The Online Library of Liberty

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• An Eulogium On President Montesquieu, By Monsieur D’alembert.
• Preface.
• The Spirit of Laws.
• Book I.: Of Laws In General.
• Chap. I.: Of the Relation of Laws to Different Beings.
• Chap. II.: Of the Laws of Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Positive Laws.
• Book II.: Of Laws Directly Derived From the Nature of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Nature of Three Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Republican Government, and the Laws Relative to Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. V.: Of the Laws Relative to the Nature of a Despotic Government.
• Book III.: Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government.
• Chap. I.: Difference Between the Nature and Principle of Government.
• Chap. II.: Of the Principle of Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: Of the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. V.: That Virtue Is Not the Principle of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner Virtue Is Supplied In a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VIII.: That Honour Is Not the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. X.: Difference of Obedience In Moderate and Despotic Governments.
• Chap. XI.: Reflections On the Preceding Chapters.
• Book IV.: That the Laws of Education Ought to Be Relative to the Principles of Government.
• Chap. I.: Of the Laws of Education.
• Chap. II.: Of Education In Monarchies.
• Chap. III.: Of Education In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. IV.: Difference Between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education.
• Chap. V.: Of Education In a Republican Government.
• Chap. VI.: Of Some Institutions Among the Greeks.
• Chap. VII.: In What Case These Singular Institutions May Be of Service.
• Chap. VIII.: Explication of a Paradox of the Ancients, In Respect to Manners.
• Book V.: That the Laws, Given By the Legislator, Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: What Is Meant By Virtue In a Political State.
• Chap. III.: What Is Meant By a Love of the Republic, In a Democracy.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality Is Inspired.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner the Laws Establish Equality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VI.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Maintain Frugality In a Democracy.
• Chap. VII.: Other Methods of Favouring the Principle of Democracy.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Laws Ought to Be Relative to the Principle of Government In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IX.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to Their Principle In Monarchies.
• Chap. X.: Of the Expedition Peculiar to the Executive Power In Monarchies.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: An Idea of Despotic Power.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Laws Are Relative to the Principles of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Communication of Power.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Presents.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Rewards Conferred By the Sovereign.
• Chap. XIX.: New Consequences of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Book VI.: Consequences of the Principles of Different Governments With Respect to the Simplicity of Civil and Criminal Laws, the Form of Judgements, and the Inflicting of Punishments.
• Chap. I.: Of the Simplicity of Civil Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. II.: Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws In Different Governments.
• Chap. III.: In What Governments, and In What Cases, the Judges Ought to Determine According to the Express Letter of the Law.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Manner of Passing Judgement.
• Chap. V.: In What Governments the Sovereign May Be Judge.
• Chap. VI.: That, In Monarchies, Ministers Ought Not to Sit As Judges.
• Chap. VII.: Of a Single Magistrate.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Accusation In Different Governments.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Severity of Punishments In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Ancient French Laws.
• Chap. XI.: That, When People Are Virtuous, Few Punishments Are Necessary.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Power of Punishments.
• Chap. XIII.: Insufficiency of the Laws of Japan.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Spirit of the Roman Senate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Roman Laws In Respect to Punishments.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Just Proportion Betwixt Punishments and Crimes.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Rack.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Pecuniary and Corporal Punishments.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Law of Retaliation.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Punishment of Fathers For the Crimes of Their Children.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Clemency of the Prince.
• Book VII.: Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three Governments, With Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Condition of Women.
• Chap. I.: Of Luxury.
• Chap. II.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of Sumptuary Laws In an Aristocracy.
• Chap. IV.: Of Sumptuary Laws In a Monarchy.
• Chap. V.: In What Cases Sumptuary Laws Are Useful In a Monarchy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Luxury of China.
