Front Page Titles (by Subject) THE FIRST BOOK of the HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. - The English Works, vol. VIII (The Peloponnesian War Part I)
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THE FIRST BOOK of the HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. - Thucydides, The English Works, vol. VIII (The Peloponnesian War Part I) 
The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; Now First Collected and Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., (London: Bohn, 1839-45). 11 vols. Vol. 8.
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THE FIRST BOOK of the HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.
The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.—The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians concerning Corcyra and Potidæa.—The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion.—The degrees by which that dominion was acquired.—The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta.—The demands of the Lacedæmonians.—The obstinacy of the Athenians; and their answer by the advice of Pericles.
To make it appear that this war was greater than any before it, the author showeth the imbecility of former times; describing three periods: 1. From the beginning of the Grecian memory to the war of Troy. 2. The war itself. 3. The time from thence to the present war which he writeth.
1. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as1 they warred against each other, beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot; with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it: conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction, some then presently and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the barbarians1 , and, as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that, looking into times far past, I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.
The state of Greece before the Trojan war.
2. For it is evident that that which now is called Hellas2 , was not of old constantly inhabited; but that at first there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode to the violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches3 , and planted nothing; (because it was uncertain when another should invade them and carry all away, especially not having the defence of walls); but made account to be masters, in any place, of such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day: they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia, and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus, except Arcadia; and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home; and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is that Attica1 , from great antiquity for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people2 . And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece3 , by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For such as by war or sedition were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where receiving the freedom of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, as Attica, being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.
The original of the name of Hellas.The name of Hellenes not given to all the Grecians in the time that Homer wrote his poems.The Trojan war was the first enterprise where the Grecians combined their forces.
3. And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum1 (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes: and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer. For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general; nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called: but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans. Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians2 , as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians3 then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together by the means of navigation, which the most part1 of Greece had now received.
Minos, king of Creta, the first that had a navy.
4. For Minos was the most ancient of all that by report we know to have built a navy. And he made himself master of the now Grecian Sea2 ; and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians and constituting his own sons there for governors; and also freed the seas of pirates as much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his own revenue.
A digression touching the piracies and robberies of old time; with other notes of savageness.Robbing had in honour.
5. For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to3 cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly4 inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same also is proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning1 of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land. And much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians called Ozolæ2 , the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent from their old trade of thieving.
Continual wearing of armour in fashion.The Athenians grew first civil.
6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe; and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom, the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were anything stepped into years, laid away upon the same3 delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats and golden grasshoppers1 , which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair. From whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate2 kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games3 , stripped themselves naked4 and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by5 many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.
The cities of Greece, how seated, and for what causes.
7. As for cities, such as are of late foundation and since the increase of navigation, inasmuch as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, [that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea], both for merchandise and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been1 in those times for the most part infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others2 also that dwelt on the sea–side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies. And even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.
The Carians and Phœnicians were those that committed the most robberies.
8. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians. For by them were the greatest part of the islands3 inhabited; a testimony whereof is this. The Athenians, when in this present war4 they hallowed the isle of Delos and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians5 ; known so to be, both by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And1 when Minos his navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free. For he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which means they who inhabited the sea–coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power they proceeded afterward to the war against Troy.
The action of Troy.Peloponnesus, so called from Pelops.The increase of the power of the Pelopians.Atreus king of Mycenæ after the death of Pelops.
9. And to me it seemeth that Agamemnon2 got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors3 of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tindareus, as for this, that he exceeded the rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts4 of the Peloponnesians, say that first Pelops, by the abundance of his wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger, yet the country was called1 after his name; and that this power was also increased by his posterity. For Euristheus being slain in Attica by the Heracleides2 , Atreus, that was his uncle3 by the mother, and was then abiding4 with him as an exiled person for fear of his father for the death of Chrysippus5 , and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man and made much of the common people), obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself; and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides6 . To which greatness Agamemnon7 succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient); who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him1 , “of many isles and of all Argos King.” Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such2 as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.
Mycenæ, though no great city, yet was of great power.The city of Sparta less, and the city of Athens greater, than for the proportion of their power.A survey of the fleetsent to Troy.
10. Now seeing Mycenæ was3 but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be4 . For if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence of their power in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts5 of Peloponnesus it possess two6 , and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because1 it is but scatteringly inhabited after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous [concerning the forces that went to Troy], nor have in regard so much the external show of a city as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also2 we may credit the poetry of Homer, who being a poet was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short. For he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels; those that were of Bœotians carrying one hundred and twenty men a–piece, and those which came with Philoctetes fifty: setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort and the least; and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth that they who were3 in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers; for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings1 and such as were in chief authority; especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least one estimate the mean of their shipping, it will appear that the whole number of men considered as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.
The poverty of the Greeks was the cause why the Trojans could so long hold out.
11. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped2 might both follow the war and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest; for else they could not have fortified their camp), it appears that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties; whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years resistance, as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas1 , if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army as at the several occasions chanced to be present; when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place both in less time and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters, all that preceded this enterprise; but also this, which is of greater name than any before it, appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame and report, which by means of the poets now goeth of it.
The state of Greece after the Trojan war.A. C. 1124. A. 1m. Ol. 347.Bœotia, more anciently Cadmeis.A. C. 1104. A. 1m. Ol. 327.The Ionians were the colonies of the Athenians.
12. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations; insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium caused not a little innovation; and in most of the cities there arose seditions; and those which were driven out, built2 cities for themselves in other places. For those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same country a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy). And in the eightieth year, the Dorians1 together with the Heracleides seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy1 and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.
The difference between tyranny and regal authority.At Corinth were made the first triremes, or gallies of three tire of oars one above another.A. C. 704. Olymp. 19. 1.A. C. 667. Olymp. 28. 2.The means of the wealth of Corinth.Corinth surnamed the rich.The Ionians had a navy in Cyrus’ time.Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had a navy in the time of Cambyses.About A. C. 600. Olymp. 45.
13. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and2 the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies: (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited were hereditary): and the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping3 into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first4 gallies of all Greece. Now5 it is well known that Aminocles, the ship–wright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos: and from the time that Aminocles went to Samos until the end6 of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years. And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans7 ; and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; (because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another but through the Corinthians’ territory); and was also wealthy in money, as appears by the1 poets, who have surnamed this town the rich. And after the Grecians had2 commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates; and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money. After this, the Ionians, in the times of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy; and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates3 , who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest having won Rhenea4 , he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The5 Phocæans likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians6 in a fight at sea.
The shipping of Greece very mean before this war.A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.
14. These were the greatest navies extant. And yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels1 of fifty oars and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Medan war2 and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these3 last were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina and the Athenians4 had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars a–piece; and that so lately5 , as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles built those ships which they used in that war. And these also not all had decks.
The causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in any great action.
15. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land, where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all: and such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other hand to hand. For the war of old between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians1 was it wherein the rest of Greece was most divided and in league with either party.
The Ionians kept down by the Persians.
16. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this: that the Persian affairs prospering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Crœsus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea–side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent: and Darius afterward, when he had overcome2 the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.
A. C. 548. Ol. 58. 1.
17. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how with as much safety as was possible to look to their own persons and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities1 and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours. For as for the tyrants of Sicily2 , they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time3 hindered, that neither jointly it could do anything remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.
The Lacedæmonians put down the tyrants through all Greece.A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2.A. C. 804.A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 3.Olymp. 75. 1.All Greece divided into two leagues; the Lacedæmonians and their league, and the Athenians and their league.
18. But after that the tyrants, both of Athens4 and of the rest of Greece where tyrannies5 were, were the most and last of them, excepting those of Sicily, put down by the Lacedæmonians; (for Lacedæmon, after that it was built by the Dorians that inhabited6 the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions7 than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free8 from tyrants: for it is unto the end of this war four hundred years and something more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government, and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities); I say, after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon. And in the tenth year again after that, came the barbarian with the great fleet1 into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before and already stowed2 their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes went a ship–board3 and became seamen. When they had jointly beaten back the barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest; for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but awhile: for afterwards the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance4 , warred each on other together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece, where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. In so much, that from the war of the Medes to this present war being continually [exercised] somtimees in peace sometimes in war, either one against the other or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions and also expert; because their practice was with danger.
The manner how the Lacedæmonians dealt with their confederates.The manner how the Athenians handled their confederates.
19. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians), reigned1 over them, and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means, their own particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when2 in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.
20. Such then I find to have been the state of things past; hard to be believed3 , though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For1 men receive the report of things, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination.
Digression to show how negligently men receive the fame of things past, by the example of their error touching the story of Hippias the son of Pisistratus: which it seems he willingly mentions, both here and hereafter, on light occasion.A. C. 514. Ol. 46. 2.
For the vulgar sort of Athenians think that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton: and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren; and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting that some of their complices had that day, and at that instant2 , discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenaical3 show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single4 , but double votes: and5 that Pitanate was a band of soldiers so called there; whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men in search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.
21. Now he1 , that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose–writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live to be greatest, and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned2 .
The diligence of the author in the inquiry of the truth of what he wrote: both touching the orations and the actions.
22. What particular persons have spoken1 when they were about to enter into the war or when they were in it, were hard2 for me to remember exactly; whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum3 of the truth of all that had been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so I have made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty; because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner; but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember.
The use of this history.
To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find4 enough herein to make him think it profitable. And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession1 , than to be rehearsed for a prize.
The greatness of the present war.Earthquakes, eclipses, famine, pestilence, concomitants of this war.A. C. 415. Ol. 83. 3. The causes of the war.Fear necessitates the war in the Lacedæmonians.
23. The greatest action before this was that against the Medes2 ; and yet that, by two battles by sea and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like in the like space had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expugned and made desolate, what by the barbarians3 and what by the Greeks warring on one another4 ; (and some cities there were, that when they were taken changed their inhabitants5 ); nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war some by sedition6 , as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal: eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time: great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part7 , the plague. All8 these evils entered together with this war: which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which immediately after the conquest of Eubœa had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel1 , though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league publicly voiced, were these.
The first pretext.A. C. 627. Ol. 38. 2.
24. Epidamnus2 is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian Gulf. Bordering upon it are the Taulantii, barbarians, a people of Illyris3 . This was planted by the Corcyræans4 ; but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidas, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and, according to an5 ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city. Besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others1 of the Doric nation. In process of time the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and2 having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining barbarians, brought low and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the barbarian war. And this they entreated in the form of suppliants3 , sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.
The Epidamnians neglected by their mother city Corcyra, procure the protection of the Corinthians.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.A. C. 436. Ol. 85. 4./86. 1.
25. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Delphi enquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians as of their founders, and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence. And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle gave their city1 to them, and declared2 how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, entreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, as thinking them no less their own than the Corcyræans’ colony, but also for hatred of the Corcyræans; who being their colony yet contemned them, and allowed3 them not their due honour in public meetings, nor in the distribution of the sacrifice began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time for store of money, and1 strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyra had been once inhabited by the Phæaces2 , who flourished in glory of naval affairs: which was also the cause why they the rather provided themselves of a navy. And they were indeed not without power that way; for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.
The Corinthians send inhabitants to Epidamnus.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1.The Corcyræans angry at the aids sent by the Corinthians, make war on Epidamnus.A. C. 436. Ol. 86. 1. The Corcyræans besiege Epidamnus.
26. The Corinthians therefore having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and of their own citizens. Which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia1 . The Corcyræans, understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty–five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent2 manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished, (for these banished3 men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulcres of their ancestors and claiming kindred, had entreated the Corcyræans to restore them), and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce), and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part, warred upon them; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers, might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.
The Corinthians send an army to relieve it.
27. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army: and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go should have equal and like privileges1 with those that were there before: and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many, both that went and that laid down their silver. Moreover they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid2 them with some galleys: who accordingly furnished out eight; the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five: the citizens of Hermione, one: the Trœzenians, two: the Leucadians, ten: the Ambraciots, eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money: of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys. And of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms3 .
A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræans offer to stand to arbitrement.The Corinthians unwilling to accept it, and not without cause.
28. The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them; and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city, they said, wherewith they had nothing to do; or if they had anything to1 allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on; and they then should hold the colony, to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi: that war they would make none; but if they must needs have it, they should, by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence to seek out better2 friends than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet and dismiss the barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter: for before they could not honestly do it; because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and3 to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.
A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corinthian fleet.A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2. The Corcyræan fleet.The Corcyræans have the victory at sea, and on the same day take the city.
29. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions, since1 their galleys were manned and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy–five galleys and two thousand2 men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium, in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him), in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, the Corcyræans sent a herald to them at3 Actium, to forbid their coming on; and in the meantime manned out their fleet; and having repaired4 and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished5 the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition and went aboard6 . The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having1 their galleys already manned and furnished to the number of eighty sail, (for forty2 attended always the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea, and arranging themselves came to a battle: in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors; and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same3 rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be4 ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should be otherwise disposed of.
A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.The Corcyræans masters of the sea.A. C. 435. Ol. 86. 2.
30. The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy5 in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians6 with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first and wasted the territory of Leucas7 , a Corinthian colony; and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had both with money and shipping given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year; till such time as in the beginning of the summer1 following the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers unto Actium, the which, for the more safe keeping of Leucas and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis2 : and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other; but after they had lyen quietly opposite all the1 summer, they retired in winter both the one side and the other to their cities.
A. C. 434. 3. Ol. 86. 3. 4. The Corinthians prepare a greater navy.Both Corcyræans and Corinthians send their ambassadors to Athens.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
31. All this year, as well before as after the battle2 , the Corinthians, being vexed3 at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest4 they were able to make, and to procure mariners5 out of Peloponnesus and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear; and (because they had never6 been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians) thought it best now to send to Athens7 , to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy to that of the Corcyræans might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other; and the Corcyræans spake to this effect.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4. oration of the ambassadors of corcyra.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
32. “Men of Athens, it is but justice that such as come to implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do1 we), and cannot pretend by any great benefit or league some precedent merit, should, before they go any farther, make it appear, principally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at least to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same: and if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill though their suit be rejected. And the Corcyræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For having ever till now been unwilling to admit others into league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Corinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league, because we would not at the discretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able to go1 through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us, would be very great to all Greece: it is necessary that we seek the succours both of you and of whomsoever else we can; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judgment.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
33. “Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this coincidence2 on our part of need will on your part be honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so place3 your benefit as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be so, indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours. Consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies, can befal you, than that that power, which you would have prized above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not1 happened at once to many. And few there be of those that sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than to confer it. If any here think, that the war wherein we may do you service will not at all be, he is in an error, and seeth not how the Lacedæmonians, through fear of you, are already in labour of the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them and enemies to you, making way for their enterprize2 , assault us now in the way to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure beforehand3 , either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It must therefore be your4 part, we offering and you accepting the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting rather than to counterplot against them.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
34. “If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us, who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced1 by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure, that hath fewest benefits bestowed upon him by his enemies to repent of.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
35. “As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians, they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there2 it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and3 out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places4 in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And5 if they impute it to you as a fault, that you grant our request; we shall take it for a greater, that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them, who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful1 forces in your dominions. Whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities2 , as we said in the beginning, we show unto you, but this for the greatest; that whereas they are your enemies, (which is manifest enough), and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these is not as the want of the other. Nay rather, your principal aim, if it could be done, should be to let none at all have shipping but yourselves; or at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends as are best furnished therewith.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
36. “If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken: let that man consider, that his fear joined with strength will make his enemies fear, and his confidence, having (if he reject us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be1 feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation no less concerning Athens than Corcyra; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (considering the present state of affairs), that makes a question, whether against a war at hand and only not already on foot, he should join unto it or not that city, which with most important advantages or disadvantages will be2 friend or enemy. For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily, that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus3 thither: and is also for divers other uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be abandoned or not, by this. For Greece having but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you suffer the other two to join in one by letting the Corinthians first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time both against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians; whereas by making league with us, you shall, with your1 fleet augmented, have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.”
Thus spake the Corcyræans: and after them the Corinthians, thus.
oration of the ambassadors of corinth.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
37. “The Corcyræans in their oration having made mention not only of your taking them into league, but also that they are wronged and unjustly warred on; it is also necessary for us first to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed to the rest of what we have to say: to the end you may foreknow2 that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy3 estate of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty, the truth is, that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness; as4 being unwilling to have any confederate for a witness of their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides, their city being by the situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this point; that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such as by necessity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth1 their goodly pretext for not admitting confederates, not because they would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had rather do it alone; that where they were too strong, they might oppress; and when there should be none to observe them, the less of the profit might be shared from them; and that they might escape the shame, when they took any thing. But if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they are), by how much the less they are obnoxious2 to accusation, so much the more means they have, by giving and taking what is3 due, to make their honesty appear. 38. But they are not such, neither towards others nor towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in revolt; but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be injured by us. But we say again, that we did not send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them, and to be regarded by them as is fit. For4 our other colonies both honour and love us much: which is an argument, seeing the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we should not have had colour1 to war against them. But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in them to have given way to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have done wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars they never claimed, as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them, and so holden.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.
39. “They say2 now, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment. But you are not to think that such a one will stand to judgment, as hath advantage and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he, that before the trial will admit equality in the matter itself as well as in the pleading. Whereas contrarily, these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw we meant not to put it3 up. And now hither they be come, not content to have been faulty in that business themselves, but to get in you; into their confederacy? no; but into their conspiracy; and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the danger; and when you, that never1 partaked of their power, must2 impart unto them of your aid, and having been free from their faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should3 communicate their power before hand, that mean to make common the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also to have no part in the sequel of them.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.
40. “Thus it appears, that we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right; whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall show you likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For although it be in the articles4 , that the cities written with neither of the parties may come in to whether of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so to the detriment of either; but only for those, that having revolted1 from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise2 ) that receive them. For3 you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they4 must defend themselves not without you. You should do most uprightly, to stand out of both our ways; and if not that, then to take our parts against the Corcyræans; (for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyræans you never had so much as a truce); and not to constitute a new law, of receiving one another’s rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion5 ; but plainly alleged, that it was reason, that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so much against us, as against yourselves.
A. C. 433. Ol. 86. 3. 4.A. C. 491. Ol. 72. 2.
41. “These are the points of justice we had to show you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in the present occasion to be granted us by way of requital. For when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory1 against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but2 of victory. For3 even a man’s domestic affairs are ordered the worse, through eagerness of present contention.
A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4.
42. “Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased to defend4 us now in the like manner. And have not this thought: that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet, if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most, wherein we do the least wrong; besides that the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frighting you go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you, indeed, to take away our former jealousies1 concerning the Megareans. For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service by this league. For to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power, than that addition of strength, which, puffed up2 with present shows, men are to acquire with danger.
43. “And since we be come to this, which once before we said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed as he shall think good against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now of you; and that you that have been helped by our votes, will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like; remembering, that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us is our greatest friend, and he that opposeth us our greatest enemy: and that you will not receive3 these Corcyræans into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries. These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.”
This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.
A. C. 433. Ol.86.3.4. A league defensive made between the Athenians and Corcyræans.
44. Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people twice assembled; in the former assembly they approved no less of the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans. But in the latter they changed their minds; not so as to make a league with the Corcyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the other; (for then, if the Corcyræans should have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the Peloponnesians); but made it only defensive, that if any one should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected that even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, to fall into the hands of the Corinthians; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired to break them one against another; that if need required, they might have to do with the Corinthians, and others that had shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.
