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• The Spirit of Laws.
• Book XX.: Of Laws In Relation to Commerce, Considered In Its Nature and Distinctions.
• Chap. I.: Of Commerce.
• Chap. II.: Of the Spirit of Commerce.
• Chap. III.: Of the Poverty of the People.
• Chap. IV.: Of Commerce In Different Governments.
• Chap. V.: Of Nations That Have Entered Into an œconomical Commerce.
• Chap. VI.: Some Effects of an Extensive Navigation.
• Chap. VII.: The Spirit of England, With Respect to Commerce.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the œconomical Commerce Has Been Sometimes Restrained.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Prohibition of Commerce.
• Chap. X.: An Institution Adapted to œconomical Commerce.
• Chap. XI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Freedom of Commerce.
• Chap. XIII.: What It Is That Destroys This Liberty.
• Chap. XIV.: The Laws of Commerce Concerning the Confiscation of Merchandises.
• Chap. XV.: Of Seizing the Persons of Merchants.
• Chap. XVI.: An Excellent Law.
• Chap. XVII.: A Law of Rhodes.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Judges of Commerce.
• Chap. XIX.: That a Prince Ought Not to Engage Himself In Commerce.
• Chap. XX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Commerce of the Nobility In a Monarchy.
• Chap. XXII.: A Singular Reflection.
• Chap. XXIII.: To What Nations Commerce Is Prejudicial.
• Book XXI.: Of Laws Relative to Commerce, Considered In the Revolutions It Has Met With In the World.
• Chap. I.: Some General Considerations.
• Chap. II.: Of the People of Africa.
• Chap. III.: That the Wants of the People In the South Are Different From Those of the North.
• Chap. IV.: The Principal Difference Between the Commerce of the Ancients and the Moderns.
• Chap. V.: Other Differences.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Commerce of the Ancients.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Commerce of the Greeks.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Alexander. His Conquest.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Commerce of the Grecian Kings After the Death of Alexander.
• Chap. X.: Of the Circuit of Africa.
• Chap. XI.: Of Carthage and Marseilles.
• Chap. XII.: The Isle of Delos. Mithridates.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Genius of the Romans As to Maritime Affairs.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Genius of the Romans With Respect to Commerce.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Commerce of the Romans With the Barbarians.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Commerce of the Romans With Arabia, and the Indies.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Commerce After the Destruction of the Western Empire.
• Chap. XVIII.: A Particular Regulation.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Commerce After the Decay of the Roman Power In the East.
• Chap. XX.: How Commerce Broke Through the Barbarism of Europe.
• Chap. XXI.: The Discovery of Two New Worlds, and In What Manner Europe Is Affected By It.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Riches Which Spain Drew From America.
• Chap. XXIII.: A Problem.
• Book XXII.: Of Laws In Relation to the Use of Money.
• Chap. I.: The Reason of the Use of Money.
• Chap. II.: Of the Nature of Money.
• Chap. III.: Of Ideal Money.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Quantity of Gold and Silver.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: The Reason Why Interest Was Lowered One Half After the Conquest of the Indies.
• Chap. VII.: How the Price of Things Is Fixed In the Variation of the Sign of Riches.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Relative Scarcity of Gold and Silver.
• Chap. X.: Of Exchange.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Proceedings of the Romans With Respect to Money.
• Chap. XII.: The Circumstances In Which the Romans Changed the Value of Their Specie.
• Chap. XIII.: Proceedings With Respect to Money In the Time of the Emperors.
• Chap. XIV.: How the Exchange Is a Constraint On Despotic Power.
• Chap. XV.: The Practice of Some Countries In Italy
• Chap. XVI.: The Assistance a State May Derive From Bankers.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Public Debts.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Payment of Public Debts.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Lending Upon Interest.
• Chap. XX.: Of Maritime Usury.
• Chap. XXI.: Of Lending By Contract, and the State of Usury Amongst the Romans.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XXIII.: Of Laws In the Relation They Bear to the Number of Inhabitants.
• Chap. I.: Of Men and Animals, With Respect to Multiplication of Their Species.
• Chap. II.: Of Marriage.
• Chap. III.: Of the Condition of Children.
• Chap. IV.: Of Families.
• Chap. V.: Of the Several Orders of Lawful Wives.
• Chap. VI.: Of Bastards In Different Governments.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Father’s Consent to Marriage.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of Young Women.
• Chap. X.: What It Is That Determines to Marriage.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Severity of Government.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Number of Males and Females In Different Countries.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Sea-port Towns.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Productions of the Earth Which Require a Greater Or Less Number of Men.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Number of Inhabitants With Relation to the Arts.
• Chap. XVI.: The Concern of the Legislator In the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Greece, and the Number of Its Inhabitants.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the State and Number of People Before the Romans.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Depopulation of the Globe.
• Chap. XX.: That the Romans Were Under a Necessity of Making Laws, to Encourage the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Laws of the Romans Relating to the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Exposing of Children.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the State of the World After the Destruction of the Romans.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Changes Which Happened In Europe, With Regard to the Number of the Inhabitants.
• Chap. XXV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVI.: Consequences.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Law Made In France to Encourage the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXVIII.: By What Means We May Remedy a Depopulation.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of Hospitals.
• Book XXIV.: Of Laws As Relative to Religion, Considered In Itself, and In Its Doctrines.
• Chap. I.: Of Religion In General.
• Chap. II.: A Paradox of Mr. Bayle’s.
• Chap. III.: That a Moderate Government Is Most Agreeable to the Christian Religion, and a Despotic Government to the Mahometan.
• Chap. IV.: Consequences From the Character of the Christian Religion, and That of the Mahometan.
• Chap. V.: That the Catholic Religion Is Most Agreeable to a Monarchy, and the Protestant to a Republic.
• Chap. VI.: Another of Mr. Bayle’s Paradoxes.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Laws of Perfection In Religion.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Connection Between the Moral Laws and Those of Religion.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Essenes.
• Chap. X.: Of the Sect of Stoics.
• Chap. XI.: Of Contemplation.
• Chap. XII.: Of Penances.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Inexpiable Crimes.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner Religion Has an Influence On Civil Laws.
• Chap. XV.: How False Religious Are Sometimes Corrected By the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XVI.: How the Laws of Religion Correct the Inconveniencies of a Political Constitution.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVIII.: How the Laws of Religion Have the Effect of Civil Laws.
• Chap. XIX.: That It Is Not So Much the Truth Or Falsity of a Doctrine Which Renders It Useful Or Pernicious to Men In Civil Government, As the Use Or Abuse of It.
• Chap. XX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Metempsychosis.
• Chap. XXII.: That It Is Dangerous For Religion to Inspire an Aversion For Things In Themselves Indifferent.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of Festivals.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Local Laws of Religion.
• Chap. XXV.: The Inconveniency of Transplanting a Religion From One Country to Another.
• Chap. XXVI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XXV.: Of Laws As Relative to the Establishment of Religion and Its External Polity.
• Chap. I.: Of Religious Sentiments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Motives of Attachment to Different Religions.
• Chap. III.: Of Temples.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Ministers of Religion.
• Chap. V.: Of the Bounds Which the Laws Ought to Prescribe to the Riches of the Clergy.
• Chap. VI.: Of Monasteries.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Luxury of Superstition.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Pontificate.
• Chap. IX.: Of Toleration In Point of Religion.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Of Changing a Religion.
• Chap. XII.: Of Penal Laws.
• Chap. XIII.: A Most Humble Remonstrance to the Inquisitors of Spain and Portugal.
• Chap. XIV.: Why the Christian Religion Is So Odious In Japan.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Propagation of Religion.
• Book XXVI.: Of Laws, As Relative to the Order of Things On Which They Determine.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap II.: Of Laws Divine and Human.
• Chap. III.: Of Civil Laws Contrary to the Law of Nature.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Cases In Which We May Judge By the Principles of the Civil Law, In Limiting the Principles of the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VI.: That the Order of Succession Or Inheritance Depends On the Principles of Political Or Civil Law, and Not On Those of the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VII.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Precepts of Religion, What Belongs Only to the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VIII.: That We Ought Not to Regulate By the Principles of the Canon Law, Things Which Should Be Regulated By Those of the Civil Law.
• Chap. IX.: That Things Which Ought to Be Regulated By the Principles of Civil Law, Can Seldom Be Regulated By Those of Religion.
• Chap. X.: In What Case We Ought to Follow the Civil Law Which Permits, and Not the Law of Religion Which Forbids.
• Chap. XI.: That Human Courts of Justice Should Not Be Regulated By the Maxims of Those Tribunals Which Relate to the Other Life.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: In What Cases, With Regard to Marriage, We Ought to Follow the Laws of Religion; and In What Cases We Should Follow the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Instances Marriages Between Relations Should Be Regulated By the Laws of Nature; and In What Instances By the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XV.: That We Should Not Regulate By the Principles of Political Law, Those Things Which Depend On the Principles of Civil Law.
• Chap. XVI.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Rules of the Civil Law, When It Is Proper to Decide By Those of the Political Law.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVIII.: That It Is Necessary to Enquire, Whether the Laws Which Seem Contradictory, Are of the Same Class.
• Chap. XIX.: That We Should Not Decide Those Things By the Civil Law, Which Ought to Be Decided By Domestic Laws.
• Chap. XX.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Principles of the Civil Law, Those Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXI.: That We Should Not Decide By Political Laws, Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXII.: The Unhappy State of the Ynca Athualpa.
• Chap. XXIII.: That When, By Some Circumstance, the Political Law Becomes Destructive to the State, We Ought to Decide By Such a Political Law As Will Preserve It, Which Sometimes Becomes a Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXIV.: That the Regulations of the Police Are of a Different Class From Other Civil Laws.
• Chap. XXV.: That We Should Not Follow the General Disposition of the Civil Law, In Things Which Ought to Be Subject to Particular Rules Drawn From Their Own Nature.
• Book XXVII.: Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Roman Laws On Successions.
• Chap. I.
• Book XXVIII. Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Civil Laws Among the French.
• Chap. I.: Different Character of the Laws of the Several People of Germany.
• Chap. II.: That the Laws of the Barbarians Were All Personal.
• Chap. III.: Capital Difference Between the Salic Laws and Those of the Visigoths and Burgundians.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner the Roman Law Came to Be Lost In the Country Subject to the Franks, and Preserved In That Subject to the Goths and Burgundians.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: How the Roman Law Kept Its Ground In the Demesne of the Lombards.
• Chap. VII.: How the Roman Law Came to Be Lost In Spain.
• Chap. VIII.: A False Capitulary.
• Chap. IX.: In What Manner the Codes of Barbarian Laws, and the Capitularies Came to Be Lost.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Other Causes of the Disuse of the Codes of Barbarian Laws, As Well As of the Roman Law, and of the Capitularies.
• Chap. XII.: Of Local Customs. Revolution of the Laws of Barbarous Nations, As Well As of the Roman Law.
• Chap. XIII.: Difference Between the Salic Law, Or That of the Salian Franks, and That of the Ripuarian Franks, and Other Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XIV.: Another Difference.
• Chap. XV.: A Reflection.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Ordeal, Or Trial By Boiling Water, Established By the Salic Law.
• Chap. XVII.: Particular Notions of Our Ancestors.
• Chap. XVIII.: In What Manner the Custom of Judicial Combats Gained Ground.
• Chap. XIX.: A New Reason of the Disuse of the Salic and Roman Laws, As Also of the Capitularies.
• Chap. XX.: Origin of the Point of Honour.
• Chap. XXI.: A New Reflection Upon the Point of Honour Among the Germans.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Manners Relative to Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the Code of Laws On Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXIV.: Rules Established In the Judicial Combat.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the Bounds Prescribed to the Custom of Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXVI.: Of the Judiciary Combat Between One of the Parties, and One of the Witnesses.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Judicial Combat Between One of the Parties, and One of the Lord’s Peers. Appeal of False Judgment.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of the Appeal of Default of Justice.
• Chap. XXIX.: Epoch of the Reign of St. Lewis.
• Chap. XXX.: Observations On Appeals.
• Chap. XXXI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIV.: In What Manner the Proceedings At Law Became Secret.
• Chap. XXXV.: Of the Costs.
• Chap. XXXVI.: Of the Public Prosecutor.
• Chap. XXXVII.: In What Manner the Institutions of St. Lewis Fell Into Oblivion.
• Chap. XXXVIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. Xl.: In What Manner the Judiciary Forms Were Borrowed From the Decretals.
• Chap. Xli.: Fiux and Reflux of the Ecclesiastic and Temporal Jurisdiction.
• Chap. Xlii.: the Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result Thereof. Change In the Tribunals.
• Chap. Xliii.: the Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. Xliv.: of the Proof By Witnesses.
• Chap. Xlv.: of the Customs of France.
• Book XXIX.: Of the Manner of Composing Laws.
• Chap. I.: Of the Spirit of a Legislator.
• Chap. II.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. III.: That the Laws Which Seem to Deviate From the Views of the Legislator, Are Frequently Agreeable to Them.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Laws Contrary to the Views of the Legislator.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Have Not Always the Same Effect.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued. Necessity of Composing Laws In a Proper Manner.
• Chap. VIII.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Were Not Always Made Through the Same Motive.
• Chap. IX.: That the Greek and Roman Laws Punished Suicide, But Not Through the Same Motive.
• Chap. X.: That Laws Which Seem Contrary, Proceed Sometimes From the Same Spirit.
• Chap. XI.: How We Are to Judge of the Difference of Laws.
• Chap. XII.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Are Sometimes Really Different.
• Chap. XIII.: That We Must Not Separate Laws From the End For Which They Were Made. of the Roman Laws On Theft.
• Chap. XIV.: That We Must Not Separate the Laws From the Circumstances In Which They Were Made.
• Chap. XV.: That Sometimes It Is Proper the Law Should Amend Itself.
• Chap. XVI.: Things to Be Observed In the Composing of Laws.
• Chap. XVII.: A Bad Method of Giving Laws.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Ideas of Uniformity.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Legislators.
• Book XXX.: Theory of the Feudal Laws Among the Franks, In the Relation They Bear to the Establishment of the Monarchy.
• Chap. I.: Of Feudal Laws.
• Chap. II.: Of the Source of Feudal Laws.
• Chap. III.: The Origin of Vassalage.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Of the Conquests of the Franks.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Goths, Burgundians, and Franks.
• Chap. VII.: Different Ways of Dividing the Land.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: A Just Application of the Law of the Burgundians and of That of the Visigoths In Relation to the Division of Lands.
• Chap. X.: Of Servitudes.
• Chap. XI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XII.: That the Lands Belonging to the Division of the Barbarians Paid No Taxes.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Taxes Paid By the Romans and Gauls, In the Monarchy of the Franks.
• Chap. XIV.: Of What They Called Census.
• Chap. XV.: That What They Called Census Was Raised Only On the Bondmen, and Not On the Freemen.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Feudal Lords Or Vassals.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Military Service of Freemen.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Double Service.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Compositions Among the Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XX.: Of What Was Afterwards Called the Jurisdiction of the Lords.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Churches.
• Chap. XXII.: That the Jurisdictions Were Established Before the End of the Second Race.
• Chap. XXIII.: General Idea of the Abbé Du Bos’ S Book On the Establishment of the French Monarchy In Gaul.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Same Subject Continued. Reflection On the Main Part of the System.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the French Nobility.
• Book XXXI.: Theory of the Feudal Laws Among the Franks, In the Relation They Bear to the Revolutions of Their Monarchy.
• Chap. I.: Changes In the Offices and In the Fiefs. of the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. II.: How the Civil Government Was Reformed.
• Chap. III.: Authority of the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Genius of the Nation In Regard to the Mayors.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner the Mayors Obtained the Command of the Armies.
• Chap. VI.: Second Epocha of the Humiliation of Our Kings of the First Race.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Great Offices and Fiefs Under the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Allodial Estates Were Changed Into Fiefs.
• Chap. IX.: How the Church-lands Were Converted Into Fiefs.
• Chap. X.: Riches of the Clergy.
• Chap. XI.: State of Europe At the Time of Charles Martel.
• Chap. XII.: Establishment of the Tithes.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Election of Bishops and Abbots.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Fiefs of Charles Martel.
• Chap. XV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVI.: Confusion of the Royalty and Mayoralty. the Second Race.
• Chap. XVII.: A Particular Circumstance In the Election of the Kings of the Second Race.
• Chap. XVIII.: Charlemaign.
• Chap. XIX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XX.: Lewis the Debonnaire.
• Chap. XXI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIV.: That the Freemen Were Rendered Capable of Holding Fiefs.
• Chap. XXV.: The Principal Cause of the Humiliation of the Second Race. Changes In the Allodia.
• Chap. XXVI.: Changes In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXVII.: Another Change Which Happened In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Changes Which Happened In the Great Offices, and In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Nature of the Fiefs After the Reign of Charles the Bald.
• Chap. XXX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXI.: In What Manner the Empire Was Transferred From the Family of Charlemaign.
• Chap. XXXII.: In What Manner the Crown of France Was Transferred to the House of Hugh Capet.
• Chap. XXXIII.: Some Consequences of the Perpetuity of Fiefs.
• Chap. XXXIV.: The Same Subject Continued.

