The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Advertisement to the Reader.
• To the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Sherifs, and Common Council of London.
• The Preface.
• The Life of James Harrington.
• The Mechanics of Nature:
• The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy Considered: and Exemplify’d In the Scotish Line, Out of Their Own Best Authors and Records.
• The Commonwealth of Oceana. to His Highness the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.
• The Introduction, Or Order of the Work.
• Oceana.
• The Preliminarys, Shewing the Principles of Government.
• The Second Part of the Preliminarys.
• The Council of Legislators.
• Oceana: the Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• Anno Dom.
• Anno Domini.
• Anno Domini.
• Epitome of the Whole Commonwealth.
• Libertas. the Proclamation of His Highness the Lord Archon of Oceana Upon Promulgation of the Model.
• The Prerogative of Popular Government.
• Epistle to the Reader.
• The First Book, Containing: a Full Answer to All Such Objections As Have Hitherto Bin Made Against Oceana.
• The Preface.
• Chap. I. Antient and Modern Prudence.
• Chap. I.: Whether Prudence Be Well Distinguish’d Into Antient and Modern.
• Chap. II.: Whether a Commonwealth Be Rightly Defin’d to Be a Government of Laws and Not of Men, and a Monarchy to Be the Government of Som Man, Or a Few Men, and Not of Laws?
• Chap. III.: Whether the Balance of Dominion In Land Be the Natural Cause of Empire?
• Chap. IV. Chap. IV.: Whether the Balance of Empire Be Well Divided Into National and Provincial; and Whether These Two, Or Any Nations That Are of Distinct Balance, Coming to Depend Upon One and the Same Head, Such a Mixture Creates a New Balance.
• Chap. V.: Whether There Be Any Common Right Or Interest of Mankind Distinct From the Parts Taken Severally; and How By the Orders of a Commonwealth It May Be Best Distinguish’d From Privat Interest.
• Chap. VI.: Whether the Senatusconsulta, Or Decrees of the Roman Senat, Had the Power of Laws?
• Chap. VII.: Whether the Ten Commandments Were Propos’d By God Or Moses, and Voted By the People of Israel.
• Chap. VIII.: Whether a Commonwealth Coming Up to the Perfection of the Kind, Coms Not Up to the Perfection of Government, and Has No Flaw In It.
• Chap. IX.: Whether Monarchy Coming Up to the Perfection of the Kind, Coms Not Short of the Perfection of Government, and Has Not Som Flaw In It. In Which Is Also Treated of the Balance of France; of the Original of a Landed Clergy; of Arms, and Their Ki
• Chap. X.: Whether a Commonwealth That Was Not First Broken By Her Self, Was Ever Conquer’d By the Arms of Any Monarch?
• Chap. XI.: Whether There Be Not an Agrarian, Or Som Law of Laws of That Nature, to Supply the Defect of It In Every Commonwealth: and Whether the Agrarian, As It Is Stated In Oceana, Be Not Equal and Satisfactory to All Interests.
• Chap. XII.: Whether Courses Or a Rotation Be Necessary to a Well-order’d Commonwealth. In Which Is Contain’d the Courses Or Parembole of Israel Before the Captivity, Together With the Epitome of Athens and Venice.
• The Second Book; Or, a Political Discourse Concerning Ordination: Against Dr. H. Hammond, Dr. L. Seaman, and the Authors They Follow.
• Advertisment to the Reader.
• Order of the Discourse.
• A Political Discourse Concerning Ordination.
• The Introduction, Or First Chapter.
• Chap. II.: That the Citys, Or Most of Them Nam’d In the Perambulation of the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, Were At That Time Under Popular Government. In Which Is Contain’d the Administration of a Roman Province.
• Chap. III.: The Deduction of the Chirotonia From Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination From the Chirotonia. In Which Is Contain’d the Institution of the Sanhedrim Or Senat of Israel By Moses, and That of Rome By Romulus
• Chap. IV.: The Deduction of the Chirothesia From Monarchical Or Aristocratical Government, and of the Second Way of Ordination From the Chirothesia. In Which Is Contain’d the Commonwealth of the Jews As It Stood After the Captivity.
• Chap. V.: Whether the Chirotonia Mention’d In the Fourteenth of the Acts Be Indeed, As Is Pretended By Dr. Mammond, Dr. Seaman, and the Authors They Follow, the Same With the Chirothesia, Or a Far Different Thing. In Which Are Contain’d the
• Advertisement to the Reader, Or Direction to the Answerer.
• An Answer to Three Objections Against Popular Government, That Were Given Me After These Two Books Were Printed.
• The Art of Lawgiving: In Three Books.
• The Order of the Work.
• The First Book.
• The Second Book.
• The Third Book.
• The First Book, Shewing the Foundations and Superstructures of All Kinds of Government.
• The Preface. Considering the Principles Or Nature of Family Government.
• Chap. I.: Considering the Principles Or Balance of National Governments; With the Different Kinds of the Same.
• Chap. II.: Shewing the Variation of the English Balance.
• Chap. III.: Of Fixation of the Balance, Or of Agrarian Laws.
• Chap. IV.: Shewing the Superstructures of Governments.
• The Conclusion: Observing That the Principles of Human Prudence Being Good Without Proof of Scripture, Are Nevertheless Such As Are Provable Out of Scripture.
• The Second Book, Containing the Commonwealths of the Hebrews; Namely, Elohim, Or the Commonwealth of Israel; and Cabala, Or the Commonwealth of the Jews.
• The Preface, Shewing That There Were Commonwealths Before That of Israel.
• Chap. I.: Shewing That Israel Was a Commonwealth.
• Chap. II.: Shewing What Commonwealth Israel Was.
• Chap. III.: Shewing the Anarchy, Or State of the Israelits Under Their Judges.
• Chap. IV.: Shewing the State of the Israelits Under Their Kings, to the Captivity.
• Chap. V.: Shewing the State of the Jews In the Captivity; and After Their Return Out of It; With the Frame of the Jewish Commonwealth.
• Chap. VI.: Shewing How Ordination Was Brought Into the Christian Church, and the Divers Ways of the Same That Were At Divers Times In Use With the Apostles.
• The Conclusion: Shewing That Neither God, Nor Christ, Or the Apostles, Ever Instituted Any Government Ecclesiastical Or Civil Upon Any Other Principles Than Those Only of Human Prudence.
• The Third Book, Containing a Model of Popular Government, Practically Propos’d According to Reason, Confirm’d By the Scripture, and Agreable to the the Present Balance Or State of Property In England.
• The Preface. Containing a Model of Popular Government, Propos’d Notionally.
• Chap. I.: Containing the Civil Part of the Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. II.: Containing the Religious Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. III.: Containing the Military Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• Chap. IV.: Containing the Provincial Part of This Model, Propos’d Practicably.
• The Conclusion: Shewing How the Model Propos’d May Be Prov’d Or Examin’d; and Giving a Brief Answer to Mr. Wren’s Last Book, Intitl’d, Monarchy Asserted Against Mr. Harrington’s Oceana.
• A Word Concerning a House of Peers.
• Six Political Tracts Written On Several Occasions.
• Valerius and Publicola: Or, the True Form of a Popular Commonwealth Extracted Ex Puris Naturalibus.
• To the Reader.
• To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of England, &c. the Humble Petition, &c.
• The Petitioner to the Reader.
• A System of Politics Delineated In Short and Easy Aphorisms. Publish’d From the Author’s Own Manuscript.
• Chap. I.: Of Government.
• Chap. II.: Of the Matter of Government.
• Chap. III.: Of the Privation of Government.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Form of Government.
• Chap. V.: Of Form In the Civil Parts.
• Chap. VI.: Of Form In the Religious Part.
• Chap. VII.: Of Form In the Military Part.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Form In the Legal Part.
• Chap. IX.: Of Form In the Judicial Part.
• Chap. X.: Of the Administration of Government, Or Reason of State.
• Political Aphorisms.
• Seven Models of a Commonwealth: Or, Brief Directions Shewing How a Fit and Perfect Model of Popular Government May Be Made, Found, Or Understood.
• The First Part.
• Divers Models the First Model of Popular Government Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Israel.
• A Second Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d.
• A Third Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Sparta.
• A Fourth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Athens.
• A Fifth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Rome.
• A Sixth Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Venice.
• A Seventh Model of a Commonwealth Propos’d. the Commonwealth of Holland.
• The Second Part, Proposing a Model of a Commonwealth Fitted to the Present State of This Nation.
• Conclusion; Or, the Use of These Propositions.
• The Ways and Means Wherby an Equal and Lasting Commonwealth May Be Suddenly Introduc’d, and Perfectly Founded, With the Free Consent and Actual Confirmation of the Whole People of England.
• The Humble Petition of Divers Well Affected Persons, Deliver’d the 6th Day of July, 1659, With the Parlament’s Answer Therto.
• Appendix, Containing All the Political Tracts of James Harrington, Esq; Omitted In Mr. Toland ’s Edition of His Works.
• Pian Piano: Or, Intercourse Between H. Ferne, D. D. And J. Harrington, Esq; Upon Occasion of the Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• Epistle to the Reader.
• Intercourse Between H. Ferne, D. D. And James Harrington, Esq; Upon Occasion of the Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana.
• The Queries I Shall Interweave With the Doctor’s Answer Unto Each of Them, Returned Unto Me With This Preamble.
• The First Query. How Much, Or In What the Author of Oceana Is Mistaken, to Think the Commonwealth of the Hebrews Appliable to His Purpose.
• The Second Query.
• The Third Query.
• The Fourth Query.
• The Fifth Query.
• The Sixth Query.
• The Seventh Query.
• The Stumbling-block of Disobedience and Rebellion, Cunningly Imputed By P. H. Unto Calvin, Remov’d, In a Letter to the Said P. H. From J. H.
• A Letter Unto Mr. Stubs, In Answer to His Oceana Weighed, &c.
• Politicaster: Or, a Comical Discourse In Answer to Mr. Wren ’s Book, Intituled, Monarchy Asserted, Against Mr. Harrington’ S Oceana.
• Pour Enclouer Le Canon.
• A Discourse Upon This Saying: the Spirit of the Nation Is Not Yet to Be Trusted With Liberty; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, Or Invade the Liberty of Conscience.
• A Discourse Shewing, That the Spirit of Parliaments, With a Council In the Intervals, Is Not to Be Trusted For a Settlement; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, and Persecution For Conscience.
• A Parallel of the Spirit of the People With the Spirit of Mr. Rogers; and an Appeal Thereupon Unto the Reader, Whether the Spirit of the People, Or the Spirit of Men Like Mr. Rogers, Be the Fitter to Be Trusted With the Government.
• A Sufficient Answer to Mr. Stubb.
• A Proposition In Order to the Proposing of a Commonwealth Or Democracy.
• The Rota: Or, a Model of a Free State, Or Equal Commonwealth.

SIX POLITICAL TRACTS WRITTEN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

VIZ.

I. Valerius and Publicola. A Dialog.

II. A System of Politics, delineated in short and easy Aphorisms, now first publish’d from the Author’s own Manuscript.

III. Political Aphorisms.

IV. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, ancient and modern, &c.

V. The Ways and Means of introducing a Commonwealth by the Consent of the People.

VI. The humble Petition of divers well affected Persons: With the Parlament’s Answer therto.

VALERIUS and PUBLICOLA: OR, THE TRUE FORM OF A POPULAR COMMONWEALTH EXTRACTED EX PURIS NATURALIBUS.

Quos perdere vult Jupiter, hos dementat prius.

TO THE READER.

THE way of dialog being not faithfully manag’d, is of all other the most fraudulent; but being faithfully manag’d, is the clearest and most effectual for conveying a man’s sense into the understanding of his reader. There is nothing in this world, next the favor of God, I so much desire as to be familiarly understood; which because great men have thought below them, has prov’d hitherto but the ruin of themselves, and the detriment of the public: for which reason, having try’d all other means, I now add this. My work, if I be not given over to utter blindness, is the same with, or nearest, that of the nation; and the work of the nation being not understood, is in extreme danger of utter ruin.

Valerius.

DEAREST Publicola, how have I long’d to meet you, and in the favorable silence of this long walk!

Publicola.

What has my noble friend Valerius to command his faithful servant?

Val.

Why really, notwithstanding the tumult of these extravagant changes, your last discourse had so much of my attention then, and has had such a digestion with me since, that I feel it running in my veins.

Pub.

Do you find in that any temtation to the buckling on of high-shoon?

Val.

My thoughts, Publicola, are quite of another strain; somtimes I fancy I see England grasping at empire, like Rome it self.

Pub.

Why then Valerius, my discourses are not such as they say; there run nothing of them in your veins, that has imbas’d your noble blood.

Val.

The heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the policy; but I would have them be a little lower in som things.

Pub.

What are those?

Val.

The vulgar complain of you, that you are too learn’d.

Pub.

I thought it was not you, Valerius.

Val.

For all that, I could be contented to see you raise your structure by your own strength, and without the help of other authors.

Pub.

That I dare say you may, when you please.

Val.

I must see it then, before I lose the covert of these reverend elms.

Pub.

You take care that the building should be well situated; and for the foundation, I may presume by what has already pass’d between you and me, that we are long since agreed.

Val.

That the threefold balance, or distribution of property is the cause of the triple way of government, I fully consent with you; as also, that the balance now in England is in the people plainly, and exclusively both of a king and lords.

Pub.

You are not of them that grant this, and then ask which way a commonwealth should be introduc’d in England.

Val.

Why truly yes; seeing not only the people are so wholly unacquainted with the means, but their leaders so averse to it.

Pub.

Think you that a plant grows the worse for not understanding the manner of its vegetation?

Val.

A plant is not a free agent; but among men who are free agents, the introduction of government seems to be arbitrary.

Pub.

What, where there is no more than Hobson’s choice, this or none?

Val.

It is true, that if they can have nothing else, they must at length have a commonwealth; but tho they can have nothing else to be holding, yet they will be trying other things.

Pub.

There is all the mischief.

Val.

And enough to ruin the nation.

Pub.

To hurt it very sore, but not to ruin it; nor yet to evade a commonwealth, except they expose us to foren invasion.

Val.

I am glad of your confidence.

Pub.

You may let it pass for confidence, if you please; but if there be no other way except that only of invasion, wherby the present balance can receive a change sudden enough to admit of any other form, the reason why we must have a commonwealth is coercive.

Val.

And putting the case it be the will of God to defend us from foren invasion, how long will it be ere they see at home the coerciveness of this reason, or, which is all one, that all power is in and from the people?

Pub.

Good Valerius, how long is it since this was both seen and declar’d in parlament?

Val.

Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a principle even in monarchy.

Pub.

This with your pardon you will revoke, seeing you well remember that this their declaration of power in the people, has bin exclusive of king and lords, and that in express terms.

Val.

But in this they related not at all to the distribution of property.

Pub.

Why then, there is not such a difference between the growing of a plant and of a commonwealth, as you thought; seeing a commonwealth knowing as little, dos no less.

Val.

This of all others is to me a consideration fullest of comfort.

Pub.

It will in time procede accordingly, thro a mere necessity of nature, or by feeling; but your desire, I suppose, is to know how it should be rationally introduc’d, or by seeing, and that with more ease and greater speed.

Val.

If it might please God, I would live to have my share of it, tho I fear I never shall.

Pub.

You carve for yourself ill: for by hope a man injoys even that which he never coms to attain; and by fear he is depriv’d even of that which he coms not to lose.

Val.

I must confess that our army has it now in their power to introduce a commonwealth.

Pub.

And there is no other action in their power that can excuse them.

Val.

Putting the case they would hearken to you, what course would you advise?

Pub.

The same I have advis’d over and over.

Val.

As how?

Pub.

As how! is that yet a question? let them divide the territory into fifty equal parts.

Val.

They will never make a new division.

Pub.

Why then they shall never have an equal commonwealth.

Val.

What ill luck is this, that the first step should be so difficult?

Pub.

You speak as if never any territory had bin divided, wheras there is none that has not; and surveyors will tell you, it is a work to be perfectly perform’d in two months, and with ease.

Val.

Putting the case this were don, what is next?

Pub.

The next is, that the commonwealth were complete.

Val.

Say you so? this indeed makes amends: but how?

Pub.

With no more addition, than that the people in every distinct division elect annually two knights and seven deputys.

Val.

I dare say the people would never stick at this.

Pub.

Not sticking at this, they of their own power have instituted the two great assemblys, of which every commonwealth consists.

Val.

But in advising these things, you must advise men so that they may understand them.

Pub.

Valerius, could I as easily have advis’d men how to understand, as what to do, there had bin a commonwealth ere this.

Val.

Com, I will have you try somthing of this kind, and begin upon som known principle, as this, All power is in the people.

Pub.

Content. But the diffusive body of the people (at least in a territory of this extent) can never exercise any power at all.

Val.

That is certain.

Pub.

Hence is the necessity of som form of government.

Val.

That is, the people of themselves being in a natural incapacity of exercising power, must be brought into som artificial or political capacity of exercising the same.

Pub.

Right. Now this may be don three ways; as first, by a single person—

Val.

How!

Pub.

Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point: but as you were intimating just now, there are royalists who derive the original right of monarchy from the consent of the people.

Val.

There are so.

Pub.

And these hold the king to be nothing else, but the representer of the people and their power.

Val.

As the Turc.

Pub.

Yes, as the Turc.

Val.

The people’s power at that rate coms to the people’s slavery.

Pub.

You say right; and so it may at other rates too.

Val.

As how?

Pub.

Why, as I was about to say, the power of the people may be politically brought into exercise three ways: by a single person; by an assembly consisting of a few; or by an assembly consisting of many.

Val.

Or by a mixture.

Pub.

Nay, I pray let that alone yet a while: for which way soever you go, it must com at length to som mixture, seeing the single person you nam’d but now, without his divan or council to debate and propose to him, would make but bad work even for himself. But as the government coms to be pitch’d fundamentally upon one of these three, so it differs not only in name, but in nature.

Val.

I apprehend you, as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

Pub.

Nay, you are out with your learning, when you have forbidden it me. But in countrys where there is not a nobility sufficiently balanc’d or inrich’d, there can be none of your aristocracy; and yet there may (as long as it will last) be a government in a few.

Val.

What call you that?

Pub.

Nay, what say you?

Val.

Com, it is oligarchy: when all is don, som words of art we must use.

Pub.

I thought you would com to it; and yet seeing I have promis’d, I will be sparing. But with your pardon, you have disorder’d my discourse, or by this time I had shew’d, that if the power of the people be committed to a single person, the common interest is submitted to that of a family; and if it be committed to a few, it is submitted to the interest of a few familys.

Val.

Which, so many times as they are more than one, is so many times worse than monarchy.

Pub.

I am not sorry that you are of that mind. For there is no such thing as a commonwealth, or, as you say, democracy in nature, if it be not pitch’d upon a numerous assembly of the people.

Val.

What call you numerous?

Pub.

Why an assembly such for number as can neither go upon the interest of one single person or family, nor the interest of a few persons or familys.

Val.

How will you constitute such an assembly?

Pub.

Commonwealths, for the constitution of their popular assemblys, have had two ways. The first by inrolling all their citizens, and stating the quorum in such sort, that all to and above the stated number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impower’d to give the vote of the whole commonwealth.

Val.

The Athenian quorum was six thousand; which towards the latter end of that commonwealth came to five.

