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PART I. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 4 Familiar Letters; Miscellaneous Pieces; The Temple of Gnidus; A Defence of the Spirit of Laws [1777]

Edition used:

The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 4.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


PART I.

THIS Defence is divided into three parts. In the first are answered the general reproaches that have been cast on the Author of the Spirit of Laws. In the second, a reply is made to particular reproaches: And the third contains reflexions on the manner in which he has been treated. The Public will soon be acquainted with the state of the case; and to its judgment the Author refers.

I.

THOUGH the Spirit of Laws is intirely a work relating to politics and civil law, the Author has had frequent occasion, in the course of that work, to mention the Christian religion. He has done it in such a manner, as fully to shew its dignity; and though he has had no view of endeavouring to prove it to be true, he has sought to render it beloved.

However, in two periodical pieces that have successively followed each other* , the most dreadful imputations have been cast upon him. The inquiry is no less, than whether the author be a Spinosist and a Deist: And though these accusations are in their own nature contradictory, the critic incessantly returns from one to the other.

Both being incompatible cannot render him more guilty than one alone; but both may render him more odious.

He is a Spinosist, who in the first article of his book has distinguished between the material world and spiritual intelligences.

He is a Spinosist, who in the second article has attacked Atheism. “Those who assert, that a blind fatality produced the various effects we behold in this world, are guilty of a very great absurdity: For can any thing be more absurd, than to pretend that a blind fatality could produce intelligent beings.”

He is a Spinosist who continues to say, “God is related to the universe as creator and preserver† ; the laws by which he has created all things, are those by which he preserves them. He acts according to these rules because he knows them: He knows them, because he has made them: And he made them because they are relative to his wisdom and power.”

He is a Spinosist who has added: “As we see that the world, though formed by the motion of matter, and void of understanding, continues to subsist, &c.‡ ”

He is a Spinosist who has shewn, against Hobbre and Spinosa, That “before laws were made, the were relations of possible justice* .”

He is a Spinosist who, in the beginning of the second chapter has said: “The law which, imprinting in our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us to him, is the first, in its importance, of natural laws.”

He is a Spinosist who has attacked with all his power a paradox asserted by Bayle, “That it is better to be an atheist than an idolater;” a paradox from which the atheists draw the most dangerous consequences.

What do they alledge after such express passages? Natural equity demands that the degree of proof should be proportionable to the greatness of the accusation.

OBJECTION I.

The Author falls at the very first step. “The Laws, in their most general signification, says he, are the necessary relations derived from the nature of things.” The laws of relations—What can he mean by this? The Author has not however deviated from the ordinary definition of Laws without design. What end had he then in view? This it is. According to the new system, there is, between all beings which form what Pope calls the universal whole, a chain so necessary, that the least disorder will produce confusion even up to the throne of the First Cause. This has made Pope say, that things can be no otherwise than they are, and that whatever is, is right. This being considered, we understand the signification of this new language, that the laws are the necessary relations derived from the nature of things. To which it is added, in this sense, “All beings have their Laws; the Deity has his Laws; the material world its Laws; the intelligencies superior to man their Laws; the beasts their Laws; man his Laws.”

THE ANSWER.

Darkness itself is not more obscure than this passage. The Critic has heard that Spinosa maintained, that the universe is governed by a blind and necessary principle; and there needed no more. As soon as he found the word necessary, this must be Spinosism. The Author has asserted, that the Laws are necessary relations: here therefore is Spinosism, because here is the term necessary. And what appears surprising is, that the Author, in the opinion of the Critic, is found to be a Spinosist by this article, though it expressly opposes such dangerous systems. The Author was attempting to overthrow Hobbes’s system; a system the most terrible, it making all the virtues and vices depend on human establishments: and by endeavouring to prove, that all mankind are born in a state of war, and that the first natural Law, is that all should make war against all, he, like Spinosa, overthrows both all religion, and all morality. In answer to this, the Author has established, in the first place, that there were laws of justice and equity before the establishment of positive Laws: he has proved, that all beings have Laws; that, even before their creation, they had possible Laws; that God himself has Laws, that is, Laws which he himself has made. He has proved, that the assertion, That man is born in a state of war, is false* . He has shewn, that a state of war did not commence till after the establishment of societies, and on this subject has advanced very clear principles. Whence it evidently follows: That the Author has attacked the errors of Hobbes, and the consequences of those of Spinosa; and that hence it has happened, that so little has he been understood, that his objections against Spinosism have been taken for the opinions of Spinosa. Before a person enters into a dispute, he ought to begin with making himself master of the state of the question; and with knowing whether he whom he attacks is a friend or an enemy.

