam bono quam malo. 2. Auxilium speciale influit ad actum moraliter bonum, et est necessarium tempore corruptæ naturæ, propter declinationem causatam in viribus animæ, ex culpa originali, non autem erat necessarium in natura integra, propter tranquillitatem quæ erat in viribus animæ, ex justitia originali, unde tempore illo sufficiebat universale auxilium ad eliciendos bonos actus moraliter: Potentiæ motivæ actus in sano et infirmo. 3. Auxilium speciale supernaturale necessarium est ad eliciendum meritorium et condignum fælicitate, vel potius si fuse loqui volumus, ad actum Deo acceptabilem et gratiosum inter quos principalis actus est credere, fides autem non per se tanquam qualitas, sed ratione objecti Christi. s. et ipsa redditur acceptabilis, et reddit alios actus omnes. Solus enim Christus meruit fælicitatem quam nos in ipso obtinemus ex gratuito favore Dei, non propter operum dignitatem. Remunerantur quidem opera, sed gratiose non propter ipsorum dignitatem. Cum sint enim in nobis duo principia agendi, Dei gratia et natura nostra, sapiunt actus nostri etiam optimi utrumque principium.” [This note contains the substance, but not the words, of the place in Aquinas.]
[1 ]“Ex voluntate perversa facta est libido, et dum servitur libidini facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur facta est necessitas.” August. Confess. [viii. 5.] “Quomodo habitus boni et mali necessitant voluntatem.”
[2 ][Inter Ep. Aug. t. ii. p. 825. “Consentiunt omnem hominem in Adam periisse, nec inde quenquam posse proprio arbitrio liberari. Sed id conveniens asserunt veritati, vel congruum prædicationi, ut cum prostratis et nunquam suis viribus surrecturis annunciatur obtinendæ salutis occasio; eo merito quo voluerint et crediderint a suo morbo se posse sanari, et ipsius fidei augmentum et totius sanitatis suæ consequantur effectum. . . . . . . Quod enim dicitur, ‘Crede et salvus eris,’ unum horum exigi asserunt, aliud offerri; ut propter id quod exigitur, si redditum fuerit, id quod offertur deinceps tribuatur . . . Quod autem dicit sanctitas tua, neminem perseverare, nisi perseverandi virtute percepta; hactenus accipiunt, ut quibus datur, inerti licet, præcedenti tamen proprio arbitrio tribuatur: quod ad hoc tantum liberum asserunt, ut velit vel nolit admittere medicinam. Cæterum et ipsi abominari se et damnare testantur, si quis quidquam virium in aliquo remansisse, quo ad sanitatem progredi possit existimet.”]
[1 ][Namely, the second council of Orange, held 529, at which Cæsarius of Arles presided: the occasion of it being the work of Faustus Regiensis, quoted above, p. 540. See Concil. iv. 1666.]
[2 ][The second council of Milevis in Numidia, at which St. Augustin assisted, who appears to have drawn up the canons there enacted: the eight first relate to the Pelagian controversy, and are armed with an anathema; which is not the case with those of Orange, mentioned above. Conc. ii. 1537. 416.]
[1 ][De Voc. Gent. ii. 4. in Bibl. Patr. Colon. t. v. part. 3, p. 175. Cœlum ergo cunctaque cælestia, mare et terra, omniaque quæ in eis sunt, consono speciei suæ ordinationisque concentu protestabantur gloriam Dei, et prædicatione perpetua majestatem sui loquebantur auctoris; et tamen maximus numerus hominum, qui (al. quia) vias voluntatis suæ ambulare permissus est, non intellexit, nec secutus hanc legem est, et odor vitæ, qui spirabat ad vitam, factus est ei odor mortis ad mortem; ut etiam in illis visibilibus testimoniis disceretur, quod litera occideret, spiritus autem vivificaret. Quod ergo in Israel per constitutionem legis et prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturæ testimonia et bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt.”]
[3 ]Tertull. [Novatian] de Trinitate, [c. 29. “Hic est qui inexplebiles cupiditates coercet, immoderatas libidines frangit, illicitos ardores extinguit, flagrantes impetus vincit, ebrietates rejicit, avaritias repellit, luxuriosas comessationes fugit; caritates nectit, affectiones constringit, sectas repellit, regulam veritatis expedit, hæreticos revincit, improbos foras exspuit, evangelia custodit.” ad calc. Tert. p. 742. ed. Pamel.]
[1 ]Hilar. de Trin. lib. 2°. [in fine p. 807. “Hoc usque in consummationem sæculi nobiscum, hoc exspectationis nostræ solatium, hoc in donorum operationibus futuræ spei pignus est, hoc mentium lumen, hic splendor animorum est. Hic ergo Spiritus Sanctus expetendus est, promerendus est, et deinceps præceptorum fide atque observatione retinendus.”]
[2 ]Ps. cxli.
[3 ]Ps. xxxiv. 13.
[4 ]Prov. iv.
[5 ]Philipp. iv.
