The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface
• Part 1: Apprehensions
• The Anti-federalists
• Letters From the Federal Farmer, No. 7 31 December 1787
• “brutus,” Essay Ii 1 November 1787
• Amendments Recommended By the Several State Conventions
• Amendments Proposed By the Virginia Convention 27 June 1788
• Ratification of the State of New York 26 July 1788
• Federalist Concerns
• James Madison to George Washington New York, 11 August 1788
• Madison to Washington New York, 24 August 1788
• James Madison to Thomas Jefferson 21 September 1788
• Madison to Jefferson 8 December 1788
• The Bill of Rights
• Proceedings In the House of Representatives 8 June 1789
• Proceedings In the House of Representatives 13 August 1789
• Apprehensions Unallayed
• “pacificus” to James Madison
• Popular Instruction of Representatives 15 August 1789
• Titles
• Part 2: The Leadership Divides
• Funding and Assumption
• Alexander Hamilton the First Report On Public Credit 14 January 1790
• Debates In the House of Representatives On the First Report On Public Credit 9–18 February 1790
• Thomas Jefferson Memorandum On the Compromise of 1790
• Opposition Out of Doors
• Virginia’s Remonstrance Against the Assumption of State Debts 16 December 1790
• The Constitution and the National Bank
• Alexander Hamilton Notes On the Advantages of a National Bank 27 March 1791
• James Madison’s Speech On the Bank Bill 2 February 1791
• Thomas Jefferson Opinion On the Constitutionality of a National Bank 15 February 1791
• Alexander Hamilton Opinion On the Constitutionality of a National Bank 15 February 1791
• James Madison to Thomas Jefferson On Speculative Excess Summer 1791
• Commerce and Manufactures
• Thomas Jefferson Notes On the State of Virginia 1785
• Jefferson and Madison On Republican Political Economy
• James Madison Speech In the House of Representatives On Commercial Retaliation and Discrimination 25 April 1789
• Congressional Proceedings On Commercial Discrimination 1789
• Alexander Hamilton Report On the Subject of Manufactures 5 December 1791
• The Collision
• James Madison Essays For the National Gazette 1792
• William Branch Giles Speech In the House of Representatives On the Apportionment Bill 9 April 1792
• Letters of Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot 1791–1792
• Philip Freneau “rules For Changing a Limited Republican Government Into an Unlimited Hereditary One” 4 and 7 July 1792
• Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington 26 May 1792
• An Administration Divided
• James Madison Further Essays For the National Gazette
• Part III. The French Revolution and the People
• Neutrality
• “an Old French Soldier” (philadelphia) General Advertiser 27 August 1793
• Alexander Hamilton “pacificus,” No. 1 29 June 1793
• James Madison “helvidius,” No. 1 24 August 1793
• James Madison “helvidius,” No. 4 14 September 1793
• Commerce and Seizures
• William Loughton Smith Speech In the House of Representatives 13 January 1794
• James Madison Speech In the House of Representatives 14 January 1794
• James Madison “political Observations” 20 April 1795
• The Popular Societies, the Excise, and the Whiskey Rebellion
• The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania (philadelphia) Principles, Articles, and Regulations 30 May 1793
• Condemnations, Defenses, and Society Attacks On the Excise
• The Rebellion
• “self-created Societies”
• Alexander Hamilton the “camillus” Essays 22 July 1795–9 January 1796
• House Debates On Implementing Jay’s Treaty 1796
• Washington’s Farewell Address 19 September 1796
• Part 4: Liberty and Order
• The Black Cockade Fever
• Philadelphia, 1798
• Addresses to the President, With His Replies April–august 1798
• The Sedition Act 14 July 1798
• Popular Protest
• “advertisement Extraordinary!!!” (philadelphia) Aurora 14 July 1798
• The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
• Thomas Jefferson Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions October 1798
• James Madison the Virginia Resolutions 21 December 1798
• State Replies to the Resolutions
• Congressional Report Defending the Alien and Sedition Laws 21 February 1799
• James Madison the Report of 1800
• The Jeffersonian Program
• Thomas Jefferson the First Inaugural Address 4 March 1801
• Thomas Jefferson First Annual Message 8 December 1801
• The Jeffersonian Vision
• Letters of the President 1799–1802
• Edmund Pendleton “the Danger Not Over” 5 October 1801
• Fisher Ames “falkland,” No. 2 6 February 1801
• Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801
• Congressional Proceedings
• Editorials On the Repeal “a Friend of the Constitution” [william Cranch], No. 1 Washington Federalist 7 December 1801
• The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 1804–1805
• Albert Gallatin Report On Internal Improvements 4 April 1808
• The Louisiana Purchase
• Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston 18 April 1802
• Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge 12 August 1803
• Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas 7 September 1803
• [alexander Hamilton] “purchase of Louisiana” New York Evening Post 5 July 1803
• Federalist Alarm
• A Republican Response
• Senate Debates On the Louisiana Purchase 2–3 November 1803
• The Embargo
• An Act Laying an Embargo On All Ships and Vessels In the Ports and Harbors of the United States 22 December 1807
• Resistance, Enforcement, and Repeal
• The War of 1812
• Madison’s War Message 2 June 1812
• Samuel Taggart, Speech Opposing the War 24 June 1812
• Henry Clay, Speech Supporting the War 9 January 1813
• Report and Resolutions of the Hartford Convention 4 January 1815
• Part 7: The End of an Era
• Madison’s Seventh Annual Message 5 December 1815
• Madison’s Veto of the Internal Improvements Bill 3 March 1817
• In Retrospect
• The Adams-jefferson Correspondence John Adams to Thomas Jefferson 13 July 1813
• Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson 12 June 1823
• Republican Farewells
• Bibliography

