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Note to Chapter 33: THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE - Viscount James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1 [1888]

Edition used:

The American Commonwealth, with an Introduction by Gary L. McDowell, 2 vols (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995).

Part of: The American Commonwealth, 2 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


Note to Chapter 33

THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE

The famous case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), decided in 1818, has been so often brought up in English discussions, that it seems proper to give a short account of it, taken from an authoritative source, an address by Mr. Justice Miller (the senior justice, and one of the most eminent members, of the Supreme Court), delivered before the University of Michigan, June 1887.

“It may well be doubted whether any decision ever delivered by any court has had such a pervading operation and influence in controlling legislation as this. It is founded upon the clause of the Constitution (Art. i. § 10) which declares that no State shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

“Dartmouth College existed as a corporation under a charter granted by the British Crown to its trustees in New Hampshire, in the year 1769. This charter conferred upon them the entire governing power of the college, and among other powers that of filling up all vacancies occurring in their own body, and of removing and appointing tutors. It also declared that the number of trustees should forever consist of twelve and no more.

“After the Revolution, the legislature of New Hampshire passed a law to amend the charter, to improve and enlarge the corporation. It increased the number of trustees to twenty-one, gave the appointment of the additional members to the executive of the State, and created a board of overseers to consist of twenty-five persons, of whom twenty-one were also to be appointed by the executive of New Hampshire. These overseers had power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees.

“The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Superior Court of New Hampshire, held that the original charter constituted a contract between the Crown, in whom the power was then vested and the trustees of the college, which was impaired by the act of the legislature above referred to. The opinion, to which there was but one dissent, establishes the doctrine that the act of a government, whether it be by a charter of the legislature or of the Crown, which creates a corporation, is a contract between the state and the corporation, and that all the essential franchises, powers, and benefits conferred upon the corporation by the charter become, when accepted by it, contracts within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution referred to.

“The opinion has been of late years much criticised, as including with the class of contracts whose foundation is in the legislative action of the States, many which were not properly intended to be so included by the framers of the Constitution, and it is undoubtedly true that the Supreme Court itself has been compelled of late years to insist in this class of cases upon the existence of an actual contract by the state with the corporation, when relief is sought against subsequent legislation.

“The main feature of the case, namely, that a State can make a contract by legislation, as well as in any other way, and that in no such case shall a subsequent act of the legislature interpose any effectual barrier to its enforcement, where it is enforceable in the ordinary courts of justice, has remained. The result of this principle has been to make void innumerable acts of State legislatures, intended in times of disastrous financial depression and suffering to protect the people from the hardships of a rigid and prompt enforcement of the law in regard to their contracts, and to prevent the States from repealing, abrogating, or avoiding by legislation contracts fairly entered into with other parties.

“This decision has stood from the day it was made to the present hour as a great bulwark against popular effort through State legislation to evade the payment of just debts, the performance of obligatory contracts, and the general repudiation of the rights of creditors.”

As here intimated, the broad doctrine laid down in this case has been of late years considerably qualified and restricted. It has also become the practice for states making contracts by grants to which the principle of this decision could apply, to reserve power to vary or annul them, so as to leave the hands of the state free.