[1 ][The sense seems to shew that the Dublin MS. has here a wrong stop; and that it should stand “by faith only: in a word”]
[2 ]Tertull. lib. v. contra Marc. [c. i. “Hæc figurarum sacramenta:” (he is speaking of certain historical allegories which he finds in the Old Testament:) and, c. iv. he says of the history of Hagar, “allegoriæ habere sacramentum.”] August. cont. advers. Legis et Proph. lib. i. [c. 24. (speaking of S. John vi. 54, 56,) “verbis sacramento congruis pascens animam credentem.”] et de Gen. ad lit. lib. viii. cap. 4, et 5. [“Erat in lignis cæteris alimentum, in illo autem sacramentum.” “Potuisse autem per lignum, i. e. per corpoream creaturam tanquam sacramento quodam significari sapientiam in paradiso corporali, ille credendum non existimat, qui vel tam multa in scripturis rerum spiritalium corporalia sacramenta non videt, vel hominem primum cum ejusmodi aliquo sacramento vivere non debuisse contendit,” &c.] Contra Faust. lib. xix. c. 14. [“Antiqui justi, qui sacramentis illis intelligebant venturam prænuntiari revelationem fidei.”] De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. ii. c. 26. [“Non unius modi est sanctificatio: nam et catechumenos secundum quendam modum suum per signum Christi et orationem manus impositionis puto sanctificari; et quod accipiunt, quamvis non sit corpus Christi, sanctum est tamen, et sanctius quam cibi quibus alimur, quoniam sacramentum est.”] De Symb. ad Catech. lib. iv. c. 1. [“Omnia sacramenta quæ acta sunt et aguntur in vobis per ministerium servorum Dei, exorcismis, orationibus, canticis spiritalibus, insufflationibus, cilicio, inclinatione cervicum, humilitate pedum,” &c.]
[1 ]August. de Doctr. Christ. lib. iii. c. 9. [“Posteaquam resurrectione Domini nostri manifestissimum indicium nostræ libertatis illuxit, nec eorum quidem signorum, quæ jam intelligimus, operatione gravi onerati sumus; sed quædam pauca pro multis, eademque factu facillima, et intellectu augustissima, et observatione castissima ipse Dominus et apostolica tradidit disciplina; sicut est Baptismi sacramentum, et celebratio corporis et sanguinis Domini.”]
[2 ][two? When]
[3 ]August. Epist. 118. [al. 54. t. ii. 124. “Tenere te volo, quod est hujus disputationis caput, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, sicut ipse in Evangelio loquitur, leni jugo suo nos subdidisse et sarcinæ levi: unde sacramentis numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, signifcatione præstantissimis, societatem novi populi colligavit, sicut est Baptismus Trinitatis nomine consecratus, communicatio corporis et sanguinis ipsius, et si quid aliud in Scripturis canonicis commendatur.”]
[4 ]August. in Evangel. Johan. Tract. 15. [c. 8. “De latere in cruce pendentis lancea percusso sacramenta Ecclesiæ profluxerunt.”]
[1 ][De Justificatione, lib. i. 16.]
[1 ][In Cœna Domini Serm. ii. t. i. 187. Paris 1586. “Sicut in exterioribus diversa sunt signa, &c. . . variæ sunt investituræ secundum ea de quibus investimur: v. g. investitur canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per baculum et annulum simul; sicut inquam in hujusmodi rebus est, sic et divisiones gratiarum diversis sunt traditæ sacramentis.”]
[1 ][Vid. Scot. ad 1 Sentent. dist. i. quæst. iv. et v. ed. Wading. t. viii. p. 78, &c.]
[2 ][Lib. iv. dist. i. c. 1. “Sacramentum proprie dicitur quod ita signum est gratiæ Dei et invisibilis gratiæ forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat.”]
[1 ][See Chr. Letter, p. 15.]
[1 ]Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται. Aristot. de Interpr. c. 9. [t. i. 60. ed. Duval.]
[1 ]Psalm cxxxix. 2; Esai. xli. 22, 23; Eccles[iasticus] xxiii. 19, 20; xxxix. 19, 20; Hebr. iv. 13.
[2 ]Οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς γνω̑σιν οὔτε πρὸς δύναμιν δυνατὸν προσγενέσθαι τῳ̑ Θεῳ̑ ὕστερον ὃ μὴ πρότερον εἰ̑χε. Justin. [i. e. a writer in his name] Resp. ad Græc. [p. 539 D. ed. Bened.]
[1 ]1 Sam. xxiii. 11, 12.
[1 ]Sap. iv. 11.
[2 ]Contra Marcion. lib. ii. c. 2. “[Deus tunc maxime magnus, cum homini pusillus; et tunc maxime optimus, cum homini non bonus; et tunc maxime unus, cum homini duo aut plures.”]
[1 ]Rom. ix. 20.
[2 ]“Nihil in ista totius creaturæ amplissima quadam immensaque republica est, quod non de interiori atque intelligibili aula Summi Imperatoris aut jubeatur, aut permittatur.” Aug. de Trin. 3. 4. [t. viii. 797, 8.]
[3 ]Rom. ii. 8.
[1 ]Acts xvii. 31; Psalm cxv. 3; Esai. xlvi. 10; Hest. xiii. 9.
[3 ][Wisdom viii. 1.]
[4 ]Sap. viii. 12.
[1 ][Confess. lib. xii. c. 7. “Tu eras, et aliud nihil unde fecisti cælum et terram, duo quædam; unum prope te, alterum prope nihil: unum quo superior tu esses, alterum quo inferius nihil esset.” t. i. p. 211 F.]
[2 ]Sap. [Sir.] xv. 14.
[1 ]“Nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inventus, non voluntate.” Tertull. contra Marc. 2. [c. vi.]
[1 ][Cont. Marcion. ii. 7. “Exigere a Deo debes et gravitatem summam, et fidem præcipuam in omni institutione ejus: ut desinas quærere, an Deo nolente potuerit quid evenire. Tenens enim gravitatem et fidem Dei boni, sed rationalibus institutis ejus vindicandas, nec illud miraberis, quod Deus non intercesserit adversus ea quæ noluit evenire; ut conservaret ea quæ voluit.”]
[2 ]Jude 6.
[3 ]John viii. 44.
[4 ]James i. 14 [13?]; 1 John ii. 16; 1 John i. 5; Matt. xix. 17; Psa. v. 5; Esai. lxv. 12; Zach. viii. 17; Eccles[iasticus] xv. 11.
