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• Notes On Aristotle’s Politics.
• Book I.
• Book II.
• Book III.
• Book IV.
• Book V.
• Book VI.
• Book VII.
• Book VIII.

BOOK I.

ἐπειδὴ πα̂σαν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

• Every community aims at some good:
• Every city is a community; and therefore
• Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

• Whereas all communities aim at some good,
• the highest aim at the highest good:
• The city is the highest community; and therefore
• The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

πα̂σα τέχνη καὶ πα̂σα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρα̂ξις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθον̂ τινὸς ἐϕίεσθαι δοκεɩ̂· διὸ καλω̂ς ἀπεϕήναντο τἀγαθὸν οὑ̑ πάντ’ ἐϕίεται.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τον̂ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται ϕύσει; and the Posterior Analytics, πα̂σα διδασκαλία καὶ πα̂σα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: ‘But a community is a complex organisation;’ Or, ‘But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;’ Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;— ‘We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.’

Ὅσοι μὲν ον̓̂ν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἰ̂ναι τὸν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle’s enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politicus, 259 C, ϕανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ’ ἐστὶ ταν̂τα· ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικήν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῳ̑ διαϕερώμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1-5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2-8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἡ τω̂ν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαϕέρει τη̂ς τω̂ν κοινω̂ν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

οἱ̑ον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων. Sc. ἄρχων ᾐ̑, or ἄρχῃ.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,

sc. τὸν ἄρχοντα λέγουσι.

τη̂ς ἐπιστήμης τη̂ς τοιαύτης,

sc. πολιτικη̂ς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικὸν which follows:—‘According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.’ Cp. i. 8. § 7, θάλατταν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained from ἁλιείας which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη κτη̂σις, where τοιαύτη (meaning ‘in the sense of a bare livelihood’) is gathered from αὐτόϕυτος and μὴ δι’ ἀλλαγη̂ς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δεɩ̂ δὲ τοιούτους εἰ̂ναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεɩ̂ν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν; where τοιούτους, meaning ‘disunited,’ is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἡ̑ττον γὰρ ἔσται ϕιλία κοινω̂ν ὄντων τω̂ν τέκνων καὶ τω̂ν γυναικω̂ν: and ii. 6. § 22, ὡς μὲν ον̓̂ν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεɩ̂ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, where the idea of an ‘imperfect’ state, like that contained in Plato’s Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ὑϕηγημένην μέθοδον.

i. e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικη̂ς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑϕηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δον̂λος τη̂ς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἠ̑ν.

ὑϕηγημένην, ‘which we have followed,’ not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὸν ὑϕηγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but ‘generally’ or ‘in this discussion.’ The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τω̂ν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεɩ̂ν (ταν̂τα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τον̂ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὡ̑ν σύγκειται σκοπον̂ντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μα̂λλον, τί τε διαϕέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεɩ̂ν περὶ ἕκαστον τω̂ν ῥηθέντων.

τούτων may either refer 1)* to ἐξ ὡ̑ν σύγκειται, i. e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἕκαστον τω̂ν ῥηθέντων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τούτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of ‘the kinds of rule’ in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καί, according to the first explanation = ‘as about the state so about the elements of the state,’ according to the second, = ‘about kinds of government as well as about other things.’ ὥσπερ ἐν τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις . . καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὥσπερ ἐν τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e. g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχη̂ς τὰ πράγματα ϕυόμενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν.

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e. g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

καὶ ἐν . . . ϕυτοɩ̂ς ϕυσικὸν τὸ ἐϕίεσθαι, οἱ̑ον αὐτό, τοιον̂τον καταλιπεɩ̂ν ἕτερον.

Aristotle, like Plato (Symp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.

ταν̂τα ποιεɩ̂ν,

sc. τὰ προορώμενα ὑπὸ τον̂ ἄρχοντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

τὴν Δελϕικὴν μάχαιραν.

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the ὀβελισκολύχνιον mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as λαμβάνουσα ἔμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηρον̂ν, ‘having an iron part added to it in front.’ The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

τὸ ϕύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, . . . γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτω̂ν δούλης καὶ δούλου.

‘Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.’ Cp. infra, cc. 12, 13.

‘ο[Editor: illegible character]κον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναɩ̂κά τε βον̂ν τ’ ἀροτη̂ρα·’

Compare Wallace’s Russia (p. 90. ed. 8). ‘The natural labour unit (i. e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.’

εἰς πα̂σαν ἡμέραν.

‘For wants which recur every day,’ and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.

ὁμοκάπνους.

‘Sitting in the smoke of one fire’ is read by MSS. of the better class, P⁴, L^s, corr. M^b, William de Moerbek; ὁμοκάπους by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word ‘fed at the same manger’ is better suited to the context.

ἡ δ’ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιω̂ν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐϕημέρου κώμη.

There was a time when the κώμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ἡ γενω̂ν καὶ κωμω̂ν κοινωνία ζωη̂ς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους), and Thucydides, i. 5: ib. 10 (κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῳ̑ παλαιῳ̑ τη̂ς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, sc. τη̂ς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Ætolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. To be taken with the words which follow: ‘When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.’

μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ ϕύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἰ̂ναι· οὓς καλον̂σί τινες ὁμογάλακτας, παɩ̂δάς τε καὶ παίδων παɩ̂δας.

‘The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.’ (There should be a comma in the Greek after ὁμογάλακτας; the words παɩ̂δάς τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with καλον̂σιν, being really an explanation of ἀποικία.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ἀποικία οἰκίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, ‘Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.’

