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• The Spirit of Laws.
• Book XX.: Of Laws In Relation to Commerce, Considered In Its Nature and Distinctions.
• Chap. I.: Of Commerce.
• Chap. II.: Of the Spirit of Commerce.
• Chap. III.: Of the Poverty of the People.
• Chap. IV.: Of Commerce In Different Governments.
• Chap. V.: Of Nations That Have Entered Into an œconomical Commerce.
• Chap. VI.: Some Effects of an Extensive Navigation.
• Chap. VII.: The Spirit of England, With Respect to Commerce.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the œconomical Commerce Has Been Sometimes Restrained.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Prohibition of Commerce.
• Chap. X.: An Institution Adapted to œconomical Commerce.
• Chap. XI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Freedom of Commerce.
• Chap. XIII.: What It Is That Destroys This Liberty.
• Chap. XIV.: The Laws of Commerce Concerning the Confiscation of Merchandises.
• Chap. XV.: Of Seizing the Persons of Merchants.
• Chap. XVI.: An Excellent Law.
• Chap. XVII.: A Law of Rhodes.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Judges of Commerce.
• Chap. XIX.: That a Prince Ought Not to Engage Himself In Commerce.
• Chap. XX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Commerce of the Nobility In a Monarchy.
• Chap. XXII.: A Singular Reflection.
• Chap. XXIII.: To What Nations Commerce Is Prejudicial.
• Book XXI.: Of Laws Relative to Commerce, Considered In the Revolutions It Has Met With In the World.
• Chap. I.: Some General Considerations.
• Chap. II.: Of the People of Africa.
• Chap. III.: That the Wants of the People In the South Are Different From Those of the North.
• Chap. IV.: The Principal Difference Between the Commerce of the Ancients and the Moderns.
• Chap. V.: Other Differences.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Commerce of the Ancients.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Commerce of the Greeks.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Alexander. His Conquest.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Commerce of the Grecian Kings After the Death of Alexander.
• Chap. X.: Of the Circuit of Africa.
• Chap. XI.: Of Carthage and Marseilles.
• Chap. XII.: The Isle of Delos. Mithridates.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Genius of the Romans As to Maritime Affairs.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Genius of the Romans With Respect to Commerce.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Commerce of the Romans With the Barbarians.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Commerce of the Romans With Arabia, and the Indies.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Commerce After the Destruction of the Western Empire.
• Chap. XVIII.: A Particular Regulation.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Commerce After the Decay of the Roman Power In the East.
• Chap. XX.: How Commerce Broke Through the Barbarism of Europe.
• Chap. XXI.: The Discovery of Two New Worlds, and In What Manner Europe Is Affected By It.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Riches Which Spain Drew From America.
• Chap. XXIII.: A Problem.
• Book XXII.: Of Laws In Relation to the Use of Money.
• Chap. I.: The Reason of the Use of Money.
• Chap. II.: Of the Nature of Money.
• Chap. III.: Of Ideal Money.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Quantity of Gold and Silver.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: The Reason Why Interest Was Lowered One Half After the Conquest of the Indies.
• Chap. VII.: How the Price of Things Is Fixed In the Variation of the Sign of Riches.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Relative Scarcity of Gold and Silver.
• Chap. X.: Of Exchange.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Proceedings of the Romans With Respect to Money.
• Chap. XII.: The Circumstances In Which the Romans Changed the Value of Their Specie.
• Chap. XIII.: Proceedings With Respect to Money In the Time of the Emperors.
• Chap. XIV.: How the Exchange Is a Constraint On Despotic Power.
• Chap. XV.: The Practice of Some Countries In Italy
• Chap. XVI.: The Assistance a State May Derive From Bankers.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Public Debts.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Payment of Public Debts.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Lending Upon Interest.
• Chap. XX.: Of Maritime Usury.
• Chap. XXI.: Of Lending By Contract, and the State of Usury Amongst the Romans.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XXIII.: Of Laws In the Relation They Bear to the Number of Inhabitants.
• Chap. I.: Of Men and Animals, With Respect to Multiplication of Their Species.
• Chap. II.: Of Marriage.
• Chap. III.: Of the Condition of Children.
• Chap. IV.: Of Families.
• Chap. V.: Of the Several Orders of Lawful Wives.
• Chap. VI.: Of Bastards In Different Governments.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Father’s Consent to Marriage.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of Young Women.
• Chap. X.: What It Is That Determines to Marriage.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Severity of Government.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Number of Males and Females In Different Countries.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Sea-port Towns.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Productions of the Earth Which Require a Greater Or Less Number of Men.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Number of Inhabitants With Relation to the Arts.