[1 ]“Omne malum aut timore aut pudore [natura perfudit.]” Tertull. cont. Gent. p. 564. [Apol. c. 1.]
[2 ]Syr. xv. 12.
[3 ]James i. 13.
[4 ]Iren. iv. 47, 48.
[5 ][In two Tracts published 1544, 1547. See his collected Tracts in Theology, Genev. 1597. p. 501, 540.]
[1 ][S. Aug. Serm. ccxcix. § 11. t. v. 1217. “Dicunt, non de peccato nos mori, quantum pertinet ad corporis mortem, sed naturæ esse quod morimur, et moriturum fuisse Adam etiamsi non peccasset.”]
[2 ]Rom. ix. 22.
[1 ][Rather, Amos iii. 6.]
[1 ][Sent. i. dist. xlv. art. 4. “Utrum voluntas Dei distinguatur in voluntatem beneplaciti et voluntatem signi.” . . . “Magna est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinæ voluntatis, quia et beneplacitum Dei est voluntas ejus, et signum beneplaciti ejus, dicitur voluntas ejus. Sed beneplacitum ejus æternum est, signum vero beneplaciti ejus non. Et consonat rerum effectibus beneplacitum ipsius, et ipsi effectus rerum ab eo non discordant. Fit enim omne quod beneplacito vult fieri, et omne quod non vult fieri nequaquam fit. Non ita autem est de signis, quia præcepit Deus multis ea, quæ non faciunt, et prohibet quæ non cavent, et consulit quæ non implent.” This distinction was perhaps in the minds of the framers of the last sentence of the seventeenth Article of our Church.]
[2 ][De Orthod. Fide, lib. ii. c. 29. t. i. p. 190. ed. Le Quien. χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγουμένως θέλει πάντας σωθη̑ναι, καὶ τη̑ς βασιλείας αὐτου̑ τυχει̑ν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ κολάσαι ἔπλασεν ἡμα̑ς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μετασχει̑ν τη̑ς ἀγαθότητος αὐτου̑, ὡς ἀγαθός· ἁμαρτάνοντας δὲ θέλει κολάζεσθαι, ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγεται οὐ̑ν, τὸ μὲν πρω̑τον, προηγούμενον θέλημα, καὶ εὐδοκία, ἐξ αὐτου̑ ὄν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον, ἐπόμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις, ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας· καὶ αὕτη διττή· ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, καὶ παιδευτικὴ πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἡ δὲ ἀπογνωστικὴ πρὸς τελείαν κόλασιν. Comp. E. P. V. xlix. 3.]
[3 ]Ezech. xviii. [23, 32.]
[4 ]De Incar. et Gra. c. 16. [“Legalis quoque auditus non solum neminem de potestate tenebrarum eripuit, quin etiam peccatoribus cumulum prævaricationis adjecit. Sine gratia quippe fidei gravius lex agnita quam ignorata condemnat. Ubi quantum ignorantia peccati minuitur, tantum reatus peccatoris augetur.” p. 240. ed. Raynaud. 1633.]
[1 ]1 Tim. 4. [10.] Servator omnium ma- (sic) [maxime credentium?]
[2 ]John vi.; Esai. liii.; 1 John ii.; 2 Cor. v.; 2 Pet. ii. 1.
[3 ]Heb. ii. 9.
[1 ][Ubi supra.]
[1 ][Proposit. ex Epist. ad Rom. Expos. § 62. sup. c. ix. 19. “Sic respondent (Apostolus) ut intelligamus, . . . patere posse prima merita fidei et impietatis, quomodo Deus præscius eligat credituros et damnet incredulos; nec illos ex operibus eligens, nec istos ex operibus damnans; sed illorum fidei præstans ut bene operentur, et istorum impietatem obdurans deserendo ut male operentur.” Ibid. § 60. sup. c. ix. 11-13. “Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujusquam in præscientia, quæ ipse daturus est; sed fidem elegit in præscientia; ut quem sibi crediturum esse præscivit, ipsum elegerit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam vitam æternam consequeretur.” t. iii. pars 2. 918, 916. comp. Epist. Hilar. § 3. ap. S. Aug. t. x. 786.]
[2 ][Retract. i. c. 23. 2, 3. t. i. 34. De Prædestin. Sanct. c. iii. t. x. 793.]
[1 ][Vide (int. al.) De Nat. et Grat. c. 5. t. x. 129 G. Contr. Julian. v. c. 6. p. 636 C. De Corrept. et Grat. c. xiii. p. 772 B. et c. vii. p. 757.]
[2 ][Among the rest, the monastery of Adrumetum was especially disturbed, which gave occasion to the treatise de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, and to that de Correptione et Gratia. See the correspondence of St. Augustin with Valentinus, t. ii. 791-9.]
[3 ][See the letters of Prosper and Hilary to S. Aug. t. x. 779-787.]
[4 ][Prosper. ap. Aug. x. 782. See hereafter, p. 581. note 5.]
[5 ][Ibid. 786. “Præscientiam, et prædestinationem, vel propositum, ad id valere contendunt, ut eos præscierit, vel prædestinaverit, vel proposuerit, eligere, qui fuerant credituri . . . Nolunt autem ita . . . perseverantiam prædicari, ut non vel suppliciter emereri vel amitti contumaciter possit.” It appears from Prosper’s letter, that many of the objectors to absolute predestination did not share the scruple about preventing grace. See § 3, 4.]
[1 ][He being Bishop of Arles: although the Benedictine editor doubts their identity.]
[2 ][Prosper, ubi sup. § 7. “Possumus quidem ad non credendum esse constantes, sed ad auctoritatem talia sentientium non sumus pares.”]
