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CHAP II.: Of Laws divine and human. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 2 The Spirit of Laws [1748]

Edition used:

The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 2.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

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CHAP II.

Of Laws divine and human.

WE ought not to decide by divine laws what should be decided by human laws; nor determine by human what should be determined by divine laws.

These two sorts of laws differ in their original, in their object, and in their nature.

It is universally acknowledged, that human laws are in their own nature different from those of religion; this is an important principle; but this principle is itself subject to others, which must be enquired after.

1. It is in the nature of human laws to be subject to all the accidents which can happen, and to vary in proportion as the will of man changes: on the contrary, by the nature of the laws of religion, they are never to vary. Human laws appoint for some good; those of religion for the best: good may have another object, because there are many kinds of good: but the best is but one, it cannot therefore change. We may alter laws, because they are reputed no more than good; but the institutions of religion are always supposed to be the best.

2. There are kingdoms, in which the laws are of no value, as they depend only on the capricious and fickle humour of the sovereign. If in these kingdoms the laws of religion were of the same nature as the human institutions, the laws of religion too would be of no value. It is however necessary to the society, that it should have something fixed; and it is religion that has this stability.

3. The influence of religion proceeds from its being believed; that of human laws, from their being feared. Antiquity suits with religion, because we have frequently a firmer belief of things, in proportion to their distance: for we have no ideas annexed to them drawn from those times, which can contradict them. Human laws, on the contrary, receive advantage from their novelty, which implies the actual and particular attention of the legislator to put them in execution.