Front Page Titles (by Subject) section iii: Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions. - An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense
Return to Title Page for An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense
The Online Library of Liberty
A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.
Search this Title:
section iii: Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions. - Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense 
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).
About Liberty Fund:
Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.
The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.
Fair use statement:
This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.
Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.
[58/59] I. The Nature of any Language has considerable Influence upon Men’s Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.
The Division of the Stoicks.Cicero, in the Fourth Book of Tusculan Questions,21 gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the Passions: First, into Love and Hatred, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is present or expected. About Good we have these two, Libido & Latitia, Desire and Joy: About Evil we have likewise two, Metus & Ægritudo, Fear and Sorrow. To this general Division he  subjoins many  Subdivisions of each of these four Passions; according as in the Latin Tongue they had different Names for the several Degrees of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of Lexicons would probably get the most precise Meanings of the Latin Names in that Book; nor would it be useless in considering the Nature of them.
The Schoolmen, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, have not so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired Aristotle.
’Tis strange that the thoughtful Malebranche did not consider, that “Desire and Aversion are obviously different from the other Modifications called Passions; that these two directly lead to Action, or the Volition of Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations; and other Affections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion, or their correspondent Propensities: So that Desire and Aversion are the only pure Affections in the strictest Sense.
Sensation and Affection distinct.If, indeed, we confine the Word Sensation to the “immediate Perceptions of  Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence  or Operation of any Object or Event, which are occasioned by some Impression on our Bodies;” then we may denote by the Word Affection, those Pleasures or Pains not thus excited, but “resulting from some Reflection upon, or Opinion of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one hand, or from a like Reflection or Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either to our selves or others.”*
Passion.When more violent confused Sensations arise with the Affection, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of Passion, especially when accompanied with some natural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.
Division by Malebranche.If this use of these Words be allowed, the Division of Malebranche is very natural. Good Objects excite Love; evil Objects Hatred: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully expected, or certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense,  the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil  present, raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; and Evil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Aversion: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.22
Desire and Aversion. Joy and Sorrow.Perhaps it may be more easy to conceive our Affections and Passions in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises Desire: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises Aversion, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper Affections, distinct from all Sensation: We may call both Desires if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself.* A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The Reflection upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect  of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of Sorrow, distinct from  those immediate Sensations arising from the Objects or Events themselves.
Affections may be distinguished from Passions.These Affections, viz. Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow, we may, after Malebranche, call spiritual or pure Affections; because the purest Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. But beside these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil, there are in our Nature violent confused Sensations, connected with bodily Motions, from which our Affections are denominated Passions.
Affections attended with undesigning Propensities. Anger.We may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, distinct both from Sensation and Desire; if by Desire we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: viz. a certain Propensity of Instinct to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or Actions are generally, tho not always, in effect the Means of some Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we  observed above,† the Propensity to Fame  may continue after one has lost all notion of Good, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our particular Affections have generally some of these Propensities accompanying them; but these Propensities are sometimes without the Affections or distinct Desires, and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the Affections could have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are some sort of Goods intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion Misery to the Offender, a Determination to Violence, even where there is no Intention of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And ’tis principally this Propensity which we denote by the Name Anger, tho other Desires often accompany it.
So also our Presence with the distressed is generally necessary to their relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we shall find a Propensity to  run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus also, beside the calm Desire of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we have a strong Propensity to their Company, to the very  Sight of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to our selves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. These Propensities, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call Passions, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them passionate. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.
Love and Hatred. Envy.It may perhaps be convenient to confine Love and Hatredto our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; Love denoting “Desire of the Happiness of another, generally attended with some Approbation of him as innocent at least, or being of a mixed  Character, where Good is generally prevalent:” And Hatred“denoting Disapprobation by our Sense, with the Absence of Desire of their  Happiness.” Benevolence may denote only “the Desire of another’s Happiness;” and Malice, “the Desire of their Misery,” abstractly from any Approbation or Condemnation by our Moral Sense. This sort of Malice is never found in our Nature, when we are not transported with Passion. The Propensities of Anger and Envy have some Resemblance of it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of another’s Misery, but only a subordinate Desire of it, as the Means of advancing our selves, or some Person more beloved than the Person envied.
Fear. Hope.Fear, as far as it is an Affection, and not an undesigning Propensity, is “a Mixture of Sorrow and Aversion, when we apprehend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we love:” There is more or less of Sorrow, according to the apprehended Degrees of Probability. Hope, if it be any way an Affection, and not an Opinion, is “a Mixture of Desire and Joy, upon the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil.” Both these Passions may have some Propensities and Sensations attending them, distinct from those of the other Affections.