[3 ][Hil. ubi sup. § 10. “Nolo sanctitas tua sic me arbitretur hæc scribere, quasi de iis quæ nunc edidisti ego dubitem.” . . . . § 9. “Tuæ sanctæ prudentiæ est dispicere quid facto opus sit, ut talium et tantorum superetur vel temperetur intentio.” Prosper, § 9, intimates that Hilary (if it were the same Hilary) was among the number of the objectors.]
[4 ][Prosper. ubi supr. § 8. “Digneris aperire. . . . . quomodo per istam præoperantem et cooperantem gratiam liberum non impediatur arbitrium.”]
[5 ][Id. ibid. “Illud etiam qualiter diluatur, quæsumus, patienter insipientiam nostram ferendo, demonstres, quod retractatis priorum de hac re opinionibus, pene omnium par invenitur et una sententia, qua propositum et prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperant; ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa honoris, alios contumeliæ fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusque præviderit, et sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio qua futurus esset voluntate et actione præsciverit.” Hil. Ep. ad. Aug. § 8. “Parvulorum causam ad exemplum majorum non patiuntur adferri. Quam et tuam sanctitatem dicunt eatenus adtigisse, ut incertum esse volueris, ac potius de eorum pœnis malueris dubitari. . . Hoc etiam de aliorum libris, quorum est in Ecclesia auctoritas, faciunt, quod perspicit sanctitas tua non parum posse juvare contradictores, nisi majora, aut certe vel paria proferantur a nobis.”]
[6 ][Prosp. ubi supr. “Quemadmodum per hanc præordinationem propositi Dei, quo fideies fiunt qui præordinati sunt ad vitam æternam, nemo eorum qui cohortandi sunt impediatur, nec occasionem negligentiæ habeant, si se prædestinatos esse desperent.” Hil. ubi supr. § 5. “Asserunt inutilem exhortandi consuetudinem, si nihil in homine remansisse dicitur, quod correptio valeat excitare . . . . Si sic prædestinati sunt, inquiunt, ad utramque partem, ut de aliis ad alios nullus possit accedere, quo pertinet tanta extrinsecus correptionis instantia?”]
[1 ][E. g. Tho. Aquin. Quæst. de Verit. q. xxiv. art. i. Resp. ad 13m. “Ex præscientia Dei, non potest concludi quod actus nostri sint necessarii necessitate absoluta, quæ dicitur necessitas consequentis; sed necessitate conditionata, quæ dicitur necessitas consequentiæ.” t. viii. 443. f. Venet. 1593.]
[2 ][I.e. De Prædestinatione Sanctorum, De Dono Perseverantiæ, and perhaps, in part, the second reply to Julian, which St. Augustine did not live to finish. But this latter Hooker had not seen. It was first published by Vignier in 1653.]
[3 ][The letters of Hilary and Prosper are dated by the Benedictines 429: St. Augustin died 430, Aug. 28.]
[4 ][Prosper (having been, as is supposed, twenty-two years Bishop of Riez in Provence) died June 25, 466. See his Life prefixed to his works, Lyons 1539.]
[5 ][See his letter to the bishops of Gaul, 431, in which at the request of Prosper and Hilary he gives what was interpreted to be an official sanction to the views of St. Augustin in his later works. See Concil. ii. 1612, and Prosper contr. Collatorem (Cassian.) sub fin. (cap. 21.) p. 163, 164: who states amongst other things that Cælestine caused Pelagius’s most active supporter, Cælestius, to be exiled from Italy. “Nec vero segniore cura ab hoc eodem morbo Britannias liberavit, quando quosdam inimicos gratiæ solum suæ originis occupantes” (for Pelagius, as is well known, was a Briton) “etiam ab illo secreto exclusit Oceani; et ordinato Scotis Episcopo, dum Romanam insulam studet servare catholicam, fecit etiam barbaram Christianam.”]
[6 ][Prosper. de Promiss. et Prædict. Dei, dimid. Temp. c. vi. “In Italia quoque nobis apud Campaniam constitutis, dum venerabilis et apostolico honore nominandus Papa Leo Manichæos subverteret, et contereret Pelagianos et maxime Julianum,” &c. p. 111 A. Photius, Biblioth. c. 54. Πρόσπερός τις, ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἀληθω̑ς του̑ Θεου̑, λιβέλλους κατ’ αὐτω̑ν ἐπιδεδωκὼς, ἀϕανει̑ς αὐτοὺς ἀπειργάσατο, ἔτι Λέοντος του̑ προειρημένου τὸν Ῥωμαϊκὸν θρόνον ἰθύνοντος. See two Epistles of St. Leo to the bishops of the Venetian province, circ. 444, with directions what kind of recantation should be required of the Pelagians returning to the Church; which imply a considerable movement of that kind. Concil. iii. 1388, 90.]
[1 ][Prosper. Chron. Theodos. xvii. et Festo Coss. ( 439.) “Hæc tempestate Julianus Athelenensis jactantissimus Pelagiani erroris assertor, quem dudum amissi episcopatus intemperans cupido exagitabat, multimoda arte fallendi correctionis spem præferens, molitus [molitur?] in communionem Ecclesiæ irrepere; sed his insidiis Sixtus Papa diaconi Leonis hortatu vigilanter occurrens nullum aditum pestiferis conatibus patere permisit; et ita omnes catholicos defectione fallacis bestiæ gaudere fecit, quasi tunc primum superbissimam hæresin apostolicus gladius detruncasset.” In Bibl. Patr. Colon. t. v. pars iii. 193.]
