Front Page Titles (by Subject) No. 50: The same subject continued, with the same view - The Federalist (Gideon ed.)
No. 50: The same subject continued, with the same view - George W. Carey, The Federalist (Gideon ed.) 
The Federalist (The Gideon Edition), Edited with an Introduction, Reader’s Guide, Constitutional Cross-reference, Index, and Glossary by George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001).
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- Editors’ Introduction
- Reader’s Guide to the Federalist
- Preface to the Gideon Edition (1818)
- The Federalist
- No. 1: Introduction
- No. 2: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force & Influence
- No. 3: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 4: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 5: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 6: Concerning Dangers From War Between the States
- No. 7: The Subject Continued, and Particular Causes Enumerated
- No. 8: The Effects of Internal War In Producing Standing Armies, and Other Institutions Unfriendly to Liberty
- No. 9: The Utility of the Union As a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
- No. 10: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 11: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Commerce and a Navy
- No. 12: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
- No. 13: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to Economy
- No. 14: An Objection Drawn From the Extent of Country, Answered
- No. 15: Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation, In Relation to the Principle of Legislation For the States In Their Collective Capacities
- No. 16: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Same Principles
- No. 17: The Subject Continued, and Illustrated By Examples, to Show the Tendency of Federal Governments, Rather to Anarchy Among the Members, Than Tyranny In the Head
- No. 18 *: the Subject Continued, With Further Examples
- No. 19: The Subject Continued, With Further Examples
- No. 20: The Subject Continued, With Further Examples
- No. 21: Further Defects of the Present Constitution
- No. 22: The Same Subject Continued, and Concluded
- No. 23: The Necessity of a Government, At Least Equally Energetic With the One Proposed
- No. 24: The Subject Continued, With an Answer to an Objection Concerning Standing Armies
- No. 25: The Subject Continued, With the Same View
- No. 26: The Subject Continued With the Same View
- No. 27: The Subject Continued, With the Same View
- No. 28: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 29: Concerning the Militia
- No. 30: Concerning Taxation
- No. 31: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 32: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 33: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 34: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 35: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 36: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 37: Concerning the Difficulties Which the Convention Must Have Experienced In the Formation of a Proper Plan
- No. 38: The Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the Plan, Exposed
- No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: an Objection In Respect to the Powers of the Convention, Examined
- No. 40: The Same Objection Further Examined
- No. 41: General View of the Powers Proposed to Be Vested In the Union
- No. 42: The Same View Continued
- No. 43: The Same View Continued
- No. 44: The Same View Continued and Concluded
- No. 45: A Further Discussion of the Supposed Danger From the Powers of the Union, to the State Governments
- No. 46: The Subject of the Last Paper Resumed; With an Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and State Governments
- No. 47: The Meaning of the Maxim, Which Requires a Separation of the Departments of Power, Examined and Ascertained
- No. 48: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to the Means of Giving Efficacy In Practice to That Maxim
- No. 49: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View
- No. 50: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View
- No. 51: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View, and Concluded
- No. 52: Concerning the House of Representatives, With a View to the Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and the Time of Service of the Members
- No. 53: The Same Subject Continued, With a View of the Term of Service of the Members
- No. 54: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to the Ratio of Representation
- No. 55: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Total Number of the Body
- No. 56: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Same Point
- No. 57: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Supposed Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to Elevate the Few Above the Many
- No. 58: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Future Augmentation of the Members
- No. 59: Concerning the Regulation of Elections
- No. 60: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 61: The Same Subject Continued, and Concluded
- No. 62: Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, With Regard to the Qualifications of the Members; the Manner of Appointing Them; the Equality of Representation; the Number of the Senators, and the Duration of Their Appointments
- No. 63: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Regard to the Duration of the Appointment of Its Members
- No. 64: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Regard to the Power of Making Treaties
- No. 65: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Relation to Its Capacity, As a Court For the Trial of Impeachments
- No. 66: The Same Subject Continued
- No. 67: Concerning the Constitution of the President: a Gross Attempt to Misrepresent This Part of the Plan Detected
- No. 68: The View of the Constitution of the President Continued, In Relation to the Mode of Appointment
- No. 69: The Same View Continued, With a Comparison Between the President and the King of Great Britain, On the One Hand, and the Governor of New York, On the Other
- No. 70: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Unity of the Executive, and With an Examination of the Project of an Executive Council
- No. 71: The Same View Continued, In Regard to the Duration of the Office
- No. 72: The Same View Continued, In Regard to the Re-eligibility of the President
- No. 73: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Provision Concerning Support, and the Power of the Negative
- No. 74: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Command of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning
- No. 75: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Power of Making Treaties
- No. 76: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Appointment of the Officers of the Government
- No. 77: The View of the Constitution of the President Concluded, With a Further Consideration of the Power of Appointment, and a Concise Examination of His Remaining Powers
- No. 78: A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department In Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour
- No. 79: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Provisions For the Support and Responsibility of the Judges
- No. 80: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Extent of Its Powers
- No. 81: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Distribution of Its Authority
- No. 82: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Reference to Some Miscellaneous Questions
- No. 83: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Trial By Jury
- No. 84: Concerning Several Miscellaneous Objections
- No. 85: Conclusion
- Appendix 1: The Declaration of Independence * In Congress, July 4, 1776
- Appendix 2: Articles of Confederation * March 1, 1781
- Appendix 3: Virginia Resolution Proposing the Annapolis Convention * January 21, 1786
- Appendix 4: Proceedings of the Annapolis Convention *
- Appendix 5: Virginia Resolution Providing For Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 * November 23, 1786
- Appendix 6: Call By the Continental Congress For the Federal Convention of 1787 * Wednesday Feby. 21, 1787
- Appendix 7: Resolution of the Federal Convention Submitting the Constitution to the Continental Congress * In Convention Monday September 17th 1787
- Appendix 8: Washington’s Letter of Transmittal to the President of the Continental Congress * In Convention, September 17, 1787
- Appendix 9: Resolution of the Continental Congress Submitting the Constitution to the Several States * Friday Sept 28. 1787
- Appendix 10: Letter of the Secretary of the Continental Congress Transmitting Copy of the Constitution to the Several Governors *
- The Constitution of the United States (cross-referenced With the Federalist ) *
- The Amendments
The same subject continued, with the same view
It may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting infractions of the constitution.
It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for enforcing the constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds; without particularly considering them, as provisions for altering the constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods, appear to be nearly as ineligible, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified, will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favour a dispassionate review of them this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses, to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined, that a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favourite object, and breaking through the restraints of the constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated.
The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the states. One of the objects of the council of censors, which met in Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire “whether the constitution had been violated; and whether the legislative and executive departments had encroached on each other.” This important and novel experiment in politics, merits, in several points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But, as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some facts which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed.
First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the council, that some, at least, of its most active and leading members, had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the state.
Second. It appears that the same active and leading members of the council, had been active and influential members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the members had been vice-presidents of the state, and several others members of the executive council, within the seven preceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others, distinguished members of the legislative assembly, within the same period.
Third. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings exhibit a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiassed observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that unfortunately passion, not reason, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.
Fourth. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.
Fifth. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance, the cotemporary legislature denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed in the contest.
This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease; and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy.
This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging, that the state in which the experiment was made, was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch, the same state will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other state, at the same, or any other given period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the people to revise the preceding administration of the government, all persons who should have been concerned in the government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined; they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under their auspices.