The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• V: Speeches In Parliament
• A. 1593 Three Petitions—liberty of Speech, Freedom From Arrest, and Free Access For Parliamentarians; Laws; Coke As Speaker
• B. 1621 Petition of Grievances; Privileges of Parliament; Impeachments
• C. 1625 Subsidies
• D. 1628 Petition of Right
• VI: Appendix I: Official Acts Related to Sir Edward Coke’s Career
• A. the High Commission (coke Refuses to Appear), 1611
• B. Commendams and the King’s Displeasure
• C. Coke’s Hearing, June 26, 1616.
• D. Coke’s Arrest After Parliament, 1621.
• E. Sir Edward Coke’s Case the Sheriff’s Oath, 1626
• VII: Appendix II: the Epitaph of Sir Edward Coke
• Selected Readings Concerning of the Life, Career, and Legacy of Sir Edward Coke 1
• Table of Regnal Years 1

B. Commendams and the King’s Displeasure

Ed.: In a case concerning the powers of the King, or others, to grant a commendam, or temporary church office, the King sought to delay the court until he could appear. When Coke did not wait or consult, the King was displeased, but Coke stood his ground, promising “to do what should be fit for a judge to do.” These notes were printed in the Acts of the Privy Council, 1616.

|[303] At Whitehall, the 6 of June, 1616.

Present: The Kinges Majestie, Lord Archbishop of Canterburie, Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, Lord Privie Seale, Lord Stewarde, Lord Chamberlein, Lord Viscount Fenton, Lord Bishop of Winchester, Lord Zouch, Lord Knollis, Lord Wotton, Lord Stanhope, Mr. Vice-Chamberlein, Mr. Secretary Winwoode, Mr. Secretary Lake, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchecquer, Master of the Roles.

His Majestie, having this day given order for meeting of the Councell, and that all the Judges (being twelve in nomber) should bee sent for to bee present; when the Lordes were sett, and the Judges readie attendinge, his Majestie came himself in person to Councell, and openned unto them the cause of that assembly; which was, that hee had called them together concerninge aquestion that had relacion to noe private person, but concerned God and the Kinge, the power of his Crowne, and the state of his Church, whereof hee was Protector; and that there was noe fitter place to handle it then at the head of his Councell Table; that there had ben a question pleaded and argued concerninge commendams,1 the proceedinges wherein had either ben misreported, or mishandled; for his Majestie a yeare since had receaved advertizement concerning that case in twoe extreames: by some, that it did trench farr into his Prerogative Royall, in the generall power of grauntinge commendams; and by others, that the doubt rested only upon a special nature of a commendam, such as in respect of the incongruitie and exorbitant forme thereof might bee questioned, without impeachinge or weakeninge the generall power at all.

Whereupon his Majestie, willinge to knowe the true state thereof, comaunded the Lord Bishop of Winchester and Mr. Secretarie Winwoode to bee present at the next argument, and to reporte the state of the question and proceedinges unto his Majestie; but Mr. Secretary Winwoode, being absent by occasion, the Lord [Bishop] of Winchester only was present, and gave information to his Majestie of the particulars thereof; which his Majestie commaunded him to report to the Boarde. Whereupon the Lord [Bishop] of Winchester stoode up and reported: That Sergeant Chibborne (who argued the case against the commendams) had maintayned divers assertions andpositions very prejudiciall to his Majesty’s Prerogative Royall:

As first, that the translacion of bishopps was against the cannon lawe, and, for authoritie, vouched the cannons of the Councell of Sardis.

|[304] That the Kinge had noe power to graunt commendams, but in case of necessitie.

That there could bee noe necessitie, because there was noe neede of augmentacion of livinges, for noe man was bounde to keepe hospitallitie above his meanes.

Besydes manie other partes of his argument tending to the overthrowe of his Majesty’s prerogative in cases of commendam.