The Anti-Federalists

Letters from the Federal Farmer, No. 7 31 December 1787

Among the hundreds of pamphlets, newspaper articles, and published speeches opposing the new Constitution, a few were judged especially outstanding and have earned enduring fame. Among these, certainly, are the Letters from the Federal Farmer, which were widely read in pamphlet form after appearing initially in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal between November 1787 and January 1788. The seventh number developed one of the deepest concerns of many opponents of the Constitution: that the people could not be adequately represented in a single national legislature and, as power gravitated increasingly into federal hands, would end up being ruled by a few great men.

Most recent authorities reject the traditional identification of the “Federal Farmer” as Virginia’s Richard Henry Lee. Several suspect that the author may have been Melancton Smith, some of whose speeches in the New York ratifying convention contain close parallels to passages in the letters. But, whoever the author, his concern with an inadequate representation and the creation of a unitary or “consolidated” central government is necessary background for an understanding of the arguments that would divide the first American parties.

Dear Sir,

In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole force reducible to two principles— … force and persuasion. By the former men are compelled, by the latter they are drawn. We denominate a government despotic or free as the one or other principle prevails in it. Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is it in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws. In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independent of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and enforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws. In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labor with very small deductions for the public use. The body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government; and it can be only those few who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism that can, for a moment, prefer the former. Our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle, to arm persuasion on every side, and to render force as little necessary as possible. Persuasion is never dangerous, not even in despotic governments; but military force, if often applied internally, can never fail to destroy the love and confidence, and break the spirits, of the people, and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for him or them who govern … to hold their places by the peoples’ elections… .

The plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain.

Government must exist—If the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the next resort. The moment the laws of Congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and the whole system be convulsed—that moment we must have recourse to this next resort, and all freedom vanish.

It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators and assign men to the different departments of the government. In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion. In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to. It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition; it must possess the confidence and have the voluntary support of the people… .

A fair and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views of the people are collected in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled. … [But] there is no substantial representation of the people provided for in [the new] government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, are proposed to be lodged. … There ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And … the elections of them ought to be better secured.

The representation is insubstantial and ought to be increased. In matters where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid and such as are well founded in the mind of the writer. I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no feature in government can be more important, perhaps no one has been less understood, and no one has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers. The ephori in Sparta and the tribunes in Rome were but the shadow [of representation]; the representation in Great Britain is unequal and insecure. In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles than, perhaps, all the world besides; yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements in representation may be made. In fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed and the number of representatives and forms of election apportioned to that situation. When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious care of the constitution and laws to arrest them from national depravity and to preserve them in their happy condition. A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous people. A virtuous and happy people, by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily be gradually changed into servile and depraved creatures. Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial and the imperfect substitute of the people. [Although] the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in the society an undue ascendancy over the others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters and the latter slaves. It is the first of all among the political balances to preserve in its proper station each of these classes. We talk of balances in the legislature and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people. … I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the Marquis Beccaria’s treatise: this sentence was quoted by Congress in 1774, and is as follows:—“In every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.” Add to this Montesquieu’s opinion that “in a free state every man who is supposed to be a free agent ought to be concerned in his own government; therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.” It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, mercantile, mechanic, etc., and perceived the efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others. Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently. It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors and can choose their legislators if they cannot, in the nature of things, choose men from among themselves and genuinely like themselves. … To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupations and politically. The first class is the aristocratical. There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country. The first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word. Montesquieu, it is true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy; this, according to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government. The second is an aristocratic faction: a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement. … The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we may place men on one side of this line which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are or ought to be. In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of Congress, of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, etc., and men of large property. The other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men. It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expenses, salaries, taxes, etc. Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge; men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects; they possess less ambition and a larger share of honesty; their dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labor, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates and of the chief offices of government. Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power and for fear of the consequences. Though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other, yet such are their general views that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favorable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, etc. The farmers alone would act on like principles. The former would tax the land, the latter the trade. The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion to lower prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries endeavor to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them endeavor to lower them; the public creditors to augment taxes and the people at large to lessen them. Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their sentinels in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, most infallibly [will] be ruined.

Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies. Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy. The yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits. The mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous; they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments. The fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions, give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it. It has been observed by an able writer that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty. It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government; gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, etc. probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that of all other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more representatives are increased, the more of the farmers, merchants, etc. will be found to be brought into the government.

These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes and the general scope of my ideas when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests, feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature; we may not only so unite and balance these as to prevent a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the combination and full representation. A small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances of the people; the members of it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them. A representation must be extremely imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience, make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions to their representatives. Where there is but one representative to 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents; even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented. On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode Island, the province of Maine, the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts will have one representative each; there can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications, between him and the people at large of either of those districts. It has been observed that mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best information and ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favorable to their purposes particularly. Many plausible shifts have been made to divert the mind from dwelling on this defective representation… .

Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information, and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain. I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations. The tyranny of the one or the licentiousness of the multitude are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of the few. It is a consideration well worth pursuing how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them… .

“Brutus,” Essay II 1 November 1787

Addressed to “The People of the State of New York,” the essays of “Brutus” appeared in Thomas Greenleaf’s New York Journal between October 1787 and April 1788, contemporaneously with the appearance of The Federalist, whose authors sometimes engaged “Brutus” in direct debates. As is true of the “Federal Farmer,” the authorship remains in doubt, although the candidate most often mentioned is Robert Yates, one of New York’s three delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The second number was among the most able explanations of the most common anti-Federalist fear of all.

… When a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid. The constitution proposed to your acceptance is designed not for yourselves alone, but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which the social compact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, and the most express and full declaration of rights to have been made—But on this subject there is almost an entire silence.

If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America from their own most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as self evident, that all men are by nature free. No one man, therefore, or any class of men, have a right, by the law of nature, or of God, to assume or exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society then is to be sought, not in any natural right which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in the united consent of those who associate. The mutual wants of men at first dictated the propriety of forming societies; and when they were established, protection and defense pointed out the necessity of instituting government. In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest; in this pursuit it frequently happened that the possessions or enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and designs of another; thus the weak were a prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, every individual was insecure; common interest therefore directed that government should be established, in which the force of the whole community should be collected, and under such directions as to protect and defend everyone who composed it. The common good, therefore, is the end of civil government, and common consent the foundation on which it is established. To effect this end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in order that what remained should be preserved. How great a proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individuals, when they submit to government, I shall not now inquire. So much, however, must be given up as will be sufficient to enable those to whom the administration of the government is committed to establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the community, and to carry those laws into effect. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, that individuals should relinquish all their natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they cannot be surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the right of enjoying and defending life, etc. Others are not necessary to be resigned in order to attain the end for which government is instituted. These, therefore, ought not to be given up. To surrender them would counteract the very end of government, to wit, the common good. From these observations it appears that, in forming a government on its true principles, the foundation should be laid in the manner I before stated, by expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights as are not necessary to be parted with. The same reasons which at first induced mankind to associate and institute government will operate to influence them to observe this precaution. If they had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of immutable righteousness, government would not have been requisite. It was because one part exercised fraud, oppression, and violence on the other that men came together and agreed that certain rules should be formed to regulate the conduct of all and the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to them. But rulers have the same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power with which they are vested for private purposes and to the injury and oppression of those over whom they are placed, as individuals in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another. It is therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority as that government should have at first been instituted to restrain private injuries.