OBJECTION II.

The Critic continues: On which the Author cites Plutarch, who says, that Law is the Queen of Gods and men. But is it from a Pagan, &c?

THE ANSWER.

It is true, the Author has quoted Plutarch, who says, that Law is the Queen of Gods and men.

OBJECTION III.

The Author has said, That “the creation, which seems to be an arbitrary act, supposes Laws as invariable as the fatality of the atheists.” From these words the Critic concludes, that the Author admits the fatality of the atheists.

THE ANSWER.

A little before he has destroyed this fatality, by saying, “Those who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we behold in the world, are guilty of a very great absurdity: for can any thing be more absurd than to pretend, that a blind fatality can produce intelligent beings.” Moreover, in the passage censured, the Author cannot be made to speak of any other subject but that he is treating of. He is not treating of causes, nor does he compare causes: but he treats of effects, and compares effects. The whole article, that which precedes it, and that which follows, shew that he is here only treating of the rules of motion, which the Author asserts are established by God. He says, that these rules are invariable; and all natural philosophy says so too. They are invariable, because God has resolved that they should be so, and because he has determined to preserve the world. He says neither more nor less than this.

I must always maintain, that the Critic never understands the sense of things, and that he applies his attention only to words. When the Author says, That the creation, which seems to be an arbitrary act, supposes rules as invariable as the fatality of the atheists, it cannot be understood as if he had said, the creation was as necessary an act as the fatality of the atheists, since he had already shewn the absurdity of that fatality. Moreover, the two members of a comparison ought to have a relation to each other: therefore it is absolutely necessary that the sentence should run thus: The creation, which seems at first to have produced Laws of variable motion, has those as invariable as the fatality of the atheists. The Critic, once more, has neither seen, nor does see, any thing but words.

II.

THERE is then no Spinosism in The Spirit of Laws. Let us pass to another accusation; and see if it be true, That the Author does not acknowledge the truth of revealed religion. The Author, at the end of the first chapter, speaking of man as a finite being, subject to ignorance and error, has said: “Such a being might every instant forget his Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the Laws of religion.”

He has said, in the first chapter of the twenty-fourth book: “I shall examine the several religions in the world, in relation only to the good they produce in civil society, whether I speak of that which has its root in heaven, or of those which spring from the earth.

“A person of the least degree of impartiality must see, that I have never pretended to make the interests of religion submit to those of a political nature, but rather to unite them: now in order to unite, it is necessary that we should know them. The Christian religion, which ordains that men should love each other, would without doubt have every nation blest with the best civil, the best political Laws; because these, next to this religion, are the greatest good that men can give and receive.”

And in the second chapter of the same book: “A Prince who loves and fears religion is a lion, who stoops to the hand that strokes, or the voice that appeases him. He who fears and hates religion, is like the savage beast, that growls, and bites the chain which prevents his flying on the passenger. He who has no religion at all, is that terrible animal, who perceives his liberty only when he tears in pieces and devours.”

In the third chapter of the same book: “While the Mahometan Princes incessantly give or receive death, the religion of the Christians renders their Princes less timid, and consequently less cruel. The Prince confides in his subjects; and the subjects in the Prince. How admirable the religion which, while it seems only to have in view the felicity of the other life, constitutes the happiness of this!”

In the fourth chapter of the same book: “From the characters of the Christian and Mahometan religions we ought, without any further examination, to embrace the one, and reject the other.” To proceed:

In the sixth chapter: “Mr. Bayle, after having abused all religions, endeavours to sully Christianity: he boldly asserts, that true Christians cannot form a government of any duration. Why not? Citizens of this profession, being infinitely enlightened, with respect to the various duties of life, and having the warmest zeal to fulfil them, must be perfectly sensible of the rights of natural defence. The more they believed themselves indebted to religion, the more they would think due to their country. The principles of Christianity, deeply engraven on the heart, would be infinitely more powerful than the false honour of monarchies, the human virtues of republics, or the servile fear of despotic states.