The Lord [Bishop] of Winchester havinge made this reporte, his Majestie resumed his former narrative, lettinge the lordes knowe that after the Lord [Bishop] of Winchester had made unto his Majestie a reporte of that which passed at the argument of the case, like in substaunce to that which hee had now made, his Majestie, apprehendinge the matter to bee of soe hiegh a nature, commaunded his Attorney Generall to signifie his Majesty’s pleasure to the Lord Chiefe Justice; that in regarde of his Majesty’s other most waighty occasions, and for that his Majestie helde it necessary (upon the Lord [Bishop] of Winchester’s reporte), that his Majestie bee first consulted with, before the Judges proceeded to argument; therefore the day appointed for the Judges’ arguments should bee putt of, till they might speake with his Majestie. And this letter of his Majesty’s Attorney was by his Majesty’s comandment openly read, which followeth in haec verba.2

My Lord,

It is the Kinges expresse pleasure that, because his Majesty’s times would not serve to conferr with your lordship and his Judges, touchinge the case of the commendams, at his last beinge in towne, in regarde of his Majestie’s other most waightie occasions; and for that his Majestie holdeth it necessarie, upon the reporte which my Lord of Winchester (who was present at the last argument, by his Majesty’s royall commandement) made to his Majestie that his Majestie bee first consulted with, ere there bee anie further proceedinge by argument of anie of the Judges, or otherwise; therefore that the day appointed for the further proceedinge of argument by the Judges in that case, bee putt of, till his Majesty’s further pleasure bee knowne upon consultinge with him. And, to that ende, that your lordship forthwith signifie his commaundement to the rest of the Judges; whereof your lordship may not faile. And soe I leave your lordship to God’s goodness.

Your lordship’s lovinge freinde to comaunde.

Fr. Bacon.

This Thursday, at afternoone, the 25th day of Aprill, 1616.

That upon this letter receaved, the Lord Chiefe Justice retorned worde to his Majesty’s said Attorney by his servaunt, that it was fitt the rest of his bretheren should understaunde his Majesty’s pleasure ymediately by letter from his said Attorney to the Judges of the severall Benches, and accordingly it was donn.

Whereupon all the said Judges assembled, and by their letter under their haundes certefyed his Majestie that they helde those letters (importinge the significacion aforesaid) to bee contrary to lawe, and such as they could not yeild to the same by their oath; and that thereupon they had proceeded at the day, |[305] and did nowe certefie his Majesty thereof; which letter of the Judges his Majestie alsoe commaunded to bee openly read, the tenor whereof followeth, in haec verba—

Most dread and most gracious Soveraigne.

It may please your most excellent Majestie to bee advertized that this letter inclosed was delivered to mee, your Chiefe Justice, on Thursday last in the afternoon, by a servaunt of your Majesty’s Attorney Generall,andletters of like effect were, on the day followinge, sent from him by his servaunt to us, your Majesty’s other Justices of every of your Courtes at Westminster. Wee are and ever wilbe readie with all faithfull and true hartes, accordinge to our bounden duties to serve and obey your Majestie,andthinkeourselves most happie to spende our lives and abillities to doe your Majestie faithfull and true service. In this present case, mencioned in this letter, what informacion hath ben made unto yow (whereupon Mr. Attorneydothground his letter), from the report of the Bishop of Winchester, wee knowe not. This wee knowe, that the true substance of the case summarily is thus. It consisteth principally upon the construccion of twoe Acts of Parliament, the one of the 25 yeare of King Edward 3, and the other of the 25 yeare of King Henry 8; whereof your Majesty’s Judges, upon their oathes, and accordinge to their best knowledge and learninge, are bounde to deliver the true understaundinge faithfully and uprightly. And the case is betweene subjects for private interrest and inheritaunce, earnestly called on for justice and expedition. Wee holde it our duties to informe your Majestie that our oathe is in theis expresse wordes: That in case anie letters come unto us contrary to lawe, that wee doe nothinge by such letters, but certefie your Majestie thereof, and goe forth to doe the lawe, notwithstaundinge the same letters. Wee have advisedly considered of the said letters of Mr. Attorney, and with one consent doe holde the same to bee contrary to lawe, and that wee could not yeild to the same by our oath; assuredly persuadinge ourselves that your Majestie, beinge truly informed that it staundeth not with your royall and just pleasure to give way to them, and therefore knowinge your Majesty’s zeale to justice, and to bee most renowned therefore, wee have, accordinge to our oathes, and duties (at the day openly prefixed the last tearme) proceeded, and thereof certefyed your Majestie, and shall ever pray to the Almightie for your Majestie in all honor, health, and happiness longe to raigne over us.

