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CHAP. XII.: Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty. - Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works, vol. 1 The Spirit of Laws [1748]

Edition used:

The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1.

Part of: Complete Works of Montesquieu, 4 vols.

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CHAP. XII.

Relation between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty.

IT is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the subject, and that there is a necessity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of slavery. This has always been and always will be the case. It is a rule derived from nature that never varies. We find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and in every state where liberty gradually declines, till we come to Turky. Swisserland seems to be an exception to this rule, because they pay no taxes; but the particular reason for that exemption is well known, and even confirms what I have advanced. In those barren mountains provisions are so dear, and the country is so populous, that a Swiss pays four times more to nature, than a Turk does to the sultan.

A conquering people, such as were formerly the Athenians and the Romans, may rid themselves of all taxes, as they reign over vanquished nations. Then, indeed, they do not pay in proportion to their liberty, because in this respect they are no longer a people, but a monarch.

But the general rule still holds good. In moderate governments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes, which is liberty. In despotic countries* there is an equivalent for liberty, which is the lightness of the taxes.

In some monarchies in Europe there are particular provinces, which, from the very nature of their civil government, are in a more flourishing condition than the rest. It is pretended that these provinces are not sufficiently taxed, because, through the goodness of their government, they are able to be taxed higher: hence the ministers seem constantly to aim at depriving them of this very government, from whence a diffusive blessing is derived, which redounds even to the prince’s advantage.

[* ]In Russia the taxes are but small; they have been increased since the despotic power of the prince is exercised with more moderation. See the History of the Tartars, 2d part.

[]The Pais d’états, where the states of the province assemble to deliberate on public affairs.