Confused Use of Names, The confused Use of the Names, Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, Delight, has made [66 ] some of the most important Distinctions of our Affections and Passions, to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a private Desire, and a publick; yet both are called Love. The Love of Money, for Instance, the Love of a generous Character, or a Friend: The Love of a fine Seat, and the Love of a Child. In like manner, what can be more different than the Sorrow for a Loss befallen our selves, and Sorrow for the Death of a Friend? Of this Men must convince themselves by Reflection.
There is also a considerable Difference even among the selfish Passions, which bear the same general Name, according to the different Senses which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of Honour, and the Desire of Wealth, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The Sorrow in like manner for our Loss by a Shipwreck, and our Sorrow for having done a base Action, or Remorse: Sorrow for our being subject to the Gout or Stone, and Sorrow for our being despisedand condemned, or Shame: Sorrow for the Damage done by a Fire, and that Sorrow which arises upon an  apprehended Injury from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call Anger. Where we  get some special distinct Names, we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in Shame and Anger; but had we other Names, appropriated in the same manner, we should imagine, with good ground, as many distinct Passions. The like Confusion is observable about our Senses.*
To say that the Sensation accompanying all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and that accompanying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that there is no farther Diversity. Pains have many differences among themselves, and so have Pleasures, according to the different Senses by which they are perceived. To enumerate all these Diversities, would be difficult and tedious. But some Men have piqued themselves so much upon representing “all our Affections as selfish; as if each Person were in his whole Frame only a seperate System from his Fellows, so that there was nothing in his Constitution leading him to a publick Interest, further than he apprehended it subservient to his own private Interest; and this Interest made nothing else, than the gratifying our external Senses and Imagination, or obtaining the Means of it:” that thereby the Wisdom  and Goodness of  the Author of our Nature is traduced, as if he had given us the strongest Dispositions toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if what all good Men have represented as the Excellence of our Nature, were a Force or Constraint put upon it by Art or Authority. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, as “they are excited by something in our Frame different from Self‐Love, and tend to something else than the private Pleasures of the external Senses or Imagination.” This we may do under the following Heads, by shewing
1. Passions about our own Actions. The Passion of Heroism in Castle building. Moral Joy or Self Approbation. Remorse.1. The Passions about our own Actions occasioned by the Moral Sense. When we form the Idea of a morally good Action, or see it represented in the Drama, or read it in Epicks or Romance, we feel a Desire arising of doing the like. This leads most Tempers into an imagined Series of Adventures, in which they are still acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any good Design, we feel inward Triumph of Joy: If we are disappointed thro our own Negligence, or have been diverted from it by some selfish View, we shall feel a Sorrow called Remorse.
Reluctance.When the Idea is in like manner formed of any morally evil Action, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises Reluctance, or Aversion: If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called Remorse: If we have resisted the Temptation,  we feel a secret Joy and Self‐Approbation, for which there is no special Name.
Modesty. Shame.We might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of Honour, according as we  apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances, shall affect the Opinions which others form concerning us. When any Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would arise, we feel Desire; when we attain it, Joy; when we are disappointed, Sorrow. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as dishonourable, we feel Aversion arising; if we apprehend our selves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may call Modesty or Shame; when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a Joy, for which there is no special Name.
Ambition. Pride.We give the Name Ambition to a violent Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into immoral Means to gratify it. The same Word often denotes the Desire of Power. Pride denotes sometimes the same Desires of Honour and Power, with Aversion to their contraries; sometimes Pride denotes Joy upon any apprehended Right or Claim to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right.
Shame for others. Men may feel the Passion of Shame for the dishonourable Actions of others, when any part of the Dishonour falls upon themselves;  as when the Person dishonoured is one of their Club, or Party, or Family. The general Relation of human Nature may produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour of another, tho this is more owing to our publick Sense.
2. Publick Passions abstractly. Goodwill. Compassion. Pity. Congratulation.2. The second Class are the publick Passions about the State of others, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their Moral Qualities. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally desire the absent Happiness of others; rejoice in it when obtained, and sorrow for it when lost. We have Aversion to any impending Misery; we are sorrowful when it befals any Person, and rejoice when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compassion; the Joy we may call Congratulation.
Since our Moral Sense represents Virtue as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the Virtue of others. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are  no way prejudiced, we wish he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel Joy; if he is disappointed,  or quits the Attempt, we feel Sorrow. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a base Action, we have Aversion to the Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel Joy; if he yields to it, Sorrow. Our Affections toward the Person arise jointly with our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.
