The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface
• Part 1: Apprehensions
• The Anti-federalists
• Letters From the Federal Farmer, No. 7 31 December 1787
• “brutus,” Essay Ii 1 November 1787
• Amendments Recommended By the Several State Conventions
• Amendments Proposed By the Virginia Convention 27 June 1788
• Ratification of the State of New York 26 July 1788
• Federalist Concerns
• James Madison to George Washington New York, 11 August 1788
• Madison to Washington New York, 24 August 1788
• James Madison to Thomas Jefferson 21 September 1788
• Madison to Jefferson 8 December 1788
• The Bill of Rights
• Proceedings In the House of Representatives 8 June 1789
• Proceedings In the House of Representatives 13 August 1789
• Apprehensions Unallayed
• “pacificus” to James Madison
• Popular Instruction of Representatives 15 August 1789
• Titles
• Part 2: The Leadership Divides
• Funding and Assumption
• Alexander Hamilton the First Report On Public Credit 14 January 1790
• Debates In the House of Representatives On the First Report On Public Credit 9–18 February 1790
• Thomas Jefferson Memorandum On the Compromise of 1790
• Opposition Out of Doors
• Virginia’s Remonstrance Against the Assumption of State Debts 16 December 1790
• The Constitution and the National Bank
• Alexander Hamilton Notes On the Advantages of a National Bank 27 March 1791
• James Madison’s Speech On the Bank Bill 2 February 1791
• Thomas Jefferson Opinion On the Constitutionality of a National Bank 15 February 1791
• Alexander Hamilton Opinion On the Constitutionality of a National Bank 15 February 1791
• James Madison to Thomas Jefferson On Speculative Excess Summer 1791
• Commerce and Manufactures
• Thomas Jefferson Notes On the State of Virginia 1785
• Jefferson and Madison On Republican Political Economy
• James Madison Speech In the House of Representatives On Commercial Retaliation and Discrimination 25 April 1789
• Congressional Proceedings On Commercial Discrimination 1789
• Alexander Hamilton Report On the Subject of Manufactures 5 December 1791
• The Collision
• James Madison Essays For the National Gazette 1792
• William Branch Giles Speech In the House of Representatives On the Apportionment Bill 9 April 1792
• Letters of Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot 1791–1792
• Philip Freneau “rules For Changing a Limited Republican Government Into an Unlimited Hereditary One” 4 and 7 July 1792
• Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington 26 May 1792
• An Administration Divided
• James Madison Further Essays For the National Gazette
• Part III. The French Revolution and the People
• Neutrality
• “an Old French Soldier” (philadelphia) General Advertiser 27 August 1793
• Alexander Hamilton “pacificus,” No. 1 29 June 1793
• James Madison “helvidius,” No. 1 24 August 1793
• James Madison “helvidius,” No. 4 14 September 1793
• Commerce and Seizures
• William Loughton Smith Speech In the House of Representatives 13 January 1794
• James Madison Speech In the House of Representatives 14 January 1794
• James Madison “political Observations” 20 April 1795
• The Popular Societies, the Excise, and the Whiskey Rebellion
• The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania (philadelphia) Principles, Articles, and Regulations 30 May 1793
• Condemnations, Defenses, and Society Attacks On the Excise
• The Rebellion
• “self-created Societies”
• Alexander Hamilton the “camillus” Essays 22 July 1795–9 January 1796
• House Debates On Implementing Jay’s Treaty 1796
• Washington’s Farewell Address 19 September 1796
• Part 4: Liberty and Order
• The Black Cockade Fever
• Philadelphia, 1798
• Addresses to the President, With His Replies April–august 1798
• The Sedition Act 14 July 1798
• Popular Protest
• “advertisement Extraordinary!!!” (philadelphia) Aurora 14 July 1798
• The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
• Thomas Jefferson Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions October 1798
• James Madison the Virginia Resolutions 21 December 1798
• State Replies to the Resolutions
• Congressional Report Defending the Alien and Sedition Laws 21 February 1799
• James Madison the Report of 1800
• The Jeffersonian Program
• Thomas Jefferson the First Inaugural Address 4 March 1801
• Thomas Jefferson First Annual Message 8 December 1801
• The Jeffersonian Vision
• Letters of the President 1799–1802
• Edmund Pendleton “the Danger Not Over” 5 October 1801
• Fisher Ames “falkland,” No. 2 6 February 1801
• Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801
• Congressional Proceedings
• Editorials On the Repeal “a Friend of the Constitution” [william Cranch], No. 1 Washington Federalist 7 December 1801
• The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 1804–1805
• Albert Gallatin Report On Internal Improvements 4 April 1808
• The Louisiana Purchase
• Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston 18 April 1802
• Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge 12 August 1803
• Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas 7 September 1803
• [alexander Hamilton] “purchase of Louisiana” New York Evening Post 5 July 1803
• Federalist Alarm
• A Republican Response
• Senate Debates On the Louisiana Purchase 2–3 November 1803
• The Embargo
• An Act Laying an Embargo On All Ships and Vessels In the Ports and Harbors of the United States 22 December 1807
• Resistance, Enforcement, and Repeal
• The War of 1812
• Madison’s War Message 2 June 1812
• Samuel Taggart, Speech Opposing the War 24 June 1812
• Henry Clay, Speech Supporting the War 9 January 1813
• Report and Resolutions of the Hartford Convention 4 January 1815
• Part 7: The End of an Era
• Madison’s Seventh Annual Message 5 December 1815
• Madison’s Veto of the Internal Improvements Bill 3 March 1817
• In Retrospect
• The Adams-jefferson Correspondence John Adams to Thomas Jefferson 13 July 1813
• Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson 12 June 1823
• Republican Farewells
• Bibliography