ὁμογάλακτες, a rare term for γεννη̂ται or ϕράτερες.

διὸ καὶ τὸ πρω̂τον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νν̂ν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνη̂λθον. πα̂σα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τον̂ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τον̂τ’ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος,

• ‘θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
• παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων.’

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαɩ̂ον ᾢκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τον̂το πάντες ϕασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νν̂ν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαɩ̂ον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοɩ̂ς ἀϕομοιον̂σιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τω̂ν θεω̂ν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men’s ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνη̂λθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Either ‘the relation of the members of the κώμη (γένος) to one another,’ or ‘to the original οἰκία.’

‘θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων.’

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13, κυκλωπικω̂ς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχου.

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοɩ̂ς ἀϕομοιον̂σιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τω̂ν θεω̂ν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

τέλειος πόλις.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

γινομένη μὲν ον̓̂ν τον̂ ζη̂ν ἕνεκεν, ον̓̂σα δὲ τον̂ εν̓̂ ζη̂ν.

‘The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.’

ον̓̂σα partly derives its meaning from γινομένη, ‘having a true being’ opposed to ‘coming into being’ (cp. οὐσία and γένεσις).

ἡ δὲ ϕύσις τέλος [Editor: illegible character]στίν.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this transcendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the οἰκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the οἰκία as prior to the state and more necessary (πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 a 26.

εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρω̂ται κοινωνίαι.

‘If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.’ But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

τω̂ν ϕύσει ἡ πόλις.

i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word ϕύσις, which is not applicable to the state.

ϕύσει τοιον̂τος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοɩ̂ς.

Lit. ‘For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.’

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives ‘sicut in volatilibus’) reads πετεινοɩ̂ς. πετοɩ̂ς is the reading of one late MS., πεττοɩ̂ς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἄζυξ occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our backgammon; the game is not however called πεττοί, nor does the description answer to the game of πεττοί. The word ἄζυξ, when applied to a game, may mean either ‘exposed’ or ‘blocked,’ and so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πετεινοɩ̂ς, ἄζυξ might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου in the next sentence.

But neither ἐν πεττοɩ̂ς nor ἐν πετεινοɩ̂ς can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ἄζυξ ὤν, alteration into ἄνευ ζυγον̂ τυγχάνων) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ἄζυξ is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

διότι.

Either 1) *‘why,’ or 2) ‘that.’ In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—‘Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.’

ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεɩ̂ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

τούτων, sc. ‘of these perceptions,’ or rather ‘of those who have these perceptions.’ For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῃ̑ ϕύσει κ.τ.λ.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is ϕύσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνῳ πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαϕθαρεɩ̂σα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη.

Referring either 1) to ὁμωνύμως:—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαϕθαρεɩ̂σα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *to ὥσπερ λιθίνη ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

ὅτι μὲν ον̓̂ν ἡ πόλις καὶ ϕύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, δη̂λον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῃ̑ ϕύσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

ϕύσει μὲν ον̓̂ν ἡ ὁρμή.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.

ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων ϕύεται ϕρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῃ̑, οἱ̑ς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρη̂σθαι μάλιστα.

1) *ὅπλα ἔχων = ὡπλισμένος, the words ϕρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῃ̑ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of ϕρόνησις and ἀρετή as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished ϕρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινότης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become ϕρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανουργία) and ἀρετή, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere ϕυσικὴ ἀρετὴ (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, as ὁρμαί τινες ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεɩ̂α καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ἄνευ νον̂ βλαβεραὶ ϕαίνονται ον̓̂σαι, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate ‘Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments for wisdom and virtue;’ i. e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into ϕρόνησις and ἀρετή, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of ‘for’ after ὅπλα ἔχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with ϕύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὅπλα ἔχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that ‘man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.’

ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι χρη̂σθαι μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe’s Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, ‘Er nennt’s Vernunft und braucht’s allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;’ and Nic. Eth. vii. 6. § 7, ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας ϕοβερώτερον δέ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τω̂ν ἀνδρω̂ν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά, οἳ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ ϕύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾳ̑.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικη̂ς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τον̂ δικαίου κρίσις.

‘But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.’

In this passage δίκη is the ‘administration of justice’: δικαιοσύνη, ‘the virtue of justice’: τὸ δίκαιον, ‘the principle of justice to be applied in each case.’

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὡ̑ν αν̓̂θις οἰκία συνίσταται· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.

αν̓̂θις = ‘in turn.’ ‘As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.’ Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

ταν̂τα δ’ ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμική and τεκνοποιητική. In ordinary Greek they would have meant ‘of or referring to marriage,’ and ‘to the procreation of children’: here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theæt. 182 A, where he calls ποιότης an ἀλλόκοτον ὄνομα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναɩ̂κα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where πατρική is used for what is here called τεκνοποιητική. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2, 3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. 1. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀναισθησία, upon the anonymous mean of ϕιλοτιμία and ἀϕιλοτιμία, upon ἀϕοβία the excess of courage, and upon ὄνομα ἀόριστον, ῥη̂μα ἀόριστον, ἀόριστος ἀρχή.

ἔστωσαν δ’ αὑ̑ται τρεɩ̂ς ἃς εἴπομεν.

‘Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.’ Cp. περὶ τριω̂ν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αἱ were inserted before τρεɩ̂ς: ‘let there be those three.’

