Econlib

The Library

Other Sites

Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow CHAP. IX.: That Things which ought to be regulated by the Principles of Civil Law, can seldom be regulated by those of Religion. - Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws

Return to Title Page for Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws

Search this Title:

CHAP. IX.: That Things which ought to be regulated by the Principles of Civil Law, can seldom be regulated by those of Religion. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws [1748]

Edition used:

The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 2.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


CHAP. IX.

That Things which ought to be regulated by the Principles of Civil Law, can seldom be regulated by those of Religion.

THE laws of religion have a greater sublimity; the civil laws a greater extent.

The laws of perfection drawn from religion have more in view the goodness of the person that observes them, than of the society in which they are observed; the civil laws, on the contrary, have more in view the moral goodness of men in general, than that of individuals.

Thus, venerable as those ideas are which immediately spring from religion, they ought not always to serve as a first principle to the civil laws; because these have another, the general welfare of society.

The Romans made regulations amongst themselves, to preserve the morals of their women; these were political institutions. Upon the establishment of monarchy, they made civil laws on this head, and formed them on the principles of their civil government. When the Christian religion became predominant, the new laws that were then made, had less relation to the general rectitude of morals, than to the holiness of marriage; they had less regard to the union of the two sexes in a civil, than in a spiritual state.

At first, by the* Roman law, a husband, who brought back his wife into his house, after she had been found guilty of adultery, was punished as an accomplice in her debauch. Justinian , from other principles, ordained, that during the space of two years he might go and take her again out of the monastery.

Formerly, when a woman, whose husband was gone to war, heard no longer any tidings of him, she might easily marry again, because she had in her hands the power of making a divorce. The law of Constantine obliged the woman to wait four years, after which she might send the bill of divorce to the general; and, if her husband returned, he could not then charge her with adultery. But Justinian decreed, that let the time be never so long after the departure of her husband, she should not marry, unless by the deposition and oath of the general she could prove the death of her husband. Justinian had in view the indissolubility of marriage; but we may safely say, that he had it too much in view. He demanded a positive proof, when a negative one was sufficient; he required a thing extremely difficult, to give an account of the fate of a man at a great distance, and exposed to so many accidents; he presumed a crime, that is, a desertion of the husband, when it was so natural to presume his death. He injured the commonwealth, by obliging women to live out of marriage; he injured individuals, by exposing them to a thousand dangers.

The law of Justinian* , which ranked amongst the causes of divorce the consent of the husband and wife to enter into a monastery, was entirely opposite to the principles of the civil laws. It is natural that the causes of divorce should have their origin in certain impediments, which could not be foreseen before marriage; but this desire of preserving chastity might be foreseen, since it is in ourselves. This law favours inconstancy in a state, which is by its very nature perpetual; it shook the fundamental principle of divorce, which permits the dissolution of one marriage only from the hope of another. In short, if we view it in a religious light, it is no more than giving victims to God without a sacrifice.

[* ]Leg. 11. sect. ult. ff. ad leg. Juliam de adulteriis.

[]Nov. 134. col. 9. cap. 10. tit. 170.

[]Leg. 7. de repudiis & judicio de morib. sublato.

[]Auth. hodie quantiscumque cod. de repudiis.

[* ]Auth. quod hodie cod. de repudiis.