The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Textual Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Essays On Equality, Law and Education
• Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press 1825
• On Marriage 1832–33?
• Austin’s Lectures On Jurisprudence 1832
• Reform In Education 1834
• On Punishment 1834
• Smith On Law Reform 1841
• The Negro Question 1850
• Statement On Marriage 1851
• Remarks On Mr. Fitzroy’s Bill For the More Effectual Prevention of Assaults On Women and Children 1853
• A Few Words On Non-intervention 1859
• The Contest In America 1862
• The Slave Power 1862
• Austin On Jurisprudence 1863
• Educational Endowments 1866
• Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews 1867
• The Subjection of Women 1869
• Editor’s Note
• Chapter I
• Chapter Ii
• Chapter Iii
• Chapter Iv
• Treaty Obligations 1870
• The Contagious Diseases Acts 1871
• Appendices
• Appendix A: Harriet Taylor, On Marriage (1832-1833?)
• Appendix B: Harriet Taylor Mill, Papers On Women’s Rights (1847-1850?)
• 1.: Rights of Women—and Especially With Regard to the Elective Franchise—by a Woman—dedicated to Queen Victoria
• 2.: Women—(rights Of)
• 3.: The Rights of Women to the Elective Franchise and Its Advantages
• 4.: Why Women Are Entitled to the Suffrage
• 5.: [reform: Ends and Means]
• Appendix C: Harriet Taylor Mill, Enfranchisement of Women (1851)
• Appendix D: Draft of a Portion of the Inaugural Address (1866)
• Appendix E: Jamaica Committee: Public Documents (1866, 1868)
• Appendix F: Textual Emendations
• Appendix G: Bibliographical Index of Persons and Works Cited, With Variants and Notes

APPENDICES

Folio 1r of “On Marriage” by Harriet Taylor.

Appendix A

ON MARRIAGE (1832–33?)

by Harriet Taylor

if i could be providence to the world for a time, for the express purpose of raising the condition of women, I should come to you to know the means—the purpose would be to remove all interference with affection, or with any thing which is, or which even might be supposed to be, demonstrative of affection—In the present state of womens minds, perfectly uneducated, and with whatever of timidity and dependance is natural to them increased a thousand fold by their habits of utter dependance, it would probably be mischievous to remove at once all restraints, they would buy themselves protectors at a dearer cost than even at present—but without raising their natures at all, it seems to me, that once give women the desire to raise their social condition, and they have a power which in the present state of civilization and of mens characters, might be made of tremendous effect. Whether nature made a difference in the nature of men and women or not, it seems now that all men, with the exception of a few lofty minded, are sensualists more or less—Women on the contrary are quite exempt from this trait, however it may appear otherwise in the cases of some—It seems strange that it should be so, unless it was meant to be a source of power in demi-civilized states such as the present—or it may not be so—it may be only that the habits of freedom and low indulgence in which boys grow up and the contrary notion of what is called purity in girls may have produced the appearance of different natures in the two sexes—As certain it is that there is equality in nothing, now—all the pleasures such as there are being mens, and all the disagreables and pains being womens, as that every pleasure would be infinitely heightened both in kind and degree by the perfect equality of the sexes. Women are educated for one single object, to gain their living by marrying—(some poor souls get it without the churchgoing in the same way—they do not seem to me a bit worse than their honoured sisters)—To be married is the object of their existence and that object being gained they do really cease to exist as to anything worth calling life or any useful purpose. One observes very few marriages where there is any real sympathy or enjoyment of companionship between the parties—The woman knows what her power is, and gains by it what she has been taught to consider “proper” to her state—The woman who would gain power by such means is unfit for power, still they do use this power for paltry advantages and I am astonished it has never occurred to them to gain some large purpose: but their minds are degenerated by habits of dependance—I should think that 500 years hence none of the follies of their ancestors will so excite wonder and contempt as the fact of legislative restraint as to matters of feeling—or rather in the expressions of feeling. When once the law undertakes to say which demonstration of feeling shall be given to which, it seems quite inconsistent not to legislate for all, and say how many shall be seen, how many heard, and what kind and degree of feeling allows of shaking hands—The Turks is the only consistent mode—

I have no doubt that when the whole community is really educated, tho’ the present laws of marriage were to continue they would be perfectly disregarded, because no one would marry—The widest and perhaps the quickest means to do away with its evils is to be found in promoting education—as it is the means of all good—but meanwhile it is hard that those who suffer most from its evils and who are always the best people, should be left without remedy. Would not the best plan be divorce which could be attained by any, without any reason assigned, and at small expence, but which could only be finally pronounced after a long period? not less time than two years should elapse between suing for divorce and permission to contract again—but what the decision will be must be certain at the moment of asking for it—unless during that time the suit should be withdrawn—

(I feel like a lawyer in talking of it only! O how absurd and little it all is!)—In the present system of habits and opinions, girls enter into what is called a contract perfectly ignorant of the conditions of it, and that they should be so is considered absolutely essential to their fitness for it!—But after all the one argument of the matter which I think might be said so as to strike both high and low natures is—Who would wish to have the person without the inclination? Whoever would take the benefit of a law of divorce must be those whose inclination is to separate and who on earth would wish another to remain with them against their inclination? I should think no one—people sophisticate about the matter now and will not believe that one “really would wish to go.” Suppose instead of calling it a “law of divorce” it were to be called “Proof of affection”—They would like it better then—

At this present time, in this state of civilization, what evil would be caused by, first placing women on the most entire equality with men, as to all rights and privileges, civil and political, and then doing away with all laws whatever relating to marriage? Then if a woman had children she must take the charge of them, women would not then have children without considering how to maintain them. Women would have no more reason to barter person for bread, or for any thing else, than men have—public offices being open to them alike, all occupations would be divided between the sexes in their natural arrangement. Fathers would provide for their daughters in the same manner as for their sons—

All the difficulties about divorce seem to be in the consideration for the children—but on this plan it would be the women’s interest not to have children—now it is thought to be the womans interest to have children as so many ties to the man who feeds her.

Sex in its true and finest meaning, seems to be the way in which is manifested all that is highest best and beautiful in the nature of human beings—none but poets have approached to the perception of the beauty of the material world—still less of the spiritual—and there never yet existed a poet, except by the inspiration of that feeling which is the perception of beauty in all forms and by all the means which are given us, as well as by sight. Are we not born with the five senses, merely as a foundation for others which we may make by them—and who extends and refines those material senses to the highest—into infinity—best fulfils the end of creation—That is only saying—Who enjoys most, is most virtuous—It is for you—the most worthy to be the apostle of all loftiest virtue—to teach, such as may be taught, that the higher the kind of enjoyment, the greater the degree—perhaps there is but one class to whom this can be taught—the poetic nature struggling with superstition: you are fitted to be the saviour of such—

Appendix B

PAPERS ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1847–50?)

by Harriet Taylor and J.S. Mill

1.

Rights of Women—and Especially with Regard to the Elective Franchise—By a Woman—Dedicated to Queen Victoria

a great number of progressive changes are constantly going forward in human affairs and ideas, which escape the notice of unreflecting people, because of their slowness. As each successive, step requires a whole generation or several generations to effect it, and is then only one step, things in reality very changeable remain a sufficient length of time without perceptible progress, to be, by the majority of cotemporaries, mistaken for things permanent and immovable—and it is only by looking at a long series of generations that they are seen to be, in reality, always moving, and always in the same direction.

This is remarkably the case with respect to Privileges and Exclusions. In every generation, the bulk of mankind imagine that all privileges and all exclusions, then existing by law or usage, are natural, fit and proper, even necessary: ^aexcept^a such as happen to be, just at that time, in the very crisis of the struggle which puts an end to them—which rarely happens to more than one set or class of them at a time. But when we take all history into view we find that its whole course is a getting rid of privileges and exclusions. Anciently all was privilege and exclusion. There was not a person or class of persons who had not a line marked round them which they were in no case permitted to overstep. There was not a function or operation in society, sufficiently desirable to be thought worth guarding, which was not rigidly confined to a circumscribed class or body of persons. Some functions were confined to particular families—some to particular guilds, corporations, or societies. Whoever has any knowledge of ancient times knows that privilege and exclusion was not only the general rule in point of fact, but ^bthat nothing else was in^b accordance with the ideas of mankind. Whenever any action or occupation, private or public, was thought of, it seemed natural to everybody that there should be some persons who were allowed to do the action or follow the occupation, and others who were not. People never thought of inquiring why it should be so, or what there was in the nature of the particular case to require it. People seldom ask reasons for what is in accordance with the whole spirit of what they see round them, but only for what jars with that spirit. Even bodily freedom, the right to use one’s own labour for one’s own benefit, was once a privilege, and the great majority of mankind were excluded from it. This seems to the people of our day something monstrously unnatural, to people of former days it seemed the most natural of all things. It was very gradually that this was got rid of, through many intermediate stages, of serfage, villenage &c. Where this did not exist, the system of castes did: and that appears profoundly unnatural to us, but so profoundly natural to Hindoos that they have not yet given it up. Among the early Romans fathers had the power of putting their sons to death, or selling them into slavery: this seemed perfectly natural to them, most unnatural to us. To hold land, in property, was throughout feudal Europe the privilege of a noble. This was only gradually relaxed and in Germany there is still much land which can only be so held. Up to the Reformation to teach religion was the exclusive privilege of a male separate class, even to read the Bible was a privilege: Those who lived at the time of the Reformation and who adopted it, ceased to recognize this case of privilege and exclusion, but did not therefore call in question any others. Throughout the Continent political office and military rank were exclusive privileges of a hereditary noblesse, till the French revolution destroyed these privileges. Trades and occupations have almost everywhere ceased to be privileges. Thus exclusion after exclusion has disappeared, until privilege has ceased to be the general rule, and tends more and more to become the exception: it now no longer seems a matter of course that there should be an exclusion, but it is conceded that freedom and admissibility ought to prevail, wherever there is not some special reason for limiting them. Whoever considers how immense a change this is from primitive opinions and feelings, will think it nothing less than the very most important advance which has hitherto been made in human society. It is nothing less than the beginning of the reign of justice, or the first dawn of it at least. It is the introduction of the principle that distinctions, and inequalities of rights, are not good things in themselves, and that none ought to exist for which there is not a special justification, grounded on the greatest good of the whole community, privileged and excluded taken together.

Considering how slowly this change has taken place and how very recent is its date, it would be surprising if many exclusions did not still exist, by no means fitted to stand the test which until lately no one ever thought of applying to them. The fact that any particular exclusion exists, and has existed hitherto, is in such a case no presumption whatever that it ought to exist. We may rather surmise that it is probably a remaining relic of that past state of things, in which privilege and exclusion were the general rule. That the opinions of mankind have not yet put an end to it is not even a presumption that they ought not, or that they will not hereafter do so.

We propose to examine how far this may be the case with one of the principal remaining cases of privilege, the privilege of sex: and to consider whether the civil and political disabilities of women have any better foundation in justice or the interest of society than any of the other exclusions which have successively disappeared.^[*]

In the first place it must be observed that the disabilities of women are exactly of the class which modern times most pride themselves on getting rid of—disabilities by birth. It is the boast of England that if some persons are privileged by birth, at least none are disqualified by it—that anybody may rise to be a peer, or a member of parliament, or a minister—that the path to distinction is not closed to the humblest. But it is closed irrevocably to women. A woman is born disqualified, and cannot by any exertion get rid of her disabilities. This makes her case an entirely peculiar one in modern Europe. It is like that of the negro in America, and worse than that of the roturier formerly in Europe, for he might receive or perhaps buy a patent of nobility. Women’s disqualifications are the only indelible ones.

It is also a peculiarity in the case, that the persons disqualified are of the same race, the same blood, the same parents, as the privileged, and have even been brought up and educated along with them. There are none of the excuses grounded on their belonging to a different class in society. The excluded, have the same advantages of breeding and social culture, as the admitted, and have or might have the same educational advantages of all sorts.

It is necessary to protest first of all against a mode of thought on the subject of political exclusions which though less common than it once was is still very common, viz. that a prohibition, an exclusion, a disability, is not an evil or a grievance in itself. This is the opinion of many grave, dignified people, who think that by uttering it they are shewing themselves to be sound, sage, and rational, superior to nonsense and sentimentality. Where is the grievance, they say, of not being allowed to be an elector? What good would it do you to be an elector? Why should you wish to be one? They always require you to point out some distinct loss or suffering, some positive inconvenience which befals you from anything you complain of. This class of persons are enemies of all sorts of liberty. They say to those who complain. Have you not liberty enough? What do you want to do more than you do at present? And what is strange is, that they think this is shewing peculiar good sense and sobriety. It is a doctrine however which they are not fond of applying to their own liberties. Suppose that a law were made forbidding them ever to go beyond the British isles, and that when they complained they were answered thus: Is not Great Britain large enough for you? Are not England, Scotland and Ireland fine countries? Is there not variety enough in them for any reasonable taste? Why do you want to go to foreign countries? Your proper place is at home. Your duties are there. You have no duties to perform abroad, you are not a sailor, or a merchant, or an ambassador. Stay at home.—Would they not say—“My good friend, it is possible that I may never wish to go abroad at all; or that if I do wish, it may not be convenient: but that does not give you any right to say I shall not go abroad. It is an injustice and a hardship to be told that even if I do wish to go I shall not be permitted. I shall probably live all my life in this house, but that is a very different thing from being imprisoned in it.”—What these people (who deem their notions wise because they are limited) think there is no harm in cutting off from the life of anybody, except themselves, is precisely what makes the chief value of life. They think you lose nothing as long as you are not prevented from having what you have and doing what you do: now the value of life does not consist in what you have or do, but in what you may have and may do. Freedom, power, and hope, are the charms of existence. If you are outwardly comfortable they think it nothing to cut off hope, to close the region of possibilities, to say that you shall have no carrière, no excitement, that neither chance nor your own exertions shall ever make you anything more or other than you now are. This is essentially the doctrine of people legislating for others. Nobody legislates in this way for himself. When it comes home to them personally all feel that it is precisely the inconnu, the indefinite, to be cut off from which would be unbearable. They know that it is not the thing they please to do, but the power of doing as they please, that makes to them the difference between contentment and dissatisfaction. Everybody, for himself, values his position just in proportion to the freedom of it: yet the same people think that freedom is the very thing which you may subtract from in the case of others, without doing them any wrong. The grievance they think is merely ideal: but they find in their own case that these ideal grievances are among the most real of any.^[*]

“The proper sphere of women is domestic life.” Putting aside the word “proper” which begs the question, what does this assertion mean? That no woman is qualified for any other social functions than those of domestic life? This will hardly be asserted, in opposition to the fact not only of the numerous women who have distinguished themselves as writers, but of the great number of eminent sovereigns who have been women—not only in Europe but in the East where they are shut up in zenanas. The assertion therefore can only be supposed to mean that a large proportion of mankind must devote themselves mainly to domestic management, the bringing up of children &c. and that this kind of employment is one particularly suitable for women. Now, taking this for what it is worth, is it in other cases thought necessary to dedicate a multitude of people from their birth to one exclusive employment lest there should not be people enough, or people qualified enough, to fill it? It is necessary that there should be coalheavers, paviours, ploughmen, sailors, shoemakers, clerks and so forth, but is it therefore necessary that people should be born all these things, and not permitted to quit those particular occupations? Still more, is it necessary that because people are clerks or shoemakers they should have no thoughts or opinions beyond clerking or shoemaking? for that is the implication involved in denying them votes.

The occupations of men, however engrossing they may be considered, are not supposed to make them either less interested in the good management of public affairs, or less entitled to exercise their share of influence in those affairs by their votes. It is not supposed that nobody ought to have a vote except idle people. A shoemaker, a carpenter, a farmer have votes. Those who say that a scavenger or a coalheaver should not have a vote, do not say so on account of his occupation but on account of his poverty or want of education. Let this ground of exclusion be admitted for one sex just as far as for the other. Whatever class of men are allowed the franchise, let the same class of women have it.

If a woman’s habitual employment, whether chosen for or by her, is the management of a family, she will be no more withdrawn from that occupation by voting in an election than her neighbour will be withdrawn by it from his shop or his office.^[†]

The feeling, however, which expresses itself in such phrases as “The proper sphere of women is private life,” “Women have nothing to do with politics” and the like, is, I believe, not so much any feeling regarding women as women, as a feeling against any new and unexpected claimants of political rights. In England especially there is always a grudging feeling towards all persons who unexpectedly profess an opinion in politics, or indeed in any matter not concerning their own speciality. There is always a disposition to say, What business is that of yours? When people hear that their tradespeople, or their workpeople, concern themselves about politics, there is almost always a feeling of dislike accompanying the remark. It seems as if people were vexed at finding more persons than they expected in a condition to give them trouble on that subject. Men have the same feeling about their sons unless the sons are mere echoes of their own opinions: and if their wives and daughters claimed the same privilege, their feeling would be that of having an additional disagreeable from a quarter they did not expect.

The truth is, everybody feels that whether in classes or individuals, having an opinion of their own makes them more troublesome and difficult to manage: and everybody is aware, in all cases but his own, that the intrinsic value of the opinion is very seldom much of an equivalent. But this is no more than the ministers of despotic monarchs feel with regard to popular opinion altogether. It is an exact picture of the state of mind of Metternich. It is much more consistent in him. He says, or would say, Leave politics to those whose business it is. But these other people say, No; some whose business it is not peculiarly may and ought to have opinions on it, but others, workpeople for instance, and women, ought not. Constitutionalists and Liberals are right against Metternich only on grounds which prove them to be wrong against those whom they would exclude. Metternich is wrong because if none but those who make politics their business, had opinions and could give votes, all the rest would be delivered blindfold into the hands of those professional politicians. This argument is good against excluding anybody, especially any class or kind of persons. It is a very great evil that any portion of the community should be left politically defenceless. To justify it in any case it must be shewn that still greater evils would arise from arming the class with opinions and votes. It may possibly admit of being maintained that this would be the result of giving votes to very ignorant or even in some cases to very poor people. But it is impossible to shew that any evils would arise from admitting women of the same social rank as the men who have votes.

Objection, “You would have perpetual domestic discussion.” If people cannot differ in opinion on any important matter and remain capable of living together without quarrelling, there cannot be a more complete condemnation of marriage: for if so, two people cannot live together at all unless one of them is a mere cipher, abdicating all will and opinion into the hands of the other, and marriage can only be fit for tyrants and nobodies.

But the proposition is false. Do not married people live together in perfect harmony although they differ in opinions and even feelings on things which come much nearer home than politics do to most people? Does it not often happen for instance that they hold different opinions in religion? And have they not continually different opinions or wishes on innumerable private matters without quarrelling? People with whose comfort it is incompatible that the person they live with should think differently from them in politics or religion will if they marry at all generally marry a person who has either no opinions or the same sort of opinions with themselves. Besides, by discouraging political opinions in women, you only prevent independent disinterested opinions. In a woman, to have no political opinions, practically means to have the political opinions which conduce to the pecuniary interest or social vanity of the family. If honest opinions on both sides would make dissension between married people, will there not be dissension between a man who has an opinion and a conscience in politics and a woman who sees what she thinks the interests of the family sacrificed to what seems to her a matter of indifference? except indeed that the man’s public spirit is seldom strong enough to hold out long against the woman’s opposition, especially if he really cares for her. Now when women and men really live together, and are each other’s most intimate associates, (which in the ancient republics they were not) men never can or will be patriotic or public spirited unless women are so too. People cannot long maintain a higher tone of feeling than that of their favourite society. The wife is the incarnate spirit of family selfishness unless she has accustomed herself to cultivate feelings of a larger and more generous kind: while, when she has, her (in general) greater susceptibility of emotion and more delicate conscience makes her the great inspirer of those nobler feelings in the men with whom she habitually associates.

A part of the feeling which makes many men dislike the idea of political women, is, I think, the idea that politics altogether are a necessary evil, a source of quarrelsome and unamiable feelings, and that their sphere of action should be restricted as much as possible, and especially that home, and social intercourse, should be kept free from them, and be retained as much as possible under influences counteractive of those of politics. One would imagine from this manner of looking at the subject, that the danger in modern times was that of too much political earnestness: that people generally felt so strongly about politics as to require a strong curb to prevent them from quarrelling about it when they meet. The fact however we know to be that people in general are quite lukewarm about politics, except where their personal interests or the social position of their class are at stake, and when that is the case women have already as strong political feelings as men have. And this wish to keep the greater interests of mankind from being thought of and dwelt on when people are brought together in private, does not really prevent ill feeling and ill blood in society, but only causes it to exist about things not worth it. Where is the benefit of hindering people from disliking each other on matters involving the liberty or the progress of mankind, only to make them hate each other from petty personal jealousies and piques? Active minds and susceptible feelings will and must interest themselves about something, and if you deny them all subjects of interest except personal ones, you reduce the personal interests to a petty scale, and make personal or social vanities the primum mobile of life: now personal rivalities are a much more fruitful source of hatred and malice than differences of political opinion.

How vain the idea that the way to make mankind amiable is to make them care for nothing except themselves and the individuals immediately surrounding them. Does not all experience shew that when people care only for themselves and their families, then unless they are held down by despotism, every one’s hand is against every one, and that only so far as they care about the public or about some abstract principle is there a basis for real social feeling of any sort? One reason why there is scarcely any social feeling in England, but every man, entrenched within his family, feels a kind of dislike and repugnance to every other, is because there is hardly any concern in England for great ideas and the larger interests of humanity. The moment you kindle any such concern, if it be only about negroes or prisoners in gaols, you not only elevate but soften individual character; because each begins to move in an element of sympathy, having a common ground, even if a narrow one, to sympathize on. And yet you would prevent the sympathetic influence of women from exercising itself on the great interests. Observe, by the way, that almost all the popular movements towards any object of social improvement which have been successful in this country, have been those in which women have taken an active part, and have fraternized thoroughly with the men who were engaged about them: Slavery abolition, establishment of schools, improvement of prisons. In the last we know that a woman^[*] was one of the principal leaders, and in all three the victory was chiefly due to the Quakers among whom women are in all points of public exertion as active as men. Probably none of these things would have been effected if women had not taken so strong an interest in them—if the men engaged had not found a constant stimulus in the feelings of the women connected with them, and a necessity for excusing themselves in the eyes of the women in every case of failure or shortcoming. And will any one say that the harmony of domestic life or of social intercourse was rendered less because women took interest in these subjects? It will be said, they were questions peculiarly concerning the sympathies and therefore suitable to women. But they were also subjects which concerned people’s self interest and were therefore sources of antipathy as well as sympathy: and there have been few subjects on which there has been more party spirit and more vehement opposition of political feeling, than on West India slavery and on the Bell and Lancaster schools.^[†]

“What is the use of giving women votes?” Before answering this question it may be well to put another: What is the use of votes at all? Whatever use there is in any case, there is in the case of women. Are votes given to protect the particular interests of the voters? Then women need votes, for the state of the law as to their property, their rights with regard to children, their right to their own person, together with the extreme maladministration of the courts of justice in cases of even the most atrocious violence when practised by men to their wives, contributes a mass of grievances greater than exists in the case of any other class or body of persons. Are votes given as a means of fostering the intelligence of the voters, and enlarging their feelings by directing them to a wider class of interests? This would be as beneficial to women as to men. Are votes given as a means of exalting the voters in social position and estimation? and to avoid making an offensive distinction to their disadvantage? This reason is strong in the case of women. And this reason would suffice in the absence of any other. Women should have votes because otherwise they are not the equals but the inferiors of men.

So clear is this, that any one who maintains that it is right in itself to exclude women from votes, can only do it for the express purpose of stamping on them the character of inferiors.

* * * * *

2.

Women—(Rights of)

the rights of women are no other than the rights of human beings. The phrase has come into use, and become necessary, only because law and opinion, having been made chiefly by men, have refused to recognize in women the universal claims of humanity. When opinion on this subject shall be further advanced towards rectification, neither “rights of women” nor even “equality of women” will be terms in use, because neither of them fully expresses the real object to be aimed at, viz. the negation of all distinctions among persons, grounded on the accidental circumstance of sex.