τοɩ̂ς δὲ παρὰ ϕύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

• ἓν γάρ τι τοɩ̂ς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην ϕέρει
• τοὔνομα· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα τω̂ν ἐλευθέρων
• οὐδεὶς κακίων δον̂λος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ᾐ̑.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

• κακὸς γὰρ ὅστις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτω̂ν
• καὶ ξυγγέγηθε καὶ ξυνωδίνει κακοɩ̂ς.
• ἔγω μὲν εἴην, κεἰ πέϕυχ’ ὑμω̂ν λάτρις,
• ἐν τοɩ̂σι γενναίοισιν ἠριθμημένος
• δούλοισι, τοὔνομ’ οὐκ ἔχων ἐλεύθερον
• τὸν νον̂ν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

• δον̂λον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν τοὔνομ’ οὐ διαϕθερεɩ̂
• πολλοὶ δ’ ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τω̂ν ἐλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

• κἂν δον̂λος ᾐ̑ τις, οὐθὲν ἡ̑ττον, δέσποτα,
• ἄνθρωπος οὑ̑τός ἐστιν, ἂν ἄνθρωπος ᾐ̑.

ib. fr. 39,—

• κἂν δον̂λός ἐστι, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει·
• ϕύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δον̂λος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
• ἡ δ’ αν̓̂ Τύχη τὸ σω̂μα κατεδουλώσατο.

βίαιον γάρ.

Either 1) * = παρὰ ϕύσιν or simply 2) ‘brought about by violence;’ βία may be opposed either to ϕύσις or νόμος or both.

ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν ταɩ̂ς ὡρισμ[Editor: illegible character]ναις τέχναις ἀναγκαɩ̂ον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεɩ̂α ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τω̂ν οἰκονομικω̂ν.

The first six words ὥσπερ . . . τέχναις are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δέ; and for the omission of both δὲ and ἐν.

Retaining Bekker’s reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ἐπεὶ ον̓̂ν begin with καὶ ἡ κτητική; or 2) δὲ after ὥσπερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ἐπεὶ in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορω̂ν δι’ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν κ.τ.λ.). If we omit δέ, the apodosis still begins with ὥσπερ.

ταɩ̂ς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀϕωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν.

Instead of Bekker’s reading οὕτω καὶ τω̂ν οἰκονομικω̂ν another reading οὕτω καὶ τῳ̑ οἰκονομικῳ̑ has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) ‘sic et yconomico.’ But τω̂ν οἰκονομικω̂ν is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. οἰκεɩ̂α ὄργανα δεɩ̂ ὑπάρχειν.

καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων.

Not ‘instead of’ but ‘taking precedence of’:—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρὸ cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δον̂λος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου. So the hand is spoken of as ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is as follows:—‘There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.’

τὰ μὲν ον̓̂ν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτη̂μα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τη̂ς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρη̂σιν αὐτη̂ς, ἀπὸ δὲ τη̂ς ἐσθη̂τος καὶ τη̂ς κλίνης ἡ χρη̂σις μόνον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ὄργανα should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλον̂τος ὀργάνων πλη̂θός ἐστιν οἰκονομικω̂ν καὶ πολιτικω̂ν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ὄργανον: ‘there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the instrument of doing something’). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the ‘instrument preceding instruments’ (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12-14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

ὁ δὲ βίος πρα̂ξις, οὐ ποίησίς ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δον̂λος ὑπηρέτης τω̂ν πρὸς τὴν πρα̂ξιν.

‘Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master’s life.’

τὸ γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου.

Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 8, τὸ δὲ κτη̂μα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾐ̑ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῃ̑, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτον̂.

ὅλως ἐκείνου.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave’s individuality is lost in his master.

τῳ̑ λόγῳ θεωρη̂σαι καὶ ἐκ τω̂ν γινομένων καταμαθεɩ̂ν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the ‘long and difficult language of facts.’ The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them any more than between the a priori and a posteriori reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.

εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετη̂ς.

‘From their very birth,’ or, with a logical turn, ‘to go no further than the state of birth;’ cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τον̂το εὐθὺς ὑϕήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν and infra § 4, τὸ δὲ ζῳ̑ον πρω̂τον κ.τ.λ.

ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει, τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον.

‘As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.’

εἴτ’ ἐκ συνεχω̂ν εἴτ’ ἐκ διῃρημένων.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τον̂το ἐκ τη̂ς ἁπάσης ϕύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοɩ̂ς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοɩ̂ς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωη̂ς ἐστί τις ἀρχή, οἱ̑ον ἁρμονίας.

1) The connexion is as follows: ‘This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them. *It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate’ (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or ἐκ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. ‘Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings’ (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation, the addition of μάλιστα after ἐνυπάρχει, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

οἱ̑ον ἁρμονίας.

Either 1)* ‘as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,’ or 2) ‘as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.’ The first accords best with the common meaning of the word ἁρμονία and with the use of the genitive.

ἐξωτερικωτέρας.

‘Somewhat foreign to the present subject,’ not in the sense of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

τὸ δὲ ζῳ̑ον πρω̂τον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχη̂ς καὶ σώματος, ὡ̑ν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ ϕύσει τὸ δ’ ἀρχόμενον.

i. e. ‘the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.’

The opposition expressed by δὲ in τὸ δὲ ζῳ̑ον is as follows: ‘not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.’

For πρω̂τον (which is to be taken with συνέστηκε) meaning either ‘to go no further,’ or ‘as the first result of analysis,’ cp. πρω̂τον ἐν ζῴῳ θεωρη̂σαι infra § 6, and the similar use of εὐθὺς supra § 2.

