The Online Library of Liberty

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• Introduction
• The Social Contract Or Principles of Political Right
• Foreword
• Book I
• Chapter I: Subject of the First Book
• Chapter II: The First Societies
• Chapter III: The Right of the Strongest
• Chapter IV: Slavery
• Chapter V: That We Must Always Go Back to a First Convention
• Chapter VI: The Social Compact
• Chapter VII: The Sovereign
• Chapter VIII: The Civil State
• Chapter IX: Real Property
• Book Ii
• Chapter I: That Sovereignty Is Inalienable
• Chapter II: That Sovereignty Is Indivisible
• Chapter III: Whether the General Will Is Fallible
• Chapter IV: The Limits of the Sovereign Power
• Chapter V: The Right of Life and Death
• Chapter VI: Law
• Chapter VII: The Legislator
• Chapter VIII: The People
• Chapter IX: The People ( Continued )
• Chapter X: The People ( Continued )
• Chapter XI: The Various Systems of Legislation
• Chapter XII: The Division of the Laws
• Book Iii
• Chapter I: Government In General
• Chapter II: The Constituent Principle In the Various Forms of Government
• Chapter III: The Division of Governments
• Chapter IV: Democracy
• Chapter V: Aristocracy
• Chapter VI: Monarchy
• Chapter VII: Mixed Governments
• Chapter VIII: That All Forms of Government Do Not Suit All Countries
• Chapter IX: The Marks of a Good Government
• Chapter X: The Abuse of Government and Its Tendency to Degenerate
• Chapter XI: The Death of the Body Politic
• Chapter XII: How the Sovereign Authority Maintains Itself
• Chapter XIII: The Same ( Continued )
• Chapter XIV: The Same ( Continued )
• Chapter XV: Deputies Or Representatives
• Chapter XVI: That the Institution of Government Is Not a Contract
• Chapter XVII: The Institution of Government
• Chapter XVIII: How to Check the Usurpations of Government
• Book Iv
• Chapter I: That the General Will Is Indestructible
• Chapter II: Voting
• Chapter III: Elections
• Chapter IV: The Roman Comitia
• Chapter V: The Tribunate
• Chapter VI: The Dictatorship
• Chapter VII: The Censorship
• Chapter VIII: Civil Religion
• Chapter IX: Conclusion
• A Discourse Which Won the Prize At the Academy of Dijon In 1750, On This Question Proposed By the Academy: Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences Had a Purifying Effect Upon Morals ?
• A Discourse On the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences Decipimur Specie Recti. — Horace.
• The First Part
• The Second Part
• A Discourse On a Subject Proposed By the Academy of Dijon: What Is the Origin of Inequality Among Men, and Is It Authorised By Natural Law ?
• A Discourse On Political Economy

CHAPTER III

the right of the strongest

The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will—at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?

Suppose for a moment that this so-called “right” exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word “right” adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.

Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept, but superfluous: I can answer for its never being violated. All power comes from God, I admit; but so does all sickness: does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of a wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I could withhold it, am I in conscience bound to give it up? For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power.

Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers. In that case, my original question recurs.