Your Majesty’s most humble and faithfull subjects and servaunts,

Edw. Coke, Henry Hobart, Laur. Tanfeilde, P. Warburton, Geo. Snigge, James Altham, Edw. Bromley, Jo. Croke, H. Winche, John Doddridge, Augustine Nicolls, Rob. Houghton.

Serjants’ Inne, 27 Aprill.

His Majestie, havinge considered of this letter, did by his princely letters retorne aunsweare, reportinge himself to their owne knowledge and experience, what princely care hee had ever had, since his comeinge to the Crowne, to have justice duly administred to his subjects with all possible expedicion, and |[306] how farr hee was from crossinge or delayinge of justice, wheretheinterrest of anie private partie was questioned; but, on the other syde, expressinge himself that where the case concerned the hiegh powers and prerogatives of his Crowne, hee would not endure to have them wounded through the sydes of a private person, admonishinge them alsoe of a custome lately entertayned, of a greater boldnes to dispute the hiegh pointes of his Majesty’s prerogative, in a popular and unlawfull libertie of argument, more then in former times, and makeinge them perceave alsoe howe weake and impertinent the pretence or allegacion of their oath was in a case of this nature, and howe well it might have ben spared; with manie other waightie pointes in the said letter contayned; which letter alsoe, by his Majesty’s commaundment, was publickely read, and followeth in haec verba:—

Trustie and well-beloved Councellor, and trustie and wel-beloved; wee greete yow well. Wee perceave by your letter that you conceave the commaundement given yow by our Attorney Generall, in our name, to have proceeded upon wronge informacion. But if yee list to remember, what princely care wee have ever had, since our comeinge to this Crowne, to see justice duly administred to our subjects with all possible expedicion, and howe farr wee have ever benn from urginge the delay thereof in anie sorte, yee may easely persuade yourselves that it was noe smale reasonwhich moved us to send yow that direccion. Yee might very well have spared your labor in informeinge us of the nature of your oath, for, although wee never studied the common lawe of Englaunde, yet are wee not ignoraunt of anie pointes which belonnge to a kinge to knowe. Wee are therefore to enforme yow hereby, that wee are farr from crossinge or delayinge anie thinge which may belonnge to the interrest of anie private partie in this case. But wee cannot bee contented to suffer the prerogative royall of our Crowne to be wounded, though the sydes of a private person. Wee have noe care at all which of the parties shall wynn his processe in this case, soe the right prevaile, and that justice bee duly administered. But upon the other parte, wee have reason to foresee, that nothinge be donn in this case which may wound our prerogative in generall; and, therefore, soe that wee may be sure that nothinge shalbe debated amongst yow, which may concerne our generall power of givinge commendams, wee desire not the parties to have an hower’s delay of justice. But, that our prerogative should not bee wounded in that regarde for all times hereafter, upon pretext of a private partie’s interrest, wee sent yow that direccion; which wee accounte to be wounded aswell, if it bee publickly disputed upon, as if anie sentence were given against it. Wee are therefore to admonish yow that, since the prerogative of our Crowne hath ben more boldly dealte withall in Westminster Hall duringe the time of our raigne then ever it was before in the raignes of divers princes ymediatly precedinge us, that wee will noe longer endure that popular and unlawfull libertie; and, therefore, were wee justly moved to sende yow that direccion to |[307] forbeare to meddle anie further in a case of soe tender a nature, till wee had further thought upon it. Wee have cause inded to rejoyce of your zeale for the speedie execution of justice; but wee would bee gladd that all our good subjects might soe finde the fruites thereof, as that noe pleas before yow were of older date then this is. But as to your argument which yow found upon your oath, yow give our predecessors, who first founded that oath, a veryuncharitablemeetinge, in pervertinge their intention and zeale to justice, to make a weapon of it to use against their successors. For, although your oath bee, that yow shall not delay justice betwixt anie private parties, yet was it not meant that the Kinge should thereby receave harme, before hee bee forewarned thereof. Neither can yee denye but that every tearme yee will, out of your owne discretions, for reasons knowne unto yow, put of either the hearinge or determininge of an ordinary cause amongst private persons, till the next tearme followinge. Our pleasure therefore is, who are the heade and fountaine of justice under God, in our dominions, and wee, out of our absolute authoritie royall, doe commaunde yow, that yow forbeare to meedle anie further in this plea, till our comeinge to the towne, and that out of our owne mouth yow may heare our pleasure in this busines; which wee doe only out of the care wee have that our perogative may not receave an unwittinge and indirect blowe, and not to hinder justice to bee ministred to anie private parties; which noe importunitie shall persuade us to move yow in, like as only for avoydinge the unreasonnable importunitieofsuitors in their owne particular, that oath was by our predecessors ordayned to be ministred unto yow. Soe wee hartely wish yow well to fare.