The present legal and moral subjection of women is the principal, and likely to be the latest remaining relic of the primitive condition of society, the tyranny of physical force. Society sets out from the state of lawlessness in which every one’s hand is against every one, and each robs and slays a weaker than himself when he has any object to gain by it: the next stage is that in which the races and tribes which are vanquished in war are made slaves, the absolute property of their conquerors, this by degrees changes into serfdom, or some other limited form of dependence, and in the course of ages mankind pass through various decreasing stages of subjection on one side and privilege on the other, up to complete democracy which the advanced guard of the human species are now just reaching: so that the only arbitrary distinction among human beings, which the one or two most advanced nations do not now, at least in principle, repudiate, is that between women and men. And even this distinction, although still essentially founded on despotism, has assumed a more mitigated form with each step in the general improvement of mankind, whether we compare age with age, people with people or class with class: which was also the case with all the other social tyrannies, in their progress towards extinction.

It deserves particular remark, that at every period in this gradual progress, the prevailing morality of the time (with or without the exception of a few individuals superior to their age) invariably consecrated all existing facts. It assumed every existing unjust power or privilege as right and proper, contenting itself with inculcating a mild and forbearing exercise of them: by which inculcation no doubt it did considerable good, but which it never failed to balance by enjoining on the sufferers an unresisting and uncomplaining submission to the power itself. Morality recommended kind treatment of slaves by their masters, and just rule by despots over their subjects, but it never justified or tolerated either slaves or subjects in throwing off the yoke, and wherever they have done so it has been by a plain violation of the then established morality. It is needless to point out how exactly the parallel holds in the case of women and men.

In the position of women as society has now made it, there are two distinct peculiarities. The first is, the domestic subjection of the larger portion of them. From this, unmarried women who are either in independent or in self-dependent pecuniary circumstances are exempt; so that by the admission of society itself, there is no inherent necessity for it, and the time cannot be far off when to hold any human being, who has past the age which requires to be taken care of and educated by others, in a state of compulsory obedience to any other human being (except as the mere organ and minister of the law) will be acknowledged to be as monstrous an infraction of the rights and dignity of humanity, as slavery is at last, though tardily, among a small, comparatively advanced part of the human race, felt to be. Practically the evil varies, in the case of women, (as it did in the case of slaves) from being slowly murdered by continued bodily torture, to being only subdued in spirit and thwarted of all those higher and finer developements of individual character of which personal liberty has in all ages been felt to be the indispensable condition.

The other point of the question relates to the numberless disabilities imposed on women by law or by custom equivalent to law; their exclusion from most public and from a great number of private occupations, and the direction of all the forces of society towards educating them for, and confining them to, a small number of functions, on the plea that these are the most conformable to their nature and powers. It is impossible here to enter, with any detail, into this part of the subject. Three propositions however may be laid down as certain. First; that the alleged superior adaptation of women to certain occupations, and of men to certain others, does not, even now, exist, to anything like the extent that is pretended. Secondly, that so far as it does exist, a rational analysis of human character and circumstances tends more and more to shew, that the difference is principally if not wholly the effect of differences in education and in social circumstances, or of physical characteristics by no means peculiar to one or the other sex. Lastly; even if the alleged differences of aptitude did exist, it would be a reason why women and men would generally occupy themselves differently but no reason why they should be forced to do so. It is one of the aberrations of early and rude legislation to attempt to convert every supposed natural fitness into an imperative obligation. There was an apparent natural reason why the children should follow the occupation of their parents; they were often familiar with it from childhood, and had always peculiar facilities for being instructed in it: but this natural fitness, converted into a law, became the oppressive and enslaving system of Castes. Good laws, laws which pay any due regard to human liberty, will not class human beings according to mere general presumptions, nor require them to do one thing and to abstain from another on account of any supposed suitableness to their natural or acquired gifts, but will leave them to class themselves under the natural influence of those and of all the other peculiarities of their situation, which if left free they will not fail to do quite as well, not to say much better, than any inflexible laws made for them by pedantic legislators or conceited soi-disant philosophers are ever likely to do.

* * * * *

3.

The Rights of Women to the Elective Franchise and Its Advantages

statement of the principle—perfect equality.

Although this requires no proof, necessary to consider the subject as usually treated and reply categorically to objections either to it as a principle or as a matter of practice.

Prevailing opinion is that some change is needed but not fundamental, only of degree—above all that the change shall not alter the principle of inequality, foundation of present condition.

Present state of opinion divided into the following:

Largest class, both men and women, composed of those who take things for granted because they are so and have always been so—have a natural fear of making any alteration in the relations on which they are accustomed to think the best things in life depend. We would prove to them that tho’ the best things in life did depend on those relations as they are, the relation under its present conditions is worn out and no longer affords to either party a life either well or sufficiently filled for the spirit of the present time which requires more developement of the spiritual and less of the physical instead of the contrary. True, education is the great want of the time, but people have scarce begun to perceive in what sense of education—that which modern developement requires should be the desire, power and habit of using the person’s own mind, instead of (as almost all educationists seem to think) filling the mind with an undigested mass from the minds of others, in consequence of which process the most educated people now are among the most ignorant—witness not only the (absurdly) called educated classes but preeminently the collegiate, legal, clerical, professional men. Placeman, clergyman, barrister, doctor, has each something to say on one subject—in the majority of cases this something is what he has heard from others and therefore comes from him deadborn—if an active minded person, he is found to talk interestingly on his one subject, but let conversation be anything worthy the name of general, and the profound ignorance and inactivity of intellect presented by the educated classes in England is the only thing capable of exciting the mind in intercourse with them.

After all the objections that are made both by men and women have been considered, one may perhaps put it down as a fact that they are all based on the supposition that conceding equal political rights to women would be contrary to the interests of men. Some think it would be contrary to their real interests, some to their selfish interests. We think they would be not only in accordance with, but greatly advantageous to, the interests of men with perhaps the exception of interests if such they can be called, as no man in the present day would venture to &c. It would probably put a stop to the sort of license of indulgence which everybody is now agreed in discountenancing:—

A great part of the feeling which resists the political equality of women is a feeling of the contrast it would make with their domestic servitude.

The evils of women’s present condition all lie in the necessity of dependence, the just cause of complaint lies here and not elsewhere.

Historical parallel between men and women sovereigns.

The expression “Rights of Women,” it is the fashion among women and among a certain vulgar class of men to affect to receive with a sneer and to endeavour to drown with ridicule. In neither case does this appear to be because they really regard it as meaningless, for if the same people are asked why they receive it so, they invariably grow angry and this mode of reception perpetuates itself because the intense constitutional shyness of Englishmen makes them of all things fear ridicule and this phrase as well as the idea it includes has always hitherto been put down by ridicule. Commonplace women’s aversion to it has more meaning—it contains the everlasting dread of the givers of the loaves and fishes^[*] —their lively imagination exaggerates the disagreeables of having to work instead of being worked for, which their education having precluded all notions of public spirit or personal dignity, far from being revolted at the idea of dependence, elevates submission into a virtue per se. They enormously exaggerate both the talent and the labour required for the external details of life, unaware that they give as much labour and fritter away as much talent in executing badly those domestic details which they enlarge upon as arguments against women’s emancipation, as would be sufficient to conduct both the public and private affairs of either an individual or a family. Is it not true that half the time of half the women in existence is passed in worthless and trashy work, of no benefit to any human being?

Objection. Well bred people never exercise the power which the law gives them. But all their conduct takes the bent which has been given to the two characters by the relation which the law establishes. The woman’s whole talent goes into the inducing, persuading, coaxing, caressing, in reality the seducing, capacity. In whatever class in life, the woman gains her object by seducing the man. This makes her character quite unconsciously to herself, petty and paltry.

* * * * *

4.

Why Women Are Entitled to the Suffrage

1st. Because it is just.

2nd. Because women have many serious practical grievances from the state of the law as it regards them.

3rd. Because the general condition of women, being one of dependence, is in itself a grievance, which their exclusion from the suffrage stamps and perpetuates.

4th. Reply to objections.

The exclusion of women from the suffrage becomes a greater offence and degradation in proportion as the suffrage is opened widely to all men. When the only privileged class is the aristocracy of sex the slavery of the excluded sex is more marked and complete.

Notion that giving the suffrage does no good; a shallow fallacy. The greatest good that can be done for women and the preparation of all others is to recognize them as citizens—as substantive members of the community instead of mere things belonging to members of the community. One of the narrownesses of modern times, in England, is that the indirect effects produced by the spirit of institutions are not recognized and therefore the immense influence on the whole life of a person produced by the fact of citizenship is not at all felt.

Even according to the most moderate reformers the suffrage should include clerks and other educated persons who are dependent on employers. These are not turned out of their employments for voting against their employers, only because there is a point of honour on the subject. There ought to be the same between married people.—

To suppose that one person’s freedom of opinion must merge in that of the other and that they could not vote differently at an election without quarrelling is a satire on marriage and a reductio ad absurdum of it. All persons, men and women, in the present age, are entitled to mental independence and marriage like other institutions must reconcile itself to this necessity.

The queen professes to live and act perfectly conscientiously, does she ask her husband’s opinion and submit to it in all her acts as queen? is not this a case of married persons exercising their separate freedom of opinion and conduct?

The principle that all who are taxed should be represented, would give votes not only to single women but to married women whose property is settled.

Women should either not be allowed to have property or should have all which follows from the possession of property.

The man acquires the points of character that belong to one who is always having homage paid to the power vested in him, self-important, domineering, with more or less politeness of form according to his breeding, and more or less suavity according to his temper—the difference in the case of a well bred man being mainly this, that as he does not need to assert what never is disputed, so he does not do so, but contents himself with accepting the position which the law assigns and which the woman yields to him, it being a main point in the ways of well bred people that all occasions of bringing wills into active collision, are avoided, sometimes by a tacit compromise in which however the chief part always remains with the strongest, sometimes because that which knows itself to be the weakest makes a graceful retreat in time. In this as in other relations, good breeding does not so much affect the substance of conduct as the manner ^aof it^a . When the man is ill bred the manner is coarse, tyrannical, brutal, either in a greater or in a less degree; there is superfluous self assertion, and of an offensive kind, well bred people’s self assertion is only tacit, until their claims are in some way resisted, but they are not therefore less tenacious of all that ^bthe law^b gives them, and are often not less really inflated by self-worship caused by the ^cworship^c they receive from dependents of every description.

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5.

[Reform: Ends and Means]

Political

No hereditary privileges whatever.

No exclusion from the suffrage, but an educational qualification (qu. what?)

Complete freedom of speech, printing, public meetings and associations, locomotion, and industry in all its branches.

No church establishment or paid clergy; but national schools and colleges without religion.

Social

All occupations to be alike open to men and women; and all kinds and departments of instruction.

Marriage to be like any other partnership, dissoluble at pleasure, and not merging any of the individual rights of either of the parties to the contract. All the interests arising out of marriage to be provided for by special agreement.

The property of intestates to belong to the state, which then undertakes the education, and setting out in life, of all descendants not otherwise provided for.

No one to acquire by gift or bequest more than a limited amount.

Appendix C

ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN (1851)

by Harriet Taylor Mill

all the more recent of these papers^[*] were joint productions of myself and of one^[†] whose loss, even in a merely intellectual point of view, can never be repaired or alleviated. But the following Essay is hers in a peculiar sense, my share in it being little more than that of an editor and amanuensis. Its authorship having been known at the time, and publicly attributed to her, it is proper to state, that she never regarded it as a complete discussion of the subject which it treats of, and, highly as I estimate it, I would rather it remained unacknowledged, than that it should be read with the idea that even the faintest image can be found in it of a mind and heart which in their union of the rarest, and what are deemed the most conflicting ^aexcellences^a , were unparalleled in any human being that I have known or read of. While she was the light, life, and grace of every society in which she took part, the foundation of her character was a deep seriousness, resulting from the combination of the strongest and most sensitive feelings with the highest principles. All that excites admiration when found separately in others, seemed brought together in her: a conscience at once healthy and tender; a generosity, bounded only by a sense of justice which often forgot its own claims, but never those of others; a heart so large and loving, that whoever was capable of making the smallest return of sympathy, always received tenfold; and in the intellectual department, a vigour and truth of imagination, a delicacy of perception, an accuracy and nicety of observation, only equalled by her profundity of speculative thought, and by a practical judgment and discernment next to infallible. So elevated was the general level of her faculties, that the highest poetry, philosophy, oratory, or art, seemed trivial by the side of her, and equal only to expressing some small part of her mind. And there is no one of those modes of manifestation in which she could not easily have taken the highest rank, had not her inclination led her for the most part to content herself with being the inspirer, prompter, and unavowed coadjutor of others.

The present paper was written to promote a cause which she had deeply at heart, and though appealing only to the severest reason, was meant for the general reader. The question, in her opinion, was in a stage in which no treatment but the most calmly argumentative could be useful, while many of the strongest arguments were necessarily omitted, as being unsuited for popular effect. Had she lived to write out all her thoughts on this great question, she would have produced something as far transcending in profundity the present Essay, as, had she not placed a rigid restraint on her feelings, she would have excelled it in fervid eloquence. Yet nothing which even she could have written on any single subject, would have given an adequate idea of the depth and compass of her mind. As during life she continually detected, before any one else had seemed to perceive them, those changes of times and circumstances which ten or twelve years later became subjects of general remark, so I venture to prophecy that if mankind continue to improve, their spiritual history for ages to come will be the progressive working out of her thoughts, and realization of her conceptions.

* * * * *

most of our readers will probably learn from these pages for the first time, that there has arisen in the United States, and in the most civilized and enlightened portion of them, an organised agitation on a new question—new, not to thinkers, nor to any one by whom the principles of free and popular government are felt as well as acknowledged, but new, and even unheard of, as a subject for public meetings and practical political action. This question is, the enfranchisement of women; their admission, in law and in fact, to equality in all rights, political, civil, and social, with the male citizens of the community.

It will add to the surprise with which many will receive this intelligence, that the agitation which has commenced is not a pleading by male writers and orators for women, those who are professedly to be benefitted remaining either indifferent or ostensibly ^bhostile: it^b is a political movement, practical in its objects, carried on in a form which denotes an intention to persevere. And it is a movement not merely for women, but by them. Its first public manifestation appears to have been a Convention of Women, held in the State of Ohio, in the spring of 1850. Of this meeting we have seen no report. On the 23rd and 24th of October last, a succession of public meetings was held at Worcester, in Massachusetts, under the name of a “Women’s Rights Convention,” of which the president was a woman,^[*] and nearly all the chief speakers women; numerously reinforced, however, by men, among whom were some of the most distinguished leaders in the kindred cause of negro emancipation. A general and four special committees were nominated, for the purpose of carrying on the undertaking until the next annual meeting.

According to the report in the New York Tribune, above a thousand persons were present throughout, and “if a larger place could have been had, many thousands more would have attended.” The place was described as “crowded from the beginning with attentive and interested listeners.”^[†] In regard to the quality of the speaking, the proceedings bear an advantageous comparison with those of any popular movement with which we are acquainted, either in this country or in America. Very rarely in the oratory of public meetings is the part of verbiage and declamation so small, that of calm good sense and reason so considerable. The result of the Convention was in every respect encouraging to those by whom it was summoned: and it is probably destined to inaugurate one of the most important of the movements towards political and social reform, which are the best characteristic of the present age.

That the promoters of this new agitation take their stand on principles, and do not fear to declare these in their widest extent, without time-serving or compromise, will be seen from the resolutions adopted by the Convention, part of which we transcribe:

The following is a brief summary of the principal demands:

It would be difficult to put so much true, just, and reasonable meaning into a style so little calculated to recommend it as ^cthat^c of some of the resolutions. But whatever objection may be made to some of the expressions, none, in our opinion, can be made to the demands themselves. As a question of justice, the case seems to us too clear for dispute. As one of expediency, the more thoroughly it is examined the stronger it will appear.

That women have as good a claim as men have, in point of personal right, to the suffrage, or to a place in the jury-box, it would be difficult for anyone to deny. It cannot certainly be denied by the United States of America, as a people or as a community. Their democratic institutions rest avowedly on the inherent right of everyone to a voice in the government. Their Declaration of Independence, framed by the men who are still their great constitutional authorities—that document which has been from the first, and is now, the acknowledged basis of their polity, commences with this express statement:

We do not imagine that any American democrat will evade the force of these expressions by the dishonest or ignorant subterfuge, that “men,” in this memorable document, does not stand for human beings, but for one sex only, that “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” are “inalienable rights” of only one moiety of the human species, and that “the governed,” whose consent is affirmed to be the only source of just power, are meant for that half of mankind only, who, in relation to the other, have hitherto assumed the character of ^dgovernors^d . The contradiction between principle and practice cannot be explained away. A like dereliction of the fundamental maxims of their political creed has been committed by the Americans in the flagrant instance of the negroes; of this they are learning to recognise the turpitude. After a struggle which, by many of its incidents, deserves the name of heroic, the abolitionists are now so strong in numbers and in influence that they hold the balance of parties in the United States. It was fitting that the men whose names will remain associated with the extirpation, from the democratic soil of America, of the aristocracy of colour, should be among the originators, for America and for the rest of the world, of the first collective protest against the aristocracy of sex, a distinction as accidental as that of colour, and fully as irrelevant to all questions of government.

Not only to the democracy of America, the claim of women to civil and political equality makes an irresistible appeal, but also to those radicals and chartists in the British islands, and democrats on the Continent, who claim what is called universal suffrage as an inherent right, unjustly and oppressively withheld from them. For with what truth or rationality could the suffrage be termed universal, while half the human species ^eremain^e excluded from it? To declare that a voice in the government is the right of all, and demand it only for a part—the part, namely, to which the claimant himself belongs—is to renounce even the appearance of principle. The chartist who denies the suffrage to women, is a chartist only because he is not a lord;^[†] he is one of those levellers who would level only down to themselves.

Even those who do not look upon a voice in the government as a matter of personal right, nor profess principles which require that it should be extended to all, have usually traditional maxims of political justice with which it is impossible to reconcile the exclusion of all women from the common rights of citizenship. It is an axiom of English freedom that taxation and representation should be co-extensive. Even under the laws which give the wife’s property to the husband, there are many unmarried women who pay taxes. It is one of the fundamental doctrines of the British constitution, that all persons should be tried by their peers, yet women, whenever tried, are tried by male judges and a male jury. To foreigners the law accords the privilege of claiming that half the jury should be composed of themselves; not so to women. Apart from maxims of detail, which represent local and national rather than universal ideas, it is an acknowledged dictate of justice to make no degrading distinctions without necessity. In all things the presumption ought to be on the side of equality. A reason must be given why anything should be permitted to one person and interdicted to another. But when that which is interdicted includes nearly everything which those to whom it is permitted most prize, and to be deprived of which they feel to be most insulting, when not only political liberty but personal freedom of action is the prerogative of a caste; when even in the exercise of industry, almost all employments which task the higher faculties in an important field, which lead to distinction, riches, or even pecuniary independence, are fenced round as the exclusive domain of the predominant section, scarcely any doors being left open to the dependent class, except such as all who can enter elsewhere disdainfully pass by; the miserable expediencies which are advanced as excuses for so grossly partial a dispensation, would not be sufficient, even if they were real, to render it other than a flagrant injustice. While, far from being expedient, we are firmly convinced that the division of mankind into two castes, one born to rule over the other, is in this case, as in all cases, an unqualified mischief; a source of perversion and demoralization, both to the favoured class and to those at whose expense they are favoured, producing none of the good which it is the custom to ascribe to it, and forming a bar, almost insuperable while it lasts, to any really vital improvement, either in the character or in the social condition of the human race.

These propositions it is now our purpose to maintain. But before entering on them, we would endeavour to dispel the preliminary objections which, in the minds of persons to whom the subject is new, are apt to prevent a real and conscientious examination of it. The chief of these obstacles is that most formidable one, custom. Women never have had equal rights with men. The claim in their behalf, of the common rights of mankind, is looked upon as barred by universal practice. This strongest of prejudices, the prejudice against what is new and unknown, has, indeed, in an age of changes like the present, lost much of its force; if it had not, there would be little hope of prevailing against it. Over three-fourths of the habitable world, even at this day, the answer, “it has always been so,” closes all discussion. But it is the boast of modern Europeans, and of their American kindred, that they know and do many things which their forefathers neither knew nor did; and it is perhaps the most unquestionable point of superiority in the present above former ages, that habit is not now the tyrant it formerly was over opinions and modes of action, and that the worship of custom is a declining idolatry. An uncustomary thought, on a subject which touches the greater interests of life, still startles when first presented; but if it can be kept before the mind until the impression of strangeness wears off, it obtains a hearing, and as rational a consideration as the intellect of the hearer is accustomed to bestow on any other subject.

In the present case, the prejudice of custom is doubtless on the unjust side. Great thinkers, indeed, at different times, from Plato to Condorcet,^[*] besides some of the most eminent names of the present age, have made emphatic protests in favour of the equality of women. And there have been voluntary societies, religious or secular, of which the Society of Friends is the most known, by whom that principle was recognised. But there has been no political community or nation in which, by law, and usage, women have not been in a state of political and civil inferiority. In the ancient world the same fact was alleged, with equal truth, in behalf of slavery. It might have been alleged in favour of the mitigated form of slavery, serfdom, all through the middle ages. It was urged against freedom of industry, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press; none of these liberties were thought compatible with a well-ordered state, until they had proved their possibility by actually existing as facts. That an institution or a practice is customary is no presumption of its goodness, when any other sufficient cause can be assigned for its existence. There is no difficulty in understanding why the subjection of women has been a custom. No other explanation is needed than physical force.

That those who were physically weaker should have been made legally inferior, is quite conformable to the mode in which the world has been governed. Until very lately, the rule of physical strength was the general law of human affairs. Throughout history, the nations, races, classes, which found themselves the strongest, either in muscles, in riches, or in military discipline, have conquered and held in subjection the rest. If, even in the most improved nations, the law of the sword is at last discountenanced as unworthy, it is only since the calumniated eighteenth century. Wars of conquest have only ceased since democratic revolutions began. The world is very young, and has but just begun to cast off injustice. It is only now getting rid of negro slavery. It is only now getting rid of monarchical despotism. It is only now getting rid of hereditary feudal nobility. It is only now getting rid of disabilities on the ground of religion. It is only beginning to treat ^fany men^f as citizens, except the rich and a favoured portion of the middle class. Can we wonder that it has not yet done as much for women? As society was constituted until the last few generations, inequality was its very basis; association grounded on equal rights scarcely existed; to be equals was to be enemies; two persons could hardly co-operate in anything, or meet in any amicable relation, without the law’s appointing that one of them should be the superior of the other. Mankind have outgrown this state, and all things now tend to substitute, as the general principle of human relations, a just equality, instead of the dominion of the strongest. But of all relations, that between men and women being the nearest and most intimate, and connected with the greatest number of strong emotions, was sure to be the last to throw off the old rule and receive the new: for in proportion to the strength of a feeling, is the tenacity with which it clings to the forms and circumstances with which it has even accidentally become associated.

When a prejudice, which has any hold on the feelings, finds itself reduced to the unpleasant necessity of assigning reasons, it thinks it has done enough when it has re-asserted the very point in dispute, in phrases which appeal to the pre-existing feeling. Thus, many persons think they have sufficiently justified the restrictions on women’s field of action, when they have said that the pursuits from which women are excluded are unfeminine, and that the proper sphere of women is not politics or publicity, but private and domestic life.