Pub.

So, so, you may quote authors: but you may remember also, that Athens was a small commonwealth.

Val.

How many would you advise for England?

Pub.

Put the case I should say, ten thousand?

Val.

They will laugh at you.

Pub.

What can I help that? or how many would you advise?

Val.

I would not go above five thousand.

Pub.

Mark you then: they only that are nearest would com; and so the city of London would give law to the whole nation.

Val.

Why really that same now is clear; but would there be less danger of it, in case you stated your quorum at ten, at twenty, or tho it were at a hundred or two hundred thousand?

Pub.

No: for which cause, as to England, it is a plain case, that this is no way for the institution of a popular assembly.

Val.

Which way then?

Pub.

For England there is no way but by representative, to be made to rise equally and methodically by stated elections of the people throout the whole nation.

Val.

Needs this to be so numerous as the other?

Pub.

No.

Val.

Why?

Pub.

Because it is not obnoxious to a party, to any certain rank, or such as are soonest upon the spur, or that make least account of their pains or of their mony.

Val.

Will you be so curious?

Pub.

Do you think this a curiosity? how else will you avoid improvement in the interest of the better sort, to the detriment of those of meaner rank; or in the interest of the few, to the detriment of that of the many?

Val.

But even this way there is danger of that foul beast the oligarchy.

Pub.

Look about you. The parlament declares all power to be in the people; is that in the better sort only?

Val.

Stay; the king was to observe leges & constitutiones quas vulgus elegerit: that vulgus is to be understood of the parlament; and the parlament consisted wholly of the better sort.

Pub.

It is true; but then that commonwealth acted in all things accordingly.

Val.

It was, you will say, no democracy.

Pub.

And will you say it was?

Val.

No truly: yet this deriv’d in part from the free election of the people.

Pub.

How free? seeing the people, then under lords, dar’d not to elect otherwise than as pleas’d those lords.

Val.

Somthing of that is true; but I am persuaded that the people, not under lords, will yet be most addicted to the better sort.

Pub.

That is certain.

Val.

How then will you prevent the like in your institution?

Pub.

You shall see presently. The diffusive body of the people, in which the power is, and is declar’d to be, consists in the far greater part of the lower sort: wherfore their representative, to rise naturally, and to be exactly comprehensive of the common interest, must consist also in the far greater part of the lower sort.

Val.

Of what number will you have this representative?

Pub

Suppose a thousand, or therabout.

Val.

What proportion will you have the meaner sort in it to hold to the better?

Pub.

Suppose about six to four.

Val.

How will you order it, that it shall be so constituted?

Pub.

Why thus: let the people in every precinct or shire at election chuse four under one hundred pounds a year in lands, goods, or mony, together with three at or above that proportion.

Val.

I see not but this representative must be exact.

Pub.

It is yet none at all; that is, unless you presume changes; for one thousand, without change governing the whole people, amounts neither to a representative nor to a commonwealth, but coms still to your hard name.

Val.

How do you order your changes?

Pub.

By annual election of one third part for three years.

Val.

So that every year one third part of your assembly falls out of it, and a new third part at the same time enters into the same.

Pub.

Even so.

Val.

This causes the representative to be perpetually extant.

Pub.

It dos so: but to respit that a little, I should be glad, before I stir farther, to know which way the vote of a representative thus constituted, can go one hair’s breadth beside the common and public interest of the whole diffusive body of the people.

Val.

No way in the earth that I can imagin, except thro ignorance.

Pub.

No human ordinance is inrallible; and what is don thro mere ignorance or mistake at one time, will be found and amended at another.

Val.

A thousand men, and six to four of the lower sort perpetually extant! this must be a grievous charge to the most of them; it will be hard to bring them, and impossible to hold them together.

Pub.

Upon such as are elected and com not, considerable fines must be levy’d; and such as com and stay together must have good salarys.

Val.

Salarys to so many! what will that com to?

Pub.

Not, with the rest of the commonwealth, to three hundred thousand pounds a year.

Val.

Why? the kings have rarely had above six.

Pub.

And did England ever grudg them any part of that proportion?

Val.

I must confess the quarrel grew when they would not be contented with so little.

Pub.

Now if England never did, nor needed grudg a king six hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among courtiers, why should we imagin she should grudg a commonwealth three hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among magistrats?

Val.

But parlamentmen have taken nothing.

Pub.

Have the people given nothing?

Val.

That was for the maintenance of armys.

Pub.

And whether had you rather maintain armys or magistrats?

Val.

But putting the case that this assembly needed not to be perpetually extant, this charge in the whole or in the far greater part might be abated.

Pub.

I cannot tell: for how often think you fit that this assembly should convene?

Val.

Parlaments at most met not above once a year.

Pub.

If they had bin perpetually extant, there would have bin no king.

Val.

No truly, except in name only.

Pub.

Therfore the popular assembly in a commonwealth ought not to be perpetually extant.

Val.

To the end, you will say, that there may be som king.

Pub.

Mock not: or what other guard of liberty is there in any commonwealth, but the popular assembly?

Val.

Com, let them assemble twice a year upon their ordinary guard.

Pub.

And what if there be an extraordinary occasion?

Val.

Then, as often as there is any such occasion.

Pub.

How much will this abate of their necessary charge, or of the salarys? and how much better were it for a representative to lead the life of statesmen than of carriers?

Val.

Commonwealth, whose assemblys have bin of the former kind, have call’d them no otherwise than at stated times, or upon extraordinary occasions.

Pub.

But then their assemblys were not equal representatives, but consisted of such as being next at hand were still ready upon any occasion.

Val.

That makes indeed a considerable difference: but were this representative always extant, I cannot see but it would have nothing to do.

Pub.

And in case it be not always extant, you imagin that it may have somthing to do.

Val.

Yes.

Pub.

Then whether gos it better with the commonwealth when the representative has somthing to do, or when it has nothing to do?

Val.

This is very quaint.

Pub.

No truly Valerius, it is plain, that the guard of liberty perpetually extant, in doing nothing must do much; and not perpetually extant, in doing much may do nothing.

Val.

I am afraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.

Pub.

Such I warrant you as the parlament and the army made the other day.

Val.

Nay, I am not so wide. A civil council and a standing army must needs have interests much more distinct than two civil assemblys; and where there is not a like cause, I know well enough there cannot be the like effect.

Pub.

I shall desire no more, than that you will hold to this; and then tell me what disputes there us’d to be between the senat of Venice and the great council, which is perpetually extant, and consists of about two thousand.

Val.

Nay, certain it is, that between those two there never was any dispute at all.

Pub.

Then tell me for what cause such a thing should any more happen between the assemblys propos’d; or, according to your own rule, from like causes expect like effects.

Val.

You put me to it.

Pub.

Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be presuming that this assembly can have nothing to do, before we com to consider what are their proper businesses and functions.

Val.

I beg your pardon, and what are those?

Pub.

Why surely no small matters; for in every commonwealth truly popular, it is inseparable from the assembly of the people that first they wholly and only have the right of result in all matters of lawgiving, of making peace and war, and in levying men and mony: secondly, That the ultimat result in judicature ly to them: and thirdly, That they have right to call to account, and to punish their magistrats for all matters of maladministration of government.

Val.

I assure you this must amount to a great deal of business.

Pub.

Certain it is, that in som commonwealths the popular assembly by this means has bin perpetually imploy’d.

Val.

And so I think it might be in England.

Pub.

It might; but I do not think it would. However, if it be in the undoubted right of the popular assembly to procede against their magistrats for maladministration, would you leave it upon the hand of those magistrats, whether this representative should assemble or no?

Val.

Com, you have said enough, it were not prudent: but as to the matter of appeals, it is certain that in Israel the ultimat resort was to the sanhedrim or 70 elders.

Pub.

I know it very well: nevertheless you shall find that the congregation judg’d Benjamin; and if you mark the appeal to the 70 elders, you shall find that it was not an appeal of the party for relief, but of the judges in inferior courts for further light and direction in difficult cases of the law.

Val.

Let me but know in what manner this assembly is to perform these functions, and I have don.

Pub.

Why as to matter of lawgiving, I told you that they wholly and only have the right and power of result.

Val.

But to result, there must necessarily go precedent debate; seeing a man, much less an assembly, resolves not upon any thing without som considerations, motives or reasons therto conducing, which ought to be first orderly and maturely debated: and how will you bring a thousand men, especially being six to four of the lower sort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?

Pub.

You say that the popular assembly in Athens consisted at the least of five thousand.

Val.

And I said true.

Pub.

Yet this assembly debated: why may not a thousand men debate as well as five thousand?

Val.

As well! Nay, Publicola, if they debate no better in your commonwealth than they did in that, you may know what will becom of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that a thousand men can debate any whit more orderly and maturely than five thousand.

Pub.

And so think I too.

Val.

How then?

Pub.

How then? Why this is the reason of the senat in every commonwealth.

Val.

So there must be a senat, which amounts to thus much; without a senat there can be no commonwealth, and with a senat there will always be practices upon the liberty of the people.

Pub.

How prove you that?

Val.

Why by the senat of Lacedemon in the beginning, and by the senat of Rome throout.

Pub.

But find you the like by the senat of Athens and Venice?

Val.

No.

Pub.

Consider then that these were by election of the people, and upon frequent removes, and that the former were defective in one or in both these circumstances.

Val

You intend your senat upon removes then?

Pub.

Right.

Val.

And elective by the people?

Pub.

Yes.

Val.

How? by the popular assembly, or by the body of the people in their precincts?

Pub.

By the body of the people in their precincts, at the same time when they elect their other deputys, and with the same circumstances, except that these be all elected out of such as have a hundred pounds a year real or personal.

Val.

What hurt, if they were elected by the popular assembly?

Pub.

They would not derive so immediatly, nor rise so equally from the people, as when chosen in the precincts; because this way every shire coms necessarily to have a share in the senat: besides, wise men and understanding are better known in their tribes than they can be in an assembly out of their tribes, especially while they are new comers; nor will the popular assembly afford so good a choice as the whole people. There are other reasons.

Val.

Enough, enough. Of what number do you constitut this senat?

Pub.

Of three hundred.

Val.

Why should not one hundred be full enough for a debating council, especially seeing debate is the more orderly where the counsillors are fewer?

Pub.

You are to bear it in mind, that this senat is upon annual change in one third part.

Val.

That is, every year one hundred having serv’d three years, go out, and a new hundred coms in.

Pub.

Right: for which cause, to have one hundred well practis’d in debate, your senat must consist of three hundred.

Val.

May not those that go out com presently in again by a new election?

Pub.

Not at all; for that were yet another way of continuing the government in a few.

Val.

Do you mean that no man shall serve in this capacity, or in that of the popular assembly, but once in his life?

Pub.

I mean that a man, having serv’d his term in one of these, may after a like vacation or interval be elected again to serve in either of them, and not before.

Val.

At what age do you make a man capable of these elections?

Pub.

Not till thirty.

Val.

He stays a great while ere he coms to preferment, and is soon out again: at which rate a man should have much ado to attain to sufficient knowledge for the leading of the commonwealth.

Pub.

This was never objected against parlaments.

Val.

It is true: but then the election of parlamentmen was not oblig’d to any interval, and divers have bin of every parlament that was summon’d during their lives.

Pub.

Parlaments, when they were the most frequent, assembl’d not above once a year, very rarely so often; and how long, pray, did they usually sit?

Val.

Som two or three months.

Pub.

I allow you the most you ask: at which rate a man that had sat in twenty parlaments, could not have sat above four years complete.

Val.

And in your parlament, at one election he sits three.

Pub.

Mark you that?

Val.

Yes, and more: wheras a parlamentman without interval could in twenty years have sat but four complete, in your assemblys a man observing his intervals, may in twenty years serve ten years complete.

Pub.

You allow that, I hope, to be som advantage towards acquiring knowlege in conduct; and yet antiently your parlamentmen were in this point thought able enough.

Val.

Now would I desire no more than to be as fully satisfy’d, that these senators must be honest enough.

Pub.

Which way can they be dishonest?

Val.

Indeed I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if nothing can be propos’d to the popular assembly, except by these only, they should, I think, propose nothing but what is for their own advantage.

Pub.

They are the senat: and in that they have all the advantages that a well-order’d commonwealth can give to a senat.

Val.

But they will be still hankering after more.

Pub.

As what?

Val.

Why riches or power.

Pub.

All magistrats are accountable to the popular assembly; and so, without acquisition of power, I cannot imagin which way they should turn themselves to the acquisition of riches.

Val.

They will drive then at power; they will be coordinat.

Pub.

In the world there has never yet bin any senat that durst so much as pretend to power.

Val.

No? Had not the senat of Israel and that of Lacedemon power?

Pub.

Executive power they had, in as much as they were judicatorys; but legislative or soverain power (which is that wherof we speak) they had none at all.

Val.

Other senats have had other power, as in the managing of foren affairs, and the like.

Pub.

Which still coms not to the point in hand, because in these and the like matters, as the creation of divers magistrats, the senat uses to be made plenipotentiary by the popular assembly, that is, by law.

Val.

I hear them talk of making a coordinat senat first, and without the people, and then of assembling a parlament in the old way to govern with that senat.

Pub.

Things, Valerius, are soon said; but if any parlament whatever, so it be elected by the people (and, perhaps, if otherwise) do not make it one of their first works to pull down a coordinat senat, I ask no credit to my politics.

Val.

This is to prophesy.

Pub.

Then, to reason the case: I say, That the senat assuming power, the popular assembly falls immediatly to debate; and the popular assembly debating, the senat is ipso facto depos’d, there being no other necessary use or function of the senat but debate only.

Val.

You said but now, That the popular assembly could not debate.

Pub.

Not orderly and maturely: but upon such an occasion as this, they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.

Val.

Nay, if there be som occasion in which you allow that the popular assembly must and ought to debate, there will hardly be any in which they will be persuaded that they may not. So this will com to the pulling down of the senat as often as the people please.

Pub.

Which is so much the rather to be fear’d, because you shall never find that popular assembly which did ever actually depose their senat.

Val.

Our army has pull’d down a good many parlaments.

Pub.

What is that to the purpose? Is our army a popular assembly? Yet let them pull down a parlament as often as they please, they must set up another; and in this indeed there may be som resemblance: for let a popular assembly pull down the senat as often as they please, they must set up another.

Val.

Or a single person.

Pub.

Right: for that holds both ways too, and (as to our case) will stand neither.

Val.

The people of Athens debated, yet for all that their senat was not depos’d.

Pub.

Not formally; but it remain’d little better than a warren, wherin great men did, as it were, start hares, to be hunted in the tumult of the popular assembly.

Val.

Verily, Publicola, this model of yours is a most entire thing.

Pub.

This with the necessary consequences, as the division of the senat into senatorian councils, the adorning and actuating of this and the other assembly with sit magistrats, wherof I have sufficiently discours’d in other places, amounts to an entire thing.

Val.

And you offer it freely.

Pub.

I do.

Val.

Would it not grieve you to see them crop a little of it, and spoil it?

Pub.

They had better take it to som purpose.

Val.

Nay, what they take will be to som purpose, I warrant you. Com, there is a party, a select, a refin’d party, a nation in a nation, that must and will govern.

Pub.

That is it which I desire to see.

Val.

You are of a rare temper: happy in unhappiness.

Pub.

O I love frequent changes.

Val.

Is that any of your virtues?

Pub.

Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there remains a way to go wrong.

Val.

They are confident men. They cannot be persuaded but they can govern the world.

Pub.

Till they have try’d. Such as can govern the world, are such as can be govern’d by reason. Now there is no party refin’d, select, or what you will in England, amounting to one twentieth part of the people.

Val.

One twentieth part of the people, for aught I know, may amount to a hundred thousand; there is no party any thing near this account, I dare say.

Pub.

A twentieth part of the people can never govern the other nineteen but by a perpetual army.

Val.

They do not like that the worse.

Pub.

The people having been govern’d by a king without an army, and being govern’d by a commonwealth with an army, will detest the government of a commonwealth, and desire that of a king.

Val.

Yes, such is the spirit of the nation.

Pub.

Such is the spirit in this case of any nation.

Val.

And yet they make it a particular quarrel.

Pub.

They make every thing particular: if you speak of Israel, Athens, Rome, Venice, or the like, they hear you with volubility of countenance; and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of government, till he brought them in play. Nay, tho they have com heels over head for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they are resolv’d to take no warning.

Val.

Publicola, you will be shent.

Pub.

I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty.

Val.

But between you and me, Do you not think that the spirit of the nation, or the main body of the people of this land, desires the restitution of their antient government?

Pub.

I make little doubt of it.

Val.

How then in case of a commonwealth are they to be trusted?

Pub.

In case of a commonwealth, it is not the people that are trusted, but the orders of the commonwealth.

Val.

The commonwealth must consist of the people.

Pub.

The people under the monarchy, when that invaded them, invaded it.

Val.

True, and in such a manner as has caus’d the ruin of it.

Pub.

What was the spirit of the people then?

Val.

But it is now another thing.

Pub.

Nay, the very same: for then it invaded a government that invaded their liberty, and now it would invade a government that invades their liberty.

Val.

But how should this be mended?

Pub.

Do you not see that this should not be mended, but incourag’d?

Val.

How should it be incourag’d then?

Pub.

By giving them a form that must preserve their liberty.

Val.

I little doubt but there is in your form a full security to the people of their liberty: but do you think that there is in it any full security that the people shall not cast off this form?

Pub.

If it secures their liberty, why should they?

Val.

My question is not, why they should, but whether they can.

Pub.

They cannot, without going against their own interest.

Val.

But they can go against their own interest.

Pub.

Nay, remember your self, whether the form shewn be not such, as you have already granted can in no wise go beside the interest of the whole people.

Val.

They that are now in power, have no trust at all in forms.

Pub.

Do they sail in ships, not upon planks? Do they ride horses, not hogs? Do they travel in coaches, not upon hurdles? Do they live in houses, not in ditches? Do they eat bread, not stones?

Val.

Enough, enough.

Pub.

But in so doing, they acknowledge such a form to be security for such a use or action. And must the form of a commonwealth be the only form in which they can allow no security for the proper use and action?

Val.

They observe none of this.

Pub.

Do they observe that there is any security in men?

Val.

That, especially in our times, were somwhat a hard matter.

Pub.

And how many securitys are there?

Val.

I know no more, than one personal, or in men; another real, or in things.

Pub.

Chuse you whether you would have.

Val.

Well, be the necessary action or use of your form what it will, I would see it more plainly and particularly demonstrated how the spirit of the nation, or the whole people, being freely eligible into your assemblys, must presently lose that inclination which now plainly they have to set up monarchy, or to persecute for conscience.

Pub.

You will allow no weight in the argument, that a people in liberty, unless the orders of their commonwealth were first fundamentally ruin’d, that is, broken in the balance or foundation, did never do either of these.

Val.

What weight soever I allow to this argument, it is no ways to my present purpose.

Pub.

You will put me then beside experience, and to shew by what reason it is that a peartree must bear pears, or why men gather not grapes on thorns, or figs on thistles.

Val.

Poor Publicola, be the task as hard as it will, I am for this time resolv’d to hold you to it.

Pub.

What is it then that any government can be sufficiently founded or balanc’d upon, but such an interest as is sufficiently able to bear it?

Val.

Good Sir, a government ought to be founded upon justice, I take it.