Postscript.—Yow shall upon the receipt of this our letter call our Attorney Generall unto yow, who will informe yow of the particular pointes which wee are unwillinge should bee publickly disputed in this case.

This letter beinge read, his Majestie resorted to take into his consideration the partes of the Judges’ letter, and other their proceedinges in that cause, and the errors therein comitted and contayned: which errors his Majestie did sett forth to bee both in matter and manner: in matter, as well by way of omission as comission; for omission, that it was a faulte in the Judges that when they hearde a Councellor at the barr presume to argue against his Majesty’s prerogative (which in this case was in effect his supremacy), they did not interrupt him, and reprove sharply that loose and bold course of disaffirmeinge and impeachinge thinges of soe hiegh a nature, by discourse; especially since his Majestie had observed, that ever since his comeinge to this Crowne thepopular sorte of lawiers have ben the men that most affrontedly in all Parlaments have troden upon his prerogative; which beinge most contrary to their vocation of anie men, since the lawe, nor lawyers, can never bee respected if the Kinge bee not reverenced, it therefore best became the Judges of anie to cheque and brydle such impudent lawyers, and in their severall Benches to disgrace them that beare soe litle respect to the King’s authoritie and prerogative. That his Majestie had a doble prerogative, whereof the one was ordinary, and had relacion to his private interrest, which mought bee, and was, every day disputed in Westminster Hall. The other was of a hiegher nature, referringe to his supreame and imperiall power and soveragnitie, which ought not to bee disputed or handled in vulgar argument; but that of late the Courtes of the |[308] Common Lawe were growne soe vaste and transcendent, as they did both meddle with the King’s prerogative, and had incroached upon allother Courtes of Justice, as the High Commission, the Councells established in Wales and Yorke, the Courte of Requests. Concerninge that which might be tearmed Commission, his Majestie tooke exception to the Judges’ letter, both in matter and forme. For matter, his Majestie did plainely demonstrate that, whereas it was contayned in the Judges’ letter, that the significacion of his Majesty’s pleasure as aforesaid was contrary to lawe and not agreeable to the oath of a Judge, that could not bee.

First, for that the puttinge of hearinge, or proceedinge upon, just and necessary cause is no denyinge or delay of justice, but a wisedome and maturitie of proceedinge, and that there cannot bee a more just and necessary cause of stay then the consultinge with the Kinge, when the cause concernes the Crowne, and that the Judges did dayly put of causes upon lighter occasions. And likewise his Majestie did desire to knowe of the Judges how his callinge them to consulte with him was contrary to lawe, which they never could aunsweare unto.

