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Front Page Titles (by Subject) SECTION II.: Division of the subject. - A Treatise of Human Nature
SECTION II.: Division of the subject. - David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739]Edition used:A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, reprinted from the Original Edition in three volumes and edited, with an analytical index, by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896).
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- Editor’s Preface.
- Book I: Of the Understanding
- Introduction.
- Part I.: Of Ideas, Their Origin, Composition, Connexion, Abstraction, &c.
- Section I.: Of the Origin of Our Ideas.
- Section II.: Division of the Subject.
- Section III.: Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination.
- Section IV.: Of the Connexion Or Association of Ideas.
- Section V.: Of Relations.
- Section VI.: Of Modes and Substances.
- Section VII.: Of Abstract Ideas.
- Part II.: Of the Ideas of Space and Time.
- Section I.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
- Section II.: Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time.
- Section III.: Of the Other Qualities of Our Ideas of Space and Time.
- Section IV.: Objections Answer’d.
- Section V.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
- Section VI.: Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence.
- Part III.: Of Knowledge and Probability.
- Section I.: Of Knowledge.
- Section II.: Of Probability; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect.
- Section III.: Why a Cause Is Always Necessary.
- Section IV.: Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect.
- Section. V.: Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory.
- Section VI.: Of the Inference From the Impression to the Idea.
- Section VII.: Of the Nature of the Idea Or Belief.
- Section VIII.: Of the Causes of Belief.
- Section IX.: Of the Effects of Other Relations and Other Habits.
- Section X.: Of the Influence of Belief.
- Section XI.: Of the Probability of Chances.
- Section XII.: Of the Probability of Causes.
- Section XIII.: Of Unphilosophical Probability.
- Section XIV.: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.
- Section XV.: Rules By Which to Judge of Causes and Effects.
- Section XVI.: Of the Reason of Animals.
- Part IV.: Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy.
- Section I.: Of Scepticism With Regard to Reason.
- Section II.: Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses.
- Section III.: Of the Antient Philosophy.
- Section IV.: Of the Modern Philosophy.
- Section V.: Of the Immateriality of the Soul.
- Section VI.: Of Personal Identity.
- Section VII.: Conclusion of This Book.
- Book II: Of the Passions
- Part I.: Of Pride and Humility.
- Section I.: Division of the Subject.
- Section II.: Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes.
- Section III.: Whence These Objects and Causes Are Deriv’d.
- Section IV.: Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas.
- Section V.: Of the Influence of These Relations On Pride and Humility.
- Section VI.: Limitations of This System.
- Section VII.: Of Vice and Virtue.
- Section VIII.: Of Beauty and Deformity.
- Section IX.: Of External Advantages and Disadvantages.
- Section X.: Of Property and Riches.
- Section XI.: Of the Love of Fame.
- Section XII.: Of the Pride and Humility of Animals.
- Part II.: Of Love and Hatred.
- Section I.: Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred.
- Section II.: Experiments to Confirm This System.
- Section III.: Difficulties Solv’d.
- Section IV.: Of the Love of Relations.
- Section V.: Of Our Esteem For the Rich and Powerful.
- Section VI.: Of Benevolence and Anger.
- Section VII.: Of Compassion.
- Section VIII.: Of Malice and Envy.
- Section IX.: Of the Mixture of Benevolence and Anger With Compassion and Malice.
- Section X.: Of Respect and Contempt.
- Section XI.: Of the Amorous Passion, Or Love Betwixt the Sexes.
- Section XII.: Of the Love and Hatred of Animals.
- Part III.: Of the Will and Direct Passions.
- Section I.: Of Liberty and Necessity.
- Section II.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
- Section III.: Of the Influencing Motives of the Will.
- Section IV.: Of the Causes of the Violent Passions.
- Section V.: Of the Effects of Custom.
- Section VI.: Of the Influence of the Imagination On the Passions.
- Section VII.: Of Contiguity, and Distance In Space and Time.
- Section VIII.: The Same Subject Continu’d.
- Section IX.: Of the Direct Passions.
- Section X.: Of Curiosity, Or the Love of Truth.
- Book III: Of Morals
- Part I.: Of Virtue and Vice In General.
- Section I.: Moral Distinctions Not Deriv’d From Reason.
- Section II.: Moral Distinctions Deriv’d From a Moral Sense.
- Part II.: Of Justice and Injustice.
- Section I.: Justice, Whether a Natural Or Artificial Virtue?
- Section II.: Of the Origin of Justice and Property.
- Section III.: Of the Rules, Which Determine Property.
- Section IV.: Of the Transference of Property By Consent.
- Section V.: Of the Obligation of Promises.
- Section VI.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning Justice and Injustice.
- Section VII.: Of the Origin of Government.
- Section VIII.: Of the Source of Allegiance.
- Section IX.: Of the Measures of Allegiance.
- Section X.: Of the Objects of Allegiance.
- Section XI.: Of the Laws of Nations.
- Section XII.: Of Chastity and Modesty.
- Part III.: Of the Other Virtues and Vices.
- Section I.: Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices.
- Section II.: Of Greatness of Mind.
- Section III.: Of Goodness and Benevolence.
- Section IV.: Of Natural Abilities.
- Section V.: Some Farther Reflexions Concerning the Natural Virtues.
- Section VI.: Conclusion of This Book.
- Appendix.
SECTION II.
Division of the subject.
Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflexion. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv’d from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter’d upon. And as the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, ’twill be necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.
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