• Chap. XVI.: The Concern of the Legislator In the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Greece, and the Number of Its Inhabitants.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the State and Number of People Before the Romans.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Depopulation of the Globe.
• Chap. XX.: That the Romans Were Under a Necessity of Making Laws, to Encourage the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Laws of the Romans Relating to the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Exposing of Children.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the State of the World After the Destruction of the Romans.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Changes Which Happened In Europe, With Regard to the Number of the Inhabitants.
• Chap. XXV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVI.: Consequences.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Law Made In France to Encourage the Propagation of the Species.
• Chap. XXVIII.: By What Means We May Remedy a Depopulation.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of Hospitals.
• Book XXIV.: Of Laws As Relative to Religion, Considered In Itself, and In Its Doctrines.
• Chap. I.: Of Religion In General.
• Chap. II.: A Paradox of Mr. Bayle’s.
• Chap. III.: That a Moderate Government Is Most Agreeable to the Christian Religion, and a Despotic Government to the Mahometan.
• Chap. IV.: Consequences From the Character of the Christian Religion, and That of the Mahometan.
• Chap. V.: That the Catholic Religion Is Most Agreeable to a Monarchy, and the Protestant to a Republic.
• Chap. VI.: Another of Mr. Bayle’s Paradoxes.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Laws of Perfection In Religion.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Connection Between the Moral Laws and Those of Religion.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Essenes.
• Chap. X.: Of the Sect of Stoics.
• Chap. XI.: Of Contemplation.
• Chap. XII.: Of Penances.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Inexpiable Crimes.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner Religion Has an Influence On Civil Laws.
• Chap. XV.: How False Religious Are Sometimes Corrected By the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XVI.: How the Laws of Religion Correct the Inconveniencies of a Political Constitution.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVIII.: How the Laws of Religion Have the Effect of Civil Laws.
• Chap. XIX.: That It Is Not So Much the Truth Or Falsity of a Doctrine Which Renders It Useful Or Pernicious to Men In Civil Government, As the Use Or Abuse of It.
• Chap. XX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Metempsychosis.
• Chap. XXII.: That It Is Dangerous For Religion to Inspire an Aversion For Things In Themselves Indifferent.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of Festivals.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Local Laws of Religion.
• Chap. XXV.: The Inconveniency of Transplanting a Religion From One Country to Another.
• Chap. XXVI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XXV.: Of Laws As Relative to the Establishment of Religion and Its External Polity.
• Chap. I.: Of Religious Sentiments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Motives of Attachment to Different Religions.
• Chap. III.: Of Temples.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Ministers of Religion.
• Chap. V.: Of the Bounds Which the Laws Ought to Prescribe to the Riches of the Clergy.
• Chap. VI.: Of Monasteries.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Luxury of Superstition.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Pontificate.
• Chap. IX.: Of Toleration In Point of Religion.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Of Changing a Religion.
• Chap. XII.: Of Penal Laws.
• Chap. XIII.: A Most Humble Remonstrance to the Inquisitors of Spain and Portugal.
• Chap. XIV.: Why the Christian Religion Is So Odious In Japan.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Propagation of Religion.
• Book XXVI.: Of Laws, As Relative to the Order of Things On Which They Determine.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap II.: Of Laws Divine and Human.
• Chap. III.: Of Civil Laws Contrary to the Law of Nature.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Cases In Which We May Judge By the Principles of the Civil Law, In Limiting the Principles of the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VI.: That the Order of Succession Or Inheritance Depends On the Principles of Political Or Civil Law, and Not On Those of the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VII.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Precepts of Religion, What Belongs Only to the Law of Nature.
• Chap. VIII.: That We Ought Not to Regulate By the Principles of the Canon Law, Things Which Should Be Regulated By Those of the Civil Law.
• Chap. IX.: That Things Which Ought to Be Regulated By the Principles of Civil Law, Can Seldom Be Regulated By Those of Religion.
• Chap. X.: In What Case We Ought to Follow the Civil Law Which Permits, and Not the Law of Religion Which Forbids.
