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AN ESSAY UPON TASTE, IN SUBJECTS OF NATURE, AND OF ART. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 4 Familiar Letters; Miscellaneous Pieces; The Temple of Gnidus; A Defence of the Spirit of Laws [1777]

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The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 4.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

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AN ESSAY UPON TASTE, IN SUBJECTS OF NATURE, AND OF ART.

A FRAGMENT.

ACCORDING to the present constitution of our being, the soul enjoys three sorts of pleasure. That derived from its very existence; that which results from its union with the body; and that founded upon the turn and prejudices it has received from certain institutions, customs, and habits.

It is the different pleasures of the soul which form the objects of taste; as, the beautiful, the good, the agreeable, the simple, the delicate, the tender, the graceful, the inexpressible charm, the noble, the grand, the sublime, the majestic, &c. For example, when we receive pleasure from the view of what we perceive to be useful to ourselves, we say that it is good; when we feel pleasure in beholding it, without perceiving any present advantage, we call it beautiful.

This the antients did not properly distinguish; they considered all the relative qualities of the mind as merely positive: hence those dialogues in which Plato makes Socrates reason, those dialogues so much admired by the antients, are at present insupportable, because they are founded upon a false philosophy; for all reasonings drawn from the good, the beautiful, perfect, wise, foolish, hard, soft, dry, wet, when treated as things positive, are now of no weight.

The sources of the beautiful, the good, the agreeable, &c. are then in ourselves, and to inquire into their causes, is to inquire into the causes of our mental pleasures.

Let us then examine the mind; let us study it in its actions, and in its passions; let us seek for it in its pleasures, it is there where it shows itself most. Poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dancing, the different kinds of games, and in a word the works of nature and art, can give it pleasure: let us see why, how, and when, they give it; let us endeavour to account for our sensations: this may contribute to form the taste; which is nothing else but an ability of discovering, with delicacy and quickness, the degree of pleasure which every thing ought to give to man.