BOOK XXXI.

THEORY OF THE FEUDAL LAWS AMONG THE FRANKS, IN THE RELATION THEY BEAR TO THE REVOLUTIONS OF THEIR MONARCHY.

CHAP. I.

Changes in the offices and in the fiefs. Of the mayors of the palace.

THE counts at first were sent into their districts only for a year; but they soon purchased the continuation of their offices. Of this we have an example in the reign of Clovis’s grandchildren. A person named Peonius* was count in the city of Auxerre; he sent his son Mummolus with money to Gontram, to prevail upon him to continue in his employment; the son gave the money for himself, and obtained the father’s place. The kings had already begun to spoil their own favours.

Though by the laws of the kingdom the fiefs were precarious, yet they were neither given nor taken away in a capricious and arbitrary manner; nay, they were generally one of the principal subjects debated in the national assemblies. It is natural however to imagine that corruption had seized this, as well as the other article; and that the possession of the fiefs, like that of the counties, was continued for money.

I shall shew in the course of this book† , that, independently of the grants which the princes made for a certain time, there were others in perpetuity. The court wanted to revoke the former grants; this occasioned a general discontent in the nation, and was soon followed with that famous revolution in the French history, whose first epocha was the amazing spectacle of the execution of Brunechild.

That this queen, who was daughter, sister, and mother to so many kings, a queen to this very day celebrated for public monuments worthy of a Roman Ædile or Proconful, born with an admirable genius for affairs, and endowed with qualities so long respected, should see herself‡ of a sudden exposed to so slow, so ignominious and cruel a torture, by∥ a king whose authority was but indifferently established in the nation, would appear very extraordinary, had she not incurred that nation’s displeasure for some particular cause. Clotharius reproached§ her with the murder of ten kings: but two of them he had put to death himself; the death of some of the others was owing to chance, or to the villany of another queen; and to a nation that had permitted Fredegunda∥ to die in her bed, that had even opposed the punishment of her flagitious crimes, ought to have been very indifferent with respect to those of Brunechild.

She was put upon a camel, and led ignominiously through the army: a certain sign that she had given great offence to those troops. Fredegarius relates, that Protarius* , Brunechild’s favourite, stripped the lords of their property, and filled the exchequer with the plunder; that he humbled the nobility, and that no person could be sure of continuing in any office or employment. The army conspired against him, and he was stabbed in his tent; but Burnechild, either by revenging§ his death, or by pursuing the same plan, became every day more odious† to the nation.

Clotharius, ambitious of reigning alone, inflamed moreover with the most furious revenge, and sure of perishing if Brunechild’s children got the upper hand, entered into a conspiracy against himself; and whether it was owing to ignorance, or to the necessity of his circumstances, he became Brunechild’s accuser, and made a terrible example of that princess.

Warnacharius had been the very soul of the conspiracy formed against Brunechild; being at that time mayor of Burgundy, he made‡ Clotharius consent, that he should not be displaced while he lived. By this step the mayor could no longer be in the same case as the French lords before that period; and this authority began to render itself independent of the regal dignity.

It was Brunechild’s unhappy regency, which had exasperated the nation. So long as the laws subsisted in their full force, no one could grumble at having been deprived of a fief, since the law did not bestow it upon him in perpetuity. But when fiefs came to be acquired by avarice, by bad practices and corruption, they complained of being divested by irregular means, of things that had been irregularly acquired. Perhaps if the public good had been the motive of the revocation of those grants, nothing would have been said: but they pretended a regard to order, while they were openly abetting the principles of corruption; the fiscal rights were claimed, in order to lavish the public treasure: and grants were no longer the reward or encouragement of services. Brunechild, from a corrupt spirit, wanted to reform the abuses of the ancient corruption. Her caprices were not owing to weakness; the vassals and the great officers thinking themselves in danger, prevented their own, by her ruin.

We are far from having all the records of the transactions of those days; and the writers of chronicles, who understood very near as much of the history of their time, as our peasants know of ours, are extremely barren. Yet we have a constitution of Clotharius, given∥ in the council of Paris for the reformation of§ abuses, which shews that this prince put a stop to the complaints that had occasioned the revolution. On the one hand, he confirms* all the grants that had been made or confirmed by the kings his predecessors; and on the other, he ordains† that whatever had been taken from his vassals, should be restored to them.

This was not the only concession the king made in that council; he enjoined that whatever had been innovated, in opposition to the privileges of the clergy, should be redressed‡ ; and he moderated the influence of the court in the∥ elections of bishops. He even reformed the fiscal affairs; ordaining that all the new§ census’s should be abolished, and that they should not levy any** toll established since the death of Gontram, Sigebert, and Chilpheric; that is, he abolished whatever had been done during the regencies of Fredegunda and Brunechild. He forbad the driving of his cattle to graze† in private people’s grounds; and we shall presently see that the reformation was still more general, so as to extend even to civil affairs.

CHAP. II.

How the civil Government was reformed.

HITHERTO the nation had given marks of impatience and levity, with regard to the choice or conduct of her masters; she had regulated their differences, and obliged them to come to an agreement amongst themselves. But now she did what before was quite unexampled; she cast her eyes on her actual situation, examined the laws coolly, provided against their insufficiency, repressed violence, and moderated the regal power.

The bold and insolent regencies of Fredegunda and Brunechild, had less surprised than roused the nation. Fredegunda had defended her horrid cruelties, her poisonings and assassinations, by a repetition of the same crimes; and had behaved in such a manner that her outrages were rather of a private than public nature. Fredegunda did more mischief: Brunechild threatened more. In this crisis, the nation was not satisfied with rectifying the feudal system; she was also determined to secure her civil government. For the latter was rather more corrupt than the former; a corruption the more dangerous as it was more inveterate, and connected rather with the abuse of manners than with that of laws.

The history of Gregory of Tours exhibits, on the one hand, a fierce and barbarous nation; and on the other, kings remarkable for the same ferocity of temper. Those princes were bloody, iniquitous, and cruel, because such was the character of the whole nation. If Christianity appeared sometimes to soften their manners, it was only by the circumstances of terror with which this religion alarms the sinner: the church supported herself against them by the miraculous operations of her saints. The kings would not commit sacrilege, because they dreaded the punishments inflicted on that species of guilt; but this excepted, either in the riot of passion, or in the coolness of deliberation, they perpetrated the most horrid crimes and barbarities, where the divine vengeance did not appear so immediately to overtake the criminal. The Franks, as I have already observed, bore with cruel kings, because they were of the same disposition themselves; they were not shocked at the iniquity and extortions of their princes, because this was the national characteristic. There had been many laws established, but it was usual for the king to defeat them all, by a kind of letters called precepts* , which rendered them of no effect; they were somewhat similar to the rescripts of the Roman emperors, whether it be that our kings borrowed this usage of those princes, or whether it was owing to their own natural temper. We see in Gregory of Tours, how they perpetrated murder in cool blood, and put the accused to death, unheard; how they gave precepts† for illicit marriages; for transfering successions; for depriving relations of their right; and in fine, marrying consecrated virgins. They did not indeed assume the whole legislative power, but they dispensed with the execution of the laws.

Clotharius’s constitution redressed all these grievances; no one‡ could any longer be condemned without being heard; relations∥ were made to succeed according to the order established by law; all precepts for marrying religious women were declared null;§ and those who had obtained and made use of them, were severely punished. We might know perhaps more exactly his determination with regard to these precepts, if the thirteenth and the two next articles of this decree had not been lost through the injuries of time. We have only the first words of this thirteenth article, ordaining that the precepts shall be observed, which cannot be understood of those he had just abolished by the same law. We have another constitution** by the same prince, which is relative to his decree, and corrects in the same manner, every article of the abuses of the precepts.

True it is that Baluzius finding this constitution without date, and without the name of the place where it was given, attributes it to Clotharius I. But I say it belongs to Clotharius II, for three reasons; 1. It says that the king will preserve the immunities† granted to the churches, by his father and grandfather. What immunities could the churches receive from Childeric, grandfather of Clotharius I. who was not a Christian, and who lived even before the foundation of the monarchy? But if we attribute this decree to Clotharius II. we shall find his grandfather to have been this very Clotharius I. who made immense donations to the church, with a view of expiating the murder of his son Cramne, whom he had ordered to be burnt, together with his wife and children.

2. The abuses redressed by this constitution, were still subsisting after the death of Clotharius I. and were even carried to the highest extravagance during the weak reign of Gontram, the cruel administration of Chilperic, and the execrable regencies of Fredegunda and Brunechild. Now can we imagine that the nation would have borne with grievances so solemnly proscribed, without complaining of their continual repetition? Can we imagine she would not have taken the same step as she did afterwards under Childeric II. ‡ when upon a repetition of the old grievances, she pressed§ him to ordain that the law and customs in regard to judicial proceedings, should be complied with as formerly.

In fine, as this constitution was made to redress grievances, it cannot relate to Clotharius I. since there were no complaints of that kind in his reign, and his authority was perfectly established throughout the kingdom, especially at the time in which they place this constitution; whereas it agrees extremely well with the events that happened during the reign of Clotharius II. which produced a revolution in the political state of the kingdom. History must be illustrated by the laws, and the laws by history,

CHAP. III.

Authority of the Mayors of the Palace.

I TOOK notice that Clotharius II. had promised not to deprive Warnacharius of his mayor’s place during life; a revolution productive of another effect. Before that time the mayor was the king’s officer, but now he became the officer of the people; he was chosen before by the king, and now by the nation. Before the revolution, Protarius had been made mayor by Theodoric, and* Landeric by Fredegunda; but† after that the mayors were chosen by the nation‡ .

We must not therefore confound, as some authors have done, these mayors of the palace with such as were possessed of this dignity before the death of Brunechild; the king’s mayors with those of the kingdom. We see by the law of the Burgundians, that among them the office of mayor was not one of the∥ most respectable in the state; nor was it one of the most eminent§ under the first kings of the Franks.

Clotharius removed the apprehensions of those who were possessed of employments and fiefs; and when after the death of Warnacharius* he asked the lords assembled at Troyes, who is it they would put in his place; they cried out, they would chuse no one, but suing for his favour, committed them entirely into his hands.

Dagobert reunited the whole monarchy in the same manner as his father; the nation had a thorough confidence in him, and appointed no mayor. This prince finding himself at liberty, and elated by his victories, resumed Brunechild’s plan. But he succeeded so ill, that the vassals of Austrasia let themselves be beaten by the Sclavonians, and returned home, so that the marches of Austrasia were left a prey to the Barbarians† .

He determined then to make an offer to the Austrasians, of resigning that country, together with a provincial treasure, to his son Sigebert, and to put the government of the kingdom and of the palace into the hands of Cunibert bishop of Cologne, and of the duke Adalgisus. Fredegarius does not enter into the particulars of the conventions then made; but the king confirmed them all by charters, and‡ Austrasia was immediately secured from danger.

Dagobert finding himself near his end, recommended his wife Nentechildis, and his son Clovis, to the care of Æga. The Vassals of Neustria and Burgundy chose* this young prince for their king. Æga and Nentechildis had the government of† the palace; they restored‡ whatever Dagobert had taken; and complaints ceased in Neustria and Burgundy, as they had ceased in Austrasia.

After the death of Æga, the queen Nentechildis∥ engaged the lords of Burgundy to chuse Floachatus for their mayor. The latter dispatched letters to the bishops and chief lords of the kingdom of Burgundy, by which he promised to preserve their honours and dignities§ for ever, that is, during life. He confirmed his word by oath. This is the period, at which** the author of the treatise of the mayors of the palace fixes the administration of the kingdom by those officers.

Fredegarius being a Burgundian, has entered into a more minute detail, as to what concerns the mayors of Burgundy, at the time of the revolution of which we are speaking, than with regard to the mayors of Austrasia and Neustria. But the conventions made in Burgundy were, for the very same reasons, agreed to in Neustria and Austrasia.

The nation thought it safer to lodge the power in the hands of a mayor whom she chose herself, and to whom she might prescribe conditions, than in those of a king whose power was hereditary.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Genius of the Nation in regard to the Mayors.

A GOVERNMENT, in which a nation that had an hereditary king, chose a person to exercise the regal authority, seems very extraordinary: but independently of the circumstances of the times, I apprehend that the notions of the Franks in regard to this article were derived from a higher source.

The Franks were descended from the Germans, of whom† Tacitus says, that in the choice of their king they were determined by his noble extraction; and in that of their leader, by his valour. This gives us an idea of the kings of the first race, and of the mayors of the palace; the former were hereditary, the latter elective.

No doubt, but those princes, who stood up in the national assembly, and offered themselves as the conductors of a public enterprize to such as were willing to follow them, united, generally in their own person, both the power of the mayor, and the king’s authority. By the splendour of their descent they had attained the regal dignity; and their military abilities having recommended them to the command of armies, they rose to the power of mayor. By the regal dignity our first kings presided in the courts and assemblies, and enacted laws with the national consent; by the dignity of duke or leader, they undertook expeditions, and commanded the armies.

In order to be acquainted with the genius of the primitive Franks in this respect, we have only to cast an eye on the conduct of‡ Argobastes, a Frank by nation, on whom Valentinian had conferred the command of the army. He confined the emperor to his own palace; where he would suffer nobody to speak to him concerning either civil or military affrirs. Argobastes did at that time what was afterwards practised by the Pepins.

CHAP. V.

In what Manner the Mayors obtained the Command of the Armies.