• Chap. XI.: That Human Courts of Justice Should Not Be Regulated By the Maxims of Those Tribunals Which Relate to the Other Life.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: In What Cases, With Regard to Marriage, We Ought to Follow the Laws of Religion; and In What Cases We Should Follow the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Instances Marriages Between Relations Should Be Regulated By the Laws of Nature; and In What Instances By the Civil Laws.
• Chap. XV.: That We Should Not Regulate By the Principles of Political Law, Those Things Which Depend On the Principles of Civil Law.
• Chap. XVI.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Rules of the Civil Law, When It Is Proper to Decide By Those of the Political Law.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVIII.: That It Is Necessary to Enquire, Whether the Laws Which Seem Contradictory, Are of the Same Class.
• Chap. XIX.: That We Should Not Decide Those Things By the Civil Law, Which Ought to Be Decided By Domestic Laws.
• Chap. XX.: That We Ought Not to Decide By the Principles of the Civil Law, Those Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXI.: That We Should Not Decide By Political Laws, Things Which Belong to the Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXII.: The Unhappy State of the Ynca Athualpa.
• Chap. XXIII.: That When, By Some Circumstance, the Political Law Becomes Destructive to the State, We Ought to Decide By Such a Political Law As Will Preserve It, Which Sometimes Becomes a Law of Nations.
• Chap. XXIV.: That the Regulations of the Police Are of a Different Class From Other Civil Laws.
• Chap. XXV.: That We Should Not Follow the General Disposition of the Civil Law, In Things Which Ought to Be Subject to Particular Rules Drawn From Their Own Nature.
• Book XXVII.: Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Roman Laws On Successions.
• Chap. I.
• Book XXVIII. Of the Origin and Revolutions of the Civil Laws Among the French.
• Chap. I.: Different Character of the Laws of the Several People of Germany.
• Chap. II.: That the Laws of the Barbarians Were All Personal.
• Chap. III.: Capital Difference Between the Salic Laws and Those of the Visigoths and Burgundians.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner the Roman Law Came to Be Lost In the Country Subject to the Franks, and Preserved In That Subject to the Goths and Burgundians.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: How the Roman Law Kept Its Ground In the Demesne of the Lombards.
• Chap. VII.: How the Roman Law Came to Be Lost In Spain.
• Chap. VIII.: A False Capitulary.
• Chap. IX.: In What Manner the Codes of Barbarian Laws, and the Capitularies Came to Be Lost.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Other Causes of the Disuse of the Codes of Barbarian Laws, As Well As of the Roman Law, and of the Capitularies.
• Chap. XII.: Of Local Customs. Revolution of the Laws of Barbarous Nations, As Well As of the Roman Law.
• Chap. XIII.: Difference Between the Salic Law, Or That of the Salian Franks, and That of the Ripuarian Franks, and Other Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XIV.: Another Difference.
• Chap. XV.: A Reflection.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Ordeal, Or Trial By Boiling Water, Established By the Salic Law.
• Chap. XVII.: Particular Notions of Our Ancestors.
• Chap. XVIII.: In What Manner the Custom of Judicial Combats Gained Ground.
• Chap. XIX.: A New Reason of the Disuse of the Salic and Roman Laws, As Also of the Capitularies.
• Chap. XX.: Origin of the Point of Honour.
• Chap. XXI.: A New Reflection Upon the Point of Honour Among the Germans.
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Manners Relative to Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the Code of Laws On Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXIV.: Rules Established In the Judicial Combat.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the Bounds Prescribed to the Custom of Judicial Combats.
• Chap. XXVI.: Of the Judiciary Combat Between One of the Parties, and One of the Witnesses.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Judicial Combat Between One of the Parties, and One of the Lord’s Peers. Appeal of False Judgment.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of the Appeal of Default of Justice.
• Chap. XXIX.: Epoch of the Reign of St. Lewis.
• Chap. XXX.: Observations On Appeals.
• Chap. XXXI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIV.: In What Manner the Proceedings At Law Became Secret.
• Chap. XXXV.: Of the Costs.
• Chap. XXXVI.: Of the Public Prosecutor.
• Chap. XXXVII.: In What Manner the Institutions of St. Lewis Fell Into Oblivion.
• Chap. XXXVIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXIX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. Xl.: In What Manner the Judiciary Forms Were Borrowed From the Decretals.
• Chap. Xli.: Fiux and Reflux of the Ecclesiastic and Temporal Jurisdiction.
• Chap. Xlii.: the Revival of the Roman Law, and the Result Thereof. Change In the Tribunals.
• Chap. Xliii.: the Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. Xliv.: of the Proof By Witnesses.
• Chap. Xlv.: of the Customs of France.
• Book XXIX.: Of the Manner of Composing Laws.
• Chap. I.: Of the Spirit of a Legislator.
• Chap. II.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. III.: That the Laws Which Seem to Deviate From the Views of the Legislator, Are Frequently Agreeable to Them.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Laws Contrary to the Views of the Legislator.
• Chap. V.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VI.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Have Not Always the Same Effect.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued. Necessity of Composing Laws In a Proper Manner.