• Chap. VII.: Fatal Consequences of Luxury In China.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Public Continency.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Condition Or State of Women In Different Governments.
• Chap. X.: Of the Domestic Tribunal Among the Romans.
• Chap. XI.: In What Manner the Institutions Changed At Rome Together With the Government.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Guardianship of Women Among the Romans.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Punishments Decreed By Emperors Against the Incontinency of Women.
• Chap. XIV.: Sumptuary Laws Among the Romans.
• Chap. XV.: Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages In Different Constitutions.
• Chap. XVI.: An Excellent Custom of the Samnites.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Female-administration.
• Book VIII.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of the Three Governments.
• Chap. I.: General Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.
• Chap. III.: Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality.
• Chap. IV.: Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People.
• Chap. V.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchical Government.
• Chap. IX.: How Ready the Nobility Are to Defend the Throne.
• Chap. X.: Of the Corruption of the Principle of Despotic Government.
• Chap. XI.: Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of Government.
• Chap. XII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XIII.: The Effect of an Oath Among Virtuous People.
• Chap. XIV.: How the Smallest Change of the Constitution Is Attended With the Ruin of Its Principles.
• Chap. XV.: Sure Methods of Preserving the Three Principles.
• Chap. XVI.: Distinctive Properties of a Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy.
• Chap. XVIII.: Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy.
• Chap. XIX.: Distinctive Properties of a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XX.: Consequence of the Preceding Chapters.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Empire of China.
• Book IX.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force.
• Chap. I.: In What Manner Republics Provide For Their Safety.
• Chap. II.: That a Confederate Government Ought to Be Composed of States of the Same Nature, Especially of the Republican Kind.
• Chap. III.: Other Requisites In a Confederate Republic.
• Chap. IV.: In What Manner Despotic Governments Provide For Their Security.
• Chap. V.: In What Manner a Monarchical Government Provides For Its Security.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Defensive Force of States In General.
• Chap. VII.: A Reflexion.
• Chap. VIII.: A Particular Case, In Which the Defensive Force of a State Is Inferior to the Offensive.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Relative Force of States.
• Chap. X.: Of the Weakness of Neighbouring States.
• Book X.: Of Laws, In the Relation They Bear to Offensive Force.
• Chap. I.: Of Offensive Force.
• Chap. II.: Of War.
• Chap. III.: Of the Right of Conquest.
• Chap. IV.: Some Advantages of a Conquered People.
• Chap. V.: Gelon, King of Syracuse.
• Chap. VI.: Of Conquests Made By a Republic.
• Chap. VII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. VIII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IX.: Of Conquests Made By a Monarchy.
• Chap. X.: Of One Monarchy That Subdues Another.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Manners of a Conquered People.
• Chap. XII.: Of a Law of Cyrus.
• Chap. XIII.: Charles XII.
• Chap. XIV.: Alexander.
• Chap. XV.: New Methods of Preserving a Conquest.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Conquests Made By a Despotic Prince.
• Chap. XVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XI.: Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, With Regard to the Constitution.
• Chap. I.: A General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Different Significations of the Word, Liberty.
• Chap. III.: In What Liberty Consists.
• Chap. IV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. V.: Of the End Or View of Different Governments.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Constitution of England.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Monarchies We Are Acquainted With.
• Chap. VIII.: Why the Ancients Had Not a Clear Idea of Monarchy.
• Chap. IX.: Aristotle’s Manner of Thinking.
• Chap. X.: What Other Politicians Thought.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Government of the Kings of Rome, and In What Manner the Three Powers Were There Distributed.
• Chap. XIII.: General Reflections On the State of Rome After the Expulsion of Its Kings.
• Chap. XIV.: In What Manner the Distribution of the Three Powers Began to Change, After the Expulsion of the Kings.
• Chap. XV.: In What Manner Rome, In the Flourishing State of That Republic, Suddenly Lost Its Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Legislative Power In the Roman Republic.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Executive Power In the Same Republic.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Judiciary Power In the Roman Government.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Government of the Roman Provinces.
• Chap. XX.: The End of This Book.
• Book XII.: Of the Laws That Form Political Liberty, As Relative to the Subject.
• Chap. I.: Idea of This Book.
• Chap. II.: Of the Liberty of the Subject.
• Chap. III.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. IV.: That Liberty Is Favoured By the Nature and Proportion of Punishments.