We deny the right of any portion of the species to decide for another portion, or any individual for another individual, what is and what is not their “proper sphere.” The proper sphere for all human beings is the largest and highest which they are able to attain to. What this is, cannot be ascertained, without complete liberty of choice. The speakers at the Convention in America have therefore done wisely and right, in refusing to entertain the question of the peculiar aptitudes either of women or of men, or the limits within which this or that occupation may be supposed to be more adapted to the one or to the other.^[*] They justly maintain, that these questions can only be satisfactorily answered by perfect freedom. Let every occupation be open to all, without favour or discouragement to any, and employments will fall into the hands of those men or women who are found by experience to be most capable of worthily exercising them. There need be no fear that women will take out of the hands of men any occupation which men perform better than they. Each individual will prove his or her capacities, in the only way in which capacities can be proved—by trial; and the world will have the benefit of the best faculties of all its inhabitants. But to interfere beforehand by an arbitrary limit, and declare that whatever be the genius, talent, energy, or force of mind of an individual of a certain sex or class, those faculties shall not be exerted, or shall be exerted only in some few of the many modes in which others are permitted to use theirs, is not only an injustice to the individual, and a detriment to society, which loses what it can ill spare, but is also the most effectual mode of providing that, in the sex or class so fettered, the qualities which are not permitted to be exercised shall not exist.

We shall follow the very proper example of the Convention, in not entering into the question of the alleged differences in physical or mental qualities between the sexes; not because we have nothing to say, but because we have too much; to discuss this one point tolerably would need all the space we have to bestow on the entire subject.^* But if those who assert that the “proper sphere” for women is the domestic, mean by this that they have not shown themselves qualified for any other, the assertion evinces great ignorance of life and of history. Women have shown fitness for the highest social functions, exactly in proportion as they have been admitted to them. By a curious anomaly, though ineligible to even the lowest offices of state, they are in some countries admitted to the highest of all, the regal, and if there is any one function for which they have shown a decided vocation, it is that of reigning. Not to go back to ancient history, we look in vain for abler or firmer rulers than Elizabeth; than Isabella of Castile, than Maria Teresa; than Catherine of Russia; than Blanche, mother of Louis IX of France; than Jeanne d’Albret, mother of Henri Quatre. There are few kings on record who contended with more difficult circumstances, or overcame them more triumphantly, than^h these. Even in semi-barbarous Asia, princesses who have never been seen by men, other than those of their own family, or ever spoken with them unless from behind a curtain, have as regents, during the minority of their sons, exhibited many of the most brilliant examples of just and vigorous administration. In the middle ages, when the distance between the upper and lower ranks was greater than even between women and men, and the women of the privileged class, however subject to tyranny from the men of the same class, were at a less distance below them than any one else ⁱwasⁱ , and often in their absence represented them in their functions and authority—numbers of heroic chatelaines, like Jeanne de Montfort, or the great Countess of Derby^[*] as late even as the time of Charles I, distinguished themselves not only by their political but their military capacity. In the centuries immediately before and after the Reformation, ladies of royal houses, as diplomatists, as governors of provinces, or as the confidential advisers of kings, equalled the first statesmen of their time: and the treaty of Cambray, which gave peace to Europe, was negociated in conferences where no other person was present, by the aunt of the Emperor Charles V, and the mother of Francis I.^[†]

Concerning the fitness, then, of women for politics, there can be no question, but the dispute is more likely to turn upon the fitness of politics for women. When the reasons alleged for excluding women from active life in all its higher departments, are stripped of their garb of declamatory phrases, and reduced to the simple expression of a meaning, they seem to be mainly three: ^j the incompatibility of active life with maternity, and with the cares of a household; secondly, its alleged hardening effect on the character; and thirdly, the inexpediency of making an addition to the already excessive pressure of competition in every kind of professional or lucrative employment.

The first, the maternity argument, is usually laid most stress upon, although (it needs hardly be said) this reason, if it be one, can apply only to mothers. It is neither necessary nor just to make imperative on women that they ^kshall^k be either mothers or nothing; or that if they ^lhave^l been mothers once, they shall be nothing else during the whole remainder of their lives. Neither women nor men need any law to exclude them from an occupation, if they have undertaken another which is incompatible with it. No one proposes to exclude the male sex from Parliament because a man may be a soldier or sailor in active service, or a merchant whose business requires all his time and energies. Nine-tenths of the occupations of men exclude them de facto from public life, as effectually as if they were excluded by law; but that is no reason for making laws to exclude even the nine-tenths, much less the remaining tenth. The reason of the case is the same for women as for men. There is no need to make provision by law that a woman shall not carry on the active details of a household, or of the education of children, and at the same time practise a profession or be elected to Parliament. Where incompatibility is real, it will take care of itself: but there is gross injustice in making the incompatibility a pretence for the exclusion of those in whose case it does not exist. And these, if they were free to choose, would be a very large proportion. The maternity argument deserts its supporters in the case of single women, a large and increasing class of the population, a fact which, it is not irrelevant to remark, by tending to diminish the excessive competition of numbers, is calculated to assist greatly the prosperity of all. There is no inherent reason or necessity that all women should voluntarily choose to devote their lives to one animal function and its consequences. Numbers of women are wives and mothers only because there is no other career open to them, no other occupation for their feelings or their activities. Every improvement in their education, and enlargement of their faculties—everything which renders them more qualified for any other mode of life, increases the number of those to whom it is an injury and an oppression to be denied the choice. To say that women must be excluded from active life because maternity disqualifies them for it, is in fact to say, that every other career should be forbidden them in order that maternity may be their only resource.

But secondly, it is urged, that to give the same freedom of occupation to women as to men, would be an injurious addition to the crowd of competitors, by whom the avenues to almost all kinds of employment are choked up, and its remuneration depressed. This argument, it is to be observed, does not reach the political question. It gives no excuse for withholding from women the rights of citizenship. The suffrage, the jury-box, admission to the legislature and to office, it does not touch. It bears only on the industrial branch of the subject. Allowing it, then, in an economical point of view, its full force; assuming that to lay open to women the employments now monopolized by men, would tend, like the breaking down of other monopolies, to lower the rate of remuneration in those employments, let us consider what is the amount of this evil consequence, and what the compensation for it. The worst ever asserted, much worse than is at all likely to be realized, is that if women competed with men, a man and a woman could not together earn more than is now earned by the man alone. Let us make this supposition, the most unfavourable supposition possible, the joint income of the two would be the same as before, while the woman would be raised from the position of a servant to that of a partner. Even if every woman, as matters now stand, had a claim on some man for support, how infinitely preferable is it that part of the income should be of the woman’s earning, even if the aggregate sum were but little increased by it, rather than that she should be compelled to stand aside in order that men may be the sole earners, and the sole dispensers of what is ^mearned.^m Even under the present laws respecting the property of women,^* a woman who contributes materially to the support of the family, cannot be treated in the same contemptuously tyrannical manner as one who, however she may toil as a domestic drudge, is a dependent on the man for subsistence. As for the depression of wages by increase of competition, remedies will be found for it in time. Palliatives might be applied immediately; for instance, a more rigid exclusion of children from industrial employment, during the years in which they ought to be working only to strengthen their bodies and minds for after life. Children are ⁿnecessarilyⁿ dependent, and under the power of others; and their labour, being not for themselves but for the gain of their parents, is a proper subject for legislative regulation. With respect to the future, we neither believe that improvident multiplication, and the consequent excessive difficulty of gaining a subsistence, will ^oalways^o continue, nor that the division of mankind into capitalists and hired labourers, and the regulation of the reward of labourers mainly by demand and supply, will be for ever, or even much longer, the rule of the world. But so long as competition is the general law of human life, it is tyranny to shut out one half of the competitors. All who have attained the age of self-government, have an equal claim to be permitted to sell whatever kind of useful labour they are capable of, for the price which it will bring.

The third objection to the admission of women to political or professional life, its alleged hardening tendency, belongs to an age now past, and is scarcely to be comprehended by people of the present time. There are still, however, persons who say that the world and its avocations render men selfish and unfeeling; that the struggles, rivalries and collisions of business and of politics make them harsh and unamiable; that if half the species must unavoidably be given up to these things, it is the more necessary that the other half should be kept free from them; that to preserve women from the bad influences of the world, is the only chance of preventing men from being wholly given up to them.

There would have been plausibility in this argument when the world was still in the age of violence, when life was full of physical conflict, and every man had to redress his injuries or those of others, by the sword or by the strength of his arm. Women, like priests, by being exempted from such responsibilities, and from some part of the accompanying dangers, may have been enabled to exercise a beneficial influence. But in the present condition of human life, we do not know where those hardening influences are to be found, to which men are subject and from which women are at present exempt. Individuals now-a-days are seldom called upon to fight hand to hand, even with peaceful weapons; personal enmities and rivalities count for little in worldly transactions, the general pressure of circumstances, not the adverse will of individuals, is the obstacle men now have to make head against. That pressure, when excessive, breaks the spirit, and cramps and sours the feelings, but not less of women than of men, since they suffer certainly not less from its evils. There are still quarrels and dislikes, but the sources of them are changed. The feudal chief once found his bitterest enemy in his powerful neighbour, the minister or courtier in his rival for place: but opposition of interest in active life, as a cause of personal animosity, is out of date, the enmities of the present day arise not from great things but small, from what people say of one another, more than from what they do; and if there are hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, they are to be found among women fully as much as among men. In the present state of civilization, the notion of guarding women from the hardening influences of the world, could only be realized by secluding them from society altogether. The common duties of common life, as at present constituted, are incompatible with any other softness in women than weakness. Surely weak minds in weak bodies must ere long cease to be even supposed to be either attractive or amiable.

But, in truth, none of these arguments and considerations touch the foundations of the subject. The real question is, whether it is right and expedient that one-half of the human race should pass through life in a state of forced subordination to the other half. If the best state of human society is that of being divided into two parts, one consisting of persons with a will and a substantive existence, the other of humble companions to these persons, attached, each of them to one, for the purpose of bringing up his children, and making his home pleasant to him; if this is the place assigned to women, it is but kindness to educate them for this, to make them believe that the greatest good fortune which can befal them, is to be chosen by some man for this purpose, and that every other career which the world deems happy or honourable, is closed to them by the law, not of social institutions, but of nature and destiny.

When, however, we ask why the existence of one-half the species should be merely ancillary to that of the other—why each woman should be a mere appendage to a man, allowed to have no interests of her own, that there may be nothing to compete in her mind with his interests and his pleasure, the only reason which can be given is, that men like it. It is agreeable to them that men should live for their own sake, women for the sake of men: and the qualities and conduct in subjects which are agreeable to rulers, they succeed for a long time in making the subjects themselves consider as their appropriate virtues. Helvetius has met with much obloquy for asserting, that persons usually mean by virtues the qualities which are useful or convenient to themselves.^[*] How truly this is said of mankind in general, and how wonderfully the ideas of virtue set afloat by the powerful, are caught and imbibed by those under their dominion, is exemplified by the manner in which the world were once persuaded that the supreme virtue of subjects was loyalty to kings, and are still persuaded that the paramount virtue of womanhood is loyalty to ^pmen^p . Under a nominal recognition of a moral code common to both, in practice self-will, and self-assertion form the type of what are designated as manly virtues, while abnegation of self, patience, resignation, and submission to power, unless when resistance is commanded by other interests than their own, have been stamped by general consent as pre-eminently the duties and graces required of ^qwomen. The^q meaning being merely, that power makes itself the centre of moral obligation, and that a man likes to have his own will, but does not like that his domestic companion should have a will different from his.

We are far from pretending that in modern and civilized times, no reciprocity of obligation is acknowleged on the part of the stronger. Such an assertion would be very wide of the truth. But even ^rthis^r reciprocity, which has disarmed tyranny, at least in the higher and middle classes, of its most revolting features, yet when combined with the original evil of the dependent condition of women, has introduced in its turn serious evils.

In the beginning, and ^samong^s tribes which are still in a primitive condition, women were and are the slaves of men for ^tthe^t purposes of toil. All the hard bodily labour devolves on them. The Australian savage is idle, while women painfully dig up the roots on which he lives. An American Indian, when he has killed a deer, leaves it, and sends a woman to carry it home. In a state somewhat more advanced, as in Asia, women were and are the slaves of men for ^uthe^u purposes of sensuality. In Europe there early succeeded a third and milder dominion, secured not by blows, nor by locks and bars, but by sedulous inculcation on the mind; feelings also of kindness, and ideas of duty, such as a superior owes to inferiors under his protection, became more and more involved in the relation. But it did not for many ages become a relation of companionship, even between ^vunequals; the^v lives of the two persons were apart. The wife was part of the furniture of home, of the resting-place to which the man returned from business or pleasure. His occupations were, as they still are, among men, his pleasures and excitements also were, for the most part, among men—among his equals. He was a patriarch and a despot within four walls, and irresponsible power had its effect, greater or less according to his disposition, in rendering him domineering, exacting, self-worshipping, when not capriciously or brutally tyrannical. But if the moral part of his nature suffered, it was not necessarily so, in the same degree, with the intellectual or the active portion. He might have as much vigour of mind and energy of character as his nature enabled him, and as the circumstances of his times allowed. He might write the Paradise Lost,^[*] or win the battle of Marengo.^[†] This was the condition of the Greeks and Romans, and of the moderns until a recent date. Their relations with their domestic subordinates occupied a mere corner, though a cherished one, of their lives. Their education as men, the formation of their character and faculties, depended mainly on a different class of influences.

It is otherwise now. The progress of improvement has imposed on all possessors of power, and of domestic power among the rest, an increased and increasing sense of correlative obligation. No man now thinks that his wife has no claim upon his actions but such as he may accord to her. All men of any conscience believe that their duty to their wives is one of the most binding of their obligations. Nor is it supposed to consist solely in protection, which, in the present state of civilization, women have almost ceased to need: it involves care for their happiness and consideration of their wishes, with a not unfrequent sacrifice of their own to them. The power of husbands has reached the stage which the power of kings had arrived at, when opinion did not yet question the rightfulness of arbitrary power, but in theory, and to a certain extent in practice, condemned the selfish use of it. This improvement in the moral sentiments of mankind, and increased sense of the consideration due by every man to those who ^whave^w no one but himself to look to, has tended to make home more and more the centre of interest, and domestic circumstances and society a larger and larger part of life, and of its pursuits and pleasures. The tendency has been strengthened by the changes of tastes and manners which have so remarkably distinguished the last two or three generations. In days not far distant, men found their excitement and filled up their time in violent bodily exercises, noisy merriment, and intemperance. They have now, in all but the very poorest classes, lost their inclination for these things, and for the coarser pleasures generally; they have now scarcely any tastes but those which they have in common with women, and, for the first time in the world, men and women are really companions. A most beneficial change, if the companionship were between equals; but being between unequals, it produces, what good observers have noticed, though without perceiving its cause, a progressive deterioration among men in what had hitherto been considered the masculine excellences. Those who are so careful that women should not become men, do not see that men are becoming, what they have decided that women should be—are falling into the feebleness which they have so long cultivated in their companions. Those who are associated in their lives, tend to become assimilated in character. In the present closeness of association between the sexes, men cannot retain manliness unless women acquire it.

There is hardly any situation more unfavourable to the maintenance of elevation of character or force of intellect, than to live in the society, and seek by preference the sympathy, of inferiors in mental endowments. Why is it that we constantly see in life so much of intellectual and moral promise followed by such inadequate performance, but because the aspirant has compared himself only with those below himself, and has not sought improvement or stimulus from measuring himself with his equals or ^xsuperiors.^x In the present state of social life, this is becoming the general condition of men. They care less and less for any sympathies, and are less and less under any personal influences, but those of the domestic roof. Not to be misunderstood, it is necessary that we should distinctly disclaim the belief, that women are even now inferior in intellect to men. There are women who are the equals in intellect of any men who ever lived: and comparing ordinary women with ordinary men, the varied though petty details which compose the occupation of most women, call forth probably as much of mental ability, as the uniform routine of the pursuits which are the habitual occupation of a large majority of men. It is from nothing in the faculties themselves, but from the petty subjects and interests on which alone they are exercised, that the companionship of women, such as their present circumstances make them, so often exercises a dissolvent influence on high faculties and aspirations in men. If one of the two has no knowledge and no care about the great ideas and purposes which dignify life, or about any of its practical concerns save personal interests and personal vanities, her conscious, and still more her unconscious influence, will, except in rare cases, reduce to a secondary place in his mind, if not entirely extinguish, those interests which she cannot or does not share.

Our argument here brings us into collision with what may be termed the moderate reformers of the education of women; a sort of persons who cross the path of improvement on all great questions; those who would maintain the old bad principles, mitigating their consequences. These say, that women should be, not slaves, nor servants, but companions; and educated for that office, (they do not say that men should be educated to be the companions of women). But since uncultivated women are not suitable companions for cultivated men, and a man who feels interest in things above and beyond the family circle wishes that his companion should sympathize with him in that interest; they therefore say, let women improve their understanding and taste, acquire general knowledge, cultivate poetry, art, even coquet with science, and some stretch their liberality so far as to say, inform themselves on politics; not as pursuits, but sufficiently to feel an interest in the subjects, and to be capable of holding a conversation on them with the husband, or at least of understanding and imbibing his wisdom. Very agreeable to him, no doubt, but unfortunately the reverse of improving. It is from having intellectual communion only with those to whom they can lay down the law, that so few men continue to advance in wisdom beyond the first stages. The most eminent men cease to improve, if they associate only with disciples. When they have overtopped those who immediately surround them, if they wish for further growth, they must seek for others of their own stature to consort with. The mental companionship which is improving, is communion between active minds, not mere contact between an active mind and a passive. This inestimable advantage is even now enjoyed, when a strong-minded man and a strong-minded woman are, by a rare chance, united: and would be had far oftener, if education took the same pains to form strong-minded women which it takes to prevent them from being formed. ^yThe modern, and what are regarded as the improved and enlightened modes of education of women, abjure, as far as words go, an education of mere show, and profess to aim at solid instruction, but mean by that expression, superficial information on solid subjects. Except accomplishments, which are now generally regarded as to be taught well if taught at all, nothing is taught to women thoroughly. Small portions only of what it is attempted to teach thoroughly to boys, are the whole of what it is intended or desired to teach to women.^y What makes intelligent beings is the power of thought: the stimuli which call forth that power are the interest and dignity of thought itself, and a field for its practical application. Both motives are cut off from those who are told from infancy that thought, and all its greater applications, are other people’s business, while theirs is to make themselves agreeable to other people. High mental powers in women will be but an exceptional accident, until every career is open to them, and until they, as well as men, are educated for themselves and for the world—not one sex for the other.

In what we have said on the effect of the inferior position of women, combined with the present constitution of married life, we have thus far had in view only the most favourable cases, those in which there is some real approach to that union and blending of characters and of lives, which the theory of the relation contemplates as its ideal standard. But if we look to the great majority of cases, the effect of women’s legal inferiority on the character both of women and of men must be painted in far darker colours. We do not speak here of the grosser brutalities, nor of the man’s power to seize on the woman’s earnings, or compel her to live with him against her will. We do not address ourselves to any one who requires to have it proved that these things should be remedied. We suppose average cases, in which there is neither complete union nor complete disunion of feelings and ^zof^z character; and we affirm that in such cases the influence of the dependence on the woman’s side, is demoralizing to the character of both.

The common opinion is, that whatever may be the case with the intellectual, the moral influence of women over men is almost always salutary. It is, we are often told, the great counteractive of selfishness. However the case may be as to personal influence, the influence of the position tends eminently to promote selfishness. The most insignificant of men, the man who can obtain influence or consideration nowhere else, finds one place where he is chief and head. There is one person, often greatly his superior in understanding, who is obliged to consult him, and whom he is not obliged to consult. He is judge, magistrate, ruler, over their joint concerns; arbiter of all differences between them. The justice or conscience to which her appeal must be made, is his justice and conscience: it is his to hold the balance and adjust the scales between his own claims or wishes and those of another. His is now the only tribunal, in civilized life, in which the same person is judge and party. A generous mind, in such a situation, makes the balance incline against its own side, and gives the other not less, but more, than a fair equality; and thus the weaker side may be enabled to turn the very fact of dependence into an instrument of power, and in default of justice, take an ungenerous advantage of generosity; rendering the unjust power, to those who make an unselfish use of it, a torment and a burthen. But how is it when average men are invested with this power, without reciprocity and without responsibility? Give such a man the idea that he is first in law and in opinion—that to will is his part, and hers to submit; it is absurd to suppose that this idea merely glides over his mind, without sinking into it, or having any effect on his feelings and practice. The propensity to make himself the first object of consideration, and others at most the second, is not so rare as to be wanting where everything seems purposely arranged for ^apermitting^a its indulgence. If there is any self-will in the man, he becomes either the conscious or unconscious despot of his household. The wife, indeed, often succeeds in gaining her objects, but it is by some of the many various forms of indirectness and management.

Thus the position is corrupting equally to both; in the one it produces the vices of power, in the other those of artifice. Women, in their present physical and moral state, having stronger impulses, would naturally be franker and more direct than men; yet all the old saws and traditions represent them as artful and dissembling. Why? Because their only way to their objects is by indirect paths. In all countries where women have strong wishes and active minds, this consequence is inevitable: and if it is less conspicuous in England than in some other places, it is because Englishwomen, saving occasional exceptions, have ceased to have either strong wishes or active minds.

We are not now speaking of cases in which there is anything deserving the name of strong affection on both sides. That, where it exists, is too powerful a principle not to modify greatly the bad influences of the situation, it seldom, however, destroys them entirely. Much oftener the bad influences are too strong for the affection, and destroy it. The highest order of durable and happy attachments would be a hundred times more frequent than they are, if the affection which the two sexes sought from one another were that genuine friendship, which only exists between equals in privileges as in faculties. But with regard to what is commonly called affection in married life—the habitual and almost mechanical feeling of kindliness, and pleasure in each other’s society, which generally grows up between persons who constantly live together, unless there is actual dislike—there is nothing in this to contradict or qualify the mischievous influence of the unequal relation. Such feelings often exist between a sultan and his favourites, between a master and his servants; they are merely examples of the pliability of human nature, which accommodates itself in some degree even to the worst circumstances, and the commonest natures always the most easily.

With respect to the influence personally exercised by women over men, it, no doubt, renders them less harsh and brutal; in ruder times, it was often the only softening influence to which they were accessible. But the assertion, that the wife’s influence renders the man less selfish, contains, as things now are, fully as much error as truth. Selfishness towards the wife herself, and towards those in whom she is interested, the children, though favoured by ^btheir^b dependence, the wife’s influence, no doubt, tends to counteract. But the general effect on him of her character, so long as her interests are concentrated in the family, tends but to substitute for individual selfishness a family selfishness, wearing an amiable guise, and putting on the mask of duty. How rarely is the wife’s influence on the side of public virtue: how rarely does it do otherwise than discourage any effort of principle by which the private interests or worldly vanities of the family can be expected to ^csuffer.^c Public spirit, sense of duty towards the public good, is of all virtues, as women are now educated and situated, the most rarely to be found among them; they have seldom even, what in men is often a partial substitute for public spirit, a sense of personal honour connected with any public duty. Many a man, whom no money or personal flattery would have bought, has bartered his political opinions against ^da title^d or invitations ^efor^e his wife; and a still greater number are made mere hunters after the puerile vanities of society, because their wives value them. As for opinions; in Catholic countries, the wife’s influence is another name for that of the priest: he gives her, in the hopes and emotions connected with a future life, a consolation for the sufferings and disappointments which are her ordinary lot in this. Elsewhere, her weight is thrown into the scale either of the most common-place, or of the most outwardly prosperous opinions: either those by which censure will be escaped, or by which worldly advancement is likeliest to be procured. In England, the wife’s influence is usually on the illiberal and anti-popular side: this is generally the gaining side for personal interest and vanity; and what to her is the democracy or liberalism in which she has no part—which leaves her the Pariah it found her? The man himself, when he marries, usually declines into Conservatism; begins to sympathize with the holders of power, more than with its victims, and thinks it his part to be on the side of authority. As to mental progress, except those ^fvulgarer^f attainments by which vanity or ambition are promoted, there is generally an end to it in a man who marries a woman mentally his inferior; unless, indeed, he is unhappy in marriage, or becomes indifferent. From a man of twenty-five or thirty, after he is married, an experienced observer seldom expects any further progress in mind or feelings. It is rare that the progress already made is maintained. Any spark of the mens divinior^[*] which might otherwise have spread and become a flame, seldom survives for any length of time unextinguished. For a mind which learns to be satisfied with what it already is—which does not incessantly look forward to a degree of improvement not yet reached—becomes relaxed, self-indulgent, and loses the spring and the tension which maintain it even at the point already attained. And there is no fact in human nature to which experience bears more invariable testimony than to this—that all social or sympathetic influences which do not raise up, pull down; if they do not tend to stimulate and exalt the mind, they tend to vulgarize it.