• Chap. VIII.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Were Not Always Made Through the Same Motive.
• Chap. IX.: That the Greek and Roman Laws Punished Suicide, But Not Through the Same Motive.
• Chap. X.: That Laws Which Seem Contrary, Proceed Sometimes From the Same Spirit.
• Chap. XI.: How We Are to Judge of the Difference of Laws.
• Chap. XII.: That Laws Which Appear the Same, Are Sometimes Really Different.
• Chap. XIII.: That We Must Not Separate Laws From the End For Which They Were Made. of the Roman Laws On Theft.
• Chap. XIV.: That We Must Not Separate the Laws From the Circumstances In Which They Were Made.
• Chap. XV.: That Sometimes It Is Proper the Law Should Amend Itself.
• Chap. XVI.: Things to Be Observed In the Composing of Laws.
• Chap. XVII.: A Bad Method of Giving Laws.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Ideas of Uniformity.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Legislators.
• Book XXX.: Theory of the Feudal Laws Among the Franks, In the Relation They Bear to the Establishment of the Monarchy.
• Chap. I.: Of Feudal Laws.
• Chap. II.: Of the Source of Feudal Laws.
• Chap. III.: The Origin of Vassalage.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Of the Conquests of the Franks.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Goths, Burgundians, and Franks.
• Chap. VII.: Different Ways of Dividing the Land.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: A Just Application of the Law of the Burgundians and of That of the Visigoths In Relation to the Division of Lands.
• Chap. X.: Of Servitudes.
• Chap. XI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XII.: That the Lands Belonging to the Division of the Barbarians Paid No Taxes.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Taxes Paid By the Romans and Gauls, In the Monarchy of the Franks.
• Chap. XIV.: Of What They Called Census.
• Chap. XV.: That What They Called Census Was Raised Only On the Bondmen, and Not On the Freemen.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Feudal Lords Or Vassals.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Military Service of Freemen.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Double Service.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Compositions Among the Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XX.: Of What Was Afterwards Called the Jurisdiction of the Lords.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Churches.
• Chap. XXII.: That the Jurisdictions Were Established Before the End of the Second Race.
• Chap. XXIII.: General Idea of the Abbé Du Bos’ S Book On the Establishment of the French Monarchy In Gaul.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Same Subject Continued. Reflection On the Main Part of the System.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the French Nobility.
• Book XXXI.: Theory of the Feudal Laws Among the Franks, In the Relation They Bear to the Revolutions of Their Monarchy.
• Chap. I.: Changes In the Offices and In the Fiefs. of the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. II.: How the Civil Government Was Reformed.
• Chap. III.: Authority of the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Genius of the Nation In Regard to the Mayors.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner the Mayors Obtained the Command of the Armies.
• Chap. VI.: Second Epocha of the Humiliation of Our Kings of the First Race.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Great Offices and Fiefs Under the Mayors of the Palace.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Allodial Estates Were Changed Into Fiefs.
• Chap. IX.: How the Church-lands Were Converted Into Fiefs.
• Chap. X.: Riches of the Clergy.
• Chap. XI.: State of Europe At the Time of Charles Martel.
• Chap. XII.: Establishment of the Tithes.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Election of Bishops and Abbots.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Fiefs of Charles Martel.
• Chap. XV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVI.: Confusion of the Royalty and Mayoralty. the Second Race.
• Chap. XVII.: A Particular Circumstance In the Election of the Kings of the Second Race.
• Chap. XVIII.: Charlemaign.
• Chap. XIX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XX.: Lewis the Debonnaire.
• Chap. XXI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIV.: That the Freemen Were Rendered Capable of Holding Fiefs.
• Chap. XXV.: The Principal Cause of the Humiliation of the Second Race. Changes In the Allodia.
• Chap. XXVI.: Changes In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXVII.: Another Change Which Happened In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Changes Which Happened In the Great Offices, and In the Fiefs.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Nature of the Fiefs After the Reign of Charles the Bald.
• Chap. XXX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXXI.: In What Manner the Empire Was Transferred From the Family of Charlemaign.
• Chap. XXXII.: In What Manner the Crown of France Was Transferred to the House of Hugh Capet.
• Chap. XXXIII.: Some Consequences of the Perpetuity of Fiefs.
• Chap. XXXIV.: The Same Subject Continued.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the judicial Combat between one of the Parties, and one of the Lord’s Peers. Appeal of false Judgment.