Pub.

Right: and is not that government which is founded upon an interest not sufficiently able to bear it, founded upon injustice?

Val.

I suspect whither this will go. A government founded upon the overbalance of property, is legitimatly founded, and so upon justice; but a government founded upon the underbalance of property, must of necessity be founded upon force, or a standing army. Is not this that which you mean by interest sufficient or not sufficient to sustain a government?

Pub.

You have it right.

Val.

O Atheist! this damns the government of the saints.

Pub.

Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to speak but with common honesty. Do you think that such as are plainly oligarchists, or shall exercise by a force, and without election by the people, such a power as is both naturally and declaredly in the people, and in them only, can establish their throne upon justice?

Val.

No.

Pub.

Do you think that such as are truly saints can establish their throne upon injustice?

Val.

No.

Pub.

Why then you have granted, that such as are plainly oligarchists cannot be truly saints. Again, do you still think, as you once intimated, that a government now introduc’d in England, exactly according to the principles of prudence and justice, would rule the earth?

Val.

Yes.

Pub.

Do you think, that such is are truly saints, if they introduce a government, ought to introduce it exactly according to the principles of prudence and justice.

Val.

Yes.

Pub.

Why then, let such as are truly saints but see what it is to rule the earth, and take the rule of the earth.

Val

They will not approve of this way.

Pub

How! not the saints approve of prudence and justice! who is the Atheist now, Valerius?

Val.

Good Publicola, let us keep to the point in hand. You say, that the security of liberty lys not in the people, but in the form of their government; so I am yet to expect when you will shew, what there is in your form, why it must be impossible for the people under it to restore monarchy, or to persecute for conscience.

Pub.

See you not, that to do either of these under such a form, must be point-blank against their interest?

Val.

But so either of these is now, and yet in this posture you will confess that they would do both.

Pub.

Mark how I am us’d. I speak of a form supported by an interest sufficiently able to bear it, and of an interest contain’d under a form sufficiently able to secure it, and you instance in a posture which is no form at all, but such a confusion among, and force upon the people, as creates an interest in them to rid themselves which way they can of such a misery.

Val.

I did acknowlege and must confess, that your popular assembly is such as cannot err, except thro ignorance; but thro this, you your self have acknowleg’d, and must confess, that it may err.

Pub.

I retract nothing.

Val.

Now first, or never, they will restore monarchy thro ignorance.

Pub.

But they cannot do this first, therfore they can never do it.

Val.

Why cannot the popular assembly do this first?

Pub.

Because it must first be propos’d by a senat, that can neither do any such thing thro ignorance nor thro knowlege.

Val.

Nay, then have at you; I will set this same senat and representative of yours to work in such a manner, that you shall confess they may set up monarchy.

Pub.

Do your worst.

Val.

Your senat being assembl’d (I will not have them make long speeches;

Pub.

Nor I.)

Val.

Rises me up one of the senators, and says, ‘Mr. Speaker, this nation has bin long in labor, but now thro the mercy of God, the child is not only com to the birth, but there is also strength to bring forth: in the number of counsillors there is strength; the number of this house is good (far better than has usually bin of late) and their election has bin very free and fair. Here is also, I know not how (but the inventions of men are overrul’d by the providence of God) an extraordinary and exceding great confluence of honest men, who are not so well here; and if you determin any thing that is good for your country, will go home and pray for you. Now, Sir, (to be brief) since our government consisted of king, lords, and commons, the antient, the only, the most happy government that this nation, nay, that the world ever knew, it is but too well known, that we have had no government at all: wherfore my opinion is, that we propose, as they call it, to these honest men (who you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the restitution of right, and of the government in this nation by king, lords, and commons.’

As sure as you live, Publicola, thus much being said, your whole senat will immediately agree to propose it to the representative: and thus much being proposed to the representative, those people will throw up their caps for joy, and immediatly return to their houses.

Pub.

But Valerius, thus much has bin said in parlament when the house was fuller; when they who were for this restitution were back’d by a single person in actual possession of the throne; when over and above the zeal of the Preshyterians, there were partys that knew no other means of self-preservation, as without, divines belaboring the oak of every pulpit; and within, lawyers, officers, and pensioners: yet was it so far from being carry’d, that the single person has bin forc’d to dissolve parlaments, and that thro apparent danger of being overrun by the principles of a commonwealth not in being. But if this were so when a commonwealth could scarce be hoped, what will it be when the commonwealth shall be in such a condition as cannot be withstood? for the senat can never com to propose any thing to the people without first agreing upon debating what it is they will propose; nor is it possible that such debate should be brought to any end, but by reasons therto conducing: now it must not only be impossible to find reasons for the restitution of monarchy, but the reasons why monarchy ought not to be restor’d must be obvious; not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the interest of the nation, and of these assemblys, but to the interest ten to one of every particular man in either of these assemblys: nor are or have the reasons bin less obvious, or less ventilated in parlament, why monarchy as to this nation is impossible in it self.

Val.

Will you say the like for liberty of conscience?

Pub.

Yes; because without liberty of conscience, civil liberty cannot be perfect; and without civil liberty, liberty of conscience cannot be perfect.

Val.

These things are true, but they never will see them, never, Publicola: you your self say, that the people cannot see, but they can feel.

Pub.

I meant that of the diffusive body of the people, not of the people under good orders; in which case they are the sharpest sighted of any kind of government whatsoever: and therfore it is not modest that you, or I, or any particular man or party, blinded with self-conceit, should pretend to see with such a constitution; or shew me that ey under the sun, that sees like that of Venice. But putting the case it were otherwise as to seeing, these things are plainly palpable or obvious to feeling.

Val.

I have indeed observ’d, that in commonwealths there are very few that see or understand them, and yet their affection to that way of government is exceeding vigorous.

Pub.

Whence can this otherwise be than from feeling? but one thing, Valerius, I take at your hands extreme heavily.

Val.

What is that, Publicola?

Pub.

That you with one little speech of a single senator, should run so regardlesly over these two assemblys, without taking any notice at all of the necessary course of them.

Val.

What course, Publicola?

Pub.

Why you might easily have thought that among three hundred senators there might have bin at least one hundred as good speakers as yours.

Val.

Have I said any thing to the contrary?

Pub.

And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be longer winded than you have allow’d.

Val.

For that matter let them please themselves.

Pub.

Ay, but then you should not have made an end of your debate in a minute.

Val.

What is all this?

Pub.

Why I say, they would have bin debating on that point at least a fortnight.

Val.

Well, and when that had been don, would never have agreed.

Pub.

No.

Val.

Did not you say that before?

Pub.

Well, but I am now upon that point; that was to the matter in debate, this is to the manner of proceding: imagin the matter had bin such upon which they could have agreed.

Val.

What then?

Pub.

That such an agreement had bin a decree of the senat.

Val.

Is a decree of the senat binding?

Pub.

If it be upon a law made, it is binding; if upon a law to be made, it is to be propos’d to the people. Now every proposition to the people is to be promulgated, that is, printed and publish’d to the whole nation six weeks before the time that the representative is to assemble and give the vote of the commonwealth, or that test without which no such proposition can be any law.

Val.

By this means it must follow, that the whole people both by discourse and letters, debate six weeks together upon the matter.

Pub.

You are right.

Val.

How is it then that you say, the representative of the people must not debate? you allow to these less privilege than to the whole people.

Pub.

No less, nor in this point any more.

Val.

Yet dos this amount to debate in those that are of the representative.

Pub.

You say well, but not to any debate at all in the representative.

Val.

Why this representative is nothing else but an instrument or method, wherby to receive the result of the whole nation with order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or confusion.

Pub.

And is that any thing the worse?

Val.

No; but I am glad you have told it me: for that those of the representative would one way or other have debate, I knew certainly.

Pub.

In sum, are you satisfy’d, that the spirit of the nation, or the people, however they may now under no form at all, and in detestation of such as having govern’d them by force, will let them see no way out of confusion, desire their old government, as having never yet known any other; yet under such a form as is propos’d, can never go about to introduce monarchy, without obvious discovery, that as to their interest it is quite contrary, and as to it self impossible?

Val.

The satisfaction is pretty good.

Pub.

Pretty good! give me but half so good, that the spirit of the army, not formerly obedient to parlaments, and now dreading or despising them, must apprehend the restitution of monarchy to be quite contrary to their interest.

Val.

You surprize me: for if the army will have no parlament, and a king restor’d can now in England without an army have no government, they may imagin this their only way to greatness and continuance.

Pub.

Had not the oligarchy then, if they meant well, better to have us’d sober expressions, and minded what those true and real interests are which in the foundation and preservation of every kind of government are paramount, than to have overcast them with the mist of new affected phrases, and fallen on conjuring up spirits?

Val.

You have conjur’d up a spirit that will keep me waking.

Pub.

Set him on pulling down the law and the ministry; when that is don, let him blow up Windsor castle, Hampton court, and throw Whitehall into the Thames.

Val.

It is the only way, for then there can be no king.

Pub.

You may be sure of that, seeing the count of Holland’s domain, and his houses are yet not only standing, but diligently preserved by the Hollanders.

Val.

Publicola, have you any more to tell me?

Pub.

Valerius, have you any more to ask me?

Val.

Not, except why you have not given the parlament to understand thus much?

Pub.

I have printed it over and over.

Val.

They take no great notice of books; you should have laid it, as they say, in their dish by som direct address, as a petition, or so.

Pub.

I did petition the committee for government.

Val.

What answer did they make you?

Pub.

None at all.

Val.

I would have gone further, and have presented it to the house.

Pub.

Towards this also I went as far as I could.

Val.

How far was that?

Pub.

Why, I think my petition may have bin worn out in the pockets of som two or three members.

Val.

Have you a copy of it about you?

Pub.

Let me see—here are many papers; this same is it.

To the Parlament of the Commonwealth of England, &c.

The humble Petition, &c.

Sheweth,

THAT what neither is, nor ever was in nature, can never be in nature.

THAT without a king and lords, no government either is, or ever was in nature (but in mere force) other than by a senat indu’d with authority to debate and propose; and by a numerous assembly of the people wholly and only invested with the right of result in all matters of lawgiving, of making peace and war, and of levying men and mony.

WHERFORE your petitioner (to disburden his conscience in a matter of such concern to his country) most humbly and earnestly prays and beseeches this parlament to take into speedy and serious consideration the irrefragable truth of the premises, and what therupon must assuredly follow, that is, either the institution of a commonwealth in the whole people of England (without exception, or with exception for a time, of so few as may be) by way of a senat, and a numerous assembly of the people, to the ends, and for the respective functions aforesaid; or the inevitable ruin of this nation, which God of his mercy avert.

And your petitioner shall pray, &e.

Val.

I would it had bin deliver’d.

Pub.

Look you, if this had bin presented to the house, I intended to have added this other paper, and to have printed them together.

The Petitioner to the Reader.

Reader,

I SAY not that the form contain’d in the petition (if we had it, and no more) would be perfect; but that without thus much (which rightly introduc’d, introduces the rest) there neither is, was, nor can be any such thing as a commonwealth, or government without a king and lords, in nature.

WHERE there is a coordinat senat, there must be a king, or it falls instantly by the people; as the king failing, the house of peers fell by the commons.

WHERE there is a senat not elective by the people, there is a perpetual feud between the senat and the people, as in Rome.

TO introduce either of these causes, is certainly and inevitably to introduce one of these effects; and if so, then who are cavaliers, I leave you to judg hereafter.

BUT to add farther reason to experience. All civil power among us (not only by declaration of parlament, but by the nature of property) is in and from the people.

WHERE the power is in the people, there the senat can legitimatly be no more to the popular assembly, than my counsil at law is to me, that is (auxilium, non imperium) a necessary aid, not a competitor or rival in power.

WHERE the aids of the people becom their rivals or competitors in power, there their shepherds becom wolves, their peace discord, and their government ruin. But to impose a select or coordinat senat upon the people, is to give them rivals and competitors in power.

SOM perhaps (such is the temper of the times) will say, That so much human confidence as is express’d, especially in the petition, is atheistical. But how were it atheistical, if I should as confidently foretel, that a boy must expire in nonage, or becom a man? I prophesy no otherwise; and this kind of prophesy is also of God, by those rules of his providence, which in the known government of the world are infallible.Ecclef. 9. 14. In the right observation and application of these consists all human wisdom; and we read that a poor man deliver’d a city by his wisdom, yet was this poor man forgotten. But if the premises of this petition fail, or one part of the conclusion coms not to pass accordingly, let me hit the other mark of this ambitious address, and remain a fool upon record in parlament to all posterity.

Val.

Thou boy! and yet I hope well of thy reputation.

Pub.

Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I can make no use of it.

Val.

The major of the petition is in som other of your writings; and I remember som objections which have been made against it: as, that à non esse nec fuisse, non datur argumentum ad non posse.

Pub.

Say that in English.

Val.

What if I cannot? are not you bound to answer a thing, tho it cannot be said in English?

Pub.

No truly.

Val.

Well, I will say it in English then. Tho there neither be any house of gold, nor ever were any house of gold, yet there may be a house of gold.

Pub.

Right: but then, à non esse nec fuisse in natura, datur argumentum ad non posse in natura

Val.

I hope you can say this in English too.

Pub.

That I can, now you have taught me. If there were no such thing as gold in nature, there never could be any house of gold.

Val.

Softly. The frame of a government is as much in art, and as little in nature, as the frame of a house.

Pub.

Both softly and surely. The materials of a government are as much in nature, and as little in art, as the materials of a house. Now as far as art is necessarily dispos’d by the nature of its foundation or materials, so far it is in art as in nature.

Val.

What call you the foundation, or the materials of government?

Pub.

That which I have long since prov’d, and you granted, the balance, the distribution of property, and the power thence naturally deriving; which as it is in one, in a few, or in all, dos necessarily dispose of the form or frame of the government accordingly.

Val.

Be the foundation or materials of a house what they will, the frame or superstructures may be diversly wrought up or shapen; and so may those of a commonwealth.

Pub.

True: but let a house be never so diversly wrought up or shapen. it must consist of a roof and walls.

Val.

That’s certain.

Pub.

And so must a commonwealth of a senat and of a popular assembly, which is the sum of the minor in the petition.

Val.

The mathematicians say, they will not be quarrelsom; but in their sphere there are things altogether new in the world, as the present posture of the heavens is, and as was the star in Cassiopœia

Pub.

Valerius, if the major of the petition extends as far as is warranted by Solomon, I mean, that there is nothing new under the sun, what new things there may be, or have bin above the sun will make little to the present purpose.

Val.

It is true; but if you have no more to say, they will take this but for shifting.

Pub.

Where there is sea, as between Sicily and Naples, there was antiently land; and where there is land, as in Holland, there was antiently sea.

Val.

What then?

Pub.

Why then the present posture of the earth is other than it has bin, yet is the earth no new thing, but consists of land and sea as it did always; so whatever the present posture of the heavens be, they consist of star and firmament, as they did always.

Val.

What will you say then to the star in Cassiopœia?

Pub.

Why I say, if it consisted of the same matter with other stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Cassiopœia; as were there a commonwealth in England, it would be no new thing in nature, but a new thing in England.

Val.

The star you will say in Cassiopœia, to have bin a new thing in nature, must have bin no star, because a star is not a new thing in nature.

Pub.

Very good.

Val.

You run upon the matter, but the newness in the star was in the manner of the generation.

Pub.

At Putzuoli near Naples, I have seen a mountain that rose up from under water in one night, and pour’d a good part of the lake antiently call’d Lucrin into the sea.

Val.

What will you infer from hence?

Pub.

Why that the new and extraordinary generation of a star, or of a mountain, no more causes a star, or a mountain to be a new thing in nature, than the new and extraordinary generation of a commonwealth causes a commonwealth to be a new thing in nature. Aristotle reports, that the nobilit of Tarantum being cut off in a battle, that commonwealth became popular. And if the pouder plot in England had destroy’d the king and the nobility, it is possible that popular government might have risen up in England, as the mountain did at Putzuoli. Yet for all these, would there not have bin any new thing in nature.

Val.

Som new thing (thro the blending of unseen causes) there may seem to be in shuffling; but nature will have her course, there is no other than the old game.

Pub.

Valerius, let it rain or be fair weather, the sun to the dissolution of nature shall ever rise; but it is now set, and I apprehend the mist

Val.

Dear Publicola, your health is my own; I bid you good-night.

Pub.

Good-night to you, Valerius.

Val.

One word more, Publicola: pray make me a present of those same papers, and with your leave and licence, I will make use of my memory to commit the rest of this discourse to writing, and print it.

Pub.

They are at your disposing.

Val.

I will do it as has bin don, but with your name to it.

Pub.

Whether way you like best, most noble Valerius.

Octob. 22. 1659.

A SYSTEM of POLITICS Delineated in short and easy APHORISMS.

Publish’d from the Author’s own Manuscript.

CHAP. I.

Of GOVERNMENT.

Chap. I.1. A PEOPLE is either under a state of civil government, or in a state of civil war; or neither under a state of civil government, nor in a state of civil war.

2. Civil government is an art wherby a people rule themselves, or are rul’d by others.

3. The art of civil government in general is twofold, national or provincial.

4. National government is that by which a nation is govern’d independently, or within it self.

5. Provincial government is that by which a province is govern’d dependently, or by som foren prince or state.

6. A people is neither govern’d by themselves, nor by others, but by reason of som external principle therto forcing them.

7. Force is of two kinds, natural and unnatural.

8. Natural force consists in the vigor of principles, and their natural necessary operations.

9. Unnatural force is an external or adventitious opposition to the vigor of principles, and their necessary working, which, from a violation of nature, is call’d violence.

10. National government is an effect of natural force, or vigor.

11. Provincial government is an effect of unnatural force, or violence.

12. The natural force which works or produces national government (of which only I shall speak hereafter) consists in riches.

13. The man that cannot live upon his own, must be a servant; but he that can live upon his own, may be a freeman.

14. Where a people cannot live upon their own, the government is either monarchy, or aristocracy: where a people can live upon their own, the government may be democracy.

Chap. II.15. A man that could live upon his own, may yet, to spare his own, and live upon another, be a servant: but a people that can live upon their own, cannot spare their own, and live upon another; but (except they be no servants, that is, except they com to a democracy) they must waste their own by maintaining their master’s, or by having others to live upon them.

16. Where a people that can live upon their own, imagin that they can be govern’d by others, and not liv’d upon by such governors, it is not the genius of the people, it is the mistake of the people.

17. Where a people that can live upon their own, will not be govern’d by others lest they be liv’d upon by others, it is not the mistake of the people, it is the genius of the people.

18. Of government there are three principles; matter, privation, and form.

CHAP. II.

Of the Matter of Government.

1. THAT which is the matter of government, is what we call an estate, be it in lands, goods or mony.

2. If the estate be more in mony than in land, the port or garb of the owner gos more upon his monys than his lands; which with privat men is ordinary, but with nations (except such only as live more upon their trade than upon their territory) is not to be found: for which cause overbalance of riches in mony or goods, as to the sequel of these aphorisms, is altogether omitted.

3. If the estate be more in land than in goods or mony, the garb and port of the owner (whether a man or a nation) gos more if not altogether upon his land.

4. If a man has som estate, he may have som servants or a family, and consequently som government, or somthing to govern: if he has no estate, he can have no government.