Resistance, Enforcement, and Repeal

Embargoes were a tested and conventional method of protecting merchant shipping when it was under threat, especially as preliminaries to war. One of thirty days had been imposed in 1794 during the crisis preceding Jay’s Treaty, another after the Leopard-Chesapeake confrontation. The act of 1807 passed the Senate (meeting in secret session) within four or five hours of the president’s message recommending it by a vote of 22 to 6. The House also met in secret session, and we are told only that there was a warm debate before an amendment limiting the measure to a period of sixty days was defeated 82 to 46. Thus, the act contained no limitation of time; and it seems clear that Jefferson and Madison, although they never thoroughly explained it to the country, were planning to employ an indefinite embargo as a weapon of economic coercion and an alternative to war, proceeding from their long-standing assumption that all the advantages in a commercial confrontation would lie on the American side.

Despite real hardships, much of the country supported the embargo. But Albert Gallatin, the always-faithful secretary of the treasury, warned Jefferson from the beginning against a long-term experiment with economic warfare. And, indeed, especially in New England, resistance was fierce. Evasion, both on the seas and in the overland trade to Canada, was an increasing problem. The administration answered with ever more stringent enforcement measures, including the employment of the army and state militias. In the end, nevertheless, Congress rebelled; and in his last days in office, on 1 March 1809, Jefferson reluctantly signed legislation replacing the complete embargo with a measure confining nonintercourse to trade with Britain and France and promising repeal of that if either country ceased its violations of neutral rights.

Albert Gallatin to Jefferson 18 December 1807

… I also think that an embargo for a limited time will be preferable in itself and less objectionable in Congress. In every point of view—privations, sufferings, revenue, effect on the enemy, politics at home, etc.—I prefer war to a permanent embargo. Governmental prohibitions do always more mischief than had been calculated; and it is not without much hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of individuals, as if he could do it better than themselves. The measure being of a doubtful policy and hastily adopted on the first view of our foreign intelligence, I think that we had better recommend it with modifications and, at first, for such a limited time as will afford us all time for reconsideration and, if we think proper, for an alteration in our course without appearing to retract. As to the hope that it may have an effect on the negotiation with Mr. Rose or induce England to treat us better, I think it entirely groundless.