SO long as the kings commanded their armies in person, the nation never thought of chusing a leader. Clovis and his four sons were at the head of the Franks, and led them on through a series of victories. Theobald son of Theodobert, a young, weak, and sickly prince, was the first* of our kings that confined himself to his palace. He refused to undertake an expedition into Italy against Narses, and had† the mortification to see the Franks chuse themselves two chiefs, who led them against the enemy. Of the four sons of Clotharius I. Gontram‡ was the least fond of commanding his armies; the other kings followed this example; and, in order to intrust the command without danger into other hands, they conferred it upon several chiefs or dukes∥ .

Innumerable were the inconveniencies which thence arose; all discipline was lost, no one would any longer obey. The armies were dreadful only to their own country; they were loaden with spoils, before they had reached the enemy. Of these miseries we have a very lively picture in Gregory of Tours* . “How shall we be able to obtain a victory, says Gontram† , we who do not so much as keep what our ancestors acquired? Our nation is no longer the same. . . . . .” Strange, that it should be on the decline so early as the reign of Clovis’s grand-children!

It was therefore natural they should determine at last upon an only duke, a duke invested with an authority over this prodigious multitude of feudal lords and vassals, who were now become strangers to their own engagements; a duke who was to establish the military discipline, and to put himself at the head of a nation unhappily practised in making war against itself. This power was conferred on the mayors of the palace.

The original function of the mayors of the palace, was the management of the king’s houshold. They had afterwards, in conjunction‡ with other officers, the political government of fiefs; and at length they obtained the sole disposal of them. They had also the administration of military affairs and the command of the armies; employments necessarily connected with the other two. In those days it was much more difficult to raise than to command the armies; and who but the dispenser of favours could have this authority? In this martial and independent nation, it was prudent to invite, rather than to compel; prudent to give away or to promise the fiefs, that should happen to be vacant by the death of the possessor; prudent, in fine, to reward continually, and to raise a jealousy with regard to preferences. It was therefore right, that the person who had the superintendency of the palace, should also be general of the army.

CHAP. VI.

Second Epocha of the Humiliation of our Kings of the first Race.

AFTER the execution of Brunechild, the mayors were administrators of the kingdom under the sovereigns; and though they had the conduct of the war, yet the kings were always at the head of the armies, and the mayor and the nation fought under their command. But the victory* of duke Pepin over Theodoric and his mayor, completed† the degradation of our princes; and that‡ which Charles Martel obtained over Chilperic and his mayor Rainfroy, confirmed it. Austrasia triumphed twice over Neustria and Burgundy; and the mayoralty of Austrasia being annexed as it were to the family of the Pepins, this mayoralty and family became greatly superior to all the rest, The conquerors were then afraid lest some person of credit should seize the king’s person, in order to excite disturbances. For this reason they kept∥ them in the royal palace as in a kind of prison, and once a year shewed them to the people. There they made ordinances, but§ these were such as were dictated by the mayor; they answered ambassadors, but the mayor made the answers. This is the time mentioned by* historians of the government of the mayors over the kings whom they held in subjection.

The extravagant passion of the nation for Pepin’s family went so far, that they chose one of his grandsons, who was yet† an infant, for mayor; and put him over one Dagobert, that is, one phantom over another.

CHAP. VII.

Of the great Offices and Fiefs under the Mayors of the Palace.

THE mayors of the palace were far from reviving the precariousness of posts and employments; for indeed their power was owing to the protection which in this respect they had granted to the nobility. Hence the great offices were continued to be given for life, and this usage was every day more firmly established.

But I have some particular reflections to make here in respect to fiefs: and in the first place I do not question but most of them became hereditary from this time.

In the treaty of Andeli‡ , Gontram and his nephew Childebert engage to maintain the donations made to the vassals and churches by the kings his predecessors; and leave is given to the† wives, daughters and widows of kings, to dispose by will and in perpetuity of whatever they hold of the exchequer.

Marculfus wrote his formularies at the time‡ of the mayors. We find several∥ in which the kings make donations both to the person and to his heirs: and as the formularies represent the common actions of life, they prove that part of the fiefs were become hereditary towards the end of the first race. They were far from having in those days the idea of an unalienable demesne; this is a modern thing, which they knew neither in theory nor practice.

In proof hereof we shall presently produce positive facts; and if we can point out a time in which there were no longer any benefices for the army, nor any funds for its support; we must certainly conclude that the ancient benefices had been alienated. The time I mean is that of Charles Martel, who founded some new fiefs, which we should carefully distinguish from those of the earliest date.

When the kings began to make grants in perpetuity, either through the corruption which crept into the government, or by reason of the constitution itself, which continually obliged those princes to confer rewards; it was natural they should begin with giving the perpetuity of the fiefs, rather than of the counties. For to deprive themselves of some acres of land was no great matter; but to renounce the right of disposing the great offices, was divesting themselves of their very power.

CHAP. VIII.

In what Manner the allodial Estates were changed into Fiefs.

THE manner of changing an allodial estate into a fief, may be seen in a formulary of Marculfus* . The owner of the land gave it to the king, who restored it to the donor by way of usufruit, or benefice, and then the latter nominated his heirs to the king.

In order to find out the reasons which induced them thus to change the nature of the allodia, I must trace the source of the ancient privileges of our nobility, a nobility who for these eleven centuries have been ready to undergo every hardship, and to spill their blood in their country’s service.

They who were seized of fiefs enjoyed very great advantages. The composition for the injuries done them was greater than that of freemen. It appears by the formularies of Marculfus, that it was a privilege belonging to the king’s vassal, that whoever killed him should pay a composition of six hundred sous. This privilege was established by the Salic law† , and by that of the Ripuarians‡ ; and while these two laws ordained a composition of six hundred sous for the murder of the king’s vassal, they gave but∥ two hundred sous for the murder of a person freeborn, if he was a Frank or Barbarian living under the Salic law; and only a hundred for a Roman.

This was not the only privilege belonging to the king’s vassals. When§ a man was summoned in court, and did not make his appearance, nor obey the judges orders, he was appealed before the king; and if he persisted in his contumacy, he was excluded from† the Royal protection, and no one was allowed to entertain him, or even to give him a morsel of bread. Now if he was a person of an ordinary condition, his goods‡ were confiscated; but if he was the king’s vassal, they were not∥ . The first by his contumacy was deemed sufficiently convicted of the crime, the second was not; the former§ for the smallest crimes was obliged to undergo the trial by boiling water, the latter** was condemned to this trial only in the case of murder: In fine, the king’s vassal†† could not be compelled to swear in court against another vassal. These privileges augmented daily, and the capitulary of Carlomannus‡‡ does this honour to the king’s vassals, that they shall not be obliged to swear in person, but only by the mouth of their own vassals. Besides, when a person who had these honours did not repair to the army, his punishment was to abstain from flesh-meat and wine as long as he had been absent from the service; but a freeman∥∥ who neglected to follow his count was fined§§ sixty sous, and reduced to a state of servitude till he paid it.

It is very natural therefore to think that those Franks who were not the king’s vassals, and much more the Romans, became fond of entering into the state of vassalage; and that they might not be deprived of their demesnes, they devised the usage of giving their allodium to the king, of receiving it from him afterwards as a fief, and of nominating their heirs. This usage was continued, and took place especially during the times of confusion under the second race, when every man being in want of a protector, was desirous to incorporate himself with* the other lords, and to enter as it were, into the feudal monarchy, because the political no longer existed.

This continued under the third race, as we find by several† charters; whether they gave their allodium, and resumed it by the same act; or whether it was declared an allodium, and afterwards acknowledged as a fief. These were called fiefs of resumption.

This does not imply that those who were seized of fiefs administered them with prudence and œconomy; for though the freemen grew desirous of being possessed of fiefs, yet they managed this sort of estates as usufruits are managed in our days. This is what induced Charlemaign, the most vigilant and attentive prince we ever had, to make a great many regulations‡ , to hinder the fiefs from being degraded in favour of allodial estates. It proves only that in his time most benefices were still only for life, and consequently that they took more care of the allodia than of the benefices; but it is no argument that they did not chuse rather to be the king’s bondmen than freemen. They might have reasons for disposing of a particular portion of a fief, but they were not willing to be stripped even of their dignity.

I know likewise that Charlemaign complains in a certain capitulary∥ that in some places there were people who gave away their fiefs in property, and redeemed them afterwards in the same manner. But I do not say, that they were not fonder of the property than of the usufruit; I mean only, that when they could convert an allodium into a fief, which was to descend to their heirs, and is the case of the formulary above-mentioned, they had very great advantages in doing it.

CHAP. IX.

How the Church-lands were converted into Fiefs.

THE use of the fiscal lands should have been only to serve as a donation, by which the kings were to encourage the Franks to undertake new expeditions, and by which, on the other hand, these fiscal lands were increased. This, as I have already observed, was the spirit of the nation; but these donations took another turn. There is still extant* a speech of Chilperic, grandson of Clovis, in which he complains that almost all these lands had been already given away to the church. “Our exchequer,” says he, “is impoverished, and our riches are transferred to the clergy† ; none reign now but bishops, who live in grandeur, while ours is quite eclipsed.”

This was the reason that the mayors, who durst not attack the lords, stripped the churches; and one of the‡ motives alledged by Pepin for entering Neustria, was his having been invited thither by the clergy, to put a stop to the encroachments of the kings, that is, of the mayors, who deprived the church of all her possessions.

The mayors of Austrasia, that is the family of the Pepins, had behaved towards the clergy with more moderation than those of Neustria and Burgundy. This is evident from our chronicles* , in which we see the monks perpetually extolling the devotion and liberality of the Pepins. They themselves had been possessed of the first places in the church. “One crow does not pull out the eyes of another;” as† Chilperic said to the bishops.

Pepin subdued Neustria and Burgundy; but as his pretence for destroying the mayors and kings was the grievances of the clergy, he could not strip the latter, without acting contrary to his own declaration, and shewing that he made a jest of the nation. However, the conquest of two great kingdoms and the destruction of the opposite party, afforded him sufficient means of satisfying his generals.

Pepin made himself master of the monarchy by protecting the clergy; his son Charles Martel could not maintain his power, but by oppressing them. This prince finding that part of the regal and fiscal lands had been given either for life, or in perpetuity to the nobility, and that the church by receiving both from rich and poor, had acquired a great part even of the allodial estates, he resolved to strip the clergy; and as the fiefs of the first division were no longer in being, he formed a second‡ . He took for himself and for his officers the church-lands, and the churches themselves: thus he remedied an evil which differed from ordinary diseases, as its extremity rendered it the more easy to cure.

CHAP. X.

Riches of the Clergy.

SO great were the donations made to the clergy, that under the three races of our princes they must have several times received the full property of all the lands of the kingdom. But if our kings, the nobility and the people, found the way of giving them all their estates, they found also the method of getting them back again. The spirit of devotion established a great number of churches under the first race; but the military spirit was the cause of their being given away afterwards to the soldiery, who divided them amongst their children. What a number of lands must have then been taken from the clergy’s mensalia! The kings of the second race opened their hands, and made new donations to them: but the Normans, who came afterwards, plundered and ravaged all before them, wreaking their vengeance chiefly on the priests and monks, and devoting every religious house to destruction. For they charged those ecclesiastics with the subversion of their idols, and with all the oppressive measures of Charlemaign, by which they had been successively obliged to take shelter in the north. These were animosities which the space of forty or fifty years had not been able to obliterate. In this situation what a loss must the clergy have sustained! There were hardly ecclesiastics left to demand the estates of which they had been deprived. There remained therefore for the religious piety of the third race, foundations enough to make, and lands to bestow. The opinions which were broached and spread in those days, would have deprived the laity of all their estates, if they had been but honest enough. But, if the clergy were actuated by ambition, the laity were not without theirs; if dying persons gave their estates to the church, their heirs would fain resume them. We meet with continual quarrels between the lords and the bishops, the gentlemen and the abbots; and the clergy must have been very hard pressed, since they were obliged to put themselves under the protection of certain lords, who granted them a momentary defence, and afterwards joined their oppressors.

But a better administration having been established under the third race, gave the clergy leave to augment their possessions; when the Calvinists started up, and having plundered the churches, they turned all the sacred plate into specie. How could the clergy be sure of their estates, when they were not even safe in their persons? They were debating on controversial subjects, while their archives were in flames. What did it avail them to demand back of an impoverished nobility, those estates which were no longer in the possession of the latter, but had been conveyed into other hands by different mortgages. The clergy have been long acquiring, and have often refunded, and still there is no end of their acquisitions.

CHAP. XI.

State of Europe at the Time of Charles Martel.

CHARLES MARTEL, who undertook to strip the clergy, found himself in a most happy situation. He was both feared and beloved by the soldiery; whose interest he promoted, having the pretence of the war against the Saracens. He was hated indeed by the clergy, but* he had no need of their assistance. The pope, to whom he was necessary, stretched out his arms to him. Every one knows the famous† embassy he received from Gregory III. These two powers were strictly united, because they supported each other: the pope stood in need of the Franks to assist him against the Lombards and the Greeks; the Franks had occasion for the pope, to serve for a barrier against the Greeks, and to embarrass the Lombards. It was impossible therefore for the enterprize of Charles Martel to miscarry.

S. Eucherius, bishop of Orleans, had a vision which frightened all the princes of that time. I shall produce on this occasion the letter‡ written by the bishops assembled at Rheims to Lewis king of Germany, who had invaded the territories of Charles the Bald: because it will give us an insight into the situation of things in those times, and the temper of the people. They say∥ , “That S. Eucherius having been snatched up into heaven, saw Charles Martel tormented in the bottom of hell by order of the saints, who are to sit with Christ at the last judgment; that he had been condemned to this punishment before his time, for having stript the church of her possessions, and thereby charged himself with the sins of all those who founded these livings; that king Pepin held a council upon this occasion, and had ordered all the church-lands he could recover to be restored; that as he could get back only a part of them, because of his disputes with Vaifre, duke of Aquitaine, he issued out letters called precaria* for the remainder, and made a law that the laity should pay a tenth part of the church lands they possessed, and twelve deniers for each house; that Charlemaign did not give the church lands away; on the contrary, that he published a capitulary, by which he engaged both for himself and for his successors never to make any such grant; that all they say is committed to writing, and that a great many of them heard the whole related by Lewis the Debonnaire, the father of those two kings.”

King Pepin’s regulation, mentioned by the bishops, was made in the council held at Leptines† . The church found this advantage in it, that such as had received those lands, held them no longer but in a precarious manner; and moreover that she received the tythe or tenth part and twelve deniers for every house that had belonged to her. But this was only a palliative, which did not remove the disorder.

Nay it met with opposition, and Pepin was obliged to make another capitulary‡ , in which he enjoins those who held any of those benefices to pay this tythe and duty, and even to keep up the houses belonging to the bishopric or monastery, under the penalty of forfeiting those possessions. Charlemaign∥ renewed the regulation of Pepin.

That part of the same letter which says, that Charlemaign promised both for himself and for his successors, never to divide again the church-lands among the soldiery, is agreeable to the capitulary of this prince, given at Aix la Chapelle, in the year 803, with a view of removing the apprehensions of the clergy upon this subject. But the donations already made were still in force* . The bishops very justly add, that Lewis the Debonnaire followed the example of Charlemaign, and did not give away the churchlands to the soldiery.

