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• The Prince.
• Niccolo Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo, Son of Piero De’ Medici.
• Chapter I.: How Many Kinds of Principalities There Are, and In What Manner They Are Acquired.
• Chapter II.: Of Hereditary Principalities.
• Chapter III.: Of Mixed Principalities.
• Chapter IV.: Why the Kingdom of Darius, Which Was Conquered By Alexander, Did Not Revolt Against the Successors of Alexander After His Death.
• Chapter V.: How Cities Or Principalities Are to Be Governed That Previous to Being Conquered Had Lived Under Their Own Laws.
• Chapter VI.: Of New Principalities That Have Been Acquired By the Valor of the Prince and By His Own Troops.
• Chapter VII.: Of New Principalities That Have Been Acquired By the Aid of Others and By Good Fortune.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Such As Have Achieved Sovereignty By Means of Crimes.
• Chapter IX.: Of Civil Principalities.
• Chapter X.: In What Manner the Power of All Principalities Should Be Measured.
• Chapter XI.: Of Ecclesiastical Principalities.
• Chapter XII.: Of the Different Kinds of Troops, and of Mercenaries.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Auxiliaries, and of Mixed and National Troops.
• Chapter XIV.: Of the Duties of a Prince In Relation to Military Matters.
• Chapter XV.: Of the Means By Which Men, and Especially Princes, Win Applause, Or Incur Censure.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Liberality and Parsimoniousness.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved Than Feared.
• Chapter XVIII.: In What Manner Princes Should Keep Their Faith.
• Chapter XIX.: A Prince Must Avoid Being Contemned and Hated.
• Chapter XX.: Whether the Erection of Fortresses, and Many Other Things Which Princes Often Do, Are Useful, Or Injurious.
• Chapter XXI.: How Princes Should Conduct Themselves to Acquire a Reputation.
• Chapter XXII.: Of the Ministers of Princes.
• Chapter XXIII.: How to Avoid Flatterers.
• Chapter XXIV.: The Reason Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States.
• Chapter XXV.: Of the Influence of Fortune In Human Affairs, and How It May Be Counteracted.
• Chapter XXVI.: Exhortation to Deliver Italy From Foreign Barbarians.
• Discourses On the First Ten Books of Titus Livius.
• Niccolo Machiavelli to Zanobi Buondelmonte and Cosimo Rucellai, Greeting.
• First Book.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Of the Beginning of Cities In General, and Especially That of the City of Rome.
• Chapter II.: Of the Different Kinds of Republics, and of What Kind the Roman Republic Was.
• Chapter III.: Of the Events That Caused the Creation of Tribunes In Rome; Which Made the Republic More Perfect.
• Chapter IV.: The Disunion of the Senate and the People Renders the Republic of Rome Powerful and Free.
• Chapter V.: To Whom Can the Guardianship of Liberty More Safely Be Confided, to the Nobles Or to the People? and Which of the Two Have Most Cause For Creating Disturbances, Those Who Wish to Acquire, Or Those Who Desire to Conserve?
• Chapter VI.: Whether It Was Possible to Establish In Rome a Government Capable of Putting an End to the Enmities Existing Between the Nobles and the People.
• Chapter VII.: Showing How Necessary the Faculty of Accusation Is In a Republic For the Maintenance of Liberty.
• Chapter VIII.: In Proportion As Accusations Are Useful In a Republic, So Are Calumnies Pernicious.
• Chapter IX.: To Found a New Republic, Or to Reform Entirely the Old Institutions of an Existing One, Must Be the Work of One Man Only.
• Chapter X.: In Proportion As the Founders of a Republic Or Monarchy Are Entitled to Praise, So Do the Founders of a Tyranny Deserve Execration.
• Chapter XI.: Of the Religion of the Romans.
• Chapter XII.: The Importance of Giving Religion a Prominent Influence In a State, and How Italy Was Ruined Because She Failed In This Respect Through the Conduct of the Church of Rome.
• Chapter XIII.: How the Romans Availed of Religion to Preserve Order In Their City, and to Carry Out Their Enterprises and Suppress Disturbances.
• Chapter XIV.: The Romans Interpreted the Auspices According to Necessity, and Very Wisely Made Show of Observing Religion, Even When They Were Obliged In Reality to Disregard It; and If Any One Recklessly Disparaged It, He Was Punished.