Secondly, that it was noe bare supposition or surmize that this case concerned the Kinges prerogative, for that it had ben directed and largly disputed at the barr, and the very disputinge thereof in a publicke audience is both daingerous and dishonorable to his Majestie.

Thirdly, that the manner of puttinge of which the Kinge required, was not infinite, nor for lounge time, but grounded upon his Majesty’s waighty occasions, which were notorious; by reason whereof hee could not speake with the Judges before the argument, and that there was a certaine expectation of his Majesty’s speedie retorne at Whitsuntide, and likewise that the case had ben soe lately argued, and could not receave judgment till Easter tearme next, as the Judges themselves afterwardes confessed.

And lastlie, because there was another just cause of absence for the twoe Cheife Justices, for that they ought to have assisted the Lord Chancellor the same day in a great cause of the Kinges, followed by the Lord Hunsdon against the Lord William Howarde in Chancerie; which cause of the Kinges (specially beinge soe waightie) ought to have had precedence before anie cause betweene partie and partie.

Also, whereas it was contayned in the Judges’ letter that the case of the commendams was but a case of private interrest betweene partie and partie, his Majestie shewed plainely the contrary, not only by the argument of Serjaunt Chibborne, which was before his commaundement, but by the argument of the Judges themselves (namely Justice Nicholls), which wasafter;butespecially since one of the parties is a Bishopp, who pleads for the commendam, only by the virtue of his Majesty’s prerogative.

Also, whereas it was contayned in the Judges’ letter that the parties called upon them earnestly for justice, his Majestie conceaves it to bee but pretence, urgeing them to prove that there |[309] was anie sollicitation by the parties for expedicion, otherwise then in an ordinary course of attendaunce, which they could never prove.

As for the forme of the letter, his Majestie noated that it was a newe thinge and very undecent, and unfitt for subjects to disobey the Kinges commaundement, but most of all to proceede in the meanetime, and to retorne unto him a bare certificate: whereas they ought to have concluded with the layinge downe and representinge of their reasons modestly unto his Majestie, why they should proceede, and soe to have submitted the same to his princely judgment, expectinge to knowe from him wheather they had given him satisfaccion.

After this his Majesty’s declaration, all the Judges fell downe upon their knees, and acknowledged their error, for matter of forme, humbly cravinge his Majesty’s gracious favour and pardon for the same.

But for the matter of the letter, the Lord Cheife Justice of the Kinges Bench entred into a defence thereof, the effect whereof was, that the stay required by his Majestie was a delay of justice, and, therefore, contrary to lawe and the Judges’ oath; and that the Judges knewe well amongst themselves, that the case (as they meant to handle it) did not concerne his Majesty’s prerogative of graunt of commendams, and that if the day had not helde by the notcomeinge of the Judges, the suite had ben discontinewed; which had ben a faylinge in justice, and that they could not adjourne it, because Mr. Attornei’s letter mencioned noe day certaine, and that an adjornment must alwaies bee to a day certaine.

Unto which aunsweare of the Chiefe Justice, his Majestie did replye, that for the last conceipt, it was meere sophistrie, for that they might in their discretions have prefixed a convenient day, such as there might have ben time for them to consult with his Majestie before the same, and that his Majestie leafte that pointe of forme to themselves.

And for that other pointe, that they should take upon them peremptorily to discerne whether the case concerned the Kinges prerogative, without consultinge with his Majestie first, and informeinge his princely judgment, was a thing preposterous, for that they ought first to have made that appeare to his Majestie, and soe to have given him assurance thereof, upon consultacion with him.