δεɩ̂ δὲ σκοπεɩ̂ν ἐν τοɩ̂ς κατὰ ϕύσιν ἔχουσι μα̂λλον τὸ ϕύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοɩ̂ς διεϕθαρμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 ‘num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?’

ἔστι δ’ ον̓̂ν ὥσπερ λέγομεν.

A resumption of the words τὸ δὲ ζῳ̑ον πρω̂τον above.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχή κ.τ.λ.

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 ἄρχον δὲ ϕύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. εἴπερ καὶ τοɩ̂ς εἰρημένοις.

I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν.

‘Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.’

τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῳ̑α οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεɩ̂· καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν.

‘The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.’

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in nothing the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

βούλεται μὲν ον̓̂ν ἡ ϕύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαϕέροντα ποιεɩ̂ν τὰ τω̂ν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τω̂ν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρη̂σιν, τὰ δ’ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὑ̑τος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ’ ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς.

‘Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen:’ that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τοὺς μὲν to the freemen and τοὺς δὲ to the slaves: ‘the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i. e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.’

ἐλευθέρων must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχάς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, ‘intention’ or ‘design;’ secondly, ‘tendency.’ The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλομαι Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μένειν μα̂λλον, sc. τὸ νόμισμα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), οὔποτε δουλείη κεϕαλὴ ἰθεɩ̂α πέϕυκεν ¦ ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ σκολιή, καὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει.

ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεɩ̂ν τό τε τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τον̂ σώματος.

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ ϕύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεποι, οἱ δὲ δον̂λοι, ϕανερόν·

οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ are not subdivisions of τινές, which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) τινὲς μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τινὲς δὲ δον̂λοι: and 2) οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δούλοι. In other words the construction beginning with τινὲς has varied into οἱ μὲν—οἱ δέ.

ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράϕονται παρανόμων.

‘But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.’ The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, νόμος γὰρ ἐν πα̂σιν ἀνθρώποις ἀΐδιός ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἁλῳ̑, τω̂ν ἑλόντων εἰ̂ναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τω̂ν ἐν τῃ̑ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τη̂ς ἀμϕισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεɩ̂ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατον̂ν ἐν ὑπεροχῃ̑ ἀγαθον̂ τινός, ὥστε δοκεɩ̂ν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετη̂ς εἰ̂ναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τον̂ δικαίου μόνον εἰ̂ναι τὴν ἀμϕισβήτησιν. Διὰ γὰρ τον̂το τοɩ̂ς μὲν εὔνοια δοκεɩ̂ τὸ δίκαιον εἰ̂ναι, τοɩ̂ς δ’ αὐτὸ τον̂το δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τω̂ν λόγων οὔτ’ ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεɩ̂ τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.

ὃ ποιεɩ̂ τοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, ὁμοιίου πολέμοιο ¦ πεɩ̂ραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες (Il. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ’ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἱ̑ς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοπον̂μεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτω̂ν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—ταν̂τα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεɩ̂ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἰ̂ναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. See also infra c. 9. § 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue. Cp. Plat. Rep. i. 352 ff.

Διὰ γὰρ τον̂το, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτων τω̂ν λόγων in § 4 refers, not to the τοὺς λόγους of § 3, but to the two positions which immediately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second, that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the connexion between ἀρετὴ and βία; the point in dispute being whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4). If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: ‘but there is no force or plausibility in this’ [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong conviction, which is repeated again and again in the Politics, that the superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: ‘There are others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the war may be unjust, and the persons may be ‘nature’s freemen,’ and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable; and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror is invalid.

The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of διὰ γὰρ τον̂το (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is εὔνοια a) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or b) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, οἱ̑ς καὶ συμϕέρει τὸ δουλεύειν, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)? The thesis that ‘justice is benevolence’ is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words διαστάντων χωρὶς = a)* ‘being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,’ or b) ‘being set aside?’ Both uses of διίστασθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεɩ̂α (sc. of Empedocles) διειστήκει χωρὶς ὑπὸ τον̂ νείκους, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words ἅτεροι λόγοι refer a) to one of the two preceding propositions, or b) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of ‘the latter,’ or ‘one of these two propositions.’ It is better to translate ‘the other view,’ which is explained by what follows, ὡς οὐ δεɩ̂ κ.τ.λ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is εὔνοια. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1-3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and ϕιλία: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, ‘Love is the fulfilling of the law.’

ὅλως δ’ ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός·

‘There are some again who identify law and justice.’ Ὅλως may be taken either 1) with τιθέασι, ‘they maintain in general terms,’ i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with ἀντεχόμενοι, ‘holding absolutely to a kind of justice.’

ἅμα δ’ οὔ ϕασιν·

‘But in the same breath they say the opposite,’ i.e. they are compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἰ̂ναι τω̂ν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμω̂ς ἂν ϕαίη τις δον̂λον εἰ̂ναι.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1)* the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους.

Cp. Xen. Hell. i. 6. § 14, κελευὄντων τω̂ν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους οὐκ ἔϕη [ὁ Καλλικρατίδας] ἑαυτον̂ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθη̂ναι, and Plat. Rep. v. 469 B, C, where Plato indignantly prohibits Hellenes from becoming the owners of other Hellenes taken in war.

ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη ϕησί.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, παράδειγμα ἐκ τον̂ Σωκράτους τον̂ Θεοδέκτου, Εἰς ποɩ̂ον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεω̂ν οὐ τετίμηκεν, ὡ̑ν ἡ πόλις νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρω̂ν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσω̂ν ἡδονω̂ν ἡττα̂ται ἢ λυπω̂ν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τον̂ ἔχεως πεπληγμἔνος, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

ὅταν δὲ τον̂το λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀρετ[Editor: illegible character] καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι τὸ δον̂λον καὶ ἐλεύθερον.

