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• Preface to the First Edition (1871)
• Preface to the Second Edition (1879)
• Preface to the Third Edition By Harriet Jevons
• Errata
• Chapter I: Introduction
• Mathematical Character of the Science.
• Confusion Between Mathematical and Exact Sciences.
• Capability of Exact Measurement.
• Measurement of Feeling and Motives.
• Logical Method of Economics.
• Relation of Economics to Ethics.
• Chapter II: Theory of Pleasure and Pain
• Pleasure and Pain As Quantities.
• Pain the Negative of Pleasure.
• Anticipated Feeling.
• Uncertainty of Future Events.
• Chapter III: Theory of Utility
• Definition of Terms.
• The Laws of Human Want.
• Utility Is Not an Intrinsic Quality.
• Law of the Variation of Utility.
• Total Utility and Degree of Utility.
• Variation of the Final Degree of Utility.
• Disutility and Discommodity.
• Distribution of Commodity In Different Uses.
• Theory of Dimensions of Economic Quantities.
• Actual, Prospective, and Potential Utility.
• Distribution of a Commodity In Time.
• Chapter IV: Theory of Exchange
• Importance of Exchange In Economics.
• Ambiguity of the Term Value.
• Value Expresses Ratio of Exchange.
• Popular Use of the Term Value.
• Dimension of Value.
• Definition of Market.
• Definition of Trading Body.
• The Law of Indifference.
• The Theory of Exchange.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Analogy to the Theory of the Lever.
• Impediments to Exchange.
• Illustrations of the Theory of Exchange.
• Problems In the Theory of Exchange.
• Complex Cases of the Theory.
• Competition In Exchange.
• Failure of the Equations of Exchange.
• Negative and Zero Value.
• Equivalence of Commodities.
• Acquired Utility of Commodities.
• The Gain By Exchange.
• Numerical Determination of the Laws of Utility.
• Opinions As to the Variation of Price.
• Variation of the Price of Corn.
• The Origin of Value.
• Chapter V: Theory of Labour
• Definition of Labour.
• Quantitative Notions of Labour.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Dimensions of Labour.
• Balance Between Need and Labour.
• Distribution of Labour.
• Relation of the Theories of Labour and Exchange.
• Relations of Economic Quantities.
• Various Cases of the Theory.
• Joint Production.
• Over-production.
• Limits to the Intensity of Labour.
• Chapter VI: Theory of Rent
• Accepted Opinions Concerning Rent.
• Symbolic Statement of the Theory.
• Illustrations of the Theory.
• Chapter VII: Theory of Capital
• The Function of Capital.
• Capital Is Concerned With Time.
• Quantitative Notions Concerning Capital.
• Expression For Amount of Investment.
• Dimensions of Capital, Credit and Debit.
• Effect of the Duration of Work.
• Illustrations of the Investment of Capital.
• Fixed and Circulating Capital.
• Free and Invested Capital.
• Uniformity of the Rate of Interest.
• General Expression For the Rate of Interest.
• Dimension of Interest.
• Peacock On the Dimensions of Interest.
• Tendency of Profits to a Minimum.
• Advantage of Capital to Industry.
• Are Articles In the Consumers' Hands Capital?
• Chapter VIII: Concluding Remarks
• The Doctrine of Population.
• Relation of Wages and Profit.
• Professor Hearn's Views.
• The Noxious Influence of Authority.
• Appendix I
• Appendix Ii

Measurement of Feeling and Motives.

Many readers may, even after reading the preceding remarks, consider it quite impossible to create such a calculus as is here contemplated, because we have no means of defining and measuring quantities of feeling, like we can measure a mile, or a right angle, or any other physical quantity. I have granted that we can hardly form the conception of a unit of pleasure or pain, so that the numerical expression of quantities of feeling seems to be out of the question. But we only employ units of measurement in other things to facilitate the comparison of quantities; and if we can compare the quantities directly, we do not need the units. Now the mind of an individual is the balance which makes its own comparisons, and is the final judge of quantities of feeling. As Mr. Bain says,1 "It is only an identical proposition to affirm that the greatest of two pleasures, or what appears such, sways the resulting action; for it is this resulting action that alone determines which is the greater."

Pleasures, in short, are, for the time being, as the mind estimates them; so that we cannot make a choice, or manifest the will in any way, without indicating thereby an excess of pleasure in some direction. It is true that the mind often hesitates and is perplexed in making a choice of great importance: this indicates either varying estimates of the motives, or a feeling of incapacity to grasp the quantities concerned. I should not think of claiming for the mind any accurate power of measuring and adding and subtracting feelings, so as to get an exact balance. We can seldom or never affirm that one pleasure is an exact multiple of another; but the reader who carefully criticises the following theory will find that it seldom involves the comparison of quantities of feeling differing much in amount. The theory turns upon those critical points where pleasures are nearly, if not quite, equal. I never attempt to estimate the whole pleasure gained by purchasing a commodity; the theory merely expresses that, when a man has purchased enough, he would derive equal pleasure from the possession of a small quantity more as he would from the money price of it. Similarly, the whole amount of pleasure that a man gains by a day's labour hardly enters into the question; it is when a man is doubtful whether to increase his hours of labour or not, that we discover an equality between the pain of that extension and the pleasure of the increase of possessions derived from it.

The reader will find, again, that there is never, in any single instance, an attempt made to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be accomplished. The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that of another. But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all directions, we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible. But even if we could compare the feelings of different minds, we should not need to do so; for one mind only affects another indirectly. Every event in the outward world is represented in the mind by a corresponding motive, and it is by the balance of these that the will is swayed. But the motive in one mind is weighed only against other motives in the same mind, never against the motives in other minds. Each person is to other persons a portion of the outward world—the non-ego as the meta-physicians call it. Thus motives in the mind of A may give rise to phenomena which may be represented by motives in the mind of B; but between A and B there is a gulf. Hence the weighing of motives must always be confined to the bosom of the individual.

I must here point out that, though the theory presumes to investigate the condition of a mind, and bases upon this investigation the whole of Economics, practically it is an aggregate of individuals which will be treated. The general forms of the laws of Economics are the same in the case of individuals and nations; and, in reality, it is a law operating in the case of multitudes of individuals which gives rise to the aggregate represented in the transactions of a nation. Practically, however, it is quite impossible to detect the operation of general laws of this kind in the actions of one or a few individuals. The motives and conditions are so numerous and complicated, that the resulting actions have the appearance of caprice, and are beyond the analytic powers of science. With every increase in the price of such a commodity as sugar, we ought, theoretically speaking, to find every person reducing his consumption by a small amount, and according to some regular law. In reality, many persons would make no change at all; a few, probably, would go to the extent of dispensing with the use of sugar altogether so long as its cost continued to be excessive. It would be by examining the average consumption of sugar in a large population that we might detect a continuous variation, connected with the variation of price by a constant law. It would not, of necessity, happen that the law would be exactly the same in the case of aggregates and individuals, unless all those individuals were of the same character and position as regards wealth and habits; but there would be a more or less regular law to which the same kind of formulæ would apply. The use of an average, or, what is the same, an aggregate result, depends upon the high probability that accidental and disturbing causes will operate, in the long run, as often in one direction as the other, so as to neutralise each other. Provided that we have a sufficient number of independent cases, we may then detect the effect of any tendency, however slight. Accordingly, questions which appear, and perhaps are, quite indeterminate as regards individuals, may be capable of exact investigation and solution in regard to great masses and wide averages.1

[[1]]The Emotions and the Will, 1st ed., p. 447.

[[1]]Concerning the meaning and employment of Averages, see Principles of Science, chap. xvi., on "The Method of Means."