Econlib

The Library

Other Sites

Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow CHAP. XLII.: The Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result thereof. Change in the Tribunals. - Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws

Return to Title Page for Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws

Search this Title:

CHAP. XLII.: The Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result thereof. Change in the Tribunals. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws [1748]

Edition used:

The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 2.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


CHAP. XLII.

The Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result thereof. Change in the Tribunals.

UPON the discovery of Justinian’s digest towards the year 1137, the Roman law seemed to rise out of its ashes. Schools were then established in Italy, where it was publicly taught; they had already the Justinian code, and the Novellæ. I mentioned before, that this code had been so favourably received in that country, as to eclipse the law of the Lombards.

The Italian doctors brought the law of Justinian into France, where they had only* the Theodosian code; because Justinian’s laws were not made till after the settlement of the Barbarians in Gaul. This law met with some opposition: but it stood its ground notwithstanding the excommunications of the popes, who supported their own canons. St. Lewis endeavoured to bring it into repute by the translations of Justinian’s works, made according to his orders, which are still in manuscript in our libraries; and I have already observed, that they made great use of them in compiling the Institutions. Philip the Fair ordered the laws of Justinian to be taught, only as written reason, in those provinces of France that were governed by customs; and they were adopted as a law in those provinces where the Roman law had been received.

I have already taken notice, that the manner of proceeding by judicial combat, required very little knowledge in the judges: disputes were decided according to the usage of each place, and to a few simple customs received by tradition. In Beaumanoir’s time§ there were two different ways of administering justice; in some places they tried by peers, in others by bailiffs: in following the former way, the peers gave judgment according to the practice of their court; in the latter, it was the prodes homines, or old men, who pointed out this same practice to the bailiff. This whole proceeding required neither learning, capacity, nor study. But when the dark code of the institutions made its appearance; when the Roman law was translated and taught in public schools; when a certain art of procedure and jurisprudence began to be formed; when practitioners and civilians were seen to rise; the peers and the prodes homines were no longer capable of judging: the peers began to withdraw from the lords tribunals; and the lords were very little inclined to assemble them; especially as the new form of trial, instead of being a solemn proceeding, agreeable to the nobility, and interesting to a warlike people, was become a course of pleading. which they neither understood, nor cared to learn. The custom of trying by peers began to be less used; that of trying by bailiffs to be more so; the bailiffs did not give§ judgment themselves, they summoned up the evidence and pronounced the judgment of the prodes homines; but the latter being no longer capable of judging, the bailiffs themselves gave judgment.

This was effected so much the easier, as they had before their eyes the practice of the ecclesiastic courts; the canon and new civil law both concurred alike to abolish the peers.

Thus fell the usage hitherto constantly observed in the French monarchy, that judgment should not be pronounced by a single person, as may be seen in the Salic laws, the capitularies, and in the first* law-writers under the third race. The contrary abuse, which obtains only in local jurisdictions, has been moderated, and in some measure redressed, by introducing in many places a judge’s deputy, whom he consults, and who represents the ancient prodes homines by the obligation the judge is under of taking two graduates, in cases that deserve a corporal punishment; and, in fine, it is become of no manner of effect by the extreme facility of appeals.

[* ]In Italy they followed Justinian’s code; hence Pope John VIII. in his constitution published after the synod of Troyes, makes mention of this code, not because it was known in France, but because he knew it himself: and his constitution was general.

[]This emperor’s code was published towards the year 530.

[]Decretals, book 5. tit. de privilegiis capite super specula.

[]By a charter in the year 1312, in favour of the university of Orleans, quoted by Du Tillet.

[§ ]Customs of Beauvoisis, chap. 1. of the office of bailiffs.

[]Among the common people the burghers were tried by burghers, as the feudatory tenants were tried by one another. See La Thaumassiere, chap. 19.

[]Thus all requests began with these words: “My lord judge, it is customary that in your court,” &c. as appears from the formula quoted by Boutillier, Somme rurale, book 4. tit. 21.

[]The change was insensible: we meet with trials by peers even in Boutillier’s time, who lived in the year 1402, which is the date of his will. He gives this formula, book 1. tit. 21. “Sire Juge, en ma justice haute, moyenne & basse que j’ai en tel lieu, cour plaids, baillis, homme feodaux & sergens.” Yet nothing but feodal matters were tried any longer by the peers. Ibid. book 1. tit. 1. pag. 16.

[§ ]As appears by the formula of the letters which their lord used to give them, quoted by Boutillier, Somme rurale, book 1. tit. 14. which is proved likewise by Beaumanoir, Custom of Beauvoisis, chap. 1. of the bailiffs; they only directed the proceedings. “The bailiff is obliged, in the presence of the peers, to take down the words of those who plead, and to ask the parties whether they are willing to have judgment given according to the reasons alledged; and if they say, Yes, my lord; the bailiff ought to oblige the peers to give judgment.” See also the Institutions of St. Lewis, book 1. chap. 105. and book 2. chap. 15. “Li Juge, si ne doit pas faire le jugement.”

[* ]Beaumanoir, chap. 67. page 336. and chap. 61. page 315. and 316. The Institutions, book 2. chap. 15.