• Chap. V.: Of Certain Accusations That Require Particular Moderation and Prudence.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Crime Against Nature.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Bad Application of the Name of Sacrilege and High-treason.
• Chap. IX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. X.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XI.: Of Thoughts.
• Chap. XII.: Of Indiscreet Speeches.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Writings.
• Chap. XIV.: Breach of Modesty In Punishing Crimes.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Infranchisement of Slaves, In Order to Accuse Their Master.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Calumny, With Regard to the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Revealing of Conspiracies.
• Chap. XVIII.: How Dangerous It Is, In Republics, to Be Too Severe In Punishing the Crime of High-treason.
• Chap. XIX.: In What Manner the Use of Liberty Is Suspended In a Republic.
• Chap. XX.: Of Laws Favourable to the Liberty of the Subject In a Republic.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Cruelty of Laws, In Respect to Debtors, In a Republic.
• Chap. XXII.: Of Things That Strike At Liberty In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of Spies In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of Anonymous Letters.
• Chap. XXV.: Of the Manner of Governing In Monarchies.
• Chap. XXVI.: That, In a Monarchy, the Prince Ought to Be of Easy Access.
• Chap. XXVII.: Of the Manners of a Monarch.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of the Regard Which Monarchs Owe to Their Subjects.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Civil Laws Proper For Mixing Some Portion of Liberty In a Despotic Government.
• Chap. XXX.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Book XIII.: Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness of the Public Revenues Have to Liberty.
• Chap. I.: Of the Public Revenues.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Bad Reasoning to Say That the Greatness of Taxes Is Good In Its Own Nature.
• Chap. III.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Part of the People Are Villains Or Bondmen.
• Chap. IV.: Of a Republic In the Like Case.
• Chap. V.: Of a Monarchy In the Like Case.
• Chap. VI.: Of a Despotic Government In the Like Case.
• Chap. VII.: Of Taxes In Countries Where Villainage Is Not Established.
• Chap. VIII.: In What Manner the Deception Is Preserved.
• Chap. IX.: Of a Bad Kind of Impost.
• Chap. X.: That the Greatness of Taxes Depends On the Nature of the Government.
• Chap. XI.: Of Confiscations.
• Chap. XII.: Relation Between the Weight of Taxes and Liberty.
• Chap. XIII.: In What Government Taxes Are Capable of Increase.
• Chap. XIV.: That the Nature of the Taxes Is Relative to the Government.
• Chap. XV.: Abuse of Liberty.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Conquests of the Mahometans.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Augmentation of Troops.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of an Exemption From Taxes.
• Chap. XIX.: Which Is Most Suitable to the Prince and to the People, the Farming the Revenues, Or Managing Them By Commission?
• Chap. XX.: Of the Farmers of the Revenues.
• Book XIV.: Of Laws As Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: General Idea.
• Chap. II.: Of the Difference of Men In Different Climates.
• Chap. III.: Contradiction In the Tempers of Some Southern Nations.
• Chap. IV.: Cause of the Immutability of Religion, Manners, Customs, and Laws, In the Eastern Countries.
• Chap. V.: That Those Are Bad Legislators Who Favour the Vices of the Climate, and Good Legislators Who Oppose Those Vices.
• Chap. VI.: Of Agriculture In Warm Climates.
• Chap. VII.: Of Monkery.
• Chap. VIII.: An Excellent Custom of China.
• Chap. IX.: Means of Encouraging Industry.
• Chap. X.: Of the Laws Relative to the Sobriety of the People.
• Chap. XI.: Of the Laws Relative to the Distempers of the Climate.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Laws Against Suicides.
• Chap. XIII.: Effects Arising From the Climate of England.
• Chap. XIV.: Other Effects of the Climate.
• Chap. XV.: Of the Different Confidence Which the Laws Have In the People, According to the Difference of Climates.
• Book XV.: In What Manner the Laws of Civil Slavery Are Relative to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Civil Slavery.
• Chap. II.: Origin of the Right of Slavery Among the Roman Civilians.
• Chap. III.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. IV.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. V.: Of the Slavery of the Negroes.
• Chap. VI.: The True Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VII.: Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.
• Chap. VIII.: Inutility of Slavery Among Us.
• Chap. IX.: Several Kinds of Slavery.
• Chap. X.: Regulations Necessary In Respect to Slavery.
• Chap. XI.: Abuses of Slavery.
• Chap. XII.: Danger From the Multitude of Slaves.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Armed Slaves.
• Chap. XIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XV.: Precautions to Be Used In Moderate Governments.
• Chap. XVI.: Regulations Between Masters and Slaves.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Infranchisements.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of Freed-men and Eunuchs.
• Book XVI.: How the Laws of Domestic Slavery Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Domestic Servitude.