And as for the mayne matter, that it should bee against the lawe, and against their oath, his Majestie sayde hee had sayed enough before; unto which the Lord Chiefe Justice in effect had made noe aunsweare, but only insisted upon the former opinion; and therefore the Kinge required the Lord Chancellor to deliver his opinion upon that pointe, whether the stay that had ben required by his Majestie were contrary to lawe, or against the Judges’ oath.

The Lord Chancellor stoode up, and moved his Majestie that, because this question had relacion to matter of lawe, his Majestie would bee informed by his learned councell first, and they first to deliver their opinion, which his Majestie commaunded them to doe.

Thereupon his Majesty’s Attorney Generall gave his opinion that the puttinge of the day in manner as was required by |[310] his Majestie (to his understaundinge) was without all scruple noe delay of justice, nor dainger of the Judges’ oath, insistinge upon some of the reasons which his Majestie had formerly openned, and addinge that the letter hee had writt in his Majesty’s name was noe imperious letter, as to say: That his Majestie, for certaine causes, or for causes knowne to himself, would have them put of the day, but plainely and fairely expressed the causes unto them; for that the Kinge conceaved, upon the Lord [Bishop] of Winchester’s reporte, that the cause concerned him, and that his Majestie would willingly have spoken to them before, but by reason of his important busines could not, and therefore required a staye till they might conveniently speake with him, which they knewe could not bee lounge; and in the conclusion of his speech wished the Judges seriously to consider with themselves whether they were not in greater dainger of breach of their oath by their proceedinge, then they could have ben by their stay. For that it is parte of their oath to counsell his Majestie when they are called; and if they will proceede in a busines first, whereupon they are called to councell, and will councell him when the matter is past, it is more then a simple refusall to give him councell; and soe concluded his speech, and the rest of the learned councell consented to his opinion.

Whereupon the Lord Chiefe Justice of the King’s Bench (aunswearinge nothing to the matter) tooke exceptions that the Kinges councell learned should pleade or dispute with the Judges, for (hee sayde) they were to pleade before the Judges, and not to dispute with them. Whereunto the Kinges Attorney replyed, that hee found that exception strainge, for that the King’s learned councell were by oath and office (and much more when they had the Kinges expresse commaundement), without feare of anie man’s face, to proceede or declare against anie, the greatest peere or subject of the kingdome, and not only anie subject in particular, but any boddie of subjects, or persons, were the[y] Judges, or were they an upper or lower house of Parlament, in case that they exceede the limitts of their authoritie, or take anie thinge from his Majesty’s royall power, or prerogative. And soe concluded that his challendge, and that in his Majesty’s presence, was a wronge to their places, for which hee and his fellowes did appeale to his Majestie for reparacion. And thereupon his Majestie did affirme that it was their dutie soe to doe, and that hee would mayntaine them therein, and tooke occasion afterwardes againe to speake of it. For when the Lord Chiefe Justice sayde hee would not dispute with his Majestie, the Kinge replyed, that the Judges would not dispute with him, nor his learned councell might not dispute with them; soe, whether they did well, or ill, it must not bee disputed.

After this the Lord Chancellor delivered his opinion, cleerely and plainely, that the stay which had beene by his Majestie required was not against lawe, nor any breach of a Judge’s oath, and required that the oath itself might bee read out of the statute, which was donn by the Kinges Sollicitor, and all the wordes thereof waighed and considered.

|[311] Thereupon his Majestie and the Lordes thought good to aske the Judges severally their opinion; the question beinge put in this manner: Whether if at anie time in a case dependinge before the Judges, which his Majestie conceaved to concerne him, either in power or profitt, and thereupon required to consult with him, and that they should stay proceedings in the meanetime, they ought not to stay accordingly. They all (the Lord Chiefe Justice only excepted) yeilded that they would, and acknowledged it to bee their dutie soe to doe; only the Lord Chiefe Justice of the King’s Bench sayd for aunsweare that when that case should bee, hee would doe that should bee fitt for a Judge to doe, and the Lord Chiefe Justice of the Common Pleas, who had assented with the rest, added, that hee would ever trust the justnes of his Majesty’s comaundement.

