EconlibThe LibraryOther Sites |
Front Page Titles (by Subject) CHAP. IX.: Of our Knowledge of Existence. - The Works, vol. 2 An Essay concerning Human Understanding Part 2 and Other Writings
Return to Title Page for The Works, vol. 2 An Essay concerning Human Understanding Part 2 and Other WritingsThe Online Library of LibertyA project of Liberty Fund, Inc.Search this Title:Also in the Library:
CHAP. IX.: Of our Knowledge of Existence. - John Locke, The Works, vol. 2 An Essay concerning Human Understanding Part 2 and Other Writings [1689]Edition used:The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol. 2.
Part of: The Works of John Locke in Nine VolumesAbout Liberty Fund:Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. Copyright information:The text is in the public domain. Fair use statement:This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.
CHAP. IX.Of our Knowledge of Existence.General certain propositions concern not existence. § 1. Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things, which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence, but what it has in the understanding) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where by the way we may take notice, that universal propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence; and farther, that all particular affirmations or negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or repugnancy. A threefold knowledge of existence. § 2. But leaving the nature of propositions and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration; and of other things by sensation. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. § 3. As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own existence; I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me, than my own existence? if I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty. |

Titles (by Subject)