3. Publick Passions with moral Perceptions. Regret.3. The Passions of the third Class are our publick Affections, jointly with moral Perceptions of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good appears attainable by a Person of Moral Dignity, our Desire of his Happiness, founded upon Esteem or Approbation, is much stronger than that supposed in the former Class. The Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger Sorrow, Pity, or Regret, and Dissatisfaction with the Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the real Advantage of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of Joy and Satisfaction with Providence, and Security in Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong Aversion to it, with Love toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises Joy, Confidence in  Providence, with Security in Virtue. If the Evil befals him, we feel the contrary Passions, Sorrow, Dissatisfaction with Providence,  and Suspicion of the Reality of Virtue.
Which of them fit for the Drama.Hence we see how unfit such Representations are in Tragedy, as make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into Distrust of Providence, Diffidence of Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his meaning, tell us Brutus express’d at his Death, “That the Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good, proved but an empty Name.” But we must here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the King of Terrors, yet an honourable Death is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The Ruin of a Free State, the Slavery of a generous Spirit, a Life upon shameful Terms, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite Distresses of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.
Passions toward moral evil Agents. No disinterested or ultimate Malice in Men. Anger.Under this Class are also included the Passions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as morally Evil. Such Characters do raise Dislike in any  Observer, who has a moral Sense: But Malice, or the ultimate Desire of their Misery, does  not necessarily arise toward them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of desiring the Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us pure disinterested Malice, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake.* When we apprehend any Person as injurious to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of Anger arises toward the Agent. By Anger is generally meant “a Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him:” This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with Sorrow for the Injury sustained, or threatned, and Desire of repelling it, and making the Author of it repent of his Attempt, or repair the Damage.
Its Effects.This Passion is attended with the most violent uneasy Sensations, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by this Passion, to apprehend the injurious as  directly malicious, and designing the Misery of others without farther Intention. While the Heat of this Passion continues, we seem naturally to pursue the Misery  of the injurious, until they relent, and convince us of their better Intentions, by expressing their Sense of the Injury, and offering Reparation of Damage, with Security against future Offences.
Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents capable of injuring each other, that every one should be made formidable to an Invader, by such a violent Passion, till the Invader shews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer; so we find it is thus ordered in our Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Passion naturally abates; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, the Sense of Mankindturns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhumane.
In considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, distinct from Anger, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes represents them, directly evil and malicious; and then make proper Abatements, for what the worst of Men come short of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathematicians  suppose perfect Hardness in some Bodies, and Elasticity in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.
Joy of Hatred. Sorrow of Hatred. The Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as entirely malicious, raises Aversion in the Observer, or Desire of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises Joy in the Event, with Trust in Providence, and Security in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of Sorrow, Distrust, and Suspicion. The Prospect of Evil, befalling an evil Character, at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived the Passion of Anger; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of Joy, than as it is necessary to some prepollent Happiness in the whole. The escaping of Evil impending over such a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of Sorrow, and Distrust of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises Joy, and Satisfaction with Providence, and Security in Virtue. We see therefore, that the Success of evil Characters, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in Tragedy.
 Let any one reflect on this Class of Passions, especially as they arise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see how little of Self‐Love there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent as any Passions  whatsoever. We seem conscious of some Dignity in these Passions above the selfish ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor are we ashamed of them. These complicated Passions the Philosophers have confusedly mentioned, under some general Names, along with the simple selfish Passions. The Poets and Criticks have sufficiently shown, that they felt these Differences, however it did not concern them to explain them. We may find Instances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.
Passions about mixed Characters. Envy, Sorrow, Joy. Pity.The Abatements to be made for what human Nature comes short of the highest Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When the Good in any mixed Character surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise as toward the Good; where the Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions arise as toward the Evil, only in both Cases with less Violence. And further, the Passions in both Cases are either stopped, or turned the contrary way, by want of due Proportion between the State and Character. Thus an imperfect good Character, [78 ] in pursuit of a Good too great for his Virtue, or to the exclusion of more worthy Characters, instead of raising Desire of his Success, raises Aversion; his Success raises Envy, or a Species of Sorrow, and his Disappointment Joy.  An imperfectly evil Character, threatned by an Evil greater than is necessary to make him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising Desire toward the Event, raises Aversion; his escaping it raises Joy, and his falling under it raises Pity, a Species of Sorrow.