‘When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.’

ἡ δὲ ϕύσις βούλεται μὲν τον̂το ποιεɩ̂ν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται.

Not ‘nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,’ for she always intends it; nor ‘nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,’ which does violence to the order of the words πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι: but ‘this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,’ πολλάκις adhering to both clauses.

ὅτι μὲν ον̓̂ν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμϕισβήτησις.

ἡ ἀμϕισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τἀναντία ϕάσκοντες.

καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν ϕύσει δον̂λοι οἱ δ’ ἐλεύθεροι.

‘And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,’ repeating ὅτι. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ ϕύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δον̂λοι, ϕανερόν: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. ‘Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.’

The words εἰσὶ καὶ are inserted before οὐκ εἰσὶν by Bekker, (ed. 2); ‘if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.’ The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιον̂τον, ὡ̑ν συμϕέρει τῳ̑ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῳ̑ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

‘Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule’; ὡ̑ν is substituted for οἱ̑ς, that it may be in regimen with τῳ̑ μέν.

ὥστε καὶ δεσπόζειν.

‘And consequently the master over his slaves,’ i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

διὸ καὶ συμϕέρον ἐστί τι καὶ ϕιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, ᾐ̑ μὲν ον̓̂ν δον̂λος οὐκ ἐστὶ ϕιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾐ̑ δὲ ἄνθρωπος. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle’s position.

ϕανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; ‘From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,’ is clearly proven.

ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἑτέρων κ.τ.λ.

‘Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.’ Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

δον̂λος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

Aristotle clearly uses the word πρὸ in the sense of precedence as supra c. 4. § 2, ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἑτέρα ἀμϕοτέρων τούτων, οἱ̑ον ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις ον̓̂σα ἢ θηρευτική.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 21) or hunting. The words οἱ̑ον ἡ δικαία imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτη̂ς [sc. τη̂ς κτητικη̂ς], ᾐ̑ δεɩ̂ χρη̂σθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τω̂ν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεϕυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς ϕύσει δίκαιον τον̂τον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον). The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of οἱ̑ον is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays, ‘for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting;’ for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to τις is feeble; but ‘I mean to say,’ or ‘I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.’ (See Bonitz, Index Arist., s.v. οἱ̑ον.)

ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικη̂ς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑϕηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δον̂λος τη̂ς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἠ̑ν.

‘We have been speaking (ἠ̑ν) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.’ For ὑϕηγημένον cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῃ̑ οἰκονομικῃ̑ ἐστίν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

ὥστε πρω̂τον κ.τ.λ. = ‘the question arises’ or ‘we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,’ which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast χρηματιστικὴ in all its branches with οἰκονομική, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause ὥστε πρω̂τον κ.τ.λ. following as if ἔστι τον̂ χρηματιστικον̂ θεωρη̂σαι without εἰ had preceded. The words ἔστι τον̂ χρηματιστικον̂ κ.τ.λ. are to be repeated with πότερον μέρος τι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροϕη̂ς.

‘The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.’

πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων.

τὰς ῥαστώνας κ.τ.λ. ‘For their convenience and the obtaining’; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, ‘for the opportunity of obtaining.’

τούτων. Sc. καρπον̂, ζῴων, understood from ζῳοϕάγα, καρποϕάγα.

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks.

θάλατταν τοιαύτην.

Sc. συμϕέρουσαν πρὸς ἁλιείαν. Cp. note on c. 1. § 2.

αὐτόϕυτον.

Either 1)* ‘immediately obtained from the products of nature’ = ἐξ αὐτη̂ς τη̂ς ϕύσεως, or 2) = αὐτουργόν, ‘by their own labour.’

τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον.

Bernays reads ἐνδεέστερον without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (ἐνδεέστατον) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

σκωληκοτοκεɩ̂.

Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τω̂ν δ’ ἀναίμων τὰ ἔντομα σκωληκοτοκεɩ̂. The term ‘vermiparous’ is not strictly correct: for all animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an egg.

τὴν τον̂ καλουμένου γάλακτος ϕύσιν.

A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. ἡ τη̂ς ἀτμίδος, τον̂ σπέρματος, τω̂ν καταμηνίων, ϕύσις, Hist. Animal. passim. (See Bonitz, Index Arist., p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

ὥστε ὁμοίως δη̂λον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε ϕυτὰ τω̂ν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἰ̂ναι καὶ τἀ̑λλα ζῳ̑α τω̂ν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρη̂σιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροϕήν, τω̂ν δ’ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλεɩ̂στα τη̂ς τροϕη̂ς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτω̂ν.

Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (Politicus 263 D) that ‘a crane or some other intelligent animal’ would have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, Analogy, Pt. I., ch. vii.: ‘It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.’ Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν, and εὐθὺς καὶ τελειωθεɩ̂σι: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Göttling and Bernays) γενομένοις, which is found with a slight variation, γενωμένοις, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has ‘genitis.’ For the use of γενομένοις = ‘after they are born’ cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 12. § 5, τον̂ γὰρ εἰ̂ναι καὶ τραϕη̂ναι αἴτιοι (sc. οἱ γονεɩ̂ς) καὶ γενομένοις τον̂ παιδευθη̂ναι.

ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτη̂ς (sc. τη̂ς πολεμικη̂ς).

Cp. Plat. Soph. 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (Primitive Property, c. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.