“It is astonishing, that this great man should not be able to distinguish between the orders for the establishment of Christianity, and Christianity itself; and that he should be liable to be charged with not knowing the spirit of his own religion. When the legislator, instead of laws, has given counsels, this is because he knew, that if these counsels were ordained as laws, they would be contrary to the spirit of the laws themselves.”

In the tenth chapter: “Could I for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian, I should not be able to hinder myself from ranking the destruction of the sect of Zeno among the misfortunes that have befallen the human race, &c. Laying aside for a moment revealed truths, let us search through all nature, and we shall not find a nobler object than the Antoninuses, &c.”

In the thirteenth chapter: “The Pagan religion indeed, that prohibited only some of the grosser crimes, that stopped the hand, but meddled not with the heart, might have crimes that were inexpiable: but a religion which bridles all the passions; which is not more jealous of actions, than of thoughts and desires; which holds us not by a few chains, but by an infinite number of threads; which, laying human justice aside, establishes another kind of justice; which is so ordered as to lead us continually from repentance to love, and from love to repentance; which puts between the judge and the criminal a great mediator; between the just and the mediator a great judge: a religion like this ought not to have crimes in themselves inexpiable. But though it gives fear and hope to all, it makes us sufficiently sensible, that there is no crime in its own nature inexpiable, though a whole criminal life may be so; that it is extremely dangerous to affront mercy by new crimes and new expiations; that an uneasiness on account of ancient debts, from which we are never free, ought to make us afraid of contracting new ones, of filling up the measure, and going to that point where paternal goodness is limited.”

In the conclusion of the nineteenth chapter, the Author, after having shewn an abuse that has arisen in several Pagan religions with respect to their opinion of the state of souls in another life, says: “It is not enough for religion to establish a doctrine; it must also direct its influence. This the Christian religion performs in the most admirable manner, particularly with regard to the doctrines of which we have been speaking. It makes us hope for a state that is the object of our belief; not for a state we have already experienced or known. Thus every article, even the resurrection of the body, leads us to spiritual ideas.”

And at the conclusion of the twenty-sixth chapter: “It follows from hence, that it is almost always proper for a religion to have particular doctrines, and a general worship. In Laws concerning the practice of religious worship, there ought to be but few particulars: for instance, they should command mortification in general, and not a certain kind of mortification. Christianity is full of good sense: abstinence is of divine institution; but a particular kind of abstinence is ordained by a political Law, and therefore may be changed.”

In the last chapter of the twenty-fifth book: “But it does not follow, that a religion brought from a far distant country, and quite different in climate, laws, manners, and customs, will have all the success to which its holiness ought to intitle it.”

In the third chapter of the twenty-fourth book: “It is the Christian religion that, in spite of the empire and the influence of the climate, has hindered despotic power from being established in Æthiopia, and has carried into the midst of Africa the manners and Laws of Europe, &c. Not far from thence may be seen the Mahometan shutting up the children of the King of Sennao; at whose death the council sends to murder them, in favour of the Prince who mounts the throne.

“Let us set before our eyes, on the one hand, the continual massacres of the Kings and Generals of the Greeks and Romans; and, on the other, the destruction of people and cities by the commanders Thimur and Gengis-Kan, who ravaged Asia; and we shall see that we owe to Christianity, in government, a certain political Law, and, in war, a certain Law of nations; benefits which human nature can never sufficiently acknowledge.” The Reader is desired to peruse the whole chapter.

In the eighth chapter of the twenty-fourth book: “In a country so unfortunate as to have a religion which God has not revealed, it is always necessary that it should be agreeable to morality, because even a false religion is the best security we can have of the probity of men.”

These passages are very explicit. We here see a writer, who not only believes the Christian religion, but who loves it. What has the Critic said to prove the contrary? Let it be once more observed, that the proofs ought to be proportionable to the accusation: and as that accusation is not of a frivolous nature, neither ought the proofs to be so. But as these proofs are always given in a pretty extraordinary form, they being a mixture of half proof and half abuse, and in a manner concealed in the train of a very vague discourse; I am going to search for them.

OBJECTION I.

The Author has praised the Stoics, who admitted a blind fatality, a necessary chain, &c.* . This is the foundation of natural religion.

THE ANSWER.