[2 ]Anno 430. [This date in the Dublin Transcript seems to have strayed from its place: it being the date of St. Augustin’s death, mentioned above; whereas the second council of Orange was held 529. From the ninth to the twenty-fourth of what are called the Arausican Canons are dicta of St. Augustin on the subjects of grace and free-will, which had been mostly extracted by Prosper in his Sentences, and may therefore with much probability be supposed to have been adopted by that council from him. See Concil. ii. 1099. ed. Harduin.]
[3 ][That is, in the bishopric of Riez: but Tillemont seems to have demonstrated that Prosper never was Bishop of Riez. Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire Ecclésiastique, t. xvi. p. 27.]
[4 ][De lib. Arbitr. lib. i. c. 1, 2.]
[5 ][In the rest of the same treatise.] “Priorem volunt obedientiam quam gratiam, ut initium salutis ex eo quod Salvator [qui salvatur, non ex eo credendum sit stare qui salvat.” Prosp. ap. Aug. x. 782. Mr. Gibbings states, that this unfinished sentence is written on the line “Prosper’s successor,” &c. in the D. MS. and remarks that the reading to which Hooker refers may allude to St. John vii. 17.]
[6 ][Bishop of Ruspa in Africa from 508, to 533. Vit. Fulg. c. 30, in Bibl. Patr. Colon. vi. 11. g. and Basnage, Annales, iii. 618. His tracts on this controversy were, 1. De Incarnatione et Gratia: written 520, in the name of sixty bishops of Africa, then exiled to Sardinia by the Arian Vandals. 2. Seven books against Faustus: written in his second exile, 522, and now lost. 3. The first of the three Books to Monimus: the subject of which is “God’s twofold Predestination;” the date uncertain.]
[1 ][This word would seem to connect the proceedings against Lucidus with the attack of Fulgentius; but the former took place 475, or thereabouts: a full generation before Fulgentius flourished.]
[2 ][At Arles, Leontius archbishop of that city presiding. Conc. Harduin. ii. 806. Some copies make the number of bishops present to have been thirty. Faustus in his dedication to Leontius intimates that his work on Free-will had the approbation of this synod and of another at Lyons. Bibl. Patr. Colon. t. v. pars 3, p. 503.]
[3 ][Faust. ep. ad Lucid. ibid. p. 526. “Cum gratia Domini operationem baptizati famuli semper adjungas; et eum, qui prædestinationem excluso labore hominis asserit, cum Pelagii dogmate detesteris. Anathema ergo illi, qui inter reliquas Pelagii impietates hominem sine peccato nasci, et per solum laborem posse salvari, damnanda præsumtione contenderit, et qui eum sine gratia Dei liberari posse crediderit. Item anathema illi, qui hominem cum fidei confessione solenniter baptizatum, et asserentem catholicam fidem, et postmodum per diversa mundi hujus oblectamenta prolapsum, in Adam et originale peccatum [originali peccato?] periisse asseruerit. Item, anathema illi, qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem deprimi hominem dixerit. Item anathema illi, qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse posset: i. e. de baptizato, vel de illius ætatis pagano, qui credere potuit et noluit. Item anathema illi, qui dixerit quod vas contumeliæ non possit adsurgere ut sit vas in honorem. Item anathema illi, qui dixerit quod Christus non pro omnibus mortuus sit, nec omnes homines salvos esse velit.” Comp. Conc. Harduin. t. ii. p. 807.]
[1 ][Ibid. 809. “Damno vobiscum sensum illum, qui dicit humanæ obedientiæ laborem divinæ gratiæ non esse jungendum. . . . Qui dicit quod post acceptum legitime baptismum in Adam moriatur quicunque deliquerit . . . . . . Qui dicit quod præscientia Dei hominem violenter compellat ad mortem. . . Profiteor etiam æternos ignes et infernales flammas factis capitalibus præparatas: quia perseverantes humanas culpas merito sequitur divina justitia; quam juste incurrunt qui hæc non toto corde crediderint. . . Libens fateor Christum etiam pro perditis advenisse, quia eodem nolente perierunt. . . . Si Christum his tantum remedia attulisse dicimus, qui redempti sunt, videbimur absolvere non redemptos, quos pro redemptione contempta constat esse puniendos.” The fifth head does not occur, either in the councils or in the Bibliotheca Patrum.]
[1 ]Hos. iv. 6; viii. 8; ix. 15; xiii. 9.
[2 ]Prosp. Respons. ad Exceptiones [Excerpta] Gen. [in App. ad Aug. t. x. p. 215. “In eo quod dictum est, Jacob dilexi, ostensum esse quid homini donaretur; et in eo quod dictum est, Esau autem odio habui, ostensum esse quid homini deberetur.”]
[3 ]Prosp. Resp. ad Ob. [Respons. ad Capitula Objectionum Vincentianarum. App. ad Aug. t. x. 208. “Poculum quippe immortalitatis, quod confectum est de infirmitate nostra et virtute divina, habet quidem in se ut omnibus prosit; sed si non bibitur, non medetur.”]
[1 ][Psalm cxlvii. 20.]
[2 ][Eph. iii. 5.]
[3 ]Prosp. de 2. 1. [de Vocat. Gent. ii. 4. ap. Bibl. PP. Colon. V. iii. 175. c.]
[4 ]Acts xiv. [17.]
[5 ]Prosp. ibidem.
[6 ]Matt. xi. 21.
[7 ]Matt. x. 6.
[1 ]Acts xvi. [6.]
[2 ]Acts xvii. 26.
[1 ][Rom. xi. 33.]
[2 ]Ps. xcv. 7.
[3 ]Jerem. v. 3.
[4 ]Rom. ii. 5.
[5 ]Exod. i. 12.
[1 ][Ps.] lxxiii. [3-]9.
[2 ]Exod. ix. 34; x. 1.