5. Where the eldest of many brothers has all, or so much that the rest for their livelihood stand in need of him, that brother is as it were prince in that family.

6. Where of many brothers the eldest has but an equal share, or not so inequal as to make the rest to stand in need of him for their livelihood, that family is as it were a commonwealth.

7. Distribution of shares in land, as to the three grand interests, the king, the nobility, and the people, must be equal or inequal.

8. Equal distribution of land, as if one man or a few men have one half of the territory, and the people have the other half, causes privation of government, and a state of civil war: for the lord or lords on the one side being able to assert their pretension or right to rule, and the people on the other their pretension or right to liberty, that nation can never com under any form of government till that question be decided; and, property being not by any law to be violated or mov’d, any such question cannot be decided but by the sword only.

9. Inequal distribution of shares in land, as to the three grand interests, or the whole land in any one of these, is that which causes one of these three to be the predominant interest.

Chap. III.10. All government is interest, and the predominant interest gives the matter or foundation of the government.

11. If one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, the interest of one man is the predominant interest, and causes absolute monarchy.

12. If a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, the interest of the few or of the nobility is the predominant interest; and, were there any such thing in nature, would cause a pure aristocracy.

13. It being so that pure aristocracy, or the nobility having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, without a moderator or prince to balance them, is a state of war, in which every one, as he grows eminent or potent, aspires to monarchy; and that not any nobility can have peace, or can reign without having such a moderator or prince, as on the one side they may balance or hold in from being absolute, and on the other side may balance or hold them and their factions from flying out into arms: it follows, that if a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, the interest of the nobility being the predominant interest, must of necessity produce regulated monarchy.

14. If the many, or the people, have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, the interest of the many or of the people is the predominant interest, and causes democracy.

15. A people neither under absolute or under regulated monarchy, nor yet under democracy, are under a privation of government.

CHAP. III.

Of the Privation of Government.

1. WHERE a people are not in a state of civil government, but in a state of civil war; or where a people are neither under a state of civil government, nor under a state of civil war, there the people are under privation of government.

2. Where one man, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, yet assumes to himself the whole power; there the people are under privation of government, and this privation is call’d tyranny.

3. Where a few men, not having the whole, or about two parts in three of the whole land or territory, yet assume to themselves the whole power; there the people are under privation of government, and this privation is call’d oligarchy.

4. Where the many, or the people, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory, yet assume to themselves the whole power; there the people are under privation of government, and this privation is call’d anarchy.

5. Where the tyranny, the oligarchy, or the anarchy, not having in the land or territory such a full share as may amount to the truth of government, have nevertheless such a share in it as may maintain an army; there the people are under privation of government, and this privation is a state of civil war.

Chap. IV.6. Where the tyranny, the oligarchy, or the anarchy, have not any such share in the land or territory as may maintain an army, there the people are in privation of government; which privation is neither a state of civil government, nor a state of civil war.

7. Where the people are neither in a state of civil government, nor in a state of civil war, there the tyranny, the oligarchy, or the anarchy, cannot stand by any force of nature, because it is void of any natural foundation; nor by any force of arms, because it is not able to maintain an army; and so must fall away of it self thro the want of a foundation, or be blown up by som tumult: and in this kind of privation the matter or foundation of a good orderly government is ready and in being, and there wants nothing to the perfection of the same, but proper superstructures or form.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Form of Government.

1. THAT which gives the being, the action, and the denomination to a creature or thing, is the form of that creature or thing.

2. There is in form somthing that is not elementary but divine.

3. The contemplation of form is astonishing to man, and has a kind of trouble or impulse accompanying it, that exalts his soul to God.

4. As the form of a man is the image of God, so the form of a government is the image of man.

5. Man is both a sensual and a philosophical creature.

6. Sensuality in a man is when he is led only as are the beasts, that is, no otherwise than by appetit.

7. Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things.

8. To preserve and defend himself against violence, is natural to man as he is a sensual creature.

9. To have an impulse, or to be rais’d upon contemplation of natural things to the adoration or worship of God, is natural to man as he is a philosophical creature.

10. Formation of government is the creation of a political creature after the image of a philosophical creature; or it is an infusion of the soul or facultys of a man into the body of a multitude.

11. The more the soul or facultys of a man (in the manner of their being infus’d into the body of a multitude) are refin’d or made incapable of passion, the more perfect is the form of government.

12. Not the refin’d spirit of a man, or of som men, is a good form of government; but a good form of government is the refin’d spirit of a nation.

13. The spirit of a nation (whether refin’d or not refin’d) can neither be wholly saint nor Atheist: not saint because the far greater part of the people is never able in matters of religion to be their own leaders; nor Atheists, because religion is every whit as indelible a character in man’s nature as reason.

14. Language is not a more natural intercourse between the soul of one man and another, than religion is between God and the soul of a man.

15. As not this language, nor that language, but som language; so not this religion, nor that religion, yet som religion is natural to every nation.

16. The soul of government, as the true and perfect image of the soul of man, is every whit as necessarily religious as rational.

17. The body of a government, as consisting of the sensual part of man, is every whit as preservative and defensive of it self as sensual creatures are of themselves.

18. The body of a man, not actuated or led by the soul, is a dead thing out of pain and misery; but the body of a people, not actuated or led by the soul of government, is a living thing in pain and misery.

19. The body of a people, not led by the reason of the government, is not a people, but a herd: not led by the religion of the government, is at an inquiet and an uncomfortable loss in it self; not disciplin’d by the conduct of the government, is not an army for defence of it self, but a rout; not directed by the laws of the government, has not any rule of right; and without recourse to the justice or judicatorys of the government, has no remedy of wrongs.

20. In contemplation of, and in conformity to the soul of man, as also for supply of those his necessitys which are not otherwise supply’d, or to be supply’d by nature, form of government consists necessarily of these five parts: the civil, which is the reason of the people; the religious, which is the comfort of the people; the military, which is the captain of the people; the laws, which are the rights of the people; and the judicatorys, which are the avengers of their wrongs.

21. The parts of form in government are as the offices in a house; and the orders of a form of government are as the orders of a house or family.

22. Good orders make evil men good, and bad orders make good men evil.

23. Oligarchists (to the end they may keep all others out of the government) pretending themselves to be saints, do also pretend, that they in whom lust reigns, are not fit for reign or for government. But libido dominandi, the lust of government, is the greatest lust, which also reigns most in those that have least right, as in oligarchists: for many a king and many a people have and had unquestionable right, but an oligarchist never; whence from their own argument, the lust of government reigning most in oligarchists, it undeniably follows that oligarchists of all men are least fit for government.

24. As in houses not differing in the kinds of their offices, the orders of the familys differ much; so the difference of form in different governments consists not in the kinds or number of the parts, which in every one is alike, but in the different ways of ordering those parts. And as the different orders of a house arise for the most part from the quantity and quality of the estate by which it is defray’d or maintain’d, according as it is in one or more of the family as proprietors, so it is also in a government.

25. The orders of the form, which are the manners of the mind of the government, follow the temperament of the body, or the distribution of the lands or territorys, and the interests thence arising.

26. The interest of arbitrary monarchy is the absoluteness of the monarch; the interest of regulated monarchy is the greatness of the nobility; the interest of democracy is the felicity of the people: for in democracy the government is for the use of the people, and in monarchy the people are for the use of the government, that is, of one lord or more.

Chap. V.27. The use of a horse without his provender, or of the people without som regard had to the necessitys of human nature, can be none at all: nor are those necessitys of nature in any form whatsoever to be otherwise provided for than by those five parts already mention’d; for which cause every government consists of five parts: the civil, the religious, the military, the laws, and the judicatorys.

CHAP. V.

Of Form in the Civil Parts.

1. THOSE naturalists that have best written of generation, do observe that all things procede from an eg, and that there is in every eg a punctum saliens, or a part first mov’d, as the purple speck observ’d in those of hens; from the working wherof the other organs or fit members are delineated, distinguish’d, and wrought into one organical body.

2. A nation without government, or fallen into privation of form, is like an eg unhatch’d; and the punctum saliens, or first mover from the corruption of the former to the generation of the succeding form, is either a sole legislator or a council.

3. A sole legislator, proceding according to art, or knowlege, produces government in the whole piece at once and in perfection. But a council (proceding not according to art, or what in a new case is necessary or fit for them, but according to that which they call the genius of the people still hankering after the things they have bin us’d to, or their old customs, how plain soever it be made in reason that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are ages about that which is very seldom or never brought by them to any perfection; but commonly coms by the way to ruin, leaving the noblest attempts under reproach, and the authors of them expos’d to the greatest miserys while they live, if not their memorys when they are dead and gone to the greatest infamy.

4. If the punctum saliens, or first mover in generation of the form be a sole legislator, his proceding is not only according to nature, but according to art also, and begins with the delineation of distinct orders or members.

5. Delineation of distinct organs or members (as to the form of government) is a division of the territory into fit precincts once stated for all, and a formation of them to their proper offices and functions, according to the nature or truth of the form to be introduc’d.

6. Precincts in absolute monarchy are commonly call’d provinces; and as to the delineation or stating of them, they may be equal or inequal. Precincts in regulated monarchy, where the lords or nobility as to their titles or estates ought not to be equal, but to differ as one star differs from another in glory, are commonly call’d countys, and ought to be inequal. Precincts in democracy, where without equality in the electors there will hardly be any equality in the elected; or where without equality in the precincts, it is almost, if not altogether impossible there should be equality in the commonwealth, are properly call’d tribes, and ought by all means to be equal.

7. Equality or parity has bin represented an odious thing, and made to imply the levelling of mens estates; but if a nobility, how inequal soever in their estates or titles, yet to com to the truth of aristocracy, must as to their votes or participation in the government be pares regni, that is to say peers, or in parity among themselves: as well likewise the people, to attain to the truth of democracy, may be peers, or in parity among themselves, and yet not as to their estates be oblig’d to levelling.

8. Industry of all things is the most accumulative, and accumulation of all things hates levelling: the revenue therfore of the people being the revenue of industry, tho som nobility (as that of Israel, or that of Lacedemon) may be found to have bin levellers, yet not any people in the world.

9. Precincts being stated, are in the next place to be form’d to their proper offices and functions, according to the truth of the form to be introduc’d; which in general is to form them as it were into distinct governments, and to indow them with distinct governors.

10. Governments or governors are either supreme or subordinat. For absolute monarchy to admit in its precincts any government or governors that are not subordinat but supreme, were a plain contradiction. But that regulated monarchy, and that democracy may do it, is seen in the princes of Germany, and in the cantons of Switzerland: nevertheless these being governments that have deriv’d this not from the wisdom of any legislator, but from accident, and an ill disposition of the matter, wherby they are not only incapable of greatness, but even of any perfect state of health, they com not under the consideration of art, from which they derive not; but of chance, to which we leave them. And, to speak according to art, we pronounce that, as well in democracy and in regulated as in absolute monarchy, governors and governments in the several divisions ought not to be soveraintys, but subordinat to one common soverain.

11. Subordinat governors are at will, or for life, or upon rotation or changes.

12. In absolute monarchy the governors of provinces must either be at will, or upon rotation, or else the monarch cannot be absolute. In regulated monarchy the governors of the countys may be for life or hereditary, as in counts or lords; or for som certain term and upon rotation, as in viscounts or sherifs. In democracy the people are servants to their governors for life, and so cannot be free; or the governors of the tribes must be upon rotation and for som certain term, excluding the party that have born the magistracy for that term from being elected into the like again, till an equal interval or vacation be expir’d.

13. The term in which a man may administer government to the good of it, and not attemt upon it to the harm of it, is the fittest term of bearing magistracy; and three years in a magistracy describ’d by the law under which a man has liv’d, and which he has known by the carriage or practice of it in others, is a term in which he cannot attempt upon his government for the hurt of it, but may administer it for the good of it, tho such a magistracy or government should consist of divers functions.

14. Governors in subordinat precincts have commonly three functions; the one civil, the other judicial, and the third military.

15. In absolute monarchy the government of a province consists of one beglerbeg, or governor for three years, with his council or divan for civil matters, and his guard of janizarys and spahys, that is, of horse and foot, with power to levy and command the timariots or military farmers.

16. In regulated monarchy the government of a county consists of one count or lord for life, or of one viscount or sherif for som limited term, with power in certain civil and judicial matters, and to levy and command the posse comitatus.

17. In democracy the government of a tribe consists of one council or court, in one third part elected annually by the people of that tribe for the civil; for the judicial, and for the military government of the same; as also to preside at the election of deputys in that tribe towards the annual supply in one third part of the common and soverain assemblys of the whole commonwealth, that is to say, of the senat and of the popular assembly; in which two these tribes, thus delineated and distinguish’d into proper organs or fit members to be actuated by those soverain assemblys, are wrought up again by connexion into one intire and organical body.

18. A parlament of physicians would never have found out the circulation of the blood, nor could a parlament of poets have written Virgil’sÆneis; of this kind therfore in the formation of government is the proceding of a sole legislator. But if the people without a legislator set upon such work by a certain instinct that is in them, they never go further than to chuse a council; not considering that the formation of government is as well a work of invention as of judgment; and that a council, tho in matters laid before them they may excel in judgment, yet invention is as contrary to the nature of a council as it is to musicians in consort, who can play and judg of any ayr that is laid before them, tho to invent a part of music they can never well agree.

19. In councils there are three ways of result, and every way of result makes a different form. A council with the result in the prince makes absolute monarchy. A council with the result in the nobility, or where without the nobility there can be no result, makes aristocracy, or regulated monarchy. A council with the result in the people makes democracy. There is a fourth kind of result or council which amounts not to any form, but to privation of government; that is, a council not consisting of a nobility, and yet with the result in itself, which is rank oligarchy: so the people, seldom or never going any further than to elect a council without any result but itself, instead of democracy introduce oligarchy.

20. The ultimat result in every form is the soverain power. If the ultimat result be wholly and only in the monarch, that monarchy is absolute. If the ultimat result be not wholly and only in the monarch, that monarchy is regulated. If the result be wholly and only in the people, the people are in liberty, or the form of the government is democracy.

21. It may happen that a monarchy founded upon aristocracy, and so as to the foundation regulated, may yet com by certain expedients or intrusions (as at this day in France and in Spain) as to the administration of it to appear or be call’d absolute; of which I shall treat more at large when I com to speak of reason of state, or of administration.

22. The ultimat result in the whole body of the people, if the commonwealth be of any considerable extent, is altogether impracticable; and if the ultimat result be but in a part of the people, the rest are not in liberty, nor is the government democracy.

23. As a whole army cannot charge at one and the same time, yet is so order’d that every one in his turn coms up to give the charge of the whole army; so tho the whole people cannot give the result at one and the same, yet may they be so order’d that every one in his turn may com up to give the result of the whole people.

24. A popular assembly, rightly order’d, brings up every one in his turn to give the result of the whole people.

25. If the popular assembly consists of one thousand or more, annually changeable in one third part by new elections made in the tribes by the people, it is rightly order’d; that is to say, so constituted that such an assembly can have no other interest wherupon to give the result, than that only which is the interest of the whole people.

26. But in vain is result where there is no matter to resolve upon; and where maturity of debate has not preceded, there is not yet matter to resolve upon.

27. Debate to be mature cannot be manag’d by a multitude; and result to be popular cannot be given by a few.

28. If a council capable of debate has also the result, it is oligarchy. If an assembly capable of the result has debate also, it is anarchy. Debate in a council not capable of result, and result in an assembly not capable of debate, is democracy.

29. It is not more natural to a people in their own affairs to be their own chusers, than upon that occasion to be provided of their learned counsil; in so much that the saying of Pacuvius, That either a people is govern’d by a king or counsil’d by a senat, is universally approv’d.

30. Where the senat has no distinct interest, there the people are counsillable, and venture not upon debate: where the senat has any distinct interest, there the people are not counsillable, but fall into debate among themselves, and so into confusion.

31. Of senats there are three kinds: first, A senat eligible out of the nobility only, as that of Rome, which will not be contented to be merely the council of the people, but will be contending that they are lords of the people, never quitting their pretensions till they have ruin’d the commonwealth. Secondly, A senat elected for life, as that of Sparta, which will be a species of nobility, and will have a kind of Spartan king, and a senat upon rotation; which being rightly constituted, is quiet, and never pretends more than to be the learned council of the people.

32. Thirdly, Three hundred senators, for example, changeable in one third part of them annually by new elections in the tribes, and constituted a senat to debate upon all civil matters, to promulgat to the whole nation what they have debated, this promulgation to be made som such convenient time before the matters by them debated are to be propos’d, that they may be commonly known and well understood, and then to propose the same to the result of the popular assembly, which only is to be the test of every public act, is a senat rightly order’d.

FORM of government (as to the civil part) being thus completed, is sum’d up in the three following aphorisms.

33. Absolute monarchy (for the civil part of the form) consists of distinct provinces under distinct governors, equally subordinat to a grand signor or sole lord, with his council or divan debating and proposing, and the result wholly and only in himself.

Chap. VI.34. Regulated monarchy (for the civil part of the form) consists of distinct principalitys or countys under distinct lords or governors, which if rightly constituted are equally subordinat to the king and his peerage, or to the king and his estates assembl’d in parliament, without whose consent the king can do nothing.

35. Democracy (for the civil part of the form) if rightly constituted, consists of distinct tribes under the government of distinct magistrats, courts, or councils, regularly changeable in one third part upon annual elections, and subordinat to a senat consisting of not above three hundred senators, and to a popular assembly consisting of not under a thousand deputys; each of these also regularly changeable in one third part upon annual elections in the tribes, the senat having the debate, and the popular assembly the result of the whole commonwealth.

CHAP. VI.

Of Form in the Religious Part.

1. FORM for the religious part either admits of liberty of conscience in the whole or in part; or dos not admit of liberty of conscience at all.

2. Liberty of conscience intire, or in the whole, is where a man according to the dictats of his own conscience may have the free exercise of his religion, without impediment to his preferment or imployment in the state.

3. Liberty of conscience in part is, where a man according to the dictats of his conscience may have the free exercise of his religion; but if it be not the national religion, he is therby incapable of preferment or imployment in the state.

4. Where the form admits not of the free exercise of any other religion except that only which is national, there is no liberty of conscience.

5. Men who have the means to assert liberty of conscience, have the means to assert civil liberty; and will do it if they are opprest in their consciences.

6. Men participating in property, or in imployment civil or military, have the means to assert liberty of conscience.

7. Absolute monarchy, being sole proprietor, may admit of liberty of conscience to such as are not capable of civil or military imployment, and yet not admit of the means to assert civil liberty; as the Greec Christians under the Turk, who, tho they injoy liberty of conscience, cannot assert civil liberty, because they have neither property nor any civil or military imployments.

8. Regulated monarchy, being not sole proprietor, may not admit naturally of liberty of conscience, lest it admits of the means to assert civil liberty, as was lately seen in England by pulling down the bishops, who, for the most part, are one half of the foundation of regulated monarchy.

9. Democracy being nothing but intire liberty; and liberty of conscience without civil liberty, or civil liberty without liberty of conscience being but liberty by halves, must admit of liberty of conscience both as to the perfection of its present being, and as to its future security: as to the perfection of its present being, for the reasons already shewn, or that she do not injoy liberty by halves; and for future security, because this excludes absolute monarchy, which cannot stand with liberty of conscience in the whole, and regulated monarchy, which cannot stand safely with it in any part.