ἓν μὲν ον̓̂ν εἰ̂δος κτητικη̂ς κατὰ ϕύσιν τη̂ς οἰκονομικη̂ς μέρος ἐστίν.

In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—‘one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.’

κατὰ ϕύσιν is equivalent to ἣ κατὰ ϕύσιν ἐστί, and is best taken, not with οἰκονομικη̂ς (Bernays) but with κτητικη̂ς, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ ϕύσιν τοɩ̂ς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοɩ̂ς πολιτικοɩ̂ς, καὶ δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν, δη̂λον.

ὃ δεɩ̂ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, ὡ̑ν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας.

ὃ δεɩ̂ is a confused expression referring grammatically to εἰ̂δος κτητικη̂ς or τη̂ς οἰκονομικη̂ς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It it needless to read with Bernays καθ’ ὃ δεɩ̂, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

αὐτὴν refers to κτητικὴ or possibly to ϕύσις: the nominative to ὑπάρχῃ is either the same as to ὑπάρχειν, i. e. ὃ = κτήματα understood from εἰ̂δος κτητικη̂ς, or θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων ἅ ἐστι πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαɩ̂α, the genitive ὡ̑ν being substituted by attraction for the nominative = ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ χρήματα ὡ̑ν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμός. It must be admitted that the words ὡ̑ν ἐστὶ would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

πλούτου δ’ οὐθὲν τέρμα πεϕασμένον ἀνδράσι κεɩ̂ται.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἀνθρώποισι for ἀνδράσι κεɩ̂ται.

κεɩ̂ται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταɩ̂ς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) πλούτῳ understood = τῃ̑ τέχνῃ τον̂ πλούτου: or 2) ταɩ̂ς ἄλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely = ‘in the other arts’: or 3) τῃ̑ κατὰ ϕύσιν κτητικῃ̑ may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμια̂ς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλον̂τος ὀργάνων πλη̂θός ἐστιν οἰκονομικω̂ν καὶ πολιτικω̂ν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.

Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere ‘the good is of the nature of the finite,’ whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τον̂ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τον̂ πεπερασμένου: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, ‘the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.’

δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν.

Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

δι’ ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεɩ̂ πέρας.

‘Owing to which,’ or ‘to the nature of which,’ ‘there appears to be no limit,’ etc.

ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ϕύσει ἡ δ’ οὐ ϕύσει.

So Plato divides κτητικὴ into θηρευτικὴ and ἀλλακτική, Soph. 223 ff.

ἑκάστου κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρη̂σις.

Cp. Adam Smith’s ‘Value in use’ and ‘Value in exchange’; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοɩ̂ς.

Sc. τοɩ̂ς ἀνθρώποις.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ τω̂ν αὐτω̂ν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλω̂ν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων· ὡ̑ν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαɩ̂ον ποιεɩ̂σθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.

Bernays inserts ἕτεροι before ἑτέρων, which he would translate ‘different persons want different things;’ and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κεχωρισμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:— 1)* ‘In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same’: or 2) καὶ ἑτέρων may be taken more simply: ‘they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well’; i. e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The word ἐκοινώνουν = κοινὰ εἰ̂χον is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like εἰ̂χον or ἐκτω̂ντο is wanted.

For κεχωρισμένοι compare ii. 2. § 3, Διοίσει δὲ τῳ̑ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὠ̂σι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλη̂θος, ἀλλ’ οἱ̑ον Ἀρκάδες.

οἱ μέν, sc. οἱ ἐν τῃ̑ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, ‘mankind in the first stage of society’; οἱ δέ, sc. πλείονος τη̂ς κοινωνίας οὔσης further explained by κεχωρισμένοι, ‘mankind after their dispersion.’

ὡ̑ν in the words which follow is to be connected with τὰς μεταδόσεις.

καὶ τω̂ν βαρβαρικω̂ν ἐθνω̂ν.

καὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause ‘As moreover some barbarian nations still do.’ There is no need to introduce νν̂ν after καὶ without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τη̂ς κατὰ ϕύσιν αὐταρκείας.

Lit. ‘to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;’ or ‘to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,’ = εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τη̂ς κατὰ ϕύσιν ἐνδείας ὥστε αὐτάρκη εἰ̂ναι.

κατὰ λόγον. ‘In a natural way’; ‘as might be expected.’

ξενικωτέρας γινομένης τη̂ς βοηθείας.

‘When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,’ etc.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τον̂ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρη̂σις.

‘Of necessity there arose a currency.’

Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 371 B, νόμισμα σύμβολον τη̂ς ἀλλαγη̂ς ἕνεκα. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 11, οἱ̑ον δ’ ὑπάλλαγμα τη̂ς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην.

ὃ τω̂ν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὂν εἰ̂χε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον.

‘Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,’ although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (λη̂ρος); see § 11.

πορισθέντος ον̓̂ν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τη̂ς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγη̂ς θάτερον εἰ̂δος τη̂ς χρηματιστικη̂ς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ μὲν πρω̂τον ἁπλω̂ς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἰ̂τα δι’ ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πω̂ς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεɩ̂στον ποιήσει κέρδος.

θάτερον εἰ̂δος, i.e. ‘other’ than what Aristotle before called ἓν εἰ̂δος κτητικη̂ς (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from καπηλική. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that καπηλική, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν καὶ πω̂ς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on δι’ ἐμπειρίας.

For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90-145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεɩ̂ον καὶ πέρας τη̂ς ἀλλαγη̂ς.

Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὑ̑τος ὁ πλον̂τος.