[3 ][Faustus de Lib. Arbitr. ii. c. 1. “Hac ratione Pharaonem, dicit Dominus, obdurabo, dum eum mihi in decem plagis, quas a Moyse exoratus removeo, insultare permitto. . . Sic interdum familiariter etiam apud homines hujus elocutionis vim assumimus, sic interdum contumacibus famulis exprobramus mansuetudinem nostram, ita dicentes: ‘Ego patientia mea te pessimum feci,’ ” &c.]
[4 ]Ex. iv. 21. [De Prædest. et Gratia, suspecti auctoris liber, c. vi. in App. ad Aug. x. 53. “Qui pie quærens aliquid desiderat invenire, illum locum ejusdem Scripturæ relegat, ubi primo Moysi in rubo ignis apparuit, . . . . et ibi inveniet totum hoc, quod indurasse Deus cor Pharaonis præmittit, non ad operationem Dei, sed ad præscientiam pertinere. Loquens enim Dominus de rubo sic dicit: ‘Ego autem scio quod non dimittet vos Pharao rex Ægypti, nisi per manum magnam. Sed extendens manum meam, percutiam Ægyptios in omnibus mirabilibus quæ faciam, et postea dimittet vos.’ Hæc prima vox Dei est, qua futuram voluntatem, Pharaonis, sicut præviderat, indicabat.”]
[5 ][Ibid. “Postea jam inter ipsos miraculorum imbres dixisse legitur, ‘Ego autem indurabo cor Pharaonis, ne dimittat populum.’ Ubi jam aperte intelligitur primam iterasse sententiam. Quid est enim, indurabo, nisi non molliam? Apparet enim in alios manante justitia, in alios gratia profluente, Scripturæ illius sententiam fuisse completam, qua dicit Deus Pharaoni, ‘In hoc ipsum excitavi te, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam,’ &c. Utente enim Deo bene etiam malis, induratione Pharaonis, flagellis Ægypti, tot ac tantis miraculis, &c. . . . . quid aliud gestum est, quam ut Dei virtus . . . ad humani generis notitiam perveniret? . . . . Pharaonem non esse mutandum, et illam omnem gentem, . . . alta illa Deus providentiæ suæ luce præscivit. Sed periturorum interitum prædestinatis a se vasis misericordiæ salutis esse voluit argumentum, et aliorum perditione ad salutem usus est aliorum.” Cf. Aug. de Grat. et Lib. Arbitr. c. xxiii. t. x. 744.]
[1 ][S. Aug. de divers. quæst. 68. 4. t. vi. 53. g. “De Pharaone facile respondetur, prioribus meritis quibus afflixit in regno suo peregrinos, dignum effectum cui obduraretur cor, ut nec manifestissimis signis jubentis Dei crederet.”]
[2 ]Rom. i. 14. [21, 24.]
[3 ]Rom. xi. 9.
[4 ] Thess. ii. [10, 11.]
[5 ]Acts vii. 51; xiii. 46.
[1 ]Esai. vi. 10, [11.]
[2 ]Fulgent. ad Mo. i. 27. [ad Monimum. Bibl. Patr. Colon. t. ii. pars 1. p. 20. g. “In talibus enim Deus judicium suum desertione inchoat, cruciatione consummat.”]
[3 ]Prosp. ad Cap. Gall. Resp. 11. [App. ad Aug. x. 203. “Cum vero aliquos a Deo aut traditos desideriis suis aut obduratos legimus, aut relictos; magnis peccatis suis hoc ipsos meruisse profitemur: quia talia eorum crimina præcesserunt, ut ipsi sibi pœnas debuerint, quæ eis etiam supplicium verterent in reatum. Atque ita nec de judicio Dei querimur, quo deserit meritos deseri; et misericordiæ ejus gratias agimus, qua liberat non meritos liberari.”]
[4 ]August. de Prædest. c. 6. [t. x. 798. b.]
[1 ]Rom. ix. 11.
[2 ][Rom. ix]. 14.
[3 ][Rom. ix.] 15.
[4 ][Rom. ix.] 17.
[5 ][Rom. ix.] 18.
[1 ][Rom. ix.] 19.
[2 ][Rom. ix.] 20.
[3 ][Rom. ix.] 21.
[4 ][Rom. ix.] 22.
[5 ][Rom. ix.] 23.
[6 ][Rom. ix.] 24.
[1 ]“He smote Ægypt, overthrew Pharaoh, slew mighty kings, for his mercy endureth for ever.” [Ps. cxxxvi. 10, 15, 18.]
[2 ]Heb. vi. 6.
[1 ]John vi. 39.
[2 ][Rom. xi. 1, 7.]
[3 ][Rom. viii. 30.]
[1 ][Rom. viii. 28.]
[2 ]John xvii. 9, 20.
[3 ]Matth. xxv. 34.
[4 ]Rom. viii. 33.
[5 ]Eccles[iasticus] xxxix. 18.
[6 ][It will be observed that these articles are evidently a modification of those agreed upon (for the quieting of a dispute which had arisen at Cambridge) by Whitgift, Bancroft, Whitaker, and others, Nov. 20, 1595, commonly called the Lambeth Articles. To shew the extent of the modification, those articles are here subjoined, as they stand in Strype, Whitg. b. iv. c. 17:
[1 ][Compare the conclusion of the Sermon on Habak. i. 4.]
[2 ][The following is Archdeacon Cotton’s memorandum subjoined to his transcript of this fragment. “Here ends the treatise (or as much of it as is preserved); not abruptly, but in the middle of a page, on which no more was written. The remaining leaf of this sheet is also blank. It is possible however, that a new article or head may have been finished by the author, and the copy of it begun on some separate sheet. Of this no vestige remains.”]