Jefferson to Jacob Crowninshield, Secretary of the Navy 16 July 1808

Complaints multiply upon us of evasions of the embargo laws, by fraud and force. These come from Newport, Portland, Machias, Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, etc., etc. As I do consider the severe enforcement of the embargo to be of an importance not to be measured by money for our future government as well as present objects, I think it will be advisable that during this summer all the gunboats actually manned and in commission should be distributed through as many ports and bays as may be necessary to assist the embargo. On this subject I will pray you to confer with Mr. Gallatin, who will call on you on his passage through Baltimore, and to communicate with him hereafter, directly, without the delay of consulting me, and generally to aid this object with such means of your department as are consistent with its situation… .

Gallatin to Jefferson 29 July 1808

I sent yesterday to the Secretary of the Navy, and he will transmit to you, a letter from General Dearborn and another from General Lincoln showing the violations of the embargo… .

With those difficulties we must struggle as well as we can this summer; but I am perfectly satisfied that if the embargo must be persisted in any longer, two principles must necessarily be adopted in order to make it sufficient: 1st, that not a single vessel shall be permitted to move without the special permission of the executive; 2nd, that the collectors be invested with the general power of seizing property anywhere and taking the rudders or otherwise effectually preventing the departure of any vessel in harbor, though ostensibly intended to remain there, and that without being liable to personal suits. I am sensible that such arbitrary powers are equally dangerous and odious. But a restrictive measure of the nature of the embargo applied to a nation under such circumstances as the United States cannot be enforced without the assis-tance of means as strong as the measure itself. To that legal authority to prevent, seize, and detain must be added a sufficient physical force to carry it into effect; and although I believe that in our seaports little difficulty would be encountered, we must have a little army along the Lakes and British lines generally. … For the Federalists having at least prevented the embargo from becoming a measure generally popular, and the people being distracted by the complexity of the subject, orders of council, decrees, embargoes, and wanting a single object which might rouse their patriotism and unite their passions and affections, selfishness has assumed the reins in several quarters, and the people are now there altogether against the law… .

That in the present situation of the world every effort should be attempted to preserve the peace of this nation cannot be doubted. But if the criminal party-rage of Federalists and Tories shall have so far succeeded as to defeat our endeavors to obtain that object by the only measure that could possibly have effected it, we must submit and prepare for war. … I have not time to write correctly or even with sufficient perspicuity; but you will guess at my meaning where it is not sufficiently clear. I mean generally to express an opinion founded on the experience of this summer that Congress must either invest the executive with the most arbitrary powers and sufficient force to carry the embargo into effect, or give it up altogether. And in this last case I must confess that unless a change takes place in the measures of the European powers, I see no alternative but war. But with whom? This is a tremendous question if tested only by policy; and so extraordinary is our situation that it is equally difficult to decide it on the ground of justice, the only one by which I wish the United States to be governed. At all events, I think it the duty of the Executive to contemplate that result as probable, and to be prepared accordingly… .

Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, Secretary of War 9 August 1808

Yours of July 27th is received. It confirms the accounts we receive from others that the infractions of the embargo in Maine and Massachusetts are open. I have removed Pope, of New Bedford, for worse than negligence. The collector of Sullivan is on the totter. The Tories of Boston openly threaten insurrection if their importation of flour is stopped. The next post will stop it. I fear your governor is not up to the tone of these parricides, and I hope, on the first symptom of an open opposition of the law by force, you will fly to the scene and aid in suppressing any commotion… .

Elisha Tracy (of Norwich, Conn.) to Jefferson 15 September 1808

… A few weeks since a Reverend D. D. from the state of Massachusetts, and then standing in the desk of the house where I usually attend divine worship, after describing the administration of the general government in colors suited to his imagination, declared that we ought no longer to confederate in such a confederation. This was the first time I had heard the sentiment avowed before a public assembly, tho I had for about four years perceived the leading Federalists cautiously beating the pulse of the people to the tune of separation. The great body of the people, even Federalist, are still opposed to such a step, and did they but fully see its object, they would execrate its advocates; but they are impelled forward by the great phalanx of the pulpit, the bar, and the monied interest of New England. The headquarters of this spirit is to be found in the town of Boston, and there is not a doubt to my mind that the object of getting town meetings to express sentiments respecting the Embargo is not to effect its removal, but with a view of increasing discontents and wanton calumnies and … to work up such a state of irritation as will furnish them with a favorable opportunity to boldly avow their objects… .