For the interest, therefore, not only of women but of men, and of human improvement in the widest sense, the emancipation of women, which the modern world often boasts of having effected, and for which credit is sometimes given to civilization, and sometimes to Christianity, cannot stop where it is. If it were either necessary or just that one portion of mankind should remain mentally and spiritually only half developed, the development of the other portion ought to have been made, as far as possible, independent of their influence. Instead of this, they have become the most intimate, and it may now be said, the only intimate associates of those to whom yet they are sedulously kept inferior; and have been raised just high enough to drag the others down to themselves.

We have left behind a host of vulgar objections, either as not worthy of an answer, or as answered by the general course of our remarks. A few words, however, must be said on one plea, which in England is made much use of for giving an unselfish air to the upholding of selfish privileges, and which, with unobserving, unreflecting people, passes for much more than it is worth. Women, it is said, do not desire—do not seek, what is called their emancipation. On the contrary, they generally disown such claims when made in their behalf, and fall with acharnement upon any one of themselves who identifies herself with their common cause.

Supposing the fact to be true in the fullest extent ever asserted, if it proves that European women ought to remain as they are, it proves exactly the same with respect to Asiatic women; for they too, instead of murmuring at their seclusion, and at the restraint imposed upon them, pride themselves on it, and are astonished at the effrontery of women who receive visits from male acquaintances, and are seen in the streets unveiled. Habits of submission make men as well as women servile-minded. The vast population of Asia do not desire or value, probably would not accept, political liberty, nor the savages of the forest, civilization; which does not prove that either of those things is undesirable for them, or that they will not, at some future time, enjoy it. Custom hardens human beings to any kind of degradation, by deadening the part of their nature which would resist it. And the case of women is, in this respect, even a peculiar one, for no other inferior caste that we have heard of, have been taught to regard their degradation as their honour. The argument, however, implies a secret consciousness that the alleged preference of women for their dependent state is merely apparent, and arises from their being allowed no choice; for if the preference be natural, there can be no necessity for enforcing it by law. To make laws compelling people to follow their inclination, has not hitherto been thought necessary by any legislator. The plea that women do not desire any change, is the same that has been urged, times out of mind, against the proposal of abolishing any social evil—“there is no complaint;” which is generally not true, and when true, only so because there is not that hope of success, without which complaint seldom makes itself audible to unwilling ears. How does the objector know that women do not desire equality and freedom? He never knew a woman who did not, or would not, desire it for herself individually. It would be very simple to suppose, that if they do desire it they will say so. Their position is like that of the tenants or labourers who vote against their own political interests to please their landlords or employers; with the unique addition, that submission is inculcated on them from childhood, as the peculiar attraction and grace of their character. They are taught to think, that to repel actively even an admitted injustice done to themselves, is somewhat unfeminine, and had better be left to some male friend or protector. To be accused of rebelling against anything which admits of being called an ordinance of society, they are taught to regard as an imputation of a serious offence, to say the least, against the proprieties of their sex. It requires unusual moral courage as well as disinterestedness in a woman, to express opinions favourable to women’s enfranchisement, until, at least, there is some prospect of obtaining it. The comfort of her individual life, and her social consideration, usually depend on the goodwill of those who hold the undue power; and to possessors of power any complaint, however bitter, of the misuse of it, is a less flagrant act of insubordination than to protest against the power itself. The professions of women in this matter remind us of the state offenders of old, who, on the point of execution, used to protest their love and devotion to the sovereign by whose unjust mandate they suffered. Griselda herself might be matched from the speeches put by Shakespeare into the mouths of male victims of kingly caprice and tryanny: the Duke of Buckingham, for example, in Henry the Eighth, and even Wolsey.^[*] The literary class of women, especially in England, are ostentatious in disclaiming the desire for equality or citizenship, and proclaiming their complete satisfaction with the place which society assigns to them; exercising in this, as in many other respects, a most noxious influence over the feelings and opinions of men, who unsuspectingly accept the servilities of toadyism as concessions to the force of truth, not considering that it is the personal interest of these women to profess whatever opinions they expect will be agreeable to men. It is not among men of talent, sprung from the people, and patronized and flattered by the aristocracy, that we look for the leaders of a democratic movement. Successful literary women are just as unlikely to prefer the cause of women to their own social consideration. They depend on men’s opinion for their literary as well as for their feminine successes; and such is their bad opinion of men, that they believe there is not more than one in ten thousand who does not dislike and fear strength, sincerity, or high spirit in a woman. They are therefore anxious to earn pardon and toleration for whatever of these qualities their writings may exhibit on other subjects, by a studied display of submission on this: that they may give no occasion for vulgar men to say (what nothing will prevent vulgar men from saying), that learning makes women unfeminine, and that literary ladies are likely to be bad wives.

But enough of this; especially as the fact which affords the occasion for this ^gnotice^g , makes it impossible any longer to assert the universal acquiescence of women (saving individual exceptions) in their dependent condition. In the United States at least, there are women, seemingly numerous, and now organised for action on the public mind, who demand equality in the fullest acceptation of the word, and demand it by a straightforward appeal to men’s sense of justice, not plead for it with a timid deprecation of their displeasure.

Like other popular movements, however, this may be seriously retarded by the blunders of its adherents. Tried by the ordinary standard of public meetings, the speeches at the Convention are remarkable for the preponderance of the rational over the declamatory element; but there are some exceptions; and things to which it is impossible to attach any rational meaning, have found their way into the resolutions. Thus, the resolution which sets forth the claims made in behalf of women, after claiming equality in education, in industrial pursuits, and in political rights, enumerates as a fourth head of demand something under the name of “social and spiritual union,” and “a medium of expressing the highest moral and spiritual views of justice,”^[*] with other similar verbiage, serving only to mar the simplicity and rationality of the other demands^h: resembling those who would weakly attempt to combine nominal equality between men and women, with enforced distinctions in their privileges and functions^h . What is wanted for women is equal rights, equal admission to all social privileges; not a position apart, a sort of sentimental priesthood. To this, the only just and rational principle, both the resolutions and the speeches, for the most part, adhere. They contain so little which is akin to the nonsensical paragraph in question, that we suspect it not to be the work of the same hands as most of the other resolutions. The strength of the cause lies in the support of those who are influenced by reason and principle; and to attempt to recommend it by sentimentalities, absurd in reason, and inconsistent with the principle on which the movement is founded, is to place a good cause on a level with a bad one.

There are indications that the example of America will be followed on this side of the Atlantic; and the first step has been taken in that part of England where every serious movement in the direction of political progress has its commencement—the manufacturing districts of the North. On the 13th of February 1851, a petition of women, agreed to by a public meeting at Sheffield, and claiming the elective franchise, was presented to the House of Lords by the Earl of Carlisle.^[†]

Appendix D

DRAFT OF A PORTION OF THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1866)

acquired with tenfold greater facility when the ^aexamples of their application^a are already ^bpresent in^b the ^cmind—if this were but done,^c an average schoolboy long before the age at which schooling ^dgenerally^d terminates, ^emight easily^e be able to read ^fwith ease, fluency, and^f intelligent interest any ordinary Latin or Greek author, in prose or verse, ^gmight^g have a competent knowledge of the grammatical structure of both languages, and have had time besides for an ample amount of scientific instruction.^h I am as unwilling to ⁱmentionⁱ all that I think practicable in this matter, as George Stephenson was ^jin the matter of locomotion^j , when he calculated the average speed of a ^krailway^k train at ten miles an hour because if he had estimated it ^lat more^l the practical men ^mwhose cooperation he needed^m would have ⁿdistrustedⁿ him as that most unsafe character in their estimation an enthusiast and a visionary. The results have shewn, in ^othis^o case, who was the real practical man. What the results would shew in the other case I will not^p anticipate. ^qIt is enough to be able to say with confidence^q , that if the two classical languages were properly taught, there would be no need whatever for ^rturning them out of^r the school course in order to have sufficient ^sroom^s for everything else that ^tneeds^t be included therein.

^uThis wonderfully^u limited estimate of what it is possible for human beings to learn, resting upon a tacit assumption that they are already as efficiently taught as they ever can ^vbe,^v not only vitiates ^wthe general conception^w of education, but actually, if we receive it, darkens our anticipations as to the future progress of mankind. For if the inexorable conditions of human life make it useless for one man to attempt to know more than one thing, what is to become of the human intellect as facts accumulate? In every generation, and ^xmore rapidly now^x than ever ^ybefore, the number of things increases,^y which it is necessary that somebody should ^zlearn^z . Every department of ^aour knowledge of the universe^a becomes so loaded with details that ^bif a person^b endeavours to know ^call that is known of it, he^c must confine himself to a smaller and smaller portion of the whole ^dfield,^d every science and art must be ^edivided and subdivided^e , until each man’s ^fspeciality, the region^f which he thoroughly knows, bears about the same ^gproportion^g to the whole ^hfield^h of useful knowledge that the art of putting on a pin’s head does to the field of human industry. Now, ⁱwhen we take this along with the fact certified by experience,ⁱ that there is no one study or pursuit which, practised to the exclusion of all others, does not narrow and pervert the mind^j, breed^j in it a class of prejudices special to that ^kparticular pursuit, and^k a general prejudice common to all narrow specialities against ^lgeneral ideas of all sorts, grounded on^l an incapacity to take ^mthem in or to judge^m of them. ⁿWhat prospect have we before us but that of a human intellectⁿ more and more dwarfed and unfitted for ^oall^o great things, ^pactually by its progress^p in small ones^q? But things^q are not so bad with us: ^rthis is not the fate we need look forward to^r . It is not the utmost limit of human acquirement to know only one thing, but to combine a minute knowledge of one or a few things with a general knowledge of many things. By a general knowledge I do not mean a ^smere vague impression^s . An eminent man one of whose writings is part of the course of this University, Abp. Whately, has well ^tpointed out, that^t a general knowledge ^uis a totally different thing from^u a superficial knowledge. To have a general knowledge of a subject is to know ^vits leading truths, but to^wlearn them with understanding,^w not superficially but thoroughly, so as to have a true conception of the subject ^xas a whole,^x leaving the minor details to those who require ^ythe knowledge of^y them ^zbecause it is their business to follow them out and to apply them. This kind of knowledge does not tend to narrow but to enlarge the mind; it forms^z a body of cultivated intellects, ^acapable of illuminating each his own special studies by the lights derived from the other branches of human knowledge, and constituting a public able to understand and appreciate the processes of thought in other people’s special departments and intelligently follow the lead of those specialists who by their general powers and cultivation of their minds are most capable of leading rightly. Above all, it is this alone which can form minds^a capable of ^bdirecting^b and improving public opinion in the greater concerns of ^chuman^c life. Government and civil society are the most complicated of all subjects accessible to the human mind, and ^dto be competent to deal with them there is great need not only of^d a general knowledge of the leading facts of ^ethe universe in almost all its departments, but of^e an understanding exercised and disciplined in the principles and rules of sound thinking up to a point which ^fno^f one science or branch of knowledge affords^g, and to obtain which it is necessary to be more or less conversant with many^g . Let us understand then, that it ^hought to be our object^h in learning, not merely to know ⁱsome one thing, the thingⁱ which is to be our principal occupation, as well as it can be known but to do this and also to know something of all the great ^jdepartments^j of human ^kknowledge;^k taking care to know that something ^laccurately, or at all events^l marking well the dividing line between what we know accurately and what we do not; and remembering that our object should be to obtain a true view of nature and ^mthe world in its^m broad outline, ⁿbutⁿ that it is ^ouseless^o to throw away time upon the ^pminute^p details of anything which is ^qnot to be^q part of the occupation of our practical energies.

It by no means follows, however, that ^reverything which deserves to be known, and which is capable of being known by everybody who has received a liberal education^r , should be included in the ^scourse^s of school or university studies. ^tSome things, very desirable to be learnt, are learnt better^t out of school or ^uafter^u school years^v are over ^wFor this reason^w I do not agree with those reformers who would ^xassign a place, and an important place,^x in the school^y course, to modern languages. This is not because I attach small importance to ^zthem^* ; no^z one can^a be ^bconsidered well-instructed or cultivated^b who is not familiar with at least the French language ^cand able^c to read French books with ease; and there is great ^dadvantage^d in cultivating a familiarity with German. But living languages are so much more easily acquired ^elater in life,^e by intercourse with those who use them in daily ^flife,^f that it is really waste of time^g to labour at ^htheir acquisition without any^h help but that of books and mastersⁱ . Again, it has always seemed to me a great absurdity that ^jsuch things as^j history and geography should be taught in schools, except ^ka few of the leading facts of both^k in elementary schools for the ^lmass of the people^l . Who ever really learnt history and geography except by private reading? and what an utter failure ^myour^m education must be if it has not given ⁿyourⁿ pupil a sufficient taste for reading to ^omake him seek by that easy process the most interesting^o of all kinds of knowledge? Besides such history and geography as can be taught in schools exercise none of the faculties of the ^pintellect except that of mere^p memory. ^qAt an University indeed it is very important that the pupil^q should be introduced to the Philosophy of History^r—that a Professor^r who not merely ^sknows^s the facts but ^thas^t exercised ^uhis mind^u on them, should initiate ^vthe pupils^v into the causes and explanation, ^was^w far as ^xan explanation is possible^x of the past life of mankind in its ^ymore important features and vicissitudes^y . But of the mere facts of history as commonly ^zbelieved and understood^z , what educated ^aperson^a of any mental activity does not learn ^ball that is of primary importance^b if he is ^conly^c turned loose in an historical library? What ^dis wanted on this subject^d is not that he should be taught it in boyhood, but that^e books should be accessible to him.

The only languages ^ftherefore^f and the only ^gliteratures^g to which I would allow a place in the ordinary ^hcourse of a liberal education^h are those of the Greeks and Romans; to these I would preserve the position ⁱ they at present occupy ^jin it. The importance of these languages in education is twofold: first, the value of languages in general, of studying and knowing^j some other cultivated language and ^ksome other^k literature than one’s own^l: secondly,^l the peculiar value of those particular languages^m .

ⁿThe value, to the human mind, of knowing, and knowing well, more than one language; or I should rather say, the extreme disadvantage of knowing no language but one’s own, is scarcely, I think, generally felt and recognized in all its force. Every thinker or writer who hasⁿ reflected on the causes of human error ^ohas^o been deeply impressed with the ^pnatural^p tendency of mankind to mistake.

Appendix E

JAMAICA COMMITTEE: PUBLIC DOCUMENTS (1866, 1868)

1.

Statement of the Jamaica Committee (1866)

Jamaica Papers, No. III, Statement of the Committee and Other Documents (London: Jamaica Committee, [1866]), 3-7. Concludes: “Signed, on behalf of the Committee, J.S. Mill, Chairman. P.A. Taylor, Treasurer, / F.W. Chesson, Hon. Sec. / 65, Fleet Street, / 27th July, 1866.” Not listed in Mill’s bibliography. Printed, with a few substantive differences, in the Daily News, 30 July, 1866, 3, and, without substantive differences, in the Diplomatic Review, 5 Sept., 1866, 118-19; the variants between the version in the Daily News and the copy-text are given in notes, in which “DN” indicates Daily News.

For comment on this and the other Jamaica documents, see xxvi-xxviii and lxxviii above.

the jamaica committee^[*] wish to explain to the public the motives by which they are actuated, and the objects which they have in view.

When there is reason to believe that a British subject has been illegally put to death, or otherwise illegally punished by a person in authority, it is the duty of the Government to inquire into the case; and if it appears that the offence has been committed, to vindicate the law by bringing the offender to public justice.

From the facts recorded in the Report of the Royal Commissioners of Inquiry,^[†] and in other documents relating to the late disturbances in Jamaica, coupled with the legal opinion of Mr. Edward James and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, published by the Committee,^[*] there appeared strong reason to believe that George William Gordon, Samuel Clarke, Edward Fleming, Charles Mitchell, William Grant, Henry Lawrence, and many other subjects of Her Majesty, both male and female, had been illegally put to death, or flogged, and in some cases flogged and afterwards put to death, and^a the houses of many others^b illegally burnt, by Ex-Governor Eyre, Brigadier Nelson,^[†] and their subordinates and coadjutors. The attention of the Government was therefore called to these cases in Parliament by Mr. Mill, the Chairman of the Committee.^[‡]

The Government not only declined to take any steps for the vindication of the law, but declined on grounds and in a tone which appear to the Committee to aggravate the dangerous aspect of the proceedings in question as infractions of the constitutional liberty of the subject.^[§]

The duty now devolves upon private citizens of taking such measures as the constitution may point out for the defence of those legal and chartered rights which protect the lives and liberties of all.

In undertaking to discharge this duty, so far as circumstances and the means placed at their disposal may permit, the Committee are not, any more than the ordinary ministers of public justice, actuated by vindictive feelings towards those whom they believe to have violated the law. Their aim, besides upholding the obligation of justice and humanity towards all races beneath the Queen’s sway, is to vindicate, by an appeal to judicial authority, the great legal and constitutional principles which have been violated in the late proceedings, and deserted by the Government.

They desire in the first instance to establish, by a judicial sentence, the principle that the illegal execution of a British subject by a person in authority is not merely an error which superiors in office may at their discretion visit with displeasure or condone, but a crime which will certainly be punished by the law. The condition of a British subject will be altered if, for the offence of taking his life without law, a public functionary is to be responsible only to a Minister of the Crown who, in the case most dangerous to public liberty, would obviously be not the censor of his subordinate but his abettor. Our lives and liberties have not been, nor can they be safely allowed to be, under the guardianship of the Executive Government alone; they have been, and it is essential that they should remain, under the guardianship of the law. ^cA Royal Commission of Inquiry, the report of which it is proposed to substitute for the regular inquest of a court of justice in a case affecting the life of the subject, is a tribunal unknown to the constitution, not independent of the Executive, incapable even of entertaining a criminal charge, much more of passing any sentence upon the guilty, and therefore, though useful in instructing the Government, not competent to protect the lives of British citizens, or to fulfil the ends of public justice.^c

In the second place, the Committee desire to challenge in a Court of Justice the jurisdiction of courts of martial law, which, as the late events show, may be made engines of indiscriminate butchery and torture; to obtain a judicial answer to the question whether military and naval officers, untrained to judicial investigation, and inflamed, probably, by the passions of the crisis, can legally try and torture or put to death the subjects of Her Majesty for high treason and other civil offences without a jury or any adequate security for justice, and without necessarily keeping even a record of the proceedings; and to have it determined by authority whether the law which these courts assume to administer is really law at all, or sanguinary licence which the law will repress and punish.

The mere refusal of Mr. Eyre’s superiors in office to reinstate him in his government affords little satisfaction to the community as regards the first of these objects, and none at all as regards the second. In the Dispatch conveying that decision some parts of his conduct are disapproved; but he is not pronounced to have violated the law; and the resolution not to retain him in office is put at last mainly on the ground that a new form of government is about to be inaugurated in the Island, and that it is better to intrust this “arduous task” to some person “who may approach it free from all the difficulties inseparable from a participation in the questions raised by the recent troubles.”^[*] The execution of Mr. Gordon is condemned in more positive terms; but it is condemned as a stretch of severity uncalled for in the particular case, not as an infraction of public rights and principles of justice sacred in all cases alike. The practice of trying British subjects for high treason and other civil offences by court-martial is not repudiated in this Dispatch; while the language of Mr. Disraeli, in his reply to Mr. Mill’s questions, admits that the proclamation of martial law is the suspension of all law,^[†] and exposes the lives of British subjects to irresponsible butchery.

The form of the legal proceedings prescribed by the law in such a case, and the issue in the event of those proceedings proving successful, the Committee must leave to be determined by the law itself, of which they take ^dthe regulation of the penalty by the exercise of^d the prerogative of mercy to be a part. It is not their fault if the law of England, instead of assigning a specific remedy against a public functionary guilty of contriving the death of an English citizen, includes the offence among those the common remedy for which is an indictment for murder;^[*] nor can the Committee admit that public justice ought on that account to be allowed to fail.

In deciding on their legal course, however, the Committee have hitherto consulted,^[†] and will continue to consult, professional advisers of the highest eminence and the most unbiassed judgment.

When indeed the Committee consider the circumstances of such a case as that of Mr. Gordon—the political antagonism which previously subsisted between him and Governor Eyre—the apparent absence of any ground of military necessity for taking the life of a man who was a helpless captive in the hands of the authorities—the eagerness with which the Governor personally interposed to arrest him and carry him^e from the place where he was living under the protection of the common law to one where it was supposed that his life might with impunity be taken without a regular trial—^fthe voice of warning raised in vain by a member of the Council,^[‡] who, seeing the Governor’s intention, suggested that Mr. Gordon should be tried before a civil court—^fthe composition of the court, which, by its combined incompetence and ruthlessness, cut off all hope alike of justice and of mercy—the pitiless manner in which the accused was deprived of all legal advice and assistance, and of the benefit of evidence which might have been given in his favour—the interception and destruction of the letter of advice sent open to the Brigadier-General for the guidance of the prisoner in pleading,^[§] and the refusal of the brief delay necessary to call a most important witness^[¶] who resided almost on the spot—the evidence on which the conviction was founded, and the total insufficiency of which to support the charge must have been palpable to any man of common understanding—the warm approval of the sentence upon that evidence by the Governor^[∥] after the date at which, by his own account, the insurrection had been got under,^[**] and when, consequently, the plea of military necessity could no longer have any force—they must confess that this is not a case which they would particularly shrink from submitting to the investigation of a court of justice.

If the execution of Mr. Gordon was illegal, and, in the eye of the law, a murder, it was a murder of which Mr. Eyre was not only constructively but personally guilty; which was committed not only under his authority, but, to all intents and purposes, with his own hand.

To lay it down that proof of private malice is indispensable in order to make an illegal execution a murder, would be to hold out impunity to the crime which is the most dangerous of all to the community—the crime of a public functionary who abuses the power entrusted to him to compass, under the forms of justice, the death of a citizen obnoxious to the Government. ^gTo lay it down that the plea of good intentions is sufficient to divest an act of criminality would be, in like manner, to hold out impunity to all political homicide: since all who commit political homicide, whether the agents of a Government or its opponents, believe that the political object which they have in view is good.^g

The Government of Jamaica institutes a prosecution for murder against Mr. Ramsay,^[*] the Provost-Marshal, though it is not suggested that his cruelties were committed from any feelings of private malice against the victims. Mr. Cardwell advises Sir Henry Storks, as Governor of Jamaica, to cause careful investigation to be made in those cases which appear to require it, with a view to such further proceedings as may be requisite and just. “Great offences,” he says, “must be punished.”^[†] It is to be presumed that he would not except the great offences of great offenders.

In attempting to vindicate the law against the violence of persons in authority, the Committee will take care to give no pretence for the charge that they are showing sympathy with disorder. The gentlemen who represented them in Jamaica^[‡] went out with strict instructions to lend no assistance or countenance to any persons who had suffered for real complicity in the late disturbances. The Committee will themselves act in the spirit of these instructions; and they will further abstain from founding proceedings on any case which appears to be fairly covered by the plea of^h necessity. They have no desire to abet resistance to lawful authority or to weaken the arm of the magistrate in preserving public order. But, on the other hand, they would remind their fellow-citizens that hopeless wrong is the sure parent of rebellion, and that its best antidote is the hope of constitutional redress.

The Committee, then, submit that they are endeavouring to defend public liberty against aggression from public motives, and by the means pointed out by law; and that they may justly claim the sympathy and support of all to whom public liberty is dear.

* * * * *

2.