Suppose for a moment that this false manner of reasoning is just. Has the Author praised the natural philosophy and metaphysics of the Stoics? He has praised their morals; he has said, that the people obtained great advantages from them: he has said this, and he has said no more.—I am mistaken; he has said more: for, in the first page of the book, he has attacked the fatality of the Stoics: he did not then praise it, when he praised the Stoics.

OBJECTION II.

The Author has praised Bayle in calling him a great man† .

ANSWER.

I will here too suppose for a moment, that in general this manner of reasoning is just: but, at least, it is not so in this case. It is true, the Author has called Bayle a great man; but he has censured his opinions. If he has censured them, he does not admit them: and since he has attacked his opinions, he does not call him a great man on their account. Every body knows, that Bayle had a great capacity; of which he has made an ill use: but that capacity which he misused, he had. The Author has, therefore, attacked his sophisms, and complained of his errors. I do not love the men who overthrow the laws of their country; but I should find it difficult to believe, that Cæsar and Cromwell were men of mean capacities. I am not fond of conquerors; but it would not be an easy matter to persuade me, that Alexander and Gengis-Kan were men of a common genius. It would not, indeed, have required any great abilities in the Author to have called Bayle an abominable man: but whether he owes this disposition to nature, or whether it is an effect of his education, it appears that he is not fond of using abusive language. I have reason to believe that, was he to take up the pen, he would not treat in that manner even those who have endeavoured to do him one of the greatest injuries that one man can do to another, by labouring to render him odious to all those who do not know him, and suspected by all who do.

Besides, I have remarked, that the declamations of angry men make little impression on those who are not themselves angry. Most readers are men of moderation, who seldom take a book but in cool blood. Reasonable men love reason; and if the Author had uttered against Bayle a thousand abusive expressions, it would not have followed from thence, that Bayle had reasoned either well, or ill: all that could have been concluded from it would have been, that the Author knew how to be abusive.

OBJECTION III.

Is drawn from the Author’s not having treated, in his first chapter, of original sin* .

ANSWER.

I ask every sensible man, whether that chapter be a treatise on theology? Had the Author treated of original sin, he might in the same manner have been charged with not having mentioned the redemption of mankind; and thus they might have proceeded, from article to article, to infinity.

OBJECTION IV.

Is drawn from the Author’s having begun his work in a very different manner from Mr. Domat; who has first treated of revelation.

ANSWER.

It is true Mr. Domat has begun his work in a different manner from the Author, and has first treated of revelation.

OBJECTION V.

The Author has followed Pope’s system in his Essay on Man.

ANSWER.

Throughout the whole work he has not one word of Pope’s system.

OBJECTION VI.

The Author says, That the law which prescribes to Man his duty towards God, is the most important; but be denies that it is the first; he pretends, that the first Law of nature is peace; that men begin with being afraid of each other, &c. But every child knows, that the first Law is to love God; and that the second is to love his neighbour.

ANSWER.

These are the Author’s words: “The Law which, imprinting in our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us to him, is the first of the natural laws in its importance, though not in its order. Man, in a state of nature, would have the power of knowing before he had acquired knowledge. It is evident that his first ideas would be far from being of a speculative nature; he would think of the preservation of his being before he would investigate its origin. Such a man would at first feel nothing in himself but impotency. His fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from instances (were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in forests, ever trembling, and flying from every shadow* .” The Author has then said, that the Law which, imprinting in us the idea of a Creator, inclines us to him, is the first of the natural Laws. It is not unlawful for him, any more than for other philosophers and writers on the Law of nature, to consider man under various situations. He has therefore taken the liberty to suppose a man as if dropped from the clouds, lest to himself, and without education, before the establishment of society. Well, the Author has said, that the first, the most important, and consequently the capital Law of nature, would be for him, as well as for all other men, to be inclined towards his Creator. It is also allowable for the Author to enquire what would be the first impression made on this man, and to examine the order in which these impressions would be traced in his brain: And he has believed, that he would have sensations before he made reflexions; that the first, in the order of time, would be fear; afterwards the want of food, &c. The Author has said, that the law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, leads us to him, is the first of the natural Laws: the Critic says, that the first Law of nature is to love God: they are therefore only divided by abuse.

OBJECTION VII.

Is drawn from the first chapter of the first book; where the Author having said that man is a limited being, has added: “Such a being might every instant forget his Creator: God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of religion.” Now, says the Critic, What is the religion to which the Author here alludes? He doubtless speaks of natural religion; he then only believes natural religion.