10. If it be said that in France there is liberty of conscience in part, it is also plain that while the hierarchy is standing this liberty is falling, and that if ever it coms to pull down the hierarchy, it pulls down that monarchy also: wherfore the monarchy or hierarchy will be beforehand with it, if they see their true interest.

11. The ultimat result in monarchy being that of one man, or of a few men, the national religion in monarchy may happen not to be the religion of the major part of the people; but the result in democracy being in the major part of the people, it cannot happen but that the national religion must be that of the major part of the people.

12. The major part of the people, being in matters of religion inabled to be their own leaders, will in such cases therfore have a public leading; or, being debar’d of their will in that particular, are debar’d of their liberty of conscience.

13. Where the major part of the people is debar’d of their liberty by the minor, there is neither liberty of conscience nor democracy, but spiritual or civil oligarchy.

14. Where the major part is not debar’d of their liberty of conscience by the minor, there is a national religion.

15. National religion is either coercive, or not coercive.

16. Religion is not naturally subservient to any corrupt or worldly interest, for which cause to bring it into subjection to interest it must be coercive.

17. Where religion is coercive, or in subjection to interest, there it is not, or will not long continue to be the true religion.

18. Where religion is not coercive, nor under subjection to any interest, there it either is (or has no obstruction why it may not com to be) the true religion.

19. Absolute monarchy pretends to infallibility in matters of religion, imploys not any that is not of its own faith, and punishes its apostats by death without mercy.

20. Regulated monarchy coms not much short of the same pretence; but consisting of proprietors, and such as if they dissent have oftentimes the means to defend themselves, it dos not therfore always attain to the exercise of the like power.

21. Democracy pretends not to infallibility, but is in matters of religion no more than a seeker, not taking away from its people their liberty of conscience, but educating them, or so many of them as shall like of it, in such a manner or knowledge in divine things as may render them best able to make use of their liberty of conscience, which it performs by the national religion.

22. National religion, to be such, must have a national ministry or clergy.

23. The clergy is either a landed or a stipendiated clergy.

24. A landed clergy attaining to one third of the territory, is aristocracy; and therfore equally incompatible with absolute monarchy, and with democracy: but to regulated monarchy for the most part is such a supporter, as in that case it may be truly enough said, that NO BISHOP, NO KING.

25. The soverainty of the prince in absolute monarchy, and of the people in democracy, admitting not of any counterpoise, in each of these the clergy ought not to be landed; the laborer nevertheless being worthy of his hire, they ought to be stipendiated.

26. A clergy well landed is to regulated monarchy a very great glory; and a clergy not well stipendiated is to absolute monarchy or to democracy as great an infamy.

Chap. VII.27. A clergy, whether landed or stipendiated, is either hierarchical or popular.

28. A hierarchical clergy is a monarchical ordination; a popular clergy receives ordination from election by the people.

FORM of Government (as to the religious part) being thus completed, is sum’d up in the three following Aphorisms:

29. Absolute monarchy (for the religious part of the form) consists of a hierarchical clergy, and of an alcoran (or som book receiv’d in the nature of Scripture) interpretable by the prince only and his clergy, willingly permitting to them that are not capable of imployments a liberty of conscience.

30. Regulated monarchy (for the religious part of the form) consists of an aristocratical hierarchy, of the liturgy, and of the holy Scriptures (or som such book receiv’d for a rule of faith) interpretable only by the clergy, not admitting liberty of conscience, except thro mere necessity.

31. Democracy (for the religious part of the form) consists of a popular clergy, of the Scriptures (or som other book acknowleg’d divine) with a directory for the national religion, and a council for the equal maintenance both of the national religion, and of the liberty of conscience.

CHAP. VII.

Of Form in the Military Part.

1. A MAN may perish by the sword; yet no man draws the sword to perish, but to live by it.

2. So many ways as there are of living by the sword, so many ways there are of a militia.

3. If a prince be lord of the whole, or of two parts in three of the whole territory, and divides it into military farms at will and without rent, upon condition of service at their own charge in arms whenever he commands them, it is the sword of an absolute monarchy.

4. If the nobility, being lords of the whole or of two parts in three of the whole territory, let their lands by good pennyworths to tenants at will, or by their leases bound at their commands by whom they live to serve in arms upon pay, it is the sword of a regulated monarchy.

5. In countrys that have no infantry, or militia of free commoners, as in France and Poland, the nobility themselves are a vast body of horse, and the sword of that monarchy.

6. If a people, where there neither is lord nor lords of the whole, nor of two parts in three of the whole territory, for the common defence of their liberty and of their livelihood, take their turns upon the guard or in arms, it is the sword of democracy.

7. There is a fourth kind of militia, or of men living more immediatly by the sword, which are soldiers of fortune, or a mercenary army.

Chap. VIII.8. Absolute monarchy must be very well provided with court guards, or a mercenary army; otherwise its military farmers having no bar from becoming proprietors, the monarchy it self has no bar from changing into democracy.

FORM of government (as to the military part) being thus completed, is sum’d up in the three following aphorisms:

9. In a regulated monarchy where there is an infantry, there needs not any mercenary army; and there the people live tolerably well.

10. In a regulated monarchy where there is no infantry, but the nobility themselves are a vast body of horse, there must also be a mercenary infantry, and there the people are peasants or slaves.

11. There is no such thing in nature as any monarchy (whether absolute or regulated) subsisting merely by a mercenary army, and without an infantry or cavalry planted upon the lands of the monarch, or of his whole nobility.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Form in the legal Part.

1. IF justice be not the interest of a government, the interest of that government will be its justice.

2. Let equity or justice be what it will, yet if a man be to judg or resolve in his own case, he resolves upon his own interest.

3. Every government, being not obnoxious to any superior, resolves in her own case.

4. The ultimat result in every government is the law in that government.

5. In absolute monarchy, the ultimat result is in the monarch.

6. In aristocracy, or regulated monarchy, the ultimat result is in the lords or peers, or not without them.

7. In democracy the ultimat result is in the people.

8. Law in absolute monarchy holds such a disproportion to natural equity, as the interest of one man to the interest of all mankind.

9. Law in aristocracy holds such a disproportion to natural equity, as the interest of a few men to the interest of all mankind.

10. Law in democracy holds such a disproportion to natural equity, as the interest of a nation to the interest of all mankind.

11. One government has much nearer approaches to natural equity than another; but in case natural equity and self-preservation com in competition, so natural is self-preservation to every creature, that in that case no one government has any more regard to natural equity than another.

12. A man may devote himself to death or destruction to save a ation, but no nation will devote it self to death or destruction to save mankind.

13. MACHIAVEL is decry’d for saying, that no consideration is to be had of what is just or injust, of what is merciful or cruel, of what is honorable or ignominious in case it be to save a state, or to preserve liberty; which as to the manner of expression Chap. IX. is crudely spoken. But to imagin that a nation will devote it self to death or destruction any more upon faith given or an ingagement therto tending, than if there had bin no such ingagement made or faith given, were not piety but folly.

14. Whersoever the power of making law is, there only is the power of interpreting the law so made.

15. God who has given his law to the soul of that man who shall voluntarily receive it, is the only interpreter of his law to that soul; such at least is the judgment of democracy. With absolute monarchy, and with aristocracy, it is an innat maxim, That the people are to be deceiv’d in two things, their RELIGION and their LAW; or that the church or themselves are interpreters of all Scripture, as the priests were antiently of the Sibyls books.

FORM of government (as to the legal part) being thus completed, is sum’d up in the three following aphorisms:

16. Absolute monarchy (for the legal part of the form) consists of such laws as it pretends God has deliver’d or given the king and priests power to interpret; or it consists of such laws as the monarch shall or has chosen.

17. Aristocracy (for the legal part of the form) consists of such laws as the nobility shall chuse or have chosen; or of such as the people shall chuse or have chosen, provided they be agreed to by their lords, or by the king and their lords.

18. Democracy (for the legal part of the form) consists of such laws as the people, with the advice of their council, or of the senat, shall chuse or have chosen.

CHAP. IX.

Of Form in the judicial Part.

1. MULTIPLICITY of laws, being a multiplicity of snares for the people, causes corruption of government.

2. Paucity of laws requires arbitrary power in courts, or judicatorys.

3. Arbitrary power (in reference to laws) is of three kinds. (1) In making, altering, abrogating, or interpreting of laws, which belong to the soverain power. (2) In applying laws to cases which are never any one like another. (3) In reconciling the laws among themselves.

4. There is no difficulty at all in judging of any case whatsoever according to natural equity.

5. Arbitrary power makes any man a competent judg for his knowledge; but leaving him to his own interest, which oftentimes is contrary to justice, makes him also an incompetent judg, in regard that he may be partial.

6. A partiality is the cause why laws pretend to abhor arbitrary power; nevertheless, seeing that not one case is altogether like another, there must in every judicatory be som arbitrary power.

7. Paucity of laws causes arbitrary power in applying them; and multiplicity of laws causes arbitrary power in reconciling and applying them too.

8. Arbitrary power where it can do no wrong, dos the greatest right; because no law can ever be so fram’d, but that without arbitrary power it may do wrong.

9. Arbitrary power, going upon the interest of one or of a few, makes not a just judicatory.

10. Arbitrary power, going upon the interest of the whole people, makes a just judicatory.

11. All judicatorys and laws, which have bin made by arbitrary power, allow of the interpretation of arbitrary power, and acknowlege an appeal from themselves to it.

12. That law which leaves the least arbitrary power to the judg or judicatory, is the most perfect law.

13. Laws that are the fewest, plainest, and briefest, leave the least arbitrary power to the judg or judicatory; and being a light to the people, make the most incorrupt government.

14. Laws that are perplext, intricat, tedious, and voluminous, leave the greatest arbitrary power to the judg or judicatory; and raining snares on the people, make the most corrupt government.

15. Seeing no law can be so perfect as not to leave arbitrary power to the judicatory, that is the best constitution of a judicatory where arbitrary power can do the least hurt, and the worst constitution of a judicatory is where arbitrary power can do the most ill.

16. Arbitrary power in one judg dos the most, in a few judges dos less, and in a multitude of judges dos the least hurt.

17. The ultimat appeal from all inferior judicatorys is to som soverain judg or judicatory.

18. The ultimat result in every government (as in absolute monarchy, the monarch; in aristocracy, or aristocratical monarchy, the peers; in democracy, the popular assembly) is a soverain judg or judicatory that is arbitrary.

19. Arbitrary power in judicatorys is not such as makes no use of the law, but such by which there is a right use to be made of the laws.

20. That judicatory where the judg or judges are not obnoxious to partiality or privat interest, cannot make a wrong use of power.

21. That judicatory that cannot make a wrong use of power, must make a right use of law.

22. Every judicatory consists of a judg or som judges without a jury, or of a jury on the bench without any other judg or judges, or of a judg or judges on the bench with a jury at the bar.

FORM of government (as to the judicial part) being thus completed, is sum’d up in the three following aphorisms.

23. Absolute monarchy (for the judicial part of the form) admits not of any jury, but is of som such kind as a cadee or judg in a city, or as we say in a hundred, with an appeal to a cadaliskar or a judg in a province, from whom also there lys an appeal to the muphti, who is at the devotion of the grand signior or of the monarch.

Chap. X.24. Aristocracy or aristocratrical monarchy (for the judicial part of the form) may admit of a jury, so it be at the bar only, and consists of som such kind as delegats or ordinary judges, with an appeal to a house of peers; or som such court, as the parlament at Paris, which was at the institution in the reign of Hugh Capet, a parlament of soverain princes.

25. Democracy (for the judicial part of the form) is of som such kind as a jury on the bench in every tribe, consisting of thirty persons or more annually eligible in one third part by the people of that tribe, with an appeal from thence to a judicatory residing in the capital city of the like constitution, annually eligible in one third part out of the senat or the popular assembly, or out of both; from which also there lys an appeal to the people, that is to the popular assembly.

CHAP. X.

Of the Administration of Government, or REASON OF STATE.

1. AS the matter of a ship or of a house is one thing, the form of a ship or of a house is another thing, and the administration or reason of a ship or of the house is a third thing; so the matter of a government or of a state is one thing, the form of a government or of a state is another, and the administration of a government (which is what’s properly and truly call’d reason of state) is a third thing.

2. There are those who can play, and yet cannot pack the cards, and there are who can pack the cards, and yet cannot play.

3. Administration of government, or reason of state, to such as propose to themselves to play upon the square, is one thing; and to such as propose to themselves to pack the cards, is another.

4. REASON of state is that in a kingdom or a commonwealth, which in a family is call’d THE MAIN CHANCE.

5. The master of a family that either keeps himself up to his antient bounds, or increases his stock, looks very well to the main chance, at least if his play be upon the square, that is, upon his own abilitys, or good fortune, or the laws; but if it were not upon the square, yet an estate however gotten, is not for that a less estate in it self, nor less descending by the law to his successors.

6. If a people thro their own industry, or the prodigality of their lords, com to acquire liberty; if a few by their industry, or thro the folly or slothfulness of the people, com to eat them out, and make themselves lords; if one lord by his power or his virtue, or thro their necessity, their wisdom, or their folly, can overtop the rest of these lords, and make himself king, all this was fair play and upon the square.

7. REASON of state, if we speak of it as fair play, is foren or domestic.

8. REASON of state, which is foren, consists in balancing foren princes and states in such a manner, as you may gain upon them, or at least that they may not gain upon you.

9. REASON of state, which is domestic, is the administration of a government (being not usurp’d) according to the foundation and superstructures of the same if they be good, or so as not being good that they may be mended, or so as being good or bad they may be alter’d; or, the government being usurp’d, the reason ofstate then is the way and means wherby such usurpation may be made good or maintain’d.

10. REASON of state, in a democracy which is rightly founded and rightly order’d, is a thing of great facility, whether in a foren or in a domestic relation. In a foren, because one good democracy, weighing two or three of the greatest princes, will easily give the balance abroad at its pleasure; in a domestic, because it consists not of any more than giving such a stop in accumulation that the state coms not to be monarchical: which one reason of state being made good, all the rest gos well; and which one reason of state being neglected, all the rest coms in time to infallible ruin.

11. Reason of state in a democracy, which is not right in its foundations, may flourish abroad, and be one: but at home will languish or be two reasons of state, that is, the reason of the state or orders of the nobility, which is to lord it over the people; and the reason of the popular state or order, which is to bring the commonwealth to equality: which two reasons of state, being irreconcilable, will exercise themselves against one another, first by disputes, then by plots, till it coms at last to open violence, and so to the utter ruin of the commonwealth, as it happen’d in Rome.

12. Reason of state in an absolute monarchy (whether foren or domestic) is but threefold; as first to keep its military farmers or timariots to the first institution; next to cut him that grows any thing above his due stature, or lifts up his head above the rest, by so much the shorter; and last of all, to keep its arms in exercise.

13. In aristocratical monarchy reason of state (as to the whole) is but one thing, that is, to preserve the counterpoise of the king and the two, or the three, or the four estates: for in som countrys, as in Poland, there are but two estates, the clergy and the nobility; in others, as in Sweden, there are four, the nobility, the gentry, the clergy, and the commons: in most others there are but three, the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, and the commons.

14. In aristocratical monarchy reason of state (as to the parts) is a multifarious thing, every state having its peculiar reason of state, and the king also his reason of state: with the king it is to balance the nobility, that he may hold them under; reason of state with the nobility is to balance the king, left he should grow absolute; reason of state both with the king and the nobility is to keep down the people; and reason of state with the people is to drive at their liberty.

15. In forms that are pure, or in governments that have no more than an absolute prince or one state, as absolute monarchy and equal or pure democracy, there is but one reason of state, and that is to preserve the form intire. In forms that are mix’d (as in an inequal commonwealth where there are two estates, and in aristocratical monarchy where there is a king and two if not three estates) there are so many reasons of state to break the form, that there has not bin any inequal commonwealth which either the people have not brought to democracy, or the nobility to monarchy. And scarce was there any aristocratical monarchy, where (to omit the wars of the nobility with their king, or among themselves) the people have not driven out their king, or where the king has not brought the people into slavery. Aristocratical monarchy is the true theatre of expedient-mongers and state-emperics, or the deep waters wherin that Leviathan the minister of state takes his pastime.

16. The complaint that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes affairs consists rather in fine deliverys and shiftings of dangers or mischiefs when they are near, than in solid and grounded courses to keep them off, is a complaint in the streets of aristocratical monarchy: and not to be remedy’d, because the nobility being not broken, the king is in danger, and the nobility being broken, the monarchy is ruin’d.

17. An absurdity in the form of the government (as that in a monarchy there may be two monarchs) shoots out into a mischief in the administration, or som wickedness in the reason of state, as in Romulus’s killing of Remus, and the monstrous assassinations of the Roman emperors.

18. Usurpation of government is a surfeit that converts the best arts into the worst: Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquisitum bonis artibus exercuit.

19. As in the privation of virtue, and in beggery, men are sharks or robbers, and the reason of their way of living is quite contrary to those of thrist; so in the privation of government, as in anarchy, oligarchy, or tyranny, that which is reason of state with them is directly opposit to that which is truly so: whence are all those black maxims set down by som politicians, particularly Machiavel in his prince, and which are condemn’d to the fire even by them who, if they liv’d otherwise, might blow their fingers.

20. Where the government from a true foundation rises up into proper superstructures or form, the reason of state is right and streight; but give our politician peace when you please, if your house stands awry, your props do not stand upright.

21. Take a jugler, and commend his tricks never so much, yet if in so doing you shew his tricks you spoil him; which has bin and is to be confess’d of Machiavel.

22. Corruption in government is to be read and consider’d in Machiavel, as diseases in a man’s body are to be read and consider’d in Hippocrates.

23. Neither Hippocrates nor Machiavel introduc’d diseases into man’s body, nor corruption into government, which were before their times; and seeing they do but discover them, it must be confest that so much as they have don tends not to the increase but the cure of them, which is the truth of these two authors.

POLITICAL APHORISMS.

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Terent.

1. THE errors and sufferings of the people are from their governors.

2. When the foundation of a government coms to be chang’d, and the governors change not the superstructures accordingly, the people becom miserable.

3. The monarchy of England was not a government by arms, but a government by laws, tho imperfect or ineffectual laws.

4. The later governments in England since the death of the king, have bin governments by arms.

5. The people cannot see, but they can feel.

6. The people having felt the difference between a government by laws and a government by arms, will always desire the government by laws, and abhor that of arms.

7. Where the spirit of the people is impatient of a government by arms, and desirous of a government by laws, there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their liberty.

8. The spirit of the people of England, not trusted with their liberty, drives at the restitution of monarchy by blood and violence.

9. The spirit of the people of England, trusted with their liberty, if the form be sufficient, can never set up a king; and if the form be insufficient (as a parlament with a council in the intervals, or two assemblys coordinat) will set up a king without blood or violence.

10. To light upon a good man, may be in chance; but to be sure of an assembly of good men, is not in prudence.

11. Where the security is no more than personal, there may be a good monarch, but can be no good commonwealth.

12. The necessary action or use of each thing is from the nature of the form.

13. Where the security is in the persons, the government makes good men evil; where the security is in the form, the government makes evil men good.

