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Subject Area: Political Theory
Collection: The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill

68.: Martial Law 2 JULY, 1867 - John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I November 1850 - November 1868 [1850]

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The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I November 1850 - November 1868, ed. John M. Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).

Part of: Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, in 33 vols.

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68.

Martial Law

2 JULY, 1867

PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 188, cols. 912–14. Reported in The Times, 3 July, p. 7, from which the variants and response are taken. The debate was on a motion (col. 903), based on a charge by the Lord Chief Justice to the Grand Jury at the Central Criminal Court on 10 April, 1867, that would make it clear that martial law could not be invoked in the United Kingdom.

there appears to be, as far as the discussion has gone on both sides of the House, a real disposition to consider this question with reference to the future rather than the past. Certainly it is most desirable that when we are considering what is essentially a question of legislation, we should not allow ourselves to be diverted to the consideration of past transactions any further than they throw light upon questions which may exist or arise in the future. At the same time it appears to me that certain considerations of great importance have not yet been touched upon, and which I think it is particularly necessary should not remain unstated when we see an obvious desire to explain away and get rid of the effect of the Charge of the Lord Chief Justice of England.1 I do not mean to say that what has been stated by the right honourable Gentleman the Home Secretary in diminution of the validity, in a legal point of view, of this Charge is unfounded.2 We know, on the contrary, that it is well founded. We know that the Charge to the Grand Jury is not law, because it has not undergone the preliminary processes necessary to make it law. At the same time there can be no doubt that such a declaration as this Charge contains, supported by such a catena of authorities afrom the very earliest period of our historya , and coming from a Judge of such high character and reputation, so elaborately produced and bearing the marks it does of most diligent and careful study, is, at all events, an exceedingly strong corroboration of that view of this subject which some of us have taken from the beginning, and which I will briefly state. Our opinion has beenb—and it has been confirmed by this charge—b that the law is what I shall now venture to state, and that if it has not been so, it ought to be made so. Our opinion was, that there is not, properly speaking, as regards non-military persons, such a thing as martial law, and that it has no existence except for military cpurposesc . Of course, Parliament can give it existence, because Parliament can make any law, however inexpedient or unjust. But the Crown, being only one branch of Legislature, cannot dmake that to be law which is not lawd . We have thought that, although there was no such thing as martial law, except for military purposes, there was a law of necessity. There may be a public necessity in case of rebellion, requiring that certain acts not justified by the ordinary law of the country should be done; but these acts should be acts of suppression and not of punishment. Now, a point which has not been noticed, and to which I attach the highest importance, is this—that in a case of public necessity, as in any analogous case of private necessity, those who act upon it, and do under the supposed necessity that which they would not ordinarily be justified in doing, should be amenable to the laws of their country for so doing. As in the case of killing any person in self-defence, so in the case of putting any person to death in defence of the country, the person who does it ought to have the onus thrown upon him of satisfying the ordinary tribunals of the country that this necessity existed. What, therefore, we say does not exist, and ought not to exist, and which if it does exist we should do our utmost to put an end to, is, the idea that any proceeding, such as a declaration of martial law, can or ought to exempt those who act upon it from amenability to the laws of their country. We contend that the law of necessity, of which nobody denies the existence, would justify the Executive in doing these things if no such thing as martial law had ever been heard of, and that by using the term martial law you ought not to be able to get rid of all responsibility. We demand that the officers of the Government of this country should not be able to escape or get out of the region and jurisdiction of the law; but, that whatever they do, if it be against the law, they should be compelled to justify. They must show the necessity which existed, not to the satisfaction of a court martial merely, but of the regular tribunals of the country. When it is said by the right honourable Gentleman the Home Secretary that it is much better that the officers who intend to assume this power, and act on this supposed necessity, should declare beforehand their intention of doing so,3 by all means let them do so; but do not let them, or any one else, think that by using the term martial law, or by announcing that they mean to make a military tribunal one of the instruments by which they will exercise their power of superseding the law, they will clear themselves from all responsibility. (Hear, hear.)

[The motion was withdrawn (col. 918).]

[1 ]Alexander James Edmund Cockburn (1802–80), Charge of the Lord Chief Justice of England to the Grand Jury at the Central Criminal Court, in the Case of the Queen against Nelson and Brand, ed. Frederick Cockburn (London: Ridgway, 1867).

[2 ]Gathorne-Hardy, col. 910.

[a-a]+TT

[b-b]+TT

[c-c]TT persons

[d-d]TT] PD do this

[3 ]Ibid., col. 909.