And yet the old abuses were carried to such a pitch, that the laity under the children† of Lewis the Debonnaire preferred ecclesiastics to benefices, or turned them out of their livings, without the consent‡ of the bishops. The benefices∥ were divided amongst the next heirs, and when they were held in an indecent manner, the bishops§ had no other remedy left than to remove the relics.

By the capitulary** of Compiegne, it is enacted, that the king’s commissary shall have a right to visit every monastery, together with the bishop, by the consent and in presence of the person who holds it; and this shews that the abuse was general.

Not that there were laws wanting for the restitution of the church lands. The pope having reprimanded the bishops for their neglect in regard to the re-establishment of the monasteries, they wrote to Charles the Bald* that they were not affected with this reproach, because they were not culpable; and they reminded him of what had been promised, resolved, and decreed in so many national assemblies. Accordingly they quoted nine.

Still they went on disputing; till the Normans came and made them all agree.

CHAP. XII.

Establishment of the Tithes.

THE regulations made under king Pepin had given the church rather hopes of relief, than effectually relieved her; and as Charles Martel found all the landed estates of the kingdom in the hands of the clergy, Charlemaign found all the church lands in the hands of the soldiery. The latter could not be compelled to restore a voluntary donation; and the circumstances of that time rendered the thing still more impracticable than it seemed to be of its own nature. On the other hand, christianity ought not to have been lost for want of ministers† , churches, and instruction.

This was the reason of Charlemaign’s establishing‡ the tithes, a new kind of property, which had this advantage in favour of the clergy, that as they were given particularly to the church, it was easier in process of time to know when they were usurped.

Some have attempted to make this establishment of an earlier date; but the authorities they produce seem rather, I think, to prove the contrary. The constitution of Clotharius* says only that they shall not raise certain† tithes on church-lands; so far then was the church from exacting tithes at that time, that its whole pretension was to be exempted from paying them. The second council‡ of Macon, which was held in 585, and ordains the payment of tithes, says indeed that they were paid in ancient times; but it says also, that the custom of paying them was then abolished.

No one questions but that the clergy opened the Bible before Charlemaign’s time, and preached the gifts and offerings of the Leviticus. But I dare say, that before that prince’s reign, though the tithes might have been preached up, they were never established.

I took notice that the regulations made under king Pepin had subjected those who were seized of church-lands in fief, to the payment of tithes, and to the repairing of the churches. It was a great point to oblige by a law, whose equity could not be disputed, the principal men of the nation to set the example.

Charlemaign did more; and we find by the capitulary∥de villis, that he obliged his own demesnes to the payment of the tithes: this was still a more striking example.

But the commonalty are rarely influenced by example to sacrifice their interests. The synod of* Frankfort furnished them with a more cogent motive to pay the tithes. A capitulary was made in that synod, wherein it is said, that in the last† famine the spikes of corn were found to contain no seed, the infernal spirits having devoured it all, and that those spirits had been heard to reproach them with not having paid the tithes; in consequence of which it was ordained that all those who were seized of church-lands, should pay the tithes; and the next consequence was that the obligation extended to all.

Charlemain’s project did not succeed at first; for it seemed too heavy a burthen‡ . The payment of the tithes among the Jews was connected with the plan of the foundation of their republic; but here it was a burthen quite independent of the other charges of the establishment of the monarchy. We find by the regulations∥ added to the law of the Lombards the difficulty there was in causing the tithes to be accepted by the civil laws; and as for the opposition they met with before they were admitted by the ecclesiastic laws, we may easily judge of it from the different canons of the councils.

The people consented at length to pay the tithes, upon condition that they might have a power of redeeming them. This the constitution of Lewis the Debonnaire* , and that of the emperor Lotharius† his son, would not allow.

The laws of Charlemaign, in regard to the establishment of tithes, were a work of necessity, not of superstition; a work in short, in which religion only was concerned.

His famous division of the tithes into four parts, for the repairing of the churches, for the poor, for the bishop, and for the clergy, manifestly proves that he wanted to restore the church to that fixed and permanent state of which she had been divested.

His will‡ shews that he was desirous of repairing the mischief done by his grandfather Charles Martel. He made three equal shares of his moveable goods; two of these he would have divided each into one-and-twenty parts, for the one-and-twenty metropolitan churches of his empire; each part was to be subdivided between the metropolitan, and the suffragan bishops. The remaining third he distributed into four parts, one he gave to his children and grandchildren, another was added to the two thirds already bequeathed, and the other two were assigned to charitable uses. It seems as if he looked upon the immense donation he was making to the church, less as a religious act, than as a political distribution.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Election of Bishops and Abbots.

AS the church was grown poor, the kings resigned the right of∥ nominating to bishopricks and other ecclesiastic benefices. The princes gave themselves less trouble about the ecclesiastic ministers; and the candidates were less solicitous in applying to their authorities. Thus the church received a kind of compensation for the possessions she had lost.

Hence if Lewis the Debonnaire* left the people of Rome in possession of the right of chusing their popes, it was owing to the general spirit that prevailed in his time: he behaved in the same manner to the see of Rome as to other bishopricks.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Fiefs of Charles Martel.

I SHALL not pretend to determine whether Charles Martel, in giving the church-lands in fief, made a grant of them for life or in perpetuity. All I know is, that under Charlemaign† , and Lotharius I.‡ there were possessions of that kind which descended to the next heirs, and were divided amongst them.

I find moreover that one part of them∥ was given as allodia, and the other as fiefs.

I took notice that the proprietors of the allodia were subject to the service all the same as the possessors of the fiefs. This, without doubt, was partly the reason that Charles Martel made grants of allodial lands, as well as of fiefs.

CHAP. XV.

The same Subject continued.

WE must observe, that the fiefs having been changed into church-lands, and these again into fiefs, they borrowed something of each other. Thus the church-lands had the privileges of fiefs, and these had the privileges of church-lands. Such were the * honorary rights of churches, which began at that time. And as those rights have been ever annexed to the judiciary power, in preference to what is still called the fief, it follows that the patrimonial jurisdictions were established at the same time with those very rights.

CHAP. XVI.

Confusion of the Royalty and Mayoralty. The second Race.

THE connexion of my subject has made me invert the order of time, so as to speak of Charlemaign before I had mentioned the famous epocha of the translation of the crown to the Carlovingians under king Pepin: a revolution which, contrary to the nature of ordinary events, is more remarkable perhaps in our days than when it happened.

The kings had no authority; they had only an empty name. The regal title was hereditary, and that of mayor elective. Though it was latterly in the power of the mayors to place any of the Merovingians on the throne, they had not yet taken a king of another race; and the ancient law which fixed the crown in a particular family, was not yet erased out of the hearts of the Franks. The king’s person was almost unknown in the monarchy; but the royalty was established. Pepin, son of Charles Martel, thought it would be proper to consound those two titles, a confusion which would leave it a moot point, whether the new royalty was hereditary or not; and this was sufficient for him, who to the regal dignity had joined a great power. The mayor’s authority was then blended with that of the king. In the mixture of these two authorities a kind of reconciliation was made; the mayor had been elective, and the king hereditary: the crown at the beginning of the second race was elective, because the people chose; it was hereditary, because they always chose in the same family* .

Father le Cointe, in opposition to the authority of all ancient records† , denies‡ that the pope authorized this great change; and one of his reasons is, that he would have committed an injustice. A fine thing to see an historian judge of facts from the circumstances of duty; at this rate we should have no history at all.

Be that as it may, it is very certain that immediately after duke Pepin’s victory, the Merovingians ceased to be the reigning family. When his grandson Pepin was crowned king, it was only a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less; he acquired nothing thereby but the royal ornaments, there was no change made in the nation.

This I have said in order to fix the moment of the revolution, that we may not be mistaken in looking upon that as a revolution which was only a consequence of it.

When Hugh Capet was crowned king at the beginning of the third race, there was a much greater change, because the kingdom passed from a state of anarchy to some kind of government; but when Pepin ascended the throne, there was only a transition from one government to another of the same nature.

When Pepin was crowned king, there was only a change of name: but when Hugh Capet was crowned, there was a change in the nature of the thing, because by uniting a great fief to the crown, the anarchy ceased.

When Pepin was crowned, the title of king was united to the highest office; when Hugh Capet was crowned, it was annexed to the greatest fief.

CHAP. XVII.

A particular Circumstance in the Election of the Kings of the second Race.

WE find by the formulary* of Pepin’s coronation, that Charles and Carloman were also anointed; and that the French nobility bound themselves, on pain of interdiction and excommunication, never to chuse a prince† of another family.

It appears by the wills of Charlemaign and Lewis the Debonnaire, that the Franks made a choice among the king’s children; which agrees with the abovementioned clause. And when the empire was transferred from Charlemaign’s family, the election, which before had been conditional, became simple and absolute; so that the ancient constitution was altered.

Pepin perceiving himself near his end, assembled‡ the lords both temporal and spiritual at St. Denis, and divided his kingdom between his two sons Charles and Carloman. We have not the acts of this assembly; but we find what was there transacted, in the author of the ancient historical collection, published by Canifius, and in∥ the writer of the annals of Mentz, according to§ the observation of Baluzius. Here I meet with two things in some measure contradictory; that he made this division with the consent of the nobility, and afterwards that he made it by his paternal authority. This proves what I said, that the people’s right in the second race was to chuse in the same family; it was properly speaking, rather a right of exclusion, than that of election.

This kind of elective right is confirmed by the records of the second race. Such is this capitulary of the division of the empire made by Charlemaign among his three children, in which after settling their shares, he says* “That if one of the three brothers happens to have a son, such as the people shall be willing to chuse as a fit person to succeed to his father’s kingdom, his uncles shall consent to it.”

This same regulation is to be met with in the partition† which Lewis the Debonnaire made among his three children, Pepin, Lewis, and Charles, in the year 837, at the assembly of Aix-la-Chapelle: and likewise in another‡ partition, made twenty years before, by the same emperor, in favour of Lotharius, Pepin, and Lewis. We may likewise see the oath which Lewis the Stammerer took at Compeigne, at his coronation. “I Lewis, by the divine mercy, and the people’s election∥ appointed king, do promise . . . . . What I say is confirmed by the acts of the council of Valence§ held in the year 890, for the election of Lewis, son of Boson, to the kingdom of Arles. Lewis was there elected, and the principal reason they give for chusing him, is, that he was of the imperial family* , that Charles the Fat had conferred upon him the dignity of king, and that the emperor Arnold had invested him by the sceptre, and by the ministry of his ambassadors. The kingdom of Arles, like the other dismembered or dependent kingdoms of Charlemaign, was elective and hereditary.

CHAP. XVIII.

Charlemaign.

CHARLEMAIGN’s attention was to restrain the power of the nobility within proper bounds, and to hinder them from oppressing the freemen and the clergy. He balanced the several orders of the state, and remained perfect master of them all. The whole was united by the strength of his genius. He led the nobility continually from one expedition to another; giving them no time to form conspiracies, but employing them entirely in the execution of his designs. The empire was supported by the greatness of its chief: the prince was great, but the man was greater. The kings his children were his first subjects, the instruments of his power, and patterns of obedience. He made admirable regulations; and, what is still more admirable, he took care to see them executed. His genius diffused itself through every part of the empire. We find in this prince’s laws a spirit of forecast and sagacity that comprizes every thing, and a certain force that appears irresistible. All pretexts† for evading the performance of duties are removed, neglects are corrected, abuses reformed or prevented. He knew how to punish, but he understood much better how to pardon. He was great in his designs, and simple in the execution of them. No prince ever possessed in a higher degree the art of performing the greatest things with ease, and the most difficult with expedition. He was continually visiting the several parts of his vast empire, and made them feel the weight of his hand wherever he fell. New difficulties sprung up on every side, and on every side he removed them. Never prince had more resolution in facing dangers; never prince knew better how to avoid them. He mocked all manner of perils, and particularly those to which great conquerors are generally subject, namely, conspiracies. This surprising prince was extremely moderate, of a very mild character, plain and simple in his behaviour. He loved to converse freely with the lords of his court. He indulged perhaps too much his passion for the fair-sex; a failing however which in a prince who always governed by himself, and who spent his life in a continual series of toils, may merit some allowance. He was wonderfully exact in his expences; administring his demesnes with prudence, attention and œonomy. A father‡ might learn from his laws how to govern his family; and we find in his capitularies the pure and sacred source from whence he derived his riches. I shall add only one word more: he gave orders that∥ the eggs in the bartons on his demesnes and the superfluous garden stuff should be sold; a most wonderful œconomy in a prince, who had distributed among his people all the riches of the Lombards, and the immense treasures of those Huns that had plundered the whole world.

CHAP. XIX.

The same Subject continued.

THIS great prince was afraid lest those whom he intrusted in distant parts with the command, should be inclined to revolt; and thought he should find more docility among the clergy. For this reason he erected a great number of bishopricks in Germany§ and endowed them with very large fiefs. It appears by some charters that the clauses containing the prerogatives of those fiefs, were not different from such as were commonly inserted in those grants* ; though at present we find the principal ecclesiastics of Germany invested with a sovereign power. Be that as it may, these were some of the contrivances he used against the Saxons. That which he could not expect from the indolence and supineness of a vassal, he thought he might promise himself from the sedulous attention of a bishop. Besides a vassal of that kind, far from making use of the conquered people against him, would rather stand in need of his assistance to support himself against his people.

CHAP. XX.

Lewis the Debonnaire.

WHEN Augustus Cæsar was in Egypt, he ordered Alexander’s tomb to be opened; and upon their asking him whether he was willing they should open the tombs of the Ptolemy’s, he made answer that he wanted to see the king, and not the dead. Thus, in the history of the second race, we are continually looking for Pepin and Charlemaign; we want to see the kings, and not the dead.

A prince who was the sport of his passions, and a dupe even to his virtues; a prince who never understood rightly either his own strength or weakness; a prince who was incapable of making himself either feared or beloved; a prince, in fine, who with few vices in his heart, had all manner of defects in his understanding, took the reins of the empire into his hands, which had been held by Charlemaign.

At a time when the whole world is in tears for the death of his father, at a time of surprize and alarm, when the subjects of that extensive empire, all call upon Charles, who is no more; at a time when he is advancing with all expedition to take possession of his father’s throne, he sends some trusty officers before him, in order to seize the persons of those who had contributed to the irregularity of his sisters. This step was productive of the most terrible catastrophies† . It was imprudent and precipitate. He began with punishing domestic crimes, before he reached the palace; and with alienating the minds of his subjects, before he ascended the throne.

His nephew, Bernard king of Italy being come to implore his clemency, he ordered his eyes to be put out, which proved the cause of that prince’s death a few days after, and created Lewis a great many enemies. His apprehension of the consequence induced him to shut his brothers up in a monastery; by which means the number of his enemies increased. These two last transactions were afterwards laid to his charge in a judicial manner‡ , and his accusers did not fail to tell him, that he had violated his oath, and the solemn promises which he had made to his father on the day of his coronation.

After the death of the empress Hermengardis, by whom he had three children, he married Judith, and had a son by that princess; but soon mixing all the indulgence of an old husband, with all the weakness of an old king, he flung his family into a disorder, which was followed with the downfal of the monarchy.

He was continually altering the partitions he had made among his children. And yet these partitions had been confirmed each in their turn by his own oath, and by those of his children and the nobility.