ANSWER.

Let us suppose again, that this manner of reasoning is just; and that when the Author speaks only of the religion of nature, we may conclude from thence that he only believes in that religion, and that he excludes revealed religion: Yet, in this place I maintain, that he has spoken of revealed religion, and not of the religion of nature; for if he had meant the religion of nature, he must have been an ideot. It would have been as if he had said: Such a being might easily forget his Creator, that is, the religion of nature; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the Laws of natural religion: so that God had given him the religion of nature, to perfect him in the religion of nature. Thus, to prepare himself for casting invectives on the Author, he begins by taking from his words their most evident sense, in order to give them the most evident absurdity; and to obtain the advantage over him, he deprives him of common sense.

OBJECTION VIII.

The Author speaking of man, has said: “Such a being might every instant forget his creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the Laws of religion: such a being is liable every moment to forget himself; philosophy has provided against this by the Laws of morality: formed to live in society, he might forget his fellow creatures; legislators have therefore, by political and civil Laws, confined him to his duty* .” Therefore, says the Critic, according to the Author, the government is divided between God, the philosophers, and the legislators, &c. Where have the philosophers learned the Laws of morality? Where have legislators seen what they ought to prescribe, in order to govern societies with equity†?

ANSWER.

It is very easy to reply to this. They have taken it from revelation, if they have been so happy as to be favoured with it: otherwise, they have taken it from that Law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, leads us towards him. Has the Author of the Spirit of Laws said with Virgil, Cæsar shares the empire with Jupiter? Has not God, the governor of the universe, given to certain men greater intellectual abilities, and to others greater power? You would maintain that the Author has said, that because God has been pleased to ordain that men should be governed by men, he is not willing that they should obey him, and that he has divested himself of the authority he had over them, &c. To such absurdities are those reduced, who are extremely weak at reasoning, but have great strength at declamation.

OBJECTION IX.

The Critic continues: It is also observable that the Author, who finds that God cannot govern free beings as well as others, because, being free, they are allowed the liberty of acting for themselves (I shall observe by the way, that the Author does not make use of the expression, God cannot) remedies this disorder no otherwise than by the Law, which shews men what they ought to do, but gives them not the power to do it. Thus, according to the Author’s system, God has created beings whose irregularities he can neither hinder nor repair. Blind mortal! who does not see that God does what he requires from them, and that they can do nothing but what he pleases.

ANSWER.

The Critic had before reproached the Author with not having mentioned original sin. He again returns to the charge, and censures him for not having spoken of grace. It is an unhappy thing to have to do with a man who censures all the articles of a book, and has only one predominant idea. He is not unlike the curate of the village, to whom some astronomers shewing the moon through a telescope, he could see nothing but a steeple.

The Author of The Spirit of Laws thought he ought to begin with giving some idea of Laws in general, and of the Law of nature and nations. The subject was immense; and yet he has included it in two chapters: he was therefore obliged to omit a great number of things that belonged to his subject; and with much better reason has he omitted those which had no relation to it.

OBJECTION X.

The Author has said, that in England self-murder is the effect of a disease, and that they can no more punish it than they can punish the effects of madness. A follower of the religion of nature cannot forget that England is the cradle of his sect. He wipes a spunge over all the crimes he perceives there.

ANSWER.

The Author does not know, that England is the cradle of the religion of nature. But he knows, that England is not his cradle, on account of his having mentioned a physical effect, which he himself observed in England. His sentiments of religion are no more like those of the English, than those of an Englishman, who treats of the physical effects that have happened in France, are like those of a Frenchman. The Author of The Spirit of Laws is not a follower of natural religion; but he would be glad to have his Critic a follower of natural logic.

I believe I have already made the terrible arms used by the Critic drop from his hand: and I am now going to give an idea of his exordium; which is such, that I am afraid my mentioning it here will be thought to be done by way of derision.

He says at first, and these are his words: That the book of the Spirit of Laws is one of those irregular productions, that were never so numerous till after the arrival of the bull Unigenitus. Is it not enough to make one laugh, to suppose that the arrival of The Spirit of Laws is caused by the arrival of the constitution Unigenitus? The bull Unigenitus is not the occasional cause of the book of The Spirit of Laws; but the bull Unigenitus, and the book of The Spirit of Laws, have been the occasional causes of the Critic’s having made so shrewd a remark.