• Chapter XV.: How the Samnites Resorted to Religion As an Extreme Remedy For Their Desperate Condition.
• Chapter XVI.: A People That Has Been Accustomed to Live Under a Prince Preserves Its Liberties With Difficulty, If By Accident It Has Become Free.
• Chapter XVII.: A Corrupt People That Becomes Free Can With Greatest Difficulty Maintain Its Liberty.
• Chapter XVIII.: How In a Corrupt State a Free Government May Be Maintained, Assuming That One Exists There Already; and How It Could Be Introduced, If None Had Previously Existed.
• Chapter XIX.: If an Able and Vigorous Prince Is Succeeded By a Feeble One, the Latter May For a Time Be Able to Maintain Himself; But If His Successor Be Also Weak, Then the Latter Will Not Be Able to Preserve His State.
• Chapter XX.: Two Continuous Successions of Able and Virtuous Princes Will Achieve Great Results; and As Well-constituted Republics Have, In the Nature of Things, a Succession of Virtuous Rulers, Their Acquisitions and Extension Will Consequently Be Very G
• Chapter XXI.: Princes and Republics Who Fail to Have National Armies Are Much to Be Blamed.
• Chapter XXII.: What We Should Note In the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and the Alban Curatii.
• Chapter XXIII.: One Should Never Risk One’s Whole Fortune Unless Supported By One’s Entire Forces, and Therefore the Mere Guarding of Passes Is Often Dangerous.
• Chapter XXIV.: Well-ordered Republics Establish Punishments and Rewards For Their Citizens, But Never Set Off One Against the Other.
• Chapter XXV.: Whoever Wishes to Reform an Existing Government In a Free State Should At Least Preserve the Semblance of the Old Forms.
• Chapter XXVI.: A New Prince In a City Or Province Conquered By Him Should Organize Everything Anew.
• Chapter XXVII.: Showing That Men Are Very Rarely Either Entirely Good Or Entirely Bad.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Why Rome Was Less Ungrateful to Her Citizens Than Athens.
• Chapter XXIX.: Which of the Two Is Most Ungrateful, a People Or a Prince.
• Chapter XXX.: How Princes and Republics Should Act to Avoid the Vice of Ingratitude, and How a Commander Or a Citizen Should Act So As Not to Expose Himself to It.
• Chapter XXXI.: Showing That the Roman Generals Were Never Severely Punished For Any Faults They Committed, Not Even When By Their Ignorance and Unfortunate Operations They Occasioned Serious Losses to the Republic.
• Chapter XXXII.: A Republic Or a Prince Should Not Defer Securing the Good Will of the People Until They Are Themselves In Difficulties.
• Chapter XXXIII.: When an Evil Has Sprung Up Within a State, Or Come Upon It From Without, It Is Safer to Temporize With It Rather Than to Attack It Violently.
• Chapter XXXIV.: The Authority of the Dictatorship Has Always Proved Beneficial to Rome, and Never Injurious; It Is the Authority Which Men Usurp, and Not That Which Is Given Them By the Free Suffrages of Their Fellow-citizens, That Is Dangerous to Civil L
• Chapter XXXV.: The Reason Why the Creation of Decemvirs In Rome Was Injurious to Liberty, Notwithstanding That They Were Created By the Free Suffrages of the People.
• Chapter XXXVI.: Citizens Who Have Been Honored With the Higher Offices Should Not Disdain Less Important Ones.
• Chapter XXXVII.: What Troubles Resulted In Rome From the Enactment of the Agrarian Law, and How Very Wrong It Is to Make Laws That Are Retrospective and Contrary to Old Established Customs.
• Chapter XXXVIII.: Feeble Republics Are Irresolute, and Know Not How to Take a Decided Part; and Whenever They Do, It Is More the Result of Necessity Than of Choice.
• Chapter XXXIX.: The Same Accidents Often Happen to Different Peoples.
• Chapter Xl.: of the Creation of the Decemvirs In Rome, and What Is Noteworthy In It; and Where We Shall Consider Amongst Many Other Things How the Same Accidents May Save Or Ruin a Republic.
• Chapter Xli.: It Is Imprudent and Unprofitable Suddenly to Change From Humility to Pride, and From Gentleness to Cruelty.
• Chapter Xlii.: How Easily Men May Be Corrupted.