The best Plots in Tragedy.There is another Circumstance which exceedingly varies our Passions of this Class, when the Agents themselves, by their own Conduct, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, Pity toward the Sufferer, Sorrow for the State, Abhorrence of Vice, Awe and Admiration of Providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in reading the Oedipus of Sophocles, when we see the Distress of that Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown.  We feel the like Passions from the Fortunes of Creon in the Antigone; or from the Fates of Pyrrhus and Orestes, in the Andromache of Racine; or our Distressed Mother. We heartily  pity these Characters, but without repining at Providence; their Misery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the justest Reason, that Aristotle* prefers such Plots to all others for Tragedy, since these Characters come nearest to those of the Spectators, and consequently will have the strongest Influence on them. We are generally conscious of some good Dispositions, mixed with many Weaknesses: few imagine themselves capable of attaining the height of perfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer imagine themselves capable of sinking into the Baseness of perfectly evil Tempers, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befal them.
How these Passions are raised high and complicated.There is one farther Circumstance which strengthens this Class of Passions exceedingly, that is, the greatness of the Change of Fortune in the Person, or the Surprize with which it comes. As this gives the Person a more acute Perception either of Happiness or Misery, so it  strengthens our Passions, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of the Person, for whom they  would move our pity; his Projects, his Hopes, his half‐executed Designs. One left his Palace unfinished, another his betrothed Mistress, or young Wife; one promised himself Glory, and a fortunate old Age; another was heaping up Wealth, boasted of his Knowledge, was honoured for his fine Armour, his Activity, his Augury.
The Joy is in like manner increased upon the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by representing their former Prosperity, Pride and Insolence.
This Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversified or complicated, when the Sufferers are multiplied, by representing the Persons attached to the principal Sufferer, and setting before us their Affections, Friendships, tender Solicitudes, care in Education, succour in former Distresses; this every  one will find in reading the Stories of Pallas, Camilla, Nisus, and Euryalus; 25 or in general, any Battle of Homer or Virgil. What there  is in Self‐Love to account for these Effects, let all Mankind judge.
4.Publick Passions and Relations of Agents.VI. The Passions of the fourth Class arise from the same moral Sense and publick Affections, upon observing the Actions of Agents some way attachedto each other, by prior Ties of Nature or good Offices, or disengaged by prior Injuries; when these Relations are known, the moral Qualities of the Actions appear considerably different, and our Passions are much diversified by them:Contrastes and Complications of Passions. there is also a great Complication of different Passions, and a sort of Contraste, or assemblage of opposite Passions toward the several Persons concerned. The most moving Peripeties, and Remembrances, in Epick and Dramatick Poetry, are calculated to raise these complicated Passions; and in Oratory we study to do the same.
Thus strong Sentiments of Gratitude, and vigorous Returns of good Offices observed, raise in the Spectator the highest Love and Esteem toward both the Benefactor, and even the Person obliged, with Security and Delight in Virtue.—Ingratitude, or returning bad Offices designedly, raises the greatest Detestation against  the Ungrateful; and Love with Compassion toward the  Benefactor, with Dejection and Diffidence in a virtuous Course of Life.—Forgiving of Injuries, and much more returning Good for Evil, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest Love toward the Forgiver, Compassion for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if relenting, some degree of Good‐will, with Compassion; if not relenting, the most violent Abhorrence and Hatred.—Mutual good Offices done designedly between morally good Agents, raise Joy and Love in the Observer toward both, with delight in Virtue.—Mutual Injuries done by evil Agents designedly, raise Joy in the Events, along with Hatredto the Agents, with Detestation of Vice.—Good Offices done designedly by good Agents toward Evil, but not so as to encourage, or enable them to further Mischief, raise Love toward the good Agent; Displicence, with some Good‐will toward the evil Agent.—Good Offices designedly done mutually among evil Agents, if these Offices do not promote their evil Intentions, diminish our Dislike and Hatred, and introduce some Compassion and Benevolence.—Good Offices from good Agents, to Benefactors unknown to the Agent, or to their unknown Friends or Posterity, increase Love toward both; and raise great Satisfaction and Trust in  Providence, with  Security in Virtue, and Joy in the Event.—Undesigned evil Returns in like Case with the former, raise Sorrow in the Observer upon account of the Event, Pity toward both, with Suspicion of Providence and Virtue.—An undesigned Return of Evil to an evil Agent from a good one, whom he had injured, raises Joy upon account of the Event, and Trust in Providence.—Undesigned evil Offices mutually done to each other by evil Agents, raise Joy in the Event, Abhorrence of Vice, and Satisfaction with Providence.—Undesigned good Offices done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to do evil, raise Pity toward the good Agent, Indignation and Envy toward the Evil, with Distrust in Providence.—Undesigned good Offices done by good to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further mischief, raise Envy or Indignation toward the evil Agent, if the Benefit be great; if not, they scarce raise any new Passion distinct from that we had before, of Love toward the one, and Hatredor Dislike toward the other.