Address to Friends of the Jamaica Committee (1866)

Examiner, 13 Oct., 1866 (2nd ed.), 647. Headed: “The Jamaica Committee / The Jamaica Committee have issued the following address to their friends throughout the country: 65. Fleet-street, London, October, 1866.” Not listed in Mill’s bibliography. Printed also, without substantive variants, and with the same heading, in the Daily News, 12 Oct., 1866, 3. Signed: John Stuart Mill, M.P., Chairman: P.A. Taylor, M.P., Treasurer: F.W. Chesson, Hon. Secretary: / Thomas Barnes, M.P., John Bright, M.P., Joseph Cowen, M.P., J.E. Cairnes, Henry Fawcett, M.P., Thomas Hughes, M.P., Wilfrid Lawson, Bart., J.M. Ludlow, Duncan M’Laren, M.P., S. Morley, F.W. Newman, R.N. Philips, M.P., T.B. Potter, M.P., Humphrey Sandwith, C.B., Goldwin Smith, Herbert Spencer, James White, M.P.

sir,—For the reasons set forth in the accompanying “Statement”^[*] —to which particular attention is requested—the Jamaica Committee resolved to undertake the duty which the Government had declined, of submitting to judicial investigation the conduct of Governor Eyre and his subordinates in putting to death Mr. Gordon and other British subjects for treason, sedition, and other alleged offences without a lawful trial.

The subscriptions and guarantees already received have justified the committee in taking the first steps; and they hope, by the time the courts resume their sittings, to be in possession of the opinion of eminent counsel as to the form of indictment and method of procedure.

The process, owing to the distance of Jamaica and other circumstances, will be very expensive; and it is evident that the committee will have to encounter a powerful resistance backed by all the resources of wealth. They deem it necessary, therefore, to appeal to the public to raise the fund to 10,000l. Your personal aid is earnestly requested, both in the form of subscription or guarantee, and in that of endeavouring to secure the co-operation of your friends.

In making this appeal, the committee desire once more to state that their sole object is to vindicate the law.

That the law has not yet been vindicated, that the principles of public liberty and justice impugned by the acts of Governor Eyre and his subordinates have not yet been effectively asserted, that no adequate security has been obtained against a repetition of such acts by men in power for the future, the Southampton banquet, the sentiments expressed at that banquet,^[*] the doctrines propounded by the chairman and other members of the Eyre Defence and Aid Committee,^[†] and the bearing of Mr. Eyre himself, are sufficient proofs. The conduct of the ex-governor, so far from being repented of or repudiated, is held up as a model for imitation; and the committee submit that, as the matter at present stands, the public cannot feel assured that British subjects, who may have given offence to a party in power, will not again be put to death without lawful trial, or that those who have been concerned in such proceedings will not again be applauded, caressed, and marked out for future reward and honour by peers, members of parliament, chaplains of her Majesty, magistrates, and other persons in high station.

The only adequate, as well as the only constitutional safeguard, is the decision of a court of justice, which, as the committee submit, those supporters of the ex-governor who believe that Mr. Gordon, Mr. Clarke, and Mr. Lawrence came lawfully and fairly to their ends ought to be the last to decline.

The committee also desire once more, in reply to persistent misrepresentation, to repeat that the acts for which they are about to prosecute were not done in the suppression of the so-called rebellion. Mr. Gordon, Mr. Clarke, and Mr. Lawrence all suffered after the period at which, as Mr. Eyre himself expressly stated, the insurrection had been completely crushed.^[‡] They suffered, there is reason to suspect, for offence given to the party in power, quite independently of the disturbances, with which no one of the three was proved to have been connected in any way whatever.

While the interests of public liberty form the most obvious ground for an effectual protest against the lawless violence of persons in authority, it must not be forgotten that justice is also due to the memory, and to the families of those who have been put to a felon’s death, and buried as felons beneath the gallows, for crimes of which there is reason to believe they were not lawfully or justly convicted.

The committee commend to your support an undertaking which they believe to be essential to the interests of public liberty and justice. They have come forward as private individuals to put the law in motion only on the positive and almost contumacious refusal of the Government to do its duty, by inquiring into the cases in which there was reason to believe the lives of subjects of her Majesty had been illegally taken. But having come forward, they will not fail the public, if the public will not fail them.

P.S.—Subscriptions should be forwarded to the treasurer, Mr. P.A. Taylor, M.P., Aubrey-house, Notting-hill; or to Mr. F. W. Chesson, the hon. secretary, 65 Fleet-street, London.

* * * * *

3

Statement of the Jamaica Committee (1868)

London: The Jamaica Committee, 1868, Headed: “To the Members of the Jamaica Committee”; signed: “John Stuart Mill, Chairman: P.A. Taylor, Treasurer: F.W. Chesson, Hon. Sec.”, and dated London, 15 July, 1868. Not listed in Mill’s bibliography. Accompanied by the following letter from Chesson, dated as the statement, from 65 Fleet St.: “Dear Sir, I beg to send you, as a Member of the (General) Jamaica Committee, the enclosed statement, explanatory of the course which your Executive Committee has followed, and of the conclusion at which they have arrived. The Executive Committee propose to call together the whole body of Subscribers in the course of the Autumn, of which you will of course receive due notice. In the meantime I need hardly say we shall be happy to receive any suggestions or opinions with which you may please to favour us.” The only copies of the statement located are in the Mill-Taylor Collection, British Library of Political and Economic Science.

the attempt to call Mr. Eyre to account for his conduct as Governor of Jamaica, under the Colonial Governors’ Act,^[*] being at an end, the Grand Jury of Middlesex having thrown out the Bill,^[†] the Executive Committee are of opinion that the duty which they undertook of exhausting all the methods afforded by the criminal law of bringing the case under the cognizance of justice has now been performed.

So much misconception has prevailed, and has been fostered by the language of those who were opposed to an inquiry, that it may be desirable to recall to mind the leading facts.

A district in the Island of Jamaica had been the scene of a disturbance, caused as it appears, in part at least, by a system of misrule under which (according to the testimony of the present Governor, Sir J.P. Grant) in minor criminal cases, those mainly affecting the people, the system of legal procedure was extremely bad, and in civil matters for the poorer classes there was no justice at all, while there was nothing worthy to be called a police.^* The disturbance, though sanguinary in its first outbreak, was suppressed without difficulty, no stand being ever made by the peasantry against the troops engaged in its suppression. The outbreak having occurred on October 11th, on the 20th the Governor reported, in a letter to the Colonial Secretary, that “the rebellion had been crushed.”^[*] Nevertheless, for more than three weeks after this date, and even for many days after he had, on the 30th October, issued a proclamation of amnesty, declaring that the rebellion had been subdued—when all excuse of military necessity for summary proceedings was at end, and every person suspected of complicity in the disturbance might have been brought before the regular courts of justice—he continued to license the shooting, hanging and flogging of the peasantry, without distinction of sex, and the destruction of their houses and property, under the name and colour of martial law. According to the Report of the Royal Commissioners of Inquiry, 439 persons in all were put to death, not less than 600 were flogged, and 1000 houses were burned.^[†] For a whole month there was a reign of terror. At one place, on a single day, 30 men and 20 women were flogged; the men with cats twisted with piano-wire, of which the Royal Commissioners of Inquiry, before whom portions of some of the cats were produced, say that it is painful to think that any man should have used such an instrument for the torturing of his fellow-creatures.^[‡] Persons were tried and put to death under martial law for acts done, and even for words spoken, before the proclamation of martial law. A peasant, named Samuel Clarke, was hanged some days after the proclamation of amnesty, for words spoken two months before the proclamation of martial law, his only specified offence being that he had, at that time, declared with an oath that a letter signed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies was a lie.^[§] The case of the Hon. G.W. Gordon was in its constitutional aspect still more grave.^[¶] A member of the Legislature of Jamaica, and a leading opponent of the government of Mr. Eyre, he was taken by the Governor himself out of the protection of the common law, carried into the proclaimed district, handed over to a so-called court-martial presided over by Lieutenant Brand, of whose fitness to sit as judge in a case of life or death the public has since had sufficient means of forming an opinion, and put to death, with the express sanction of Mr. Eyre;^[∥] to whom the sentence had been specially submitted, with an intimation from the commanding officer, General Nelson, that there was no military necessity for a summary execution: and this on evidence which the Royal Commissioners pronounce to have been wholly insufficient to support the charge,^[*] and which is characterized by the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench, not only as legally “inadmissible before any properly-constituted tribunal,” but as “morally worthless.”^[†] “No one, I think,” says the same authority, “who has the faintest idea of what the administration of justice involves, could deem the proceedings on this trial consistent with justice, or, to use a homely phrase, with that fair play which is the right of the commonest criminal.” “All I can say,” proceeds the Lord Chief Justice, “is that if, on martial law being proclaimed, a man can lawfully be thus tried, condemned and sacrificed, such a state of things is a scandal and a reproach to the institutions of this great and free country; and, as a minister of justice, profoundly imbued with a sense of what is due to the first and greatest of earthly obligations, I enter my solemn and emphatic protest against the lives of men being thus dealt with in the time to come.”^[‡]

The gravity of these events, in a constitutional point of view, and the necessity of bringing the case before a legal tribunal in the interest of public liberty and justice, were enhanced by the language of certain classes and of certain journalists in this country, who applauded the arbitrary violence of Mr. Eyre; by the publications of legal writers, the advocates of prerogative, who took occasion to uphold martial law as exemplified in the acts of the Governor and his subordinates in Jamaica (and notably in the trial and execution of Mr. Gordon) putting forth doctrines which the Lord Chief Justice denounces as “dangerous and pernicious,” and of which he says that he “almost shuddered when he read them,”^[§] and, above all, by the attitude of the ministers of the Crown, one of whom, when questioned on the subject in Parliament, maintained, in effect, that martial law, when proclaimed, exempted those assuming to act under it from responsibility for their actions, however criminal and oppressive, to the laws and legal tribunals of the land,^* while his colleague defended the execution of Mr. Gordon, without reference to legality, as “practically just.”^†

Acting, as they have acted throughout, under the legal guidance of counsel at once eminent and dispassionate,^[¶] the Executive Committee proceeded to try the question whether an officer of the Crown, who had illegally taken the life of a British subject, was or was not responsible to the law. This was done by proceeding at common law against Mr. Eyre and his subordinates, General Nelson and Lieut. Brand, for the illegal execution of Mr. Gordon. The subordinates were committed for trial by Sir Thomas Henry, the chief magistrate of the metropolitan district, but the Grand Jury of London threw out the Bill.^[*] Mr. Eyre himself, acting, as was stated, under the advice of his Committee, had retired into Shropshire, where he was under the jurisdiction of the county magistrates, who, upon application being made to them, refused to commit him for trial.^[†] The case against Mr. Eyre was now laid in its completeness before the Attorney-General, that the investigation, which the Shropshire Justices of the Peace refused, might, under his authority and on his motion, be obtained; but the Attorney-General declined to act.^[‡] Much time was next spent in endeavouring to bring Mr. Eyre, who had left Shropshire, but whose movements the Solicitor of the Committee found great difficulty in tracing, before a magistrate legally educated, and upon whose impartiality reliance could be placed. When, at length, this was effected, the magistrate^[§] refused to commit, on the technical ground that General Nelson and Lieutenant Brand were the principals in the execution of Mr. Gordon, while Mr. Eyre was only an accessory, and that the Bill against the principals having been thrown out by the Grand Jury, the accessory ought not to be committed on that charge. Thus baffled by the forms of law, the Executive Committee made a final attempt, under the advice of their counsel, to bring the case before a jury under the Colonial Governors’ Act. Under that Act the magistrate,^[¶] after first seeking the direction of the Court of Queen’s Bench as to his jurisdiction in the matter, committed Mr. Eyre for trial; but the Grand Jury of Middlesex threw out the Bill.

In accordance with their pledge, and in consistency with the instructions given by them to their legal representatives in Jamaica, the Executive Committee have abstained from calling in question any act done by an officer of the Crown in the suppression of insurrection. They have confined the proceedings to acts done after the insurrection had, in the recorded opinion of the Governor himself, been put down, and when, in the judgment of his chief military subordinate, the military necessity was at an end.

Nor would the Executive Committee have assumed to themselves and their constituents in any case the invidious function of setting the law in motion, if the Government had shewn any disposition to perform that duty. Once, as has already been stated, they attempted, and they would at any time have been ready, to transfer the matter to the hands of the Law Officers of the Crown. But the Government, though it instituted proceedings against some of the subordinate agents in Jamaica, wholly refused to take any steps for submitting the conduct of the principal agents to a judicial investigation here.^[*] The duty of vindicating the law, when thus abandoned by the Government, is cast, by the principles of the English constitution, on private citizens; if private citizens declined it, there would be no check on the illegal conduct of officers of the Crown.

For the inappropriateness, uncertainty and awkwardness of the remedies provided by the law against a Colonial Governor guilty of oppression, and the protraction of the legal proceedings thereby occasioned, the Executive Committee are not responsible. Nor are they responsible for the unavoidable delay incurred in bringing witnesses from Jamaica, or for that caused by the difficulty of finding Mr. Eyre within the jurisdiction of a professional minister of the law. Due allowance being made for these impediments, the proceedings have been carried on with all possible despatch.

The difficulty of bringing evidence from Jamaica not only occasioned loss of time and expenditure of money, but prevented the case from being presented before the public in the Courts of Law, with its full moral force, the Executive Committee being compelled to content themselves with no more testimony than what was technically sufficient to support the charge.

The proceedings of the Committee may be said to have had three objects—to obtain a judicial inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Eyre and his subordinates; to settle the law in the interest of justice, liberty and humanity, and to arouse public morality against oppression generally, and particularly against the oppression of subject and dependent races.

The first object has not been attained. The Grand Jury in Jamaica threw out the Bill in the case of Provost-Marshal Ramsay (who had hanged a man for a gesture made, or an exclamation uttered under the torture of the lash) notwithstanding the declaration of the presiding judge that a trial was essential to the interests of public justice.^[†] The county Magistrates of Shropshire, and the Grand Juries of London and Middlesex, have interposed their authority to prevent a judicial inquiry into the case of a British citizen put to death “unlawfully and unjustifiably,” in the words of the Lord Chief Justice,^[‡] by an officer of the Crown. In each case the public must be left to judge whether the result was due to the want of ground for an inquiry, or to the determination of those who interposed that no inquiry should take place. On the other hand, it is needless to say that Mr. Eyre is in error when he speaks of himself as having been twice acquitted.^[*] As there has been no trial, there can have been no acquittal; and in that respect the question remains exactly where it was before these proceedings were commenced.

The second object has been attained. The memorable charge of the Lord Chief Justice in the case of Nelson and Brand will remain, as the Executive Committee believe, a lasting barrier against the encroachment of martial law and its upholders on the rights and liberties of British subjects. If the subsequent charge of Mr. Justice Blackburn^[†] in some respects differed from that of the Lord Chief Justice, the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice is known to be shared by every other member of the Court. But even Mr. Justice Blackburn did not maintain, as some lawyers had maintained, that the power of proclaiming martial law formed a part of the prerogative of the Crown in England. His doctrine was limited to Jamaica, and was founded on Acts of the Colonial Legislature, which, with all Colonial Acts of a similar character, have now, and in consequence of the manifestation of public opinion respecting the events in Jamaica, been repealed.^[‡] British jurisprudence, therefore, has been finally purged of martial law. The committal of Mr. Eyre, General Nelson and Lieutenant Brand, for trial, by London Magistrates, has moreover confirmed the principle that the officers of the Crown are responsible in the ordinary course of justice to the Courts of Law for acts done by them in the suppression, or alleged suppression, of insurrection.

With regard to the third object, also, the Executive Committee feel that the efforts of the Jamaica Committee have been well repaid. A great amount of sound public opinion has been called forth; and it is not unreasonable to think that this has contributed to the escape of the nation from any thing which could leave a stain on its humanity or honour in the suppression of the recent disturbances in Ireland, where there were not wanting cruel and panic-stricken advocates of a proclamation of martial law. That sympathy with Mr. Eyre and with his policy should at the same time be exhibited in the quarters where it prevailed, was inevitable. It was inevitable also, that this sympathy should take the form of charges of vindictiveness, malignity and persecution against those who, without the slightest personal feeling, were endeavouring to discharge the unwelcome but indispensable duty of guarding public liberty and vindicating the law; nor was it unnatural that such charges should find acceptance among the unthinking, when, from the lapse of time, the agony of so many hundreds of sufferers had been forgotten, and the annoyance inflicted by legal proceedings on the author of the suffering alone remained present to the mind. In answer to the charge of persecution, so far as it is founded on the protraction of the proceedings, the Executive Committee repeat, that for this protraction they are not responsible. Had Mr. Eyre been advised to meet justice like his subordinates, his case would have been brought to as prompt a hearing as those of General Nelson and Lieutenant Brand.

Appendix F

TEXTUAL EMENDATIONS

in this list, following the page and line numbers, the reading of the copy-text is given first, and then the emended reading in square brackets, with explanations if required. “SC” indicates Mill’s own copies of the texts in Somerville College, Oxford. Typographical errors in versions other than the copy-text are ignored. When the copy-text is a manuscript, end-of-line punctuation, frequently omitted by Mill, is supplied when necessary for the sense.

5.10 end.^† [end.”^†] [restyled in this ed.]

5n.7 parceque [parce que] [as in Source]

6.3 libel. [libel?] [for sense]

7.11 reason, [reason] [as elsewhere in paragraph]

18.24 reign—. [reign?] [as in Source]

24n.3 Wils. [Wils. K.B.] [as in Source]

27.38 defence.” [defence.’] [restyled in this ed.]

29.20 Yorke, . . . .) [Yorke . . .).] [to conform to usual practice]

29n.1 Holt’s Rep. [Holt K.B.] [for consistency]

31.20 begins [begin] [as in Source]

31.21 formed’ [formed.’] [restyled in this ed.]

32.14 party” [party.’] [restyled in this ed.]

33.41 witness’ [witness.’] [restyled in this ed.]

53.1 early a brilliant [early or brilliant] [corrected by JSM in SC copy]

54.19 people. Our [people; our] [altered to people, Our by JSM in SC copy: treated as incomplete revision]

56.10 an author [our author] [corrected by JSM in SC copy]

67.32 three [3] [for consistency]

67n.1 .) [).]

68.39 No.” [“No.”]

72.15 avoirdupoise [avoirdupois] [as in Source]

78.6 another? [another.] [corrected by JSM in SC copy]

79.17 merely [surely] [corrected by JSM in SC copy]

79.25 self defence [self-defence] [as elsewhere in paragraph]

93.39 highest [briefest] [corrected by JSM in SC copy]

113.41 refrein [refrain] [as in 59^1,2]

150.42 lawless, [lawless] [as in Source and 64]

152.29 as [as,] [as in Source and 64]

152.34 His [His] [as in Source]

155.5-6 “There . . . slaveholder,” . . . Georgia, . . . “in [“‘There . . . slaveholder,’ Georgia,” . . . “‘in] [restyled in this ed.]

155.18 owner.” [owner.”’] [restyled in this ed.]

155.33-8 “is . . . peculiarities.” [“‘is . . . peculiarities.”’]

164.24 made [made by] [as in 62^1,2,64, and for sense]

173.24 as as a [as a]

179.28 motion [notion] [as in 63,75]

179.33 every one [everyone] [as in previous sentence, and 63^1,2]

270.10 parliament [Parliament] [as elsewhere in work]

309.33 themselves; (if [themselves (if] [to conform to usual practice]

309.36 ) [).] [to conform to usual practice]

315.2 Stael [Stael]

324.20 she [he] [for sense]

347.1 nations, [nations] [as in 75, and for sense]

351.23 imprisonmǝnt [imprisonment]

353.11 analagous [analogous] [incorrect also in 71¹]

355.1 , that, [that] [as in 71¹]

355.1 divorce, [divorce] [as in 71¹]

356.18 self supporting [self-supporting] [as in 71¹]

356.23 licences [licenses] [as in answer, 71¹, and elsewhere]

356.30 brothel keepers [brothel-keepers] [as elsewhere in passage]

357.23 practice [practise] [as in 71¹]

358.5 Goverment [Government]

358.35 themselves we [themselves, we] [as in 71¹]

359.5 before-hand [beforehand] [as elsewhere in passage, end-of-line hyphen in 71¹]

359.5 practicing [practising] [as in 71¹]

359.21 fault, [fault.]

359.25 from [for] [for sense]

360.2 alone, [alone] [as in 71¹]

360.3 into [in] [as in 71¹]

361.14 working. [working?] [as in 71¹]

362.13 council [counsel] [as in 71¹and elsewhere in passage]

364.8 anotherreason [another reason]

365.7 inconsistent, [inconsistent] [for sense]

366.12 evidence? [evidence.]

366.34-5 more generally than are now in practice. I should say, if you found a decided measures of that sort with regard to the destitute classes person [lines restored to their proper order as in 71¹]

367.22 remdy [remedy]

368.23 cousidered [considered]

368.39 still go [go still] [as in 71¹and for sense]

369.26 licence [license] [as in 71¹, and elsewhere in passage]

371.3 commission [Commission] [as in 71¹, and elsewhere in passage]

378.4 changable [changeable] [slip of the pen?]

379.26 this [This] [slip of the pen?]

381.7 elector, [elector?] [as elsewhere in passage]

381.11 what [What] [as elsewhere in passage]

381.15 they were [they] [slip of the pen]

381.19 there, [there.] [for consistency]

381.32 They [they] [incomplete revision]

382.19 occupations; [occupations?] [end of page]

382.36 life” [life,”]

383.35 other. [other,] [incomplete revision]

388.22 it is [it as] [slip of the pen]

389.7 majority [the majority] [slip of the pen]

389.30 Women” It [Women,” it] [incomplete revision]

395.37 [½-line space added]

403.2 parliament [Parliament] [as elsewhere in passage]

417.13 accumulate. [accumulate?] [as in printed version]

417.18 man’ [man’s] [slip of the pen]

430.22 Clark [Clarke] [as in Source]

431.24 “he almost [he “almost]

431.29 land,”* [land,*] [the passage is not a quotation, and the opening quotation marks are not in the text]

434.23 Committe [Committee]

Appendix G

Bibliographical Index of Persons and Works Cited, with Variants and Notes

like most nineteenth-century authors, Mill is cavalier in his approach to sources, sometimes identifying them with insufficient care, and occasionally quoting them inaccurately. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the Index proper). Included here also are (at the end of the appendix) references to parliamentary documents, entered in order of date under the heading “Parliamentary Papers,” and references to statute law, entered by country in order of date under the heading “Statutes.” The material otherwise is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each person or work quoted or referred to. Anonymous articles in newspapers are entered in order of date under the title of the particular newspaper. References to mythical and fictional characters are excluded. The following abbreviations are used. PD for Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, and PP for Parliamentary Papers.

The entries take the following form.

1. Identification, author, title, etc. in the usual bibliographic form. When only a surname is given, no other identification has been found.

2. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, Somerville College, Oxford (referred to as SC), and any other relevant information.

3. Lists of the pages where works are reviewed, quoted, and referred to.

4. In the case of quotations, a list of substantive variants between Mill’s text and his source, in this form. Page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).

The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. The original wording is supplied where Mill has omitted two sentences or less, only the length of other omissions is given. There being uncertainty about the actual Classical texts used by Mill, the Loeb editions are cited when possible.

Abbott, Charles.

note: the quotation and the reference are from Thomas Jonathan Wooler, A Verbatim Report (q.v. for the collation).

quoted: 31

referred to: 30

Aberdeen, Lord. See George Gordon.