[1 ][v. Editor’s Preface, I. p. xxvii, xxviii, cxvii.]
[2 ][This date may have been given to Strype by Fulman, in whose handwriting it is entered in the copy of the letter as first published, belonging to the library of C. C. C. See also his MS. Collections for a Hist. of the College, fol. 26. The date exactly suits the matter of the letter, which was evidently written after receipt of the fifth book, (published 1597,) and probably in answer to a request from Hooker for such hints as might occur to Cranmer regarding the conclusion of the whole work. If Cranmer went into France with Essex and Killigrew, 1591, he may have returned to England on the signature of the peace of Vervins, 1598: and may have been conveniently situated for receiving and revising Hooker’s work. The next year, Feb. 1599-1600, we know that he went with Mountjoy into Ireland. Camd. Ann. part ii. p. 190.]
[3 ]John Whitgift, the Archbishop. [This note is Strype’s.]
[1 ][See E. P. book V. Dedic. to Whitgift, § 3.]
[2 ]See Pref. to E. P. c. ii. [10; and the notes there.
[3 ][Especially Travers’s book, De Disciplina Ecclesiastica, 1584.]
[4 ][See Pref. viii. 13 (vol. i. page 192, note 3). See also Bancroft, Dang. Pos. b. iii. c. 1, for an account of the establishment of the first English presbytery at Wandsworth, Nov. 20, 1572. The following chapters to the 15th relate similar proceedings down to 1592.]
[1 ][Especially Travers, in the conclusion of his book, “De Discipl. Eccles.”]
[2 ][In the MS. “Advertisement touching the Controversies of the Church of England,” quoted E. P. V. c. ii. § 2. note 1 on page 21, is the following: “It is time there were an ende or surseance made of this unmodest and deformed maner of writing lately intertained: whereby matters of religion are handled in the stile of the stage.” Comp. Bp. Cooper, Adm. 96. “Histrionical mocks and scoffs, too immodest for any vice in a play.” (“Thus, like the formal vice, Iniquity, | I moralize two meanings in one word.”—Richard III. 3. 1. 82.)]
[3 ][Banc. Dang. Pos. iv. 12. “I have heard reported, that upon the coming forth of Martin’s Epistle, M. Cartwright should say, ‘Seeing the bishops would take no warning, it is no matter that they are thus handled.’ ”]
[4 ][Hacket and Coppinger, Feb. 1591.]
[5 ][Namely, Cartwright, and eight others, whose names may be seen in Strype, An. iv. 103; or in Neal, Hist. of the Puritans, i. 524. They were imprisoned Sept. 1590, chiefly for continuing to practise their discipline.
[1 ][Cosins’ “Conspiracy for pretended Reformation,” p. 56. “After they both had thus come, (with mighty concourse of the common multitude, as to such a novelty of hearing two new prophets in these days arisen was likely,) with an uniform cry into Cheapside near unto the Cross, and there finding the throng and press of people to increase about them . . . they got them up into an empty cart which stood there, and out of that choice pulpit (for such a purpose) made their lewd and traitorous preachment unto the people: wherein . . . (so near as I could learn from so common an auditory, and in so confused an action) they reading something out of a paper, went more particularly over the office and calling of Hacket: how he represented Christ, by partaking a part of his glorified body: by his principal Spirit, and by his office of severing the good from the bad with his fan in his hand . . . and of bringing in that Discipline which they so often babble of,” &c.]
[2 ][Viz. Arthington and Coppinger, who were evidently simple persons.]
[3 ]Cosin, Consp. p. 2. “These two having itching ears . . . made choice to hear and follow such preachers as were thought fittest to feed their humours: which preachers with their sad looks, frequent sighs abroad, long and vehement conceived prayers, bitter and plain invectives in private, and privy (sic) depraving in public, of the laws and polity ecclesiastical, . . . may seem so to have inflamed these two persons, as that they thought this Discipline a worthy subject whereupon they should spend most of their actions and cogitations.” In p. 3, he quotes a letter from Hacket to Wigginton, who, as it seems, had been instrumental in converting him; in which he expresses his desire “to communicate his spirit at large” to Wigginton; and adds, “Make my sound heart knowen to Master Cartwright, Master Snape, Master Udall, Master Lord, &c.” 3 March, 1590-1.]
[1 ][Cosin, Consp. p. 10. “Coppinger . . . had signified to two of his familiar acquaintance (whom he had requested to fast and pray with him for success in obtaining a widow) that ‘God had shewed him great favour, by revealing such a secret mystery unto him as was wonderful, . . . viz. that he knew a way how to bring the Queen to repentance, to cause all her council and nobles to do the like out of hand, or else detect them to be traitors that refused.’ ” p. 9. “When Hacket came to London, Wigginton introduced Coppinger to him, as being a man who had a message to say to his sovereign, concerning some practice intended against her; from dealing wherein, the preachers in London had wonderfully discouraged him.” p. 11. “The manner and other circumstances of the first revealing of this pretended mystery, Coppinger himself declareth in a letter written the 4th of February last, unto T. C. in prison.” The substance of the letter is such as to make it strange that Cartwright should not at once have declined receiving communications from such a person. Cosin adds, p. 15. “For resolution also herein, by the help of his diligent fellow-labourer John ap Henry alias a Penry, he solicited the reformed preachers of some foreign parts.” And p. 20. “Arthington at one of his examinations confessed that Penry sent a letter unto him forth of Scotland, wherein he signified that reformation must shortly be erected in England . . . Now it is sure that Penry conveyed himself privily into England, and was lurking about London at the selfsame time when these other prophets arose in Cheapside.” See also Ded. to Whitg. p. 5. note 1. But Cartwright in his Answer to Sutcliffe, 1596, affirms that he refused to receive the letter, or to see Coppinger: and that he discouraged his proceedings in every possible way. Personally indeed he seems to be exculpated. But the argument from the tendency of his doctrine may appear to some all the stronger.]