Jefferson to Mr. Letue 8 November 1808

While the opposition to the late laws of embargo has in one quarter amounted almost to rebellion and treason, it is pleasing to know that all the rest of the nation has approved of the proceedings of the constituted authorities. The steady union which you mention of our fellow citizens of South Carolina is entirely in their character. They have never failed in fidelity to their country and the republican spirit of its constitution. Never before was that union more needed or more salutary than under our present crisis. I enclose you my message to both houses of Congress, this moment delivered. You will see that we have to choose between the alternatives of embargo and war; there is indeed one and only one other, that is submission and tribute. For all the Federal propositions for trading to the places permitted by the edicts of the belligerents, result in fact in submission. … I do not believe, however, that our fellow citizens … will concur with those to the east in this parricide purpose, any more than in the disorganizing conduct which has disgraced the latter… .

Resolutions of the Connecticut General Assembly 23 February 1809

Resolved, that to preserve the Union and support the Constitution of the United States, it becomes the duty of the legislatures of the states, in such a crisis of affairs, vigilantly to watch over and vigorously to maintain the powers not delegated to the United States but reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, and that a due regard to this duty will not permit this Assembly to assist or concur in giving effect to the … unconstitutional act passed to enforce the embargo.

Resolved, that this Assembly highly approve of the conduct of his Excellency, the Governor, in declining to designate persons to carry into effect, by the aid of military power, the act of the United States enforcing the embargo… .

Resolved, that persons holding executive office under this state are restrained by the duties which they owe this state from affording any official aid or cooperation in the execution of the act aforesaid; and that his Excellency the Governor be requested, as commander in chief of the military force of this state, to cause those resolutions to be published in general orders; and that the secretary of this state be, and he is hereby, directed to transmit copies of the same to the several sheriffs and town clerks.

Resolved, that his Excellency the Governor be requested to communicate the foregoing resolution to the President of the United States with an assurance that this Assembly regret that they are thus obliged under a paramount sense of public duty to assert the unquestionable right of this state to abstain from any agency in the execution of measures which are unconstitutional and despotic.

Resolved, that this Assembly accord in sentiment with the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that it is expedient to effect certain alterations in the Constitution of the United States and will zealously cooperate with that Commonwealth and any other of the states in all legal and constitutional measures for procuring such amendments … as shall be judged necessary to obtain more effectual protection and defense for commerce, and to give to the commercial states their fair and just consideration in the union and for affording permanent security as well as present relief from the oppressive measures under which they now suffer.

Resolved, that his Excellency the Governor be requested to transmit copies of the foregoing resolution to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and to the legislatures of such of our sister states as manifest a disposition to concur in restoring to commerce its former activity and preventing the repetition of measures which have a tendency, not only to destroy it, but to dissolve the union, which ought to be inviolate.

John Adams to Benjamin Rush 27 September 1808

… I believe, with you, “a republican government,” while the people have the virtues, talents, and love of country necessary to support it, “the best possible government to promote the interest, dignity, and happiness of man.” But you know that commerce, luxury, and avarice have destroyed every republican government. England and France have tried the experiment, and neither of them could preserve it for twelve years. It might be said with truth that they could not preserve it for a moment, for the commonwealth of England, from 1640 to 1660, was in reality a succession of monarchies under Pym, Hampden, Fairfax, and Cromwell, and the republic of France was a similar monarchy under Mirabeau, Brissot, Danton, Robespierre, and a succession of others like them, down to Napoleon, the Emperor. The mercenary spirit of commerce has recently destroyed the republics of Holland, Switzerland, and Venice. Not one of these republics, however, dared at any time to trust the people with any elections whatever, much less with the election of first magistrates. In all those countries, the monster venality would instantly have appeared and swallowed at once all security of liberty, property, fame, and life… .

Americans, I fondly hope and candidly believe, are not yet arrived at the age of Demosthenes or Cicero. If we can preserve our union entire, we may preserve our republic; but if the union is broken, we become petty principalities, little better than the feudatories, one of France and the other of England.