Adderley, Charles Bowyer. Speech on the Disturbances in Jamaica (31 July, 1866, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 184, cols. 1785-97.

quoted: 431

431.30 “practically just”] At all events. I do not wish to press that point, but I may say that, although there is some question about the illegality of the arrest, and the sufficiency of evidence, there is less question about the practical justice of the result (col. 1794)

Addison, Joseph.The Spectator, No. 160 (1 Sept., 1711).

note: reprinted in collections under the title “The Vision of Mirzah.”

referred to: 198

Aesop.Aesop’s Fables. Trans. Vernon Stanley Vernon Jones. London: Heinemann, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1912

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Aesopi Phrygis fabulae graece et latine, cum alus opusculis (Pladunes Collection) (Basel. Heruagius, 1544) is in SC. The reference at 53 is to the fable of “The Lioness and the Vixen”, that at 112 is to “The Fox without a Tail.”

referred to: 53, 112

Albret, Jeanne d’.

note: mother of Henri IV of France.

referred to: 401

Anderson, William Wemyss. Letter to George W. Gordon (Oct., 1865). In Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Jamaica Royal Commission, PP, 1866, XXXI, 805

referred to: 425

Anne (of England). Referred to: 252

Anon. “Mr. Carlyle on the Negroes,” The Inquirer, VIII (8 Dec., 1849), 769-70.

quoted: 95

95.28 “a . . . devil”] It is a . . . Devil, the fostering of a tyrannical prejudice (770)

Anon. Review of Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia, by M. Victor Cousin. Translated by Sarah Austin. Monthly Repository, n.s. VIII (May, 1834), 383

note: in the list of “New Publications.”

referred to: 63

Applegarth, Robert. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25.

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Applegarth, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 369-71

referred to: 350

Aristotle. Referred to: 225, 229, 230, 238, 302

— The “Art” of Rhetoric (Greek and English). Trans. J.H. Freese. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. De rhetorica seu arte dicendi libri (Greek and Latin). ed. Theodor Goulston (London: Griffin, 1619), is in SC.

referred to: 175, 229

— The Nicomachean Ethics (Greek and English). Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference Another ed. (Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1716) in SC.

referred to: 229

— Politics (Greek and English). Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1932.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Another ed. Politica, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1810), is in SC.

referred to: 229, 269

Arnold, Thomas. Referred to: 222

Aspasia. Referred to: 314

Attila. Referred to: 140

Austin, John.

note: the references at 54, 57, 179, and 204 are to Austin’s delivery of the lectures eventually fully published as Lectures on Jurisprudence, q.v.

referred to: 54, 56, 57, 167-8, 169, 172-3, 179, 181, 182, 202-4

— Lectures on Jurisprudence. Ed. Sarah Austin. 3 vols. London: Murray, 1863.

note: Vol. I is a reprint (identified as 3rd ed.) of the 2nd ed. (1861) of The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, q.v. As the review in which the quotations and references to this version of this work are in a review of the Lectures, they (and the collations) are given here the quotations at 172, 173n-4n, 177, and 204 are from and the references at 175, 176, 176-8, 202, and 203 to The Province identified also as Vol. I of Lectures. See also the references at 54, 57, 179 and 204 to the delivery of the lectures.

reviewed: 165-205

quoted: 172, 173n-4n, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 183-4, 184, 185, 185n, 186, 188-91, 191, 191-2, 192, 192-3, 194, 195, 196-7, 201, 204, 205n

referred to: 245-6

172.2-4 In . . . law “most . . . terms” . . . “are not names of . . . objects.”] Though that, indeed, is a name which will hardly denote them distinctly for, like most . . . terms in . . . law, it is not the name of . . . objects * [footnote omitted] (I, 14)

174n.1-2 “a cause . . . nothing . . . cure.”] To the absence of this distinction (a cause . . . naught . . . cure), the greater compactness of the Roman system, with its greater symmetry and clearness, are mainly imputable (I, xciv n)

174n.10 mass] mess (II, 154)

177.14 “If] But to say this is to talk absurdly for every object which is measured, or every object which is brought to a test, is compared with a given object other than itself.—If (I, 116n)

179.16 “all] [paragraph] Now (as I shall endeavour to demonstrate in this evening’s discourse) all (II, 56)

179.17 considered universally] considered universally (II, 56)

179.17 generality.”] generality, and may be compressed into a single proposition, or into a few short propositions (II, 56)

180.21 “a] Now a (II, 52)

180.23-4 “a right . . . burthen,” . . . “an absurdity.”] [paragraph] For, 1st, in purely onerous conditions, the mark is not to be found a right . . . burthen, being an absurdity (II, 395)

181.9 “to] [paragraph] But before we can determine the import “Injury” and “Sanction” (or can distinguish the compulsion or restraint, which is implied in Duty or Obligation, from that compulsion or restraint which is merely physical), we must try to (II, 79)

182.36-7 “law . . . lawyers.”] For law . . . lawyers, is not committed to writing ab initio, although it may afterwards be recorded in legal treatises, or may be adopted by the supreme legislature and promulged in a written form (II, 195)

183.31-2 “that . . . authority.”] [paragraph] But though every positive law exists as positive law through the position or institution given to it by a sovereign government, it is supposed by a multitude of writers on general and particular jurisprudence, that . . . authority (II, 221)

183.36 “much] [paragraph] Again Much (II, 235)

184.4-5 “puerile fiction.”] But the opinions of both, as determining the decisions of the tribunals, may be considered as causes of that law, which (in spite of the puerile fiction about immemorial usage) is notoriously introduced by judges acting in their judicial capacity (II, 236)

184.20 “thoroughly] Since it is peculiar to Ulpian, and since no attempt to apply it occurs in the Pandects or Institutes, it can scarcely be considered the natural Law of the Romans,* [footnote omitted] nor can it be fairly imputed to the body of the Classical Jurists who (heaven knows) have enough to answer for, in that they adopted from the Greeks the other jus naturale, and were thus the remote authors of that modern Law of Nature which has so thoroughly (II, 240-1)

185.14 “omnipotent with barbarians”] They arose in early ages, and in the infancy of the human mind, partly from caprices of the fancy (which are nearly omnipotent with barbarians), and partly from the imperfect apprehension of general utility which is the consequence of narrow experience. (I, 58)

185n.3 “I could point,” . . . “at] If I liked, I could point at (II, 273)

185n.5-6 misunderstood] misapprehended (II, 273)

186.10-11 “not . . . human] [paragraph] But since their human authors copied them from divine originals, which were known to those human authors through a perfectly infallible index, they are not . . . human (II, 261)

186.15-17 “every . . . any] It comprises every . . . any (II, 260)

188.22 First A] First: As I showed in my last lecture, a (II, 359)

188.38 “law . . . And] law, provided (that is to say) that the statute law with which the rule is compared, be not only expressed in abstract and brief expressions, but also in such expressions as are apt and unambiguous as may be. For (as I shall show immediately) the very indeterminateness of its form (or the very indeterminateness of the signs by which it is signified or indicated) renders a judiciary law less uncertain in effect than a statute law unaptly and dubiously worded. But, assuming that a statute law is aptly and unambiguously worded, (or as aptly and unambiguously worded as the subject and language will permit,) it is more accessible and knowable than a rule of judiciary law which must be obtained through the process to which I have adverted above [paragraph] And (II, 360)

189.5-6 constructed. . . . [paragraph] There] constructed [ellipsis indicates 8-paragraph omission] [paragraph] Fourthly. For the reasons which I assigned in my last lecture, and for others which I passed in silence, there (II, 361-2)

189.48 [I] [v.v. I (II, 364)

190.3 Not] v.v. Not (II, 364)

190.7 Forms, . . . legislature.] [paragraph] The] v.v. Forms, . . . legislature.] [2-paragraph omission] [paragraph] The (II, 364)

190.13-14 skill. . . . [paragraph] Fifthly] skill [ellipsis indicates 4-paragraph omission] [paragraph] Fifthly (II, 365)

190.19-20 rule was decided? . . . [paragraph] We] rule were decided? [ellipsis indicatey 1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] In fine, we (II, 365-6)

190.25-6 obviated. . . . [paragraph] Sixthly] obviated [ellipsis indicates 4-paragraph and 2-note omission] [paragraph] Sixthly (II, 366-7)

190.32-3 Romilly [paragraph] “Not] Romilly, in that admirable article on Codification which I ventured to criticize in my last evening’s discourse [paragraph] The passage is as follows [paragraph] “Not (II, 367)

190.48 authority.” [paragraph] [Hence] authority.”* [footnote and 1 paragraph omitted] [paragraph] v.v. Hence (II, 368)

191.2 Hence] v.v. Hence (II, 368)

191.11 though the] though (for the reasons which I stated in my last lecture, and to which I shall revert immediately) the (II, 368)

191.13-14 question . . . [paragraph] Seventhly] question. I have heard Lord Eldon declare (more than once) that nothing should provoke him to decide more than the decision of the case in question absolutely required [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] Seventhly (II, 368-9)

191.20-1 judiciary. . . . [paragraph] Wherever] judiciary [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] [paragraph] Wherever (II, 369)

191.25-6 irregular unsystematic . . . judges . . . [paragraph] Wherever . . . judiciary] irregular or unsystematic . . . judges [ellipsis indicates 5-paragraph omission] [paragraph] Wherever judiciary (II, 369-70)

191.32 a Code, or . . . law, will] a Code (or . . . law) will (II, 370)

191.39-40 the task . . . codification?”] the difficult task . . . codification? of producing a code, which, on the whole, would more than compensate the evil that must necessarily attend the change? (II, 373)

191.41-2 “the technical . . . legislation incomparably . . . ethical;”] I will venture to affirm, that what is commonly called the technical . . . legislation is incomparably . . . ethical (II, 371)

191.43-192.1 “far . . . law-giver”] In other words, it is far . . . lawgiver (II, 371)

192.8 “the futility] [paragraph] In considering, therefore, the question of codification, (to which I now proceed,) I shall merely show the futility (II, 373)

192.33 The truth, however, is that] The truth, however, is, as I showed in my last lecture, that (II, 375)

193.6-7 particular . . . ] [paragraph] Repetition] particular [ellipsis indicates 8-paragraph omission] [paragraph] Repetition (II, 375-6)

193.21 accessible. Assuming] accessible. [paragraph] Assuming (II, 377)

193.23 I admit] Reverting to the objection. I admit (II, 377)

194.6 Peculiarly . . . lawyers. No] Peculiarly . . . lawyers [paragraph] No (III, 278)

194.9 A code . . . minds.] A code . . . minds * [footnote omitted] (III, 278)

194.11 All-importance . . . intention.] All-importance . . . intention.] (III, 278)

194.13 practice.] practice, [footnote omitted] (III, 278)

195.19-20 “have . . . system,”] They have . . . system, and may be detached from it without breaking its continuity (II, 413)

195.21 “have] They have (II, 413)

196.39-40 “one fiction suffices.”] [paragraph] Therefore one fiction suffices and the rational way of considering the matter is, to look at the incident as begetting an obligation, and to treat the refusal to make satisfaction, or to withhold the advantage, as a delict i.e. as a breach of that obligation (III, 134)

196.40-197.2 The terms . . . &c., . . . subject.] The terms . . . etc., . . . subject, in a work from which an excerpt is contained in the Pandects (III, 134-5)

201.3-4 “indissolubly connected with . . . Things.”] For the law which regards specially the powers and duties of political persons, is not of itself a complete whole, but is indissolubly connected, like the law of any other status, with . . . Things, and also with the law regarding other conditions (II, 439-40)

204.4 “absurd,”] [paragraph] I remarked, in a former lecture, (when explaining the various meanings of the term person,) that a certain absurd definition of the term person as meaning homo) [sic] arose from a confusion of caput and status from a supposition that the Roman lawyers limited the term status to those peculiar status which they called capita (II, 409)

204.4 “jargon”] [see collation at 204.27-30 below]

204.5 “fustian”] [paragraph] If you read the disquisition in Blackstone on the nature of laws in general, or the fustian description of law in Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity, you will find the same confusion of laws imperative and proper with laws which are merely such by a glaring perversion of the term (I, 164)

204.16 “I said so and so. But . . . absurd, for it would prove.”] I said that a negative attitude might be jus in rem, if it were possible for any but the owner, or other occupant, to violate the right. But . . . absurd. For as Mr. Mill* [footnote omitted] very truly observed, it would prove that every right in personam might be jus in rem (III, 24-5)

204.26-7 “the godlike Turgot”] The dislike of the French people to the ministry of the godlike Turgot, amply evinces the melancholy truth (I, 274-5)

204.27-30 “that . . . jargon,”] It evinces that . . . jargon (I, 150n)

205n.1-7 “A . . . ‘Law of Nature.”’] See his “Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre”—“Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Law.” A . . . Law of Nature (III, 167)

— On the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence. London: Murray, 1863.

note: reprinted from Vol. III of Lectures on Jurisprudence, q.v.

reviewed: 165-205

quoted: 173

173.23 institutions] institution (18)

173.28-9 them [paragraph] In] them [l-page omission] [paragraph] In (18-19)

173.29 (elegentia)] “elegentia” [footnote omitted] (19)

— The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. London: Murray, 1832.

reviewed: 51-60

quoted: 58-9, 59-60

referred to: 167, 169, 175

58.37 vigour] rigour (83) [printer’s error?]

59.9 indifferency] “indifferency” (84)

59.12 are] are (84)

59.18 charge] change (84) [printer’s error?]

59.20 In] In (84)

60.21 Hoadleys] Hoadlys (81)

— 2nd ed. Ed. Sarah Austin. London: Murray, 1861.

note: see also 1st ed. (1832), and Lectures on Jurisprudence, 3 vols. (1863), Vol. I of which is identified as the 3rd ed. of The Province. The collations and references are given under the Lectures (because it is the work under review).

referred to: 167, 169

Austin, Sarah.

note: the references at 167 and 169 are to her as editor of John Austin’s Province, 2nd ed. (q.v.), that at 202 is to her as editor of his Lectures (q.v.) See also Cousin.

referred to: 167, 169, 202

Bacon, Francis.Novum Organum (1620). In Works, Ed. James Spedding, et al. 14 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1857-74, I, 119-365 (Latin); IV, 38-248 (English).

note: in SC.

quoted: 280

referred to: 235, 240

280.14 “opinio . . . inopiae est.”] Atque cum opinio . . . inopiae sit; quumque ex fiducia praesentium vera auxilia negligantur in posterum, ex usa est, et plane ex necessitate, ut ab illis quae adhuc inventa sunt in ipso operis nostri limine (idque relictis ambagibus et non dissimulanter) honoris et admirationis excessus tollatur, utili monito, ne homines eorum aut copiam aut utilitatem in majus accipiant aut celebrent (125)

— “Of Marriage and Single Life” (1612). In Works, VI, 391-2.

referred to: 332

Bain, Alexander.

note: a professor at Aberdeen University.

referred to: 243

Baker, Elizabeth.

note: a nurse whose cruelty led to the death of a child (Albert Monks).

referred to: 103

Barker.

note: not otherwise identified. The reference, in a quotation from Austin, is to the case of Omychund v. Barker in 1744.

referred to: 192

Barnes, Thomas. Referred to: 427

Beaujeu, Anne, duchesse de.

note: sister of Charles VIII of France, regent 1483-91 as designated by their father, Louis XI.

referred to: 303

Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin Caron de.La folle journée, ou Le mariage de Figaro (1785). In Oeuvres complètes. 7 vols. Paris: Collin, 1809, II, 57-320.

note: a 2-vol. Oeuvres complètes was formerly in SC.

referred to: 325

Beethoven, Ludwig van Referred to: 302

Bell, Andrew. Referred to: 385

Bentham, Jeremy. Referred to: 57, 167, 168, 245

— Constitutional Code (1827, 1841). In Works. Ed. John Bowring. 11 vols. Edinburgh: Tait; London: Simpkin. Marshall, Dublin: Cumming, 1843, IX.

note: in SC.

referred to: 24

— A Fragment on Government (1776). In Works, I, 221-95.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 22

22.17 every thing . . . be,] Nor is a disposition to find “everything . . . be,” less at variance with itself, than with reason and utility (I, 230)

— An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). In Works, I, 1-154.

referred to: 200

— Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction. Including Correspondence with the Russian Emperor, and Divers Constituted Authorities in the American United States (1817). In Works, IV, 451-533.

note: the same word is quoted in both places.

quoted: 56, 171

56.19 cognoscible] [paragraph] 2. As to form—here again, by one word—cognoscibility, every sort and degree of excellence, which, under this head, can be given to a body of law, will be found expressible (454)

171.13-14 cognoscible] [see collation for 56.19 above]

— Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the Form of a Catechism, with an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate Reform (1817). In Works, III. 433-557.

note: the indirect quotation is in a quotation from John Austin.

quoted: 32, 59

— Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the Outlines of a Procedure Code (1839). In Works, II, 1-188.

referred to: 174

Berkeley, George.

note: the reference at 60 is in a quotation from Austin, that at 243 is to the “Berkeleian controversy.”

referred to: 60, 242, 243

Bertha (of Kent). Referred to: 327

Biber, George Edward.Christian Education, in a Course of Lectures, Delivered in London, in Spring 1829. London: Wilson, 1830

note: on 69-70. Biber quotes from Manual of the System of Teaching Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, in the Elementary Schools of the British and Foreign School Society which we were unable to consult.

quoted: 66, 67-9, 69-70, 71-3, 73-4

66.5 As regards the] [no paragraph] And as regards, lastly, the (181)

66.10 all fanciful] all the fanciful (181)

67.25 What] But what (162)

69.21 It] [no paragraph] But it (167)

69.21 system.] system, in which two evil spirits are so ingeniously yoked together in the service of man (167-8)

69.22 each school time] [in italics] (168)

69.22-3 every three months] [in italics] (168)

69.34 not] not (168)

69.37 calculating spirit] [in italics] (168)

69.38 reward tickets] [in italics] (168)

69.41 Mammon of unrighteousness] [in italics] (168)

70.2-3 pay . . . dismissed] [in italics] (168)

70.3-4 those . . . them] [in italics] (169)

70.5-6 in . . . them] [in italics] (169)

70.31 round the school-room] [in italics] (170)

70.32 proclaim] proclaim (170)

70.32-3 they . . . learning] [in italics] (170)

70.33 two . . . school] [in italics] (170)

71.7 The] [no paragraph] However that may be, it is certain that the (172)

71.7 and, as] and that, as (172)

71.21 grafted upon] grafted in upon (173)

72.25 beef] beef (175)

72.35 connecting] connecting (175)

73.18 at] for (176)

Bible. Referred to: 296

— Colossians.

quoted: 296

296.16 “Wives, obey your husbands.”] Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord. (3.18)

296.17 “Slaves, obey your masters.”] Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eyeservice, as menpleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God. (3.22)

— I Corinthians.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Biber.

referred to: 69

— Deuteronomy.

referred to: 58

— Exodus.

note: the reference is to the Ten Commandments.

referred to: 288

— Genesis.

quoted: 37

37.7 “it . . . good for man to be alone”] It . . . good that man should be alone. (2.18)

— Hosea.

note: the quotations are in a quotation from Biber.

quoted: 69

69.28 “love a reward upon every cornfloor”] Rejoice not, O Israel, for joy, as other people for thou hast gone a whoring from thy God, thou hast loved a reward upon every cornfloor. (9.1)

—Isaiah.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Biber.

quoted: 69

69.30 “love gifts, and follow after rewards”] Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves every one loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them. (1.23)

— Judges.

note: the reference is to Deborah.

referred to: 302

— Luke.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Biber, the reference at 68 is in a quotation from Biber, that at 257 is to the parable of the sower.

quoted: 69

referred to: 68, 257, 281, 389

69.41 “Mammon of unrighteousness.”] And I say unto you. Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations (16:9)

— Matthew.

quoted: 87

87.7 “as one having authority”] For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes (7.29)

— Proverbs.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Biber.

quoted: 71

71.15-16 him,”] him (27.22)

— Romans.

quoted: 296

296.21-2 “The powers. . . . God,”] For there is no power but of God the powers . . . God (13.1)

— Titus.

quoted: 39

39.19 “to the pure all things are pure”] Unto the pure all things are pure, but unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure, but even their mind and conscience is defiled (1.15)

Blackburn, Colin. Charge to Middlesex Grand Jury in the Case of Governor Eyre (2 June, 1868). In “Ex-Governor Eyre,” The Times, 3 June, 1868, 9-10.

referred to: 434

Blackstone, William.Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69.

note: the reference at 21 is to Blackstone’s Commentaries (IV, 150) as one of the six legal authorities cited by Holt, q.v. The references at 178, 194 and 195 are cited by Austin, who used the 1st ed. The 5th ed. (1773) is in SC.

referred to: 21, 178, 194, 195

Blanche (of Castile).

note: mother of Louis IX of France, regent for several periods during his reign.

referred to: 303, 401

Blunt, John Henry, ed. The Annotated Book of Common Prayer, Being an Historical, Ritual, and Theological Commentary on the Devotional System of the Church of England. 7th ed. London: Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons, 1876.

note: this version used for ease of reference. The reference is to “The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony,” 261-74.

referred to: 296

Boccaccio, Giovanni.Decameron (1353).

note: as the reference is simply to Griselda, the heroine of one of the stories, no ed. is cited.

referred to: 414

The Book of Common Prayer. See John Henry Blunt.

Bourdeille, Pierre de, seigneur de Brantôme.Les vies des dames galantes (1666). Vols. II and III of Mémoires de Messire Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme. 10 vols. Leyden Sambix le jeune, 1665-1722.

note: see also Francis I, and Victor Hugo, Le roi s’amuse.

referred to: 312

Bourguignon, Louis Dominique (“Cartouche”).

note: his name became proverbial for highway robbers.

referred to: 137

Brand, Herbert Charles Alexander. Referred to: 430, 432, 434, 435

Brayne, William.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Carlyle.

referred to: 92

Breckinridge, John Cabell. Referred to: 157

Bridges, John Henry. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25.

