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• The Religious Pilgrimage.
• ΙΧΘϒΟΦΑΓΙΑ.
• The Funeral.
• Echo.
• ΠΟΛϒΔΑΙΤΙΑ, Or, the Unequal Feast.
• Of Things and Words.
• Charon.
• The Assembly of Grammarians.
• ΑΓΑΜΟΣ ΓΑΜΟΣ, Or, the Unequal Marriage.
• The Imposture.
• Cyclops, Or the Gospel-carrier.
• ΑΠΡοΣΔΙοΝϒΣΑ the Impertinents, Or Crosspurposes.
• The False Knight: Or, ΙΠΠΕϒΣ ΑΝΙΠΠΟΣ·
• ΑΣΤΡΑΓΑΛΙΣΜΟΣ.
• ΓϒΝΑΙΚΟΣϒΝΕΔΡΙΟΝ. the Assembly Or Parliament of Women.
• Diluculum: Or, the Early Rising.
• ΝΗΦΑΛΙοΝ ΣϒΜΠοΣΙοΝ. the Sober Feast.
• The Notable Art.
• The Sermon, Or Merdardus.
• The Lover of Glory.
• Opulentia Sordida, Or the Wealthy Miser.
• The Seraphick Funeral.
• Amicitia, Or Friendship.
• Problema.
• The Epicurean.
• The Conflict Between Thalia and Barbarism.
• Des. Erasmus of Rotterdam to the Reader,: Concerning the Profitableness of Colloquies.
• Erasmus of Rotterdam, of the Method of Study, to Christianus of Lubeck.

The LOVER of GLORY.

The Argument.

PHILODOXUS, SYMBULUS.

PHI.

I promise myself Happiness, that I have met with you, Symbulus.

Sym.

I wish, Philodoxus, it were in my Power to make you happy in any Thing.

Phi.

What can be more felicitous, than for God to meet a Man?

Sym.

Indeed I should account that much more lucky than the Flight of a thousand Night-Owls; but what God is it you Mean?

Phi.

Why, ’tis yourself I mean, Symbulus.

Sym.

What me!

Phi.

Even yourself.

Sym.

I always thought, that those Gods that did their Business backwards, were not worth a Straw.

Phi.

If the Proverb be true, That he is a God that helps a Man, then you are a God to me.

Sym.

I leave the Proverb to be made out by other People; but as for me, I would do any Service I can to my Friend with all my Heart.

Phi.

Well, Symbulus, don’t be in Pain, I an’t about to borrow any Money of you: Counsel is a sacred Thing, only give me your Assistance with that.

Sym.

That is only demanding what is your own, since this Office ought to be mutual among Friends, as indeed should every Thing else. But what is it you want my Counsel in?

Phi.

I am weary of living in Obscurity, I have a great Mind to become famous; prithee tell me how I may become so.

Sym.

O, here’s a short Way for you; imitate Erostratus, who set Diana’s Temple on Fire; or Zoilus, who carped at Homer; or do some memorable Villainy or other; and then you will be as famous as the Cercopes or Nero.

Phi.

They that like it, may get themselves a Name by Impiety; I am ambitious of a good Name.

Sym.

Then be such a one in Fact, as you would be in Name.

Phi.

But a great many Persons have been virtuous, that were never famous.

Sym.

I question that; but however, if it be as you say, Virtue is a sufficient Reward to itself.

Phi.

You speak very true, and much like a Philosopher. But for all that, as Times go, in my Opinion, Glory is the chief Reward belonging to Virtue, which delights to be known, as the Sun does to shine; for this very Reason, that it may benefit a great many, and draw them to an Imitation of itself. And then lastly, I don’t see how Parents can leave a fairer Fortune to their Children, than the immortal Memory of a good Name.

Sym.

Then, as I understand you, you would have Glory gotten by Virtue.

Phi.

That’s the very Thing.

Sym.