If I could lay an embargo or pass a new importation law against corruption and foreign influence, I would not make it a temporary, but a perpetual law, and I would not repeal it, though it should raise a clamor as loud as my gag-law, or your grog-law, or Mr. Jefferson’s embargo. The majorities in the five states of New England, though small, are all on one side. New York has fortified the same party with half a dozen members, and anxious are the expec-tations from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. There is a body of the same party in every other state. The Union, I fear, is in some danger. Nor is the danger of foreign war much diminished. An alliance between England and Spain is a new aspect of planets towards us. Surrounded by land on the east, north, west, and south by the territories of two such powers, and blockaded by sea by two such navies as the English and Spanish, without a friend or ally by sea or land, we may have all our republican virtues put to a trial.

I am weary of conjectures, but not in despair.

John Adams to J. B. Varnum 26 December 1808

… Ever since my return from Europe, where I had resided ten years and could not be fully informed of the state of affairs in my own country, I have been constantly anxious and alarmed at the intemperance of party spirit and the unbounded license of our presses. In the same view I could not but lament some things which have lately passed in public bodies. To instance, at Dedham and Topsfield, and last of all in the resolutions of our Massachusetts legislature. Upon principle, I see no right in our Senate and House to dictate, nor to advise, nor to request our representatives in Congress. The right of the people to instruct their representatives is very dear to them and will never be disputed by me. But this is a very different thing from an interference of a state legislature. Congress must be “the cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night” to conduct this nation, and if their eyes are to be diverted by wandering light, accidentally springing up in every direction, we shall never get through the wilderness.

I have not been inattentive to the course of our public affairs and agree with Congress in their resolutions to resist the decrees, edicts, and orders of France and England; but I think the king’s proclamation for the impressment of seamen on board our merchant ships has not been distinctly enough reprobated. It is the most groundless pretension of all. Retired as I am, conversing with very few of any party, out of the secret of affairs, collecting information only from public papers and pamphlets, many links in the great chain of deliberations, actions, and events may have escaped me. You will easily believe that an excessive diffidence in my own opinions has not been the sin that has most easily beset me. I must nevertheless confess to you that in all the intricate combinations of our affairs to which I have ever been a witness, I never found myself so much at a loss to form a judgment of what the nation ought to do or what part I ought to act. No man, then, I hope, will have more confidence in the solidity of any thing I may suggest than I have myself.

I revere the upright and enlightened general sense of our American nation. It is nevertheless capable, like all other nations, of general prejudices and national errors. Among these, I know not whether there is any more remarkable than that opinion so universal that it is in our power to bring foreign nations to our terms by withholding our commerce. When the executive and legislative authority of any nation, especially in the old governments and great powers of Europe, have adopted measures upon deliberation and published them to the world, they cannot recede without a deep humiliation and disgrace, in the eyes of their own subjects as well as all Europe. They will therefore obstinately adhere to them at the expense even of great sacrifices and in defiance of great dangers. In 1774, Congress appeared almost unanimously sanguine that a non-importation and a non-consumption association would procure an immediate repeal of acts of parliament and royal orders. I went heartily along with the rest in all these measures, because I knew that the sense of the nation, the public opinion in all the colonies, required them, and I did not see that they could do harm. But I had no confidence in their success in anything but uniting the American people. I expressed this opinion freely to some of my friends, particularly to Mr. Henry of Virginia and to Major Hawley of Massachusetts. These two, and these only, agreed with me in opinion that we must fight, after all. We found by experience that a war of eight years, in addition to all our resolutions, was necessary, and the aid of France, Spain, and Holland, too, before our purposes could be accomplished. Do we presume that we can excite insurrection, rebellion, and a revolution in England? Even a revolution would be of no benefit to us. A republican government in England would be more hostile to us than the monarchy is. The resources of that country are so great, their merchants, capitalists, and principal manufacturers are so rich, that they can employ their manufacturers and store their productions for a long time, perhaps longer than we can or will bear to hoard ours. In 1794, upon these principles and for these reasons, I thought it my duty to decide, in Senate, against Mr. Madison’s resolutions, as they were called, and I have seen no reason to alter my opinion since. I own I was sorry when the late non-importation law passed. When a war with England was seriously apprehended in 1794, I approved of an embargo as a temporary measure to preserve our seamen and property, but not with any expectation that it would influence England. I thought the embargo which was laid a year ago a wise and prudent measure for the same reason, namely to preserve our seamen and as much of our property as we could get in, but not with the faintest hope that it would influence the British Councils. At the same time I confidently expected that it would be raised in a few months. I have not censured any of these measures, because I knew the fond attachment of the nation to them; but I think the nation must soon be convinced that they will not answer their expectations. The embargo and the non-intercourse laws, I think, ought not to last long. They will lay such a foundation of disaffection to the national government as will give great uneasiness to Mr. Jefferson’s successor and produce such distractions and confusions as I shudder to think of. The naval and military force to carry them into execution would maintain a war.