This was as if he wanted to try the fidelity of his subjects; it was endeavouring by confusion, scruples, and equivocation to puzzle their obedience; it was confounding the different rights of those princes, and rendering their titles dubious, especially at a time when there were but few fortresses, and when the principal bulwark of authority was the fealty sworn and accepted.

The emperor’s children, in order to preserve their shares, courted the clergy, and granted them privileges till then unheard. These privileges were specious; and the clergy in return were made to warrant the revolution in favour of those princes. Agobard∥ represents to Lewis the Debonnaire, his having sent Lotharius to Rome, in order to have him declared emperor; and that he had made a division of his dominions among his children, after having consulted heaven by three days fasting and praying. What defence could such a weak prince make against the attack of superstition? It is easy to perceive the shock which the supreme authority must have twice received from his imprisonment, and from his public penance; they would fain degrade the king, and they degraded the regal dignity.

We find a difficulty at first to conceive how a prince who was possessed of several good qualities, who had some knowledge, who had a natural disposition to virtue, and who in short was the son of Charlemaign, could have such a number of enemies* , so impetuous and implacable as even to insult him in his humiliation, and to be determined upon his ruin: and indeed they would have utterly completed it, if his children, who in the main were more honest than they, had been steady in their design, and could have agreed amongst themselves.

CHAP. XXI.

The same Subject continued.

THE strength and solidity for which the kingdom was indebted to Charlemaign, still subsisted under Lewis the Debonnaire in such a degree as enabled the state to support its grandeur, and to command respect from foreign nations. The prince’s understanding was weak, but the nation was warlike. His authority declined at home, though there seemed to be no diminution of power abroad.

Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemaign, were in succession rulers of the monarchy. The first flattered the avarice of the soldiers; the other two that of the clergy.

In the French constitution, the whole power of the state was lodged in the hands of the king, the nobility, and clergy. Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemaign, joined sometimes their interests with one of those parties to check the other and generally with both: but Lewis the Debonnaire could gain the affection of neither. He disobliged the bishops by publishing regulations which had the air of severity, because he carried things to a greater length than was agreeable to their inclination. Very good laws may be ill-timed. The bishops in those days, being accustomed to take the field against the Saracens* , and the Saxons, had very little of the spirit of religion. On the other hand, as he had no longer any confidence in the nobility, he promoted mean people, turning the nobles out of their employments at court§ to make room for strangers and upstarts. By these means the affections of the two great bodies of the nobility and clergy were alienated from their prince, the consequence of which was a total desertion.

CHAP. XXII.

The same Subject continued.

BUT what chiefly contributed to weaken the monarchy, was the extravagance of this prince in alienating the crown demesnes§ . And here it is that we ought to listen to the account of Nitard, one of our most judicious historions, a grandson of Charlemaign, strongly attached to Lewis the Debonnaire, and who wrote his history by order of Charles the Bald.

He says, “that one Adelhard for some time gained such an ascendant over the emperor, that this prince conformed to his will in every thing; that at the instigation of this favourite, he had granted the the crown lands* to every body that asked them, by which means the state was ruined† .” Thus he did the same mischief throughout the empire, as I‡ observed he had done in Aquitaine; the former, Charlemaign redressed, but the latter, was past all remedy.

The state was reduced to the same debility in which Charles Martel found it upon his accession to the mayoralty; and so desperate were its circumstances, that no exertion of authority was any longer capable of saving it.

The treasury was so exhausted, that in the reign of Charles the Bald, no one could continue∥ in his employments, nor be safe in his person, without paying for it, When they had it in their power to destroy the Normans† , they took money to let them escape: and the first advice which Hincmar gives to Lewis the Stammerer, is to ask of the assembly of the nation, a sufficient allowance to defray the expences of his houshold.

CHAP. XXIII.

The same Subject continued.

THE clergy had reason to repent the protection they had granted to the children of Lewis the Debonnaire. This prince, as I have already observed, had never given‡ any of the church-lands by precepts to the laity; but it was not long before Lotharius in Italy, and Pepin in Aquitaine, quitted Charlemaign’s plan, and resumed that of Charles Martel. The clergy had recourse to the emperor against his children, but they themselves had weakened the authority to which they appealed. In Aquitaine some condescension was shewn, but none in Italy.

The civil wars with which the life of Lewis the Debonnaire had been embroiled, were the seed of those which followed his death. The three brothers, Lotharius, Lewis, and Charles, endeavoured each to bring over the nobility to their party. To such as were willing therefore to follow them they granted church-lands by precepts; so that to gain the nobility, they sacrificed the clergy.

We find in the capitularies* , that those princes were obliged to yield to the importunity of demands, and that what they would not often have freely granted, was extorted from them: we find that the clergy thought themselves more oppressed by the nobility than by the kings. It appears that Charles the Bald† became the greatest enemy of the patrimony of the clergy, whether he was most incensed against them for having degraded his father on their account, or whether he was the most timorous. Be that as it may, we meet with‡ continual quarrels in the capitularies; between the clergy who demanded their estates, and the nobility who refused or deferred to restore them; and the kings acting as mediators.

The situation of affairs at that time is a spectacle really deserving of pity. While Lewis the Debonnaire made immense donations out of his demesnes to the clergy; his children distributed the church-lands among the laity. The same prince with one hand enriched, and with another oftentimes stripped the clergy. The latter had no fixt state; one moment they were plundered, another they received satisfaction: but the crown was continually losing.

Towards the close of the reign of Charles the Bald, and from that time forward, there was an end of the disputes of the clergy and laity, concerning the restitution of church lands. The bishops indeed breathed out still a few sighs in their remonstrances to Charles the Bald, which we find in the capitulary of the year 856, and in the letter* they wrote to Lewis king of Germany, in the year 858: but they proposed things, and challenged promises, so often eluded, that we plainly see they had no longer any hopes of obtaining their desire.

All that could be expected then, was† to repair in general the injuries done both to church and state. The kings engaged not to deprive the nobility of their freemen, and not to give away any more church-lands by precepts‡ ; so that the interests of the clergy and nobility seemed then to be united.

The dreadful depredations of the Normans, as I have already observed, contributed greatly to put an end to those quarrels.

The authority of our kings diminishing every day, both for the reasons already given, and those which I shall mention hereafter, they imagined they had no better resource left, than to resign themselves into the hands of the clergy. But the ecclesiastics had weakened the power of the kings, and these had diminished the influence of the ecclesiastics.

In vain did Charles the Bald and his successors call in the church to support the state, and to prevent its ruin; in vain did they avail themselves of the* respect which the commonalty had for that body, to maintain that which they should also have for their prince; in vain did they endeavour† to give an authority to their laws by that of the canons; in vain did they join the ecclesiastic‡ with the civil punishments; in vain to counterbalance the authority of the count∥ did they give to each bishop the title of their commissary in the several provinces: it was impossible for the clergy to repair the mischief they had done; and a terrible misfortune, which I shall presently mention, proved the ruin of the monarchy.

CHAP. XXIV.

That the Freemen were rendered capable of holding Fiefs.

I SAID that the freemen were led against the enemy by their count, and the vassals by their lord. This was the reason that the several orders of the state balanced each other; and though the king’s vassals had other vassals under them, yet they might be overawed by the count who was at the head of all the freemen of the monarchy.

The freemen§ were not allowed at first to do homage for a fief; but in process of time this was permitted: and I find that this change was made during the period that elapsed from the reign of Gontram to that of Charlemaign. This I prove by the comparison which may be drawn between the treaty of Andely† , signed by Gontram, Childebert, and queen Brunechild, and the‡ partition made by Charlemaign amongst his children, as well as a like partition by Lewis the Debonnaire. These three acts contain nearly the same regulations, with regard to the vassals; and as they determine the very same points, under almost the same circumstances, the spirit as well as the letter of those three treaties in this respect are very much alike.

But as to what concerns the freemen, there is a capital difference. The treaty of Andely does not say that they might do homage for a fief; whereas we find in the divisions of Charlemaign and Lewis the Debonnaire express clauses to empower them to do homage. This shews that a new usage had been introduced after the treaty of Andely, whereby the freemen were become capable of this great privilege.

This must have happened when Charles Martel, after distributing the church-lands to his soldiers, partly in fief, and partly as allodia, made a kind of revolution in the feudal laws. It is very probable that the nobility who were seized already of fiefs, found a greater advantage in receiving the new grants as allodia; and that the freemen thought themselves happy in accepting them as fiefs.

CHAP. XXV.

THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE HUMILIATION OF THE SECOND RACE.
Changes in the Allodia.

CHARLEMAIGN, in the partition* , mentioned in the preceding chapter, ordained, that after his death, the vassals belonging to each king, should be permitted to receive benefices in their own sovereign’s dominion, and not in those† of another; whereas they‡ might keep their allodial estates in any of their dominions. But he adds∥ , that every freeman might, after the death of his lord, do homage in any of the three kingdoms to whom he pleased, as well as he that never had been subject to a lord. We find the same regulations in the partition which Lewis the Debonnaire made among his children in the year 817.

But though the freemen had done homage for a fief, yet the count’s militia was not thereby weakened: the freeman was still obliged to contribute for his allodium, and to get people ready for the service belonging to it, at the proportion of one man to four manors: or else to procure a man that should do the duty of the fief in his stead. And when some abuses had been introduced upon this head, they were redressed, as appears by the constitutions* of Charlemaign, and by that† of Pepin king of Italy, which explain each other.

The remark made by historians, that the battle of Fontenay was the ruin of the monarchy, is very true: but I beg leave to cast an eye on the unhappy consequences of that day.

Some time after that battle, the three brothers, Lotharius, Lewis, and Charles, made a treaty‡ , wherein I find some clauses which must have altered the whole political system of the French government.

In the declaration∥ , which Charles made to the people, of that part of the treaty relating to them, he says, that§ every freeman might chuse whom he pleased for his lord, whether the king or any of the nobility. Before this treaty the freemen might do homage for a fief; but his allodium still continued under the immediate power of the king, that is, under the count’s jurisdiction; and he depended on the lord to whom he vowed fealty, only on account of the fief which he had obtained. After that treaty, every freeman had a right to subject his allodium to the king, or to any other lord, as he thought proper. The question is not in regard to those who put themselves under the protection of another for a fief, but to such as changed their allodial into a feudal land, and withdrew themselves, as it were, from the civil jurisdiction, to enter under the power of the king, or of the lord whom they thought proper to chuse.

Thus it was that those who formerly were only under the king’s power, as freemen under the count, became insensibly vassals one of another, since every freeman might chuse whom he pleased for his lord, the king, or any of the nobility.

2. If a man changed an estate, which he possessed in perpetuity into a fief, this new fief could no longer be only for life. Hence we see, a short time after, a* general law for giving the fiefs to the children of the present possessor: it was made by Charles the Bald, one of the three contracting princes.

What has been said concerning the liberty every freeman had in the monarchy, after the treaty of the three brothers, of chusing whom he pleased for his lord, the king or any of the nobility, is confirmed by the acts subsequent to that time.

In the reign† of Charlemaign, when the vassal had received a present of a lord, were it worth only a sol, he could not afterwards quit him. But under Charles the Bald, the vassals‡ might follow what was agreeable to their interests, or their inclination, with intire safety; and so strongly does this prince explain himself on this subject, that he seems rather to encourage them in the enjoyment of this liberty, than to restrain it. In Charlemaign’s time, benefices were rather personal than real; afterwards they became rather real than personal.

CHAP. XXVI.

Changes in the Fiefs.

THE same changes happened in the fiefs, as in the allodia. We find by the capitulary* of Compeigne, under king Pepin, that those who had received a benefice from the king, gave a part of this benefice to different bondmen; but these parts were not distinct from the whole. The king revoked them when he revoked the whole; and at the death of the king’s vassal, the rear-vassal lost also his rear-fief; and a new beneficiary succeeded, who likewise established new rear-vassals. Thus it was the person, and not the rear-fief, that depended on the fief; on the one hand, the rear-vassal returned to the king, because he was not tied for ever to the vassal; and the rear-fief returned also to the king, because it was the fief itself, and not a dependance of it.

Such was the rear-vassalage, while the fiefs were during pleasure; and such was it also while they were for life. This was altered when the fiefs descended to the next heirs, and the rear-fiefs the same. That which was held before immediately of the king, was held now mediately; and the regal power was thrown back, as it were, one degree; sometimes two, and oftentimes more.

We find in the books† of fiefs, that though the king’s vassals might give away in fief, that is, in rear-fief, to the king, yet these rear-vassals, or petty vavasors, could not give also in fief; so that whatever they had given, they might always resume. Besides, a grant of that kind did not descend to the children like the fiefs, because it was not supposed to have been made according to the feudal laws.

If we compare the situation in which the rear-vassal-age was at the time when the two Milanese senators wrote that book, to what it was under king Pepin, we shall find that the rear-fiefs preserved† their primitive nature longer than the fiefs.

But when those senators wrote, such general exceptions had been made to this rule, as had almost abolished it. For if a person‡ who had received a fief of a rear-vassal, happened to follow him upon an expedition to Rome, he was intitled to all the privileges of a vassal. In like manner, if he had given money to the rear-vassal to obtain the fief, the latter could not take it from him, nor hinder him from transmitting it to his son, till he returned him his money: in fine, this rule∥ was no longer observed by the senate of Milan.

CHAP. XXVII.

Another Change which happened in the Fiefs.

IN Charlemaign’s time* they were obliged, under great penalties, to repair to the general meeting in case of any war whatsoever; they admitted of no excuses, and if the count exempted any one he was liable himself to be punished. But the treaty of the three brothers∥ made a restriction§ upon this head, which rescued the nobility, as it were, out of the king’s hands; they were no longer obliged to serve in time of war, but when the war was defensive. In others, they were at liberty to follow their lord, or to mind their own business. This treaty relates to another∥ , concluded five years before, between the two brothers, Charles the Bald and Lewis king of Germany, by which these princes release their vassals from serving them in war, in case they should attempt hostilities against each other; an agreement which the two princes confirmed by oath, and, at the same time, made their armies swear to it.

The death of an hundred thousand French, at the battle of Fontenay, made the remains of the nobility imagine, that by the private quarrels of their kings, about their respective shares, their whole body should be exterminated, and that the ambition and jealousy of those princes would end in the destruction of all the best families of the kingdom. A law was therefore passed, that the nobility should not be obliged to serve their princes in war, unless it was to defend the state against a foreign invasion. This law* obtained for several ages.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Changes which happened in the great Offices, and in the Fiefs.

THE many changes introduced into the fiefs, in particular cases, seemed to spread so wide as to be productive of a general corruption. I took notice, that in the beginning several fiefs had been alienated in perpetuity; but those were particular cases, and the fiefs in general preserved their nature; so that if the crown lost some fiefs, it substituted others in their stead. I observed likewise, that the crown had never alienated the great offices in perpetuity† .

But Charles the Bald made a general regulation, which equally affected the great offices and the fiefs. He ordained, in his capitularies, that the‡ counties should be given to the children of the count, and that this regulation should also take place in respect to the fiefs.

We shall see presently that this regulation received a more considerable extent, insomuch that the great offices and fiefs went even to distant relations. From thence it followed, that most of the lords, who before this time had held immediately of the crown, held now only mediately. Those counts who formerly administered justice in the king’s placita, and who led the freemen against the enemy, found themselves situated between the king and his freemen; and the king’s power was removed farther off another degree.