They aid Corcyra with ten galleys.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
45. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcyræans into league; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten galleys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lacedæmonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles; and1 had order not to fight with the Corinthians, unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there or in some other place of theirs: which, if they did, then with all their might to oppose them. This1 they forbad, because they would not break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys arrived at Corcyra.
The Corinthian fleet.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
46. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Corcyra with one hundred and fifty sail; of the Eleans ten, of the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciots twenty–seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth was Xenocleides the son of Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come2 together upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas, and came to Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis. In3 this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyra, in that part of Thesprotis which is called Elæatis; and near unto it disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divideth Thesprotis from Cestrine4 ; betwixt which two rivers ariseth this promontory of Chimerium. To this part of the continent came1 the Corinthians, and encamped.
The Corcyræan fleet.
47. The Corcyræans understanding that they made against them, having ready one hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota: and the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces stayed in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many barbarians, which in those quarters have2 been evermore their friends.
The Corinthians set forward.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
48. The Corinthians, after they were ready and had taken aboard three days’ provision of victual, put off by night from Chimerium with purpose to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off from Sybota and coming on to fight with the Corinthians3 . As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing4 of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own5 , were divided into three commands, under the three commanders, one under one. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians and right wing of the Corcyræans they were themselves placed, with such galleys as were best of sail, in the left.
The battle.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.The Corinthians have the better.The Athenians and Corinthians fight.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
49. The standard1 being on either side lift up, they joined battle; having on both parts2 both many men of arms and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought; near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once3 run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood whilst the galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages4 through each other they made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill. Insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder: in which the Athenian galleys, being always, where the Corcyræans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress; for the Corcyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went aland, burnt their abandoned tents and took away their baggage. So that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyræans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyræans were in distress, now aided them manifestly1 ; whereas before, they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athenians.
Sybota of the continent, a haven.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A supply of twenty sail from Athens.
50. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk1 unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down, to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many and taking up a large space at sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before of Grecians against Grecians. When2 the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead; which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land–forces of the barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they reunited themselves, and made again to the Corcyræans. And they likewise, with such galleys as they had fit for the sea remaining3 of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song1 which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern: for they had descried twenty Athenian galleys2 , sent from Athens to second the former ten; for fear lest the Corcyræans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few3 to defend them.
The Corinthians fall off.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
51. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off. But the Corcyræans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight4 ) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern; till at last some that saw them, said they were enemies5 ; and then retired also the Corcyræans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended1 in night. The Corcyræans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcases and wrecks, soon after they were descried arrived at the camp of the Corcyræans in Leucimna. The Corcyræans at first (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they2 anchored there.
The Corcyræans offer battle again.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Corinthians expostulate with the Athenians, to sound their purpose.The answer of the Athenians.
52. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both for that they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and for many difficulties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place their galleys were not yet3 repaired; but took thought rather how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace for already broken in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart. 53. They therefore thought good to send1 afore unto the Athenians certain men without privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this manner: “Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war and violate the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, you stand in our way and bear arms against us: if therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve2 the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.” Thus said they: and the Corcyræans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war nor break the peace; but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyræans: if you please therefore to go any whither else, we hinder you not; but if against Corcyra, or any place belonging unto it, we will not3 suffer you.”
The Corinthians go home.Both the Corcyræans and Corinthians challenge the victory, and both set up trophies.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
54. When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also both took up the wreck and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the waves and the winds that arose the night before, came driving to their hands; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota the island. The victory was thus challenged on both sides upon these grounds. The Corinthians did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having1 gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy of the enemies’ galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty2 galleys of the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by reason of the wind; and because the day before, upon sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern and went away from them: and lastly, for that when they3 went to Sybota, the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.
The Corinthians in their way home, take Anactorium, and keep two hundred and fifty of the best men prisoners, being Corcyræans, and use them well.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
55. The Corinthians in their way homeward took in Anactorium, a town seated in the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, by deceit; (this town was common to them and to the Corcyræans); and having put into it Corinthians only4 , departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans, eight hundred that were servants5 , they sold; and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with very much favour, that they might be a means, at their return, to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians; the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered1 of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians: namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.
The second pretext of the war:Potidæa suspected.Potidæa commanded to give hostages, and to pull down part of their wall.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 2.
56. Presently after this, it came to pass that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied2 to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene3 , a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards4 Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away and no more receive the Epidemiurgi5 , (magistrates so called), which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth; fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas1 and of the Corinthians they should revolt, and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace2 .
The Athenians give orders to the generals they were sending against Perdiccas, to secure their cities in those parts.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
57. These things against the Potidæans, the Athenians had precontrived presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred3 upon them. And the cause why he did so was, that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war, and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa. And likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans, to revolt with them: for if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys with a thousand men of arms, under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas), both to receive hostages of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls1 ; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not.
The Potidæans seek the protection of the Lacedæmonians.The revolt of Potidæa, Bottiæa, and Chalcidice, from the Athenians.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
58. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them; by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedæmon, dealt2 with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them no less than against Macedonia: and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa, to invade Attica: then at last they revolted, and together with them the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For3 Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and that one city to make strong: and unto those that removed, gave part of his own, and part4 of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when1 they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves to the war.
The Athenian fleet, finding Potidæa and other cities already lost, go into Macedonia.
59. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible, with their present forces, to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out; and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from above.
The Corinthians send their forces to Potidæa to defend it.
60. In the meantime after Potidæa was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger their own, sent unto it, both of their own city2 , and of other Peloponnesians which they hired, to the number of sixteen hundred men of arms and four hundred light3 armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus, for whose sake4 most of the volunteers of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidæans. And they arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidæa forty days.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Athenians send forces against Potidæa.Veria.
61. The news of the revolt of these cities was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys, under the conduct of Callias the son of Calliades1 . These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, who by this time had taken Therme2 , and were now besieging the city of Pydna; and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition; and having made a necessary3 league with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus), departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhœa4 , they attempted to take it: but when they could not do it, they turned back, and marched towards Potidæa by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys, seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast5 , by moderate journeys came in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The Athenians and those with Aristeus prepare themselves for battle.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The victory falleth to the Athenians.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
62. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near unto1 Olynthus, and had the market kept for them without2 the city. And the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas: for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans. The purpose of Aristeus was, to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus3 , and therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians; and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were4 passed by, to come on their backs and to inclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias the Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town; and then dislodging marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come on as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also did the like; and not long after they joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite unto them, and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians were by the Athenians defeated, and fled into the city. 63. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution1 , was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus or to Potidæa. In the end he resolved of the shortest2 way, and with his soldiers about him ran as hard as he was able into Potidæa; and with much ado got in at the pier3 through the sea, cruelly shot at, and with the loss of a few, but the safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began4 , they that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs5 off, and in sight), advanced a little way to have aided them; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle, to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards being taken1 down, they retired again; they of Olynthus into that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the Athenians. So2 that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of the bodies of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred; and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias one of their commanders.
The Athenians begin to besiege Potidæa.The Athenians send Phormio with sixteen hundred men of arms to Potidæa.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Potidæa straightly besieged on all sides.
64. Presently upon this, the Athenians raised a wall before the city on the part towards3 the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison; but the part to Pallene–ward they left unwalled. For they thought themselves too small a number, both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and withal to go over and fortify in Pallene; fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidæa was unwalled on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither sixteen hundred men of arms under the conduct of Phormio the son of Asopius: who arriving in Pallene, left4 his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to give him battle, he raised a wall before the city on that part also that looketh towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides strongly besieged; and also from the sea by the Athenian galleys, that came up and rode before it.
The advice of Aristeus, to carry all the people but five hundred men out of the city, that their victual might the better hold out, refused.Aristeus getteth out of the city, unseen of the Athenians.And staying in Chalcidice, slew certain of the city of Sermylius by ambushment.Phormio wasteth the territories of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans.
65. Aristeus, seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without hope of safety save what might come from Peloponnesus or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and of them that should remain within offered himself to be one. But when his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their business1 , and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea unseen of the Athenian guard; and staying amongst the Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war2 , laid an ambush before Sermylius and slew many of that city, and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his sixteen hundred men of arms, wasted the territory of the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, and some small towns he took in.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.The solicitation of the war by the Corinthians and other confederates of the Lacedæmonians.Complaints exhibited against the Athenians in the council of Sparta.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
66. These were3 the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled the Athenians, for besieging Potidæa, and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus. The Athenians quarrelled the Peloponnesians, for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for that they had come thither, and openly fought against them in the behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms; for this was but a particular action of the Corinthians. 67. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for their men’s sakes that were within, and also for fear to lose the place, they could no longer hold. But out of hand, they procured1 of their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and thither also they went themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, though not openly by ambassadors for fear of the Athenians, yet privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alledging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles2 they ought to have been. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council3 of their own state commanded them to speak. Then presented every one his accusation; and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open this especially, that contrary to the articles they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens1 . Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedæmonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in and said as followeth.
oration of the ambassadors of corinth.A. C. 432. Ol 87. 1.
68. “Men of Lacedæmon, your own fidelity, both in matter of estate and conversation, maketh you the less apt to believe us, when we accuse others of the contrary2 . And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity3 , but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us a mischief; yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you have therefore called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now when the evil is already upon us. Before whom our speech must be so much the longer, by how much our objections are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some1 are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others2 , and especially against our confederates; and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For else they would never have taken Corcyra, and holden it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa; whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace3 , and the other had brought unto the Peloponnesians a most fair navy.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
69. “And of all this you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them upon the end of the Persian war to fortify their city, and again afterwards to raise their long walls; whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it neglects the same, is most truly said to do it; especially if they assume the honour to be esteemed the deliverers of Greece [as you do]. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet with any certain resolution what to do. For the question1 should not have been put, whether or not we have received injury, but rather in what manner we are to repair it. For they2 that do the wrong, having consulted upon it beforehand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only3 that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours, but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely through your blindness, they are the less bold: but when they shall perceive that you see, and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still defend others, not with your forces, but with promises4 ; and you are also the only men, that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it beginneth, but when it is doubled. You have indeed a report5 to be sure; but yet it is more in fame that, than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Persian came against6 Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth, before you encountered him as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their invasion, than to invade them; and by having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we1 know that the barbarian’s own error, and in our war against the Athenians, their own oversights, more than your assistance, was the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath been the destruction of some, that relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man think that we speak this out of malice, but only by way of expostulation: for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
70. “Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate his neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it; especially on so great quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem2 to have any feeling, nor to consider what manner of men, and how different from you in every kind the Athenians be, that you are to contend withal. For they love innovation, and are swift to devise, and also to execute what they resolve on. But you on the contrary are only apt to save your own; not devise any thing new, nor scarce3 to attain what is necessary. They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous above their own reason, and in danger hope still the best. Whereas your actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even what your judgment1 assures; and being in a danger, never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers; they love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being abroad to add to their estate; you, if you should go forth against the state of another, would think to impair your2 own. They, when they overcome their enemies advance the farthest, and when they are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least; and as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they were none of their own; but their minds, when they would serve the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand3 what they have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain any thing, they think lightly of it in respect of what they look to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary for the present, and enter presently into other hopes.4 For they alone both have and hope for at once whatsoever they conceive, through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour and toil all the days of their lives. What they have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more: nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profitable; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment than laborious business. So that, in a word, to say they are men born neither to rest themselves, nor suffer others, is to say the truth. 71. Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this city, your adversary, be such as we have said, yet you still delay time; not knowing, that those only are they to whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit still1 , who, though they use not their power to do injustice, yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could attain, though the states about you were of the same2 condition. But, as we have before declared, your customs are in respect of theirs antiquated; and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much experience, are more new to you than yours are to them3 . Here therefore give a period to your slackness; and4 by a speedy invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest: lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred5 to their cruelest enemies; and lest we and6 others be driven through despair to seek out some other league. Which to do were no injustice, neither against the Gods, judges of men’s oaths, nor against men, the hearers1 of them. For not they break the league, who being abandoned have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously, neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners, than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well of these points; and take such a course, that Peloponnesus may not by your leading fall into worse estate, than it was left unto you by your progenitors.”
The Athenian ambassadors residing in Lacedæmon upon their business, desire to make answer to the oration of the Corinthians.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
72. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing at Lacedæmon upon their2 business, when they heard of this oration, thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedæmonians, not to make apology for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to show in general3 , that it was not fit for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but farther time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of their city; to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already, and to the younger, for an information of what they knew not: supposing, that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly; who willed them to come in. And the Athenians went into the assembly and spake to this effect.
oration of the ambassadors of athens.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
73. “Though our embassage was not to this end, that we should argue against our1 confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the criminations of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges either of them or us), but to the end you may not be drawn away to take the worse resolution at the persuasion of the confederates, in matters of so great importance: and withal, touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you that what we possess, we have it justly, and that our city deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past, confirmed more by hearsay, than by the eyes of those that are to hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious2 to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your parts in the substance3 , so must we have ours (if that be any benefit) in the commemoration. And we shall make recital of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation1 and declaration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone hazarded battle against the barbarian in the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards, when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle amongst the rest by sea at Salamis; which was the cause that kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste city after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the Persian himself; who when his fleet was overcome, and that he had2 no more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his army.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
74. “Which being so, and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred to the same3 the three things of most advantage; namely, the greatest number of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage. For of four hundred galleys in the whole, our own were few less than two–thirds; and for commander Themistocles, who was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait4 , whereby he clearly saved the whole business, and whom, though a stranger, you your selves have honoured for it more than any man that came unto you. And a forwardness we showed more adventurous than any other, in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before, and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city and lose our goods; and even in that estate, not to betray the common cause of the confederates, or divided from them to be unuseful, but to put ourselves into our navy and undergo the danger with them; and that without passion against you for not having formerly defended us in the like manner. So that we may say, that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you, than we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and to the end you might still keep them so; and when you were afraid, not of our danger, but your own. Whereas1 we, coming from a city no more being2 , and putting ourselves into danger for a city3 hopeless ever to be again, saved both you in4 part, and ourselves. But if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to have our territories wasted; or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea, because your fleet had been too small; but his affairs had1 succeeded as he would himself.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Atheniaus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians.A. C. 432 Ol. 87. 1. Oration of the Athenians.
75. “Therefore, men of Lacedæmon, we deserve not so great envy of the Grecians2 , for our courage at that time and for our prudence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against the barbarian, came in and entreated us to take the command of their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of the nature of the thing itself; as chiefly for fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted, and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been, but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a safe course, laying by our power to put ourselves into your danger3 . For the revolts from us, would all have been made to you. Now it is no fault for men in danger, to order their affairs to the best. 76. For you also4 , men of Lacedæmon, have command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to your best advantage. And had you, when the time was1 , by staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well, you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously, or to have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at nor beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the government upon us as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same; and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the commodity, you now fall to allegation of equity; a thing which no man that had the occasion to achieve anything by strength, ever so far preferred as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of commendation, who following the natural inclination of man in desiring2 rule over others, are juster than for their own power they need. And therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make appear our own moderation; and yet our moderation hath undeservedly incurred contempt3 rather than commendation. 77. For1 though in pleas of covenants with our confederates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us, we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them considering that2 others, who in other places have dominion and are toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never upbraided for it. For they that have the power to compel, need not at all to go to law. And yet3 these men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if they lose anything which they think they should not, either by sentence or by the power of our government, they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in this kind also4 they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice, than for violence. For that, coming as from an equal, seemeth rapine; and the other, because from one stronger, but necessity. Therefore when they suffered worse things under the Medes’ dominion, they bore it; but think ours to be rigorous. And good reason; for to men in subjection, the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, you would soon find a change of the love which they bear you now for fear of us, if you should do again as you did1 for a while, when you were their commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions are different2 from those of others, but also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge], he neither useth those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece. 78. Deliberate therefore of this a great while, as of a matter of great importance; and do not upon the opinions and criminations of others procure your own trouble. Consider before you enter, how unexpected the chances of war be. For a long war for the most part endeth in calamity, from which we are equally far off; and whether part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And men, when they go to war, use many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come behind; and when they have taken harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error ourselves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace nor violate your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to witness, that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us.”
The Lacedæmonians amongst themselves take counsel how to proceed.
79. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians’ answer, they put them every one out of the court1 , and consulted of the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this; that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.
oration of archidamus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Archidamus.
80. “Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me to have the like; insomuch as you2 cannot desire this war either through inexperience, as many do, nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now deliberate of, will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians and our neighbour states we have equal1 strength, and can quickly be upon them; yet against men whose territory is remote, and are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides; and that have many confederates paying them tribute: against such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war? And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying should we make such haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak: and if we will provide2 and prepare against them, it will require time. On our money? But therein also we are more too weak3 ; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute. 81. But it may be, some rely on this; that we exceed them in arms and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again, if we essay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue, whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour for us, when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. As1 for the hope, that if we waste their country, the war will soon be at an end; let that never lift us up: for I fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their earth; nor as men without experience, to be astonished at the war. 82. And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athenians in their plots against them; but only not yet to take up arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no great show neither of war nor of sufferance: and in the mean time to make our provision, and make friends both of Greeks and barbarians, such as in any place we can get of power either in shipping or money; (nor are they to be blamed, that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto them not Grecians only, but also barbarians for their safety); and withal to set forth2 our own. If they listen to our ambassadors, best of all; if not, then two or three years passing over our heads, being better appointed, we may war3 upon them if we will. And when they see our preparation4 , and hear words that import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner; especially having their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon commodities extant and not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better husbanded. The which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may; lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugn. For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confederates we waste their territory; consider if1 in so doing we do not make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against2 cities as private men, may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly with honour be letten fall again. 83. Now let no man think it cowardice, that being many cities3 , we go not presently and invade that one city. For of confederates that bring them in money, they have more than we; and war is not so much war of arms as war of money, by means whereof arms are useful; especially when it is a war of land–men against sea–men. And therefore let us first provide ourselves of money, and not first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought the causers of all events, good or bad, have reason also to take some leisure in part to foresee them. 84. As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith5 we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it; for the more haste you make to the war, you will4 be the longer before you end it, for that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever free and well thought of: and this which they object, is rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment. For by that it is, that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof moved to undergo danger more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, doth the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours maketh us both good soldiers, and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begetteth1 modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame: good counsellors, in this, that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws, and by severity more modestly than to disobey them: and also in that, we do not, like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy and in effect not assault him accordingly; but do think our neighbour’s cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech2 ; and do therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy, as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man; but him only to be the best, that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties3 . 85. Let us not therefore cast aside the institutions1 of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us of many men’s lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at leisure; the which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidæa; send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they be content to refer the cause to judgment; and one that offereth himself to judgment, may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given. And prepare withal for the war. So shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy.”
Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner:
oration of sthenelaidas.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Sthenelaidas.
86. “For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes, when time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double punishment; because they are not good as they were, and because they are evil as they were not. Now are we the same we were2 ; and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to repair them; for the harm they suffer, is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be defended with words1 , (for they are not hurt in words), but to be aided with all our power and with speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lancedæmon, decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the Gods proceed against the doers of injustice.”