• Chap. II.: That, In the Countries of the South, There Is a Natural Inequality Between the Two Sexes.
• Chap. III.: That a Plurality of Wives Greatly Depends On the Means of Supporting Them.
• Chap. IV.: That the Law of Polygamy Is an Affair That Depends On Calculation.
• Chap. V.: The Reason of a Law of Malabar.
• Chap. VI.: Of Polygamy Considered In Itself.
• Chap. VII.: Of an Equality of Treatment In Case of Many Wives.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Separation of Women From Men.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Connexion Between Domestic and Political Government.
• Chap. X.: The Principle On Which the Morals of the East Are Founded.
• Chap. XI.: Of Domestic Slavery Independently of Polygamy.
• Chap. XII.: Of Natural Modesty.
• Chap. XIII.: Of Jealousy.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Eastern Manner of Domestic Government.
• Chap. XV.: Of Divorce and Repudiation.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Repudiation and Divorce Amongst the Romans.
• Book XVII.: How the Laws of Political Servitude Have a Relation to the Nature of the Climate.
• Chap. I.: Of Political Servitude.
• Chap. II.: The Difference Between Nations In Point of Courage.
• Chap. III.: Of the Climate of Asia.
• Chap. IV.: The Consequences Resulting From This.
• Chap. V.: That, When the People In the North of Asia and Those of the North of Europe Made Conquests, the Effects of the Conquest Were Not the Same.
• Chap. VI.: A New Physical Cause of the Slavery of Asia and of the Liberty of Europe.
• Chap. VII.: Of Africa and America.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Capital of the Empire.
• Book XVIII.: Of Laws In the Relation They Bear to the Nature of the Soil.
• Chap. I.: How the Nature of the Soil Has an Influence On the Laws.
• Chap. II.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. III.: What Countries Are Best Cultivated.
• Chap. IV.: New Effects of the Barrenness and Fertility of Countries.
• Chap. V.: Of the Inhabitants of Islands.
• Chap. VI.: Of Countries Raised By the Industry of Man.
• Chap. VII.: Of Human Industry.
• Chap. VIII.: The General Relation of Laws.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Soil of America.
• Chap. X.: Of Population, In the Relation It Bears to the Manner of Procuring Subsistence.
• Chap. XI.: Of Savage and Barbarous Nations.
• Chap. XII.: Of the Law of Nations Among People Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Civil Law of Those Nations Who Do Not Cultivate the Earth.
• Chap. XIV.: Of the Political State of the People Who Do Not Cultivate the Land.
• Chap. XV.: Of People Who Know the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVI.: Of Civil Laws Among People Who Know Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVII.: Of Political Laws Amongst Nations Who Have Not the Use of Money.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Power of Superstition.
• Chap. XIX.: Of the Liberty of the Arabs and the Servitude of the Tartars.
• Chap. XX.: Of the Law of Nations As Practised By the Tartars.
• Chap. XXI.: The Civil Law of the Tartars.
• Chap. XXII.: Of a Civil Law of the German Nations.
• Chap. XXIII.: Of the Regal Ornaments Among the Franks.
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Marriages of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXV.: Childeric.
• Chap. XXVI.: Of the Time When the Kings of the Franks Became of Age.
• Chap. XXVII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVIII.: Of Adoption Among the Germans.
• Chap. XXIX.: Of the Sanguinary Temper of the Kings of the Franks.
• Chap. XXX.: Of the National Assemblies of the Franks.
• Chap. XXXI.: Of the Authority of the Clergy Under the First Race.
• Book XIX.: Of Laws, In Relation to the Principles Which Form the General Spirit, the Morals, and Customs, of a Nation.
• Chap. I.: Of the Subject of This Book.
• Chap. II.: That It Is Necessary People’s Minds Should Be Prepared For the Reception of the Best Laws.
• Chap. III.: Of Tyranny.
• Chap. IV.: Of the General Spirit of Mankind.
• Chap. V.: How Far We Should Be Attentive Lest the General Spirit of a Nation Be Changed.
• Chap. VI.: That Every Thing Ought Not to Be Corrected.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.
• Chap. VIII.: Effects of a Sociable Temper.
• Chap. IX.: Of the Vanity and Pride of Nations.
• Chap. X.: Of the Character of the Spaniards and Chinese.
• Chap. XI.: A Reflection.
• Chap. XII.: Of Custom and Manners In a Despotic State.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Behaviour of the Chinese.
• Chap. XIV.: What Are the Natural Means of Changing the Manners and Customs of a Nation.
• Chap. XV.: The Influence of Domestic Government On the Political.
• Chap. XVI.: How Some Legislators Have Confounded the Principles Which Govern Mankind.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Peculiar Quality of the Chinese Government.
• Chap. XVIII.: A Consequence Drawn From the Preceding Chapter.
• Chap. XIX.: How This Union of Religion, Laws, Manners, and Customs, Among the Chinese, Was Effected.
• Chap. XX.: Explication of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese.
• Chap. XXI.: How the Laws Ought to Have a Relation to Manners and Customs.
• Chap. XXII.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXIII.: How the Laws Are Founded On the Manners of a People.
• Chap. XXIV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXV.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVI.: The Same Subject Continued.
• Chap. XXVII.: How the Laws Contribute to Form the Manners, Customs, and Character, of a Nation.