Then set before you, for Imitation, the Men that have been celebrated by the Pens of all Men, such as Aristides, Phocion, Socrates, Epaminondas, Scipio Africanus, Cato Senior, and Cato of Utica, and Marcus Brutus, and the like; who both by War and Peace studied to deserve as well as possible of the Common-Wealth. This is the fertile Field of Glory.

Phi.

But among those famous Men, Aristides suffered Banishment for ten Years, Phocion and Socrates drank Poison, Epaminondas was accused of Treason, and so was Scipio; Cato the Elder being accus’d, was oblig’d to plead forty Times in his own Defence, Cato of Utica kill’d himself, and so did Brutus. But I would have Glory without Envy.

Sym.

Ay, but that is more than Jupiter granted even to Hercules himself; for after he had tamed so many Monsters, last of all he had Hydra to engage with; and that was the longest Engagement of ’em all.

Phi.

I would never envy Hercules the Glories of his Labours; I only account them happy Men that obtain a good Name, not sullied with Envy.

Sym.

I perceive you’d have a pleasant Life, and for that Reason are afraid of Envy; nor are you in the wrong, for that is one of the worst of Monsters.

Phi.

It is so.

Sym.

Then live a private Life.

Phi.

But that is to be dead, and not to live.

Sym.

I understand what you would be at; you would walk in the Sun, and have no Shadow.

Phi.

That’s impossible.

Sym.

And so it is equally impossible to obtain Glory, and be free from Envy; Glory accompanies Well-doing, and so does Envy Glory.

Phi.

But the old Comedian tells us, that Glory may be without Envy, saying, Ita ut facillime sine invidia laudem invenias et amicos pares.

Sym.

If you will be content with that Praise, which young Pamphilus gain’d by Obsequiousness and Agreeableness of Humour, you may from the same Place fetch the Method of obtaining what you desire so earnestly. Remember in every Thing, Ne quid nimis, [not to over-do any Thing] but yet Mediocriter omnia, [all Things with Moderation] be easy in bearing with the Manners of other Persons, taking no Notice of small Faults; and do not be obstinate and tenacious of your own Opinion, but be comformable to the Tempers of others; don’t contradict any one, but be obliging to all.

Phi.

Many Persons have a mighty Affection for Youth, and so it is no hard Matter to obtain such Praise as that. That which I would have is a certain Gloriousness of Name, that should ring all the World over, that should increase in Illustriousness, as I do in Age, and be most renowned after my Death.

I commend the Greatness of your Mind, Philodoxus; but if you are ambitious of a Glory that proceeds from Virtue, it is the chiefest Virtue to be regardless of Glory, and the highest Commendation not to aspire after Praise, which follows them most that endeavour to shun it. Therefore you ought to take Care, lest the more strenuously you pursue it, the more you be frustrated of it.

Phi.

I am not an insensible Stoic, I am subject to human Affections.

Sym.

If you acknowledge yourself to be a Man, and don’t refuse to submit to those Things that are human, why do you pursue those Things which are denied, even to God himself? for you know that Saying of Theocritus, that was as truly as it was wittily said, Jovem nec pluvium, nec serenum, placere omnibus; That Jupiter does not please all Men, either when he sends Rain or fair Weather.

Phi.

Perhaps there is no Fire, but there is some Smoke; but yet there are some Things that are without Smoke. Altho’ it be impossible for a Man to obtain a Glory, that shall not be obscur’d with some Cloud or other of Ill-will; yet I believe there are some Methods to be taken, that there shall be but very little of Enmity mixed with it.

Sym.

Shall I tell you what those Methods are?

Phi.

I should be very glad to know them.

Sym.

Shew your Virtue but sparingly, and you shall be the less troubled with Envy.

Phi.

But Glory is no Glory, unless it be notable.

Sym.

Well, I’ll tell you a sure Way: Do some noble Exploit, and die; and then you shall be renown’d without Envy, as the Codri, the Menæcei, the Iphigenii, the Decii and Curtii were.

• Pascitur in vivis livor, post fata quiescit.
• Envy is maintain’d among the Living, but ceases after Death.

Phi.