The Lacedæmonians by question conclude that the Athenians had broken the peace.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
87. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephor, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern whether was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes viva voce, and not with balls2 ), and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war1 , he put it unto them again, and said, “to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder,” and withal he showed them a certain place: “and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side”. So they arose and the room was divided; wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.
Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their sentence was that the Athenians had done them wrong: but yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again; that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent2 . This done, their confederates went home: and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had dispatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years, for which a peace had been formerly concluded after the actions past in Eubœa.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The true cause of this war being the fear the Lacedæmonians had of the power of Athens, the author digresseth to show how that power grew first up.
88. The Lacedæmonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates, as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.
The means by which the Athenians came to have the command of the common forces of Greece against the Persian, by which they raised their empire.The Athenians return to their city.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. They repair their city, and wall it.
89. Now the manner how the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves, was this. After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale1 were there also utterly overthrown; Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus went home. But the Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from the king, staid behind and besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes; and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it abandoned by the barbarians2 . And after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the body3 of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the barbarians, went home also, and fetched thither their wives and children, and such goods as they had, from the places where they had been put out to keep; and went about the reparation1 of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.
The Lacedæmonians advise them to the contrary for their own ends, pretending the common good.Themistocles adviseth them to build on.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. His subtilty in deluding the Lacedæmonians.The building hastened.Themistocles goeth to Lacedæmon ambassador.He adviseth the Lacedæmonians to send ambassadors to see if the wall went up or not.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. He sendeth letters to Athens secretly, to have those ambassadors stayed till the return of himself and his fellows from Lacedæmon.And hearing that the walls were finished, he justifies it.A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3.The Lacedæmonians dissembled their dislike.
90. The Lacedæmonians hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors, partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls; but principally as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage showed against the Persians: and entreated them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing: not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians; but pretending this, that if the barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did2 of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer; that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height1 ; and that all the men in the city, in the mean time, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice that might advance the work, but pulling all down whatsoever, should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding that he would himself do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon he went not to the state2 , but delaying the time excused himself; and when any of those that were in office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, “that he stayed for his fellow–ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly and wondered they were not come already”. 91. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up, and that it was come to good height already, they could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and having informed themselves would relate the truth: which they also did. And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athenians about the same men, to take order for their stay with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned: (for by this time were arrived those that were joined with him, namely, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height): for he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, according as it was written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his audience before the Lacedæmonians, said plainly, “that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within: and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians1 upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto them, they were to send thenceforward as to men that understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best to quit their city and put themselves into their galleys, he2 said, they were bold to do it without asking the advice of them: and in common counsel, the advice of the Athenians was as good as the advice of them. And now at this time their opinion is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in strength1 unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore, said he, either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us.” The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no show of being angry with the Athenians; (for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them not to build the wall2 ; besides they bare them affection then, for their courage shown against the Medes); yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed of their will. And the ambassadors returned home of either side without complaint.
The walls of Athens built in haste.A. C. 473. Ol. 76. 4.Themistocles author to the Athenians of assuming the dominion of the sea, and of fortifying Piræus. A. C. 493. Ol. 71. 4.The reason why Themistocles was most addicted to affairs by sea.A. C. 478. Ol. 75. 3.
93. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls; the structure itself making manifest3 the haste used in the building. For the foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts; and those in some places unwrought, and as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres4 , and polished stones were piled together amongst the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Piræus5 ; for it was begun in the year that himself was archon of Athens; as conceiving the place both1 beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed the first man that durst tell them, that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel also it was, that they built the wall of that breadth about Piræus which is now to be seen. For two carts carrying stones2 met and passed upon it one by another. And yet within it there was neither rubbish nor mortar [to fill it up], but it was made all of great stones, cut square3 and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised but to the half, at the most, of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth; and that a few and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea, because, as I think, he had observed that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Piræus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed4 by land, they should go down thither, and with their galleys make resistance against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon the departure of the Persians.
Pausanias sent general of the Greeks, to pursue the relics of the Persian war.A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3.Pausanias growing insolent, the Ionians offended desire the protection of the Athenians.Pausanias sent for home to answer to certain accusations.A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 3. In his absence, the Grecians give the Athenians the leading of them.Pausanias acquit, but sent general no more.The Grecians refuse the command of Dorcis, sent from Sparta to be their general.
94. In the meantime was Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, sent from Lacedæmon commander of the Grecians with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus; with which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates; and making war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium1 , which they besieged and won. 95. But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Grecians, and especially the Ionians, who2 had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came unto the Athenians, and requested them for consanguinity’s3 sake to become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. The Athenians accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there in such sort as it should seem best unto themselves. In the mean time the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him of such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Grecians that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny, than a command in war. And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though he were censured1 for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquit; especially2 of Medising, the which seemed to be the most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more; but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; whose command the confederates refused; and they finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedæmonians sent no more; because they feared lest such as went out, would prove the worse for the state, as they had seen by Pausanias; and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders and at that time their friends.
A. C. 477. Ol. 75. 4.The Athenians assess their confederates for the sustaining of the war. A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.The original of the tribute paid to the Athenians.
96. When the Athenians had thus gotten the command, by the confederates’ own accord for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order, which cities should contribute money for this war against the barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up amongst the Athenians the office of Treasurers of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute3 ; for so they called this money contributed. And the first tribute that was taxed, came to four hundred and sixty talents4 . The treasury was at Delos1 , and their meetings were kept there in the temple.
A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. The history of the time between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, pretermitted by other writers, briefly delivered by Thucydides.
97. Now using their authority, at first, in such manner as that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by [the] war and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following. Which also I have therefore written, both because this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written before me: (for they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus, who hath also touched them in his Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the times): and also because they carry with them a demonstration of how the Athenian empire grew up2 .
The steps of the Athenians towards their great dominion. The Athenians take Eion:A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. and Scyros:and Carystus: A. C. 467. Ol. 78. 2.and Naxos, their confederate. A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.
98. And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades they took Eion3 upon the river Strymon from the Medes by siege, and carried away1 the inhabitants captives. Then the isle Scyros, in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, the inhabitants whereof they also carried away captives, and planted therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war on the Carystians alone without the rest of the Eubœans; and those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which contrary to the ordinance2 they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like by the rest.
The cause of revolts from the Athenians.A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.
99. Amongst other causes of revolts, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and their refusing (when they did so) to follow the wars3 . For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms; and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the causes. For4 through this refusal to accompany the army, the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to: by which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates; and themselves unprovided and without means to make war, in case they should revolt.
The Athenians defeat the Persian upon the river of Eurymedon.They war on Thasos. A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4.They take Amphipolis, and afterwards receive a great overthrow at Drabescus in Thrace.A. C. 465. Ol. 78. 3. 4. The Lacedæmonians intending to invade Attica, are hindered by an earthquake.A. C. 465.A. C. 463. Ol. 79. 1. 2. Thasos rendered to the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians send for aid to the Athenians, in their war against Ithome. A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4.The first dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians.The Athenians being had in suspicion by the Lacedæmonians, join with the Argives.A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 3. 4.
100. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and by water, upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia; and in one and the same day the Athenians had victory in both1 ; and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this again happened the revolt of Thasos, upon a difference about the places of trade and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace2 . And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates’ people unto the river of Strymon, for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine–ways, now Amphipolis; they won the said Nine–ways, which was held by the Eidonians; but advancing farther towards the heart of the country of Thrace, they were defeated3 at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new–built town of the Nine–ways. 101. The Thasians in the meantime, being overcome in divers battles and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica: which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened they were hindered. In which earthquake their Helots1 , and of neighbouring towns2 the Thuriatæ and Æthæans, revolted and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into servitude in former3 times; whereby also it came to pass that they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lacedæmonians now a war at Ithome. The4 Thasians in the third year of the siege rendered themselves to the Athenians, upon condition to raze their walls; to deliver up their galleys; to pay both the money behind and for the future, as much as they were wont; and to quit both the mines and the continent. 102. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, amongst other their confederates sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small forces under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege seeming to require men of ability in that kind; whereby they might perhaps have gotten the place by force1 . And upon this journey, grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race2 , might, at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration if they staid, dismissed them alone of all the confederates; not discovering their jealousy, but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving that they were not sent away upon good3 cause, but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedæmonians’ hands, as soon as they were gone1 , left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath and made the same league with the Thessalians.
The Helots in Ithome, after ten years’ siege, compound and quit Peloponnesus. A. C. 455. Ol. 81. 1. 2.The Athenians receive them, and place them in Naupactus.Megara revolteth from the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians.
103. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege rendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, upon condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and whosoever should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by a certain answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they and their wives and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore2 to the Lacedæmonians, received them and put them into Naupactus; which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians; who built for the Megareans the long walls from the city to Nisæa, and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly, that the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athenians.
A. C. 460. Ol. 80. 1. The Athenians send an army into Egypt, to aid the rebels against the king of Persia.Cairo.The Athenians fight by land, against the Corinthians and Epidaurians. A. C. 458. Ol. 80. 2. 3.After that, against the Peloponnesians.Then against the Æginetæ.The Peloponnesians aid Ægina. A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.The Corinthians receive a great loss in Megaris.A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.
104. Moreover Inarus, the son of Psammetticus, an African1 , king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Mareia above Pharus, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against the king Artaxerxes; and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the river of Nilus, after they had made themselves masters of the river and of two parts of the city of Memphis, assaulted the third part, called the White–Wall. Within were of the Medes and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest. 105. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias, and landing their soldiers fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphaleia, and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war being on foot of the Athenians against the Æginetæ, a great battle was fought between them by sea upon the coast of Ægina, the confederates of both sides being at the same, in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys landed their army and besieged the city, under the conduct of Leocrates the son of Strœbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over into Ægina itself three hundred men of arms, of the same that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces1 seized on the top of Geraneia. And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence into the territory of Megara; supposing that the Athenians, having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina, but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again, with an opinion on both sides not to have had the worse in the action. And the Athenians, who notwithstanding had rather the better, when the Corinthians were gone away erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara with a huge shout2 , both slew those that were setting up the trophy, and charging the rest got the victory. 106. The Corinthians being overcome, went their way; but a good part of them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a great ditch had no passage through. Which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them1 at the place by which they entered with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light armed soldiers killed those that were entered with stones. This was a great loss to the Corinthians; but the rest2 of their army got home again.
The Athenians build their long walls from both sides of the city to the sea.A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 3. 4.The Lacedæmonians fight with the Athenians at Tanagra.A. C. 457. Ol. 80. 4.A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The Athenians overthrow the Bœotians at Œnophyta, [that is to say, the vineyards], and subdue Bœotia and Phocis.Ægina yielded to the Athenians.The Athenians sail round Peloponnesus, and waste it.
107. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to Peiræus. The Phoceans also making war upon Bœum, Cytinium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Dorians3 , of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians, under the conduct of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanactes son of king Pausanias, who was yet in his minority, sent unto the aid of the Dorians fifteen hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crisæan Gulf, the Athenians going1 about with their fleet would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geraneia they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ. For Geraneia was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always guarded by the Athenians2 . They thought good therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst3 they were there, there wanted not some Athenians, that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government, and to have demolished the long walls then building. But the Athenians, with the whole power of their city, and a thousand Argives, and other confederates as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them: for4 there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians5 certain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians. 108. They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the Lacedæmonians had the victory; but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians entering into the territories of Megara, and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. Upon the two–and–sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians, under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against the Bœotians and overthrew them at Œnophyta, and brought the territories of Bœotia and Phocis under their obedience; and withal razed the walls of Tanagra, and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus a hundred hostages; and finished also at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions: that they should have their walls pulled down, and should deliver up their galleys, and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made a voyage about Peloponnesus1 wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonians’ navy, took Chalcis2 a city of the Corinthians, and landing their forces in Sicyonia overcame in the fight those that made head against them.
A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4. The end of the Athenian forces in Egypt.A supply of Athenians going to Egypt, defeated by the forces of the king.A. C. 456. Ol. 80. 4.
109. All this while the Athenians stayed still in Egypt3 , and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt: and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus, a Persian, with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia. And1 then was Megabazus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces, and coming in by land overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drave the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally inclosed them in the isle of Prosopis2 . There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground and the island for the most part continent, and so came over and won the island with land soldiers. 110. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost after six years’ war; and few of many passing through Africa saved themselves in Cyrene: but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtæus, that reigned in the fens. For him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens3 of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans, and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty galleys more into Egypt, for a supply of those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest: and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.
The Athenians invade Thessaly.A. C. 454. Ol. 81. 2. 3. The Athenians under Pericles besiege Œniades.
111. Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians, taking with them the Bœotians and Phoceans1 , their confederates, made war against Pharsalus2 , a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army3 , (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling); but could not win the city nor yet perform anything else of what they came for, but came back again without effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the gallies that lay at Pegæ, (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians), under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia4 , and landing put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head; and then presently took up forces in Achaia; and putting over made war on Œnias5 , a city of Acarnania, which they besieged. Nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.
Truce for five years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.The Athenians war on Cyprus.Cimon dieth. A. C. 449. Ol. 82. 3. 4.The Holy War. A. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1.The Athenians recover Chæroneia, taken by the Bœotian outlawsA. C. 448. Ol. 82. 4./83. 1. The Athenians defeated at Coroneia by the outlaws, lose BœotiaEubœa revolteth from the Athenians. A. C. 446. Ol. 83. 2. 3. Megara revolteth Ol. 83. 3.A. C. 445 Ol. 83. 3. Eubœa subdued by the AtheniansPeace for thirty years between the Athenians and Peloponnesians.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.The Athenians war upon Samos.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.Samos yielded to the Athenians.A. C. 440. Ol. 85. 1.
112. Three years after this6 , was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. And the Athenians gave over the Grecian war; and with two hundred galleys, part their own, and part confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these there went sixty sail into Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens; and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there dying and a famine arising in the army1 , they left Citium; and when they had passed Salamis2 in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gotten victory in both returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet, now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war called the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians3 . But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phoceans. 113. Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Bœotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chæroneia and certain other places of Bœotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæroneia, they carried away the inhabitants4 captives, and leaving a garrison in the city departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus, and the Eubœan outlaws, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia1 , and overcoming the Athenians in battle some they slew and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest2 returned, and lived again under their own laws. 114. Not long after revolted Eubœa from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted, and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica; and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward brake into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusine and3 Thriasium, under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and came no farther on, but so went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa1 , and totally subdued it: the Hestiæans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands; but ordered the rest of Eubœa according to composition made. 115. Being returned from Eubœa, within a while after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years; and rendered Nisæa, Achaia2 , Pegæ, and Trœzene, (for these places the Athenians held of theirs), to the Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians, concerning Priene; and the Milesians being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; which when they had put into Lemnos, and set a guard upon them1 , they came home. But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening, and first set upon the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there2 into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines. 116. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use; (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos); but with the forty–four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought3 with seventy galleys of the Samians, (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers), as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty–five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city; which they inclosed with a triple wall4 , and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos, and others out of other places, to meet the Phœnicians. 117. In the mean time, the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour1 of the Athenians, which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame the rest2 in fight; insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this, there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides3 , Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded, with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.
The business about Corcyra and Potidæa, before related.Between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, fifty years.The oracle consulted by the Lacedæmonians, encourageth them to the war.A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4.Consultation of the Peloponnesians in general, whether they should enter into a war or not. A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4. / 87. 1.
118. Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever other intervenient1 pretext of this war. These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time, the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates, and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little; but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them: till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed, and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer; but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was2 by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly: and also having sent to Delphi, and enquired of Apollo, whether they should have the better in the war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: “That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory, and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled”. 119. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, “whether they should make war or not”. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect.
oration of the ambassadors of corinth.A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.
120. “Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, they having both decreed the war themselves1 , and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of them: yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake1 what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to make account, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves; and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us; and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong; yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition: and neither to swell with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success, observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill advised, come to good effect against enemies worse advised; yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies2 . For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear. 121. As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number1 ; and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion2 . And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both out of every one’s particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic: whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief. 122. We have also many other ways of war; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue1 ; the building of forts in their territory2 ; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper, standeth the firmest; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know, that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest3 servitude: which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored: whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid1 one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.
A. C. 432. Ol. 86. 4./87. 1. Oration of the Corinthians.
123 “But to what end should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present, labour for the future2 : for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom: for there is no reason that what was gotten in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war, as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself: and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit1 , are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them2 ; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1./86. 4. Oration of the Corinthians.
124. “So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same; and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans; who are Dorians, and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians; nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay, when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity, and that this is the best advice: and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war groweth the confirmation of peace; yet for love of ease to refuse the war, doth not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigneth over some already, and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war1 ; and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.” Thus said the Corinthians.
The war decreed by all the confederates.
125. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls to all the confederates present in order, from the greatest state to the least: and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently, because they were unprovided, and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves of what was necessary; yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.
The Lacedæmonians send embassages to the Athenians about expiation of sacrileges, only to pick better quarrels for the war.A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.
126. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians with certain criminations, to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising of the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva for pollution of sanctuary2 . Which polution was thus. There had been one Cylon an Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exercises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and that had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the God answered, that on the greatest festival day1 he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having gotten forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus, with intention to take upon him the tyranny: esteeming the feast of Jupiter2 to be the greatest, and to touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were meant to be the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest3 . For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and is celebrated without the city; wherein in the confluence of the whole people many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but such as was the fashion of the natives of the place4 . But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise. And when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away; and left both the guard of the citadel and the whole business to the nine archontes, with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the commonweal were administered by those nine archontes1 . Now those that were besieged with Cylon, were for want of both victual and water in very evil estate; and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar that is in the citadel. And the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe Goddesses, as they were going away1 . And from this the Athenians, both themselves and their posterity, were called accursed and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes, a Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians in a sedition2 , banished them afterwards again: and not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless there returned of them afterwards again; and there are of their race in the city unto this day.
A. C. 612. Ol. 42. 1.Pericles always adverse to the Lacedæmonians.
127. This pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city of: principally forsooth, as taking part with the gods; but knowing withal, that Pericles the son of Xantippus, was by the mother’s side3 one of that race. For they thought if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city; as if the misfortune of him were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposite to the Lacedæmonians; not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way, but inciting them to the war.
The Athenians require the Lacedæmonians to expiate the violation of sanctuary also on their parts.A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3.The occasion and manner of the death of Pausanias in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca.A. C. 470. Ol. 77. 3.Pausanias practiseth with the king of Persia against the state of Greece. A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.The Letter of Pausanias to the king.
128. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Tænarus. For the Lacedæmonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Tænarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them: for which cause they themselves think it was, that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta. Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca; which was thus. After that Pausanias the Lacedæmonian was1 recalled by the Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called in question by them was absolved, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in a galley of Hermione as a private man, without leave of the Lacedæmonians; to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negociate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business, was at first from this. When after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium; when he was there the first time, (which being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters unto him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, was thus written: “Pausanias, General of the Spartans, being desirous to do thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men, whom he hath by arms taken prisoners. And I have a purpose, if the same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If therefore any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man to the sea–side, by whose mediation we may confer together.”
A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.The Letter of Xerxes to Pausanias.
129. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea–side, with commandment to take the government of the province of Dascylis1 , and to dismiss Megabates, that was governor there before: and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzantium, and to show him the seal, and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter; wherein was written this answer: “Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias: For the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house indelibly registered2 for ever: and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come3 . But with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both.”
Pausanias groweth proud upon the receipt of these letters.A. C. 478.7. Ol. 75. 3.
130. Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was before in great authority4 for his conduct at Platæa, became now many degrees more elevated; and endured no more to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled at Byzantium1 after the fashion of Persia; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose; but in trifles made apparent beforehand the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access; and would be in such choleric2 passions toward all men indifferently, that no man might endure to approach him; which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.
A. C. 470. Ol. 77. 3.A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.Pausanias his ambition, in dedication of the Tripode at Delphi.A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.
131 When the Lacedæmonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came that he had seated himself at Colonæ in the country of Troy, practising still with the barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose: then the ephori forebore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the scytale3 , commanding him not to depart from the officer; and in case he refused, denounced war against him. But he, desiring as much as he could to decline suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the ephori committed to ward; (for the ephori1 have power to do this to their king); but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth, and exhibited himself to justice against such as had any thing to allege against him. 132. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in great authority: (for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas, being king and as yet in minority, Pausanias, who was his cousin–german, had the tuition of him yet): by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state2 . They considered also that he differed in manner of life from the discipline established: amongst other things by this, that upon the tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular this elegiac verse1 :
Pausanias accused of practice with the Helots.He sends letters to the king, which are opened by the way.Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.Pausanias by the art of the ephori made to betray himself.
But the Lacedæmonians then presently defaced that inscription of the tripode, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so2 . This therefore was numbered amongst the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather for the condition he was now in3 . They had information farther, that he had in hand some practice with the Helots. And so he had: for he promised them, not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him and co–operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon some appeachment of the Helots, would they proceed against him, but kept the custom which they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length (as it is reported) purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion4 and most faithful to him: who being terrified with the cogitation, that not any of those which had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter anything in the letter, it might not be discovered), and opened the letter; wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered. 133. The ephori, when these letters were by him shown unto them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias his own mouth; the man being upon design1 gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built him a little room with a partition in which he hid the ephori, and Pausanias coming to him and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him for what he had written about him, and from point to point discovered all the practice: saying2 , that though he had never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour as well as many other of his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, intreating him to go on in his journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.
Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.He flieth into sanctuary.Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4.
134. Now the ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way; and knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the ephori coming towards him, what they came for: and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close of the temple1 of Pallas Chalciœca, and got in before they overtook him; (now the temple itself was hard by); and entering into a house belonging to the temple, to avoid the injury of the open air, there staid. They that pursued him, could not then overtake him: but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house, and watching a time when he was within, beset the house and mured him up, and leaving a guard there famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him, as he was1 , out of the house, yet breathing; and being out he died immediately. After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæada2 , where they use to cast in malefactors: yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabouts. But the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterward, both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died3 ; (so that he lies now in the entry4 of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar); and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary) to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciœca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same unto her for Pausanias. 135. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedæmonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.
Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 4. Themistocles in the same treasonThemistocles, pursued by the Athenians and Peloponnesians, flieth to Corcyra.Thence is put over to the main land, and goeth to the king of the Molossians.Post A. C. 469. Ol. 77. 3.
At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedæmonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians accused Themistocles, for that he also had Medised together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against1 Pausanias; and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment by ostracism2 , and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and fro in other places of Peloponnesus), they sent certain men in company of the Lacedæmonians, who were willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in wheresoever they could find him. 136. But Themistocles, having had notice of it beforehand, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra; to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial. But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not keep him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a strait to turn in unto Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife; and by her was instructed to take their son with him, and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired him, that though he had opposed him in some suit in Athens, not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight: saying, that being now the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger; whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms: and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for what and by whom he was followed), he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him bade him arise, together with his son whom he held as he sat: which is the most submiss supplication that is1 .
Thence he is conveyed to Pydna.A. C. 466. Ol. 77. 3.In danger to be cast upon the Athenian fleet at Naxos, he maketh himself known to the master of the ship.A. C. 466. Ol. 78. 3. He arriveth at Ephesus.His Letter to Artaxerxes.
137. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not, but sent him away by land to Pydna upon the other sea, (a city belonging to Alexander), because his purpose was to go to the king: where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet2 of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master (for he was unknown) who he was, and for what he fled; and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say that he had hired him to carry him away for money; and that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone; to which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so; and having lain a day and a night at sea upon the fleet3 of the Athenians, he arrived afterwards at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, (for he received there both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put out at Argos), he took his journey upwards in company of a certain Persian of the low countries, and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose: “I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who, of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the maniest damages; yet the benefits I did him were more, after once I with safety, he with danger was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due unto me”, (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians’ departure1 out of Salamis, and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge falsely unto himself), “and2 at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship’s sake. But I desire to have a year’s respite, that I may declare unto thee the cause of my coming myself.”
Post A. C. 466.The praise of Themistocles.His death. Post A. C. 464.
138. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of respite he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place. And a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king more than ever had been any Grecian before; both for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he promised to bring into his subjection; but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters1 upon short deliberation the best discerner, and also of what for the most part would be their issue the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate: and what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick he ended his life: some say, he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king. His monument is in Magnesia2 in Asia, in the market–place: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents by the year, for his bread; and Lampsacus for his wine, (for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine3 ); and the city of Myus for his meat1 . His bones are said by his kindred, to have been brought home by his own appointment, and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians: for it was not lawful to bury one there, that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian; the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1.
139. And this is that which the Lacedæmonians did command, and were commanded, in their first embassage, touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.
The Lacedæmonians by ambassadors command the abrogation of the act against the Megareans.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. The last ambassadors from Lacedæmon require the Athenians to lay down their dominion.The Athenians consult what to answer.
After this they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidæa and to suffer Ægina to be free; but principally and most plainly telling them, that the war should not be made in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans: by which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands nor in the abrogation of that act: but recriminated the Megareans for having tilled holy ground and unset out with bounds2 ; and for receiving of their slaves1 that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, that “the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws”: the Athenians called an assembly, and propounding their opinions amongst themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as followeth.
Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.
140. “Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, not to give way to the Peloponnessians; (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the events); but also I see, that I must now advise the same things, or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place, that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent; or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty: which is also the cause, that when any thing happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles], that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess; they never yet sought any such trial themselves, nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war, rather than by words: and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to command. For they command us to arise from before Potidæa, and to restore the Æginetæ to the liberty of their own laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that come last1 , command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concerning Megara; (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay); nor retain2 a scruple in your minds, as if a small matter moved you to the war. For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial, you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality. 141. Resolve therefore from this1 occasion, either to yield them obedience before you receive damage; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think is best), be the pretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours before judgment by way of command, hath one and the same virtue, to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour2 , without money either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars and by sea they are without experience; for that the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short through poverty. And such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armies by land very often; because they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be maintained3 , and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars; and such as live by their labour, are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will outlive the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent1 ; especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion; and having equality of vote and being of several races2 , every one will press his particular interest; whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire to take revenge on some enemy, and others to have their estates least wasted. And being long before they can assemble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to dispatch their own private affairs. And every one supposeth, that his own neglect of the common estate can do little hurt, and that it will be the care of somebody else to look to that for his own good3 : not observing how by these thoughts of every one in several, the common business is jointly ruined. 142. But their greatest hindrance of all, will be their want of money; which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay; which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own in time of peace to fortify in that manner; much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them1 . And if they had a garrison here, though they might, by excursions and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory: yet would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to hinder us from sallying into their territories and from taking revenge with our fleet; which is the thing wherein our strength lieth. For we have more experience in land–service by use of the sea, than they have in sea–service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed, if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men: but awed by many, they will not stir that way; and not applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended at idle times and on the by; but requiring rather, that whilst it is a–learning, nothing else should be done on the by. 143. But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet; this indeed, if going aboard both ourselves and those that dwell amongst us1 , we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen and other necessary men for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial2 would be found content to fly his own country, and withal upon less hope of victory, for a few days’ increase of wages, take part with the other side.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.
“In this manner, or like to this, seemeth unto me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and hath many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica; yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us, there is other land both in the islands and continent. For the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this. If we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages1 ; and not for the loss of them, out of passion, give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves. For though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more: and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war upon them, they will revolt. Nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men’s bodies: for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out and destroy them yourselves; and show the Peloponnesians, that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.
A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.A. C. 432. Ol. 87. 1. Oration of Pericles.
144. “ There be many other things that give hope of victory, in case you do not2 , whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and undergo other voluntary dangers; (for I am afraid of our own errors, more than of their designs); but they shall be spoken of at another time, in prosecution of the war itself. For the present, let us send away these men with this answer: ‘that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also make no banishment of us nor of our confederates as of strangers’: for neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbidden in the articles1 : ‘also, that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave unto their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good: also that we will stand to judgment according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but be revenged on those that shall’. For this is both just, and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity war there will be; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies; and that out of the greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the barbarian and advance this state to the height it now is at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to revenge us by all means upon our enemies; and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to posterity.”
The answer of the Athenians to the ambassadors of Lacedæmon.
145. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians liking best of his advice, decreed as he would have them; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in particulars as he had spoken, and generally, “that they would do nothing on command, but were ready1 to answer their accusations upon equal terms by way of arbitrement”. So the ambassadors went home; and after these there came no more.
146. These were the quarrels and differences on either side, before the war: which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but2 the confusion of the articles, and matter of the war to follow.
[1 ]ὡς ἐπολέμησαν. [“As” they warred, and not, as translated by Valla and others, “how” they warred. The words ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου, would of themselves imply that the history was so written, even if the words ὡς ἐπολέμησαν were omitted. They are so understood by Goeller, Poppo, and others, as well as the Scholiast and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.]
[1 ]The common appellation given by the Grecians to all nations besides themselves. [μέρ̧ει τινὶ: to a “large portion” of the barbarians. Arnold.]
[3 ]χρ̧ήματα: whatever is estimated by money. Aristotle.
[1 ]The territory of the Athenian city, so called from Atthis, the daughter of Cranaus.
[2 ]The Athenians had an opinion of themselves, that they were not descended from other nations, but that their ancestors were ever the inhabitants of Attica: wherefore they also styled themselves αὐτόχθονειϛ, i. e. men of the same land. [“sprung from the land itself”].
[3 ][This passage is differently understood by different translators. Some, as Valla, Acacius, and Hudson, understand it thus: “that Attica increased not so much in other things as in men.” Others, as Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold, thus: “that Greece in its other parts did not thrive equally with Athens:” which is in substance the same interpretation as that of Hobbes.]
[1 ][“But the tribes, the Pelasgian in especial as well as the rest, gave their names from themselves;” that is, each tribe gave its own name to the region it inhabited, the Pelasgian being the most general.]
[2 ][“Because that neither were the Hellenes, as appears to me, as yet distinguished by one name in opposition” (to the barbarians).]
[3 ][“They, therefore, who first of all individually, and, such as had intercourse with each other, by cities, got the name of Hellenes, and afterwards were universally so called, did never before,” &c.]
[1 ][Hobbes seems to have read τὰ πλείω. Bekker, Goeller, Arnold, all omit the article. “And to that expedition they came together through their having now more use of the sea.”]
[2 ]Before that time, it was called the Carian Sea. [Made himself master “of the greatest part” of the now Grecian sea.”]
[3 ][Began “more frequently” to cross over.]
[4 ][Καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις. This is not exactly “scatteringly” inhabited, as appears from ch. x. κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ελλάδος τρ̧όπῳ οἰκισθείσης· It seems rather to mean that the πόλις was still divided into distinct communities, called κῶμαι. “If several little tribes united to form one people, they would sometimes occupy a spot where several eminences were to be found, near to each other, yet distinct: and each of them would form a separate κώμη, or village, appropriated to a separate tribe, while all together composed the city of the united people. Sparta was an instance of a city thus formed out of a cluster of distinct villages; and, according to some opinions, Rome was another.” Arnold.]
[1 ][Od. iii. 71:—
[2 ]In distinction to the other Locrians, called Opuntii.
[3 ][The words explain why they wore the linen dress, not why they left it off. Arnold, Goeller. The sense therefore is: “they not long after laid aside the effeminate custom of wearing linen under–garments.”]
[1 ]The Athenians, holding themselves to be sprung from the ground they lived on, wore the grasshopper for a kind of cognizance; because that beast is thought to be generated of the earth.
[2 ][“A common dress.” The Lacedæmonian dress consisted principally of two parts, the χιτὼν and the χλαῖνα. The first was a narrow kind of frock, without sleeves, coming down to the knees; the other a sort of large square shawl, which wrapped round the left arm, then passed across the back and under the right arm, then over the breast, and the end was finally thrown over the left shoulder. Arnold. Goeller renders it “a plain dress.”]
[3 ]Exercises of divers kinds instituted in honour of Jupiter at Olympia in Peloponnesus; to which resorted such out of Greece as contended for prizes.
[4 ]This was perhaps the cause, why it was a capital crime for women to be spectators of the Olympic exercises.
[5 ][“And one might perhaps show that the ancient Greeks, in many other respects also, used,” &c.]
[1 ][But the old cities, “by reason of the great hindrance of piracy,” were built, &c. Bekker and Arnold read ἀντισχοῦσαν. Goeller reads ἀντισχοῦσαι; which he renders: “veteres urbes ob latrocinia, postquam diu et restiterunt et perduraverunt, longius a mare conditæ erant.”]
[2 ][“For they robbed both each other, and also such of the rest as, not being seamen, dwelt by the sea–side.”]
[3 ]The Cyclades.
[4 ]Vide lib. iii. cap. 104.
[5 ]The Carians having invented the crest of the helmet, and the handle of the target, and also the drawing of images on their targets, had therefore a helmet and a buckler buried with them, and had their heads laid towards the west. [This is a mistake. It is not the Carians, but the Phœnicians who were distinguished by their position in their grave. And their heads were laid not to the west, but to the east, so as to look to the west. See the Scholium.]
[1 ][“And” these robberies were the exercise, &c. “But” when Minos his navy, &c.]
[2 ]The son of Atreus, the son of Pelops.
[3 ]The opinion was, that Tyndareus, the father of Helena, took an oath of all his daughter’s suitors, that if violence were done to him that obtained her, all the rest should help to revenge it. And that Menelaus, having married her, and Paris, the son of Priam king of Troy, taken her away, Agamemnon, in the behalf of his brother Menelaus, drew them by this oath to the siege of Ilium.
[4 ][“Those who have received the clearest accounts of the affairs of Peloponnesus;” or, “those who have received the clearest accounts of any Peloponnesians.” Arnold considers that the want of the article, and the word Πελοποννησίων, which for the first interpretation should be Πελοποννησιακῶν, are in favour of the second.]
[1 ][The original name of the country was Apia. See the Schol. and Il. i. 270: τηλόθεν ἐξ Ἀπίης γαίης.]
[2 ]A kindred and race of men whereof was Hercules. This family was persecuted by Euristheus, who was of the house of Perseus; and driven into Attica, thither he following them was slain by the Athenians.
[3 ]Astidamia, the mother of Euristheus, was Atreus’ sister.
[4 ][“And who happened to have fled from his father for the death of Chrysippus.”]
[5 ]Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pelops, at the impulsion of their mother, slew this Chrysippus, who was their half–brother, viz. by the father; and for this fact Atreus fled to Euristheus.
[6 ][Thus far is the account of “those that by tradition know most,” &c.]
[7 ]The son of Atreus, heir to the power of both houses, both of the Pelopides and of the Perseides.
[1 ][Il. ii. 108.]
[2 ][The islands which Thucydides here calls “periœcidæ,” are, according to Poppo, Calauria, Hydrea, Tiparenus, Cecryphalea; perhaps Ægina, though of that Od. Mueller has some doubts. Goeller.]
[3 ][Mycenæ had been destroyed by the Argives, A.C. 468, thirty–seven years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. From that time it remained in ruins; but the remains, which will last apparently as long as the human race exists, are fully described in Sir W. Gell’s Argolis. Arnold.]
[4 ][Et traditio diu durans obtinet. Goeller.]
[5 ]1. Laconia. 2. Arcadia. 3. Argolica. 4. Messenia. 5. Elis. [Achaia was the fifth part: Elis was comprehended in Arcadia. Goeller.]
[6 ]Laconia, Messenia.
[1 ][“And not forming a connected or continuous city, but made up of different κῶμαι, after the ancient manner of Greece.” Mueller (Dor.) gives the names of these villages: Pitane, Messoa, Simnæ, and Cynosura, lying round about the Acropolis, some on small hills, some on the plains. In the time of the Romans they were all enclosed in one wall. Goeller.]
[2 ][αὖ: again. Referring to “if any think his testimony sufficient.” chap. ix.]
[3 ][“But that they were all mariners and fighting men, he has shown in his account of the ships of Philoctetes.” Bekker, Goeller, and Arnold all agree in this construction of the passage.]
[1 ]As Achilles, Ulysses, Ajax, Diomedes, Patroclus, and the like. The whole number of men, estimating the ships at a medium to carry eighty–five men a piece, which is the mean between one hundred and twenty and fifty, come to one hundred and two thousand men carried in these one thousand two hundred ships. Yet the author makes it a light matter in respect of the present war.
[2 ][And no greater than they “expected could maintain itself from the seat of war by their arms: and when upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, &c., they appear not even then to have used their whole power,” &c. That is, they carried the lesser army, and that lesser army they did not make the most of.]
[1 ][“Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and had with all their forces, eased of boot–haling and tillage, carried through the war without interruption, they might easily have overcome them in open battle and taken the city; since they were a match for the Trojans even without their whole force, and with such part only as from time to time was present at the siege; or even by a blockade, they might have taken Troy with less time and trouble.”]
[2 ][“Built the cities.” That is, those famous cities built by Teucer, Philoctetes, Diomede, &c. Poppo.]
[1 ][The great family or rather clan, which claimed descent from the hero Hercules, being expelled from Peloponnesus by the Pelopidæ, found an asylum among the Dorians, an Hellenian people inhabiting a mountain district between the chain of Æta on the one side, and Parnassus on the other. Here they found willing followers in their enterprise for the recovery of their former dominion in Peloponnesus: the Heraclidæ were to possess the thrones of their ancestors; but the Dorians were to have the free property of the lands they hoped to conquer, and were not to hold them under the Heraclidæ. The invaders were also assisted by an Ætolian chief named Oxylus, and by his means they were enabled to cross over by sea from the northern to the southern side of the Corinthian gulf, instead of forcing their way by land through the isthmus. This invasion was completely successful; all Peloponnesus, except Arcadia and Achaia, fell into their power; and three chiefs of the Heraclidæ took possession of the thrones of Sparta, Argos, and Messenia, while Elis was assigned to their associate Oxylus. The land was divided in equal shares, with the exception probably of some portions attached to the different temples, and which, with the offices of priesthood, belonged to the Heraclidæ, as descendants of the national gods and heros of the country. Meanwhile the old inhabitants were either reduced to emigrate, or were treated as an inferior caste, holding such lands as they were permitted to cultivate, not as freeholders, but as tenants under Dorian lords. These were the Laconians, or περ̧ίοικοι, of whom we shall find frequent mention in the course of this history; and some of this caste striving to recover their independence, were degraded to the still lower condition of villains or predial slaves; and thus formed the first class of Helots, which was afterwards greatly swelled from other quarters. On the other hand, the Hellenian name derived its general predominance throughout Greece from the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus; the Dorians claiming descent from the eldest son of Hellen, and while they gloried in their extraction, asserting their peculiar title to the Hellenian name above all the other tribes which had assumed it. Arnold.]
[1 ][The name “Italy,” in the age of Thucydides, was applied merely to the southernmost point of the Peninsula, the modern provinces of Calabria citra and Calabria ultra. See Aristotelis Politica, vii. 10. Arnold.]
[2 ][“And wealth was accumulated still more than formerly; in many of the cities there were erected tyrannies, the revenues becoming greater: (but before that, the governments were hereditary kingdoms with prerogatives and revenues defined).” Goeller.]
[3 ][That is, from fifty–oared vessels to triremes.]
[5 ][“And Aminocles, the shipwright of Corinth, appears to have built four ships for the Samians also.”]
[6 ]By this it appears, that Thucydides outlived the whole war.
[7 ]By Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, for the slaughter of his son Lycophron. See Herodotus, iii. 53. [The Scholiast has misled Hobbes: Periander did not begin till about a. c. 630.]
[1 ][Il. 2. 570. ἀϕνειόν τε Κόρ̧ινθον.]
[2 ][“And after the Grecians had more commerce by sea, they (the Corinthians) procured the ships (before mentioned), and scoured the sea of pirates.”]
[3 ][See Herod. iii. 39, 120.]
[4 ][See post, book iii. 104.]
[5 ]The Phocæans in the time of Tarquinius came into the mouth of Tiber, entered into amity with the Romans, and thence went and built Marseilles amongst the savage nations of the Ligurians and Gauls. Justin, lib. xliii. 3.
[6 ][Arnold cautions against confounding this battle with the Carthaginians, with that mentioned by Herodotus, i. 166. The building of Marseilles took place fifty–five years before the expulsion of the Phocæans by the Persians, related by Herodotus. See also Hermann’s Griech. Antiquitäten. § 78. n. 28.]
[1 ][πεντηκοντόρ̧οις. Hoc vocabulum etsi apud Homerum non obvium est, naves tamen hujus generis ab eo commemorari videntur, ut Il. ii. 719; xvi. 168. Erant autem πεντηκόντοροι ex eo navium genere, quod dicitur μονῆρες, id est, uno remorum ordine in utroque latere instructum. Quini ergo et viceni remiges in dextro, totidem in sinistro latere sedebant. Siebel, cited by Goeller.]
[2 ]Medes and Persians used here promiscuously, the Medan monarchy being translated to the Persians.
[3 ]Of the Corinthians, Ionians, and Phocæans. [“For these were the last navies before the invasion of Xerxes (that is, the navies next before the invasion of Xerxes) worth speaking of.”]
[4 ][And the Athenians, “and the rest, if any,” had, &c.]
[5 ][“And it was at a late period that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, making war on Ægina, &c. to build,” &c. Arnold, Goeller. See Herod. vii. 144.]
[1 ][See Herod. v. 99.]
[2 ][And Darius afterwards, “overcoming by the aid of the Phœnician fleet,” did the like, &c.]
[1 ][“But the tyrants, as many as there were in the Grecian cities, considering only how to promote their own private interest, both as to the safety of their persons and as to their household, governed their states with a view mainly to security; and did no action,” &c.]
[2 ][ὁι γἁρ̧ ἐν Σικελίᾳ. Ante hæc verba, supple (cum Schol.): “non dico de tyrannis Siciliæ: nam Siciliæ tyranni,” &c. Goeller, Arnold.]
[3 ][For a long time “in every way” hindered.]
[4 ]Pisistratus and his sons.
[5 ][And of the rest of Greece, “governed for the most part by tyrants even before”: that is, before Athens.]
[6 ][By the Dorians “who now inhabit it.”]
[7 ][See Herod. i. 65.]
[8 ][Herod. v. 92.]
[1 ]A fleet of twelve hundred galleys, and two thousand hulks of the round manner of building. Corn. Nepos in Vita Themistoclis.
[2 ][ἀνασκευάζεσθαι: “to break up one’s establishment, and make off with it.” It is opposed to κατασκευάζεσθαι. Goeller, Arnold.]
[3 ]The Athenians being admonished by the Oracle, for their safety against the Medes to put themselves within walls of wood: Themistocles interpreting the oracle, they went into their gallies.
[4 ]This variance began upon this: that Cimon having been sent for to aid the Lacedæmonians against the Helots, was sent back with his Athenians out of distrust the Lacedæmonians had of their forward spirit: which the Athenians took for a disgrace. [See ch. 102.]
[1 ]Hence it is, that through all this history “subjects” and “confederates” are taken for the same thing, especially with the Athenians. [“The Lacedæmonians governed their confederates, not making them tributaries, but only drawing, &c.: but the Athenians (governed them) in the course of time taking into their hands the gallies of the cities, all except the Chians and Lesbians, and ordaining every of them,” &c. This is the sense according to the reading of Bekker, Goeller, Arnold, &c. Hobbes is mistaken in supposing that subjects and confederates are synonymous, even amongst the Athenians. The distinction is constantly made between those ξύμμαχοι that were αὐτόνομοι and those that were ὑπήκοοι. See iii. 39, vi. 69, vii. 57.]
[2 ][“Than when their prosperity was at the greatest.” Hoc fastigium potentiæ Atheniensium referas recte ad tempora paulo ante inducias tricennales; quum Athenienses non solum insularum, sed etiam Asiæ minoris dominatum tenebant, Æginetas perdomuerant, atque Phocin, Argos, Bœotiam, et Achaiam sibi junctas habebant. Goeller. See chap. 102–115.]
[3 ][“Being hard for believing, every argument one after another.” Arnold.]
[1 ][“For men receive from one another the reports of things done before their own time, even those of their own country, all equally without trying them by the touchstone of enquiry”: (ἀβασανίστως.)]
[2 ][At the instant of the deed.]
[3 ]Panathenaica, were the solemnities instituted by Theseus, in memory of that he had drawn together all the Athenians, that lived dispersed in Attica, into the city of Athens. Paus. in Arcad. [See another derivation given by Hermann; namely, the feast of the tribe Athenais, as Pandia, the feast of the tribe Dias: the Athenians being supposed to have been anciently divided into four tribes, Athenais, Dias, Posidonias, and Hephæstias. Gr. Antiq. § 93.]
[4 ][ἑκάτερον: “had each of them not single,” &c. Sententia, quam scriptor reprehendit, est Herodoti, vi. 57. Goeller.]
[5 ][“And that the Pitanetan was a cohort amongst them.” Etiam his verbis tacite Herodotus perstringi creditur, qui cohortis Pitanatæ mentionem facit, ix. 53, et qui δῆμον Πιτανάτην memorat, iii. 55. Etenim ratione, quam et Græci et Romani antiquitus sequebantur, partes exercitus eædem erant ac partes populi in pace. Goeller.]
[1 ][ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρ̧ίων ὅμως κ. τ. λ. This is the sentence corresponding to τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ, beginning the last chapter. “But at the same time he would not be far out, who, from the proofs I have mentioned, should judge them to be for the most part such as I have described them; and should not rather believe them to be either as poets have sung, adorning them so as to make them greater than the reality, or as prose writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth; admitting of no proof, and the greater part of them having by the aid of time taken their place amongst fables, so as to deserve no credit: and should think them here searched out by the most evident signs that can be; and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity.”]
[2 ][To have been greater “than any of those before it.”]
[1 ][λόγῳ εἷπον: quæ orationibus habitis dixerunt. Goeller. “In regular set speeches.” Arnold.]
[2 ][“It were difficult to remember accurately the very words spoken, both for me what I heard myself, and for those who at other times reported to me.”]
[3 ]To the analogy and fitness of what was to be said: so that though he used not their words, yet he used the arguments that best might serve to the purpose which at any time was in hand. [Verum prout quisque mihi videbatur de præsenti qualibet causa quæ maxime in rem erant dicturus fuisse, consectanti quam proxime summam sententiæ orationum vere habitarum, sic mihi commemorata sunt. Goeller.]
[4 ][Valla and Hudson agree with Hobbes as to the sense of this passage. Goeller and Arnold give a different meaning to the words ἀρ̧κούντως ἕξει: “it will satisfy me if so many, &c. shall judge this work to be profitable.”]
[1 ]κτῆμα ἐς ἀεὶ. Both poets and historiographers of old recited their histories to captate glory. This emulation of glory in their writings, he calleth ἀγώνισμα.
[2 ]When Xerxes invaded them. Two battles by sea, viz. one at Salamis, and the other at Mycale in Ionia. And two by land, one at Thermopylæ, and the other at Platæa. [The battle by sea was at Artemisium in Eubœa, not at Mycale in Ionia.]
[3 ][Mycalessus in Bœotia. Goell.]
[4 ][Platæa. Thyrea.]
[5 ][Potidæa, Ægina, Scione, Melos. Goeller.]
[6 ][Corcyræa, Argos, Samos. Haack, Poppo.]
[7 ][μέρ̧ος τι: a considerable part.]
[8 ][ταῦτα γὰρ̧ πάντα: “For all these evils entered together with this war.” In continuation of the sentence above: “But as for this war, the harm it did to Greece, &c.]
[1 ][πρ̧όϕασις: “cause or occasion.” Goeller; Arnold, citing Herod. iv. 79: the Scholiast, too, explains the word by αἰτίαν. The passage may perhaps be rendered thus: “And the alleged cause for their breaking the treaty, I have therefore set down first, because, &c. For the truest reason, though least in speech, I conceive to be, &c. But the causes publicly alleged on both sides, for which breaking the treaty they went to war, were these.”]
[2 ]Dyrrachium, Durazzo. The Ionian gulf, now the Gulf of Venice, called so from Iüs an Illyrian.
[3 ]Illyrii, now Slavonia and Dalmatia.
[4 ]Inhabitants of Corcyra, now Corfu.
[5 ][κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον: according to the ancient custom. Si qui in coloniam mittebantur, armis et commeatu a civibis suis instruebantur de publico. Præterea publica iis diplomata debebantur, quæ ἀποίκια vocabant. Sed quod præcipuum est, sacra patria coloni secum asportabant, ignemque sacrum e penetrali urbis depromtum et accensum; qui quidem si casu extinctus esset, ex Prytanæo conditorum accendi eum oportebat. Moris quoque erat, ut coloniæ quotannis legatos in majorem patriam (μητρόπολιν) mitterent Diis patriis sacra facturos. Solenne etiam erat, ut coloniæ ab originibus suis pontifices acciperent. Quinetiam si aliquando coloni aliam coloniam aliquo deducere vellent, moris erat, ut ducem a majore patria postularent; ideoque Phalium ex metropoli (Corintho) arcessebant Corcyræi, ut coloniæ Epidamnum deducendæ dux esset. Duker.]
[1 ][In part of Corinthians, “and of the other Doric race.” So Bekker and the rest. Valla, as well as Hobbes, has followed the common reading.]
[2 ][“But having for many years had factions amongst them, growing, as is said, out of a war with the neighbouring barbarians, their strength was broken.” So Valla, as well as Goeller and Arnold.]
[3 ]Either the Epidamnians had offended the Corcyræans, or the manner was in those times to take sanctuary, not only for crimes, but for obtaining aid in extremities; tacitly disclaiming all other help save that of the gods, and those to whom they made supplication.
[1 ][“The colony.”]
[2 ][“Showing how the first founder was a Corinthian, and declaring what answer,” &c.
[3 ][The construction of Goeller (adopted by Arnold) is to make Κορ̧ινθιῳ ἀνδρ̧ὶ the dative governed by διδόντες; and the sense as follows: “nor allowed due honours to the mother country in their solemn rites, common to both mother country and colony; nor to a Corinthian in the rite of auspicating their sacrifices.” Γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα, intelligo omnia ea, quæ honoris causa metropoli essent præstanda in solemnibus metropoli et coloniæ communibus. Hæc enim ex sacrorum ac religionum inter metropolim et colonias communione fluxisse videntur, sive jura sive officia, ut ad certa quædam solemnia, diis fere πατρ̧ώοις a metropoli instituta, quotannis coloniæ mitterent qui iis interessent (θεωρούς), et sacrificia et donaria ferrent. Illi θεωρ̧οί sacris epulis adhibebantur, et in ludis publicis sedem in theatro assignatam habebant. Vicissim, sacris coloniarum solennibus legati a metropoli missi intererant, quibus id honoris ex more habitum, ut victimæ molam aspergerent et libationem sacram facerent, et in ludis princeps locus eis daretur, (προεδρία): qui locus etiam viris ex metropoli, si qui forte aderant, principibus est tributus. Προκαταρ̧χόμενοι: verbum ἄρ̧χομαι et composita, in sacris usitata, vim habent auspicandi sacrificia et ceremonias, ac sacra faciendi. Munia autem, quæ Corcyræi viro Corinthio tribuere de more tenebantur in suis sacris, intelligo fuisse ea ipsa, quibus Græci heroicæ ætatis et posteræ, ut videtur, sacra auspicabantur. Faciebant igitur, sacra auspicantes, ea quæ ipsam immolationem antecedebant; id est, χέρνιβα, οὐλοχύτην, τριχοτομίαν, σπονδίν. Erat enim is honor præcipuus viris principibus, qui aderant, habitus, ut sacra hæc ministeria per eos facerent. Hæc igitur totius loci sententia est; “neque enim in solennitatibus communibus solita munia (id est, πρ̧οεδρ̧ίαν, ἱερξια, et sacrorum præfecturam) Corinthiis tribuebant, nec viro Corinthio in suis sacris χέρ̧νιβα, οὐλοχύτην, τρ̧ιχοτομίαν, et σπονδήν.” Goeller.]
[1 ][“And more strongly,” &c.]
[2 ]By Homer this isle is called Phæacia.
[1 ][To Apollonia, “being a colony of the Corinthians.”]
[2 ][κατ’ ἐπήρειαν: “out of malice;” that is, out of malice to the Epidamnians, not from a desire to gratify the exiles. Goeller.]
[3 ]ϕυγάδες. Divers occasions force men from their country: sentence of law, which is commonly called banishment: proscription, when the sentence is death, for which cause they fly into banishment. But those that are here meant, are such as in seditions being the weaker faction, fly for fear of being murdered; which I call here banished men; or might call them perhaps better outlaws or fugitives, but neither of them properly. The Florentines, and other places of Italy that were or are democratical, wherein such banishment can only happen, call them properly fuorusciti.
[1 ][Should have equal and like privileges “with the mother country”: that is, the colony was to be a sovereign state, independent of the mother country. Goeller, Arnold.]
[2 ][“To escort them with some galleys.”]
[3 ]ὁπλῖται: Men in armour.
[1 ][“Or if they make any claim to it themselves.”]
[2 ]Meaning the Athenians.
[3 ][σπονδὰς δὲ ποιήσασθαι. This appears to have been the reading of Hobbes; which is defended also by Arnold. Bekker, Goeller, and Poppo, all omit δὲ: “and that they were also ready, on condition that (ὥϛε) both sides remain as at present, to make a truce until,” &c.]
[1 ][“The Corinthians assented to none of these propositions, but as soon as their galleys were manned,” &c.]
[2 ]Either here or before, it is likely the number hath been miswritten: for a little before he says they had made ready three thousand.
[3 ][Hobbes reads ἐν ᾈκτίῳ. Bekker, Goeller, and Arnold ἐν ἀκατίῳ: in a light vessel.]
[4 ][ζεύξαντες. ζευγνὐναι ναῦν est navem reficere. Goell. One mode is described by Goeller, of passing ropes round the hull of the vessel, so as to hold together the loose planks.]
[5 ][ἐπισκευάσαντες. Hoc verbum significat navem ad cursum aptare, quod de navibus, quæ per vela aguntur, dicas. Alias, ἐπισκευάζειν ναῦν, significat fere, εκ παλαιὀτητος εἰς νέαν κατάστασιν εἰδοποιεῖν, ut verbis Scholiastæ utar. Goeller.]
[6 ][The sense literally is this: “The Corcyræans sent a herald, &c., and at the time were manning their ships, having made the old ones sea–worthy by binding them together, and having as it were new–made the rest.”]
[1 ][Literally: “But when the herald returned, &c., and their ships were completely manned to the number of eighty, (for there were forty at the siege of Epidamnus), they put to sea,” &c.]
[2 ]It is said before, that the Corcyræans had in all one hundred and twenty galleys: which number agreeth with this eighty that fought, and the forty that maintained the siege.
[3 ][παραστήσασθαι: to force to surrender. “To make another stand by one’s side”: as the vanquished is compelled to fight on the side and under the standard of the conqueror. Arnold.]
[4 ][ἀποδόσθαι: Should be sold. Goeller.]
[5 ]τρ̧οπὴ: Turning, particularly turning the back. Trophies, monuments, in remembrance of having made the enemy turn their backs. These were usual in those times, now out of date.
[6 ][After this, when the Corinthians “and their vanquished allies were gone home with their ships,” &c.]
[7 ]Santa Maura, now an island, then a peninsula. [See iv. 8. note. But Thucydides is speaking of the city, not of the island itself.]
[1 ][περιϊόντι τῷ θέρ̧ει. This is the reading of Reiske, Goeller, and Arnold, instead of περιόντι, the common reading still retained by Bekker and Poppo. Goeller says, that περ̧ιϊέναι ἐνιαυτός is said of the year when it is on the turn, or verging towards its close; that the summer here meant, is that in which the battle was fought between the Corinthians and Corcyræans; and that this is manifest, from putting in juxta–position the word τοῦ τε χρ̧όνου τὸν πλεῖστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, κ. τ. λ., with the words at the end of the chapter, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέρ̧ος τοῦτο αντικαθεζόμενοι, χειμῶνος ἤδη (scil. ὄντος) ἀνεχώρ̧ησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου ἑκάτερ̧οι, and with the words at the beginning of the next chapter, τόν δ’ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, καὶ τὸν ὕστ[Editor: illegible character]ρ̧ον, ὁι Κορ̧ίνθιοι ἐναυπηγοῦντο. “Primo, pugnæ navalis exitum narravit, deinde quid æstate post pugnam factum sit; hinc Corcyræos et hostes eorum, ingruente hyeme, stationes utrosque suas reliquisse, quas post pugnam habuerant; denique addit, quid anno proximo et altero post pugnam egerint.” He observes moreover, that the words περ̧ιὀντι τῷ θέρ̧ει cannot signify reliqua æstate; that that would be either τῳ περ̧ιόντι τοῦ θέρους, or τῷ θέρ̧ει τῷ περ̧ιόντι; and that they are the same as τῷ θέρει ὃ περ̧ιῆν, that is in the summer (that one of two or more summers) which was remaining. Arnold considers the meaning of περ̧ιϊόντι τῷ θέρει not certain, but Goeller’s the most probable. The sense is literally: “And the greatest part of the time after the sea–fight they were masters of those seas, and infested the Corinthian allies, until at the close of the summer the Corinthians sending a fleet and land–force, their allies being hard pressed, encamped at Actium and about Chimerium, for the more safe keeping,” &c.]
[2 ]Thesprotis, part of Albania.
[1 ][τὸ θέρος τοῦτο: “during this summer,” that is, the summer now describing. χειμῶνος ἤδη: “at the setting in of the winter.”]
[2 ][“And during the whole year, both that after the sea–fight and the following year.”]
[3 ][ὀρ̧γῇ ϕέρ̧οντες τὸν πρ̧ὸς Κερ̧κυρ̧αίους πόλεμον. Cupidi vindictæ, bellum fortiter toleraverunt, id est, sumptus omnes bellicos in se receperunt, ita ut per biennium non desinerent naves ædificare. Goeller.]
[4 ][Preparing of a fleet, “in the best manner they could.”]
[5 ][To procure mariners “by the offer of pay,” &c.]
[6 ][Because they “were” not in league, &c.]
[7 ][To go to Athens “and become allies”, and to see, &c.]
[1 ][“It is reasonable that such as, like us, come to implore the aid of their neighbours without previous title to any good offices or any alliance, should make it quite clear (ἀναδιδάξαι), first of all, that what they seek is advantageous, or at any rate not prejudicial (to those that are to grant it); and in the next place, that they will also not forget the favour: and if they shall not clearly establish any of these things, then,” &c. πρ̧ῶτον answers to ἔπειτα δὲ, and has not the meaning of “before they go any farther”.]
[1 ][περ̧ιγενέσθαι: to get the better.]
[2 ][“The accident of our need will in many ways bring honour to you.”]
[3 ][καταθεῖσθε. This is Bekker’s conjecture, adopted by Goeller and Arnold, instead of the common reading κατάθησθε. It is, as Goeller observes, a metaphor taken from money placed out at interest. “You shall so place out your favour, as to place it out with the most everlasting testimony.”]
[1 ][“Have not, in all the time we know of (that is, within memory), happened,” &c.]
[2 ][“Are making a beginning with us now, in their way to their attack hereafter upon you; in order that we may not, by our common hatred of them, stand by each other.”]
[3 ][“And that they may not miss of both things, to be beforehand either in doing us a mischief, or in gaining strength to themselves.” Goeller.]
[4 ][Valla, as well as Hobbes, has “your part”. Bekker, Goeller, Poppo, and Arnold, “our part”.]
[1 ][“Not to be led away by their false pretences, nor lend yourselves to their purpose making their demands directly or openly.” Goell.]
[2 ][“For there it is said”: that is to say, in the thirty years’ treaty; which is also meant by τῆς προκειμένης ξυμμαχίας, a little farther on, which Hobbes has translated “the league now propounded”.]
[3 ][“And moreover out of the rest of Greece also.”]
[4 ]As Cephalonia.
[5 ][Hobbes seems to have read εἰ δὲ, for which there is no authority, instead of εἷτα. “And it would be hard if they are to man their ships, &c., and exclude us from the common treaty and all other help, &c.: and then complain of being wronged by your listening to our demand. But we shall complain of you much more loudly, if we prevail not.”]
[1 ][“But also suffer to raise forces in your dominions, which it is not just (to suffer): but (you ought) either to forbid their recruiting, or give us help too, according to what you may be prevailed on to give; but especially to help us by taking us openly into your league”.]
[2 ][“And as we suggested at first, we show you many advantages: and principally, that these same men were enemies to us both, which is a most decisive argument; and those not weak ones, but able to hurt such as secede from them. And when you have the offer of a naval, and not a continental alliance, it is not the same thing to reject it: but it behoves you above all, if you can, to let no one else have any ships; and if you cannot do that, then whosoever is the strongest, him to have your friend”. This is the sense according to the reading of Bekker and the rest, ἡμῖν ἦσαν instead of the common reading ὑμῖν εἰσίν. Goeller supposes that the imperfect, “the same men were enemies to us both,” is used with reference to the already existing enmity between the Athenians and the Corinthians on the score of the Megareans, mentioned in ch. 103. Arnold supposes that it is a mere inaccuracy of expression.]
[1 ][Will be less “dreadful to his powerful enemies.”]
[2 ][“Will be made friend or enemy.” Goeller, Arnold. The sense is quite altered by the misplacing of the relative: it should be “he forecasteth for them (Athens and Corcyra) none of the best, who considering the present state of affairs, makes a question,” &c.]
[3 ][ἐνθένδε πρ̧ὸς τἀκξι: “hence to those parts;” from Athens to Italy.]
[1 ][ὑμετέραις. Bekker is followed by Arnold in retaining this reading. “You will contend with your ships more in number than theirs, instead of less.” Haack, Poppo, Goeller, read ἡμετέρ̧αις: “with so many more on your side, as our fleet amounts to:” making ἡμετέραις the dative after πλείοσι, as in the phrase πολλῷ πλείονες.
[2 ][ἀσϕαλέστερ̧ον προειδῆτε: “that you may be more certainly acquainted beforehand with the grounds of our request.” Haack and Bredow: using ἀσϕαλέστερον adverbially.]
[3 ][χρ̧είαν: a demand urged by necessity, as opposed to ἀξίωσις, one supported by equity. Bredow.]
[4 ][But from mere wickedness; “and as being unwilling to have any ally, either to witness their evil deeds, or to put them to the blush by calling for their aid.”]
[1 ][And to this end have they put forward this plausible pretext of theirs, of keeping out of alliances.]
[2 ][ἀληπτότεροι. Valla agrees with Hobbes in the translation of this word, which the Scholiast also explains by ἀκατηγορητότεροι. Duker, Goeller, and Arnold, all translate it: “less in the power of others”. Arnold gives two other instances in chaps. 82 and 143 of this book, in which the sense is manifestly that of security from attack.]
[3 ][“By giving and receiving law”: by submitting their disputes to the decision of the law.]
[4 ][“Our other colonies, at least, honour us; and from the colonists especially we receive the love of a child to its parent.”]
[1 ][“Nor are we wont to make war in a manner unbecoming the mother country, unless compelled by some signal injury.” Goeller. “Nor do we attack them (that is, the Corcyræans in this particular instance) without having received,” &c. Arnold.]
[2 ][“And they say forsooth, that before they took it, they offered to put the cause to trial of judgment: which truly not he that challenges when he has the advantage and is in security, ought to meet with any attention, but he that fashions his deeds as well as his words according to equity before he begins the contest.”]
[3 ][“To overlook, put up with it.”]
[1 ][τότε οὺ μεταλαβόντες: “that partook not of their power then”; that is, when they were most in safety. This refers to the Samian and Æginetan war. Goeller.]
[2 ][νῦν: Will now have to impart aid.]
[3 ][“And they (the Corcyræans) should of old have shared their power with you, if they meant you to take your share in the events.” The rest of the sentence, “and they that share not,” &c., is omitted by Bekker, and placed within brackets by Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold.]
[4 ][ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς: the thirty years’ truce. All the states were either ἔνσπονδοι, that is, included in this truce: or ἄσπονδοι, ἔκσπονδοι, or ἄγρ̧αϕοι, included neither in the thirty years’ truce, nor any treaty with the Lacedæmonians or the Athenians.]
[1 ][That not withdrawing themselves from any other.]
[2 ][εἰ σωϕρ̧ονοῦσι. No satisfactory explanation is given of these words; Goeller’s is far from being so. As rendered by Hobbes, they are nonsense. Valla has made sense by taking the liberty of interpolating “non recepturis;” thus “iis a quibus recipitur (non recepturis, si saperent),” &c.]
[3 ][“Which may befall you at this time, if you listen not to us. For you may chance to be not only auxiliaries to these,” &c.]
[4 ][“We too must defend (our colony) against them, and you along with them. Wherefore you shall do justly at any rate by standing,” &c.]
[5 ][“Were divided in opinion, as to whether they should assist them.”]
[1 ][ἐπικρ̧άτησιν: Getting the mastery over.]
[2 ][παρ̧ὰ τὸ νικᾶν: Are blind to every thing “for the sake of conquering.” Arnold.]
[3 ][“For they (those about to attack their enemies) consider as a friend, him that then serves their purpose, even though heretofore he may have been his enemy; and as an enemy, him that withstands him, even though he chance to be his friend: for they sacrifice even their own affairs to their eagerness of present contention.”]
[4 ][ἀμύνεσθαι: “To requite us with the like.” Duker, Goeller, Arnold. See also lib. iv. 63: τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρ̧ῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀμυνούμεθα.
[1 ][See chap. 103.]
[2 ][“Excited by the immediately apparent.”]
[3 ][Hobbes seems to have read δέχεσθαι, which is found in one MS. (See Arnold). Bekker and the rest read δέχεσθε: “and receive not,” &c.
[1 ][“But they gave them orders not to fight,” &c.]
[1 ][“And they gave these orders, because,” &c.]
[2 ][πρ̧οσέμιξαν: when they had touched land. “And when sailing from Leucas they touched land over against Corcyra, they station themselves at Chimerium in the country of Thesprotis.” It is only necessary to look at the map, to see that ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πλέοντες, belongs to προσέμιξαν, and not to ὁρμίζονται; that is to say, that they sailed from Leucas before, and not after reaching land opposite Corcyra.]
[3 ][“It (Chimerium) is a haven, and by it lies,” &c. Thucydides distinguishes the port of Chimerium from the promontory.]
[4 ]Cestrine, the territory of Cestria, part of Chaonia.
[1 ][“In this part of the continent then the Corinthians station their fleet and pitch their camp.”]
[2 ][ἀεἰ ποτε εἰσίν: Are “never not” their friends. Goeller.]
[3 ][They descried the galleys of the Corcyræans “at sea, and sailing down upon them”.]
[4 ]κέρας. The galleys stood all one by one in a row; and the right wing were those that were on the right hand from the middest; and the left wing, those on the left hand.
[5 ][“But the rest” (the centre and the left wing), “they occupied themselves; making three divisions of their ships, each of which was commanded by one of the three generals.”]
[1 ]σημεῖα: A picture or image held up, as the eagle amongst the Romans.
[2 ][ἐπὶ τῶν καταςτρωμάτων: upon the decks. “Both sides having upon the decks many heavy–armed soldiers and many archers and slingers, being still somewhat unskilfully appointed after the old fashion. And the battle was,” &c. The want of skill was displayed in crowding their decks with fighting men, instead of relying upon their ships. The word but, inserted by Hobbes, quite alters the sense.]
[3 ][“For whenever they happened to run aboard each other, they did not easily disengage themselves, both by reason of the number and crowding of the ships, and from trusting rather to the men at arms on the decks, who made a standing fight,” &c.]
[4 ][διέκπλοι. περ̧ίπλοι. ἀνακρούσεις. ἀναϛροϕαὶ. These various manœuvres may be described thus: διέκπλους, breaking through the enemy’s line, so as by a quick turn to strike their opponent on either the side or the stern, and so sink it: περίπλους, taking a circuit round the enemy’s ships, and bearing down upon them whenever the opportunity seemed favourable: ἀνάκρουσις, rowing back or astern, so as to gain space for making another charge. ἀναστροϕὴ is understood by Arnold to mean the return to the charge, after gaining space enough by either περίπλους or ἀνάκρουσις.]
[1 ][More without pretext or disguise. “They aided them now more undisguisedly; at first indeed forbearing from making assault upon any: but when they fled,” &c.]
[1 ]ἂς καταδύσειαν: “Which they might happen to have sunk”: not meaning, sunk “to the bottom”, but damaged and made waterlogged. Goeller, Arnold.]
[2 ][“But after the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans on shore, they betook themselves to collecting the wrecks,” &c.
[3 ][καὶ ὅσαι ἦσαν λοιπαὶ. Goeller and Poppo agree in the opinion, which is also seemingly adopted by Arnold, that by λοιπαὶ are here meant the ten vessels, out of the one hundred and twenty in all belonging to the Corcyræans (see chap. 25), which were not present at the battle; they having but a hundred and ten in the action (see chap. 47). It should therefore be “with such galleys as they had fit for sea, and those which were not in the action, together with,” &c.]
[1 ]Pæan, a hymn to Mars, in the beginning of fight: to Apollo, after the victory.
[2 ][“For they descried twenty Athenian galleys making towards them: which, after the first ten, the Athenians sent as a reinforcement; for fear,” &c.]
[3 ][ὀλίλαι ἀμύνειν: “Few” to defend: that is, “too few.”
[4 ]viz., More behind their backs.
[5 ][εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσι: “Said, there are ships yonder sailing down upon us.” Goeller, Arnold.]
[1 ][“Ended at night”: anglice, did not end till night. Goeller, Arnold. See lib. iii. 108. ἡ μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἕως ὀψέ.]
[2 ][These Corcyræans were those encamped at Leucimna, the footsoldiers and the thousand Zacynthians mentioned in chap. 47. Valla, as well as Goeller, interprets ὡρμίσαντο: “the Corcyræans received them (the Athenians) into their station”: and not, the Athenians “stationed themselves there”.]
[3 ][And that being in a desert place, “there was no repairing of their ships”.]
[1 ][The common reading was προπέμψαι: but Bekker, Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold, all agree in reading προσπέμψαι. Without herald: that is, as if in time of peace.]
[2 ][If therefore you be resolved, &c. “and you break the treaty, lay hands first upon us that are here,” &c.]
[3 ][“So far as in us lies, we will not overlook it.”]
[1 ][They had the better all day, “so as to carry off the greatest number of the wreck,” &c.]
[2 ][“About thirty galleys.”]
[3 ][And for that when “the Athenians” went to Sybota. This is according to the reading of Bekker, and also of Arnold, who refers to chap. 52 in confirmation of the opinion, that the Athenians are the subject of the verb ἦλθον. Hobbes has followed the common reading, omitting ὁι Ἀθηναῖοι, which is adopted by Stephen and Valla, and approved of by Poppo and Goeller, both of whom include those words in brackets; considering the Corcyræans as the nominative to ἦλθον.]
[4 ][“And establishing in it Corinthian colonists, departed,” &c.]
[5 ][δοῦλοι: Slaves. “But two hundred and fifty they kept in bonds,” &c. These prisoners are met with again in iii. 70.]
[1 ][περιγγίνεται. Arnold, “survived the war”; Poppo and Goeller, “bello Corinthios superat.” It is at all events hardly correct to say “was delivered from the war”; this in fact being only the commencement of it.]
[2 ][πρασσόντων: practising. See iii. 70. note.]
[3 ][Anciently Phlegra.]
[4 ][That is, the wall towards the sea, which was therefore a defence against the Athenians, masters of the sea. The Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, were accustomed to destroy the walls towards the continent.]
[5 ][ἐπιδημιουργοι: magistrates of the Dorians, a name expressing their doing the work of the people. The preposition ἐπὶ is considered by Goeller, to indicate that they were magistrates sent by the mother country, in addition or as assessors to the magistrates (δημιουργοὶ) appointed by the colony.]
[1 ]King of Macedonia.
[2 ][τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης: “The people Thrace–ward,” or living in the direction of Thrace; a general term applied to the Greek states situate on the northern coast of the Ægean Sea from Thessaly to the Hellespont. The Chalcidian colonies hereabouts, amongst which were Olynthus, Torone, Sermyle, and Arne, were planted from Chalcis in Eubœa. Arnold.]
[3 ][“Had been rendered hostile to them.”]
[1 ][τὸ τεῖχος: “The wall.” See the last chapter.]
[2 ][ἔπρ̧ασσον. This word is included in brackets by Bekker and the rest. If omitted, the sentence would run thus: “The Potidæans having sent to Athens, &c., and also going to Lacedæmon, in order to secure aid, if wanted, &c.: when they found, after much negotiation, that they got no good at Athens, but that the ships sent against Macedonia attacked them also; and when the government of the Lacedæmonians promised, &c.: then at last they revolted”, &c.]
[3 ][“And Perdiccas persuades,” &c.]
[4 ][“He gave them part of his own territory, Mygdonia, to live in.”]
[1 ][This does not accurately express the idea in the Greek, which is literally: “And so they destroying their cities, went higher up the country and prepared themselves for war.” The destroying, and going higher up the country, was part of the preparing for war.]
[2 ][“Both of themselves such as volunteered, and of the rest of the Peloponnesians such as they could induce by pay.”]
[3 ]Archers, darters, and the like, that wore not armour on their bodies, and were called ψίλοι, naked.
[4 ][Valla, as well as Hobbes, omits ουχ ἥκιστα: “for whose sake chiefly most of those from Corinth went as volunteers”.]
[1 ][“With four others.” See chap. 62.]
[2 ]Therme, after called Thessalonica, now Salonichi. [“These on first coming into Macedonia, find the former thousand had just taken Therme, &c. And they too stationed themselves there and besieged Pydna.”]
[3 ]Or scarce honourable. [It means no more than, a league forced by circumstances.]
[4 ][Berœa. Bekker and the rest.]
[5 ][“And their galleys, seventy in number, sailed by them. And marching forward by slow marches, in three days they reached Gigonus, and encamped.”]
[1 ][πρὸς Ὀλύνθῳ. This is the reading of Haack and Bekker, as well as Hobbes. The common reading, which is that also of Valla, is πρὸ Ὀλύνθου, before Olynthus. Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold read πρ̧ὸς Ὀλύνθου, on the side of Potidæa towards Olythus.]
[2 ][This was, that the men might have no excuse for leaving their posts to go into the town for provisions. Arnold.]
[3 ]The isthmus of Pallene, where they were. [In the isthmus on the other side of Potidæa: not in Pallene.]
[4 ][“And when the Athenians should march upon themselves”: upon Aristeus and his army.]
[1 ][“And saw the rest of the army worsted”.]
[2 ][“In the end he resolved to draw those with him into as small a space as possible, and run and force his way into Potidæa.” Goell.]
[3 ][παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν. So called from its likeness either to the claw of a crab, or the cloven hoof of an ox. It seems to have comprised not only the mole or pier of the harbour, but also the breakwater that protected the sea–wall. The walls of Potidæa extending to the sea on both sides of the isthmus, and the gate towards the continent being shut, Aristeus was obliged to get in at the gate towards Pallene; which he could reach only by the breakwater under the sea–wall.]
[4 ][“And the standards were raised.”]
[5 ][The stadium, always translated by Hobbes furlong, used to be reckoned six hundred feet; but has been fixed by recent surveys at five hundred and seventy–five. A furlong being six hundred and sixty feet, the stadium is much nearer to the ninth than the eighth part of a mile. The word for, in “for it is” &c., is not in the Greek.]
[1 ][“Being torn down.”]
[2 ][“And neither side, &c. ἱππῆς δὲ. It no where appears as yet that the Potidæans had no cavalry in the battle.]
[3 ][“From the isthmus”: that is, towards Olynthus.]
[4 ][Who “marching from Aphytis, led his army by slow marches to Potidæa”, wasting, &c.]
[1 ][“Desiring to do what was the next best thing to be done”, and make the best, &c.]
[2 ][Bekker and the rest have ξυνεπολέμει: “amongst other acts of assistance in the war.”]
[3 ][πρ̧οσγεγένηντο. Goeller, Bekker. προεγεγενηντο, Arnold. “These were the quarrels which had before this time arisen between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.”]
[1 ][“They summoned the allies to Lacedæmon.”]
[2 ][κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. Arnold considers that the treaty here meant, that is, that the treaty which the Æginetæ would naturally appeal to, must be the latest treaty, or the thirty years’ treaty. Mueller observes that in strictness the Æginetæ could appeal to neither treaty, neither the five years’ nor the thirty years’ treaty, being under the dominion of the Athenians before the date of either; and that by neither was any alteration made in their condition. He inclines to refer the words τὰς σπονδάς to τὸ ξυμμαχικôν, made by the influence of the Spartans, amongst the Greeks in general, and the stipulation for mutual liberty made in that treaty.]
[3 ]Of the Ephori and those that had the sovereignty, that is, before the aristocracy. [See chap. 87, note.]
[1 ][This decree of Pericles is said by the Scholiast, to have been proposed by him at the suggestion of Alcibiades; who, when a boy, saw him much disturbed by thinking how he should account for the public money; and being informed of the cause, told him that he should be thinking not how he should account, but how he should not account. Whereupon Pericles proposed this decree, and succeeded in diverting public attention from the subject of his accounts.]
[2 ][According to Bekker and Arnold: “makes you less ready to give credit to others, if we complain of aught”. According to Goeller: “makes you less ready to give credit to us, if we have aught to say against the rest”. Valla makes something quite different of the passage: “fides vestra facit, ut nobis alii, si quid in vos dixerimus, fidem non habeant.”]
[3 ][And hereby “you do indeed exhibit your moderation”, but you have less, &c.]
[1 ][The Æginetans. Schol.]
[2 ][The Potidæans and Megareans. Schol.]
[3 ][πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀποχρῆσθαι: “most commodious, to give you the full benefit of your dominion in the neighbourhood of Thrace.” Arnold. To use away, or out; simili, si non eodem sensu, Latini dicunt abuti. Goeller.]
[1 ][“The question should no longer be”.]
[2 ][“For they (the Athenians) being the active party, come with their plans already arranged, and not having still to do that, upon their adversary who has yet decided upon nothing.” Goeller.]
[3 ][“And we know in what manner, and that it is by degrees that the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours.”]
[4 ][μελλήσει: “With threatening demonstration.” Arnold. “Expectation of attack meditated.” Goell.]
[5 ][“You were indeed said to be cautious and secure: and your report therefore exceeded the reality”. For we, &c]
[6 ][“As far as” Peloponnesus.]
[1 ][“Though you well know”, &c.]
[2 ][“You neither seem, to us at least, to have any feeling, nor ever to have considered with yourselves.”]
[3 ][“And in action to attain not even to what is necessary.”]
[1 ][“You distrust even counsels to be surely calculated upon.” Arnold, Goeller.]
[2 ][καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα: “Even what is under your hand.”]
[3 ][μὴ ἐξέλθωσιν: “Unless they go through with”, that is, “attain.”]
[4 ][“And if therefore they fail, &c., by entering into other hopes they have already repaired the mishap.”]
[1 ][“Quietem iis maxime contingere.” Poppo and Goeller. “That they enjoy the longest peace.” Arnold.]
[2 ][“Though your neighbouring state were of the same way of thinking”, in regard to justice.]
[3 ][“Why in the Athenian customs, through much experience, there has been more innovation than in yours.”]
[4 ][νῦν δὲ: And at this moment.]
[5 ][ξυγγενεῖς: The Potidæans, a colony of the Corinthians.]
[6 ][“And we the rest be driven” through despair, &c.]
[1 ][ἀνθρώπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων: “homines aliquo sensu præditos”: Stephen, Goeller. An allusion to the insensibility charged against the Lacedæmonians in chap. 70.]
[2 ][“About other matters.”]
[3 ][περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, scilicet λόγου: “concerning the whole matter in debate”. See the next chap. βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου δηλῶσαι.]
[1 ][Bekker and the rest, ὑμετέροις: “against your confederates.”]
[2 ][“Though it be somewhat irk–some to us to be ever bringing forward this subject.”]
[3 ][“These things when we did, we endangered ourselves for the common safety; in achieving which, it cannot be denied that up to a certain point you took your share; but still we ought not to be deprived, if it is of any value, of all right of speaking of them.” Goeller.]
[1 ][“But of testimony.”]
[2 ][“As if his power were no longer what it had been, went away, &c.” Goeller, Arnold.]
[3 ][ἐς αὐτὸ: “to it”: that is, the event just related, τοιούτου ξυμβάντος τούτου. “This coming to pass in this manner, we contributed to it,” &c.]
[4 ]Of Salamis.
[1 ][“But whilst we were yet safe,” (that is, whilst the time was for aiding us), “you were not at hand”: whereas, &c.]
[2 ]The Athenians at the coming in of the Persian, when they put themselves into their galleys, left their city to the army of the Persians by land, and sent their wives and children into Ægina, Salamis, and Trœzene.
[3 ][ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βρ̧αχείᾳ ἐλπίδι οὔσης. τῆς οὔσης are by Didot referred, not to Athens, but to the fleet, the only city the Athenians then had remaining; which at that time was εν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι, of slender hopes.]
[4 ][τὸ μέρος: “we bore our share in delivering you and ourselves”. Arnold. “quantum in nobis erat”: Goeller.]
[1 ][Had quietly succeeded.]
[2 ][Ἆρ’ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, κ. τ. λ.; “Do we deserve then not to be so greatly envied, &c.?” ἆρ̧α est ecquid; qui interrogandi modus graviter affirmat. Baver. Hobbes has followed the common reading, ἀρχῆς τε. Bekker and the rest read ἀρχῆς γε.]
[3 ][“To run the risk of laying down our power.”]
[4 ][It is no fault, &c. to order to the best. You “therefore at any rate” order, &c.: “and had you at that time staid it out, and made yourselves hated for your command like us, we well know that you would have been not less heavy, &c. So neither have we done any thing wonderful, if overcome by three the greatest things, &c.”]
[1 ]That is, when Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, pursuing the relics of the Persian war, through his pride and insolent command procured the hatred of the confederates so far as, the Lacedæmonian state calling him home, they put themselves under the leading of the Athenians.
[2 ][Goeller agrees with Hobbes in rendering ὥστε ἄρχειν, desiring to rule: “prægnanti sensu accipiendum, vt sit imperare velle”. Vulgo, γένωνται. Bekker and the rest, γεγένηνται: have been juster than, &c.]
[3 ][ἀδοξὶα: an ill name.]
[1 ][“For conceding somewhat of our strict right in making conventions with our allies for trying their causes, and giving them the right of decision by the same laws with ourselves, we have then”, &c. Δίκαι ξυμβολαίαι, “conventional causes” are thus explained by Goeller: “Inter quas civitates frequens commercium esset, eæ pacta quædam inire solebant de ratione actionum inter privatos cives suos instituendarum, de foro, utrum litigantes sequerenter, et rebus similibus. Hæc, ut alia pacta civitatum cum civitatibus, σύμβολα appellabantur. Causas privatorum, quæ ex talibus pactis componebantur, Thucydides dixit ξυμβολαίας δίκας. Latine cum Livio, xli. 24, hoc institutum dicas “commercium jus præbendi et repetendi.”]
[2 ]διότι: wherefore. “None of them considering how it comes about that others, &c., are never upbraided with this (a love of contention).” The reason is, they use force. “For they that may compel, have no need farther, to go to law”.]
[3 ][ὁι δὲ: “But these men, &c., if they are worsted in any thing, be it ever so trifling, contrary to their opinion that it ought not to be, either by sentence, &c., are not in the majority of cases thankful for what they do not lose; but take their disappointment in worse part than if”, &c. Goeller.]
[4 ][“But in that case”, that is, if we took by force, &c. Goeller.]
[1 ][“If your system be such as that of which you showed symptoms before.” Ὑπεδείξατε for ἀπεδείξατε has been rightly restored by Bekker, Poppo, Goeller. The Lacedæmonians had not “fully manifested” (ἀπέδειξαν), their tyrannical spirit during the command of Pausanias; but had “shown symptoms of it”, which is exactly ὐπέδειξαν. Arnold.]
[2 ][ἄμικτα: unmixed, not modified to suit those of other states. Spartanos, antiquis rebus constanter adhærentes, consentaneum est postremo in tanta cæterorum Græcorum mobilitate ab his ita recessisse, ut peculiaris neque aut cum Græcis aut cum barbaris consociabilis populus viderentur. Muell. By saying that those who go abroad, use neither the customs of Sparta nor of the rest of Greece, must be meant that they use their own arbitrary will only.]
[1 ][“Out of the assembly”. The speech of the Athenians was addressed ἐς τὸ πλῆθος, see chap. 72.]
[2 ][That is, of the same age.]
[1 ][παρόμοιος: “of the same description”: military rather than naval. Arnold.]
[2 ][If we will exercise ourselves.]
[3 ][Still much more deficient.]
[1 ][“For as for the hope,” &c.]
[2 ][And in the meantime to make our provision, “both by getting allies, &c., and by contributing our own fortunes at the same time”. Göll.]
[3 ][We then attack them, if we will, “better prepared”.]
[4 ][“Already making”.]
[1 ][“See that we do not make the affair more dishonourable”, &c.]
[2 ][As well of cities as, &c.]
[3 ][πολλοὶς: “that we being many.” Valla has “multas urbes”.]
[5 ][“Above all things.”]
[4 ][ἂν παύσαισθε: you may be the longer, &c.]
[1 ][“Is the main ingredient in.”]
[2 ][“Good counsellors in this: that we are brought up more simply than, &c.; and not like men exceedingly wise in things needless, to find fault eloquently, &c.; but to think that the thoughts of our neighbours are like the accidents of fortune, not to be discovered by speeches”, &c. Goeller.]
[3 ][“That has been taught what is most needful”.]
[1 ][μελέτας. Lacedæmoniorum instituta in educandis liberis. Goeller. “These institutions, which our ancestors have handed down to us.”]
[2 ][We are alike, “both then and now”. The deliverers of Greece.]
[1 ][Nor to be “judged with judgments and words”.]
[2 ]ψήϕος: properly lapillus, calculus; a little stone or ball, which he that gave his voice put into a box, either on the affirmative or negative part, as he pleased. The Athenians used beans, white and black. The Venetians now use balls; and the distinction is made by the box, inscribed with yea and no. [κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῆ: “for they vote by shouting.” This was the mode of voting in the Spartan ἐκκλησία: a body consisting of such of the Spartans of the class called ὅμοιοι or peers, that is, those whose means enabled them to devote their time to the Spartan education and to support the expenses of the ϕιδίτια or public table, as were of the age of thirty years. No Spartan that had not gone through the discipline considered essential for forming a useful citizen, was admitted by Lycurgus to the exercise of any political right: and hence the Spartans of inferior means formed a class which, in distinction to the ὅμοιοι, came to be designated the ὑπομείονες or inferiors. The γερούσια or senate, said to be an institution of Lycurgus, consisted, including the two kings who presided in it, of thirty members: their qualification was, the being of the ὅμοιοι and sixty years of age: they were chosen for life, and nominally by the pares: see Plut. Lycurg. The assembly, here called τὸ πλῆθος, had the right of simply affirming or rejecting the measures proposed to them by the kings and senate: they could neither modify nor even discuss those measures, nor originate any of their own. The five Ephori, said to be instituted about a hundred and thirty years after the time of Lycurgus by Theopompus, were chosen out of the whole Spartan race without distinction; and were therefore naturally the organ of the democracy: whilst the ὅμοιοι were in possession of the senate and the assembly.]
[1 ][“But wishing to excite them more to the war, openly declaring their opinion”: that is to say, the war being popular, by obliging them to vote openly.]
[2 ][This joint vote is taken afterwards. Chap. 119, 125.]
[1 ]A promontory in Asia the less, where the remnant of Xerxes’ fleet was defeated, the same day that this land forces were also defeated by Pausanius at Platea with the slaughter of Mardonius their general, and almost their whole army of three hundred thousand men. [When the Medes were departed from Europe, &c.]
[2 ][See Herodot. ix. 114, et seq.]
[3 ]το κοῖνον: the state. That is, they made Athens again the seat of their government, whereas before it was in the fleet and camp, still removing.
[1 ][ἀνοικοδομξιν: “went about to rebuild the city and the walls: for of the circuit of the walls little remained standing, and of the houses the most had fallen down; though a few were standing, in which lodged the principal of the Persians.”]
[2 ][ὡσπερ νῦν: as he had just now made of Thebes.]
[1 ][Till the walls were raised to the lowest possible height they could defend themselves from.]
[2 ][πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς: to the Ephori. Goeller.]
[1 ][“The Lacedæmonians or their allies.”]
[2 ][They said. Themistocles is speaking in the name of the Athenians. “They said, they were bold to decide upon it without them: and that in whatever on the other hand they thought fit to advise of with them, they showed themselves in counsel behind no one.”]
[1 ][παρασκευῆς: apparatus, or means of strength: “for that they could not, if they were not to be on equal terms in point of apparatus, advise”, &c. No single word will express the exact sense in English.]
[2 ][“For they had not, forsooth, sent their ambassadors to forbid, but to offer advice for the common good. Moreover they were just at that time specially well affected to them”, &c.]
[3 ][“Even at this day.”]
[4 ]The walls of Athens made of chapels and tombs. Corn. Nepos, in Vita Themistoclis.
[5 ]This was before a village, and now made the Athenian arsenal.
[1 ][“Considering that the spot was both convenient, having three natural havens, and would also aid them, when they were become seamen, to obtain power”. Popp. Göll. These havens were called Cantharon, Aphrodision, and Zea.]
[2 ][“For the stones (for building the wall) were carried by two carts, that used to pass each other on the wall”. Arnold.]
[3 ][The meaning here of ἐγγώνιοι, in itself simply “angular”, is decided by the fact that the wall is found at the present day to be built of square stones.]
[4 ][“That if, therefore, they were ever forced by land”.]
[2 ][“And all” who had newly, &c.]
[3 ]The Ionians were all colonies of the people of Athens.
[1 ][“Convicted” of some, &c.]
[2 ][“But not the least matter laid to his charge was Medising”, the which, &c.]
[3 ][ϕόρος. Quia ϕόρος Græcis nomen grave et odiosum erat, pro eo deinde cœpit dici σύνταξις. Duk.]
[4 ]86,250l. sterling. [If Boeckh has correctly estimated the Attic drachma at 5 gros 6 pfenninge, formulæ imperialis, the drachme would be equal to 8¼d. and the talent to 206l. 5s. sterling; and four hundred and sixty talents would therefore be equal to 94,875l. That is, calculating the thaler at thirty–six pence English.]
[1 ]Not at Athens, because they would not seem to challenge a propriety in that money.
[2 ][“Now using their authority at first, &c.; by war and administration &c. they came to such great power. And I have written those things and made this digression in the history, because all writers before me have pretermitted &c., (for they have either &c.); and Hellanicus who has touched them, has mentioned them but briefly &c. Moreover they carry, &c.” The history of Hellanicus is called ἡ ᾈτθίς.]
[3 ][There was one Eion in Chalcis in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, and another on the Strymon, a colony of the Athenians.]
[1 ][“Sold them as slaves”.]
[2 ][“In violation of the established law”: the law, that is, that all Greeks were free. Schol. Goell.]
[3 ][“And making default (when it so happened) in sending their contingent of military.” This is Goeller’s interpretation of λειποστράτιον: ἀστρατεία, desertion of military duty. The latter is said of individuals; the former, of states.]
[4 ][“For through this dread of military service, the most &c. taxed themselves in money instead of sending their quota of ships: whereby the Athenian navy was increased with the funds contributed by the allies, and they, whenever they revolted, were without either means or experience to make war.” Bekker &c., ἄπειροι: Valla, Portus, Hobbes, ἄποροι.]
[1 ][“Under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades: and took and destroyed triremes of the Phœnicians, in all to the number of two hundred”.]
[2 ][“About the places of trade in the opposite part of Thrace, and the mines which they possessed”. The Thasians had some gold mines at Scapte Hyle in Thrace; but there were also mines in Thasos itself, particularly those found by the Phœnicians, between Ænyra and Cœnyra. See Herod. vi. 46, 47.]
[3 ][They were “all destroyed at Drabescus by the Thracians”. This is according to Poppo’s conjecture of ξύμπαντες for ξυμπάντων. There is the authority of Diodorus, and of Thucydides himself (iv. 102.), for the fact that these ten thousand settlers were all destroyed. Valla has: “omnes sunt perempti.”]
[1 ]The Lacedæmonians employed the captives taken in war, and their posterity, in husbandry and other servile works; which was all done by this kind of men. And they were called by them Helots, because the first of them so employed were captives of the town of Helos in Laconia. [See iv. 80.]
[2 ][τῶν περιοίκων. The περίοικοι were the old Achaian inhabitants of Laconia, who after the Dorian conquest submitted to the invaders on certain conditions, by which they retained their private rights of citizenship, and also the right of voting in the public assembly. These rights however were forfeited after an unsuccessful attempt to shake off the Dorian yoke; and from henceforward they were treated as subjects rather than citizens; being eligible indeed to military commands, but with no voice in the public assembly, and of course being disqualified for the offices of Ephor or senator. They remained in this dependent condition down to the time of Augustus Cæsar, who on their making an appeal to his interference gave them the full enjoyment of civil rights, and deprived the Spartans of their exclusive ascendancy. Arnold.]
[3 ][“At that so well known time”.]
[4 ][“Against these then had the Lacedæmonians, &c.: and the Thasians”, &c. This, commonly called the third Messenian war, by occupying the Lacedæmonians, caused the surrender of the Thasians.]
[1 ][They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults. “But on the siege being protracted, there appeared in them a deficiency of this skill: for else they had taken the place by assault.” Arnold, Goeller.]
[2 ]The Lacedæmonians were Dorians, the Athenians Ionians.
[3 ][Upon the “fairer reason”.]
[1 ][“Immediately upon their return”.]
[2 ][They “already” bore, &c.]
[1 ][“A Libyan, king of the Libyans.” Hobbes throughout renders Λίβυς by “Africa”, as often as the word occurs.]
[1 ][“After this the Peloponnesians sent over into Ægina three hundred men of arms, &c.: and the Corinthians seized on the heights of Geraneia, and descended into the Megarid.” So Bekker and the rest. The seizing of these heights would naturally be the act of the party that was descending into the Megarid: lying immediately in their passage, and essential for the security of their retreat. Portus and Valla are both with Hobbes. “With other forces”, is not in the Greek.]
[2 ][The common reading was ἐκβοήσαντες, βοὴ being often used in the sense of pugna, auxilium. Bekker and the rest have ἐκβοηθήσαντες; that is, “sallying out of Megara to oppose them”. See iii. 18, where ἐκβοηθεία is used in the sense of “sallying out”.]
[1 ][“Shut them in with their heavy–armed men in front.”]
[2 ][But “the bulk” of the army.]
[3 ]The Dorians, the mother nation of the Lacedæmonians, inhabited a little country on the north side of Phocis, called Doris, and Tetrapolis, from the four cities it contained; of which those here mentioned were three, and the fourth was Pindus. [Goeller observes: “vulgo de tetrapoli Dorica loquuntur, sed quartam urbem Pindum ignorant cum Thucydide Diodorus, Conon aliique.” Hermann names Acyphas as the fourth town; and says that others make out six instead of four. Gr. Antiq. § 16. 7.]
[1 ][“The Athenian fleet had already sailed round, and were ready to hinder them”.]
[2 ][“And at that very time they saw they were intending to stop them this way too”.]
[3 ][“And another thing, certain Athenians were privily inviting them”; hoping, &c.]
[4 ][“And they marched upon them (the Lacedæmonians) thinking them to be at a loss by which way they should pass; and also in some measure from suspicion of an intended dissolution of the democracy”.]
[5 ][“According to the terms of their alliance”.]
[1 ][“Under the conduct of Tolmides the son of Tolmæus”.]
[2 ]A city of Corinthians, near the river Evenus in Ætolia.
[3 ][“In the meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt with their allies were still persevering: and saw, &c. For at first”, &c.]
[1 ][Megabazus returned with the money, &c.: “but sends Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus”, &c. So Bekker and the rest.]
[2 ][Prosopitis, an island in the Delta. See Herod. ii. 41.]
[3 ][ὁι ἕλειοι; “qui in palustribus (βουκολίοις) habitabant, inter Taniticum et Pelusiacum ostia Nili. Vocatur quoque inferior Ægypti pars ἕλος, inclusa Bolbitino et Sebennytico ostiis. Quæ regio insularis hoc loco intelligenda videtur.” Gottleber.]
[1 ][Taking them as their confederates. Goeller.]
[2 ]Famous for the battle between Jul. Cæsar and Cn. Pompeius.
[3 ][“So far as was consistent with not straying far from where the arms were piled”: that is, from the camp.]
[4 ][“To Sicyon”.]
[5 ][“Marched to Œniadæ”.]
[6 ][The words “after this”, which would fix the date of this treaty, about which there are many different opinions, are wanting in the Greek.]
[1 ][“In the army”, not in the Greek.]
[2 ][And when “off Salamis”, &c. Bekker and the rest omit the “Cyprians”.]
[3 ][Because the noble families of the Delphians were of Dorian origin. Arnold. Hermann observes, that, as belonging to their race, this oracle had at all times exercised a peculiar influence over the internal concerns of the Dorians; hence the sanction given by it to the constitution of Lycurgus. Gr. Antiq. §23.]
[4 ][“And having taken Chæroneia, they departed, leaving a garrison in it”. So Bekker and the rest, leaving out the remainder.]
[1 ][Κορωνεία. The field of battle at Chæroneia is so connected with the plain of Coroneia, that the scene of more than one battle is assigned, sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other. Mueller. Amongst others that fell at this battle, was Clinias, the father of Alcibiades.]
[2 ][By ὁι ἄλλοι παντές: “and all the rest,” are meant the Locrian exiles, and some also from Phocis; Phocis and Locris, as well as Bœotia, being lost to the Athenians by the battle of Coronea; which revolution, the commons of Phocis being well–affected to Athens (iii. 95), could be effected only by the return of the exiles and consequent ascendency of the aristocratical party. Arnold.]
[3 ][“They invaded and wasted Attica as far as Eleusis and the Thriasian plain”. Θριάσιον πεδίον campus erat, ut nonnullis videtur, inter Eleusinem, Eleutheras, Castiam, Rhetos, et Daphnen monasterium. Goeller.]
[1 ][“Under the conduct of Pericles.”]
[2 ][Opinions differ as to the meaning of Ἀχαΐα. Arnold understands by it the country of that name. The connexion, he says, between Athens and the Achaians was natural: the latter being alienated from Lacedæmon by difference of race as well as of government. Their ancestors had been expelled from Laconia and Argolis by the Dorians: and the twelve states of Achaia were all democratical in their government. And he supports his opinion by that of Thirlwall. Goeller is persuaded that it is the name of some unknown town: referring to iv. 21, where Cleon requires Lacedæmon to restore “Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzene, and Achaia”; an insane demand, if he meant the province of Achaia. Od. Mueller understands by it some small town in Megaris.]
[1 ][The garrison was left in Samos, not over the hostages.]
[2 ][παρὰ σϕίσιν: in Samos.]
[3 ][“At the island of Tragia”.]
[4 ][That is, by a wall on three sides, and the ships on the fourth.]
[1 ][ϛρ̧ατοπέδῳ. The naval camp pitched on the sea–shore, the constant accompaniment of all naval expeditions of the Greeks. Their ships being totally unprovided with accommodation for eating or sleeping on board, they had always a camp with a regular market established on shore, where the men took their meals and slept. The ships were drawn up on the beach in front of this camp, and protected against surprise by a certain number of ships which lay afloat off the camp, ready manned, as a guard. Sometimes a stockade was made in the sea in front of the ships so drawn up, or a palisade or a similar fortification was raised on the shore. These precautions the Athenians appear on this occasion to have neglected. Arnold.]
[2 ][And overcame “those that were launched to meet them”.]
[3 ]Not the writer of the history.
[1 ][μεταξὺ, “intervenient”, omitted by Bekker and the rest.]
[2 ][διέγνωστο: “it had already been decreed, &c.: but still they sent to Delphi to inquire”, &c.]
[1 ][This is not correct: for the Lacedæmonians had not yet decreed the war, but had summoned the allies to consider ἐι χρὴ πολεμεῖν: a question in which they had equal voices with themselves. “Do not let us blame the Lacedæmonians for not having themselves voted the war, when they have now brought us together for this purpose. For it is the duty of our leaders, having due regard to their private interests, to consider first of all the common weal, as they also are in other things honoured above all the rest”.]
[1 ][Not to be careless judges of what we now say. Goeller, Arnold.]
[2 ][“Have disgracefully fallen out contrariwise”. Against well–advised enemies, is not in the Greek.]
[1 ][“And in warlike skill”.]
[2 ]All land–soldiers, all of one manner of arming and discipline.
[1 ][Their revenues: “wherein their strength lies”.]
[2 ]Though this be here said in the person of a Corinthian, yet it was never thought on by any of that side till Alcibiades put it into their heads when he revolted from his country.
[3 ][ἄντικρυς δουλείαν: “direct, downright”, and so, “clear, undisputed”. A metaphor taken from a dart or arrow going straight forward, and penetrating to its object. Arnold.]
[1 ][“How we can be cleared of &c.: for certainly you avoid them not when you betake yourselves to that, which, &c. For contempt, because &c, hath gotten the opposite name of foolishness”. The opposition between καταϕρόνησις and ἀϕροσύνη, contempt or arrogance and folly, is not very satisfactorily explained.]
[2 ][“They that would defend what they have at present, must labour for what is next to be. For we have it from our forefathers, to gain”, &c.]
[1 ][ὠϕελειᾳ: “some from fear of the Athenians, some to aid us”. See ii. 8. 11. Goeller.]
[2 ][“Which for certain even the God, by enjoining war, deemeth broken”. Neither us, nor by them, is in the Greek.]
[1 ][“Let us attack and subdue it”.]
[2 ]Excommunication: extending also to posterity. [“To drive out those under the curse of the goddess. Now the sacrilege was as follows”. ἄγος, which Hobbes seems throughout to consider equivalent to “pollution of sanctuary”, is in its original meaning, any thing venerated: thence by antiphrasis, any thing wicked and accursed. Arnold observes, that it corresponds to the Latin word “sacer”, and implies devoted to some god for good or for evil.]
[1 ][“Of Jupiter”.]
[2 ][“Esteeming this to be the greatest feast of Jupiter”. Besides those in Peloponnesus, revived by Iphitus of Elis, there were Olympic games also in Macedonia, instituted by Archelaus.]
[3 ]The oracles were always obscure, that evasion might be found to salve their credit; and whether they were the imposture of the devil, or of men, which is the more likely, they had no presention nor secure wise conjecture of the future.
[4 ]Images of living creatures, made of paste. [“In which they sacrifice in the assembly of the whole people, many however not living creatures, but such as”, &c. It appears from Herodotus (ii. 47), that in Egypt, in the feast of the Moon, when swine were sacrificed, the poorer classes used to bake figures of swine made of paste, and offer them as their sacrifice.]
[1 ][Upon the death of Codrus and consequent strife between his sons, the Eupatridæ, as the first step towards establishing the aristocracy, changed the name of King into that of Archon: leaving however the functions of the dignity, which was still for life, untouched. A farther inroad was made (A. C. 752) by limiting the office to ten years: and again (A. C. 714) by declaring the class of Eupatridæ eligible to it. Finally (A.C.683), when the Medontidæ became extinct, the power and name of the office were shared amongst nine archons elected yearly from the Eupatridæ: the three first assumed to represent the king in his several characters of archon, high priest and judge, and commander in war, by styling themselves respectively ἄρχων, βασιλεὑς, and πολέμαρχος. The nine archons exercised unlimited power, both executive and judicial. Draco first set bounds to the latter by establishing a court of appeal, called the ἔϕεται. Solon on introducing his four classes (see iii. 16), gave the office of archon to the first class. But it was the name only: for the surrender to the citizens at large of the judicial functions, and to the council of four hundred, chosen out of the four Ionic tribes, of the administrative functions, stripped it of all real power. Cleisthenes (A. C. 510) introduced the farther change in all offices, of election by lot. And finally Aristides, in making the democracy supreme, declared eligible to the office of archon all citizens without distinction of birth or fortune, with the except tion, perhaps of the Thetes, and that the candidate must trace his citizenship up to his grandfather. The ἄρχων gave his name to the year, and had jurisdiction in disputes relating to inheritance, and other family matters: the βασιλέ υ regulated all matters concerning public worship and religion: and the πολέμαρχος had the control of the metœci, aliens, &c. So late however as the battle of Marathon, the polemarch had a vote with the ten strategi: see Herod. vi. 109.]
[1 ]The Lacedæmonians that in the reign of Codrus invaded Athens and were defeated, some of them being entered the city, could not get away, but sat at those altars, and were dismissed safe; but some of them slain as they went home. [The Athenians, “when they saw them dying in the temple”, raised them, &c.: “and some sitting suppliants even to the venerable Goddesses amongst the altars in the approach to their temple, they slew. And from this they (the murderers) were called”, &c. The sentence refers, not to the Lacedæmonians, but to the companions of Cylon. See Plutarch, Solon.]
[2 ][The factions of Isagoras and Cleisthenes. See Herod. v. 66–72]
[3 ][The mother of Pericles was Agariste, the grand–daughter of Megacles (Herod. vi. 127–131): one principally concerned in the murder of Cylon: Plutarch, Solon. The insurrection of Cylon is attributed by some to the severity of the laws of Draco; whereby the Eupatridæ attempted to stifle the rising desires of the people for a more popular government. See Hermann. Gr. Antiq. § 103.]
[1 ][Was “the first time” recalled. See his second recall, chap. 131.]
[1 ][Dascylium: the name of the satrapy of Bithynia and Phrygia.]
[2 ][ἀνάγραπτος. Qui de rege et regno Persarum (οἴκῳ) bene meriti erant, ὀροσάγγαι ab iis dicebantur, (εὐεργέται Græci converterunt), eorumque nomina codicibus regiis inferebantur. Hudson.]
[3 ][“For thee to go”.]
[4 ][“Amongst the Grecians”.]
[1 ][“But habited in the Medan stole issued from Byzantium, and went through Thrace with a guard, &c.” Per σκευὰς Μηδικάς significat fortasse στολὴν την Μηδικὴν, quæ passim a Xenophonte memoratur, and proprie κάνδυς dicebatur. Fortasse vero etiam ἀναξυρίδας, et alia quæ recensentur a Xenophonte Cyrop. viii. 3. 14, induit. Poppo.]
[2 ][“And carried himself so haughtily towards all alike”, &c.]
[3 ]Scytale, properly a staff; here, a form of letter, used by the Lacedæmonians in this manner. They had two round staves of one bigness, whereof the state kept one, and the man whom they employed abroad, kept the other; and when they would write, they wrapt about it a small thong of parchment; and having thereon written, took it off again, and sent only that thong; which wrapped likewise about the other staff, the letters joined again, and might be read. This served instead of cypher. It seems Pausanias retained his staff, from the time he had charge at Byzantium. [“An officer with a letter.” σκυτάλα, in Doric, is a staff: thence the writing wrapped round it. Thus Pindar calls the messenger Æneas, σκυτάλα μουσῶν. Ol. vi. 91.]
[1 ][See viii. 12, note.]
[2 ][“To be something greater than the present state of things permitted”. Arnold.]
[1 ][“They also diligently considered every act, wherein in his manner of life he had transgressed the established customs, and amongst the rest, that upon the tripod, &c., he caused to be inscribed by his own authority this verse”.]
[2 ][All the cities that having joined, &c., “made the offering”.]
[3 ][“And after he became involved in the present matter, had much more the appearance of an act near akin to his present design”.]
[4 ]παιδικά, taken both in good and bad sense, for a man with whom another man is in love. [It appears from Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. ii. 13, that this word was used in the latter sense. The words in use to express the recognized connexion between two Spartans of the male sex, were εἰσπνήλας, inspirer, and ἀΐτας, hearer. See Müll. Dor. iv.4.6.]
[1 ][“Upon a concerted plan”.]
[2 ][“Saying, that though he had never brought him into any danger in the transactions with the king, yet he is to be selected for death like any other of all the multitude of his servants”. Goeller.]
[1 ]ἱερὸν: both the temple, and ground consecrated wherein standeth the temple, altars, and edifices for the use of their religion: τέμενος, the temple or church of the goddess. [“He ran towards the temple of Pallas Chalciœca, and getting before them, (the precincts were near at hand), entered into a house”, &c. τέμενος, from τέμνω, to divide, and thence to set apart, is not, as Hobbes renders it, the temple, but the whole consecrated ground. “These words are sometimes used as synonymous, both denoting no more than “ground consecrated for the worship of some god”. Thus in Herod. vi. 79, the grove dedicated to the hero Argos is called by both these names. They are however more frequently distinguished: and then τέμενος signifies the whole consecrated ground, including sometimes even arable land belonging to the temple: Herod. iv. 161. Ἱερὸν expresses the sacred buildings, including the στοὰ or cloister, and the habitations of the ministers of the god: Herod. ii. 112. Ναὸς is that part of the buildings, in which his statue was placed and himself supposed to dwell. Other smaller ναοὶ, like chapels in the aisles of Roman Catholic cathedrals, were often ranged round the great ναὸς or choir, and dedicated to other gods. Thus Minerva, under the title of προναία, had a small ναὸς close to the entrance of the great ναὸς at Delphi.” Arnold.]
[1 ][“And when he was near dying as he was, in the house, they seeing it carried him out of the temple”, &c.]
[2 ]Cæada, a pit near Lacedæmon.
[3 ][“To remove it to the place where he died”. He was buried first of all πλησίον που, somewhere near the Cæadas: that is, as Corn. Nepos says, “procul ab eo loco, quo erat mortuus.”]
[4 ][ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι. The later meaning of this word seems to be that of a portico or vestibule, in which was kept the holy water for every one to sprinkle himself with as he entered. Here however it apparently means a sort of gate or lodge, like the Propylæa at Athens, to the whole sacred ground: similar to our closes at Salisbury, Peterborough, &c. For a dead body would not have been buried within the sacred ground, much less in the actual vestibule of the temple. Arn. The temple of Pallas Chalciœca was one of the most ancient at Sparta: so called from the brazen statue of the goddess, and interior of the temple.]
[1 ][By certain proofs found upon Pausanias. See Plut. Themist.]
[2 ]A kind of banishment, wherein the Athenians wrote upon the shell of an oyster the name of him they would banish; used principally against great men, whose power or faction they feared might breed alteration in the state: and was but for certain years. [See viii. 73, note.]
[1 ][That is, amongst the Molossi. See Plut. Themist. Duker.]
[2 ][“The camp”.]
[3 ][ὑπὲρ: “over against the camp”.]
[1 ][τὴν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως: “the warning to retreat, sent to Xerxes from Salamis after the battle”: Arnold. “The message sent before the battle, intimating the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis”: Goeller.]
[2 ][“And having it now in my power to do thee”, &c.]
[1 ][“Of things immediately present” the best judge, &c., and “of things future” the best conjecturer, &c.]
[2 ]There is another city of that name in Greece.
[3 ][“To far exceed others in the fruitfulness of the vine”.]
[1 ][ὄψον. Bread and wine being considered the main supports of human life, all additional articles of food, such as meat, fish, or vegetables, were called by the common name of ὄψον. Arnold.]
[2 ][τῆς γῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου. Talis ager ἀόριστος, situs erat inter Megarida et Eleusinem, qui perpetuo incultus jacere debebat, ut sacrum solum a profano discerneretur. Thucydides enim hic duplex terræ genus discernit; sacrum, et limites non habens. Nam dicit τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, non τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ ἀορίστου: neque ulla scripturæ discrepantia est. Intelligenda igitur est terra, partim deabus Eleusiniis, Cereri et Proserpinæ, sacra, ager templi Eleusinii, qui non minus diligenter arabatur quam terra non sacra; partim terra in confiniis jacens, nullis limitibus descripta nec tamen Diis sacra. Goeller.]
[1 ][The slaves of Aspasia. Goeller.]
[1 ][“And these men here, that are now just come”.]
[2 ][Nor give place in your minds to any reproach, as if, &c. Goeller.]
[1 ][“From these considerations”. Goeller.]
[2 ][αὐτουργοί: “men that cultivate their lands by their own hands”. See chap. 142, where they are called γεωργοὶ. The number of slaves in Laconia was a striking exception to the state of the rest of Peloponnesus; where, as in almost all the merely agricultural republics of Greece and Italy, there were in early times extremely few of them. And we find afterwards that the other states of Peloponnesus were extremely unwilling to undertake any military operation during harvest–time, because their citizens were themselves ordinarily employed at that season in getting in their crops; while to the Lacedæmonians, whose agricultural labours were performed by Helots, one season of the year was the same as another. See iii. 15. Arnold.]
[3 ][Peloponnesus had as yet no paid troops: nor Athens till the time of Pericles, though half its mariners were now foreigners. See iii. 17, n.]
[1 ][“They are not sure that it may not be spent: especially, &c. For the Peloponnesians”, &c.]
[2 ]Of the Peloponnesians and their confederates, some were Dorians, some Æolians, some Bœotians.
[3 ][“And that it concerns any one but himself to take forethought about any thing”.]
[1 ][Goeller understands ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων in a figurative sense: that the Athenian fleet, by infesting the Peloponnesian coasts, would counterbalance the Lacedæmonian fortification in Attica. By ἐπιτείχισις, he understands the actual building of some city as a check on the state, in or near which it is built; as Megara by the Dorians, as a check on Athens, and Heracleia in Trachinia (iii. 92.), as a check on the Thessalians: by ϕρούρια, some already existing town converted into a stronghold in a hostile territory; as Deceleia, Pylos, Methone, Budorum, &c. His sense of the passage is this: “And indeed neither is their fortifying nor their navy much to be dreaded. For the first, it were hard for a city equal to such an undertaking to effect, even in time of peace; to say nothing of a time of war, and of ourselves being already no less formidably fortified with our navy against them. And if they garrison here, they may indeed annoy &c.: but that will not suffice, at any rate, to hinder us from fortifying after our fashion, by sailing to their territory, and taking revenge with our fleet, wherein we are the stronger”. This sense is supported by chap. 143.]
[1 ][μέτοικοι. For an account of the metœci, usually rendered by Hobbes, strangers that dwelt amongst them, see ii. 31.]
[2 ][“Would choose, by reason of the peril, to fly”, &c.]
[1 ][We must “abandon our land and houses, and have a care of the sea and the city”.]
[2 ]Thucydides hath his mind here upon the defeat in Sicily, which fell out many years after the death of Pericles. Whereby it seems, he frameth his speech more to what Pericles might have said, than to what he did say. Which also he professeth in general of his course in setting down speeches. Besides, he maketh Pericles here to answer point by point to the oration of the Corinthians at Lacedæmon, as if he had been by when it was delivered; and useth the same manner in all opposite orations.
[1 ][“For neither the one, (the use of our markets by the Megareans), nor the other, (the ceasing to banish foreigners from Sparta), does hurt in time of peace”. Goeller. The government of Sparta was accustomed at its pleasure, summarily to order all foreigners to quit the territory: both from a dread of the introduction of foreign manners, and to prevent the formation of any wealthy mercantile class, likely to give strength and consistence to the excluded commons. Arn. See ii. 39, n.]
[1 ][“According to the treaty”.]
[2 ][This interpolated but reverses the sense. Γὰρ refers, not to ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, but to ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὔ: “without herald indeed, but without suspicion not; for what had passed was the dissolution of the treaty, and the pretext of the war to follow”. Intercourse without herald, was the test of peace.]