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there is a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word πέρας, (1) ‘limit’ or ‘measure,’ as opposed to the infinite or indefinite ἄπειρον, and (2) ‘end’ as opposed to ‘means.’ Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τον̂ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι καὶ ἑκάστη τω̂ν τεχνω̂ν τον̂ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεɩ̂νο βούλονται ποιεɩ̂ν), τω̂ν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τη̂ς χρηματιστικη̂ς οὐκ ἔστι τον̂ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιον̂τος πλον̂τος καὶ χρημάτων κτη̂σις.

‘The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.’ Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

τη̂ς δ’ οἰκονομικη̂ς οὐ χρηματιστικη̂ς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τον̂το τη̂ς οἰκονομικη̂ς ἔργον.

Lit. ‘the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. ὁ τοιον̂τος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.’

ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρη̂σις τον̂ αὐτον̂ ον̓̂σα ἑκατέρα τη̂ς χρηματιστικη̂ς.

‘For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.’

ἡ χρη̂σις governs both τη̂ς χρηματιστικη̂ς and τον̂. αὐτον̂. The emendation of Bernays ἑκατέρᾳ τῃ̑ χρηματιστικῃ̑ is unnecessary.

τη̂ς γὰρ αὐτη̂ς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτη̂σις, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τη̂ς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος, τη̂ς δ’ ἡ αὔξησις.

χρήσεως κτη̂σις. ‘For acquisition belongs to the same use of χρηματιστική,’ i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τον̂ εν̓̂ ζη̂ν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητον̂σιν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ καὶ τον̂τ’ ἐν τῃ̑ κτήσει ϕαίνεται ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (τον̂τ’) depend on wealth. Cp. τον̂το, § 15, referring to χρηματιστική.

ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεɩ̂ν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος.

I. e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

δη̂λον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχη̂ς, πότερον τον̂ οἰκονομικον̂ καὶ πολιτικον̂ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ δεɩ̂ τον̂το μὲν ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ ἀπορούμενον see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2.

τον̂το, sc. τὰ χρήματα, understood from χρηματιστικὴ as infra § 3 τον̂το ὑπάρχειν refers to τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ δεɩ̂ is the other alternative of the ἀπορία, implying the answer to the question: ‘whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.’

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεɩ̂ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβον̂σα παρὰ τη̂ς ϕύσεως χρη̂ται αὐτοɩ̂ς, οὕτω καὶ τροϕὴν τὴν ϕύσιν δεɩ̂ παραδον̂ναι γη̂ν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι.

The last words γη̂ν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι are either 1)* in apposition with τὴν ϕύσιν, or 2) accusatives after παραδον̂ναι. In the first case γη̂ν and θάλατταν are an explanation of τὴν ϕύσιν. In the second case τροϕὴν is a remote accusative, ‘nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.’ The latter way of taking the words is forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεɩ̂, ταν̂τα διαθεɩ̂ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον.

ἐκ τούτων, ‘thereupon,’ i. e. ἐκ τον̂ λαβεɩ̂ν παρὰ ϕύσεως; ταν̂τα διαθεɩ̂ναι, ‘to order them,’ i. e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or ἐκ τούτων = ‘from what is given by nature.’ ταν̂τα διαθεɩ̂ναι, ‘to set in order,’ i. e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.

καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις.

‘Were this otherwise’ (as in the translation) i. e. ‘if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.’

καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας.

About health as well as about wealth.

μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεɩ̂ ϕύσει τον̂το ὑπάρχειν.

τον̂το refers to some general idea, such as ‘the means of life,’ to be gathered from τὰ χρήματα in the preceding sentence.

παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὑ̑ γίνεται, τροϕὴ τὸ λειπόμενόν ἐστιν.

τὸ λειπόμενον = τὸ λειπόμενον ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὑ̑ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i. e. milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, ᾠὸν . . ἐξ οὑ̑ γίγνεται τὸ γινόμενον ζῳ̑ον ἐκ μορίου τὴν ἀρχήν, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο τροϕὴ τῳ̑ γινομένῳ ἐστίν: and supra c. 8. § 10.

διὸ κατὰ ϕύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πα̂σιν ἀπὸ τω̂ν καρπω̂ν καὶ τω̂ν ζῴων.

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (διό), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος.

Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, τον̂το δ’ ἔσθ’ ὁ τόκος τί θηρίον; Thesm. 845, ἀξία γον̂ν εἰ̂ τόκου τεκον̂σα τοιον̂τον τόκον.

Cp. also Shakspere’s Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—‘A breed of barren metal.’

It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E; Laws v. 742.

τὰ τοιαν̂τα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ’ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.

1*) ‘To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.’ In modern language ‘a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.’ Cp. infra § 5, περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νν̂ν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεɩ̂σθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, ϕορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν: and iv. 15. § 4, ἀλλὰ ταν̂τα διαϕέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεɩ̂ν· οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμϕισβητουντων περὶ τον̂ ὀνόματος· ἔχει δέ τιν’ ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῳ̑ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον ϕιλοσοϕον̂ντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεɩ̂όν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορα̂ν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλον̂ν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν.

Or again 2) ‘Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;’ i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e. g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμον πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας supporting the second, ϕορτικὸν τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν the first. ἐμπειρίαν connects with ἔμπειρον which follows: ‘experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.’

SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF κτητική, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.

ναυκληρία, ϕορτηγία.

