The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Editors’ Introduction
• Reader’s Guide to the Federalist
• Preface to the Gideon Edition (1818)
• The Federalist
• No. 1: Introduction
• No. 2: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force & Influence
• No. 3: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 4: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 5: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 6: Concerning Dangers From War Between the States
• No. 7: The Subject Continued, and Particular Causes Enumerated
• No. 8: The Effects of Internal War In Producing Standing Armies, and Other Institutions Unfriendly to Liberty
• No. 9: The Utility of the Union As a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• No. 10: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 11: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Commerce and a Navy
• No. 12: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
• No. 13: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to Economy
• No. 14: An Objection Drawn From the Extent of Country, Answered
• No. 15: Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation, In Relation to the Principle of Legislation For the States In Their Collective Capacities
• No. 16: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Same Principles
• No. 17: The Subject Continued, and Illustrated By Examples, to Show the Tendency of Federal Governments, Rather to Anarchy Among the Members, Than Tyranny In the Head
• No. 18 *: the Subject Continued, With Further Examples
• No. 19: The Subject Continued, With Further Examples
• No. 20: The Subject Continued, With Further Examples
• No. 21: Further Defects of the Present Constitution
• No. 22: The Same Subject Continued, and Concluded
• No. 23: The Necessity of a Government, At Least Equally Energetic With the One Proposed
• No. 24: The Subject Continued, With an Answer to an Objection Concerning Standing Armies
• No. 25: The Subject Continued, With the Same View
• No. 26: The Subject Continued With the Same View
• No. 27: The Subject Continued, With the Same View
• No. 28: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 29: Concerning the Militia
• No. 30: Concerning Taxation
• No. 31: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 32: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 33: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 34: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 35: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 36: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 37: Concerning the Difficulties Which the Convention Must Have Experienced In the Formation of a Proper Plan
• No. 38: The Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the Plan, Exposed
• No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: an Objection In Respect to the Powers of the Convention, Examined
• No. 40: The Same Objection Further Examined
• No. 41: General View of the Powers Proposed to Be Vested In the Union
• No. 42: The Same View Continued
• No. 43: The Same View Continued
• No. 44: The Same View Continued and Concluded
• No. 45: A Further Discussion of the Supposed Danger From the Powers of the Union, to the State Governments
• No. 46: The Subject of the Last Paper Resumed; With an Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and State Governments
• No. 47: The Meaning of the Maxim, Which Requires a Separation of the Departments of Power, Examined and Ascertained
• No. 48: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to the Means of Giving Efficacy In Practice to That Maxim
• No. 49: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View
• No. 50: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View
• No. 51: The Same Subject Continued, With the Same View, and Concluded
• No. 52: Concerning the House of Representatives, With a View to the Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and the Time of Service of the Members
• No. 53: The Same Subject Continued, With a View of the Term of Service of the Members
• No. 54: The Same Subject Continued, With a View to the Ratio of Representation
• No. 55: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Total Number of the Body
• No. 56: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Same Point
• No. 57: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Supposed Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to Elevate the Few Above the Many
• No. 58: The Same Subject Continued, In Relation to the Future Augmentation of the Members
• No. 59: Concerning the Regulation of Elections
• No. 60: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 61: The Same Subject Continued, and Concluded
• No. 62: Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, With Regard to the Qualifications of the Members; the Manner of Appointing Them; the Equality of Representation; the Number of the Senators, and the Duration of Their Appointments
• No. 63: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Regard to the Duration of the Appointment of Its Members
• No. 64: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Regard to the Power of Making Treaties
• No. 65: A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, In Relation to Its Capacity, As a Court For the Trial of Impeachments
• No. 66: The Same Subject Continued
• No. 67: Concerning the Constitution of the President: a Gross Attempt to Misrepresent This Part of the Plan Detected
• No. 68: The View of the Constitution of the President Continued, In Relation to the Mode of Appointment
• No. 69: The Same View Continued, With a Comparison Between the President and the King of Great Britain, On the One Hand, and the Governor of New York, On the Other
• No. 70: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Unity of the Executive, and With an Examination of the Project of an Executive Council
• No. 71: The Same View Continued, In Regard to the Duration of the Office
• No. 72: The Same View Continued, In Regard to the Re-eligibility of the President
• No. 73: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Provision Concerning Support, and the Power of the Negative
• No. 74: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Command of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning
• No. 75: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Power of Making Treaties
• No. 76: The Same View Continued, In Relation to the Appointment of the Officers of the Government
• No. 77: The View of the Constitution of the President Concluded, With a Further Consideration of the Power of Appointment, and a Concise Examination of His Remaining Powers
• No. 78: A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department In Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour
• No. 79: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Provisions For the Support and Responsibility of the Judges
• No. 80: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Extent of Its Powers
• No. 81: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Distribution of Its Authority
• No. 82: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Reference to Some Miscellaneous Questions
• No. 83: A Further View of the Judicial Department, In Relation to the Trial By Jury
• No. 84: Concerning Several Miscellaneous Objections
• No. 85: Conclusion
• Glossary
• Appendixes
• Appendix 1: The Declaration of Independence * In Congress, July 4, 1776
• Appendix 2: Articles of Confederation * March 1, 1781
• Appendix 3: Virginia Resolution Proposing the Annapolis Convention * January 21, 1786
• Appendix 4: Proceedings of the Annapolis Convention *
• Appendix 5: Virginia Resolution Providing For Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 * November 23, 1786
• Appendix 6: Call By the Continental Congress For the Federal Convention of 1787 * Wednesday Feby. 21, 1787
• Appendix 7: Resolution of the Federal Convention Submitting the Constitution to the Continental Congress * In Convention Monday September 17th 1787
• Appendix 8: Washington’s Letter of Transmittal to the President of the Continental Congress * In Convention, September 17, 1787
• Appendix 9: Resolution of the Continental Congress Submitting the Constitution to the Several States * Friday Sept 28. 1787
• Appendix 10: Letter of the Secretary of the Continental Congress Transmitting Copy of the Constitution to the Several Governors *
• The Constitution of the United States (cross-referenced With the Federalist ) *
• The Amendments

No. 13

by Alexander Hamilton

The same Subject continued, with a view to Economy

As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object, may be usefully applied to another; and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the states be united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support: if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for; and each of them, as to the principal departments, co-extensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the states into thirteen unconnected sovereignties, is a project too extravagant, and too replete with danger, to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire, seem generally turned towards three confederacies; one consisting of the four northern, another of the four middle, and a third of the five southern states. There is little probability that there would be a great number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government, less comprehensive in its organs or institutions, than that which has been proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a state attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government, and the same forms of administration, which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power, necessary to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire, by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.

The supposition, that each confederacy into which the states would be likely to be divided, would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another conjecture, more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies, as the alternative to a general union. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different states, we shall be led to conclude, that, in case of disunion, they will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four eastern states, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connexion, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are obvious reasons, that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a state to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more southern states, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system, which would give unlimited scope to all nations, to be the carriers, as well as the purchasers, of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connexion so adverse to her policy. As she must, at all events, be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety, to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the northern confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the northern confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that state.

Nothing can be more evident than that the Thirteen States will be able to support a national government, better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication, between the different confederacies, against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military establishments, which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations, into which the states would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty, of every part.

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