[2 ][Dangerous Positions, b. iv. c. 5-14.]
[3 ][Bp. Cooper’s Admon. to the People of England, 1589. p. 29. “If the state of the clergy shall be made contemptible, and the best reward of learning a mere pension, he (Satan) foreseeth that neither young flourishing wits will easily incline themselves to godly learning, neither will their parents and friends suffer them to make that the end of their travail. To bring this to pass, he worketh his devices by sundry kinds of men. 1. By such as be papists in heart, but yet can clap their hands and set forward this purpose, because they see it the next way either to overthrow the course of the gospel, or by great and needless alteration to hazard and endanger the state of the commonwealth. Of the second sort are certain worldly and godless epicures, which can pretend religion, and yet pass not which end thereof go forward, so they may be partakers of that spoil which in this alteration is hoped for. The third sort, in some respect the best, but of all other most dangerous, because they give opportunity and countenance to the residue, and make their endeavours seem zealous and godly. These be such which in doctrine agree with the present state, and shew themselves to have a desire of perfection in all things, and in some respect, indeed, have no evil meaning, but through inordinate zeal are so carried, that they see not how great dangers by such devices they draw into the church and state of this realm.”]
[1 ][Brownists’ “True Confession,” 1596. art. 31. “That these ecclesiastical assemblies, remaining in confusion and bondage under this antichristian ministry, courts, canons, worship, ordinances, &c. without freedom or power to redress any enormity, have not in this confusion and subjection Christ their Prophet, Priest and King; neither can be in this estate (whilst we judge them by the rules of God’s word) esteemed the true, orderly gathered, or constituted churches of Christ, whereof the faithful ought to become or stand members, or to have any spiritual communion with them in their public worship and administration.”]
[2 ][Ibid. art. 32. “That by God’s commandment all that will be saved must with speed come forth of this antichristian estate, leaving the suppression of it to the magistrate to whom it belongeth. And that both all such as have received or exercised any of these false offices or any pretended function or ministry in or to this false and antichristian constitution, are willingly in God’s fear to give over and leave those unlawful offices; and that none also, of what sort or condition soever, do give any part of their goods, lands, money, or money worth to the maintenance of this false ministry and worship, upon any commandment or under any colour whatsoever.”]
[3 ][Ibid. art. 33. “That being come forth out of this anti-christian estate unto the freedom and true profession of Christ, besides the instructing and well guiding of their own families, they are willingly to join together in Christian communion and orderly covenant, and by confession of faith and obedience of Christ to unite themselves into peculiar congregations; wherein, as members of one body whereof Christ is the only head, they are to worship and serve God according to His word, remembering to keep holy the Lord’s day.” And art. 42. “That if God withhold the magistrates’ allowance and furtherance herein, they yet proceed together in Christian covenant and communion thus to walk in the obedience of Christ, even through the midst of all trials and afflictions,” &c.]
[1 ][T. C. ii. Reply, p. 1. “We offer to shew the Discipline to be a part of the Gospel, and so to have a common cause.” Comp. E. P. III. ii.]
[2 ][The Brownists themselves took this view so strongly as to call the Puritan preachers mere hypocrites for shrinking from it. “As for the priests and preachers of the land; they of all other men have bewrayed their notable hypocrisy, that standing erewhile against the English Romish hierarchy, and their popish abominations, have now so readily submitted themselves to the beast, and are not only content to yield their canonical obedience unto him, and receive his mark, but in most hostile manner oppose and set themselves against us . . . These have long busied themselves in seeking out new shifts and cavils to turn away the truth, which presseth them so sore; and have at last been driven to palpable and gross absurdities, seeking to daub up that ruinous antichristian muddy wall which themselves did once craftily undermine. And herein we report us to the learned discourses of Dr. Robert Some and Mr. Giffard . . . With what equity now can these priests so blaspheme and persecute us for rejecting the heavy yoke of their tyrannous prelates, whom they themselves call antichristian and bishops of the Devil? for forsaking their priesthood, which they have complained is not the right ministery?” Preface to the Brownists’ “True Confession,” 1596.]
[1 ][Cf. p. 285 supra.]
[2 ][This word is used in a peculiar sense, borrowed from the state of parties in France, from which country Cranmer had just returned. See in Thuanus, lib. xliv. c. 11. (1568.) the substance of a letter from the Prince of Condé to Charles IX., in which he complains that the house of Guise and their partisans gave this name to all those who although attached to the old religion refused to go all lengths with them under pretence of supporting it. Davila, b. v. gives an account of the materials of this party, under the year 1573; and says of them, “Havevano formato come un terzo partito, che non facendo alcun fondamento, nè alcuna differenza dall’ una religione all’ altra, ma tutto applicandosi alla riforma dello stato, cominciò a nominarsi il partito de’ Politici, overo de’ malcontenti.”]
[1 ][See E. P., Bk. V. ii. 2. note 1 on page 21.]
[1 ][Cap. ii. p. 210. ed. Victorii. ϕαυ̑λον δ’ ἂν δόξειεν εἰ̑ναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν, ὅπερ εὐδοκιμει̑ παρὰ τοι̑ς Καρχηδονίοις· ἓν γὰρ ὑϕ’ ἑνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ’ ἀποτελει̑ται.]
[This is apparently a reference to the Christian Letter, p. 11.]
[There is a blank here in the MS. of one word, which has been supplied by conjecture.]
[This reference stands here in the margin of the MS. But to what book it relates does not appear.]