Again it appears from the capitularies∥ , that the counts had benefices annexed to their countries, and vassals under them. When the counties became hereditary, the count’s vassals were no longer the immediate vassals of the king; and the benefices annexed to the counties were no longer the king’s benefices: the counts grew powerful, because the vassals, whom they had already under them, enabled them to procure others.

In order to be convinced how much the monarchy was thereby weakened towards the end of the second race, we have only to cast an eye on what happened at the beginning of the third, when the multiplicity of rear-fiefs flung the great vassals into despair.

It was a custom§ of the kingdom, that when the elder brothers had given shares to their younger brothers, the latter paid homage to the elder; so that those shares were held of the lord paramount only as a rear-fief. Philip Augustus, the duke of Burgundy, the counts of Nevers, Boulogne, S. Paul, Dampierre, and other lords, declared* that henceforward, whether the fief was divided by succession, or otherwise, the whole should be held always of the same lord, without any intermediation. This ordinance was not generally followed; for as I have elsewhere observed, it was impossible to make general ordinances at that time; but many of our customs were regulated by them.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of the Nature of the Fiefs after the Reign of Charles the Bald.

WE have observed, that Charles the Bald ordained that when the possessor of a great office or of a fief left a son at his death, the office or fief should devolve to him. It would be a difficult matter to trace the progress of the abuses which from thence resulted, and of the extension given to that law in each country. I find in the books* of fiefs, that towards the beginning of the reign of the emperor Conrad II. the fiefs situated in his dominions did not descend to the grandchildren: they descended only to one of the last possessor’s children† , who had been chosen by the lord: thus the fiefs were given by a kind of election, which the lord made among the children.

In the seventeenth chapter of this book, we have explained in what manner the crown was in some respects elective, and in others hereditary, under the second race. It was hereditary, because, the kings were always taken from that family, and because the children succeeded; it was elective, by reason the people chose from amongst the children. As things of a similar nature move generally alike, and one political law is constantly relative to another, the same spirit was followed‡ in the succession of fiefs, as had been observed in the succession to the crown. Thus the fiefs were transmitted to the children by the right of succession, as well as of election; and each fief was become both elective and hereditary, like the crown.

This right of election in the person of the lord, was not subsisting∥ at the time of the authors§ of the books of fiefs, that is, in the reign of the emperor Frederic I.

CHAP. XXX.

The same Subject continued.

IT is mentioned in the books of fiefs, that when** the emperor Conrad set out for Rome, the vassals in his service presented a petition to him, that he would please to make a law, that the fiefs which descended to the children should descend also to the grandchildren, and that he whose brother died without legitimate heirs, might succeed to the fief which had belonged to their common father: This was granted.

In the same place it is said, (and we are to remember that those writers* lived at the time of the emperor Frederic I.) “that the ancient civilians† had always been of opinion, that the succession of fiefs in a collateral line did not extend farther than to cousin germans by the father’s side, though of late it was carried as far as the seventh degree, and by the new code they had extended it in a direct line in infinitum.” It is thus that Conrad’s law was insensibly extended.

All these things being supposed, the bare perusal of the history of France is sufficient to demonstrate, that the perpetuity of fiefs was established earlier in this kingdom than in Germany. Towards the commencement of the reign of the emperor Conrad II. in 1024, things were upon the same footing still in Germany, as they had been in France under the reign of Charles the Bald, who died in 877. But such were the changes made in this kingdom after the reign of Charles the Bald, that Charles the Simple found himself unable to dispute with a foreign house his incontestable rights to the empire; and, in fine, that in Hugh Capet’s time the reigning family, stripped of all its demesnes, was no longer in a condition to maintain the crown.

The weak understanding of Charles the Bald produced an equal weakness in the French monarchy. But as his brother Lewis king of Germany, and some of that prince’s successors, were men of better parts, their government preserved its vigor much longer.

But what do I say? perhaps the flegmatic constitution, and, if I dare use the expression, the immutability of spirit peculiar to the German nation, made a longer stand than the volatile temper of the French, against that disposition of things, which perpetuated the fiefs, by a natural tendency in families.

Besides, the kingdom of Germany was not laid waste, and annihilated, as it were, like that of France, by that particular kind of war with which it had been harrassed by the Normans and Saracens. There were less riches in Germany, fewer cities to plunder, less extent of coast to scour, more marshes to get over, more forest to penetrate. As the dominions of those princes were less in danger of being ravaged and torn to pieces, they had less need of their vassals, and consequently less dependence on them. And in all probability, if the emperors of Germany had not been obliged to be crowned at Rome, and to make continual expeditions into Italy, the fiefs would have preserved their primitive nature much longer in that country.

CHAP. XXXI.

In what Manner the Empire was transferred from the Family of Charlemaign.

THE empire, which in prejudice to the branch of Charles the Bald, had been already given to the* bastard line of Lewis king of Germany, was transferred to a foreign house by the election of Conrad, duke of Franconia, in 912. The reigning branch of France being hardly able to dispute a few villages, was much less in a situation to contest the empire. We have an agreement which passed between Charles the Simple and the emperor Henry I. who had succeeded to Conrad. It is called the compact of Bonn† . These two princes met in a vessel which had been placed in the middle of the Rhine, and swore eternal friendship. They used on this occasion an excellent middle term. Charles took the title of king of West France, and Henry that of king of East France. Charles contracted with the king of Germany, and not with the emperor.

CHAP. XXXII.

In what Manner the Crown of France was transferred to the House of Hugh Capet.

THE inheritance of the fiefs, and the general establishment of rear-fiefs, extinguished the political, and formed a feudal government. Instead of that prodigious multitude of vassals who were formerly under the king, there were now a few only, on whom the others depended. The kings had scarce any longer a direct authority; a power which was to pass through so many and through such great powers, either stopt or was lost before it reached its term. Those great vassals would no longer obey; and they even made use of their rear-vassals to withdraw their obedience. The kings deprived of their demesnes, and reduced to the cities of Rheims and Laon, were left exposed to their mercy; the tree stretched out its branches too far, and the head was withered. The kingdom found itself without a demesne, as the empire is at present. The crown was therefore given to one of the most potent vassals.

The Normans ravaged the kingdom: they sailed in open boats or small vessels, entered the mouths of rivers, and laid the country waste on both sides. The cities of Orleans* and Paris put a stop to those plunderers, so that they could not advance farther, either on the Seine, or on the Loire. Hugh Capet, who was master of those cities, held in his hands the two keys of the unhappy remains of the kingdom; the crown was conferred upon him as the only person able to defend it. It is thus the empire was afterwards given to a family, whose dominions form so strong a barrier against the Turks.

The empire went from Charlemaign’s family, at a time when the inheritance of fiefs was established only as a mere condescendence. It even appears that this inheritance obtained much later† among the Germans than among the French; which was the reason that the empire, considered as a fief, was elective. On the contrary, when the crown of France went from the family of Charlemaign, the fiefs were really hereditary in this kingdom; and the crown, as a great fief, was also hereditary.

But it is very wrong to refer to the very moment of this revolution, all the changes which happened, either before or afterwards. The whole was reduced to two events; the reigning family changed, and the crown was united to a great fief.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Some Consequences of the perpetuity of Fiefs.

FROM the perpetuity of fiefs, it followed, that the right of seniority or primogeniture was established among the French. This right was quite unknown under the first race* ; the crown was divided among the brothers, the allodia were shared in the same manner; and as the fiefs, whether precarious or for life, were not an object of succession, there could be no partition in regard to those tenures.

Under the second race, the title of emperor which Lewis the Debonnaire enjoyed, and with which he honoured his eldest son Lotharius, made him think of giving this prince a kind of superiority over his younger brothers. The two kings† were obliged to wait upon the emperor every year, to carry him presents, and to receive much greater from him; they were also to consult with him upon common affairs. This is what inspired Lotharius with those pretences which met with such bad success. When Agobard‡ wrote in favour of this prince, he alledged the emperor’s own regulation, who had associated Lotharius to the empire, after he had consulted the Almighty by a three days fast, and by the celebration of the holy mysteries; after the nation had sworn aliegiance to him, which they could not refuse without perjuring themselves; and after he had sent Lotharius to Rome to be confirmed by the pope. Upon all this he lays a stress, and not upon his right of primogenitute. He says, indeed, that the emperor had designed a partition among the younger brothers, and that he had given the preference to the elder; but saying he had preferred the elder, was saying at the same time that he might have given the preference to his younger brothers.

But as soon as the fiefs became hereditary, the right of seniority was established in the feudal succession: and for the same reason in that of the crown, which was the great fief. The ancient law of partitions was no longer subsisting; the fiefs being charged with a service, the possessor must have been enabled to discharge it. The right of primogeniture was established, and the reason of the feudal law was superior to that of the political or civil institution.

As the fiefs descended to the children of the possessor, the lords lost the liberty of disposing of them; and, in order to indemnify themselves, they established what they called the right of redemption, whereof mention is made in our customs, which at first was paid in a direct line; and by usage came afterwards to be paid only in a collateral line.

The fiefs were soon rendered transferable to strangers, as a patrimonial estate. This gave rise to the right of fines of alienation, which were established almost throughout the kingdom. These rights were arbitrary in the beginning; but when the practice of granting such permissions was become general, they were fixed in every district.

The right of redemption was to be paid at every change of heir, and at first was paid even in a direct line∥ . The most general custom had fixed it to one year’s income. This was burthensome and inconvenient to the vassal, and affected in some measure the fief itself. It was often agreed§ in the act of homage, that the lord should no longer demand more than a certain sum of money for the redemption, which, by the changes incident to money, became afterwards of no manner of importance. Thus the right of redemption is in our days reduced almost to nothing, while that of the fines of alienation is continued in its full extent. As this right concerned neither the vassal nor his heirs, but was a fortuitous case which no one was obliged to foresee or expect; these stipulations were not made, and they continued to pay a certain part of the price.

When the fiefs were for life, they could not give a part of a fief to hold in perpetuity as a rear-fief; for it would have been absurd that a person who had only the usufruit of a thing, should dispose of the property of it. But when they became perpetual, this was* permitted, with some restrictions made by the customs† , which was what they call dismembering their fief.

The perpetuity of feudal tenures having established the right of redemption, the daughters were rendered capable of succceding to a fief, in default of male issue. For when the lord gave the fief to his daughter, he multiplied the cases of his right of redemption, because the husband was obliged to pay it as well as the wife‡ . This regulation could not take place in regard to the crown; for as it was not held of any one there could be no right of redemption over it.

The daughter of William V. count of Tholouse, did not succeed to the county. But Eleanor succeeded to Aquitaine, and Mathildis to Normandy; and the right of the succession of females seemed so well established in those days, that Lewis the Young, after his divorce from Eleanor, made no difficulty in restoring Guyenne to her. But as these two last instances followed close to the first, the general law by which the women were called to the succession of fiefs, must have been introduced much later† into the county of Toulouse, than into the other provinces of France.

The constitutions of several kingdoms of Europe have been directed by the state of feudal tenures at the time when those kingdoms were founded. The women succeeded neither to the crown of France nor to the empire, because at the establishment of those two monarchies, they are incapable of succeeding to fiefs. But they succeeded in kingdoms, whose establishment was posterior to that of the perpetuity of the fiefs, such as those founded by the Normans, those by the conquests made on the Moors; and others, in fine, which beyond the limits of Germany, and in latter times received in some measure, a second birth, by the establishment of Christianity.

When these fiefs were at will, they were given to such as were capable of doing service for them, and therefore were never bestowed on minors; but‡ when they became perpetual, the lords took the fiefs into their own hands, till the pupil came of age, either to increase their own emoluments, or to train the pupil to the use of arms. This is what our customs call the guardianship of a nobleman’s children, which is founded on principles different fom those of tutelage, and is intirely a distinct thing from it.

When the fiefs were for life, it was customary to vow fealty for a fief; and the real delivery, which was made by a scepter, secured the fief, as it is now secured by homage. We do not find that the counts, or even the king’s commissaries, received, the homage in the provinces; nor is this ceremony to be met with in the commissions of those officers, which have been handed down to us in the capitularies. They sometimes, indeed, made all the king’s subjects take an oath of allegiance∥ ; but so far was this oath from being of the same nature as the service afterwards established by the name of homage, that it was only a§ ceremony, or less solemnity, occasionally used, either before or after that act of obeisance; in short, it was quite a distinct thing from homage.

The counts and the king’s commissaries made those vassals* whose fidelity was suspected, give occasionally a security which was called firmitas; but this could not be an homage, since the king’s† gave it to one another.

And though the abbot Suger† makes mention of a chair of Dagobert, in which according to the testimony of antiquity, the kings of France were accustomed to receive the homage of the nobility; it is plain that he expresses himself agreeably to the ideas and language of his own time.

When the fiefs descended to the heirs, the acknowledgment of the vassal, which at first was only an occasional service, became a regular duty. It was performed in a more solemn manner, and attended with more formalities, because it was to be a perperual monument of the reciprocal duties of the lord and vassal.

I should be apt to think, that homages began to be established under king Pepin, which is the time I mentioned that several benefices were given in perpetuity; but I should not think thus without caution, and only upon a supposition that the authors of the ancient annals‡ of the Franks were not ignorant pretenders, who in describing the fealty professed by Tassillo, duke of Bavaria, to king Pepin spoke∥ according to the usages of their own time.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The same subject continued.

WHEN the fiefs were either precarious or for life, they seldom had a relation to any other than the political laws, for which reason in the civil institutions of those times there is very little mention made of the laws of fiefs. But when they were become hereditary, when there was a power of giving, selling, and bequeathing them, they had a relation both to the political and the civil laws. The fief, considered as an obligation of performing military service, depended on the political law; considered as a kind of commercial property, it depended on the civil law. This gave rise to the civil regulations concerning feudal tenures.

When the fiefs were become hereditary, the law relating to the order of succession must have been relative to the perpetuity of fiefs. Hence this rule of the French law, estates of inheritance do not ascend∥ , was established in spite of the Roman and Salic§ laws. It was necessary that service should be paid for the fief; but a grandfather or a great uncle would have been too old to perform any service; therefore this rule took place at first only in regard to the feudal tenures, as we learn of Boutillier* .

When the fiefs became hereditary, the lords who were to see that service was paid for the fief, insisted that the† females who were to succeed to the feudal estate, and I fancy sometimes the males, should not marry without their consent; insomuch that the marriage-contracts became in respect to the nobility both a feudal and a civil regulation. In an act of this kind under the lord’s inspection, regulations were made for the succession, with a view that the heirs might pay service for the fief; hence none but the nobility at first had the liberty of disposing of successions by marriage contract, as‡ Boyer and∥ Aufrerius have justly observed.

It is needless to mention that the power of redemption, founded on the old right of the relations, a mystery of our ancient French jurisprudence which I have not time to develop, could not take place with regard to the fiefs, till they were become hereditary.

I finish my treatise of fiefs at a period, where most authors commence theirs.

End of the Second Volume.

[* ]Gregory of Tours, book iv. chap. 42.

[† ]Chap. vii.

[‡ ]Fredegarius’s chronicle, chap. 42.

[∥ ]Clotharius II. son of Chilperic, and father of Dagobert.

[§ ]Fredegarius’s chronicle, chap. 42.

[∥ ]See Gregory of Tours, book viii. chap. 31.