The Critic continues: The Author says that he has often begun, and as often laid aside his work. However, when he threw his first productions into the fire, he was less distant from the truth, than when he began to be satisfied with his labours. How does he know that? He adds: If the Author had been willing to follow a beaten path, his work would have cost him less pains. How again does he know that? He afterwards pronounces this oracle: It does not require much penetration to perceive, that The Spirit of Laws is founded on the system of natural religion. It has been shewn in the letters against Pope’s Essay on Man, that the system of natural religion is connected with that of Spinosa: this is enough to inspire a Christian with horror at the new book of which we are here giving an account.

I reply, that this is not only enough, but even too much. But I have just proved, that the Author’s system is not that of the religion of nature; and supposing that natural religion is connected with Spinosa’s system, the Author’s system is not that of Spinosa, since it is not that of the religion of nature.

He would then inspire us with horror, before he has proved that we ought to be filled with horror.

These are the two forms of reasoning diffused through the two pieces I have undertaken to answer. The Author of the Spirit of Laws is a follower of natural religion: we must then explain what he says there by the principles of natural religion: therefore, if what he says there is founded on the principles of natural religion, he is a follower of natural religion.

The other form of reasoning is this: The Author of the Spirit of Laws is a follower of the religion of nature: what he then says in his book in favour of revelation is only to conceal his being a follower of the religion of nature: therefore, if he thus conceals himself, he is a follower of the religion of nature.

Before I conclude this first part, I shall be tempted to make an objection to him that has made so many. He has so terrified our ears with the phrase, follower of the religion of nature, that I, who defend the Author, scarcely dare to pronounce the word. I will however take courage. Do not these two pieces require more explication than that I defend? Does he do well, when he is treating of natural religion and revelation, to throw himself perpetually on one side, and to cause all traces of the other to be intirely lost? Does he do well never to distinguish those who acknowledge only the religion of nature, from those who acknowledge both natural and revealed religion? Does he do well to be frightened whenever the Author considers man in a state of nature, and when he explains any thing on the principles of natural religion? Does he do well to confound the religion of nature with atheism? Have I not always heard, that all of us have the religion of nature? Have I not heard, that Christianity is the perfection of natural religion? Have I not heard, that people make use of arguments drawn from the religion of nature, in proof of a revelation, against the Deists; and that we employ the same natural religion, to prove the existence of God against the atheists? He says that the Stoics were the followers of natural religion: and I, that they were atheists* ; since they believed that the universe was governed by a blind fatality, and that, from natural religion, we ought to oppose the opinion of the Stoics. He says, that the system of natural religion is connected with that of Spinosa† : and I, that they are contradictory, and that it is by natural religion we overthrow Spinosa’s system. I say, that to confound the religion of nature with atheism, is to confound the proof with the thing we would prove, and the objection against the error with the error itself; and that it is to deprive us of the powerful arms of which we are possessed against that error. God forbid that I should impute any ill design to the Critic, or take advantage of the consequences that might be drawn from his principles. Though he has treated the Author with very little indulgence, I would shew some to him. I only say, that the metaphysical ideas in his brain are very confused; that he has not the least power of separating them; that he is incapable of forming a good judgment, because among the various things he might see, he never sees but one. In this I have no design of making him reproaches, but merely of destroying those he has made.

[* ]One on the ninth of October 1749; and the other on the 16th of the same month.

[† ]Book i. chap. 1.

[‡ ]Ibid.

[* ]Book i. Chap. 1.

[* ]Book i. Chap. 2.

[* ]The second piece, of October 16, 1749, p. 165.

[† ]Ibid.

[* ]The piece of the 9th of October 1749, page 162.

[* ]Book i. chap. 2.

[* ]Book i. chap. 1.

[† ]The piece of the 9th of October 1749, p. 162.

[* ]See the piece of October 9, 1749, page 165. “The Stoics admitted the existence of only one God: but this God was no other than the soul of the universe. They maintained, that all beings, up to the First cause, were united together in the manner of a chain; a fatal necessity drew the whole. They denied the immortality of the soul, and made the sovereign happiness consist in living conformably to nature. This is the foundation of the system of natural religion.”

[† ]See the first piece of October 9, 1749, page 161, at the end of the first column.