14. Assemblys legitimatly elected by the people, are that only party which can govern without an army.

15. Not the party which cannot govern without an army, but the party which can govern without an army, is the refin’d party, as to this intent and purpose truly refin’d; that is, by popular election, according to the precept of Moses, and the rule of Scripture: Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you.

16. The people are deceiv’d by names, but not by things.

17. Where there is a well-order’d commonwealth, the people are generally satisfy’d.

18. Where the people are generally dissatisfy’d, there is no commonwealth.

19. The partys in England declaring for a commonwealth, hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a commonwealth.

20. To hold that the government may be manag’d by a few, or by a party, is inconsistent with a commonwealth; except in a situation like that of Venice.

21. To hold that there can be any national religion or ministry without public indowment and inspection of the magistracy, or any government without a national religion or ministry, is inconsistent with a commonwealth.

22. To hold that there may be liberty, and not liberty of conscience, is inconsistent with a commonwealth that has the liberty of her own conscience, or that is not Popish.

23. Where civil liberty is intire, it includes liberty of conscience.

24. Where liberty of conscience is intire, it includes civil liberty.

25. Either liberty of conscience can have no security at all, or under popular government it must have the greatest security.

26. To hold that a government may be introduc’d by a little at once, is to wave prudence, and commit things to chance.

27. To hold that the wisdom of God in the formation of a house or of a government, gos not universally upon natural principles, is inconsistent with Scripture.

28. To hold that the wisdom of man in the formation of a house, or of a government, may go upon supernatural principles, is inconsistent with a commonwealth, and as if one should say, God ordain’d the temple, therfore it was not built by masons; he ordain’d the snuffers, therfore they were not made by a smith.

29. To hold that hirelings (as they are term’d by som) or an indow’d ministry, ought to be remov’d out of the church, is inconsistent with a commonwealth.

30. Nature is of GOD.

31. Som part in every religion is natural.

32. A universal effect demonstrats a universal cause.

33. A universal cause is not so much natural, as it is nature it self.

34. Every man, either to his terror or consolation, has som sense of religion.

35. Man may rather be defin’d a religious than a rational creature; in regard that in other creatures there may be somthing of reason, but there is nothing of religion.

36. Government is of human prudence, and human prudence is adequat to man’s nature.

37. The prudence or government that is regardless of religion, is not adequat nor satisfactory to man’s nature.

38. Where the government is not adequat or satisfactory to man’s nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.

39. The major part of mankind gives itself up in the matter of religion to the public leading.

40. That there may be a public leading, there must be a national religion.

41. Where the minor part takes away the national religion, there the major part is depriv’d of liberty of conscience by the minor.

42. Where the major part is depriv’d of liberty of conscience by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that liberty of conscience which they might otherwise injoy.

43. InIsrael there was an indow’d clergy or priesthood, and a national religion under inspection of the magistrat: whence the Christians in apostolic times, defraying their own ministry, could have liberty of conscience; wheras if the Christians by going about to take away tithes, and abolish the national religion, had indeavor’d to violat the consciences of the unconverted Jews, these being far greater in number, must needs have taken away the liberty of conscience from the Christians.

44. PAUL in Athens could freely and undisturbedly convert Dionysius and others; therfore in Athens there was liberty of conscience: but if Paul and his converts had gon about to drive hirelings, or an indow’d priesthood or clergy out of that church, who sees not that the Athenians would have driven Paul and his converts out of Athens?

45. That there may be liberty of conscience, there must be a national religion.

46. Tha there may be a national religion, there must be an indowed clergy.

47. Commonwealths have had three ways of union. As the Athenians, by bringing their confederats to subjection: as the united provinces by an equal league: or as the Romans by an inequal league. The first way is tyrannical. In the second, one commonwealth under the league is no more than another, and each one as to herself has a negative: which kind of union is not only obstructive, but tends (as we have seen both in Holland and Switzerland) towards division. In the third way, the commonwealth uniting other commonwealths, retains to her self the leading of the whole league, leaving to each of the rest her own laws, and her own liberty.

48. Till a commonwealth be first fram’d, how such a commonwealth should make an effectual union with another nation, is not possible to be seen.

49. The new, unpractis’d, and heretofore unheard union (as it is vulgarly spoken) with Scotland, by uniting deputys of divers nations, not in a council apart, or by way of states general, as in the united provinces, but in the standing councils of som one commonwealth in the league, is destructive to liberty both in England and in Scotland.

50. If the commonwealth of England receives deputys from Scotland in a greater number than that of her own, she receives law from a foren interest, and so loses her own liberty.

51. IfScotland be receiv’d in an equal number, it obstructs the freedom of both, or occasions war or dissension.

52. IfScotland be receiv’d in an inferior number, she receives law from England, and so loses her liberty. The like is understood of Ireland.

53. Wheras a well-order’d commonwealth should give the balance to her consederats, and not receive it from them; the councils in which divers others are thus united, tho in a far inferior number of deputys, yet if these ly in wait, or lay their heads together, may be over-rul’d, obstructed, or overbalanc’d by foren interests.

54. Where countrys are divers in their laws, and yet are to receive laws one from the other, neither the commonwealth giving law, knows what to give, nor the commonwealth receiving law, understands what she receives: in which case the union returns to force or confusion.

55. The best way of holding a nation different or not different in laws, is the Roman, that is, by way of province.

56. A province, especially if she has strong holds, may, by defraying of a small guard, be kept to a just league, and for the rest injoy her own laws, her own government, and her perfect liberty. Other ways of union will be found more chargeable, and less effectual, on both sides: for if England has no army in Scotland, Scotland will receive no law from England; and if England has an army there, her hold consists not in the union, but in the force. The like is to be understood of Ireland.

57. If a country be very small, and not able to subsist of it self, as Wales, it may be safely united and held: but the advantage that Wales has in a participation of all magistracys and offices, is not that which England is able to afford to such a country as Scotland, without subjecting her neck to the yoke.

58. The order of a commonwealth requires, that it consists, first of a civil; secondly, of a religious; thirdly, of a military; and fourthly, of a provincial part. The manner of uniting provinces or different nations, pertains to the last part; and in the formation of a commonwealth, to begin with that first, which is naturally last, is to invert the order, and by consequence the commonwealth it self, which indeed is nothing but order.

59. Where there can be any other government, there can be no commonwealth.

60. Where there can be a commonwealth, what tumults soever there happen, and which soever prevail, there can be no other government; that is to say, without foren invasion, which throout I must be understood to except.

61. If Sir George Booth had prevail’d, he must either have introduc’d a commonwealth, or have restor’d the king.

62. If the king were restor’d, he must either govern by an army, or by parlaments.

63. A king governing now in England by an army, would for the same causes find the same effects with the late protector.

64. A king governing now in England by parlaments, would find the nobility of no effect at all.

65. A parlament, where the nobility is of no effect at all, is a mere popular council.

66. A mere popular council will never receive law from a king.

67. A mere popular council giving law to a king, becoms therby a democracy, or equal commonwealth; or the difference is no greater than in the imperfection of the form.

68. A commonwealth or democracy to be perfect in the form, must consist especially of such an assembly, the result wherof can go upon no interest whatsoever, but that only which is the common interest of the whole people.

69. An assembly consisting of a few, may go upon the interest of one man, as a king; or upon the interest of one party, as that of divines, lawyers, and the like; or the interest of themselves, and the perpetuation of their government.

70. The popular assembly in a commonwealth may consist of too few, but can never consist of too many.

71. In every commonwealth there has bin a popular assembly. This in Israel at least consisted of twenty-four thousand, upon a monthly rotation. In Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, it consisted of the whole citizens, that is, of all such as had a right in the commonwealth, whether they inhabited in city or country. In Venice it consists of about two thousand. In the province of Holland only, which contains eighteen or nineteen soveraintys, the popular or resolving assemblys consist at least of five hundred persons: these in the whole union, may amount to five or six thousand; in Switzerland I believe they com to a greater number. And the most of these assemblys have bin perpetually extant.

72. If the popular assembly consists of so few, and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate, it is good for nothing but to destroy the commonwealth.

73. If the popular assembly consists of so many, and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate, there must be a senat to help this defect.

74. The reason of the senat is, that a popular assembly rightly constituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.

75. The reason of the popular assembly is, that a senat rightly constituted for debate, must consist of so few and eminent persons, that if they have the result too, they will not resolve according to the interest of the people, but according to the interest of themselves.

76. A popular assembly without a senat cannot be wise.

77. A senat without a popular assembly will not be honest.

78. The senat and the popular assembly being once rightly constituted, the rest of the commonwealth will constitute itself.

79. TheVenetians having slain divers of their dukes for their tyranny, and being assembl’d by such numbers in their great council as were naturally incapable of debate, pitch’d upon thirty gentlemen who were call’d pregati, in that they were pray’d to go apart, and, debating upon the exigence of the commonwealth, to propose as they thought good to the great council: and from thence first arose the senat of Venice (to this day call’d the pregati) and the great council, that is, the senat and the popular assembly of Venice. And from these two arose all those admirable orders of that commonwealth.

80. That a people of themselves should have such an understanding as when they of Venice did institute their pregati or senat, is rare.

81. That a senat or council of governors having supreme power, shou’d institute a popular assembly, and propose to it, tho in all reason it be the far more facil and practicable, is that which is rarer.

82. The diffusive body of the people is not in a natural capacity of judging; for which cause the whole judgment and power of the diffusive body of the people must be intirely and absolutely in their collective bodys, assemblys or representatives, or there can be no commonwealth.

83. To declare that assemblys or representatives of the people have power in som things, and in others not, is to make the diffusive body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a political capacity of judging.

84. To bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity of judging, is to introduce government. To bring a natural incapacity of judging to such a collective or political capacity of judging, as yet necessarily must retain the interest of the diffusive body, is to introduce the best kind of government. But to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of judging, is to frustrat all government, and to introduce anarchy. Nor is anarchy, whether impos’d or obtruded by the legislator first, or by the people, or their demagogs or incendiarys afterwards, of any other kind whatsoever than of this only.

85. To make principles or fundamentals, belongs not to men, to nations, nor to human laws. To build upon such principles or fundamentals as are apparently laid by God in the inevitable necessity or law of nature, is that which truly appertains to men, to nations, and to human laws. To make any other fundamentals, and then build upon them, is to build castles in the air.

86. Whatever is violent, is not secure nor durable; whatever is secure and durable, is natural.

87. Government in the whole people, tho the major part were disaffected, must be secure and durable, because it waves force, to found it self upon nature.

88. Government in a party, tho all of these were well affected, must be insecure and transitory, because it waves nature, to found itself upon force.

89. Commonwealths, of all other governments, are more especially for the preservation, not for the destruction, of mankind.

90. Commonwealths, that have bin given to cut off their diseas’d limbs (as Florence) have brought themselves to impotence and ruin. Commonwealths that have bin given to healing their diseas’d limbs (as Venice) have bin healthful and flourishing.

91. ATHENS under the oligarchy of four hundred, was infinitly more afflicted and torn with distraction, blood and animosity of partys, than is England; yet by introduction of a senat of four hundred, and a popular assembly of five thousand, did therupon, so suddenly as if it had been a charm, recover might and glory. See the eighth book ofThucydides;A story in these times most necessary to be consider’d.

92. To leave our selves and posterity to a farther purchase in blood or sweat of that which we may presently possess, injoy, and hereafter bequeath to posterity in peace and glory, is inhuman and impious.

93. As certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispels the peevishness and peril of sickness, dos a good state of government the animosity and danger of partys.

94. The frame of a commonwealth having first bin propos’d and consider’d, expedients (in cafe such should be found necessary for the safe, effectual, and perfect introduction of the same) may with som aim be apply’d or fitted; as to a house, when the model is resolv’d upon, we fit scaffolds in building. But first to resolve upon expedients, and then to fit to them the frame of a commonwealth, is as if one should set up props, and then build a house to lean upon them.

95. As the chief expedients in the building of a house are axes and hammers; so the chief expedient in the building of a government, is a standing army.

96. As the house which, being built, will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of axes and hammers, is imperfect; so is the government which, being form’d, cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing army.

97. While the civil and religious parts of a commonwealth are forming, there is a necessity that she should be supported by an army; but when the military and provincial parts are rightly form’d, she can have no farther use of any other army. Wherfore at this point, and not till then, her armys are by the practice of commonwealths, upon slighter occasions, to have half pay for life, and to be disbanded.

98. Where there is a standing army, and not a form’d government, there the army of necessity will have dictatorian power.

99. Where an army subsists upon the pay or riches of a single person, or of a nobility, that army is always monarchical. Where an army subsists not by the riches of a single person, nor of a nobility, that army is always popular.

100. TheEnglish armys are popular armys.

101. Where armys are popular, and exercise dictatorian power in deposing single persons, and monarchical assemblys, there can be no greater, nor needs any other expedient for the introduction of a commonwealth. Nevertheless to this may be added som such moderat qualifications as may prune the commonwealth, not lop off her branches. Whom these will not satisfy, it is not a commonwealth, but a party, that can.

102. If the late king had freely permitted to the people the exercise of the power inevitably devolv’d upon them by the change of the balance, he had not bin destroy’d. If either of the late single persons had brought the people into an orderly exercise of the power devolv’d upon them, he had bin great. What party soever shall hinder the people from the exercise of the power devolv’d upon them, shall be certainly ruin’d: who or what party soever shall introduce the people into the due and orderly exercise of the power devolv’d upon them, shall be forthwith secure and famous for ever.

103. A man uses, nourishes, and cherishes his body, without understanding it; but he that made the body understood it.

104. The reason why the nations that have commonwealths, use them so well, and cherish them so much, and yet that so few nations have commonwealths, is, That in using a commonwealth, it is not necessary it should be understood; but in making a commonwealth, that it be understood, is of absolute necessity. Caput reipublicæ est nosse rempub.Cicero.

105. As the natural body of a Christian or Saint can be no other for the frame, than such as has bin the natural body of an Israelit or of a Heathen; so the political bodys, or civil governments of Christians or Saints can be no other, for the frame, than such as have bin the political bodys or civil governments of the Israelits, or of the Heathens.

106. It shall be as soon found when and where the soul of a man was in the body of a beast, as when or where the soul or freedom natural to democracy, was in any other form than that only of a senat, and an assembly of the people.

107. In those things wherin, and so far as art is directed or limited by the nature of her materials, it is in art as in nature.

108. That democracy, or equal government by the people, consist of an assembly of the people, and a senat, is that wherby art is altogether directed, limited, and necessitated by the nature of her materials.

109. As the soul of man can never be in the body of a beast, unless God make a new creation; so neither the soul or freedom natural to democracy in any other form whatsoever, than that only of a senat and a popular assembly.

110. The right constitution, coherence, and proper symmetry of a form of government gos for the greater part upon invention.

111. Reason is of two parts; invention, and judgment.

112. Judgment is most perfect in an assembly.

113. Invention is most perfect in one man.

114. In one man, judgment wants the strength which is in a multitude of counsillors.

115. In a multitude of counsillors, invention is none at all.

116. Thro the defect of invention, the wisest assemblys in the formation or reformation of government, have pitch’d upon a sole legislator.

117. It is not below the dignity of the greatest assembly, but according to the practice of the best commonwealths, to admit of any one man that is able to propose to them, for the good of his country.

118. To the making of a well order’d commonwealth, there gos little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, than the establishment of an equal or apt division of the territory, and the proposing of such election to the divisions so made, as from an equal foundation may raise equal superstructures; the rest being but paper-work, is as soon don, as said or voted.

119. Where such elections are propos’d, as being made by the people, must needs produce a well order’d senat and popular assembly, and the people (who, as we have already found by experience, stick not at the like work) elect accordingly; there not the proposers of any power in themselves, but the whole people by their peculiar and natural right and power, do institute and ordain their whole commonwealth.

120. The highest earthly felicity that a people can ask, or God can give, is an equal and well-order’d commonwealth. Such a one among the Israelits, was the reign of God; and such a one (for the same reason) may be among Christians the reign of Christ, tho not every one in the Christian commonwealth should be any more a Christian indeed, than every one in the Israelitish commonwealth was an Israelit indeed.

Seven Models of a Commonwealth:

OR, BRIEF DIRECTIONS SHEWING How a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government may be made, found, or understood.

THERE is nothing more apparent, than that this nation is greatly disquieted and perplex’d thro a complication of two causes: the one, that the present state therof is not capable of any other form than that only of a popular government; the other, that they are too few who understand what is the form or model naturally necessary to a popular government, or what is requir’d in that form or prudence for the fitting of it to the use of this nation. For these infirmitys I shall offer som remedy by a brief discourse or direction consisting of two parts.

THE first shewing those forms or models of popular government, or of commonwealths, which have bin hitherto extant, whether fit or unfit for the present state of this nation: the second, shewing a model or form of popular government fitted to the present state of this nation. In the first part I shall propose seven models roughly and generally: in the second, one, but more particularly and exactly.

THE FIRST PART.

IN every frame of government, either the form must be fitted to the property as it stands, and this is only practicable in this nation; or the property must be alter’d and fitted to the frame, which without force has bin somtimes, but very seldom, practicable in any other nation. Nevertheless, for the better knowlege of the one way, it will be best to propose in both ways.

DIVERS MODELS THE FIRST MODEL OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Israel.

THAT the nobility, the gentry, and the people, be persuaded to give up their whole lands to the commonwealth.

That if the whole people shall so give up their lands, they be divided into twelve equal precincts, call’d tribes.

That the man of greatest quality in every tribe have about ten thousand pounds a year given to him and his heirs, with the hereditary dignity of prince of his tribe.

That som ten other men of the next quality under the prince in every tribe, have about two thousand pounds a year in the same given to each of them and their heirs, with the hereditary dignity of patriarchs, or chief of the fathers.

That the remaining part of the lands, except forty-eight citys and their suburbs, be distributed to the whole people equally by lots.

That it be not lawful for any prince, patriarch, or other, to sell or alienat his land, or any part therof, in such manner, but that upon every fiftieth year, being for this cause a year of jubile, all lands within that compass sold or alienated return to the antient possessors or lawful heirs.

That there be one other tribe added to the twelve; that this tribe so added be not local, nor suffer’d to have any lands at all, except the forty-eight citys above reserv’d, with their suburbs, that is with a quantity of land to each of them, being in depth two thousand cubits round. That these be settl’d upon them and their heirs for ever, besides the annual tithe of the whole territory, and a piece of mony every year upon every head under the notion of an offering, in regard that other offerings are now unlawful; and that this tribe consist of clergy, having one hereditary archbishop, or high priest, for the head and prince of their tribe.

That there be no other law than that of the word of God only; and that the clergy being best skill’d in this law, be eligible into all courts of justice, all magistracys and offices whatsoever.

That the prince of a tribe, together with one or more courts, consisting of twenty-three judges elected by the people of that tribe for life, be the government of the same.

That the people of twelve local divisions take by the ballot wise men and understanding among their tribes, and of these constitute a senat for the whole commonwealth consisting of seventy elders for life.

That every local tribe monthly elect two thousand of their own number; and that these elections amounting in all to four and twenty thousand, assemble at the metropolis or capital city, and be the monthly representative of the people.

That the senat be a standing judicatory of appeal from all other courts, with power to shew the sentence of the laws of God.

That besides the law of God, whatever shall be propos’d by the seventy elders, and resolv’d by the monthly representative of the people, be the law of the land.