AS the nature of judicial combats was to terminate the affair for ever, and was incompatible with* a new judgment, and new prosecutions; an appeal, such as is established by the Roman and Canon laws, that is, to a superior court, in order to re-judge the proceedings of an inferior, was a thing unknown in France.

This is a form of proceeding to which a warlike nation, entirely governed by the point of honour, was quite a stranger; and agreeably to this very spirit, the same methods† were used against the judges, as was allowed against the parties.

An appeal among the people of this nation was a challenge to fight with arms, a challenge decided by blood, and not by an invitation to a paper quarrel, the knowledge of which was deferred to succeeding ages.‡

Thus St. Lewis in his institutions, says, that an appeal includes both felony and iniquity. Thus Beaumanoir tells us, that if a vassal§ wanted to make his complaint of an outrage committed against him by his lord, he was first obliged to denounce that he quitted his fief; after which he appealed to his lord paramount, and offered pledges of battle. In like manner the lord renounced the homage of his vassal, if he appealed him before the count.

A vassal to appeal his lord of false judgment, was telling him, that his sentence was unjust and malicious: now, to utter such words against his lord, was in some measure committing the crime of felony.

Hence, instead of bringing an appeal of false judgment against the lord, who appointed and directed the court, they appealed the peers of whom the court itself was formed: by which means they avoided the crime of felony; for they insulted only their peers, with whom they could always account for the affront.

It was a very∥ dangerous thing to appeal the peers of false judgment. If the party waited till judgment was pronounced, he was obliged to fight them all,* when they offered to make good their judgment. If the appeal was made before all the judges had given their opinion, he was obliged to fight all who had agreed in their judgment. To avoid this danger, it was usual to petition the lord† to direct that each peer should give his opinion out loud; and when the first had pronounced, and the second was going to do the same, the party told him that he was a liar, a knave, and a slanderer, and then he had to fight only with that peer.