• Chapter Xliii.: Those Only Who Combat For Their Own Glory Are Good and Loyal Soldiers.
• Chapter Xliv.: a Multitude Without a Chief Is Useless; and It Is Not Well to Threaten Before Having the Power to Act.
• Chapter Xlv.: It Is a Bad Example Not to Observe the Laws, Especially On the Part of Those Who Have Made Them; and It Is Dangerous For Those Who Govern Cities to Harass the People With Constant Wrongs.
• Chapter Xlvi.: Men Rise From One Ambition to Another: First, They Seek to Secure Themselves Against Attack, and Then They Attack Others.
• Chapter Xlvii.: Although Men Are Apt to Deceive Themselves In General Matters, Yet They Rarely Do So In Particulars.
• Chapter Xlviii.: One of the Means of Preventing an Important Magistracy From Being Conferred Upon a Vile and Wicked Individual Is to Have It Applied For By One Still More Vile and Wicked, Or By the Most Noble and Deserving In the State.
• Chapter Xlix.: If Cities Which From Their Beginning Have Enjoyed Liberty, Like Rome, Have Found Difficulties In Devising Laws That Would Preserve Their Liberties, Those That Have Had Their Origin In Servitude Find It Impossible to Succeed In Making Such L
• Chapter L.: No Council Or Magistrate Should Have It In Their Power to Stop the Public Business of a City.
• Chapter Li.: a Republic Or a Prince Must Feign to Do of Their Own Liberality That to Which Necessity Compels Them.
• Chapter Lii.: There Is No Surer and Less Objectionable Mode of Repressing the Insolence of an Individual Ambitious of Power, Who Arises In a Republic, Than to Forestall Him In the Ways By Which He Expects to Arrive At That Power.
• Chapter Liii.: How By the Delusions of Seeming Good the People Are Often Misled to Desire Their Own Ruin; and How They Are Frequently Influenced By Great Hopes and Brave Promises.
• Chapter Liv.: How Much Influence a Great Man Has In Restraining an Excited Multitude.
• Chapter Lv.: Public Affairs Are Easily Managed In a City Where the Body of the People Is Not Corrupt; and Where Equality Exists, There No Principality Can Be Established; Nor Can a Republic Be Established Where There Is No Equality.
• Chapter Lvi.: the Occurrence of Important Events In Any City Or Country Is Generally Preceded By Signs and Portents, Or By Men Who Predict Them.
• Chapter Lvii.: the People As a Body Are Courageous, But Individually They Are Cowardly and Feeble.
• Chapter Lviii.: the People Are Wiser and More Constant Than Princes.
• Chapter Lix.: Leagues and Alliances With Republics Are More to Be Trusted Than Those With Princes.
• Chapter Lx.: How the Consulates and Some Other Magistracies Were Bestowed In Rome Without Regard to the Age of Persons.
• Second Book.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: The Greatness of the Romans Was Due More to Their Valor and Ability Than to Good Fortune.
• Chapter II.: What Nations the Romans Had to Contend Against, and With What Obstinacy They Defended Their Liberty.
• Chapter III.: Rome Became Great By Ruining Her Neighboring Cities, and By Freely Admitting Strangers to Her Privileges and Honors.
• Chapter IV.: The Ancient Republics Employed Three Different Methods For Aggrandizing Themselves.
• Chapter V.: The Changes of Religion and of Languages, Together With the Occurrence of Deluges and Pestilences, Destroy the Record of Things.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Manner In Which the Romans Conducted Their Wars.
• Chapter VII.: How Much Land the Romans Allowed to Each Colonist.
• Chapter VIII.: The Reasons Why People Leave Their Own Country to Spread Over Others.
• Chapter IX.: What the Causes Are That Most Frequently Provoke War Between Sovereigns.
• Chapter X.: Money Is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered.
• Chapter XI.: It Is Not Wise to Form an Alliance With a Prince That Has More Reputation Than Power.
• Chapter XII.: Whether It Is Better, When Apprehending an Attack, to Await It At Home, Or to Carry the War Into the Enemy’s Country.
• Chapter XIII.: Cunning and Deceit Will Serve a Man Better Than Force to Rise From a Base Condition to Great Fortune.
• Chapter XIV.: Men Often Deceive Themselves In Believing That By Humility They Can Overcome Insolence.
