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• Preface to the First Edition (1871)
• Preface to the Second Edition (1879)
• Preface to the Third Edition By Harriet Jevons
• Errata
• Chapter I: Introduction
• Mathematical Character of the Science.
• Confusion Between Mathematical and Exact Sciences.
• Capability of Exact Measurement.
• Measurement of Feeling and Motives.
• Logical Method of Economics.
• Relation of Economics to Ethics.
• Chapter II: Theory of Pleasure and Pain
• Pleasure and Pain As Quantities.
• Pain the Negative of Pleasure.
• Anticipated Feeling.
• Uncertainty of Future Events.
• Chapter III: Theory of Utility
• Definition of Terms.
• The Laws of Human Want.
• Utility Is Not an Intrinsic Quality.
• Law of the Variation of Utility.
• Total Utility and Degree of Utility.
• Variation of the Final Degree of Utility.
• Disutility and Discommodity.
• Distribution of Commodity In Different Uses.
• Theory of Dimensions of Economic Quantities.
• Actual, Prospective, and Potential Utility.
• Distribution of a Commodity In Time.
• Chapter IV: Theory of Exchange
• Importance of Exchange In Economics.
• Ambiguity of the Term Value.
• Value Expresses Ratio of Exchange.
• Popular Use of the Term Value.
• Dimension of Value.
• Definition of Market.
• Definition of Trading Body.
• The Law of Indifference.
• The Theory of Exchange.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Analogy to the Theory of the Lever.
• Impediments to Exchange.
• Illustrations of the Theory of Exchange.
• Problems In the Theory of Exchange.
• Complex Cases of the Theory.
• Competition In Exchange.
• Failure of the Equations of Exchange.
• Negative and Zero Value.
• Equivalence of Commodities.
• Acquired Utility of Commodities.
• The Gain By Exchange.
• Numerical Determination of the Laws of Utility.
• Opinions As to the Variation of Price.
• Variation of the Price of Corn.
• The Origin of Value.
• Chapter V: Theory of Labour
• Definition of Labour.
• Quantitative Notions of Labour.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Dimensions of Labour.
• Balance Between Need and Labour.
• Distribution of Labour.
• Relation of the Theories of Labour and Exchange.
• Relations of Economic Quantities.
• Various Cases of the Theory.
• Joint Production.
• Over-production.
• Limits to the Intensity of Labour.
• Chapter VI: Theory of Rent
• Accepted Opinions Concerning Rent.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Illustrations of the Theory.
• Chapter VII: Theory of Capital
• The Function of Capital.
• Capital Is Concerned With Time.
• Quantitative Notions Concerning Capital.
• Expression For Amount of Investment.
• Dimensions of Capital, Credit and Debit.
• Effect of the Duration of Work.
• Illustrations of the Investment of Capital.
• Fixed and Circulating Capital.
• Free and Invested Capital.
• Uniformity of the Rate of Interest.
• General Expression For the Rate of Interest.
• Dimension of Interest.
• Peacock On the Dimensions of Interest.
• Tendency of Profits to a Minimum.
• Advantage of Capital to Industry.
• Are Articles In the Consumers' Hands Capital?
• Chapter VIII: Concluding Remarks
• The Doctrine of Population.
• Relation of Wages and Profit.
• Professor Hearn's Views.
• The Noxious Influence of Authority.
• Appendix I
• Appendix Ii

Relation of Economics to Ethics.

I wish to say a few words, in this place, upon the relation of Economics to Moral Science. The theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain; and the object of Economics is to maximise happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain. The language employed may be open to misapprehension, and it may seem as if pleasures and pains of a gross kind were treated as the all-sufficient motives to guide the mind of man. I have no hesitation in accepting the Utilitarian theory of morals which does uphold the effect upon the happiness of mankind as the criterion of what is right and wrong. 'But I have never felt that there is anything in that theory to prevent our putting the widest and highest interpretation upon the terms used.