Défontaines‡ would have it, that before an appeal was made of false judgment, it was customary to let three judges pronounce; and he does not say, that it was necessary to fight them all three, much less that there was any obligation to fight all those who had declared themselves of the same opinion. These differences arise from this, that there are few usages exactly in all parts the same; Beaumanoir gives an account of what passed in the county of Clermont; and Défontaines of what was practised in Vermandois.

When* one of the peers had declared that he would maintain the judgment, the judge ordered pledges of battle to be given, and likewise took security of the appellant, that he would maintain his appeal. But the peer who was appealed gave no security, because he was the lord’s vassal, and was obliged to defend the appeal, or to pay the lord a fine of sixty livres.

If the† appellant did not prove that the judgment was false, he paid the lord a fine of sixty livres, the same fine‡ to the peer whom he had appealed, and as much to every one of those who had openly consented to the judgment.

When a person violently suspected of a capital crime, had been taken and condemned, he could make no appeal∥ of false judgment: for he would always appeal either to prolong his life, or to get an absolute discharge.

If a person§ said that the judgment was false and bad, and did not offer to make his words good, that is to fight, he was condemned to a fine of six sous, if a gentleman, and to five sous, if a bondman, for the injurious expressions he had uttered.

The judges or peers‡‡ who were overcome, forfeited neither life nor limbs; but the person who appealed them was punished with death, if it happened to be a capital crime.∥∥

This manner of appealing the peers of false judgment, was to avoid appealing to the lord himself. If the lord§§ had no peers, or had not a sufficient number, he might, at his own expence, hire‡ peers of his lord paramount; but these peers were not obliged to pronounce judgment if they did not like it; they might declare, that they were come only to give their opinion: in that particular case∥ the lord himself pronounced sentence as judge; and if an appeal of false judgment was made against him, it was his business to stand the appeal.

If the lord happened* to be so very poor as not to be able to hire peers of his paramount, or if he neglected to ask for them, or the paramount refused to give them, then the lord could not judge by himself, and as nobody was obliged to plead before a tribunal where judgment could not be given, the affair was brought before the lord paramount.

This, I believe, was one of the principal causes of the separation between the jurisdiction and the fief, from whence arose that maxim of the French lawyers, “The fief is one thing, and the jurisdiction another.” For as there was a vast number of peers who had no subordinate vassals under them, they were incapable of holding their court; all affairs were then brought before their lord paramount, and they lost the privilege of pronouncing judgment, because they had neither power nor will to claim it.

All the peers† who had agreed to the judgment, were obliged to be present when it was pronounced, that they might follow one another, and say Yes to the person who, wanting to make an appeal of false judgment, asked them whether they followed; for Défontaines says,‡ “that it is an affair of courtesy and loyalty, and there is no such thing as evasion or delay.” From hence, I imagine, arose the custom still followed in England, of obliging the jury to be all unanimous in their verdict in cases relating to life and death.

Judgment was therefore given according to the opinion of the majority: and if there was an equal division, sentence was pronounced, in criminal cases, in favour of the accused; in cases of debt, in favour of the debtor; and in cases of inheritance, in favour of the defendant.

Défontaines observes∥ , that a peer could not excuse himself by saying that he would not sit in court if there were only four§ , or if the whole number, or at least the wisest part, were not present. This is just as if he were to say in the heat of an engagement, that he would not assist his lord, because he had not all his vassals with him. But it was the lord’s business to cause his court to be respected, and to chuse the bravest and most knowing of his tenants. This I mention in order to shew the duty of vassals, which was to fight and to give judgment; and such indeed was this duty, that to give judgment was all the same as to fight.

It was lawful for a lord who went to law with his vassal in his own court, and was cast, to appeal one of his tenants of false judgment. But as the latter owed a respect to his lord for the fealty he had vowed, and the lord on the other hand owed benevolence to his vassal for the fealty accepted; it was customary to make a distinction between the lord’s affirming in general, that the judgment* was false and unjust, and imputing personal† prevarications to his tenant. In the former case, he affronted his own court, and in some measure himself, so that there was no room for pledges of battle. But there was room in the latter, because he attacked his vassal’s honour; and the person overcome was deprived of life and property, in order to maintain the public tranquility.