• Chapter XV.: Feeble States Are Always Undecided In Their Resolves; and Slow Resolves Are Invariably Injurious.
• Chapter XVI.: Wherein the Military System Differs From That of the Ancients.
• Chapter XVII.: Of the Value of Artillery to Modern Armies, and Whether the General Opinion Respecting It Is Correct.
• Chapter XVIII.: According to the Authority of the Romans and the Example of Ancient Armies We Should Value Infantry More Than Cavalry.
• Chapter XIX.: Conquests Made By Republics That Are Not Well Constituted, and Do Not Follow In Their Conduct the Example of the Romans, Are More Conducive to Their Ruin Than to Their Advancement.
• Chapter XX.: Of the Dangers to Which Princes and Republics Are Exposed That Employ Auxiliary Or Mercenary Troops.
• Chapter XXI.: The First Prætor Sent By the Romans Anywhere Was to Capua, Four Hundred Years After They Began to Make War Upon That City.
• Chapter XXII.: How Often the Judgments of Men In Important Matters Are Erroneous.
• Chapter XXIII.: How Much the Romans Avoided Half-way Measures When They Had to Decide Upon the Fate of Their Subjects.
• Chapter XXIV.: Fortresses Are Generally More Injurious Than Useful.
• Chapter XXV.: It Is an Error to Take Advantage of the Internal Dissensions of a City, and to Attempt to Take Possession of It Whilst In That Condition.
• Chapter XXVI.: Contempt and Insults Engender Hatred Against Those Who Indulge In Them, Without Being of Any Advantage to Them.
• Chapter XXVII.: Wise Princes and Republics Should Content Themselves With Victory; For When They Aim At More, They Generally Lose.
• Chapter XXVIII.: How Dangerous It Is For a Republic Or a Prince Not to Avenge a Public Or a Private Injury.
• Chapter XXIX.: Fortune Blinds the Minds of Men When She Does Not Wish Them to Oppose Her Designs.
• Chapter XXX.: Republics and Princes That Are Really Powerful Do Not Purchase Alliances By Money, But By Their Valor and the Reputation of Their Armies.
• Chapter XXXI.: How Dangerous It Is to Trust to the Representations of Exiles.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of the Method Practised By the Romans In Taking Cities.
• Chapter XXXIII.: The Romans Left the Commanders of Their Armies Entirely Uncontrolled In Their Operations.
• Third Book.
• Chapter I.: To Insure a Long Existence to Religious Sects Or Republics, It Is Necessary Frequently to Bring Them Back to Their Original Principles.
• Chapter II.: It May At Times Be the Highest Wisdom to Simulate Folly.
• Chapter III.: To Preserve the Newly Recovered Liberty In Rome, It Was Necessary That the Sons of Brutus Should Have Been Executed.
• Chapter IV.: A Prince Cannot Live Securely In a State So Long As Those Live Whom He Has Deprived of It.
• Chapter V.: Of the Causes That Make a King Lose the Throne Which He Has Inherited.
• Chapter VI.: Of Conspiracies.
• Chapter VII.: The Reasons Why the Transitions From Liberty to Servitude and From Servitude to Liberty Are At Times Effected Without Bloodshed, and At Other Times Are Most Sanguinary.
• Chapter VIII.: Whoever Wishes to Change the Government of a Republic Should First Consider Well Its Existing Condition.
• Chapter IX.: Whoever Desires Constant Success Must Change His Conduct With the Times.
• Chapter X.: A General Cannot Avoid a Battle When the Enemy Is Resolved Upon It At All Hazards.
• Chapter XI.: Whoever Has to Contend Against Many Enemies May Nevertheless Overcome Them, Though He Be Inferior In Power, Provided He Is Able to Resist Their First Efforts.
• Chapter XII.: A Skilful General Should Endeavor By All Means In His Power to Place His Soldiers In the Position of Being Obliged to Fight, and As Far As Possible Relieve the Enemy of Such Necessity.
• Chapter XIII.: Whether an Able Commander With a Feeble Army, Or a Good Army With an Incompetent Commander, Is Most to Be Relied Upon.
• Chapter XIV.: Of the Effect of New Stratagems and Unexpected Cries In the Midst of Battle.
• Chapter XV.: An Army Should Have But One Chief: a Greater Number Is Detrimental.