Indeed, to confess ingenuously, I would leave the Inheritance of a good Name to my Children and Grand-Children; but I would have some Enjoyment of it myself while I am alive.

Sym.

Well, come, I won’t keep you any longer in Suspence. The surest Way to obtain an illustrious Name, is to deserve well, as well in a private Capacity, of every particular Person, as in a publick Capacity, of the whole Community; and that is to be done partly by good Offices, and partly by Bounty: But Bounty is so to be moderated, as not to be obliged to take away forcibly from one, what you bestow upon another; for from such Bounty as this, there arises more ill Will from the good, than good Will from the bad. And besides, to be commended by the bad, is rather an Infamy than a Reputation. Moreover, the Fountain of Bounty will be drawn dry by frequent Donations: But that Bounty that consists in good Offices has no Bottom; the more it is drawn, the more it springs: But there are a great many Things that mitigate Envy, and illustrate Glory; which no Body can give to himself, but they happen purely from the Bounty of God himself.

• Gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus.
• That Virtue is the more lovely, that comes from a beautiful Body.

But no Man can bestow upon himself Comeliness of Person. Nobility carries along with it much of Dignity, but this is the Gift of Fortune. The same Opinion we ought to have of Riches, which being justly gotten by Grandfathers or Great-Grandfathers, descend to us by Inheritance. Nor can any one bestow this upon himself. Of the same Kind are Quickness of Wit, a Grace in Speaking, Pleasantness and Courteousness, that is not acquired, but in-bred; and in the last Place, a certain internal Beauty and Felicity; the Effect of which we see daily in a great many, but can give no Reason of it: so that we often see the same Things to be said and done by different Persons, and he that acted and said the worst, obtain’d Favour, when he who did and said best, instead of Thanks, gain’d ill Will. The Antients indeed ascribed this Effect to Mens Genius; for they said that every one was fortunate in that which he was born to; and, on p. 258 the other Hand, whatsoever any one attempted against the Grain, and the Consent of his Genius, would never succeed.

Phi.

Then here is no Room for Advice in this Case.

Sym.

Very little: But yet Persons of Penetration do discover in Children and Youth some secret Marks, by which they can conjecture what Studies, what Sort of Life, and what Actions they are fitted for. So also as to those Things that are good, there is a certain secret Instinct of Nature in us, that we have an Aversion for some Things, without any apparent Cause, and are carried on with a wonderful Propensity to others. Hence it is that one is an expert Soldier, another a good Politician, and another, you would say, was born to be a Student. And in these Things too, there is an admirable Variety, as great as is the Diversity of Employments. Nature has framed one for a General, another for a good common Soldier; and where Nature has been most bountiful, there the same Person may be fit to command or obey, as Homer says. So likewise in civil Affairs, one is a good Counsellor; another a good Barrister; another is made for an Ambassador, and performs that Office with great Success. What Need is there to mention the Variety of Inclinations? There are some who are so strongly inclined to a monastick Life, and yet not every one neither, but to this or that particular Order, that they take no Pleasure of their Lives, if they do not attain it; when, on the other Hand, others have so strong an Aversion for that Sort of Life, that they had rather die than be made Monks: Nor is this because they hate that Way of Living, or can give any Reason for it, but by some secret Instinct in Nature.

Phi.

As you say, I have often found many such Instances, and have admired at them.

Sym.

In these Gifts that Nature liberally bestows upon us, a Person shall be much less liable to Envy, if a Man be not proud and ostentatious. Beauty, Nobility, Wealth, Eloquence, appear the most lovely in those Persons that seem not to know they are endow’d with them. Courtesy and Modesty do no Way lessen these Advantages; but as they add a Grace to them, so they drive away Envy. And this Courtesy and Sweetness of Temper ought to go along with all the Actions of our Lives, unless it be contrary to our Nature; for, in my Opinion, Xenocrates would have attempted in vain that which Socrates and Diogenes succeeded in; Cato the Censor would in vain have endeavour’d after that which gain’d Laelius so much good Will. Yet Demea in Terence being alter’d so on a sudden, is a sufficient Instance of what Efficacy it is in gaining good Will, to suit ourselves with Persons Inclinations and Humours: but as often as Men deviate from Right, they degenerate from true Glory to the temporary Favour of Man; but that Glory only is lasting, which is founded upon Honesty, and comes from the Judgment of Reason: For the Affections make their temporary Efforts, and when they have once spent themselves, we begin to hate what before we loved vehemently, and hiss what before we clapp’d, and condemn what before we commended: But tho’ the Disposition can’t be wholly alter’d, yet it may in Part be corrected.