This distinction, which was necessary in that particular case, had afterwards a greater extent. Beaumanoir says, that when the appellant of false judgment attacked one of the peers by personal imputation, battle ensued; but if he attacked only the judgment, the peer appealed was at liberty‡ to determine the dispute either by battle, or by law. But as the prevailing spirit in Beaumanoir’s time was to restrain the usage of judicial combats, and as this liberty which had been granted to the peer appealed, of defending the judgment by combat or not, is equally contrary to the ideas of honour established in those days, and to the obligation the vassal lay under of defending his lord’s jurisdiction; I am apt to think that this distinction of Beaumanoir’s was owing to a new regulation among the French.

I would not have it thought, that all appeals of false judgment were decided by battle; it fared with this appeal as with all others. The reader may recollect the exceptions mentioned in the 25th chapter. Here it was the business of the superior court to examine whether it was proper to withdraw the pledges of battle or not.

There could be no appeal of false judgment against the king’s court; because as there was no one equal to the king, no one could appeal him; and as the king had no superior, none could appeal from his court.

This fundamental regulation, which was necessary as a political law, diminished also as a civil law the abuses of the judicial proceedings of those times. When a lord was afraid* that his court would be appealed of false judgment, or perceived that they were determined to appeal; if justice required there should be no appeal, he might petition for peers from the king’s court, who could not be appealed of false judgment. Thus king Philip, says Défontaines† , sent his whole council to judge an affair in the court of the Abbot of Corbey.

If the lord could not have judges from the king, he might remove his court into the king’s, if he held immediately of him: but if there were intermediate lords, he had recourse to his paramount, removing from one lord to another, till he came to the sovereign.

Thus, notwithstanding they had not in those days neither the practice or even the idea of our modern appeals, yet they had recourse to the king, who was the source from whence all those rivers flowed, and the sea into which they returned.

[* ]Beaumanoir, chap. 2, p. 22.

[† ]Ibid. chap. 61, p. 312, and chap. 67, p. 338.

[‡ ]Book 2, chap. 15.

[§ ]Beaumanoir, chap. 61, p. 310 and 311, and chap. 67, p. 337.

[∥ ]Beaumanoir, chap. 61, p. 313.

[* ]Ibid. p. 314.

[† ]Ibid. chap. 61, p. 314.

[‡ ]Chap. 22, art. 1, 10 and 11, he says only, that each of them was allowed a small fine.

[* ]Beaumanoir, chap. 61. page 314.

[† ]Ibid. Défontaines, chap. 22. art. 9.

[‡ ]Défontaines, chap. 22. art. 9.

[∥ ]Beaumanoir, chap. 61. page 316.

[§ ]Ibid. chap. 16. page 314. and Défontaines, chap. 22. art. 21.

[‡‡ ]Défontaines, chap. 22. art. 7.

[∥∥ ]See Défontaines, chap. 21. art. 11 and 12. and following, who distinguishes the cases in which the appellant of false judgment loses his life, the point contested, or only the imparlance.

[§§ ]Beaumanoir, chap. 62. page 322. Défontaines, chap. 22.

[‡ ]The count was not obliged to lend any. Beaumanoir, chap. 67. p. 337.

[∥ ]Nobody can pass judgment in his court, says Beaumanoir, chap. 67. p. 336 and 337.

[* ]Ibid. chap. 62. page 322.

[† ]Défontaines, chap. 21. art. 27 and 28.

[‡ ]Défontaines chap. 21. art. 28.

[∥ ]Chap. 21. art. 37.

[§ ]This number at least was necessary. Défontaines, chap. 21. art. 36.

[* ]Beaumanoir, chap. 67. page 337.

[† ]Ibid.

[‡ ]Ibid. chap. 67. page 337 and 338.

[* ]Défontaines, chap. 22.

[† ]Ibid.