Are you then for war, you will ask. I will answer you candidly. I think a war would be a less evil than a rigorous enforcement of the embargo and non-intercourse. But we have no necessity to declare war against England or France, or both. We may raise the embargo, repeal the non-intercourse, authorize our merchants to arm their vessels, give them special letters of marque to defend themselves against all unlawful aggressors and take and burn or destroy all vessels, or make prize of them as enemies, that shall attack them. In the meantime apply all our resources to build frigates, some in every principal seaport. … I never was fond of the plan of building line of battle ships. Our policy is not to fight squadrons at sea, but to have fast-sailing frigates to scour the seas and make impression on the enemy’s commerce; and in this way we can do great things. Our great seaports and most exposed frontier places ought not to be neglected in their fortifications; but I cannot see for what purpose a hundred thousand militia are called out, nor why we should have so large an army at present. The revenues applied to these uses would be better appropriated to building frigates. We may depend upon it, we shall never be respected by foreign powers until they see that we are sensible of the great resources which the Almighty in his benevolent providence has put into our hands. No nation under the sun has better materials, architects, or mariners for a respectable maritime power. I have no doubt but our people, when they see a necessity, will cheerfully pay the taxes necessary for their defense and to support their union, independence, and national honor. When our merchants are armed, if they are taken, they cannot blame the government; if they fight well and captivate their enemies, they will acquire glory and encouragement at home, and England or France may determine for themselves whether they will declare war. I believe neither will do it, because each will be afraid of our joining the other. If either should, in my opinion, the other will rescind; but if we should have both to fight, it would not be long before one or the other would be willing to make peace, and I see not much difference between fighting both and fighting England alone. My heart is with the Spanish patriots, and I should be glad to assist them as far as our commerce can supply them.

I conclude with acknowledging that we have received greater injuries from England than from France, abominable as both have been. I conclude that whatever the government determines, I shall support as far as my small voice extends.

The War of 1812

Although he seems to have believed that war was the only honorable alternative to the embargo, Jefferson declined to provide any firm guidance to Congress during his last weeks in office. Madison, who was as much an architect of the policy of commercial coercion as Jefferson himself, but even more inclined toward diffidence in the executive’s relationships with Congress, inherited the same set of troubles. Through the next several years, Congress and the administration struggled constantly to find a means by which the economic weapon could be used without damaging the United States more than it did the warring European powers. In 1809, the administration reached an agreement with British minister David Erskine and reopened trade with Britain, but Britain disavowed the arrangement; nonintercourse was once again imposed. In 1810, Macon’s Bill Number 2 (named after congressman Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina) ended nonintercourse, but provided that it was to be reimposed against either of the European powers if the other ceased its violations of neutral rights without a comparable response. On 2 November 1810, believing that Napoleon had rescinded his decrees so far as they applied to American shipping, Madison proclaimed that nonintercourse would go into effect again unless Great Britain followed suit. On 11 March 1811, Congress sanctioned its reimposition. With Britain still refusing to rescind its orders and the governor of Canada providing aid and encouragement to Tecumseh and the Prophet, Shawnee brothers who were at the head of an Indian confederacy which was at war with the United States in the Northwest, several new and vigorous members of the Twelfth Congress, which met in November 1811, favored war. Madison had probably already made the same decision.