Phi.

I want to hear what you aim at.

Sym.

He that is of a complaisant Temper, ought to be careful, lest while he labours to ingratiate himself with all Persons, he deviates from Honesty: and lest, while he endeavours to accommodate himself to all Company, he changes his Shape so often, that none can tell what to make of him.

Phi.

I know a great many such slippery Blades, at whose Vanity one cannot forbear blushing.

Sym.

But then again, they who are of a rugged Temper, ought to endeavour so to affect Courtesy, as that what they do may not seem to be counterfeit; or by ever and anon falling into their natural Propensity, instead of Commendation get a double Disgrace, first for acting rigidly, and then for being inconsistent with themselves. For Constancy has so great an Efficacy, that they who are naturally of a bad Temper, are the easier borne with for this Reason, because they always act like themselves; for as soon as the Disguise p. 260 is seen thro’, even Things that have been well acted become displeasing: And besides, that which is done under a Colour, can’t be kept always conceal’d; it will come out one Time or other, and whenever it does, all the gay Appearance drops off, and becomes a mere Jest.

Phi.

If I take in your Intention, you would have one depart as little as may be from Nature, but not at all from Integrity; (that which is honest is honourable.)

Sym.

You are right; and besides, you know very well, that whatsoever grows famous on a sudden, lies exposed to Envy. And thence comes the odious Name of an Upstart, call’d by the Greeks νεοπλούτος; and by the Romans, Novus homo; and by both, Terrae filii, [Sons of the Earth] and Caelo delapsi [dropt out of the Clouds.] But that Reputation that springs up gently, and grows gradually, as on the one Side it is less liable to Envy, so on the other it is commonly more durable; as the witty Poet Horace intimates, saying, Crescit occulto velut arbor aevo fama Marcelli, [Marcellus’s Fame grows insensibly like a Tree:] So that if you would obtain Glory that is true, lasting, and as little as may be obnoxious to Envy, mind what Socrates says, that it often happens that they who make the most Haste at first setting out, come latest to their Journey’s End.

Phi.

But the Life of Man is very short.

Sym.

For that Reason we should use Expedition towards good Deeds, and not Glory; and that will follow necessarily of its own Accord: For I suppose what you enquire after, is not how you may live long; for that is in the Breasts of the Destinies, who draw out and cut off the Thread of Life at their Pleasure.

Phi.

I wish you could do that too.

Sym.

O Philodoxus! God has never been so bountiful as to give all to one Man: What one wants in Years, is often made up in Honour. There are indeed some, but those very few, to whom he is so bountiful, that while they are alive and as it were in being, they enjoy the Fruits of Posterity; tho’ they are but few that the just God loves. Perhaps some of a divine Descent have attain’d this; but this Felicity does not fall under our Consideration.

Phi.

I have often admired whether it is by the Malignity of Nature or Fortune, that no Conveniences happen to Mankind, without being allayed with some Inconvenience.

Sym.

My Friend, what then have we to do, but, as we are of human Race, to endeavour to bear our human Condition with a contented Mind? And it will not a little conduce to moderate Envy, if you do but look thoroughly into the Dispositions of Nations, of Bodies of Men, and single Persons; as they do who make it their Business to tame and feed Beasts; for such Persons make it their chief Study to find out by what Things the Animal is made fierce, or becomes tame. I don’t at present speak of the Difference between a Bird and a four-footed Beast, between a Serpent and a Fish; or between the Eagle and the Vulture, between the Elephant and the Horse, between the Dolphin and the Porpoise, between a Viper and an Asp; but of the innumerable Variety that is between all Kinds of Animals.