A SECOND MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

THAT there be a king without guards.

That the word or command of this king be the law.

That this king stirring out of his palace, it may be lawful for any man to slay him.

IN this model there wants but security, that while the people are dispers’d the king can gather no army, to demonstrat, that either the people must be free, or the king a prisoner.

A THIRD MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Sparta.

THAT the nobility, the gentry, and the people, having upon persuasion given up their lands to the public, the whole territory be divided into one hundred thousand equal lots, and two more, being each of ten thousand acres.

That the inferior lots be distributed to the people.

That every man possessing a lot, be a citizen.

That the rest, except only the children of citizens, be servants to, and tillers of the ground for the citizens.

That there be no profess’d students.

That no citizen exercise any trade but that of arms only; and that the use of mony, except it be made of iron, be wholly banish’d.

That there be two kings hereditary: that each of them possess one of those lots of ten thousand acres.

That they be presidents of the senat, with single votes; and that in war they have the leading of the armys.

That there be a senat consisting, besides the kings, of twenty-eight senators, elected for life by the people.

That whatever be propos’d by this senat to the whole people, or any ten thousand of them, and shall be resolv’d by the same, be the law.

That there be a court consisting of five annual magistrats elected by the people; and that this court have power to bring a king, a senator, or other, that shall openly or secretly violat the laws, or invade the government, to justice.

A FOURTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Athens.

THAT there be a representative of the people, consisting of five thousand.

That these annually elect by lot a senat consisting of four hundred, and a signory by suffrage consisting of nine annual princes.

That each fourth part of the senat, for one fourth part of their annual term, be a council of state.

That the council of state may assemble the people, and propose to the same: that the senat may assemble the people, and propose to them. And that what is propos’d by the senat, and resolv’d by the people, be the law.

That the executive power of the laws made, be more especially committed and distributed in various functions, and divers administrations, to the nine princes.

A FIFTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Rome.

THAT the whole nation be divided into three distinct orders: the one senatorian, or nobility; the other equestrian, or gentry; and the third plebeian, or popular.

That the equestrian order be the cavalry of the commonwealth, and the plebeian the foot.

That there be a senat consisting of the senatorian order, and of three hundred senators for life.

That there be two magistrats elected by the people, for five years term, call’d censors.

That the censors have power upon cause shewn to remove a senator out of the senat; and to elect a nobleman, or somtimes a plebeian, therby made noble, into the senat.

That there be two annual magistrats elected by the people, call’d consuls.

That the consuls be presidents of the senat, and have the leading of the armys.

That the senat as they shall see occasion) may nominat one person to be dictator for som short term.

That the dictator for his term have soverain power.

That there be a division of the whole people, of what orders soever, into six classes, according to the valuation of their estates. For example: That the first classis consist of all such as have two thousand pounds a year, or upwards; the second of all such as have one thousand pounds a year, or upwards, under two; the third, of all such as have six hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under one thousand; the fourth, of all such as have three hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under six hundred; the fifth, of all such as have under the former proportion; the sixth, of all such as pay no taxes, or have no land, and that these be not us’d in arms.

That the senat propose all laws to be enacted, to an assembly of the people.

That all magistrats be elected by the same.

That this assembly of the people consist of the five classes, in such manner, that if the votes of the first and second classes be near equal, the third classis be call’d; and if these agree not, the fourth be call’d; and so for the rest.

That what is thus propos’d by the senat, and resolv’d by the people, be the law.

IN this frame the senat, by the optimacy of the first and second classes (which seldom or never disagree) carrys all, to the exclusion of the main body of the people: whence arises continual feud or enmity between the senat and the people: who consulting apart, introduce popular debate, set up som other way of assembly, as by tribes, or by parishes, with more equality of votes; elect magistrats of their own, make decrees binding the senat of nobility, indeavor to curb their power by weakning their balance, or diminishing their estates: all these tumultuously, and to the alteration of the government, with so frequent changes under so divers shapes, as make a very Proteus of the commonwealth, till having bin all her lifetime afflicted with anarchy, she ends her days in tyranny.

A SIXTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Venice.

THAT the soverain power be estated upon four thousand select men, to them and their heirs for ever.

That there be a great council consisting of these four thousand; and that their sons at five and twenty years of age have right to the same.

That the great council elect one duke for life: That the duke have a royal palace assign’d, with a guard, at the state’s charge, and a revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year; and that he bear the soverain dignity of the commonwealth.

That this duke have six counsillors annually chosen by the great council. That he have no power to sign any writing, tho in his own name, nor to do any of his political functions without his counsillors. That his counsillors have power to sign any writing in the duke’s name, or to do any of his political functions without him; and that the duke with these six counsillors be the signory of the commonwealth.

That the signory of this commonwealth have session and suffrage in all the councils of the same, with right also to propose to each or any of them, either jointly or severally.

That one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great council, together with other councils and magistrats, to whom of course the like honor is appertaining, be the senat.

That sixteen other magistrats propos’d by the senat, and confirm’d by the great council for the term of six months, be a council apart, with three weekly provosts or proposers, call’d the college.

That the signory may assemble the college, and propose to them; that the college may assemble the senat, and propose to them; and that the senat may assemble the great council, and propose to them. And that whatever is resolv’d by the senat, and not contradicted, nor question’d by the great council, be the law.

That there be a council of ten elected annually by the great council; and that this council of ten, with the signory, and som of the college, having right of session and suffrage in the same, may upon occasion exercise dictatorian power in this commonwealth.

That the rest of the people under the empire of this commonwealth, be disarm’d, and govern’d by lieutenants of provinces. That the commonwealth have a standing army of strangers or others, in disciplin and pay. And that the city wherin she shall reside, be founded in the sea, after such a manner, that it can no more be approach’d by a fleet, than by an army without a fleet. Otherwise, this commonwealth is expos’d both to the provinces, and to a mercenary army.

A SEVENTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOS’D.

The Commonwealth of Holland.

THAT the people in every city, and in every province or county within these three nations, elect to every city, province, or county of the same, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty magistrats for life. That these magistrats being so elected, be the senat of that respective city, province or county.

That the senats, thus elected, thenceforth have and injoy the soverain power within their respective jurisdiction, for ever. That every senat annually elect two or four burgomasters or consuls, to be presidents of the same. That they also elect seven magistrats, or present fourteen persons to the governor of the province; and that he elect seven. That the seven so elected be judges, or have the executive power of the laws for their term, and within their respective jurisdiction.

That in case of affairs of more public and general concern, as war or peace, levy of men or mony, and the like, the governor of the province give information of the things to be consider’d, to the nobility, and to the senats of that province; therwith appointing a time and place for the assembly of the states provincial. That each of the senats, having debated the matter propos’d, delegat one consul, with som other senators well inform’d and instructed with their will and pleasure, to the assembly of the states provincial. That the nobility of the same province delegat som of their order likewise to the provincial states. That the delegats both of the nobility and of the senats give the vote of their principals according to instruction; and that neither the nobility, nor any senat or soverainty be otherwise bound, than by their own vote.

That the provincial estates elect one magistrat for life, or during pleasure, to be provincial governor: That they elect one or more other magistrats for life, or during pleasure, to be states general.

That the states general being elected, and well instructed by their provinces, have the direction of the whole league: That each give not his own vote, but the vote of his province; and that no province be otherwise bound, than by her own vote.

IF these models (in which I claim to be the first that has laid the whole, and the highest mysterys of the antient commonwealths, to the lowest capacity of vulgar debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in pamphlets, for chimæras or utopias, it is great chance: yet contain they no less than the whole revolution of popular prudence. Nor is it more certain, that no one of them would fit the present state of this nation, than that he or they, whose contemplation and understanding is not well vers’d in the most, or in the best of these, shall never fit a model of popular government to the present state of this nation, or of any other. In which assurance, I com to fulfil my promise in the Second Part, or to propose such a model as is fitted to the present state of this nation.

THE SECOND PART, Proposing a Model of a COMMONWEALTH

Fitted to the present State of this Nation.

BUT so it is ever, that the humors or interests of predominant partys hold themselves to be national; and that which fits them, can never fit a nation; nor that which fits a nation, ever fit them. This, in the introduction of government, is always the main difficulty. But where partys are no better founded, or fitted for usurpation, than now in England, they are rather to be slighted than consider’d, as those, the stoutest wherof have but given this example to the rest, that they who in this state of affairs shall obstruct an equal and well-order’d government, shall but ruin themselves. For which cause it is propos’d,

1. THAT all citizens, that is, freemen, or such as are not servants, be distributed into horse and foot. That such of them as have one hundred pounds a year in lands, goods, or mony, or above this proportion, be of the horse; and all such as have under this proportion, be of the foot.

2. That all elders, or freemen, being thirty years of age or upwards, be capable of civil administration; and that the youth, or such freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of civil administration, but of military only, in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this model .

3. That the whole native or proper territory of the commonwealth be cast with as much exactness as can be convenient, into known and fix’d precincts or parishes.

4. That the elders resident in each parish annually assemble in the same, for example upon Monday next insuing the last of December: That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man of every five, to be for the term of the year insuing a deputy of that parish; and that the first and second so elected be overseers, or presidents for the regulating of all parochial congregations, whether of the elders, or of the youth, during the term for which they were elected.

5. That so many parishes lying nearest together, whose deputys shall amount to one hundred or therabouts, be cast into one precinct call’d the hundred; and that in each precinct call’d the hundred, there be a town, village, or place appointed to be the capital of the same.

6. That the parochial deputys elected throout the hundred assemble annually, for example upon Monday next insuing the last of January, at the capital of their hundred. That they then and there elect out of the horse of their number one justice of the peace, one juryman, one captain, one insign; and out of the foot of their number one other juryman, one high constable, &c.

7. That every twenty hundreds lying nearest, and most conveniently together, be cast into one tribe; that the whole territory being after this manner cast into the tribes, some town or place be appointed to every tribe for the capital of the same; and that these three precincts (that is, the parish, the hundred, and the tribe) whether the deputys thenceforth annually chosen in the parishes or hundreds com to increase or diminish, remain firm and inalterable for ever, save only by act of parlament. The tribes are presum’d throout these propositions to amount to fifty.

8. That the deputys elected in the several parishes, together with their magistrats and other officers both civil and military elected in the several hundreds, assemble or muster annually, for example upon Monday next insuing the last of February, at the capital of their tribe, for the space of two days.

9. That this whole body thus assembl’d, upon the first day of their assembly elect out of the horse of their number, one high sherif, one lieutenant of the tribe, one custos rotulorum, one conductor, and two censors. That the high sherif be commander in chief, the lieutenant commander in the second place, and the conductor in the third place, of this band or squadron: That the custos rotulorum be mustermaster, and keep the rolls; that the censors be governors of the ballot; and that the term of these magistracys be annual.

10. That the magistrats of the tribe (that is to say, the high sherif, lieutenant, custos rotulorum, the censors, and the conductor, together with the magistrats and officers of the hundreds, that is to say, the twenty justices of the peace, the forty jurymen, the twenty high constables) be one troop, or one troop and one company apart, call’d the prerogative troop or company. That this troop bring in and assist the justice of assize, hold the quarter session in their several capacities, and perform their other functions as formerly.

11. That the magistrats of the tribe (that is to say, the high sherif, lieutenant, custos rotulorum, the censors, and the conductor, together with the twenty justices elected at the hundreds) be a court for the government of the tribe call’d the phylarch; and that this court procede in all matter of government as shall from time to time be directed by act of parlament.

12. That the squadron of the tribe on the second day of their assembly, elect two knights, and three burgesses out of the horse of their number, and four other burgesses out of the foot of their number. That each knight upon election forthwith make oath of allegiance to the commonwealth, or refusing such oath, the next competitor in election to the same magistracy, making the said oath, be the magistrat. The like for the burgesses. That the knights thus sworn have session in the senat for the term of three years; and that the burgesses thus sworn, be of the prerogative tribe or representative of the people for the like term.

13. That for the full and perfect institution of the assemblys mention’d, the squadron of the tribe in the first year of the commonwealth, elect two knights for the term of one year, two other knights for the term of two years, and lastly two knights more for the term of three years; the like for the burgesses of the horse first, and then for those of the foot. And that this proposition be of no farther use than for the first year’s election only.

14. That a magistrat or officer elected at the hundred be therby bar’d from being elected a magistrat of the tribe, or of the first day’s election; but that no former election whatsoever bar a man of the second day’s election at the tribe, or to be chosen a knight or burgess. That a man being chosen a knight or burgess, who before was chosen a magistrat or officer of the hundred, or tribe, may delegat his former office or magistracy in the hundred, or in the tribe, to any other deputy, being no magistrat nor officer, and being of the same hundred, and of the same order, that is, of the horse or foot respectively.

15. That the knights of the annual election take their places on Monday next insuing the last of March in the senat; that the like number of knights whose session determins at the same time, recede. That every knight or senator be paid out of the public revenue quarterly, one hundred twenty-five pounds during his term of session, and be oblig’d to sit in purple robes.

16. That annually on reception of the new knights, the senat procede to election of new magistrats or counsillors. That for magistrats they elect one general, one speaker, and two censors, each for the term of one year, these promiscuously; and that they elect one commissioner of the great seal, and one commissioner of the treasury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new knights only.

17. That the general and the speaker, as consuls of the commonwealth, and presidents of the senat, be during the term of their magistracy paid quarterly out of the public revenue five hundred pounds; that the insigns of these magistracys be a sword born before the general, and a mace before the speaker; that they be oblig’d to wear ducal robes. And that what is said of the general in this proposition, be only understood of the general sitting, and not of the general marching.

18. That the general sitting, in case he be commanded to march, receive fieldpay; and that a new general be forthwith elected by the senat to succede him in the house, with all the rights, insigns and emoluments of the general sitting; and this so often as one or more generals are marching.

19. That the three commissioners of the great seal, and the three commissioners of the treasury, using their insigns and habit, and performing their other functions as formerly, have paid quarterly to each of them three hundred seventy-five pounds.

20. That the censors govern the ballot; that they be presidents of the council for religion; that each have a silver wand for the insign of his magistracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred seventy-five pounds, and be oblig’d to wear scarlet robes.

21. That the general sitting, the speaker, and the six commissioners abovesaid, be the signory of this commonwealth.

22. That there be a council of state consisting of fifteen knights, five out of each order, list, or election; and that the same be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new knights, or those last elected into the senat.

23. That there be a council for religion consisting of twelve knights, four out of each order, and perpetuated by the annual election of four out of the knights last elected into the senat. That there be a council for trade, consisting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the same manner.

24. That there be a council of war not elected by the senat, but elected by the council of state out of themselves. That this council of war consist of nine knights, three out of each order, and be perpetuated by the annual election of three out of the last knights elected into the council of state.

25. That in case the senat add nine knights more elected promiscuously, or not promiscuously, out of their own number, to the council or war, the said council of war be understood by such addition to be dictator of the commonwealth for the term of three months and no longer, except by farther order of the senat the said dictatorian power be prolong’d for a like term.

26. That the signory have session and suffrage, with right also jointly or severally to propose both in the senat, and in all senatorian councils.

27. That each of the three orders or divisions of knights, in each senatorian council, elect one provost for the term of one week; and that any two provosts of the same council so elected, may propose to the same council for their term, and not otherwise.

28. That som fair room or rooms well furnish’d and attended, be allow’d at the state’s charge, for a free and open academy to all comers, at som convenient hour or hours towards the evening. That this academy be govern’d according to the rules of good-breeding, or civil conversation, by som one or more of the provosts; and that in this academy it be lawful for any man, by word of mouth, or by writing, in jest or in earnest, to propose to the proposers.

29. That for embassadors in ordinary, there be four residences, as France, Spain, Venice, and Constantinople; and that every resident upon election of a new embassador in ordinary, remove to the next residence in order hereby mention’d, till having serv’d orderly in all the said residences, he returns home. That upon Monday next insuing the last of November, there be every second year elected by the senat som fit person, being above twenty-five and under thirty-five years of age, and not of the senat, nor of the popular assembly. That the party so elected repair on Monday next insuing the last of March following, as an embassador in ordinary to the court of France, and there reside for the term of two years to be computed from the first of April next insuing his election. That every embassador in ordinary be allow’d three thousand pounds a year during the term of his residence. And that if a resident coms to dy, there be an extraordinary election into his residence for his term, and for the remainder of his removes and progress.

30. That all emergent elections be made by scrutiny, that is by a council, or by commissioners proposing, and by the senat resolving in the manner following: that all field officers be propos’d by the council of war: that all embassadors extraordinary be propos’d by the council of state: that all judges and serjeants at law be propos’d by the commissioners of the great seal: that all barons and officers of trust in the exchequer be propos’d by the commissioners of the treasury; and that such of these as are thus propos’d to, and approv’d by the senat, be held lawfully elected.

31. That the cognizance of all foren negotiation, and of all matter of state to be consider’d, or law to be enacted, whether provincial or national, domestic or foren, pertain to the council of state. That all such affairs of like kind as the council of state shall judg fit to be carry’d with more than ordinary secrecy, be committed by them, and pertain to the cognizance and trust of the council of war, to this end consisting of a select part, or committee of the council of state. That the cognizance and protection both of the national religion, and of the liberty of conscience, equally establish’d in this nation, after the manner provided in the religious part of this model, pertain to the council for religion. That all matter of traffic, and regulation of the same pertain to the council for trade. That in the exercise of these several functions, each being naturally senatorian or authoritative only, no council assume any other power than such only as shall be particularly or expresly estated upon the same by act of parlament.

32. That what shall be propos’d to the senat by any one or more of the signory, or of the proposers general; or whatever was propos’d by any two of the provosts, or particular proposers to their respective council, and upon debate at that council shall com to be propos’d by the same to the senat, be necessarily debatable, and debated by the senat.

33. That in all cases wherin power is deriv’d to the senat by law made, or by act of parlament, the result of the senat be ultimat: that in all cases of law to be made, or not already provided for by act of parlament, as som particular peace or war, levy of men or mony, or the like, the result of the senat be not ultimat, but preparatory only, and be propos’d by the senat to the prerogative tribe, or assembly of the people, except only in cases of such speed or secrecy, wherin the senat shall judg the necessary slowness or openness of like proceding to be of detriment or danger to the commonwealth.

34. That if upon the motion or proposition of a council, or proposer general, the senat add nine knights, promiscuously or not promiscuously chosen out of their own number, to the council of war, the said council of war be therby made dictator, and have power of life and death, as also to enact laws in all cases of speed or secrecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except upon new order from the senat: and that all laws enacted by the dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer, except the same be propos’d by the senat, and resolv’d by the people.

35. That the burgesses of the annual election return’d by the tribes, enter into the prerogative tribe on Monday next insuing the last of March; and that the like number of burgesses whose term is expir’d, recede at the same time. That the burgesses thus enter’d, elect to themselves out of their own number two of the horse, one to be captain, and the other to be cornet of the same; and two of the foot, one to be captain, the other to be insign of the same, each for the term of three years. That these officers being thus elected, the whole tribe or assembly procede to the election of four annual magistrats, two out of the foot to be tribuns of the foot, and two out of the horse to be tribuns of the horse. That the tribuns be commanders in chief of this tribe so far as it is a military body, and presidents of the same as it is a civil assembly. And lastly, that this whole tribe be paid weekly as follows: to each of the tribuns of the horse seven pounds, to each of the tribuns of the foot six pounds; to each of the captains of horse five pounds, to each of the captains of foot four pounds; to each of the cornets three pounds, to each of the insigns two pounds seven shillings; to every horseman one pound ten shillings, and to every one of the foot one pound.