These Passions might have been diversified, according to Malebranche’s Division, as the Object or Event was present, or in suspense, or certainly removed: And would appear in different Degrees of  Strength, according  as the Persons concerned were more nearly attached to the Observer, by Nature, Friendship, or Acquaintance.26
5.Publick Passions join’d with the selfish.VII. The Passions of the last Class, are those in which any of the former Kinds are complicated with selfish Passions, when our own Interest is concerned. It is needless here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of selfish Passions will very much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any selfish Interests, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the publick Desires or Aversions, or those founded upon the Sense of Virtue or Honour; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against Conscience.
These Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation of others; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in the most lively manner.
[85/86] In all this tedious Enumeration, let any one consider, “How few of our Passions can be any way deduced from Self‐Love, or desire of private Advantage: And how improbable it is, that Persons in the Heat of Action, have any of those subtle Reflections, and selfish Intentions, which some Philosophers invent for them: How great a part of the Commotions of our Minds arise upon the moral Sense, and from publick Affections toward the good of others. We should find, that without these Principles in our Nature, we should not feel the one half at least of our present Pleasures or Pains; and that our Nature would be almost reduced to Indolence.”
How Characters and Tempers of Men are formed.An accurate Observation of the several distinct Characters and Tempers of Men, which are constituted by the various Degrees of their natural Sagacity, their Knowledge, their Interests, their Opinions, or Associations of Ideas, with the Passions which are prevalent in them, is a most useful and pleasant Entertainment for those, who have Opportunities of large Acquaintance and Observation. But our present Purpose leads only to consider the first general  Elements, from the various Combinations  of which, the several Tempers and Characters are formed.
The Order of Nature partly vindicated.This account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for the Goodness of the Deity, from the Constitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of Pleasure or Advantage are given us, than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other Affections represented as natural, save those toward private Good: it may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue from Inclination, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the Biass of our Nature opposite to the Laws he would give us; and making all Pleasure, the most natural Character of Good, attend the prohibited Actions, or the indifferent ones; while Obedience to the Law must be a constrainedCourse of Action, inforced only by Penalties contrary to our natural Affections and Senses. Nature and Grace are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no  such Inconsistency: “Every Passion  or Affection in its moderate Degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and morally good: we have Senses and Affections leading us to publick Good, as well as to private; to Virtue, as well as to external Pleasure.”
[21.]See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV.6–12.
[*]See above, Sect. 2. Art. 1.
[22.]At De la Recherche de la Vérité, V.9 Malebranche presents his account of love and aversion which roughly corresponds to Hutcheson’s description. But Hutcheson misinterprets Malebranche’s theory of the passions, perhaps intentionally, in two important ways. First, Malebranche’s main point in V.9 is to emphasize that love is primary and that even aversion assumes love as it is a privation of the good. In accord with his Augustinianism and Cartesianism, Malebranche’s opposition is not as sharply binary as Hutcheson presents it. Second, Malebranche distinguishes between desire as a general passion (V.7) and love as a particular passion (V.9).
[*]See Sect. 2. Art. 1.
[†]Sect. 1. near the End.
[*]Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 10.
[*]SeeSect. 5. Art. 5. of this Treatise.
[*]Aristotle Poetic, Chap. 13.
[23.]The passages from Homer are Iliad II.859, “but he did not ward off black death with bird omens,” and II.873, “fool, and this did not protect him from grievous destruction.” Along with the passages from Virgil directly following them, they are common examples used to illustrate the human failure to ward off fate.
[24.]Here Hutcheson quotes two distinct passages from Virgil’s Aeneid: “But the augury was unable to drive away ruin” (IX.328) and “But he was not able to heal the cut of the Dardan blade” (VII.756–57).
[25.]Pallas, Camilla, Nisus, and Euryalus were all heroes of the Trojan War celebrated in Virgil’s Aeneid. In describing them, Virgil emphasized the approbation that spectators had for them as well as their sympathetic ties to friends and family in order to amplify the pathos of their deaths (cf. IX.423–37, X.491–5, XI.532–96).
[26.]See Malebranche, De la Recherche, V. 7–9.
[27.]Virgil, Aeneid, X.870–72. Dryden renders it “Love, anguish, wrath, and grief, to madness wrought//Despair, and secret shame, and conscious thought//Of inborn worth, his lab’ring soul oppress’d.” The third line is thought now to be spurious, but was common to eighteenth‐century editions.