Jeremy Bentham put forward the Utilitarian theory in the most uncompromising manner. According to him, whatever is of interest or importance to us must be the cause of pleasure or of pain; and when the terms are used with a sufficiently wide meaning, pleasure and pain include all the forces which drive us to action. They are explicitly or implicitly the matter of all our calculations, and form the ultimate quantities to be treated in all the moral sciences. The words of Bentham on this subject may require some explanation and qualification, but they are too grand and too full of truth to be omitted. "Nature," he says,1 "has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters—pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but, in reality, he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light."

In connection with this passage we may take that of Paley, who says, with his usual clear brevity,2 "I hold that pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity."

The acceptance or non-acceptance of the basis of the Utilitarian doctrine depends, in my mind, on the exact interpretation of the language used. As it seems to me, the feelings of which a man is capable are of various grades. He is always subject to mere physical pleasure or pain, necessarily arising from his bodily wants and susceptibilities. He is capable also of mental and moral feelings of several degrees of elevation. A higher motive may rightly overbalance all considerations belonging even to the next lower range of feelings; but so long as the higher motive does not intervene, it is surely both desirable and right that the lower motives should be balanced against each other. Starting with the lowest stage—it is a man's duty, as it is his natural inclination, to earn sufficient food and whatever else may best satisfy his proper and moderate desires. If the claims of a family or of friends fall upon him, it may become desirable that he should deny his own desires and even his physical needs their full customary gratification. But the claims of a family are only a step to a higher grade of duties.

The safety of a nation, the welfare of great populations, may happen to depend upon his exertions, if he be a soldier or a statesman: claims of a very strong kind may now be overbalanced by claims of a still stronger kind. Nor should I venture to say that, at any point, we have reached the highest rank—the supreme motives which should guide the mind. The statesman may discover a conflict between motives; a measure may promise, as it would seem, the greatest good to great numbers, and yet there may be motives of uprightness and honour that may hinder his promoting the measure. How such difficult questions may be rightly determined it is not my purpose to inquire here.

The utilitarian theory holds, that all forces influencing the mind of man are pleasures and pains; and Paley went so far as to say that all pleasures and pains are of one kind only. Mr. Bain has carried out this view to its complete extent, saying,1 "No amount of complication is ever able to disguise the general fact, that our voluntary activity is moved by only two great classes of stimulants; either a pleasure or a pain, present or remote, must lurk in every situation that drives us into action." The question certainly appears to turn upon the language used. Call any motive which attracts us to a certain course of conduct, pleasure; and call any motive which deters us from that conduct, pain; and it becomes impossible to deny that all actions are governed by pleasure and pain. But it then becomes indispensable to admit that a single higher pleasure will sometimes neutralise a vast extent and continuance of lower pains. It seems hardly possible to admit Paley's statement, except with an interpretation that would probably reverse his intended meaning. Motives and feelings are certainly of the same kind to the extent that we are able to weigh them against each other; but they are, nevertheless, almost incomparable in power and authority.

My present purpose is accomplished in pointing out this hierarchy of feeling, and assigning a proper place to the pleasures and pains with which the Economist deals. It is the lowest rank of feelings which we here treat. The calculus of utility aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour. Each labourer, in the absence of other motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the accumulation of wealth. A higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to show how he may best employ that wealth for the good of others as well as himself. But when that higher calculus gives no prohibition, we need the lower calculus to gain us the utmost good in matters of moral indifference. There is no rule of morals to forbid our making two blades of grass grow instead of one, if, by the wise expenditure of labour, we can do so. And we may certainly say, with Francis Bacon, "while philosophers are disputing whether virtue or pleasure be the proper aim of life, do you provide yourself with the instruments of either."

CHAPTER II

THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

[[1]]An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, by Jeremy Bentham. Edition of 1823, vol. i. p. 1.

[[2]]Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, book i., chap. vi.

[[1]]The Emotions and the Will, 1st ed., p. 460.