After this was put to a pointe, his Majestie thought fitt, in respect of the further day of argument appointed the Saturday followeinge for the commendams, to knowe from his Judges what hee might expect from them concerninge the same. Whereupon the Lord of Canterburie breakeinge the case into some questions, his Majestie did require his Judges to deale plainely with him, whether they meant in their argument to touch the generall power of grauntinge commendams, yea or noe. Whereupon all his said Judges did promisse and assure his Majestie that, in the argument of the said case of commendams, they would speake nothinge which should weaken, or drawe into doubte, his Majesty’s prerogative for the graunting of them, but intended particularly to insist upon the pointe of the laps, and other individuall pointes of this case, which they conceaved to bee of a forme differringe from all other commendams which have ben practized.

The Judges alsoe went further, and did promise his Majestie that they would not only abstaine from speakeinge anie thinge to weaken his Majesty’s prerogative of commendams, but would directly and in plaine tearmes affirme the same, and correct the erronious and bold speeches which had ben used at the barr in derogation thereof.

Alsoe, all the Judges did in generall acknowledge and professe, with greate forwardnes that it was their dutie, if anie councellor at the barr presumed at anie time to call in question his Majesty’s hiegh prerogatives and regallities, that they ought to reprehende them and silence them; and all promised soe to doe hereafter.

Lastly, the twoe Judges, which were then next to argue, Mr. Justice Dodridge and Mr. Justice Winche, openned themselves unto his Majestie thus farr, that they would insist chiefely upon the laps, and some pointes of uncertaintie, repugnancy and absurditie, beinge peculiar to this commendam, and that they would shewe their dislike of that which had ben sayde at the barr for the weakeninge of the generall power; and Mr. Justice Doddridge sayde that he would conclude for the Kinge that the Church was voyde, and in his Majesty’s guifte; and alsoe sayde |[312] that the Kinge might give a commendam to a Bishop, either before or after his consecration, and that hee might either give it him duringe his life, or for a certaine nomber of yeares.

The Judges havinge thus farr submitted and declared themselves, his Majestie admonished them to keepe the boundes and lymitts of their severall Courtes, not to suffer his prerogative to bee wounded by rash and unadvised pleadinge before them, or by newe inventions of lawe. For as hee well knewe that the true and ancient common lawe is the most favourable for kinges of anie lawe in the worlde; soe hee advised them to apply themselves to the studie and practize of that ancient and best lawe, and not to extende the power of anie of their Courtes beyounde their due lymitts, followinge the president of the best ancient Judges, in the times of best Govermentes, and that then they might assure themselves that hee for his parte in the proteccion of them and expediting of justice, would walke in the stepps of the ancient and best kinges. And thereupon gave them leave to proceede in their argument.

When the Judges were removed, his Majestie, that had forborne to aske the votes and opinions of his councell before the Judges, because hee would not prejudicate the freedome of the Judges’ opinions concerninge the point; whether the stay of proceedinges that had been by his Majestie required, could by anie construccion bee thought to bee within the compasse of the Judges’ oath (which they had hearde reade unto them), did then put the question to his Councell, who all with one consent did give opinion that it was farr from anie colour or shadowe of such interpretacion, and that it was against common sence to thinke the contrary, especially since there is noe mention made in their oath of the delay of justice, but only that they shall not deny justice, nor bee moved by anie of the Kinges letters to doe any thinge contrary to lawe, or justice.

G. Cant., T. Ellesmere, Canc., T. Suffolke, E. Worcester, Lenox, Nottingham, Pembroke, W. Knollis, John Digbye, Raphe Winwoode, Tho. Lake, Fulk Grevill, Jul. Caesar, Fr. Bacon.

[1. ][Ed.: Commitment, an order granting temporary possession ofa vacantecclesiasticallivingorbenefice, including its revenues until the office is permanently filled.]

[2. ][Ed.: in these words.]