CHAP. III.

Of the Laws relative to the Nature of Aristocracy.

IN an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and executive authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them, the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.

They do not vote here by lot; for this would be productive of inconveniencies only. And indeed, in a government where the most mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious: it is the nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.

When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate the affairs which the body of nobles are incapable of deciding, and to prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said, that the aristocracy is in some measure in the senate, the democracy in the body of the nobles, and the people are a cypher.

It would be a very happy thing, in an aristocracy, if the people, in some measure, could be raised from their state of annihilation. Thus, at Genoa, the bank of St. George being administered by the people* gives them a certain influence in the government, from whence their whole prosperity is derived.

The senators ought by no means to have a right of naming their own members; for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses. At Rome, which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy, the senate did not fill up the vacant places in their own body: the new members were nominated by the* censors.

In a republic, the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant power produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy. In the latter, the laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted themselves to, the constitution; and the principle of government checks the monarch: but, in a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant power,† the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws foresaw it not, and consequently made no provision against it.

There is an exception to this rule, when the constitution is such as to have immediate need of a magistrate invested with an exorbitant power. Such was Rome with her dictators; such is Venice with her state-inquisitors: these are formidable magistrates, who restore, as it were by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that these magistracies are so very different in these two republics? It is because Rome supported the remains of her aristocracy against the people; whereas Venice employs her state-inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy against the nobles. The consequence was, that at Rome the dictatorship could be only of a short duration, as the people act through passion, and not with design. It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should be exercised with lustre and pomp; the business being to intimidate, and not to punish, the multitude. It was also proper that the dictator should be created only for some particular affair, and for this only should have an unlimited authority, as he was always created upon some sudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occasion for a permanent magistracy; for here it is that schemes may be set on foot, continued, suspended, and resumed; that the ambition of a single person becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many. They have occasion for a secret magistracy, the crimes they punish being hatched in secrecy and silence. This magistracy must have a general inquisition; for their business is not to remedy known disorders, but to prevent the unknown. In a word, the latter is designed to punish suspected crimes; whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment, even for crimes that were openly avowed.

In all magistracies the greatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration. This most legislators have fixed to a year: a longer space would be dangerous, and a shorter would be contrary to the nature of government; for who is it that, in the management even of his domestic affairs, would be thus confined? At Ragusa* the chief magistrate of the republic is changed every month, the other officers every week, and the governor of the castle every day. But this can take place only in a small republic environed† by formidable powers, who might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant magistrates.

The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the legislature are so few and inconsiderable, that the governing party have no interest in oppressing them. Thus, when‡ Antipater made a law at Athens, that whosoever was not worth two thousand drachms should have no power to vote, he formed, by this method, the best aristocracy possible; because this was so small a sum, as excluded very few, and not one of any rank or consideration in the city.

Aristocratical families ought, therefore, as much as possible, to level themselves, in appearance, with the people. The more an aristocracy borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches to perfection; and, in proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more it is imperfect.

But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the people that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command; as the aristocracy of Poland, where the peasants are slaves to the nobility.

[* ]See Mr. Addison’s Travels to Italy.

[* ]They were named at first by the consuls.

[† ]This is what ruined the republic of Rome. See Considerations on the causes of the grandeur and decline of the Romans.

[* ]Tournefort’s voyages.

[† ]At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months.

[‡ ]Diodorus, lib. 18. p. 601. Rhodoman’s edition.