This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things, is confirmed by universal experience. Those who have governed have been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and abridge the public liberty. This has induced the people in all countries, where any sense of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers. The country from which we have derived our origin is an eminent example of this. Their magna charta and bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the security, of that nation. I need say no more, I presume, to an American, than that this principle is a fundamental one in all the constitutions of our own states; there is not one of them but what is either founded on a declaration or bill of rights or has certain express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of them. From this it appears that, at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high and when an appeal was made to the people to form constitutions for the government of themselves, it was their universal sense that such declarations should make a part of their frames of government. It is therefore the more astonishing that this grand security to the rights of the people is not to be found in this constitution.

It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declaration of rights, however requisite they might be in the constitutions of the states, are not necessary in the general constitution, because, “in the former case, everything which is not reserved is given, but in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given is reserved.” It requires but little attention to discover that this mode of reasoning is rather specious than solid. The powers, rights, and authority granted to the general government by this constitution are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government—It reaches to everything which concerns human happiness—Life, liberty, and property are under its control. There is the same reason, therefore, that the exercise of power in this case should be restrained within proper limits as in that of the state governments. To set this matter in a clear light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of the individual states, and apply them to the case in question.

For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of most of the states have declared that no man shall be held to answer for a crime until he is made fully acquainted with the charge brought against him; he shall not be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself—The witnesses against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be fully heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security of life and liberty that trial of facts be in the vicinity where they happen. Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general government as in that of a particular state? The powers vested in the new Congress extend in many cases to life; they are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exercise, save only that “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed.” No man is secure of a trial in the county where he is charged to have committed a crime; he may be brought from Niagara to New York or carried from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for an offense supposed to be committed. What security is there that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain description of the charges against him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor? That he shall see the witnesses against him face to face, or that he shall be fully heard in his own defense by himself or counsel?

For the security of liberty it has been declared, “that excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted—That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places or seize any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppressive.”

These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that of the individual states; for the power of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing fines, inflicting punishments, granting search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, in certain cases, as the other.

For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is declared by all the states, “that in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”

Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right, under this national compact, as in that of this state? Yet nothing is said respecting it. In the bills of rights of the states it is declared that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free government—That as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up, and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to and controlled by the civil power.

The same security is as necessary in this constitution, and much more so; for the general government will have the sole power to raise and to pay armies, and are under no control in the exercise of it; yet nothing of this is to be found in this new system.

I might proceed to instance a number of other rights which were as necessary to be reserved, such as, that elections should be free, that the liberty of the press should be held sacred; but the instances adduced are sufficient to prove that this argument is without foundation.—Besides, it is evident that the reason here assigned was not the true one why the framers of this constitution omitted a bill of rights; if it had been, they would not have made certain reservations while they totally omitted others of more importance. We find they have, in the 9th section of the 1st article, declared that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion—that no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed—that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, etc. If everything which is not given is reserved, what propriety is there in these exceptions? Does this constitution anywhere grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus, to make ex post facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles of nobility? It certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that can be given is that these are implied in the general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said that all the powers which the bills of right guard against the abuse of are contained or implied in the general ones granted by this constitution.

So far it is from being true that a bill of rights is less necessary in the general constitution than in those of the states, the contrary is evidently the fact.—This system, if it is possible for the people of America to accede to it, will be an original compact; and being the last, will, in the nature of things, vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it. For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people, all other forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption must yield to it. This is expressed in positive and unequivocal terms in the 6th article, “That this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution, or laws of any state, to thecontrary notwithstanding.

“The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.”

It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the different state constitutions are repealed and entirely done away so far as they are inconsistent with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States. Of what avail will the constitutions of the respective states be to preserve the rights of its citizens? Should they be pleaded, the answer would be, the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is the supreme law, and all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the general or state governments, are bound by oath to support it. No privilege reserved by the bills of rights or secured by the state government can limit the power granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. It stands therefore on its own bottom, and must receive a construction by itself without any reference to any other—And hence it was of the highest importance that the most precise and express declarations and reservations of rights should have been made.

This will appear the more necessary when it is considered that not only the constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, but all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are the supreme law of the land, and supersede the constitutions of all the states. The power to make treaties is vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of two thirds of the senate. I do not find any limitation, or restriction, to the exercise of this power. The most important article in any constitution may therefore be repealed, even without a legislative act. Ought not a government vested with such extensive and indefinite authority to have been restricted by a declaration of rights? It certainly ought.

So clear a point is this that I cannot help suspecting that persons who attempt to persuade people that such reservations were less necessary under this constitution than under those of the states are willfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage.