Front Page Titles (by Subject) BOOK III. - The English Works, vol. VI (Dialogue, Behemoth, Rhetoric)
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BOOK III. - Thomas Hobbes, The English Works, vol. VI (Dialogue, Behemoth, Rhetoric) 
The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; Now First Collected and Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., (London: Bohn, 1839-45). 11 vols. Vol. 6.
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of the original of elocution and pronunciation.
Three things being necessary to an oration, namely proof, elocution, and disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.
As for action or pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an orator may be fetched out of the book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the action of the stage. For tragedians were the first that invented such action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the magnitude, tone, and measure of the voice; a thing less subject to art, than is either proof or elocution.
And yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for poetry. But oratorical action has not been hitherto reduced to art. And orators in the beginning, when they saw that the poets in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connexion of words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse, and made choice of words. But when the poets changed their style, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and measures proper to themselves.
Seeing therefore pronunciation or action are in some degree necessary also for an orator, the precepts thereof are to be fetched from the Art of Poetry.
In the meantime this may be one general rule. If the words, tone, greatness of the voice, gesture of the body and countenance, seem to proceed all from one passion, then it is well pronounced. Otherwise not. For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the hearer always.
of the choice of words and epithets.
The virtues of a word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent, that is, neither above nor below the thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine.
Perspicuous are all words that be proper.
Fine words are those, that are borrowed, or translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.
The reason why borrowed words please, is this. Men are affected with words, as they are with men; admiring in both that which is foreign and new.
To make a poem graceful, many things help; but few an oration. For to a poet it sufficeth, with what words he can, to set out his poem. But an orator must not only do that, but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas belief is the scope of his oration.
The words that an orator ought to use are of three sorts; proper, such as are received, and metaphors.
Words taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new coined, are seldom to be used.
Synonymes belong to poets, and equivocal words to sophisters.
An orator if he use proper words, and received and good metaphors, shall both make his oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a metaphor alone there is perspicuity, novity, and sweetness.
Concerning metaphors the rules are these:
1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for example, let him call a crime an error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his metaphor from somewhat worse; as, calling error, crime.
2. A metaphor ought not to be so far-fetched, as that the similitude may not easily appear.
3. A metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things; as the poets do, that choose rather to say rosy-fingered, than red-fingered Aurora.
In like manner the rule of epithets is, that he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an ode in honour of the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid, called them by their name, Ἡμιόνȣϛ, that signifies their propinquity to asses: but having received a greater reward, styles them the sons of swift-footed coursers.
of the things that make an oration flat.
The things that make an oration flat or insipid, are four:
1. Words compounded. And yet a man may compound a word, when the composition is necessary for want of a simple word, and easy, and seldom used.
2. Foreign words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.
3.Long, impertinent, and often epithets.
4. Metaphors indecent and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far-fetched. Indecent, when they are ridiculous, as in comedies; or too grave, as in tragedies.
of a similitude.
A similitude differs from a metaphor only by such particles of comparison as these; as; even as; so; even so, &c.
A similitude therefore is a metaphor dilated; and a metaphor is a similitude contracted into one word.
A similitude does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent; for it is poetical.
An example of the similitude, is this of Pericles, that said in his oration, that the Bæotians were like so many oaks in a wood, that did nothing but beat one another.
of the purity of language.
Four things are necessary to make language pure.
1. The right rendering of those particles, which some antecedent particle does require; as to a not only, a not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.
2. The use of proper words, rather than circumlocutions; unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.
3. That there be nothing of double construction, unless there be cause to do it of purpose; as the prophets of the heathen, who speak in general terms, to the end they may be better maintain the truth of their prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, than in particulars. For it is easier to divine whether a number be even or odd, than how many; and that a thing will be, than what it will be.
4. Concordance of gender, number, and person; as not to say him for her, man for men, hath for have.
In sum, a man’s language ought to be easy for another to read, pronounce, and point.
Besides, to divers antecedents, let divers relatives, or one common to them all, be correspondent; as, he saw the colour, he heard the sound; or he perceived both colour and sound: but by no means, he heard or saw both.
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him ( to this, and to this purpose), afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose; is vicious.
of the amplitude and tenuity of language.
A man shall add amplitude or dignity to his language, but by such means as these.
1. By changing the name with the definition, as occasion shall serve. As, when the name shall be indecent, by using the definition; or contrary.
2. By metaphors.
3. By using the plural number for the singular.
4. By privative epithets.
of the convenience or decency of elocution.
Elocutions are made decent:
1. By speaking feelingly; that is, with such passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as, angerly in matter of injury.
2. By speaking as becomes the person of the speaker; as for a gentleman to speak eruditely.
3. By speaking proportionably to the matter; as of great affairs to speak in a high, and of mean, in a low style.
4. By abstaining from compounded, and from out-landish words: unless a man speak passionately, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his hearers; or ironically.
It confers also to persuasion very much, to use these ordinary forms of speaking; all men know, it is confessed by all, no man will deny, and the like. For the hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be esteemed the only ignorant man.
It is good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the pronunciation and countenance that to such a word belongs; that the disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well to correct himself: for he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says. But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in showing of this consideration. For the ostentation of carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required.
of two sorts of styles.
There be two sorts of styles. The one continued, or to be comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by periods.
The first sort was in use with ancient writers; but is now out of date. An example of this style is in the history of Herodotus; wherein there is no period till the end of the whole history.
In the other kind of style, that is distinguished by periods, a period is such a part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.
This latter kind is pleasant, the former unpleasant; because this appears finite, the other infinite. In this the hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no end, and has nothing finished to him. This may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence; which is the cause that verses be easily remembered: the other not.
Every sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interposed.
Period is either simple, or divided into parts.
Simple, is that which is indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.
A period divided, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends; seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one colon or part; and in these, seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the period.
The parts or members, and periods, of speech, ought neither be too long, nor too short.
Too long, are they which are produced beyond the expectation of the hearer. Too short, are they that end before he expects it.
Those that be too long, leave the hearer behind; like him that walking goes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that walks with him.
They that be too short, make the hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.
A period that is divided into parts, is either divided only; or has also an opposition of the parts one to another.
Divided only is such as this; This the senate knows, the consul sees; and yet the man lives.
A period with opposition of parts, called also antithesis, and the parts antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together, or also joined by a third.
Contrary parts are put together as here; The one has obtained glory, the other riches; both by my benefit.
Antitheta are therefore acceptable, because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition, but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of enthymeme, which leads to impossibility.
Parts or members of a period, are said to be equal, when they have altogether, or almost, equal number of syllables.
Parts or members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin or end alike: and the more similitudes, and the greater equality there is of syllables, the more graceful is the period.
of those things that grace an oration, and make it delightful.
Forasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a man, than to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those words are most grateful to the ear, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the things signified.
And therefore foreign words are unpleasant, because obscure; and plain words, because too manifest, making us learn nothing new. But metaphors please; for they beget in us, by the genus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of science. As when an old man is called stubble; a man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth, and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to stubble and to old men.
That which a metaphor does, a similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.
Such enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.
The things that make a speech graceful, are these; antitheta, metaphors, and animation.
Of antitheta and antithesis hath been spoken in the precedent chapter.
Of metaphors, the most graceful is that which is drawn from proportion.
Aristotle, in the twelfth chapter of his Poetry, defines a metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the general to the particular. 2. From the particular to the general. 3. From one particular to another. 4. From proportion.
A metaphor from proportion is such as this; A state without youth, is a year without a spring.
Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes. As he that said, The Athenians poured out their city into Sicily; meaning, they sent thither the greatest army they could make. And this is the greatest grace of an oration.
If therefore in the same sentence there concur both metaphor and this animation, and also antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful.
That an oration is graced by metaphor, animation, and antithesis, hath been said: but how it is graced, is to be said in the next chapter.
in what manner an oration is graced by the things aforesaid.
It is graced by animation, when the actions of living creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the sword is said to devour.
Such metaphors as these come into a man’s mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the metaphor.
A metaphor without animation, adds grace then, when the hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.
Also paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do believe them. For they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a man’s expectation.
And paragrams, that is, allusions of words, are graceful, if they be well placed, and in periods not too long, and with antithesis. For by these means the ambiguity is taken away.
And the more of these, namely, metaphor, animation, antithesis, equality of members, a period hath, the more graceful it is.
Similitudes grace an oration, when they contain also a metaphor.
And proverbs are graceful, because they are metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another.
And hyperboles, because they also are metaphors. But they are youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not comely in old men.
of the difference between the style to be used in writing, and the style to be used in pleading.
Thestyle that should be read, ought to be more exact and accurate. But the style of a pleader, ought to be suited to action and pronunciation.
Orations of them that plead, pass away with the hearing. But those that are written, men carry about them, and are considered at leisure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.
Written orations appear flat in pleading. And orations made for the bar, when the action is away, appear in reading insipid.
In written orations repetition is justly condemned. But in pleadings, by the help of action, and by some change in the pleader, repetition becomes amplification.
In written orations disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by action. But in pleadings it is amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.
Of pleadings, that which is judicial ought to be more accurate than that which is before the people.
And an oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to action, than a judicial.
And of judicial orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to action, which is uttered to many. As in a picture, the further he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine; so in orations, the further the hearer stands off, the less need there is for his oration to be elegant.
Therefore demonstrative orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be read.
of the parts of an oration, and their order.
Thenecessary parts of an oration are but two; propositions and proof; which are, as it were, the problem and demonstration.
The proposition is the explication or opening of the matter to be proved. And proof is the demonstration of the matter propounded.
To these necessary parts are sometimes added two other, the proem and the epilogue; neither of which is any proof.
So that in some there be four parts of an oration; the proem; the proposition, or as others call it, the narration; the proofs, which contain confirmation, confutation, amplification, and diminution; and the epilogue.
of the proem.
Theproem is the beginning of an oration, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.
In some kinds of orations it resembles the prelude of musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended. In other kinds it resembles the prologue of a play, that contains the argument.
Proems of the first sort, are most proper for demonstrative orations; in which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist upon. And for the most part it is better not; because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, digression will seem variety; but if he have engaged himself, variety will be accounted digression.
In demonstratives, the matter of the proem consisteth in the praise or dispraise of some law or custom, or in exhortation or dehortation, or in something that serves to incline the hearer to the purpose.
Poems of the second kind are most proper for judicial orations. For as the prologue in a dramatic, and the exordium in an epic poem, setteth forth in few words the argument of the poem; so in a judicial oration, the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the mind of the hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight err or wander.
Whatsoever else belongs to a proem, is drawn from one of these four: from the speaker, from the adversary, from the hearer, or from the matter.
From the speaker and adversary, are drawn into proems such criminations and purgations as belong not to the cause.
To the defendant, it is necessary in the proem to answer to the accusations of his adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his oration.
But to the plaintiff, it is better to cast his criminations all into the epilogue; that the judge may the more easily remember them.
From the hearer and from the matter, are drawn into the proem such things as serve to make the hearer favourable or angry, attentive or not attentive, as need shall require.
And hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.
But to make the hearer attentive, is not the part of the proem only, but of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than of the proem. For the hearer is everywhere more remiss than in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make appear both the probity of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great consequence; or that it concerns the hearer, or that it is new, or that it is delightful.
He that will have the hearer attentive to him, but not to the cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle without relation to the hearer, common and tedious.
That the hearer may be favourable to the speaker, one of two things is required: that he love him, or that he pity him.
In demonstrative orations, he that praises shall have the hearer favourable, if he think himself or his own manners, or course of life, or anything he loves, comprehended in the same praise.
On the contrary, he that dispraises shall be heard favourably, if the hearer find his enemies, or their courses, or anything he hates, involved in the same dispraise.
The proem of a deliberative oration is taken from the same things from which are taken the proems of judicial orations. For the matter of a deliberative oration needeth not that natural proem, by which is shown what we are to speak of, for that is already known; the proem in these being made only for the speaker’s or adversary’s sake, or to make the matter appear great or little, as one would have it; and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the plaintiff or defendant, or from the hearer, or from the matter, as in orations judicial.
places of crimination and purgation.
One, from the removal of ill opinion in the hearer, imprinted in him by the adversary or otherwise.
Another from this: that the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.
A third from the recompense: as, I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.
A fourth from the excuse; as, It was error, mischance, or constraint.
A fifth from the intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.
A sixth from the comprehension of the accuser; as, What I have done, the accuser has done the same, or his father, kinsman, or friend.
A seventh from the comprehension of those that are in reputation; as, What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good men.
An eighth from comparison with such as have been falsely accused or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.
A ninth from recrimination; as, The accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.
A tenth from that the judgment belongs to another place, or time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this matter.
An eleventh from crimination of the crimination: as, It serves only to pervert judgment.
A twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is taken from some sign; as, Teucer is not to be believed, because his mother was Priam’s sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his father was Priam’s enemy.
A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed; as, to praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.
A fourteenth, common both to crimination and purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact. For he that purgeth himself, interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his adversary said, he chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the honour.
of the narration.
Thenarration is not always continued, and of one piece; but sometimes, as in demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole oration.
For there being in a narration, something that falls not under art; as namely, the actions themselves, which the orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the narration of them where he best may. As for example, if being to praise a man, you would make a narration of all his acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while from some of them you praise his valour, and from others his wisdom; whereby your oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.
It is not necessary always that the narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.
In the narration, as oft as may be, it is good to insert somewhat commendable in one’s self, and blameable in one’s adversary: as, I advised him, but he would take no counsel.
In narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation, &c. in the hearer beside the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her sad.
The narration ought also to be in such words as argue the manners, that is some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expressed; as, setting his arms a-kimbo, he answered, &c.; by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.
In an oration a man does better to shew his affection than his judgment; that is, it is better to say, I like this, than to say, this is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour follows goodness; whereas wisdom procures envy.
But if this affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, she loved her brother better than her husband or children; she added, for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For it is not easily believed that any man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.
Besides in a narration, not only the actions themselves, but the passions and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.
And in his narration a man should make himself and his adversary be considered for such and such, as soon and as covertly as he can.
A narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning. In deliberative orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come, a narration, which is always of things past, has no place. And yet things past may be recounted, that men may deliberate better of the future. But that is not as narration, but proof; for it is example.
There may also be narration in deliberatives, in that part where crimination and praise come in. But that part is not deliberative, but demonstrative.
of proof or confirmation, and refutation.
Proofs are to be applied to something controverted.
The controversy in judicial orations is, whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great; and whether it be just, or no.
In a question of fact, one of the parties of necessity is faulty; for ignorance of the fact is no excuse; and therefore the fact is chiefly to be insisted on.
In demonstratives, the fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the fact are to be proved.
In deliberatives, the question is, whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great; or whether it be just; or whether it be profitable.
Besides the application of the proof to the question, a man ought to observe whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause. For it is a sign he does the same in the cause.
The proofs themselves are either examples, or enthymemes.
A deliberative oration, because it is of things to come, requireth rather examples than enthymemes.
But a judicial oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather enthymemes.
Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one another’s force by confounding the hearer.
Nor ought a man to endeavour to prove everything by enthymeme, lest like some philosophers he collect what is known, from what is less known.
Nor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some affection. For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.
For the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would express manners.
But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his manners, he may withal use sentences.
A deliberative oration is more difficult than a judicial, because it is of the future; whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely, the law; and it is easier to prove from principles, than without.
Besides, a deliberative oration wants those helps of turning to the adversary, of speaking of himself, of raising passion.
He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise. And in demonstratives, he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.
He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration.
Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear.
Confutation is also a part of proof. And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs; unless the controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before. For it is necessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man and his oration, that is damned beforehand.
If a man desire his manners should appear well, lest speaking of himself, he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous; let him introduce another person.
Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences, but such as have the same force. As here is an enthymeme: If it be then the best time to make peace, when the best conditions of peace may be had; then the time is now, while our fortune is entire. And this is a sentence of equal force to it: Wise men make peace, while their fortune is entire.
of interrogations, answers, and jests.
The times when it is fit to ask one’s adversary a question, are chiefly four.
The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other.
The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred with out adding that proposition which is manifest.
The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself.
The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these: In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so.
Out of these cases, it is not fit to interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.
To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.
To interrogations, which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question.
And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish.
Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by jests.
The several kinds of jests are set down in the Art of Poetry. Whereof one kind is ironia, and tends to please one’s self. The other is scurrility, and tends to please others.
The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding.
of the epilogue.
Theepilogue must consist of one of these four things.
Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the adversary’s side. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties.
Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is.
Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge.
Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said.
Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration; and how, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversary’s, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.
THE ART OF RHETORIC PLAINLY SET FORTH. WITH PERTINENT EXAMPLES FOR THE MORE EASY UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE OF THE SAME. by THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMSBURY.
THE ART OF RHETORIC.
Rhetoric is an art of speaking finely. It hath two parts:
1. Garnishing of speech, called elocution;
2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called pronunciation.
Garnishing of speech is the first part of rhetoric; whereby the speech itself is beautified and made fine. It is either the fine manner of words, called a trope; or the fine shape or frame of speech, called a figure.
The fine manner of words is a garnishing of speech, whereby one word is drawn from its first proper signification to another; as in this sentence: sin lieth at the door: where sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoined unto it: lieth at the door, signifieth at hand; as that which lieth at the door, is ready to be brought in.
This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of words; afterwards confirmed by delight, because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be shamefaced, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification, than to be driven by force unto the same.
Yet sometimes this fine manner of speech swerveth from this perfection; and then it is, either the abuse of this fine speech, called katachresis, or the excess of this fineness, called hyperbole.
Be not too just nor too wicked; which speech, although it seem very hard, yet it doth, not without some fineness of speech, utter thus much; That one seek not a righteousness beyond the law of God; and that when none can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not dominion over them.
As, My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hate me are more in number than the hairs of my head. Both which do utter by an express of speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.
The abuse of speech is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and unwonted, as in the first example.
The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high and lofty, as in the second example, and Psalms vi. vii.
But the excellency or fineness of words or tropes, is most excellent, when divers are shut up in one, or continued in many.
An example of the first sort is in 2 Kings ii. 9: I pray thee, let me have a double portion of thy Spirit: where by Spirit is meant the gift of the Spirit; and by thy Spirit, the gift of the spirit like to thine.
The continuance of tropes, called an allegory, is, when one kind of trope is so continued, as, look with what kind of matter it be begun, with the same it be ended. So in Psalm xxiii. the care of God towards his church is set forth in the words proper to a shepherd. So in the whole book of Canticles, the sweet conference of Christ and his church, is set down by the words proper to the husband and the wife. So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, in Ecclesiastes xii. 5, 6.
Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a trope. Now the divers sorts do follow. They are those which note out, 1, no comparison, or are with some comparison; or, 2, no respect of division, or some respect.
The first is double: 1. The change of name, called a metonymy. 2. The mocking speech, called an irony.
The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it. It is double: 1. When the cause is put for the thing caused; and contrarywise. 2. When the thing to which anything is adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined; and contrarywise.
The change of name of the cause is when either the name of the maker, or the name of the matter, is put for the thing made.
Of the maker, when the finder out, or the author of the thing, or the instrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So Moses is put for his writings: so love is put for liberality, or bestowing benefits, the fruit of love; so (Rom. i. 8): faith, the cause, is put for religious serving of God, the thing caused. So (James iii.) the tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the speech itself. Rule thy tongue.
Of the matter: Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return; that is, one made of dust.
Now, on the other side, when the thing caused, or the effect, is put for any of these causes. So the Gospel of God is called the power of God to salvation; that is, the instrument of the power of God. So love is said to be bountiful, because it causeth one to be bountiful. St. Paul saith, The bread that we break, is it not in the communion of the body and blood of Christ? That is, an instrument of the communion of the body of Christ. So the body is said to be an earthly tabernacle; that is, a tabernacle made of earth.
The change of name, or metonymy, where the subject, or that which hath anything adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined, or adjunct. So the place is put for those, or that in the place: set thine house in order; that is, thy household matters. It shall be easier for Sodom and Gomorrha; that is, the people in Sodom and Gomorrha. So Moses’ chair is put for the doctrine taught in Moses’ chair. So all Jericho and Jerusalem came out; that is, all the men in Jericho and Jerusalem. So before, sin was put for the punishment of sin. Let his blood rest upon us and our children; that is, the punishment which shall follow his death. So Christ said, This is my body; that is, a sign or sacrament of my body. This wine is the new testament in my blood; that is, a sign or seal of the new testament in my blood. So John saith, I saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a dove; that is, the sign of the Spirit.
On the other side, the adjunct is put for the thing to which it is adjoined. As Christ (1 Tim. i. 1) is called our hope; that is, on whom our hope did depend. So, we are justified by faith; that is, by Christ applied by faith. So, love is the fulfilling of the law; that is, those things to which it is adjoined. Hope for the things hoped for; as Rom. viii. 24. So in the Epistle to the Ephesians, v. 16: The days are evil; that is, the manner, conversation, and deeds of men in the days.
Hitherto the metonymy, or change of name. Now followeth the mocking speech, or irony.
Themocking trope is, when one contrary is signified by another; as God said, Man is like to one of us. So Christ saith, Sleep on; and yet by-and-by, Arise, let us go. So Paul saith, You are wise, and I am a fool.
This trope is conceived either by the contrariety of the matter, or the manner of utterance, or both. So Elijah said to the prophets of Baal, Cry aloud, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ, Hail, King of the Jews!
Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain elegance noteth it. So Philemon 19: That I say not, thou owest thyself unto me.
Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division. Now followeth that which respecteth division, called synechdoche.
A synechdoche is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or the name of the part to the whole. And it is double. 1. When the whole is put for the member, and contrarily. 2. When the general, or whole kind, is put for the special; or contrarily.
So St. John: Not only for our sins, but for the sins of the whole world. So righteousness, a member of goodness, is put for all goodness; so unrighteousness is put for all manner of sins.
Examples of the second sort, as these: So Israel is put for those of Juda sometimes. So nations for the heathen. A minister of Christ for an apostle of Christ, as Rom. xv. 16. A minister put for a distributer, as Rom. xii. 7.
On the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort or general, in the examples following. In the Lord’s prayer, bread, one help of life, is put for all helps; this day, one time for all times. So Solomon saith, the thing of the day in his day; that is, the thing of the time in his time.
So sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called diminution, or meiosis. As James saith to him that knoweth how to do well and doth it not, it is sin; that is a great sin. So our Saviour Christ saith, If they had not known, they had had no sin; that is, no such great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by comparison.
So Solomon saith, Receive my words, and not silver; that is, my words rather than silver. So Paul saith, I was sent to preach, and not to baptize; that is, not so much to baptize as to preach.
Hitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no comparison. Now followeth the fineness of words which noteth out comparison, called a metaphor.
A metaphor is when the like is signified by the like: as (1 Cor. iii. 13) the Apostle saith, doctrine must be tried by fire; that is, the evidence of the word, spirit, trying doctrine, as fire doth metals. So Christ is said to baptize with fire; where fire is put for the power of the Holy Ghost, purging as fire. So Christ saith, none shall enter into the kingdom of God but he that is born of the Holy Ghost and water. So Paul calleth himself the father of the Corinthians, and said, that he begat them in Christ. So he calleth Timothy and Titus his natural sons in the faith.
Hitherto of a trope or garnishing of speech in one word, where the metaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the synechdoche; and last of all, the irony. Now followeth the fine frame or shape of speech, called a figure.
A figure is a garnishing of speech wherein the course of the same is changed, from the more simple and plain manner of speaking unto that which is more full of excellency and grace. For as in the fineness of words, or a trope, words are considered asunder by themselves; so in the fine shape or frame of speech, or a figure, the apt and pleasant joining together of many words is noted.
The garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure, is garnishing of speech in words, or in a sentence.
The garnishing of speech in words, called figura dictionis, is wherein the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joined together.
This is either in the measure of sounds; or in the repetition of sounds.
The measure of sounds is belonging either to poets, with us called rhymers; or orators, with us called eloquent pleaders.
The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces; and it is either rhyme or verse.
Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of syllables ending alike; and these in the mother tongues are most fit for psalms, songs, or sonnets.
Verses are the second sort, containing certain feet fitly placed.
A foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of syllables; for the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because we have no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the large handling of them should be more curious than necessary.
The measure of sounds belonging to orators, is that which, as it is not uncertain, so it differeth altogether from rhyme and verse, and is very changeable with itself. Therefore in that eloquent speech you must altogether leave rhyme and verse, unless you allege it for authority and pleasure.
In the beginning of the sentence little care is to be had, in the middle least of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had; because the fall of the sentence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to be harsh and unpleasant both to the mind and ear, there must be most variety and change.
Now this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that must be set down in feet of two syllables.
And thus much of garnishing of speech by the measure of sounds, rather to give some taste of the same to the readers, than to draw any to the curious and unnecessary practice of it.
Now followeth the repeating of sounds.
Repetition of sounds is either of the like, or the unlike sound.
Of the like, is either continued to the end of, or broken off from, the same, or a diverse sentence.
Continued to the end of the same sentence is, when the same sound is repeated without anything coming between, except a parenthesis; that is, something put in, without the which, notwithstanding, the sentence is full. And it is a joining of the same sound, as Rom. i. 29: All unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness. And in the prayer of Christ, My God, my God. From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men, &c. (Psalm xvii. 14.)
Continued in a diverse sentence is, either a redoubling, called anadyplosis; or a pleasant climbing, called climax.
Redoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former sentence, and the beginning of the sentence following. As Psalm ix. 9: The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due time. Psalm xlviii. 14: For this God is our God. But more plain in Psalm xlviii. 8: As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of our God: God will establish it for ever.
A pleasant climbing, is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or steps of the same sounds: as Rom. viii. 17: If we be children, we be heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ. Rom. viii. 30: Whom he predestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified. Also Rom. ix. 14, 15.
And hitherto of the same sound continued to the end. Now followeth the same sound broken off.
The same sound broken off, is a repetition of the same in the beginning or in the end.
In the beginning, it is called anaphora, a bringing of the same again; as Rom. viii. 38, 39: Nor death, nor life, nor angels, &c. nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us, &c. So likewise Ephes. iv. 11: Some to be apostles, some preachers, &c. So Galatians ii. 14: Nor Jew, Gentile, &c. So likewise Hebrews xi. 1, 2.
Repetition of the same sound in the end, is called epistrophe, a turning to the same sound in the end. So Ezekiel viii. 15: Behold greater abominations than these. Lament. iii. 41, &c.: Let us lift up our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned and have rebelled; therefore thou hast not spared.
When both of these are joined together, it is called a coupling or symplote. As 2 Cor. vi. 4-11: But in all things we approve ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c. See also 2 Cor. xi. 23.
Hitherto of the repetitions in the same place. Now of those that do interchange their place.
They are either epanalepsis, which signifieth to take back; or epanados, which signifies the turning to the same tune.
The first is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the ending; as, 2 Sam. xviii. 33: My son Absolom, my son.
Epanados is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the middle, in the middle and the end. Ezekiel xxxv, 6: I will prepare thee unto blood, and blood shall pursue thee: except thou hate blood, even blood shall pursue thee. And 2 Thes. ii. 4: So that he that doth sit as God, in the temple of God, sheweth himself that he is God.
Hitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are like. Now of those that are unlike.
Unlike; a small changing of the name, as παρονομασια; a small changing of the end or case, as πολνπτωτον.
A small change of name is, when a word, by the change of one letter or syllable, the signification also is changed; as, Rom. v. 4: Patience, experience; and experience, hope. 2 Cor. x. 3: We walk after the flesh, not war in the flesh. 2 Cor. vi. 8-9: So by honour and dishonour, as unknown and yet known.
A small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning rebound by divers ends: Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness, is righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doeth righteously, is born of him. And of both these there are many in the Scripture; but the translations cannot reach them.
Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech, in words. Now followeth the garnishing of the shape of speech, in a sentence.
Garnishing of the frame of speech in a sentence, is a garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a sort beautify the sense and very meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far surpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.
It is either the garnishing of speech alone, or with others.
The garnishing of speech alone, is when as the sentence is garnished without speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the matter; or of the person.
In regard of the matter; it is either a crying out, called exclamation; or a pulling or calling back of himself, called revocation.
A crying out, or exclamation, is the first, which is set forth by a word of calling out. Sometimes of wonder, as, Rom. xi. 33: O the depth of the judgments of God! Psal. viii. 1: O Lord, how excellent is thy name! Sometimes of pity; also these words, Behold, Alas, Oh, be signs of this figure, as, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which stonest the prophets. Sometimes of desperation; as, My sin is greater than can be forgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, &c. Sometimes of wishing: as, Psalm lxxxiv. 1: O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy tabernacles! Sometimes of disdaining: as, Rom. vii. 24: O miserable wretch that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of sin! Sometimes of mocking: as they which said to our Saviour Christ, Ah, thou that, &c. Sometimes of cursing and detestation; as in David, Let their table be made a snare, and bow down their back always.
Also when this figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voice or επιϕωνημα; as when the sins of Jezebel were spoken against, this is added at the end, Seemed it a little to her to do thus and thus.
So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up his praise with this: Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory. Sometimes here is used a certain liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: as Peter (Acts iii. 12,) saith: Ye men of Israel, hear these words. And Paul, (2 Cor. xi. 1): Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishness, and indeed ye suffer me.
Thus much of crying out. Now followeth the figure of calling back, or revocation.
Revocation is when any thing is called back; and it is as it were a cooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.
And this is either a correction of one’s self, called επανορθωσιϛ; or a holding of one’s peace, called αποσιωπησιϛ.
Επανορ̧θωσιϛ is correction, when something is called back that went before: as Paul correcteth his doubtfulness of Agrippa’s belief, when he saith, Believest thou, King Agrippa? I know thou believest. So, 1 Cor. xv. 10: I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, &c.
A keeping of silence, or αποσιωπησιϛ, is when the course of the sentence bygone is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence, not being uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ (John xii. 27) saith, My soul is heavy: what shall I say?
Thus much of a figure garnishing the speech alone, in regard of the matter. Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone, in regard of the person.
Garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person, is double: either in turning to the person called apostrophe; or feigning of the person, called prosopopœia.
Apostrophe, or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to another person than the speech appointed did intend or require. And this apostrophe or turning is diversely seen, according to the diversity of persons. Sometimes it turneth to a man’s person; as David in the sixth Psalm, where having gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to the wicked, saying, Away from me, all ye workers of iniquity; for the Lord hath heard the voice of my petition.
Sometimes from a man to God, as Psalm iii. 3. David being dismayed with the number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: But thou art my buckler, &c.
Sometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense; as Isaiah i. and Isaiah xxi.
Prosopopœia, or a feigning of the person, is whereby we do feign another person speaking in our speech. And it is double; imperfect and perfect.
Imperfect is when the speech of another person is set down lightly and indirectly. As in Psalm. xi. 1. David bringeth in the wicked, Who say unto my soul, fly as the bird unto yonder hill.
A perfect prosopopœia, is when the whole feigning of the person is set down in our speech, with a fit entering into the same, and a leaving it off. So Wisdom, (Prov. viii.); where the entrance is in the first verses, her speech in the rest of the chapter.
Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone. Now follow the other, which concern the speeches of two.
They which concern the speeches of two, are either in asking, or in answering.
That of asking, is either in deliberation; or in preventing an objection.
Deliberation is when we do every now and then ask, as it were, reasons of our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth set down some great thing.
This deliberation is either in doubting, or in communication.
A doubting is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul (1 Philipp. i. 23,24), doubting whether it were better to die than to live, he garnisheth his speech in this manner: For I am greatly in doubt on both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.
Communication is a deliberation with others. As, Galatians iii. 1, 2: O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, &c.
And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called deliberation.
Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the preventing of an objection, or occupation.
Occupation is, when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto it. Therefore this speech between two, in the first part, is called the setting down of the objection or occupation: in the latter part, an answering of the objection or the subjection: as Rom. vi. 1: What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin, that grace may abound? In which words is set down the objection: the answering in these words, God forbid. And here this must be marked, that the objection is many times wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion and answer of it: as 1 Tim. v. 11,12: They will marry, having condemnation. Now lest any might say, what, for marrying? He answereth: No, for denying their first faith.
Hitherto of the figures of asking. Now followeth the figures of answering. They are either in suffering of a deed, called permission; or, granting of an argument, called concession.
Suffering of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed, being never so filthy; as Rev. xxii. 11: Let him that is filthy, be filthy still. And 1 Cor. xiv. 38: If any be ignorant, let him be ignorant.
Concession or granting of an argument is, when an argument is mockingly yielded unto, as Ecclesiastes xi. 9: Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c.
THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.
Although the rules of Sophistry be needless for them that be perfect in logic; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to the young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle arguments, and the better practising of logic and rhetoric, we have thought good to turn it into the English tongue.
Sophistry is the feigned art of elenches, or coloured reasons.
A coloured reason, or elench, is a show of reason to deceive withal. It is either when the deceit lieth in the words; or in the default of logic, called a sophism.
In words, is either when the deceit lieth in one word; or in words joined together. If it were, it should be, whosoever.
In one word, is either the darkness of a word; or, the doubtfulness of a word.
The darkness of a word, or an insolence, deceiveth, when by a reason the meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the oldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort is that spoken of in 2 Peter ii. 18.
By this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side for deserving by good works.
Where merits is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by desert or freedom of promise.
Doubtfulness of a word, likeness of name, is either called homonymia; or by a trope or fineness of speech.
The likeness of name, or homonymia, is when one word is given to signify divers things: as,
Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.
Doubtfulness by a trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively or contrarily: As,
Where by body is meant the sign or sacrament of his body.
Unto the first, a perfect logician would answer, that the proposition is not an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of merit. And if the word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.
To the second he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and adjunct are not joined together: which hath justifying faith, or believing sincerely, shall be saved; and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred is false.
Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true; because if the word body be taken properly, it is not then true that is set down; but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ saith in proper words, it is my body; and then it is false.
Hitherto of the fallacies in single words. Now of those that are joined together.
It is either amphibolia, or the doubtfulness of speech: or exposition, or unapt setting down of the reason.
The first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as thus, if any obey not our word by a letter, note him: where some refer by a letter, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the latter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show that it must be referred to the first.
The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is perverted.
Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,
Here the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the assumption.
Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in words. Now of the default of logic, called sophism.
It is either general or special. The general are those which cannot be referred to any part of logic. They are either begging of the question, called the petition of the principle; or bragging of no proof.
Begging of the question, is when nothing is brought to prove but the question, or that which is doubtful: as,
Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.
Where the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof, as the question.
The answer is this, out of the definition of the syllogism; that there is no new argument invented; therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.
Bragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called redounding.
It is either impertinent to another matter, called heterogenium; or a vain repetition, called tautologia.
Impertinent, or not to the purpose, is when anything is brought for a proof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand; whereunto the common proverb giveth answer, I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk.
A vain repetition, is when the same thing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after a long time of prayer say, Let us pray. And this fallacy our Saviour Christ (Matt. vi. 5) condemneth in prayer. And this is a fault in method.
Special are those, which may be referred to certain parts of logic, and they are of two sorts. Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called invention; or to judgment.
Those referred to invention, are when anything is put for a reason, which is not; as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect; and so of the rest.
In the distribution this is a proper fallacy, when anything simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not meant nor intended: as,
The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true; for there may be a way to say there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.
Fallacies of judgment, are those that are referred to the judgment of one sentence, or of more.
Of one sentence, either to the proprieties of an axiom, or to the sorts.
To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily: an affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of St. John, I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray, for no denial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.
To the sorts, are referred either to the simple or compound.
The first, when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So the Papists, by this fallacy, do answer to that general saying of Paul; We are justified with faith without the works of the law: which they understand of works done before faith, when that was never called in doubt.
The fallacies which are referred to a compound axiom, are those which are referred either to a disjoined, or knitting axiom. To a disjoined axiom, when the parts indeed are not disjoined: as, Solomon was either a king, or did bear rule.
To a knitting axiom, is when the parts are not necessarily knit together; as, If Rome be on fire, the Pope’s chair is burnt.
And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment. Now followeth the second.
And they be either those that are referred to a syllogism; or to method. And they again are general, and special. General, which are referred to the general properties of a syllogism. It is either when all the parts are denied; or are particular. All parts denied: as,
And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of a negative syllogism, which must always have one affirmative.
All particular: as,
This is answered, by the definition of a special syllogism; which is, that hath one part general.
The special, are those which are simple or compound.
The simple is of two sorts. The first is more plain. The second less plain.
More plain, is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particular: as,
Less plain, hath one fallacy in common, when the proposition is special: as,
The fallacy of the first kind, is when all the parts be affirmative: as,
The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: as,
Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple syllogism. Now follow those which are referred to a compound; which are those which are referred either to the connexive, or to the disjoined.
Of the first sort, one is when the first part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be so likewise: as,
The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: as,
Of those referred to the disjoined, the first is when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: as,
The second kind, is when the second part of the copulative negative axiom is denied, that the first may be so: as,
And thus much of the fallacies in a syllogism.
The fallacy in method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the beginning, the special before the general; good order be gone, confounded; and finally when darkness, length, and hardness, is laboured after.
end of vol. vi.