[* ]Sæva illi fuit contra personas iniquitas, fisco nimium tribunes, de rebus personarum ingeniose fiscum vellens implere . . . . ut nullus reperiretur qui gradum quem arripuerat potuisset adsumere. Fredeg. chron. chap. 27. in the year 605.

[§ ]Ibid cap. 28. in the year 607.

[† ]Ibid cap. 41. in the year 613. Burgundiæ farones, tam episcopi quam cæteri Leudes, timentes Brunecbildem et odium in eam habentes, consilium inientes, &c.

[‡ ]Ibid. cap. 42. in the year 613. Sacramento a Clothario accepto ne unquam vitæ suæ temporibus degradaretur.

[∥ ]Some time after Brunechild’s execution, in the year 615. See Baluzius’s edition of the capitularies, page 21.

[§ ]Quæ contra rationis ordinem acta vel ordinata sunt, ne in antea, quod avertat divinitas, contingant, disposuerimus, Christo præsule, per hujus edicti tenorem generaliter emendare. Ibid. art. 16.

[* ]See Baluzius’s edit. of the capitularies, art. 16.

[† ]Ibid. art. 17.

[‡ ]Et quod per tempora ex hoc prætermissum est vel dehinc perpetualiter observetur.

[∥ ]Ita ut episcopo decedente in loco ipsius, qui a metropolitano ordinari debet cum principalibus, a clero et populo eligatur; et si persona condigna fuerit, per ordinationem principis ordinetur; vel certe si de palatio eligitur, per meritum personæ & doctrinæ ordinetur. Ibid. art. 1.

[§ ]Ut ubicumque census novus impiè additus est, emendetur. Art. 8.

[** ]Ibid. art. 9.

[† ]Ibid. art. 21.

[* ]They were orders which the king sent to the judges, to do or to tolerate things contrary to law.

[† ]See Gregory of Tours, book iv. page 227. Both our history and the charters are full of this; and the extent of these abuses appears especially in Clotharius’s constitution, inserted in the edition of the capitularies made to reform them. Baluzius’s edition, page 7.

[‡ ]Art. 22.

[∥ ]Ibid. art. 6.

[§ ]Ibid.

[** ]In Baluzius’s edition of the capitularies, tom. i. page 7.

[† ]In the preceding book I have made mention of these immunities, which were grants of judicial rights, and contained prohibitions to the regal juges to perform any function in the territory, and were equivalent to the erection or grant of a fief.

[‡ ]He began to reign towards the year 670.

[§ ]See the life of S. Leger.

[* ]Instigante Brunechilde, Theodorico jubente, &c. Fredegarius, chap. 27. in the year 605.

[† ]Gesta regum Francorum, cap. 36.

[‡ ]See Fredegarius’s chronicle, chap. 54, in the year 626, and his anonymous continuator, chap. 101. in the year 695. and chap. 105. in the year 715. Aimoin, book iv. chap. 15. Eginhard, life of Charlemaign, chap. 48. Gesta regum Francorum, chap. 45.

[∥ ]See the law of the Burgundians in præfat. and the second supplement to this law, tit. 13.

[§ ]See Gregory of Tours, book ix. chap. 36.

[* ]Eo anno Clotarius cum proceribus et leudibus Burgundiæ Trecassinis conjugitur, cum eorum effet sollicitus si vellent jam Warnachario discesso, alium in ejus honoris gradum sublimare: Sed omnes unanimiter denegantes se nequaquam velle majorem domus eligere, regis gratiam obnixe petentes, cum rege transegere. Fredegarius’s, chronicle, chap. 54, in the year 626.

[† ]Istam victoriam quam Winidi contra Francos meruerunt, non tantùm Sclavinorum fortitudo obtinuit, quantùm dementatio Austrasiorum, dum se cernebant cum Dagoberto odium incurrisse, et assidue expoliarentur. Fredegarius’s chronicle, chap. 68. in the year 630.

[‡ ]Deinceps Austrasii eorum studio limitem et regnum Francorum contra Winidos utiliter defensasse noscuntur. Fredagarius’s chronicle, chap. 75, in the year 632.

[* ]Fredegarius’s chronicle, chap. 79. in the year 638.

[† ]Ibid.

[‡ ]Ibid. chap. 80. in the year 639.

[∥ ]Ibid. chap. 89. in the year 641.

[§ ]Ibid. cap. 89. Floachatus cunctis ducibus a regno Burgundiæ seu et pontisicibus, per epistolam etiam et sacramentis firmavit unicuique gradum honoris et dignitatem, seu et amicitiam, perpetuo conservare.

[** ]Deinceps a temporibus Clodovei qui suit filius Dagoberti inclyti regis, pater vero Theodorici, regnum Francorum decidens per majores domus, cœpit ordinari. De majoribus domus regia.

[† ]Reges ex nobilitate, duces, ex virtute sumunt. De moribus Germanorum.

[‡ ]See Sulpicius Alexander in Gregory of Tours, book 2.

[* ]In the year 552.

[† ]Leutharis vero et Butilinus, tametsi id regi ipsorum minime placebat, belli cum eis societatem inierunt. Agathias, book 1. Gregory of Tours, book iv. chap. 9.

[‡ ]Gontram did not even march against Gondovald, who stiled himself son of Clotharius, and claimed his share of the kingdom.

[∥ ]Sometimes to the number of twenty. See Gregory of Tours, book v. chap. 27. book viii. chap. 18, and 30. book x. chap. 3. Dagobert, who had no mayor in Burgundy, observed the same policy, and sent against the Gascons ten dukes and several counts who had no dukes over them. Fredegarius’s Chronicle, chap. 78. in the year 636.

[* ]Gregory of Tours, book viii. chap. 30. and book x. chap. 3. Ibid. book viii. chap. 30.

[† ]Ibid.

[‡ ]See the second supplement to the law of the Burgundians, tit. 13. and Gregory of Tours, book ix. chap. 36.

[* ]See the annals of Metz, year 687, and 688.

[† ]Illis quidem nomina regum imponens, ipse totius regni habens privilegium, &c. Annals of Metz, year 695.

[‡ ]Ibid, year 719.

[∥ ]Sedemque illi regalem sub sua ditione concessit. Ibid. anno 719.

[§ ]Ex chronico Centulensi, lib. 2. Ut responsa quæ erat eductus vel potius jussus ex sua velut potestate redderet.

[* ]Annals of Metz, anno 691. Anno principatus Pippini super Theodoricum . . . . . Annals of Fuld, or of Laurisham. Pippinus dux Francorum obtinuit regum Francorum per annos 27. cum regibus sibi subjectis.

[† ]Posthæc Theudoaldus filius ejus (Grimoaldi) parvulus in loco ipsius, cum prædicto rege Dagoberto, major-domus pallatii effectus est. The anonymous continuator of Fredegarius in the year 714. chap. 104.

[‡ ]Cited by Gregory of Tours, book 9. See also the edict of Clotharius II. in the year 615. art. 16.

[† ]Ut si quid de agris fiscalibus vel speciebus atque præsidio pro arbitrii sui voluntate facere aut cuiquam conserre voluerint, fixa stabilitate perpetuo conservetur.

[‡ ]See the 24th and the 34th of the first book.

[∥ ]See the 14th formula of the first book, which is equally applicable to the fiscal estates given directly and in perpetuity, or given at first as a benefice, and afterwards in perpetuity: Sicut ab illo aut a fisco nostro fuit possessa. See also the 17th formula, ibid.

[* ]Book i. formulary 13.

[† ]Tit. 44. See also the titles 66. sect. 3. and 4. and tit. 74.

[‡ ]Tit. 2.

[∥ ]See also the law of the Ripuarians, tit. 7. and the Salic law, tit. 44. art. 1. and 4.

[§ ]Salic law, tit. 59, and 76.

[† ]Extra sermonem regis. Salic law, tit. 59, and 76.

[‡ ]Ibid. tit. 59. sect. 1.

[∥ ]Ibid. tit. 76. sect. 1.

[§ ]Ibid. tit. 56, and 59.

[** ]Ibid. tit. 76. sect. 1.

[†† ]Ibid. tit. 76. sect. 2.

[‡‡ ]Apud Vernis Palatium, in the year 883. art. 4, and 11.

[∥∥ ]Capitulary of Charlemaign, in the year 812. art. 1, and 3.

[§§ ]Heribannum.

[* ]Non infirmis reliquit hæredibus, says Lambert à Ardres, in Du Cange, on the word alodis.

[† ]See those quoted by Du Cange, in the word alodis, and those produced by Galland, in his treatise of allodial lands, page 14. and the following.

[‡ ]Second capitulary of the year 802, art. 10. and the 7th capitulary of the year 803. art. 3. the 1st capitulary incerti anni, art. 49. the 5th capitulary of the year 806. art. 7. the capitulary of the year 779. art. 29. and the capitulary of Lewis the Pious, in the year 829. art. 1.

[∥ ]The 5th of the year 806. art. 8.

[* ]In Gregory of Tours, book vi. chap. 46.

[† ]This is what induced him to annul the testaments made in favour of the clergy, and even the donations of his father; Gontram re-established them, and even made new donations. Gregory of Tours, book vii. chap. 7.

[‡ ]See the annals of Metz, year 687. Excitor imprimis querelis sacerdotum & servorum Dei, qui me sæpius adierunt ut pro sublatis injuste patrimoniis, &c.

[* ]See the annals of Metz.

[† ]In Gregory of Tours.

[‡ ]Karolus plurima juri ecclesiastico detrahens prædia fisco sociavit, ac deinde militibus dispertivit. Ex Chronico Centulenst, lib. ii.

[* ]See the annals of Metz.

[† ]Epistolam quoque, decreto Romanorum principum, sibi prædictus præful Gregorius miserat, quod sese populus Romanus relicta imperatoris dominatione, ad suam defensionem & invictam clementiam convertere voluisset Annals of Metz, year 741. Eo pacta patrato, ut a partibus imperatoris recederet. Fredegarius.

[‡ ]Anno 858. apud Carisianum; Baluzius’s edition, tom. 1. page 101.

[∥ ]Ibid. art. 7. page 109.

[* ]Precaria, quod precibus utendum conceditur, says Cujas in his notes upon the first book o fiefs. I find in a diploma of king Pepin, dated the 3d year of his reign, that the prince was not the first who established these precaria; he cites one made by the mayor Ebrom, and continued after his time. See the diploma of the king, in the 5th tom. of the historians of France by the Benedictins, art. 6.

[† ]In the year 743. see the 5th book of the capitularies, art. 3. Baluzius’s edition, page 825.

[‡ ]That of Metz, in the year 736, art. 4.

[∥ ]See his capitulary in the year 803, given at Worms, Baluzius’s edition, page 411. where he regulates the precarious contract; and that of Frankfort, in the year 794, page 267. art. 24. in relation to the repairing of the houses; and that of the year 800. page 330.

[* ]As appears by the preceding note, and by the capitulary of Pepin king of Italy, where it says, that the king would give the monasteries in fief to those who would swear allegiance for fiefs: it is added to the law of the Lombards, book iii. tit. 1. sect. 30. and to the Salic laws, collection of Pepin’s laws in Echard, page 195. tit. 26. art. 4.

[† ]See the constitution of Lotharius I. in the law of the Lombards, book iii. law 1. sect. 43.

[‡ ]Cum consilio & consensu ipsius qui locum retinet.

[∥ ]Ibid. sect. 44.

[§ ]Ibid.

[** ]Given the 28th year of the reign of Charles the Bald, in the year 868. Baluzius’s edition, page 2, 3.

[* ]Consistum apud Bonoilum, the 16th year of Charles the Bald, in the year 856, Baluzius’s edition, page 78.

[† ]In the civil wars which broke out at the time of Charles Martel, the lands belonging to the Church of Rheims were given away to laymen; the clergy were left to shift as well as they could, says the life of Remigius, Surius tom. 1. page 279.

[‡ ]Law of the Lombards, book 3. tit. 3. sect. 1. and 2.

[* ]It is that on which I have descanted in the 4th chapter of this book, and which is to be found in Baluzius’s edition of the capitularies, tom. 1. art. 11. page 9.

[† ]Agratia & pascuria vel decimas porcorum ecclesiæ concedimus, ita aut actor aut decimator in rebus ecclesiæ nullus accedat. The capitulary of Charlemaign in the year 800. Baluzius’s edition, page 336. explains extremely well what is meant by that sort of tithe from which the church is exempted by Clotharius; it was the tithe of the swine which were put into the king’s forests to fatten; and Charlemaign enjoins his judges to pay it, as well as other people, in order to set an example: it is plain, that this was a right of seigniory or œconomy.

[‡ ]Canone 5. ex tomo 1. conciliorum antiquorum Galliæ opera Jacobi Sirmundi.

[∥ ]Art. 6. Baluzius’s edition, page 332. it was given in the year 800.

[* ]Held under Charlemaign, in the year 794.

[† ]Experimento enim didicimus in anno quo illa valida fames irrepsit, ebullire vacuas annonas a dæmonibus devoratas, & voces exprobrationis auditas, &c. Baluzius’s edition, page 267. art. 23.

[‡ ]See among the rest the capitulary of Lewis the Debonnaire, in the year 829. Baluzius’s edition, page 663. against those who to avoid paying tithes neglected to cultivate the lands, &c. art. 5. Nonis quidem & decimis, unde & genitor noster et nos frequenter in diversis placitis admonitionem fecimus.

[∥ ]Among others, that of Lotharius, book 3. tit. 3. chap. 6.

[* ]In the year 829. art. 7. in Baluzius, tom. 1. page 663.

[† ]In the law of the Lombards, book 3. tit. 3. sect. 8.

[‡ ]It is a kind of codicil produced by Eginhard, and different from the will itself, which we find in Goldastus and Baluzius.

[∥ ]See the capitulary of Charlemaign in the year 803. art. 2. Baluzius’s edition, page 379. and the edict of Lewis the Pious, in the year 834, in Goldast. Constit. Imperial. tom. 1.

[* ]This is mentioned in the famous canon, ego Ludovicus, which is a palpable forgery; it is in Baluzius’s edition, page 591. in the year 817.

[† ]As appears by his capitulary, in the year 801. art. 17. in Baluzius, tom. 1. page 360.

[‡ ]See his constitution, inserted in the code of the Lombards, book 3. tit. 1. sect. 44.

[∥ ]See the above constitution, and the capitulary of Charles the Bald, in the year 846. chap. 20. in villa Sparnaco, Baluzius’s edition, tom. 2. page 31. and that of the year 853. chap. 3. and 5. in the synod of Soissons, Baluzius’s edition, tom. 2. page 54. and that of the year 854. apud Attiniacum, chap. 10. Baluzius’s edition, tom. 2. page 70. See also the first capitulary of Charlemaign, incerti anni, art. 49. and 56. Baluzius’s edition, tom. 1. page 519.

[* ]See the capitularies, book 5. art. 44. and the edict of Pistes in the year 869. art. 8. and 9. where we find the honorary rights of the lords established, in the same manner as they are at this very day.

[* ]See the will of Charlemaign, and the division which Lewis the Debonnaire made to his children in the assembly of the states held at Querzy, produced by Goldast, quem populos eligere velit, ut patri suo succedat in regni hæreditate.

[† ]The anonymous chron. in the year 752. and Chronic. Centul. in the year 754.

