CHAP. XIV.: On the discovery of Questions for Demonstration - Aristotle, Posterior Analytics [1901]
Edition used:
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, trans. E.S. Bouchier, B.A. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1901).
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- Introductory Note.
- Book I.
- Chap. I.: Whether a Demonstrative Science Exists
- Chap. II.: What Knowing Is, What Demonstration Is, and of What It Consists
- Chap. III.: A Refutation of the Error Into Which Some Have Fallen Concerning Science and Demonstration
- Chap. IV.: The Meaning of ‘distributive,’ ‘essential,’ ‘universal’
- Chap. V.: From What Causes Mistakes Arise With Regard to the Discovery of the Universal. How They May Be Avoided
- Chap. VI.: Demonstration Is Founded On Necessary and Essential Principles
- Chap. VII.: The Premises and the Conclusion of a Demonstration Must Belong to the Same Genus
- Chap. VIII.: Demonstration Is Concerned Only With What Is Eternal
- Chap. IX.: Demonstration Is Founded Not On General, But On Special and Indemonstrable Principles; Nor Is It Easy to Know Whether One Really Possesses Knowledge Drawn From These Principles
- Chap. X.: The Definition and Division of Principles
- Chap. XI.: On Certain Principles Which Are Common to All Sciences
- Chap. XII.: On Questions, And, In Passing, On the Way In Which Sciences Are Extended
- Chap. XIII.: The Difference Between the Demonstration and Science of a Thing’s Nature and Those of Its Cause
- Chap. XIV.: The Figure Proper to Demonstrate Syllogism
- Chap. XV.: On Immediate Negative Propositions
- Chap. XVI.: On Ignorance Resulting From a Defective Arrangement of Terms In Mediate Propositions
- Chap. XVII.: On Ignorance Resulting From a Defective Arrangement of Terms In Immediate Propositions
- Chap. XVIII.: On Ignorance As Resulting From Defective Sense Perception
- Chap. XIX.: Whether the Principles of Demonstration Are Finite Or Infinite
- Chap. XX.: Middle Terms Are Not Infinite
- Chap. XXI.: In Negations Some Final and Ultimate Point Is Reached Where the Series Must Cease
- Chap. XXII.: In Affirmations Some Final and Ultimate Point Is Reached Where the Series Must Cease
- Chap. XXIII.: Certain Corollaries
- Chap. XXIV.: Whether Universal Or Particular Demonstration Is Superior
- Chap. XXV.: That Affirmative Is Superior to Negative Demonstration
- Chap. XXVI.: Direct Demonstration Is Superior to Reduction Per Impossible
- Chap. XXVII.: What Science Is More Certain and Prior, and What Less Certain and Inferior
- Chap. XXVIII.: What Constitutes One Or Many Sciences
- Chap. XXIX.: Concerning Many Demonstrations of the Same Thing
- Chap. XXX.: On Fortuitous Occurrences
- Chap. XXXI.: Sense Perception Cannot Give Demonstrative Science
- Chap. XXXII.: On the Difference of Principles Corresponding to the Difference of Syllogisms
- Chap. XXXIII.: The Distinction Between Science and Opinion
- Chap. XXXIV.: On Sagacity
- Book II.
- Chap. I.: On the Number and Arrangements of Questions
- Chap. II.: Every Question Is Concerned With the Discovery of a Middle Term
- Chap. III.: The Distinction Between Definition and Demonstration
- Chap. IV.: The Essence of a Thing Cannot Be Attained By Syllogism
- Chap. V.: Knowledge of the Essence Cannot Be Attained By Division
- Chap. VI.: The Essence Cannot Be Proved By the Definition of the Thing Itself Or By That of Its Opposite
- Chap. VII.: Whether the Essence Can In Any Way Be Proved
- Chap. VIII.: How the Essence Can Be Proved
- Chap. IX.: What Essences Can and What Cannot Be Proved
- Chap. X.: The Nature and Forms of Definition
- Chap. XI.: The Kinds of Causes Used In Demonstration
- Chap. XII.: On the Causes of Events Which Exist, Are In Process, Have Happened, Or Will Happen
- Chap. XIII.: On the Search For a Definition
- Chap. XIV.: On the Discovery of Questions For Demonstration
- Chap. XV.: How Far the Same Middle Term Is Employed For Demonstrating Different Questions
- Chap. XVI.: On Inferring the Cause From the Effect
- Chap. XVII.: Whether There Can Be Several Causes of the Same Thing
- Chap. XVIII.: Which Is the Prior Cause, That Which Is Nearer the Particular, Or the More Universal?
- Chap. XIX.: On the Attainment of Primary Principles
- Appendix. Prior Analytics. Book II.
- Chap. XXIII.: On Induction
- XXIV.: On Example
CHAP. XIV.
On the discovery of Questions for Demonstration
To express questions for demonstration in a fitting manner a subject must be selected to which the quality to be demonstrated primarily belongs.
In order to find questions for solution we must make a selection from various partitions and divisions, taking care that a common generic notion lies at the base of all subordinate divisions, and assuming that all belong to a common genus. E.g. If Animals be the subject of investigation, we must first lay down what attributes are common to every animal. When this is done we should find what are the attributes of the first subdivision after the genus. Thus, if the subject be a bird, we should find the qualities possessed by every bird, and we must continue thus with the attributes of each lower term in the series. We shall then clearly be able to give the reason why the species included in the common genus possess such and such attributes; e.g. the reason why Man or Horse, as species of Animal, possess particular attributes. Let A be animal, B the attributes of every animal, C, D, E, particular species of animal. Now it is clear why B is an attribute of D, namely because of A, and it will similarly belong to the other species of animal. The same reasoning applies to other instances.
Hitherto we have spoken of cases where custom has sanctioned the application of the common class names to the particular species, but we should not limit ourselves to these. If anything else be seen to be an attribute of several things but to have no common generic name, we should take it for examination and look what are its attributes or of what it is an attribute. Thus, the possession of a ruminating stomach is a commonattribute of horned animals, as well as the possession of front teeth in one jaw only. We must then enquire what animals have the attribute of being horned. It will then be clear why the attribute mentioned belongs to these animals. It will belong to them because they have horns. Another method consists in the observation of analogies. No single designation for instance exists for the spine of a fish, the pounce of a cuttle and ordinary bone, and yet all these parts have common qualities, as if their nature were the same in each case.
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