• Chapter XVI.: In Times of Difficulty Men of Merit Are Sought After, But In Easy Times It Is Not Men of Merit, But Such As Have Riches and Powerful Relations, That Are Most In Favor.
• Chapter XVII.: A Person Who Has Been Offended Should Not Be Intrusted With an Important Administration and Government.
• Chapter XVIII.: Nothing Is More Worthy of the Attention of a Good General Than to Endeavor to Penetrate the Designs of the Enemy.
• Chapter XIX.: Whether Gentle Or Rigorous Measures Are Preferable In Governing the Multitude.
• Chapter XX.: An Act of Humanity Prevailed More With the Faliscians Than All the Power of Rome.
• Chapter XXI.: Why Hannibal By a Course of Conduct the Very Opposite of That of Scipio Yet Achieved the Same Success In Italy As the Latter Did In Spain.
• Chapter XXII.: How Manlius Torquatus By Harshness, and Valerius Corvinus By Gentleness, Acquired Equal Glory.
• Chapter XXIII.: The Reasons Why Camillus Was Banished From Rome.
• Chapter XXIV.: The Prolongation of Military Commands Caused Rome the Loss of Her Liberty.
• Chapter XXV.: Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus, and That of Many Other Roman Citizens.
• Chapter XXVI.: How States Are Ruined On Account of Women.
• Chapter XXVII.: Of the Means For Restoring Union In a City, and of the Common Error Which Supposes That a City Must Be Kept Divided For the Purpose of Preserving Authority.
• Chapter XXVIII.: The Actions of Citizens Should Be Watched, For Often Such As Seem Virtuous Conceal the Beginning of Tyranny.
• Chapter XXIX.: The Faults of the People Spring From the Faults of Their Rulers.
• Chapter XXX.: A Citizen Who Desires to Employ His Authority In a Republic For Some Public Good Must First of All Suppress All Feeling of Envy: and How to Organize the Defence of a City On the Approach of an Enemy.
• Chapter XXXI.: Great Men and Powerful Republics Preserve an Equal Dignity and Courage In Prosperity and Adversity.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of the Means Adopted By Some to Prevent a Peace.
• Chapter XXXIII.: To Insure Victory the Troops Must Have Confidence In Themselves As Well As In Their Commander.
• Chapter XXXIV.: How the Reputation of a Citizen and the Public Voice and Opinion Secure Him Popular Favor; and Whether the People Or Princes Show Most Judgment In the Choice of Magistrates.
• Chapter XXXV.: Of the Danger of Being Prominent In Counselling Any Enterprise, and How That Danger Increases With the Importance of Such Enterprise.
• Chapter XXXVI.: The Reason Why the Gauls Have Been and Are Still Looked Upon At the Beginning of a Combat As More Than Men, and Afterwards As Less Than Women.
• Chapter XXXVII.: Whether Skirmishes Are Necessary Before Coming to a General Action, and How to Know a New Enemy If Skirmishes Are Dispensed With.
• Chapter XXXVIII.: What Qualities a Commander Should Possess to Secure the Confidence of His Army.
• Chapter XXXIX.: A General Should Possess a Perfect Knowledge of the Localities Where He Is Carrying On a War.
• Chapter Xl.: Deceit In the Conduct of a War Is Meritorious.
• Chapter Xli.: One’s Country Must Be Defended, Whether With Glory Or With Shame; It Must Be Defended Anyhow.
• Chapter Xlii.: Promises Exacted By Force Need Not Be Observed.
• Chapter Xliii.: Natives of the Same Country Preserve For All Time the Same Characteristics.
• Chapter Xliv.: Impetuosity and Audacity Often Achieve What Ordinary Means Fail to Attain.
• Chapter Xlv.: Whether It Is Better In Battle to Await the Shock of the Enemy, and Then to Attack Him, Or to Assail Him First With Impetuosity.
• Chapter Xlvi.: the Reasons Why the Same Family In a City Always Preserves the Same Characteristics.
• Chapter Xlvii.: Love of Country Should Make a Good Citizen Forget Private Wrongs.
• Chapter Xlviii.: Any Manifest Error On the Part of an Enemy Should Make Us Suspect Some Stratagem.
• Chapter Xlix.: a Republic That Desires to Maintain Her Liberties Needs Daily Fresh Precautions: It Was By Such Merits That Fabius Obtained the Surname of Maximus.
