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CHAP. XLV.: Deprived of the power of putting to death. - Aristotle, Constitution of Athens [320 BC]

Edition used:

Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens, trans. Thomas J. Dymes (London: Seeley and Co., 1891).

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CHAP. XLV.

Deprived of the power of putting to death.

Now the Council formerly had power to punish by fines, to imprison, and to put to death. But on one occasion, as it was conducting Lysimachus to the executioner, who was awaiting him, Eukleides of Alopeke took him out of their hands, declaring that it was not right for any citizen to be put to death without the verdict of a court of law. On a trial being held in court, Lysimachus was acquitted, and got the surname of ‘the man who escaped the cudgel.’ Then the people deprived the Council of its power of putting to death and imprisoning and punishing by fines, and carried a law that in cases where the Council passed sentences or punished, the Thesmothetæ should bring the sentences and punishments before the court of justice, and that the vote of the jurors should be final. Now, the Council can try most of the officers of state, particularly such as have the management of money; but their decision is not final, and there is an appeal to the court of justice. Private individuals also have the right of indicting any officers of state they like for violating the laws, while such as are so indicted have also an appeal to the court of justice, if the Council finds them guilty. It examines also the members who are to compose the Council for the following year, and the nine archons. Formerly it had the power of rejection, but now in such cases there is an appeal to the court of justice. In the above matters then the Council does not possess final authority. Further, it submits preliminary ordinances to the people, and it is not lawful for the people to pass any measure which has not been thus submitted, or of which the presidents have not previously given public notice. For it is on these very grounds that the successful mover of a bill makes himself liable to an indictment for proposing unconstitutional measures.