[‡ ]Fabella quæ post Pippini mortem excogitata est, equitati ac sanctitati Zachariæ papæ plurimum adyersatur . . . . . Ecclesiastic annals of the French, tom. 2. page 319.

[* ]Vol. 5th of the historians of France by the Benedictins, page 9.

[† ]Ut numquam de alterius lumbis regem in ævo presumant eligere, sed ex ipsorum. Vol. 5th o the bistorians o France page 10.

[‡ ]In the year 768.

[∥ ]Tom. 2. lectionis antiquæ.

[§ ]Edition of the capitularies, tom. 1, page 188.

[* ]In the first capitulary of the year 806. Baluzius’s edition, page 439, art. 5.

[† ]In Goldast. Imperial. Constitut. tom. 2. page 19.

[‡ ]Baluzius’s edition, page 574. art. 14. Si vero aliquis illorum decedens legitimos filios reliqueret, non inter eos potestas ipsa dividatur, sed potius populus pariter conveniens, unum ex eis quem dominus voluerit eligat, et hunc senior frater in loco fratris et filii suscipiat.

[∥ ]Capitulary of the year 877. Baluzius’s edition, page 272.

[§ ]In father Labbe’s councils, tom. 9. col. 424. and in Dumont’s Corp. Diplomat. tom. 1. art. 36.

[* ]By the mother’s side.

[† ]See his 3d capitulary of the year 811. page 486. art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and the first capitulary of the year 812. page 490. art. 1. and the capitulary of the year 812. page 494. art. 9, and 11.

[‡ ]See the capitulary de villis in the year 800. his 2d capitulary of the year 813. art. 6. and 19, and the 5th book of the capitularies, art. 303.

[∥ ]Capitul. de villis, art. 39. See this whole capitulary, which is a masterpiece of prudence, good administration, and œconomy.

[§ ]See among others the foundation of the archbishoprick of Bremen in the capitulary of the year 789. Baluzius’s edition, page 245.

[* ]For instance, the prohibition to the King’s judges against entering upon the territory to demand the freda, and other duties. I have said a good deal concerning this in the preceding book.

[† ]The anonymous author of the life of Lewis the Debonnaire in Duchesne’s collection, tom. 2. page 295.

[‡ ]See his trial and the circumstances of his deposition, in Duchesne’s collection, tom. 2. page 331.

[∥ ]See his letters.

[* ]See his trial and the circumstances of his deposition, in Duchesne’s collection, tom. 2. page 331. See also his life written by Tegan Tanto enim odio laborabat, ut taederet eos vita ipsius, says this anonymus author in Duchesne, tom. 2. page 307.

[* ]Tegan says that what seldom happened under Charlemaign was a common practice under Lewis.

[§ ]Being desirous to check the nobility, he promoted one Bernard to the place of Chamberlain, by which the great lords were exasperated to the highest pitch.

[§ ]Villas regias quae erant sui et avi et tritavi, fidelibus suis tradidit eas in possessiones sempiternas: fecit enim hoc diu tempore. Tegan de Gestis Ludovici Pii.

[* ]Hinc libertatis, hinc publica in propriis usibus distribuere suasit. Nitard, Lib. 4. propre finem.

[† ]Rempublicam penitùs annullavit. Ibid.

[‡ ]See book xxx. chap. 13.

[∥ ]Hincmar, let. 1. to Lewis the Stammerer.

[† ]See the fragment of the chronicle of the monastery of S. Sergius in Angers in Du Chesne, tom. ii. page 40.

[‡ ]See what the bishops say in the synod of the year 845. Apud Teudonis Villam.

[* ]See the synod in the year 845, apud Teudonis Villam, art. 3, and 4, which gives a very exact description of things; as also, that of the same year, held at the palace of Vernes, art. 12, and the synod of Beauvais also in the same year, art. 3, 4, and 6; and the capitulary in villa Sparnaco, in the year 846, art. 20, and the letter which the bishops assembled at Rheims wrote in 858, to Lewis king of Germany, art. 8.

[† ]See the capitulary in villa Sparnaco, in the year 846. The nobility had set the king against the bishops, insomuch that he expelled them from the assembly; a few of the canons enacted in council were picked out, and the prelates were told that these were the only ones which should be observed; nothing was granted them that could be refused. See art. 20, 21, and 22. See also the letter which the bishops assembled at Rheims wrote in the year 858 to Lewis king of Germany, and the edict of Pistes, in the year 864, art. 5.

[‡ ]See this very capitulary in the year 846, in villa Sparnaco. See also the capitulary of the assembly held apud Marsnam, in the year 847. art. 4. wherein the clergy reduced themselves to demand only the restitution of what they had been postessed of under Lewis the Debonnaire. See also the capitulary of the year 851. apud Marsnam, art. 6. and 7. which confirms the nobility and clergy in their several possessions, and that apud Bonoilum, in the year 856, which is a remonstrance of the bishops to the king, because the evils, after so many laws, had not been redressed; and, in fine, the letter which the bishops assembled at Rheims wrote in the year 858, to Lewis king of Germany, art. 8.

[* ]Art. 8.

[† ]See the capitulary of the year 852. art. 6. & 7.

[‡ ]Charles the Bald, in the synod of Soissons, says, that he had promited the bishops not to issue out any more precepts relating to church-lands. Capitularies of the year 853. art. 11. Baluzius’s edition, tom. ii. p. 56.

[* ]See the capitulary of Charles the Bald, apud Saponarias, in the year 859. art. 3. “Venilon, whom I made archbishop of Sens, has consecrated me; and I ought not to be expelled the kingdom by any body.” Saltem sine audientia & judicio episcoporum, quorum ministerio in regem sum consecratus, & qui throni Dei sunt dicti, in quibus Deus sedet, & per quos sua decernit judicia, quorum paternis correctionibus & castigatoriis judiciis me subdere fui paratus & in præsenti sum subditus.

[† ]See the capitulary of Charles the Bald, de Carisiaco, in the year 857. Baluzius’s edition, tom. ii. page 81. sect. 1, 2. 4. & 7.

[‡ ]See the synod of Pistes in the year 802. art. 4. and the capitulary of Lewis II. apud vernis palatium, in the year 883. art. 4. and 5.

[∥ ]Capitulary of the year 876, under Charles the Bald, in Synodo Pontigonensi, Baluzius’s edition, art. 12.

[§ ]See what has been said already, book xxx. last chapter towards the end.

[† ]In the year 587. in Gregory of Tours, book 9.

[‡ ]See the following chapter, where I shall speak more diffusively of those partitions; and the notes in which they are quoted.

[* ]In the year 806, between Charles, Pepin, and Lewis; it is quoted by Goldast, and by Baluzius, tom. 1. p. 439.

[† ]Art. 9. page 443. which is agreeable to the treaty of Andely in Gregory of Tours, book ix.

[‡ ]Art. 10. and there is no mention made of this in the treaty of Andely.

[∥ ]In Baluzius, tom. i. p. 574. Licentiam habeat unusquisque liber homo qui seniorem non habuerit, cuicumque ex his tribus sratribus voluerit, se commendandi, art. 9. See also the division made by the same emperor in the year 837. art. 6. Baluzius’s edition, page 686.

[* ]In the year 811. Baluzius’s edition, tom. 1. page 486. art. 7. and 8. and that of the year 812. ibid. page 490. art. 1. Ut omnis liber homo qui quatuor mansos vestitos de proprio suo, sive de alicujus beneficio, habet, ipse se præparet, & ipse in hostem pergat sive cum seniore suo, &c. See also the capitulary of the year 807. Baluzius’s edition, tom. 1. page 458.

[† ]In the year 793. inserted in the law of the Lombards, book iii. tit. 9. chap. 9.

[‡ ]In the year 847. quoted by Aubert Le Mire, and Baluzius, tom. ii. p. 42. Conventus apud Marsnam.

[∥ ]Adnunciato.

[§ ]Ut unusquisque liber homo in nostro regno seniorem quem voluerit in nobis & in nostris fidelibus accipiat, art. 2. of the Declaration of Charles.

[* ]Capitulary of the year 877. tit. 53. art. 9. and 10. apud Carisiacum, similiter & de nostris vassallis faciendum est, &c. This capitulary relates to another of the same year, and of the same place, art. 3.

[† ]Capitulary of Aix la Chapelle, in the year 813. art. 16. quod nullus seniorem suum dimittat postquam ab eo acceperit valente solidum unum; and the capitulary of Pepin, in the year 783. art. 5.

[‡ ]See the capitulary de Cansiaco, in the year 856. art. 10. and 13. Baluzius’s edition, tom, 2. page 83. in which the king, together with the lords spiritual and temporal, agreed to this; Et si aliquis de vobis sit cui suus senioratus non placet, & illi simulat ad alium seniorem meliùs quam ad illum acaptare possit, veniat ad illum, & ipse tranquille & pacifico animo donat illi commeatum . . . & quod Deus illi cupierit ad alium seniorem acaptare potuerit, pacificè habeat.

[* ]In the year 757. art. 6. Baluzius’s edition, page 181.

[† ]Book i. chap. 1.

[† ]At least in Italy and Germany.

[‡ ]Book i. of fiefs, chap. 1.

[∥ ]Ibid.

[* ]Capitulary of the year 802. art. 7. Baluzius’s edition, page 365.

[∥ ]Apud Marsnam, in the year 847. Baluzius’s edition, p. 42.

[§ ]Volumus ut cujuscumque nostrum homo in cujuscumque regno sit, cum seniore suo in hostem, vel aliis suis utilitatibus pergat, nisi talis regni invasio quam Lamtuveri dicunt, quod absit, acciderit, ut omnis populus illius regni ad eam repellendam, communiter pergat, art. 5. ibid. page 44.

[∥ ]Apud argentoratum, in Baluzius, capitularies, tom. 2. page 39.

[* ]See the law of Guy king of the Romans, among those which were added to the Salic law, and to that of the Lombards, tit. 6. sect. 2. in Echard.

[† ]Some authors pretend that the county of Toulouse had been given away by Charles Martel, and passed by inheritance down to Raymond the last count; but if this be true, it was owing to some circumstances, which might have been an inducement to chuse the counts of Toulouse from among the children of the last possessor.

[‡ ]See his capitulary of the year 877. tit. 53. art. 9. and 10. apud Carisiacum; this capitulary is relative to another of the same year and place, art. 3.

[∥ ]The 3d capitulary of the year 812. art. 7. and that of the year 815. art. 6. on the Spaniards. The collection of the capitularies, book 5. art. 223. and the capitulary of the year 869. art. 2. and that of the year 877. art. 13. Baluzius’s edition.

[§ ]As appears from Otho of Frisingen, of the actions of Frederic, book ii. chap. 29.

[* ]See the ordinance of Philip Augustus in the year 1209. in the new collection.

[* ]Book i. tit. 1.

[† ]Sic progressum est, ut ad filios deveniret in quem Dominus hoc vellet beneficium confirmare. Ibid.

[‡ ]At least in Italy and Germany.

[∥ ]Quod hodie ita stabilitum est, ut ad omnes æqualiter veniat. Book i. of the fiefs, tit. 1.

[§ ]Gerardus Niger and Aubertus de Orto.

[** ]Cum vero Conradus Romam proficisceretur, petitum est a fidelibus qui in ejus erant servitio, ut, lege ab eo promulgatâ, hoc etiam ad nepotes ex filio producere dignaretur, & ut frater fratri sine legitimo hærede defuncto in beneficio quod eorum patria fuit, succedat. Book i. of fiefs, tit. 1.

[* ]Cujas has proved it extremely well.

[† ]Sciendum est quod beneficium advenientes ex latere, ultra fratres patrueles non progreditur successione ab antiquis sapientibus constitutum, licet moderno tempore usque ad septimum geniculum sit usurpatum, quod in masculis descendentibus novo jure in infinitum extenditur. Ibid.

[* ]Arnold, and his son Lewis IV.

[† ]In the year 926. quoted by Aubert le Mire, Cod. donationum piarum, chap. 27.

[* ]See the capitulary of Charles the Bald, in the year 877, apud Carisiacum, on the importance of Paris, S. Denis, and the castles on the Loire, in those days.

[† ]See above, chap. xxx. p. 199.

[* ]See the Salic law, and the law of the Ripuarians, in the title of allodia.

[† ]See the capitulary of the year 817, which contains the first partition made by Lewis the Debonnaire, among his children.

[‡ ]See his two letters upon this subject, the title of one of which is, de divisione imperii.

[∥ ]See the ordinance of Philip Augustus, in the year 1209, on the fiefs.

[§ ]We find several of these conventions in the charter, as in the register-book of Vendome, and that of the abbey of S. Cyprian in Poitou, of which Mr. Galland has given some extracts, page 55.

[* ]But they could not abridge the fiefs, that is, abolish a portion of it.

[† ]They fixed the portion which they could dismember.

[‡ ]This was the reason that the lords obliged the widow to marry again.

[† ]Most of the great families had their particular laws of succession. See what M. de la Thaumassiere says, concerning the families of Berry.

[‡ ]We see in the capitulary of the year 877, apud Carsiacum, art. 3. Baluzius’s edition. tom. 2. page. 269. the moment in which the kings caused the fiefs to be administred in order to preserve them for the minors; an example followed by the lords, and which gave rise to what we have mentioned by the name of the guardianship of a nobleman’s children.

[∥ ]We find the formula thereof in the second capitulary of the year 802. See also that of the year 854, art. 13. and others.

[§ ]M. Du Change, in the word bominium, page 1163. and in the word fidelitas, page 474, cites the charters of the ancient homages where these differences are found, and a great number of authorities which may be seen. In paying homage, the vassal put his hand on that of his lord, and took his oath; the oath of fealty was made by swearing on the gospels. The homage was performed kneeling, the oath of fealty standing. None but the lord could receive homage, but his officers might take the oath of fealty. See Littleton, sect. 91, 92. of homage, that is, fidelity and homage.

[* ]Capitularies of Charles the Bald, in the year 860, post redditum a Confluentibus, art. 3. Balusius’s edition, page 145.

[† ]Ibid. art. 3.

[† ]Lib. de administratione sua.

[‡ ]Anno 757. chap. 17.

[∥ ]Tassillo venit in vasatico se commendans, per manus sacramenta juravit multa et in numerabilia, reliquiis sanctorum manus imponens et fidelitatem promisit regi Pippinio. One would think that here was an homage and an oath of fealty. See the Capihilaries of Charles the Bald. Balus. edit.

[∥ ]Book 4. de feudis, tit. 59.

[§ ]In the title of allodia.

[* ]Somme Rurale, book 1. tit. 96. page 447.

[† ]According to an ordinance of St. Lewis, in the year 1246, to settle the customs of Anjou and Maine, those who shall have the care of the heiress of a fief, shall give security to the lord, that she shall not be married without his consent.

[‡ ]Decision 155. No. 8. and 204. and No. 38.

[∥ ]In Capell. Theol. decis. 453.

[* ][The author concludes his elaborate work with an allusion to the joyful acclamations of Æneas’s followers upon coming in fight of the land of Italy, they so much desired, after long wanderings, great dangers, and furious storms undergone in quest of it.

• —Humilemque videmus
• Italiam! Italiam! primus conclamat Achates!
• Italiam læto focii clamore salutant.
• Æneid. lib. 3. ver. 522.]