ναυκληρία = ‘commerce by sea,’ ϕορτηγία = ‘commerce by land.’ The word ναυκληρία may also be taken in the narrower sense of ‘owning of ships’; and ϕορτηγία in the sense of ‘carrying whether by sea or land.’ But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

διαϕέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῳ̑ τὰ μὲν ἀσϕαλέστερα εἰ̂ναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of τὰ μὲν . . τὰ δὲ favours the more general application of the words.

οἱ̑ον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πα̂σα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιείληϕε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τω̂ν ἐκ γη̂ς μεταλλευομένων ἐστίν.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating ‘the third or mixed kind of chrematistic,’ which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἤδη, ‘mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.’

εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τω̂ν ἐργασιω̂ν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τη̂ς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ’ ἐν αἱ̑ς τὰ σώματα λωβω̂νται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τον̂ σώματος πλεɩ̂σται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεɩ̂ ἀρετη̂ς. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν skips the intervening passage εἰσὶ δὲ . . . ἀρετη̂ς, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle’s Politics; e. g. iii. 4. §§ 11-13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, ἀναγκαɩ̂ον τω̂ν παρὰ τοɩ̂ς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἰ̂ναι.

οἱ̑ον Χάρητι δή.

δὴ is to be taken with οἱ̑ον like ὅλως δή, οὕτω δή, καὶ δὴ with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e. g. καὶ πλούτῳ δή, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλεω τον̂ Μιλησίου.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. ‘But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.’

τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολήν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

ὅραμα Θάλεω.

ὅραμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of ‘idea’ here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

* εὕρημα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δρα̂μα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 A.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that ‘all three parts are concerned with man’ is resumed in the next chapter.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either ἠ̑ν μέρος οἰκονομικη̂ς or εἴρηται αὐτὸν from the preceding words.

ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἰ̂ναι βούλεται τὴν ϕύσιν καὶ διαϕέρειν μηθέν. ὅμως δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δ’ ἄρχηται, ζητεɩ̂ διαϕορὰν εἰ̂ναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαɩ̂ς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις εἰ̂πε τὸν περὶ τον̂ ποδανιπτη̂ρος λόγον.

βούλεται sc. ἡ πολιτεία or ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρχή, understood from ἐν ταɩ̂ς πολιτικαɩ̂ς ἀρχαɩ̂ς: ‘where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.’ The construction of ζητεɩ̂ may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.

Ἄμασις, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: ‘Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.’

τὸ δ’ ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θη̂λυ τον̂τον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικω̂ς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (ἀεί). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an ‘aristocratical’ than a ‘constitutional’ rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

καὶ τω̂ν ἄλλων τω̂ν τοιούτων ἕξεων.

Supply ἀρετή τις before τω̂ν ἄλλων—assisted by οὐδεμία in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, σκυτοτόμος δ’ οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τω̂ν ἄλλων τεχνιτω̂ν. The words τω̂ν τοιούτων are used inaccurately ‘of such habits,’ meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμϕοτέρους ἀρετη̂ς, ταύτης δ’ εἰ̂ναι διαϕοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τω̂ν ϕύσει ἀρχομένων.

‘Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]’; or, with Bernays, ‘corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,’ cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert ἀρχόντων καὶ before ἀρχομένων. Better: ‘There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.’

καὶ τον̂το εὐθὺς ὑϕήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.

1) ‘*And this is immediately suggested by the soul’: or 2) ‘And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.’ There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb ὑϕήγηται in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz, ‘and this distinction was indicated in the soul.’ Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, δη̂λον ὅτι καθάπερ ὑϕήγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτέον. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2-6.

ὥστε ϕύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τον̂ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τον̂ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πα̂σιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπάρχει διαϕερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δον̂λος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θη̂λυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ’ ἄκυρον· ὁ δὲ παɩ̂ς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαɩ̂ον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς.

By inserting ἐπεὶ before ϕύσει, altering τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα into πλείω τὰ ἄρχοντα, and omitting ἀναγκαɩ̂ον before ἔχειν a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacoluthon seems more probable, and Bernays’ alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον go back to ταύτης εἰ̂ναι διαϕοράς.

ὥστε ϕανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τω̂ν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωϕροσύνη κ.τ.λ.

‘Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.’

καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

In the Meno of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to allow, — that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand, and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the Meno is intended.

καὶ ὁ μὲν δον̂λος τω̂ν ϕύσει σκυτοτόμος δ’ οὐθείς.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan. The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of the modern operative with that of the mediæval serf. We may note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household servant in England has received an impress from a master or mistress, and in Aristotle’s language, ‘has derived a virtue from them.’ Cp. iii. 5. § 4, τω̂ν δ’ ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἑνὶ λειτουργον̂ντες τὰ τοιαν̂τα δον̂λοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βάναυσοι καὶ θη̂τες, where, in a similar spirit, Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to the individual.

ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τω̂ν ἔργων δεσποτικήν.

These strange words may be translated literally: ‘But not in so far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the slave in his particular employment;’ i. e. it is not as the teacher of a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλω̂ς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστερον̂ντες καὶ ϕάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρη̂σθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μα̂λλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παɩ̂δας.

These words may mean: either 1)* ‘who do not allow us to converse with slaves,’ or 2) ‘who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.’ In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τη̂ς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτω̂ν ἀρετη̂ς, καὶ τη̂ς πρὸς σϕα̂ς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλω̂ς καὶ μὴ καλω̂ς ἐστί, καὶ πω̂ς δεɩ̂ τὸ μὲν εν̓̂ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακω̂ς ϕεύγειν, ἐν τοɩ̂ς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαɩ̂ον ἐπελθεɩ̂ν.

This is one of the many promises in the Politics which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of παιδονόμος and γυναικονόμος.