• Thoughts of a Statesman.
• Prefatory Note.
• Niccolo Machiavelli to His Son Bernardo.
• Chapter I.: Religion.
• Chapter II.: Peace and War.
• Chapter III.: The Admirable Law of Nations Born With Christianity.
• Chapter IV.: Vices That Have Made the Great the Prey of the Small.
• Chapter V.: Laws.
• Chapter VI.: Justice.
• Chapter VII.: Public Charges.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Agriculture, Commerce, Population, Luxury, and Supplies.
• Chapter IX.: The Evils of Idleness.
• Chapter X.: Ill Effects of a Corrupt Government.
• Chapter XI.: Notable Precepts and Maxims.
• Chapter XII.: Beautiful Example of a Good Father of a Family.
• Chapter XIII.: The Good Prince.
• Chapter XIV.: Of the Ministers.
• Chapter XV.: The Tyrant Prince.
• Chapter XVI.: Praise and Safety of the Good Prince, and Infamy and Danger of the Tyrant.

CHAPTER XI.

whoever has to contend against many enemies may nevertheless overcome them, though he be inferior in power, provided he is able to resist their first efforts.

The power of the Tribunes of the people in Rome was very great, as has already been said several times, but it was necessary to restrain the ambition of the nobles, who would otherwise have corrupted the republic much more than it was already. Nevertheless, as all human institutions (as has been observed elsewhere) contain some inherent evil that gives rise to unforeseen accidents, it becomes necessary to provide against these by new measures. The Tribunes had become insolent and formidable to the nobility and to all Rome, and would have become dangerous to the liberties of the republic had not Appius Claudius pointed out the way for the Romans to protect themselves against the ambition of the Tribunes. As there was always to be found amongst them some one more easily intimidated or corrupted than the others, or some lover of the public good, Claudius advised that they should oppose such a one to his colleagues whenever these wanted to pass any act contrary to the wishes of the Senate. This expedient tempered the formidable authority of the Tribunes, and for a long while proved most advantageous to Rome; and it has caused me to reflect that the presumption of success should always be in favor of a single power contending against a combination, however superior in numbers and power. For independent of the infinity of circumstances of which an individual can take advantage better than a combination of many, the former will always have the opportunity, with a little address, to create divisions between the latter, and thus to weaken any powerful combination. I will not adduce here any examples of antiquity, of which there are many, but will confine myself to instances of our own times only. In the year 1484 all Italy leagued together against the Venetians; who, after losing everything, and being unable to keep the field any longer, succeeded in corrupting Ludovico Sforza, governor of Milan, and concluded a treaty with him by which they not only recovered all the territory they had lost, but actually seized a portion of the principality of Ferrara. And thus, although they had been losers in war, yet they proved to be gainers in peace. A few years since a general league was formed against France, but before the termination of the war Spain broke from the league, and made terms with France, so that the other confederates were soon afterwards constrained also to come to terms with her. We may therefore with reasonable certainty presume that when a number of princes combine to make war upon a single one, the latter will triumph over the combination, provided he has courage and strength enough to resist the first shock and bide events by temporizing. But if he cannot do this, he is exposed to a thousand dangers, as was the case with the Venetians in 1508. If at that time they could have held their own against the French army until they could gain over some of those who had combined against them, they would have escaped the disasters by which they were overwhelmed. But being without an army that could temporarily hold the French in check, and thus having no time to detach any one power from the league, they were crushed. In fact, we see that the Pope, after having recovered what belonged to him, became their friend; and so did Spain; and both of these powers would gladly have saved to the Venetians their possessions in Lombardy if they could have done it, so as to prevent France from becoming so powerful in Italy. The Venetians might, by sacrificing a part, have saved the rest; this would have been a wise course for them to pursue, provided they had done so before seeming to be forced to it by necessity; but after the war was actually begun, such a course would have been disgraceful, and probably of little advantage. Before the war only a few of the citizens of Venice could discern the danger, still fewer perceived the remedy, and none advised it. But to return to what I said at the beginning of this discourse, I conclude that, as the Roman Senate found the means for saving the country from the ambition of the Tribunes, who were many, so will any one prince find a remedy, when assailed by many enemies, provided he has wisdom and skill, by suitable means, to create such misunderstandings between them as will cause their disunion.