Phi.

I would fain hear what you drive at.

Sym.

All Dogs are contain’d under one Species, but this Species is diversify’d into innumerable Forms, so that you would say there were so many distinct Genus’s, rather than one Species: For in the same Species, what a great Variety is there of Manners and Tempers?

Phi.

A very great one indeed!

Sym.

That which is said of Dogs, you may understand of all other living Creatures; but it is not visible in any other Creature so much as in Horses.

Phi.

’Tis true: But what do you mean by all this?

Sym.

Whatsoever Variety there is in the Different Kinds or Forms of living Creatures, or in Individuals, suppose the same to be in Man: among them you will find Wolves of various Kinds, Dogs in an unspeakable Variety, Elephants, Camels, Asses, Lions, Sheep, Vipers, Apes, Dragons, Eagles, Vultures, Swallows, Leeches; and what not?

Phi.

But what of all that?

There is no living Creature so fierce, but, being managed by Art, it may be made useful, or at least not hurtful.

Phi.

I can’t for my Life see what you drive at.

Sym.

There is a Difference between a Spaniard, an Italian, a German, a Frenchman, and an Englishman.

Phi.

There is so.

Sym.

Besides, there is in every single Man of these several Nations, a certain Temper peculiar to himself.

Phi.

I confess it.

Sym.

If you shall nicely observe this Variety, and accommodate yourself to each of their Manners, you will easily bring it about, that they will either all be your Friends, or at least that none of them will be your Enemies.

Phi.

What, would you have me to be a Polypus; where is Honesty and Sincerity in the mean Time?

Sym.

There is in all common Affairs a certain Obsequiousness that does in no wise intrench upon Honesty; as for Instance, in Italy Men kiss one another, which would be look’d upon very absurd to do in Germany; but instead of that, they give you their right Hand. Again, in England it is the Custom for Men to kiss the Women, even at Church: but if you should do this in Italy, it would be accounted a high Crime. Again, in England it is accounted a Piece of Civility to give the Cup to one that comes in when you are at Dinner; but in France it is look’d upon as an Affront. In these and the like Cases Persons may be complaisant, without any Detriment to Honesty.

Phi.

But it is a very hard Matter to be acquainted with the Manners and Tempers of every Man of all Nations.

Sym.

’Tis true, Philodoxus: But if you would obtain a considerable Reputation, and that by Virtue, you must of Necessity exercise no common Virtue. You know Virtue is conversant in Difficulties, as old Hesiod taught before the Peripateticks; and therefore if you have a Mind to eat Honey, you must be content to bear with the Trouble of Bees.

Phi.

I know that, and remember it very well; but that we are in Quest of, is, how to moderate Envy.

Sym.

Then do you endeavour that in the Camp you rather chuse to be a common Soldier than a General, and in such a War as is against Enemies who are Foreigners, rather than your Fellow-Citizens and Countrymen. In Government rather chuse those Offices which are popular and ingratiating; as to defend is more popular than to accuse, to honour than to punish. But if any Case happen, as it sometimes necessarily will, that is troublesome in its Nature, if you can’t avoid acting in it, make it as easy as you can by Moderation.

Phi.

How must that be done?

Sym.

Suppose you are a Judge, or an Arbitrator, you must bear something hard upon one Party or another; but be sure to manage the Matter with so much Equity, that, if it be possible, he that you give the Cause against, may give you Thanks.

Phi.

How must that be manag’d?

Sym.