36. That inferior officers, as captains, cornets, insigns, be only for the military disciplin of the tribe. That the tribuns have session in the senat without suffrage: that of course they have session and suffrage in the dictatorian council, so often as it is created by the senat. That in all cases to be adjudg’d by the people they be presidents of the court or judicatory.

37. That peculat or defraudation of the public, and all cases or crimes tending to the subversion of the government, be triable by the prerogative tribe or the assembly of the people; and that to the same there ly an appeal in all causes, and from all courts, magistrats, or councils, national and provincial.

38. That the right of debate, as also of proposing to the people, be wholly and only in the senat, without any power at all of result not deriv’d from the people, and estated upon the senat by act of parlament.

39. That the power of result be wholly and only in the people, without any right at all of debate.

40. That the senat having debated and agreed upon a law to be propos’d, cause promulgation of the said law to be made for the space of six weeks before proposition; that is, cause the law to be written fair, and hung up for the time aforesaid in som of the most eminent places of the city, and of the suburbs.

41. That promulgation being made, the signory demand of the tribuns sitting in the senat, an assembly of the people. That the tribuns upon such demand of the signory, or of the senat, be oblig’d to assemble the prerogative tribe in arms by sound of trumpet, with drums beating, and colors flying, in any town, field, or marketplace, being not above six miles distant, upon the day, and at the hour appointed, except the meeting, thro inconvenience of the weather, or the like, be prorogu’d by consent of the signory and of the tribuns. That the prerogative tribe being assembl’d accordingly, the senat propose to them by two or more of the senatorian magistrats therto appointed, at the first promulgation of the law. That the proposers for the senat open to the people the occasion, motives, and reasons of the senat for the law to be propos’d; and that the same being don, they put the law or proposition by distinct clauses to the ballot of the people. That if any material clause or clauses of the proposition, or law so propos’d, be rejected by the people, the clause or clauses so rejected may be review’d, alter’d, and propos’d again to the third time, if the senat think fit, but no oftner.

42. That what is thus propos’d by the senat, and resolv’d by the people, be the law of the land, and no other, except what is already receiv’d as such, or reserv’d to the dictatorian council.

43. That every magistracy, office, or election throout this whole commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be understood of course or consequence to injoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the same. That the magistracy or office of a knight, and of a burgess, be in this relation understood as one and the same; and that this order regard only such elections as are national or domestic, and not such as are foren, or contain’d in the provincial part of this model.

44. That for an exception from this rule, where there is but one elder of the horse in one and the same parish, that elder be eligible in the same without interval; and where there be above four elders of the horse in one and the same parish, there be not above half, nor under two of them eligible at the same election.

45. That throout all the assemblys and councils of this commonwealth, the quorum consist of one half in the time of health, and of one third part in a time of sickness, being so declar’d by the senat.

THE use of the ballot, being as full of prolixity and abstruseness in writing, as of dispatch and facility in practice, is presum’d throout all elections and results in this model, and for the rest reserv’d rather to practice than writing. There remain the religious, military and provincial parts of this frame: but the civil part being approv’d, they follow, or being not approv’d, may be spar’d.

CONCLUSION; OR, The Use of these Propositions.

THESE propositions are so laid out to debate or examination, that a man having the mind to weigh, discourse upon, or object against this model, may do it in the parts with the greatest convenience.

ANY examination of, or objection against the whole, or any part in print or in writing, the author holds himself bound to acknowlege or answer: but as to mere discourse upon matters of this compass, it is usually narrow; besides that in writing a man must put himself upon better aim than he can be oblig’d to take in discourse.

ANY one objection lying in writing against any one order in this part of the model, after such manner as to shew that the part or order so invaded ought to be expung’d, alter’d, or amended, unless it may be expung’d, alter’d, or amended accordingly, destroys the whole.

AND any one or more objections so lying against any one or more of these orders or propositions, that therby they may be expung’d, alter’d or amended, must in the whole or in part make a better model.

IN this case therfore, or in case no objection lys, the use of these propositions will be such as therby any man or any assembly of men, considering or debating upon them in order, may find or make a true model of a well order’d commonwealth.

AND that an assembly can never make or frame a model of any government otherwise than in som such manner, is probable first by a demonstration from the effect; and secondly by a demonstration from the cause.

THE demonstration from the effect is, that an assembly no otherwise frames a law or order, than by having it first pen’d by som one man, and then judging upon it; and the model of a commonwealth must consist of many laws or orders.

THE demonstration from the cause is, that wheras reason consists of two parts, the one invention, and the other judgment, a man may be as far beyond any assembly for invention, as any assembly can be beyond a man for judgment; or which is more, that the formation of a model of government requires a strong faculty of invention, and that an assembly is naturally void of all manner of invention.

Nov. 13. 1658.

THE WAYS and MEANS Wherby an Equal and Lasting COMMONWEALTH May be suddenly introduc’d, and perfectly founded, with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the whole People of England.

Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter.

Perf.

A WORD fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver.

The desire of the people of England now runs strongly to have a free parlament.

Let there be a free parlament.

To the end that the people may be most equally represented, or that the parlament may be freest.

Let there be a new division of England and Wales, with as much equality as may stand with convenience, into fifty shires.

Let every shire elect annually two knights to be of one house, and seven deputys to be of another house of parlament, for the term of three years. For the first year only, let the deputys in each division be elected triple, that is, seven for the term of one year, seven for the term of two years, and seven for the term of three years. The like for the knights, save only that the present parlament remain; that is, let two knights in each division be elected the first year only for the term of one year, two other knights at the same time for the term of two years; and let the present parlament be the triennial part of the knights house for the first election.

The house of knights and the house of deputys being assembl’d, let the house of knights debate and propose.

Let what is propos’d by the house of knights, be promulgated for the space of six weeks.

Promulgation being thus made, let the house of deputys meet, and give their result upon the proposition.

Let what was thus propos’d by the senat or house of knights, and resolv’d by the people or house of deputys, be the law.

In this constitution these councils must of necessity contain the wisdom, and the interest of the nation.

In this method, debate must of necessity be mature.

If it be according to the wisdom and the interest of the nation upon mature debate that there be a king, let there be a king.

If it be according to the wisdom and the interest of the nation upon mature debate, that there be a commonwealth; two assemblys in this order are actually a commonwealth, and so far a well order’d commonwealth, that they are capacitated and inclin’d to reach to themselves whatever furniture shall be further necessary in more particular orders, which also is at hand.

Till this or the like be don, the line of the late king and the people must be fellow sufferers; in which case the impatience of the people must be for the restitution of that line at all adventures.

But this or the like being once don, immediatly the line of the late king and the people becom rivals, in which case they will never restore monarchy.

Will never, may som say? but if the senat and the popular assembly be both royalists, they both will and can restore monarchy.

Tho both royalists, they neither will nor can: for let them, that look no further than home or self, say what they will, to affirm that a senat, and a popular assembly thus constituted can procreat monarchy, is to affirm that a horse and a mare can generat a cat: that wheat being rightly sown may com up pease; or that a river in its natural channel may run upwards.

In the present case of England, commonwealthsmen may fail thro want of art, but royalists must fail thro want of matter; the former may miss thro impotence, the latter must thro impossibility. Or where the state is purely popular, that is, not overbalanc’d by a lord or lords; let there be one example, or one reason given that there is, was, or ever can be monarchy. There will be this when all fails, for the aftergame, tho the work should fall, as is like enough, into the hands of royalists.

Certain it is, that where any privat citizen or freeman might not (som way or other) propose, there never was a well order’d commonwealth.

Upon this incouragement I offer’d this paper to good hands, but it was (according to custom) thrown after me.

So it went in the protector’s time, in every revolution since, La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini; but that is Atheism, that’s Machiavel.

Well, but now says the protectorian family, O that we had set up the equal commonwealth! so say broken parlaments and statesmen; so say the sadly mistaken sectarys; so say the cashier’d officers; so says he that would have no nay, but oligarchy was a good word; and so will more say after these, except they learn to say after another, aut reges non exigendi fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo, danda libertas; either the kings ought not to have bin driven out, or the people to have their liberty not in word, but in deed: but that is Heathenism, that’s Cicero; well this is Christian, if there will be no such saying, I would there might be no swearing.

Feb. 6. 1659.

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF DIVERS WELL AFFECTED PERSONS, Deliver’d the 6th Day of July, 1659, With the PARLAMENT’s Answer therto.

TO THE SUPREME AUTHORITY, The Parlament of the Commonwealth of England;

The humble Petition of divers well affected Persons,

SHEWS,

THAT your petitioners have for many years observ’d the breathings and longings of this nation after rest and settlement, and that upon mistaken grounds they have bin ready even to sacrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted right, to follow after an appearance of it.

And your petitioners do daily see the bad effects of long continu’d distractions, in the ruins and decays of trade foren and domestic: and in the advantages that are taken to make consederacys to involve the nation in blood and confusion, under pretence of procuring a settlement.

That it has bin the practice of all nations, on the subversion of any form of government, to provide inimediatly a new constitution suitable to their condition; with certain successions and descents, that so both their lawgivers and magistrats might use their several trusts, according to the establish’d constitution; and the people’s minds be settl’d secure, and free from attemts of introducing several forms of government, according to the variety of their fancys, or corrupt interests.

That God has preserv’d this nation wonderfully without example many years, since the dissolution of the old form of government by king, lords and commons; there having bin no fundamental constitutions of any kind duly settl’d, nor any certain succession provided for the legislative power; but even at this instant, if by any sudden sickness, design, or force, any considerable numbers of your persons should be render’d incapable of meeting in parlament, the commonwealth were without form of successive legislature or magistracy, and left to the mercy of the strongest faction. Yet we have reason to remember in these years of unsettlement, the inexpressible sufferings of this nation in their strength, wealth, honor, liberty, and all things conducing to their well-being; and we have like reason now sadly to apprehend the impending ruin. And we cannot discern a possibility of your honors unanimous and expeditious proceedings towards our country’s preservation, and relief from its heavy pressures, while your minds are not settl’d in any known constitution of government or fundamental orders; according to which, all laws should be made: but divers or contrary interests may be prosecuted on different apprehensions of the justice and prudence of different forms of government, tho all with good intentions.

YOUR petitioners therfore conceiving no remedy so effectual against the present dangers, as the settlement of the peoples minds, and putting them into actual security of their propertys and libertys, by a due establishment of the constitution under which they may evidently apprehend their certain enjoyment of them; and therupon, a return of their trade and free commerce, without those continual fears that make such frequent stops in trade, to the ruin of thousands.

AND your petitioners also observing, that the interest of the late king’s son is cry’d up, and promoted daily, upon pretence, that there will be nothing but confusion and tyranny, till he com to govern; and that such as declare for a commonwealth, are for anorchy and confusion, and can never agree among themselves, what they would have.

UPON serious thoughts of the premises, your petitioners do presume with all humility, and submission to your wisdom, to offer to your honors their principles and proposals concerning the government of this nation: wherupon, they humbly conceive, a just and prudent government ought to be establish’d, viz.

1. That the constitution of the civil government of England by king, lords, and commons, being dissolv’d, whatever new constitution of government can be made or settl’d according to any rule of righteousness, it can be no other than a wise order or method, into which the free people’s deputys shall be form’d for the making of their laws, and taking care for their common safety and welfare in the execution of them: for, the exercise of all just authority over a free people, ought (under God) to arise from their own consent.

2. That the government of a free people ought to be so settl’d, that the governors and govern’d may have the same interest in preserving the government, and each other’s propertys and libertys respectively; that being the only sure foundation of a commonwealth’s unity, peace, strength, and prosperity.

3. That there cannot be a union of the interests of a whole nation in the government, where those who shall somtimes govern, be not also somtimes in the condition of the govern’d; otherwise the governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the government, nor the govern’d to injoy the advantages of it: and then it will be the interest of the major part to destroy the government, as much as it will be the interest of the minor part to preserve it.

4. That there is no security that the supreme authority shall not fall into factions, and be led by their privat interest to keep themselves always in power, and direct the government to their privat advantages, if that supreme authority be settl’d in any single assembly whatsoever, that shall have the intire power of propounding, debating and resolving laws.

5. That the soverain authority in every government, of what kind soever, ought to be certain in its perpetual successions, revolutions, or descents; and without possibility (by the judgment of human prudence) of a death or failure of its being, because the whole form of the government is dissolv’d if that should happen, and the people in the utmost imminent danger of an absolute tyranny, or a war among themselves, or rapin and confusion. And therfore where the government is popular, the assemblys in whom reside the supreme authority, ought never to dy or dissolve, tho the persons be annually changing: neither ought they to trust the soverain care of the strength and safety of the people out of their own hands, by allowing a vacation to themselves, lest those that should be trusted be in love with such great authority, and aspire to be their masters, or else fear an account, and seek the dissolution of the commonwealth to avoid it.

6. That it ought to be declar’d as a fundamental order in the constitution of this commonwealth, that the parlament being the supreme legislative power, is intended only for the exercise of all those acts of authority that are proper and peculiar to the legislative power; and to provide for a magistracy, to whom should appertain the whole executive power of the laws: and no case either civil or criminal to be judg’d in parlament, saving that the last appeals in all cases, where appeals shall be thought fit to be admitted, be only to the popular assembly; and also that to them be refer’d the judgment of all magistrats in cases of maladministrations in their offices.

AND in prosecution of these principles,

YOUR petitioners humbly propose for the settlement of this commonwealth, that it be ordain’d,

1. THAT the parlament or the supreme authority of England, be chosen by the free people, to represent them with as much equality as may be.

2. THAT a parlament of England shall consist of two assemblys, the lesser of about three hundred, in whom shall reside the intire power of consulting, debating, and propounding laws: the other, to consist of a far greater number, in whom shall rest the sole power of resolving all laws so propounded.

3. THAT the free people of England, in their respective divisions at certain days and places appointed, shall for ever annually chuse one third part to each assembly, to enter into their authority, at certain days appointed: the same days, the authority of a third of each of the said assemblys to cease, only in the laying the first foundation in this commonwealth’s constitution: the whole number of both the assemblys to be chosen by the people respectively, viz. one third of each assembly to be chosen for one year, one third for two years, and one third for three years.

4. THAT such as shall be chosen, having serv’d their appointed time in either of the said assemblys of parlament, shall not be capable to serve in the same assembly during som convenient interval or vacation.

5. THAT the legislative power do wholly refer the execution of the laws to the magistracy, according to the sixth principle herein mention’d.

6. THAT in respect to religion and Christian liberty, it be ordain’d that the Christian religion by the appointment of all succeding parlaments, be taught, and promulgated to the nation, and public preachers therof maintain’d: and that all that shall profess the said religion, tho of different persuasions in parts of the doctrin, or disciplin therof, be equally protected in the peaceable profession, and public exercise of the same; and be equally capable of all elections, magistracys, preferments in the commonwealth, according to the order of the same. Provided always, that the public exercise of no religion contrary to Christianity be tolerated; nor the public exercise of any religion, tho professedly Christian, grounded upon, or incorporated into the interest of any foren state or prince.

These your petitioners humbly conceive to be the essentials of the form of a free commonwealth, which if they were made fit for practice by your honors appointing the numbers, times, places, and all other necessary circumstances, and settl’d as the fundamental orders of the commonwealth, would naturally dispose those that should hereafter be chosen into the parlaments, from the love of their own interest to seek the common good, being oblig’d by the constitutions here humbly offer’d to partake with the whole body of the people, of the good or evil that shall happen to the commonwealth, having no probable temtations or means left to compass any privat or factious ends in matters religious or civil. And your petitioners cannot imagin a greater security for the cause and interest contended for with such effusion of blood, than by disposing the free people into this kind of order, wherby the same cause would becom their common interest. Yet if your honors should think it necessary or convenient for securing the minds of such as are doubtful and jealous that the people may betray their own libertys, there may be inserted into the fundamental orders of the commonwealth, these following expedients, viz.

1. That for securing the government of this commonwealth, and of the religious and civil freedom of the good people therof, it may be for ever esteem’d and judg’d treason against the commonwealth, for any member of either assembly of parlament, or any other person whatsoever, to move or propose in either of the said assemblys, the restitution of kingly government, or the introduction of any single person to be chief magistrat of England, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental order herein contain’d that concerns the equal freedom and protection of religious persons of different persuasions.

2. That about the number of twelve persons of the most undoubted fidelity and integrity may be authoriz’d and impower’d, for som certain number of years next ensuing, to seize, apprehend, and in safe custody to detain any person or persons whatsoever, till he or they be in due form of law deliver’d, as is hereafter specify’d, that shall move or propose in either of the said assemblies of parlament the restitution of kingly governmeut, or the introduction of any single person to be chief magistrate of this commonwealth, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental order herein contain’d, that concerns the equal freedom and protection of religious persons of different persuasions; but for no other matter or cause whatsoever. And when it shall happen, that any person or persons shall be arrested or seiz’d for any of the causes aforesaid, in manner aforesaid, then a commission of oyer and terminer may issue forth in due form of law to the said twelve, or any six of them, to proceed in due form of law, within one month after the apprehension of any such person or persons, to the arraignment and publick trial of every such person or persons; and upon the legal conviction of him or them by the testimony of two sufficient witnesses of any of the treasons herein declar’d, to condemn to the pains of death, and to cause the same judgment to be duly executed: and the keeper or keepers of the great seal of England that shall be for the time being, may be authoriz’d and requir’d from time to time during the term of NA years, to issue out commissions to the said twelve, or any six of them, authorizing them to proceed as aforesaid.

And if your honours shall further judge it convenient, the fundamental orders of the government may be consented to or subscrib’d by the people themselves, if their express pact shall be esteem’d any additional security; other nations, upon the like occasions of expulsion of their kings, having taken the people’s oaths against their returning: and the same may be proclaim’d as often as our ancestors provided for the proclaiming of magna charta; and any further security also added, if any can be found among men, that has a foundation in justice.

Now your petitioners having, with humble submission to your grave wisdoms, thus declar’d their apprehensions of the present condition of this distracted nation, and the only effectual means under God to prevent the impending mischiefs; they do most humbly pray,

Wednesday July the 6th, 1659.

THE house being inform’d, that divers gentlemen were at the door with a petition, they were call’d in, and one of the petitioners in behalf of himself and the rest said, We humbly present you a petition, to which we might have had many thousand hands, but the matter rather deserves your serious consideration than any public attestation; and therfore we do humbly present it to this honourable house. Which, after the petitioners were withdrawn, was read, and was intitl’d, The humble petition of divers well affected persons.

Resolv’d,

THAT the petitioners have the thanks of the house.

THE petitioners were again call’d in, and Mr. Speaker gave them this answer:

Gentlemen,

THE house has read over your petition, and find it without any private end, and only for the public interest, and I am commanded to let you know, that it lies much upon them to make such a settlement as may be most for the good of posterity: and they are about that work, and intend to go forward with it with as much expedition as may be. And for your parts, they have commanded me to give you thanks; and in their names I do give you the thanks of this house accordingly.

Tho. St. Nicholas, Clerc of the Parliament.