Suppose the Action be to be laid for Theft or Sacrilege; if it be in your Power, mitigate it, and let it be laid for a Trespass; and by this Means you may ease the Defendant, and do no Injury to the Plaintiff. In short, moderate every Cause so, that without injuring the Plaintiff, you may seem to act justly to the Defendant; and lastly, make the condemn’d Person’s Sentence as easy as may be. And all the while take Care to avoid surly Looks, or sour or morose Words; for they often are the Cause that some Persons will owe you more ill Will for doing them a Courtesy, than others shall for denying them one. Sometimes you ought to admonish a Friend; but if there are no Hopes of his being the better by it, it is better to be silent. If it be a weighty Case, and there be any Hope of doing Good, then it is of great Moment what the Admonition is; for it often falls out that Admonition being either unhandsome or unseasonable, exasperates the Disease, and makes a Friend an Enemy. But this Dexterity is most necessary if you admonish p. 264 a Prince; for sometimes it falls out, that their Humours must be contradicted; and if it be done pleasantly and wittily, afterwards they that contradicted have greater Thanks given them, than they that soothed them: For that which is grateful to the Passion is of short Continuance, but what is done with Reason, is approved always; for the far greater Part of ill Will arises from the Unruliness of the Tongue. How much Mischief does sometimes a single Word bring upon some Persons? how many has an ill-timed Jest brought to Ruin? Therefore when you commend any Person, let it be those that are worthy, and sparingly; but be more sparing in reflecting on any one, if you do reflect at all. And then again, you must avoid Talkativeness, for it is a very hard Matter to talk much, and to the Purpose.

Phi.

I agree to all these Things; but, in my Opinion, the chief Way of making one’s Name famous, is to write Books.

Sym.

You say very right; it is, were it not that there are so many Authors: But if you are for doing it that Way, take Care you write with a great Deal of Exactness, rather than much; and in the first Place, chuse some Argument that is not common, that has been touch’d on but by very few, and such a one that is not of an invidious Nature: and bestow upon it all the curious Observations that you have been collecting for many Years, and then treat on it in such a Manner, that may be both profitable and pleasant.

Phi.

You give me very prudent Advice, and such as would be to my Satisfaction, if you went one Step farther, and told me how I might attain this Glory quickly too; for I see a great many that don’t grow famous till they are going out of the World, and others not till they are gone out of it.

Sym.

As to that, I have no better Advice to give you, than that which the Fidler gave his Fellow: See that you approve yourself to those that have already attain’d such a Glory as has repell’d Envy: Let yourself into the Familiarity of such Persons whose good Word will gain you Esteem with the Populace.

But if notwithstanding all this I be attack’d with Envy, what Remedy do you prescribe?

Sym.

Then do as they do who boil Pitch; if it catch Fire they pour Water upon it, and then it will rage and crackle more if you don’t keep on doing so.

Phi.

What Sort of Riddle is that?

Sym.

When you perceive Envy arising, rather overcome it by Benefits than Revenge. Hercules was never the better for cutting off the Hydra’s Heads; it was by the Greek Fire that he overcame the destroying Monster.

Phi.

But what is that you call the Greek Fire?

Sym.

That which burns in the Middle of the Water. He applies that who being provok’d by the Injuries of ill Men, nevertheless does not give over doing good to all that deserve it.

Phi.

What’s that you mean? is Beneficence sometimes Water, and sometimes Fire?

Sym.

Why not? when Christ by Way of Allegory is sometimes a Sun, sometimes a Fire, sometimes a Stone. I said so for the Purpose; if you know any Thing better, make Use of it, and don’t follow my Advice.

Philodoxus. Symbulus253

“Lover of Glory.” “Counsellor.”

The Flight of a thousand Night-Owls253

See above, p. 383.

He is a God that helps a Man253

Alluding to the Greek adage, ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου δαιμόνιον, “man the divinity of man:” applied to sudden and unexpected help in an emergency. So Horace amusingly commemorates his deliverance from a bore: “sic me servavit Apollo.” Ser. i. 9. 78. Hence, “godsend.”

Against the Grain and the consent of his Genius258

Lit., “Minerva being unwilling and his Genius angry.”

As the witty Poet Horace intimates, saying, Crescit occulto velut arbor aevo fama Marcelli260

Od. i., 12, 45.

The Advice which the Fidler gave his Fellow264

In the original the word is tibicen, the piper. They must have been an important class in ancient life, like the harpers and pipers of the feudal times.