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Bridges as member of the Commission.

quoted: 358-9

referred to: 350

Bright, John. Referred to: 427

Brougham, Henry Peter (Lord Brougham). Speech on the Address on the King’s Speech (29 Jan., 1828; Commons), PD, n.s., Vol. 18, cols. 49-58.

note: the quotation, in a quotation from The Cornish Guardian, is indirect.

quoted: 66-7

— Speech on National Education (14 Mar., 1833, Lords), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 16, cols. 632-8.

referred to: 64, 65, 71

Brown, John.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Phillips.

referred to: 133n

— Last Speech (2 Nov., 1859). Reported in “Brown’s Trial,” New-York Daily Tribune, 3 Nov., 1859, 5.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Phillips.

referred to: 133n

Brown, Thomas. Referred to: 240, 243

Buller, Francis. Judgment in the Case of R. v. Archer (25 Jan., 1788). 100 English Reports 113.

note: the quotation is taken from Holt (q.v. for the collation). The “writing like the present” refers to the books of the corporation of Yarmouth, which recorded the payment to Watson of £2300 as just compensation for his fine of £1500 for a libel against a man called Hurry, wherein Watson had claimed that the recently acquitted Hurry would soon be indicted again. Originally appeared in 2 Term Reports 205.

quoted: 32

32.25 law . . . remedy] [not in italics] (113)

32.27 by writing] by a writing (113)

Buonarroti, Michelangelo. See Michelangelo

Burnet, Gilbert.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 60

Burns, Robert.

note: the reference is to his poetry in general.

referred to: 233

— “Scots wha hae wi Wallace bled” (1794). In Works, New ed. 2 pts. London: Tegg, et al.; Dublin Milliken, et al.; Glasgow: Griffin, 1824, Pt. II, 254.

note: this ed. in SC, as was formerly The Poetical Works, 2 vols. (London: Pickering, 1830).

referred to: 252

Butler, Joseph.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 60

Cairnes, John Elliot. Referred to: 145-6, 427

— The Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Probable Designs Being an Attempt to Explain the Real Issues Involved in the American Contest. London: Parker, et al., 1862.

note: dedicated to JSM, 2nd ed. (1863) is in SC, inscribed “With the author’s regards.”

reviewed: 143-64

quoted: 146, 147, 147-8, 148, 148-9, 149, 149-50, 150, 151, 152, 152-3, 154, 155, 156, 157

146.11 “the most] In the following pages an attempt will be made to resolve this system into its component elements, to trace the connexion of the several parts with each other, and of the whole with the foundation on which it rests, and to estimate generally the prospects which it holds out to the people who compose it, as well as the influence it is likely to exercise on the interests of other nations, and, if I do not greatly mistake the purport of the considerations which shall be adduced, their effect will be to show that this Slave Power constitutes the most (18)

146.19 “The vastness,” . . . “of] The vastness of (18)

146.33-4 “it is . . . scruples.”] It is . . . scruples, and, if the system had been found suitable to the requirements of the country, it is to be presumed that they would have gradually extended its basis, and that, like their neighbours, especially since the treaty of Utrecht had secured for English enterprise the African slave-trade, they would have availed themselves of this means of recruiting their labour market (36)

147.4-5 “is . . . Europeans.”] The climate of the oldest of the Slave States—Virginia. Maryland, Delaware, North and South Carolina—is . . . Europeans * [footnote.] *Olmsted’s Slave States, pp. 131, 462-3 [text.] and, though the same is not true in the same degree of the Gulf States, yet it is a fact that these regions also afford examples of free European communities increasing in numbers under a semi-tropical climate, and rising to opulence through the labour of their own hands (37)

147.7-8 “are . . . and Spain.”] “The Southern parts of the Union,” says De Tocqueville, “are and of Spain, and it may be asked why the European cannot work as well there as in the two latter countries.” (38n)

147.10 “nearly] Nearly (38) [Cairnes is quoting Weston, Progress of Slavery, pp. 160-1]

147.19-20 “it . . . end.”] Slave labour, therefore, admits of the most complete organization, that is to say, it . . . end, and its cost can never rise above that which is necessary to maintain the slave in health and strength (44)

147.29 “not] [paragraph] Secondly, slave labour is unskilful, and this, not (45)

147.33 “The slave is unsuited] He is therefore unsuited (46)

147.36 commonest] coarsest (46)

147.37 labour.”] forms of labour * [footnote quoting Olmsted omitted] (46)

148.4 soil.”] soil * [footnote.] *Olmsted’s Seaboard Slave States, pp. 337 to 339 (46-7)

148.13 labourer can] labourer, Mr. Russell tells us,* [footnote.] *Russell’s North America, pp. 141, 164 [text.] can (50)

148.21 “the] And, in confirmation of this view it may be added that wherever in the Southern States the (52)

148.33 unfit.] unfit * [footnote quoting Olmsted omitted] (53)

148.35 cultivation,] cultivation,* [footnote quoting Russell omitted] (53)

148.37 account.] account.* [footnote omitted] (53)

149.3 product.] product * [footnote quoting Olmsted omitted] (54)

149.27 The] [no paragraph] The (66)

149.28 susceptibility of] susceptibility, that is to say, of (66)

149.32 required.] required (66)

149.40 classes From] classes. We arrive therefore at this singular conclusion, that, while large capitals in countries of slave labour enjoy peculiar advantages, and while the aggregate capital needed in them for the conduct of a given amount of industry is greater than in countries where labour is free, capital nevertheless in such countries is extremely scarce From (75)

150.2-3 exist “Our] exist. They form the burthen of most of what has been written on our West Indian Islands while under the regime of slavery, and they are not less prominently the characteristic features of the industrial system of the Southern States. “Our (75-6)

150.16-17 “mean whites” or “white trash.”] Such are the “Mean whites” or “white trash” of the Southern States. (76)

150.20 Become the] [no paragraph] For the tracts thus left, or made, desolate become in time the (75)

150.34 supporters] supports (75)

150.40 “it] [paragraph] The constitution of a slave society, it has been seen, is sufficiently simple it (85)

150.41 classes—] classes, broadly distinguished from each other, and connected by no common interest— (85)

151.3 “When] [no paragraph] When (85)

151.7 property, political] property—in a society so constituted, political (86)

151.19 party,] party,* [footnote omitted] (86)

151.22 few . . . [paragraph] To] [ellipsis indicates 5-page omission] (87-92)

152.2 “between] The truth is, between (98)

152.3 America,”] America, there exist the most deep reaching distinctions (98)

152.22 wants, a] wants, it is obvious that a (101)

152.34 His] His (101) [treated as typographical error in this ed.]

152.40 senator.” Modern slaveholders, on the contrary, are rendered independent] senator.” The industrial necessities of Roman society (and the same was true of society in the middle ages) in this way provided for the education of at least a large proportion of the slave population, and education, accompanied as it was by a general elevation of their condition, led, by a natural and almost inevitable tendency, to emancipation.* [footnote quoting Congreve’s Politics of Aristotle omitted] [text.] [paragraph] But in the position of slavery in North America there is nothing which corresponds to this. Owing to the vast development in modern times of international trade, modern slaveholders are independent (102-3)

153.19 “the] [paragraph] But there is yet another distinction between the slavery of modern times and slavery as it was known among the progressive communities of former ages, which deserves to be noticed—I mean the (107)

153.23 labour, can] labour, which can [sic] (108)

153.25 and] or (108)

153.26 West.”] West.* [footnote omitted] (108)

153.29 “by] Now, it does this in two ways, by (109)

154.2-4 “mean whites” . . . “more . . . unmanageable”] It is universally agreed that the labour of the mean whites* [footnote.] *And it may be added, of such free labourers as will consent to the degradation of living in a slave community [text.] is more . . . unmanageable than even the crude efforts of the slaves (126)

154.8-9 “popular . . . speculations”] Under such conditions social intercourse cannot exist, popular . . . speculations, in short, all the civilizing agencies of highest value are, by the very nature of the case, excluded (129)

154.10-11 “a . . . passenger”] In South Carolina a . . . passenger.* [footnote.] *See Stirling’s Letters from the Slave States, p. 265 (131)

154.26 corner-stone] “corner stone” (139)

155.5-6 “‘There . . . Georgia,” . . . “in] “There . . . Georgia, “in (151) [Cairnes’s quotation marks adopted in this ed.]

155.16 certain limits] certain specified limits (152)

155.18 owner.”] owner.”* [footnote.] *Progress of Slavery, p. 227 (152) [Cairnes’s quotation marks adopted in this ed.]

155.29 despotism, he] despotism. He (155)

155.33 “‘is] “The commerce between master and slave,” says a slaveowner, “is (155) [Cairnes’s quotation marks adopted in this ed.]

155.35 it. The] it. . . . The (155)

155.38 peculiarities.”’] peculiarities.”* [footnote:] Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia, p. 39 (155) [Cairnes’s quotation marks adopted in this ed.]

156.22 “squatter sovereignty”] By this bill [the Kansas and Nebraska Bill] the Missouri Compromise was abrogated, and in its place a principle was established, popularly known as that of “squatter sovereignty,” by which it was resolved that the future settlement of the Territories should be determined (195)

156.27 “border ruffians”] Bands of border ruffians were mustered on the Missouri frontier, and held in leash to be let slip at the decisive moment (197)

157.7 “is one] It forms, as it seems to me, one (221)

Caligula (Gaius Caesar). Referred to: 286

Camden, Lord. See Charles Pratt.

Carafa, Antonio.

note: for the collation see De Thou.

quoted: 66

Cardwell, Edward (Viscount).

note: the reference is to him as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

referred to: 430

— Despatch from the Right Hon. Edward Cardwell, M.P., to Lieut.-Gen. Sir H.K. Storks, PP, 1866, LI, 137-43.

quoted: 424, 426

424.24-6 “arduous task” to some person “who . . . troubles.”] It remains therefore to decide whether the inauguration of the new Government shall be accomplished by Mr. Eyre, or whether Her Majesty shall be advised to intrust that arduous task to some other person who . . . troubles (143)

426.21-2 “Great offences,” . . . “must be punished.”] But great offences ought to be punished (143)

Carey, Henry Charles.The French and American Tariffs Compared, in a Series of Letters Addressed to Mons. Michel Chevalier, Philadelphia, printed Collins, 1861.

referred to: 132, 138

Carlisle, Earl of. See George William Frederick Howard.

Carlyle, Thomas. “Biography,” Fraser’s Magazine, V (Apr., 1832), 253-60.

quoted: 39

39.14-15 “an open loving heart.”] One grand, invaluable secret there is, however, which includes all the rest, and, what is comfortable, lies clearly in every man’s power, To have an open loving heart, and what follows from the possession of such! (259)

— Letter to Hamilton Hume (23 Aug., 1866), The Times, 12 Sept. 1866, 6.

referred to: 428n

— “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Fraser’s Magazine, XL (Dec., 1849), 670-9.

note: when Carlyle republished the essay, after Mill’s attack, he retitled it “The Nigger Question.” JSM’s “The Negro Question” (85-95), is a reply to Carlyle’s essay, not strictly a review.

quoted: 87, 88, 89, 89-90, 91, 92, 94

referred to: 87-95

87.1 “rights of Negroes”] My Philanthropic Friends.—It is my painful duty to address some words to you, this evening, on the Rights of Negroes (670)

87.4 “immortal gods”] Both these things, we may be assured, the immortal gods have decided upon, passed their eternal act of parliament for and both of them, though all terrestrial Parliaments and entities oppose it to the death, shall be done (675)

87.4 “The Powers”] If Quashee will not honestly aid in bringing out those sugars, cinnamons, and nobler products of the West Indian Islands, for the benefit of all mankind, then I say neither will the Powers permit Quashee to continue growing pumpkins there for his own lazy benefit, but will sheer him out, by and by, like a lazy gourd overshadowing rich ground, him and all that partake with him,—perhaps in a very terrible manner (675)

87.4 “the Destinies”] For, under favour of Exeter Hall, the ‘terrible manner’ is not yet quite extinct with the Destinies in this Universe, nor will it quite cease, I apprehend, for soft sawder or philanthropic stump-oratory now or henceforth (675)

87.5-6 “have . . . for.”] [see collation for 87.4 above]

87.9 “eternal . . . Parliament”] [see collation for 87.4 above]

87.12-13 “born lord” . . . “servant”] You are not ‘slaves’ now, nor do I wish, if it can be avoided, to see you slaves again but decidedly you will have to be servants to those that are born wiser than you, that are born lords of you,—servants to the whites, if they are (as what mortal can doubt they are?) born wiser than you (676-7)

87.13-14 “compelled to work” . . . “beneficent whip” . . . “other . . . not.”] Quashee, if he will not help in bringing out the spices, will get himself made a slave again (which state will be a little less ugly than his present one), and with beneficent whip, since other methods avail not, will be compelled to work. (675)

87.15 “the gods”] The gods are long-suffering, but the law from the beginning was, He that will not work shall perish from the earth, and the patience of the gods has limits! (675)

88.4 jargon,” . . . “hearts] jargon,—sad product of a sceptical Eighteenth Century, and of poor human hearts (671)

88.4 destitute] destitute (671)

88.5-6 heathen,” . . . “human species” . . . “reduced . . . alone.”] Heathen, and reduced alone, and to cultivate the same under its Christian, Antichristian, Broad-brimmed. Brutus-headed and other forms,—has not the human species gone strange roads, during that period? (671)

89.16-18 “wish to see” . . . “if . . . avoided.” . . . “decidedly” . . . “will . . . servants,” “servants . . . whites,”] [see collation for 87 12-13 above]

89.18 “compelled to labour” . . . “not . . . minute.”] And I incessantly pray Heaven, all men, the whitest alike and the blackest, the richest and the poorest, in other regions of the world, had attained precisely the same right, the divine right of being compelled (if ‘permitted’ will not answer) to do what work they are appointed for, and not to go idle another minute, in a life so short! (674)

89.19 “Black Quashee”] And now observe, my friends, it was not Black Quashee or those he represents that made those West India Islands what they are, or can by any hypothesis be considered to have the right of growing pumpkins there (674)

89.19 “up . . . pumpkins”] Sitting yonder with their beautiful muzzles up . . . pumpkins, imbibing sweet pulps and juices, the grinder and incisor teeth ready for every new work, and the pumpkins cheap as grass in those rich climates while the sugar-crops rot round them uncut, because labour cannot be hired, so cheap are the pumpkins,—and at home we are but required to rasp from the breakfast loaves of our own English labourers some slight ‘differential sugar-duties,’ and lend a poor half-million or a few poor millions now and then, to keep that beautiful state of matters going (671)

89.20 “working . . . day”] The West Indies, it appears, are short of labour, as indeed is very conceivable in those circumstances where a Black man by working . . . a-day (such is the calculation) can supply himself, by aid of sun and soil, with as much pumpkin as will suffice he is likely to be a little stiff to raise into hard work! (672)

89.32 “an eye-sorrow” . . . “blister . . . state”] Any poor idle Black man, any idle White man rich or poor, is a mere eye-sorrow to the State, a perpetual blister . . . State (676)

89.35 world.”] world, and woe is to every man who, by friend or by foe, is prevented from fulfilling this the end of his being (673)

89.36-7 “sacred . . . earth” . . . “his . . . enemy.”] Whatsoever prohibits or prevents a man from this his sacred . . . earth,—that, I say, is the man’s deadliest enemy, and all men are called upon to do what is in their power or opportunity towards delivering him from it (673)

89.37-90.2 “his own indolence” . . . “the first right he has” . . . “by some wise means compel . . . for.”] If it be his own indolence that prevents and prohibits him, then his own indolence is the enemy he must be delivered from: and the first “right” he has,—poor indolent blockhead, black or white, is, that every unprohibited man, whatsoever wiser, more industrious person may be passing that way, shall endeavour to “emancipate” him from his indolence and by some wise means, as I said, compel . . . for (673)

90.6-7 “divine . . . for”] [see collation for 89.18 above]

90.9-10 “the eternal . . . will”] The one perfect eternal proprietor is the Maker who created them the temporary better or worse proprietor is he whom the Maker has sent on that mission, he who the best hitherto can educe from said lands the beneficent gifts the Maker endowed them with, or, which is but another definition of the same person, he who leads hitherto the manfullest life on that bit of soil, doing, better than another yet found can do, the Eternal Purpose and Supreme Will there (674)

90.10-11 “injustice” . . . “for . . . accursed”] For injustice is for ever accursed and precisely our unfairness toward the enslaved black man has,—by inevitable revulsion and fated turn of the wheel,—brought about these present Confusions (676)

91.3-5 “spices.” “The gods . . . Indies”] No, the gods . . . Indies thus much they have declared in so making the West Indies,—infinitely more they wish that manful industrious men occupy their West Indies, not indolent two-legged cattle, however happy over their abundant pumpkins! (675)

91.5 “noble . . . grey”] For countless ages, since they first mounted oozy on the back of earthquakes, from their dark bed in the Ocean deeps, and reeking saluted the tropical Sun, and ever onwards till the European white man first saw them some three short centuries ago, those Islands had produced mere jungle, savagery, poison-reptiles and swamp-malaria till the white European first saw them, they were as if not yet created,—their noble . . . grey, lying all asleep, waiting the white Enchanter who should say to them, Awake! (674-5)

91.6 “things . . . pumpkins.”] The Islands are good withal for pepper, for sugar for sago, arrowroot, for coffee, perhaps for cinnamon and precious spices, things . . . pumpkins, and leading towards commerces, arts, polities, and social developements which alone are the noble product, where men (and not pigs with pumpkins) are the parties concerned! (674)

91.8 “immortal gods”] [see collation for 87.4 above]

91.9-10 “towards . . . developements”] [see collation for 91.6 above]

92.3 “divine right”] [see collation for 89.18 above]

92.9-11 “It was . . . are”] And now observe my friends, it was . . . are or can by any hypothesis be considered to have the right of growing pumpkins there (674)

92.12-14 “Under . . . men” . . . “had . . . laid”] But under the soil of Jamaica, before it could even produce spices or any pumpkin, the bones of many thousand British men had to be laid. (676)

92.13-14 “brave . . . Brayne”] Brave . . . Brayne,—the dust of many thousand strong old English hearts lies there, worn down swiftly in frightful travail, chaining the Devils, which were manifold (676)

92.18 “compel.”] And his own happiness, and that of others round him, will alone be possible by his and their getting into such a relation that this can be permitted him, and in case of need that this can be compelled him (673-4)

92.20-1 “Never . . . his” . . . “could . . . throat.”] Never . . . his could . . . throat, nothing but savagery and reeking putrefaction could have grown there (675)

92.23-5 “Little . . . jungle.”] Let him, by his ugliness, idleness, rebellion, banish all White men from the West Indies, and make it all one Haiti,—with little . . . jungle,—does he think that will for ever continue pleasant to gods and men? (675)

92.31-4 “You . . . you.”] [see collation for 87.12-13 above]

94.5-6 “the new . . . little” . . . “take . . . others”] If the new . . . little, take . . . others, what remedy is there? (672)

94.8 “a black Ireland.”] To have ‘emancipated the West Indies into a Black Ireland, free indeed, but an Ireland, and black’ (672)

94.30 “Universal . . . Association”] Taking, as we hope we do, an extensive survey of social affairs, which we find all in a state of the frightfullest embroilment, and as it were of inextricable final bankruptcy, just at present, and being desirous to adjust ourselves in that huge upbreak, and unutterable welter of tumbling ruins, and to see well that our grand proposed Association of Associations, the UNIVERSAL ABOLITION-OF-PAIN ASSOCIATION, which is meant to be the consummate golden flower and summary of modern Philanthropisms all in one, do not issue as a universal ‘Sluggard-and-Scoundrel Protection Society,’—we have judged that, before constituting ourselves, it would be very proper to commune earnestly with one another, and discourse together on the leading elements of our great Problem, which surely is one of the greatest (670)

94.34-6 “the Destinies” . . . “terrible manner” . . . “for soft . . . stump-oratory,”] [see collation for 87.4 above]

— On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. London: Fraser, 1841.

note: in SC. JSM is citing Goethe (in whose work the passage has not been found), but there is little doubt that he took the reference from Carlyle, who says. “In this point of view, too, a saying of Goethe’s, which has staggered several, may have meaning. ‘The Beautiful,’ he intimates, ‘is higher than the Good, the Beautiful includes in it the Good.”’ (132).

referred to: 255

— Past and Present. London: Chapman and Hall, 1843.

note: in SC.

referred to: 90

— Sartor Resartus (1833-34). 2nd ed. Boston: Munroe, 1837.

note: in SC.

referred to: 90

— “Signs of the Times,” Edinburgh Review, XLIX (June, 1829), 439-59.

referred to: 90

Carnarvon, 4th Earl of. See Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert.

Carrington, Nathan.

note: the reference is to the case of Entick v. Carrington in 1765 over which Lord Camden (q.v.) presided.

referred to: 24

Cartouche. See Louis Dominique Bourguignon.

Catherine II (of Russia).

note: known as Catherine the Great.

referred to: 304, 401

Catherine de’ Medici. Referred to: 304

Chadwick, Edwin. “Copy of Two Papers Submitted to the [Education] Commission by Mr. Chadwick, as to Half-Time Teaching and Military and Naval Drill, and on Time and Cost of Popular Education on a Large and Small Scale, with a Further Return, Being a Letter to Mr. Senior, Explanatory of the Former Paper,” PP, 1862, XLIII, 1-160.

note: the quotation is of evidence by Tufnell, q.v.

quoted: 213-14

referred to: 209, 210, 212

213.34 It] As a proof of this, I may mention that it (143)

Charlemagne. Referred to: 303

Charles I (of England). Referred to: 402

Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor). Referred to: 303, 402

Charles VIII (of France). Referred to: 303

Chesson, Frederick William.

note: the references are to him as Honorary Secretary of the Jamaica Committee, co-signer of the accounts published here as App. E.

referred to: 422, 427, 429

Christie, Hugh.A Grammar of the Latin Tongue, After a New and Easy Method, Adapted to the Capacities of Children. Edinburgh: Donaldson, 1758.

referred to: 221-2

Clarke, Samuel.

referred to: 423, 428, 430

Clarkson, Thomas. Referred to: 141

Clay, Clement Claiborne. “Address of Hon. C.C. Clay, Jr. Delivered before the Chunnenuggee Horticultural Society of Alabama,” De Bow’s Review, o.s. XIX (Dec., 1855), 725-8

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Cairnes.

quoted: 150

150.3 planters,” . . . “are] planters, with greater means and no more skill, are (727)

Clovis (of the Franks). Referred to: 327

Clotilda (of the Franks). Referred to: 327

Cobbett, William.

note: the reference is to the libel trial of Cobbett before Lord Ellenborough in 1804 for a series of articles in his Political Register.

referred to: 30

— and John Wright, eds. The Parliamentary History of England, from the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the Year 1803. 36 vols. London: Bagshaw, Longmans, 1806-20.

note: the reference is to Pitt’s extending the strong arm of power to crush critics by means of “The King’s Proclamation against Seditious Writings” (21 May, 1792).

referred to: 26

Cobden, Richard. See under Parliamentary Papers, treaty of 23 Jan., 1860

Cockburn, Alexander James Edmund.Charge of the Lord Chief Justice of England to the Grand Jury at the Central Criminal Court, in the Case of the Queen against Nelson and Brand. Ed. Frederick Cockburn, London: Ridgway, 1867

quoted: 431, 433

431.4-5 “inadmissible before . . . tribunal”] A man has been condemned, sentenced to death, and executed upon evidence which would not have been admitted before . . . tribunal and upon evidence which, if admitted, fell altogether short of establishing the crime with which he was charged (153)

431.5 “morally worthless”]. And I must further say that, looking at this evidence, I come irresistibly to the conclusion that no jury, however influenced by prejudice or passion arising out of local or other circumstances, if they had been guided by a competent, impartial and honest judge, could, upon evidence so morally and intrinsically worthless and, as I shall show you presently, so wholly inconclusive as that evidence was, have condemned that man on the charges on which he was tried (115)

431.5-6 think,” . . . “who] think who (165)

431.9 say,” . . . “is] say is (165)

431.23 “dangerous and pernicious”] I cannot too strongly express my dissent from, or my thorough disapprobation of, this most dangerous and pernicious doctrine, for which I am glad to think there is no authority whatever (155)

431.24 “almost shuddered when he read them”] I have seen it written—and I confess I almost shuddered as I read it—that it was justifiable to send Mr. Gordon to a court-martial to be tried, because a court-martial would be justified in convicting a man when mischief had resulted from acts of his, although that mischief had been entirely beyond the scope of or even contrary to his intention, as if it could make any difference in the quality of the oftence for which a man was tried, whether he was tried before one tribunal or another (153-4)

433.34 “unlawfully and unjustifiable”] I entertain a very strong opinion that the whole proceeding—the seizing him where he was, the putting him on board a steamer, and taking him to Morant Bay and handing him over to the martial tribunal—was altogether unlawful and unjustifiable (114)

Code Napoléon. See Statutes, France.

Coke, Edward.The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England; or, A Commentarie upon Littleton, Not the Name of a Lawyer Onely, but of the Law It Selfe. London: Society of Stationers, 1628.

note: the reference at 173 is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 22, 173

— Judgment in the Case de Libellis Famosis, 1606. 77 English Reports 250.

note: one of the six legal authorities cited by Holt, q.v. Originally appeared in 5 Coke 125.

referred to: 21

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor.The Friend: A Series of Essays, in Three Volumes, to Aid in the Formation of Fixed Principles in Politics, Morals, and Religion, with Literary Amusements Interspersed. 3 vols. London: Rest Fenner, 1818.

note: in SC.

referred to: 187

Collier, Robert Porrett (Lord Monkswell).

note: counsel to the Jamaica Committee.

referred to: 431, 432

Collinson, Richard. Referred to: 350

A Complete Collection of State Trials. See Howell.

Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de.Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progres de l’esprit humain. Paris: Agasse, 1795.

referred to: 399

Coote, Holmes. Referred to: 350

Corinna. Referred to: 314

The Cornish Guardian and Western Chronicle. Leading article, 13 June, 1834, 4.

quoted: 66-7

66.32-67.1 “The schoolmaster,” . . . “the schoolmaster may be abroad, but] “The schoolmaster” may “be abroad,” but (4)

67.2 ungratefully,”] ungratefully (4)

Cousin, Victor.Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia. Trans. Sarah Austin, London: Wilson, 1834.

reviewed: 61-74

quoted: 64

64.6 “Constituted,” says she, “as] Constituted as (viii)

Cowen, Joseph. Referred to: 427

Cowper, William. “Tirocinium.” In The Task, a Poem, in Six Books, to Which Are Added by the Same Author, An Epistle to Joseph Hill, Esq., Tirocinium, or a Review of Schools, and The History of John Gilpin. London: Johnson, 1785, 289-341.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from William Smith.

quoted: 83-4

84.1 he who runs may read] [paragraph] Truths that the learn’d pursue with eager thought, / Are not important always as dear-bought, / Proving at last, though told in pompous strains, / A childish waste of philosophic pains, / But truths on which depends our main concern, / That ’tis our shame and mis’ry not to learn, / Shine by the side of ev’ry path we tread, / With such a lustre, he that runs may read (297, 73-80)

Cuvier, Georges Léopold Chrétien Frédéric Dagobert, baron. Referred to: 311

Dante Alighieri. Referred to: 254

Davis, Jefferson. Referred to: 141, 141n

Davis, Paulina Kellogg Wright. Referred to: 395

Deborah. See Bible, Judges

Demosthenes.

note: the references are to the Orations in general.

referred to: 229, 231, 254

Derby, Countess of. See Charlotte Stanley

Derby, Earl of. See Edward George Geoffrey Smith Stanley

Dicey, Edward.Six Months in the Federal States. 2 vols. London and Cambridge: Macmillan, 1863.

note: in SC. Portions were also printed in Macmillan’s Magazine and the Spectator.

referred to: 162

Diogenes Laertius.Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Greek and English). Trans. R.D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925

note: this ed. used for ease of reference.

quoted: 186

Disraeli, Benjamin. Speech on the Outbreak in Jamaica (19 July, 1866. Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 184, cols. 1066-9

referred to: 423, 424, 431

Dupin, Amandine Aurore Lucie, baronne Dudevant. (“George Sand”) Referred to: 315

Edinburgh Review. Referred to: 136

Eldon, Lord. See John Scott

Elizabeth I (of England). Referred to: 123, 302, 401

Ellenborough, Lord. See Edward Law

Entick, John.

note: the reference is to the case of Entick v. Carrington in 1765 over which Lord Camden (q.v.) presided.

referred to: 24

Ethelbert (of Kent). Referred to: 327

Eustis, George. Referred to: 130

Eyre, Edward John. Referred to: 422-35

— Despatch to Mr. Cardwell (20 Oct., 1865). The Times, 20 Nov., 1865, 9.

quoted: 430

referred to: 425, 428

430.5 “the rebellion had been crushed”] In the lately disturbed districts the rebellion is crushed, in the others it is only kept under for the present but might at any moment burst into fury (9)

— Letter to Brigadier-General Nelson (22 Oct., 1865). In Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Jamaica Royal Commission. PP, 1866, XXXI, 636.

referred to: 425, 430

— Letter to the Editor (2 June, 1868), The Times, 4 June, 1868, 7.

referred to: 434

Fawcett, Henry. Referred to: 427

Ferrier, James Frederick. Referred to: 463

Finch, William. “Observations of William Finch. Merchant. Taken out of His Large Journall.” In Samuel Purchas. Purchas His Pilgrimes. 4 vols. London: Fetherstone, 1625, I, 414-40.

referred to: 26

Fitzroy, Henry.

note: the references derive from the introduction by Fitzroy (Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department) of “A Bill for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Aggravated Assaults upon Women and Children,” q.v.

referred to: 101-8 passim

— Speech in Introducing. “A Bill for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Aggravated Assaults upon Women and Children” (10 Mar., 1853; Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 124, cols. 1414-19.

referred to: 103, 105

Fleming, Edward. Referred to: 423

Fletcher, Andrew.An Account of a Conversation Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of Mankind. In a Letter to the Marquiss of Montrose, the Earls of Rothes, Roxburg, and Hadington, from London the 1st of December, 1703. Edinburgh: n.p., 1704.

note: known as Fletcher of Saltoun.

quoted: 252

252.21 “Let . . . songs”] I said, I knew a very wise man so much of Sir Chr—’s [Christopher’s] sentiment, that he believed if a man were permitted to make all the Ballads, he need not care who should make the Laws of a Nation (10)

Fonblanque, Edward Barrington de.The Life and Labours of Albany Fonblanque. London: Bentley, 1874.

note: the reference arises from a phrase JSM attributes to “somebody,” and Fonblanque attributes to JSM. It is a variation on the phrase, “a Radical because he is not a lord.” See CW, VI, 353.

referred to: 397

Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de.Digression sur les anciens et les modernes (1688). In Oeuvres. New ed. 10 vols. Paris: Libraires associés, 1766, IV, 169-98.

note: in SC.

referred to: 220

Forman, Jacob Gilbert. “Women’s Rights Convention at Worcester, Mass.,” New York Daily Tribune, 25 Oct., 1850, 5-6.

quoted: 395-6

referred to: 400, 415

396.3 are entitled] are clearly entitled (6)

396.4 office . . . and] office, the omission to demand which on their part is a palpable recreancy to duty, and the denial of which is a gross usurpation on the part of man—no longer to be endured—and (6)

396.8 struck] stricken (6)

— “Women’s Rights Convention at Worcester, Mass.,” New York Daily Tribune, 26 Oct., 1850, 5-6.

quoted: 395, 396, 415

referred to: 415

395.22 “if] If (6)

395.23-4 “crowded from the beginning with] This hall had been crowded from the beginning thus far with (6)

396.9 in after-life . . . and] in after life, for the faculties we are laboring to discipline, is the honest stimulus to fidelity, in the use of Educational advantages, and (6)

396.12 women] Woman (6)

396.12 them] her (6)

396.13 their . . . their] her . . . her (6)

396.14 open to them.] open, to arouse her ambition, and call forth all her nature (6)

396.15-16 women . . . conscience] Woman, until you accord to her her rights, and arouse her conscience (6)

396.16 their] her (6)

396.18 persons] parties (6)

396.24-5 1 Education . . . institutions.] Education, in Primary and High Schools, Universities, Medical, Legal and Theological Institutions, as comprehensive and exact as their abilities prompt them to seek, and their capabilities fit them to receive (6)

396.26 industry.] industry, with such limits as are assigned by taste, intuitive judgment, or their measure of spiritual and physical vigor, as tested by requirement (6)

415.10-11 “social and spiritual union”] Such Social and Spiritual Union as will enable them to be the Guardians of pure and honourable manners—a high Court of Appeal, in cases of outrage, which cannot be and are not touched by Civil and Ecclesiastical organizations, as at present existing, and a medium of expressing the highest moral and spiritual views of Justice, dictated by Human Conscience and sanctioned by Holy Inspirations (6)

415.11-12 “a medium . . . justice”] [see preceding collation]

Fortescue, Richard.

note: the reference derives from Carlyle.

referred to: 92

Fox, William Johnson. “Religious Prosecutions,” Westminster Review, II (July, 1824), 1-26.

referred to: 8

Francis I (of France).

note: see also Pierre de Bourdeille, Les vies des dames galantes, and Victor Hugo, Le roi s’amuse.

referred to: 312, 402

Franck, Sebastian.Paradoxa ducenta octoginta. [Ulm: Varnier, 1535.]

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Biber, for the rest of the maxim, see De Thou Historia.

quoted: 66

66.14-15 Mundus vult decipt ergo decipiatur.] Munaus vult decipt. (141, No. 237)

Fraser’s Magazine. Referred to: 158

Frémont, John Charles.

note: JSM uses the spelling Fremont.

referred to: 132

French Code. See under Statutes, France.

Fry, Elizabeth. Referred to: 385

Gaius. See Heineccius, Elementa . . . pandectarum.

Gaywood, John.

note: a child whose death was caused by a nurse’s (Mary Ann Oldham’s) cruelty.

referred to: 103-4

Genghis Khan. Referred to: 140

George III (of England).

note: the reference is to his being libelled by John Hunt.

referred to: 31

George IV (of England).

note: the reference is to his being libelled by Daniel Whittle Harvey.

referred to: 31

Gibbon, Edward.The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols. London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776-88.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Cairnes.

quoted: 152

152.38-9 “The youths of promising genius,” . . . “were]. The youths of a promising genius were (I, 42)

152.39 and almost every] and their price was ascertained by the degree of their skill and talents.⁵⁶ [footnote omitted] Almost every (I, 42)

152.39-40 liberal and mechanical] either liberal⁵⁷ [footnote omitted] or mechanical (I, 42)

Gifford, Robert.

note: Master of the Rolls in 1825, but Solicitor-General in 1817, when the Attorney-General was Samuel Shepherd, q.v.

referred to: 30

Godwin, William.Things As They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams. 3 vols. London: Crosby, 1794.

note: the phrase (indirectly quoted) was popular in an ironic sense, occurring, for example, as a heading in James Mill’s Commonplace Book (London Library), Vol. III, f. 145r.

quoted: 12

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von.

note: see also Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes.

referred to: 255

Gordon, George William. Referred to: 422-35

Gorrie, John. Referred to: 426, 432

Grant, John Peter. Referred to: 429

— Speech to the Legislative Council of Jamaica (16 Oct., 1866), The Times, 13 Nov., 1866, 7.

referred to: 429-30

Grant, William. Referred to: 423

Granville, Lord. See Granville George Leveson-Gower

Grattan, Henry.

note: the reference is to his speeches.

referred to: 252

Gray, Thomas.

note: the reference is to his poetry in general.

referred to: 233

— An Elegy Wrote in a Country Church Yard (1751). In The Works of Thomas Gray, with Memoirs of His Life and Writings by William Mason. Ed. Thomas James Mathias. 2 vols. London: Porter, 1814, I, 57-63.

note: in SC.

referred to: 254

Gregory, Robert. Referred to: 350

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume. Despatch to Metternich on the Incorporation of Cracow (3 Dec., 1846), La Presse, 4 Dec., 1846, 1.

note: the relevant passages were quoted from La Presse in The Times, 7 Dec., 1846, 4.

referred to: 348

Habeas Corpus Act. See 31 Charles II, c. 2.

Hale, Matthew.An Analysis of the Law. Being a Scheme, or Abstract, of the Several Titles and Partitions of the Law of England, Digested into Method. London: Walthoe, 1713

referred to: 194

Hallam, Henry.The Constitutional History of England, from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1827

referred to: 227

Hamilton, William. Referred to: 243

— “Study of Mathematics—University of Cambridge,” Edinburgh Review, LXII (Jan., 1836), 409-55.

note: reprinted in Hamilton’s Discussions (1852), 263-325.

referred to: 236

Hammill, John. See The Times, 25 Mar., 1853.

Handel, George Frederick. Referred to: 255

Hannah, John. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869.” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Hannah, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 355-6

referred to: 350

Hardwicke, Lord. See Philip Yorke

Hartley, David. Referred to: 243

Harvey, Daniel Whittle.

note: the reference is to his trial for libelling King George IV in 1823 in his paper the Sunday Times.

referred to: 31

Hawkins, William.A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown: or, A System of the Principal Matters Relating to That Subject, Digested under Their Proper Heads. 2 vols. London: Walthoe, 1716-21

note: one of the six legal authorities cited by Holt, q.v.

referred to: 21

Haydn, Franz Joseph. Referred to: 315

Heineccius, Johann Gottlieb.Elementa juris civilis secundum ordinem institutionum (1726) 6th ed. (1747). In Operum ad universam juris prudentiam. 8 vols. Geneva Cramer Heirs and Philibert Bros., 1744-49, V, 1-367 (separately paged from the next item)

note: in addition to this one, another ed. (Leipzig: Fritsch, 1766) is in SC.

quoted: 201, 201n, 202

201.19 “obligationes quae] De obligationibus, quae (V, 263, IV, i, title)

202.9 [see collation for 201.19 above]

— Elementa juris civilis, secundum ordinem pandectarum (1727), Ibid., V, 1-812.

note: the reference at 183 is to the Pandects, which JSM studied in this version. The reference at 197 to Gaius’ views, included in this work, is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 183, 197

Heloise.

note: JSM uses the form Heloisa.

referred to: 315

Helvétius, Claude Adrien.De l’esprit. Paris: Durand, 1758

referred to: 405-6

Henry IV (of France). Referred to: 401

Henry, Thomas. Referred to: 432

Herbert, Henry Howard Molyneux (4th Earl of Carnarvon). “Circular Despatch to Colonial Governors, Dated 30th January, 1867, on the Subject of Martial Law,” PP, 1867, XLIX, 395.

referred to: 434

Herodotus.Herodotus (Greek and English). Trans. A.D. Godley, 4 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926-30

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Two Greek and Latin eds. (Glasgow: Foulis, 1761, and Edinburgh: Laing, 1806) were formerly in SC.

referred to: 337

Hoadley, Benjamin (Bishop of Winchester).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 60

Hobbes, Thomas.

note: the second reference at 58 is in a quotation from Austin, that at 204 derives from Austin.

referred to: 58, 204, 243

— Leviathan; or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (1651). In The English Works. Ed. William Molesworth, 11 vols. London: Bohn, 1839-45, III.

note: in SC, as is ed. of 1855.

quoted: 226.

226.4 “Words are the counters of wise men, but the money of fools.”] For words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them, but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man (III, 25, Pt. I, Chap. iv.)

Hobson, Tobias.

note: the quotation is traditionally ascribed to Hobson, a Cambridge hosteler, who gave his customers the choice of one horse or none.

quoted: 281

referred to: 282

Holmes, Timothy. Referred to: 350

Holt, Francis Ludlow.The Law of Libel. In Which Is Contained, a General History of This Law in the Ancient Codes, and of Its Introduction, and Successive Alterations, in the Law of England Comprehending a Digest of All the Leading Cases upon Libels, from the Earliest to the Present Time. London: Reed, Dublin: Phelan, 1812.

quoted: 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 25-6, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32

referred to: 15, 20, 29, 32

18.13 Our] [no paragraph] Our (39)

18.24 reign— ] reign? (40)

18.31 every society] every society (45)

18.32 to maintain the] to the above ends; which are necessary to maintain the (45)

18.33 exercise,] exercise, and, without which, governments would be successively adopted and rejected like opposite paradoxes in the schools,—and, without which, no magistrate, no corporation, could execute their duties (46)

21.1 A] [paragraph] A (50)

21.1-2 A . . . writing] [in italics] (50)

21.2 signs, pictures, &c.] [in italics] (50)

21.4 contempt and] contempt, or (50)

23.29 to subvert] to attempt to subvert (74)

23.35 wantonly to defame . . . indecorously to calumniate] [not in italics] (74)

24.34 governments must] governments,” says Lord Camden^†, [footnote.] ^†Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils 275 [text.] “must (75)

25.40 truth] fruit (76)

27.3-7 [see quotation at 27.28-38]

28.12 “The law,” . . . “in] [paragraph] The law, in (103)

28.13 duty Invective] Duty [paragraph] Invective (103)

28.40 reflecting on the government] [in italics] (108)

29.7 Lord Chief Justice Raymond. Even a] [no paragraph] His lordship added, “even a (110-11)

29.20 Sir Philip Yorke (afterwards Lord Chancellor Hardwicke). He (the printer) is] [no paragraph] He may lawfully print and publish what belongs to his own trade, but he is (112)

29.22 administration] administration (112)

29.22 ministers.] ministers, nor yet to stain the character or reputation of any of his subjects (112)

29.27 “that the] [paragraph] The second of these points [urged by defence council] the court said they would not suffer to be argued “for the (55)

30.1 Lord Ellenborough. It] [no paragraph] It (119)

30.2 bringing . . . disesteem] [not in italics] (119)

30.4 crime, it] crime. It (119)

32.11 peaceable] decent (144)

32.14 party.] party* [footnote omitted] (144)

32.15 reflection,” . . . “on] reflection on (144)

32.21 Justice Buller. Nothing can] In this case Buller, justice, observed, “nothing can (145)

32.25 law . . . remedy] [not in italics] (145)

Holt, John. Referred to: 31

— Charge to the Jury in the Trial of John Tutchin, 1704. In Howell, A Complete Collection (q.v.), Vol. XIV, cols. 1125-9.

note: the quotation is taken from Francis Holt, q.v. This speech is also located in 90 English Reports 1133 and originally appeared in Holt K.B. 424.

quoted: 28-9

28.39 They] They say they are innocent papers, and no libels, and they (1128)

28.40 on] upon (1128)

28.42 such stations] Such or such stations (1128)

28.42 army. To] Army. [paragraph] To (1128)

29.2 men] people (1128)

29.3 subsist.] subsist, for it is very necessary for every Government that the people should have a good opinion of it (1128)

— Judgment in the Trial of Beare, 1698. 9] English Reports 363.

note: one of the six legal authorities cited by Holt, q.v. Originally appeared in 1 Salkeid 417.

referred to: 21

Homer. Referred to: 302

— Iliad (Greek and English). Trans. A.T. Murray. 2 vols. London: Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Iliad and Odyssey (Greek) 2 vols. (Oxford: 1800) was formerly in SC.

quoted: 327

Hooker, Richard.Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. 2 vols. London: Windet, [1593]-97.

note: the reference derives from Austin.

referred to: 178

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). Referred to: 231, 233

— Epistles. In Satires. Epistles and Ars poetica (Latin and English). Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough London: Heinemann. New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926, 248-440.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Opera ed. William Baxter (Glasgow Mundell. 1796., is in SC.

referred to: 229

— Satires. Ibid., 4-244.

quoted: 412

referred to: 229

412.18-19 mens divinior] ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior atque os magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem (52, I, iv, 43-4)

Horsley, Samuel.The Speeches in Parliament of Samuel Horsley. Ed. H. Horsley, Dundee: Chalmers, 1813.

note: the quotation is indirect. The comment was made by Bishop Horsley in Committee of the House of Lords on the Treason Bill introduced by Lord Grenville on 6 November, 1795. On the third reading, 13 November, the remark was attacked by Lord Lauderdale, and defended by Horsley.

quoted: 17

17.22-3 They [the people] have nothing to do with their rulers except to obey them]. All that the people had to do with the laws of the country was to obey them (167-8)

Horth, Samuel. Referred to: 107n

Howard, Benjamin C. Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States. 24 vols. Washington, D.C. Morrison, 1857.

note: the reference is to Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford (December term, 1856).

referred to: 161

Howard, George William Frederick (7th Earl of Carlisle). Referred to: 415

Howard, John. Referred to: 94

Howell, Thomas Bayly, ed. A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Illustrations Compiled by T.B. Howell, Esq. F.R.S., F.S.A., and Continued from the Year 1783 to the Present Time by Thomas Jones Howell, Esq. 34 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1809-28.

note: the reference at 22 is to Lord Ellenborough’s definition of libel as “any thing which hurts the feelings of any body.” Ellenborough’s statement formed part of his summing up in the case of the King against Cobbett, 24 May, 1804. On that occasion, Ellenborough stated. “Upon the subject of libel, it may be as well for me to observe, before I enter upon the question, that, by the law of England, there is no impunity to any person publishing any thing injurious to the feelings and happiness of an individual, or prejudicial to the general interests of the state” (Vol. XXIX, col. 49). The quotation at 22-3 is to the Indictment in the Trial of John Lambert and James Perry, for a libel upon His Majesty George III, which is cited as representative, there being no standard form of indictment. For example, the indictment of William Cobbett for libel in 1804 uses the term “dislike” rather than “contempt.” The 1819 Libel Act (60 George III & 1 George IV, c. 8) also uses the phrase “tending to bring into Hatred and Contempt the Person of His Majesty, His Heirs or Successors, or the Regent, or the Government and Constitution of the United Kingdom as by Law established, or either House of Parliament . . .” The quotations at 28-9 and 29 are taken from Francis Holt (q.v. for the collations), from speeches by Edward Law, Robert Raymond, and Philip Yorke, q.v.

quoted: 22, 22-3, 28-9, 29

Hughes, Thomas. Referred to: 427

Hugo, Victor.Le roi s’amuse. Paris: Renduel, 1832.

note: JSM’s reference is to the “famous distich” of Francis I, but tradition has it that his comment on women’s fickleness, carved in stone in his room at Chambord, was merely “Toute femme varie.” See Pierre de Bourdeille, Les vies des dames galantes. It seems certain that JSM is taking the distich “Souvent femme varie, “ Bien fol est qui s’y fie!” from the King’s (Francis I’s) song in Le roi s’amuse, IV, ii.

referred to: 312

Hume, David. Referred to: 243

— The History of England (1754-62). 8 vols. in 4. Oxford: Talboys and Wheeler, London: Pickering, 1826.

note: formerly in SC.

referred to: 227

Hume, Hamilton.

note: the reference is to him as one of the members of the Eyre Defence Committee.

referred to: 428

Hunt, John.

note: the reference is to his trial for libelling the deceased king, George III, in 1824.

referred to: 31

Hunter, John. See Thomas Ruddiman. The Rudiments of the Latin Tongue

Hypatia. Referred to: 315

Institutes. See Heineccius.

Irving, Washington.Chronicles of Wolfert’s Roost and Other Papers. Author’s ed. Edinburgh: Constable, London: Hamilton, Dublin: McGlashan, 1855

quoted: 161

161.8 “almighty dollar,”] In a word, the almighty dollar, that great object of universal devotion throughout our land, seems to have no genuine devotees in these peculiar villages, and unless some of its missionaries penetrate there, and erect banking-houses and other pious shrines, there is no knowing how long the inhabitants may remain in their present state of contented poverty. (30)

Isabella I (of Spain).

note: known as Isabella of Castile.

referred to: 401

Jackson, Andrew. Referred to: 132

James, Edward.

note: see also The Times, 16 Jan., 1866.

referred to: 422

James, Walter Charles. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by James, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 356-7, 368

referred to: 350

Jarvis, William. Referred to: 107n

Jefferson, Thomas.Notes, on the State of Virginia. Baltimore Pechin, 1800

note: the quotation is taken from Cairnes, who gives a reference to p. 39, the ed. Cairnes used has not been located, but the passage appears in all eds. in “Query XVIII.”

quoted: 155

Jehangir (Mogul Emperor).

note: see also William Finch.

referred to: 26

Jevons, Thomas.Remarks on Criminal Law, with a Plan for an Improved System, and Observations on the Prevention of Crime. London: Hamilton, Adams, Edinburgh. Waugh and Innes, Dublin: Curry, Liverpool: Marples, 1834

reviewed: 77-9

quoted: 78, 79

78.14 man,” “in] man, in (72)

78.18 certainty.”] certainty how much less then can this punishment be justified, if its effects are uniformly bad, as concerns both the individual object of it and the public at large, which there is too much reason to believe is the actual result at the present time, as well as in all past ages. (72)

78.19 “for example’s sake,”] [see next collation]

78.20 “earnest] [paragraph] When we consider the history of the punishments that have from time to time been inflicted for example’s sake, it is enough to make us shudder at the degraded state to which our species has in some countries been reduced by this debasing practice, and to express our earnest (72-3)

79.3 “the fundamental] [paragraph] The fundamental (23)

79.3 should govern] should alone govern (23)

79.4 state, viz. protection] state appears, from what has been said, to be simply protection—protection (23)

79.4 and property,”] and of property, and all beyond this is superfluous, and belongs not to the province of the state (23)

Joan of Arc. Referred to: 302

Kant, Immanuel.Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In Sammtliche Werke. Ed. Karl Rosenkrantz and Friedrich Schubert. 14 vols. in 12, Leipzig: Voss, 1838-40, II.

referred to: 242

— Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre (1797). Ibid., IX, 1-214.

note: the reference at 205 derives from, that at 205n is in a quotation from, John Austin.

referred to: 205, 205n

Kenyon, Lloyd. Judgment in the Trial of Topham, 1791. 100 English Reports 931.

note: one of the six legal authorities cited by Holt, q.v. The original report appeared in 4 Term Reports 126.

referred to: 21

Ker, Alan. Referred to: 433

Kingsley, Henry.

note: the reference is to him as a member of the Eyre Detence Committee.

referred to: 428

Koran. Referred to: 296

Lambert, John. See Thomas Bayly Howell, State Trials.

Lancaster, Joseph. Referred to: 385

Law, Edward (Lord Ellenborough).

note: the remark attributed to Law, referred to in both places, has not been located.

referred to: 18, 20

— Charge to the Jury in the Trial of William Cobbett, 1804. In Howell, State Trials (q.v.), Vol. XXIX, cols. 49-54.

note: the quotation at 30 is from Holt (q.v. for the collation)

quoted: 22, 30

Lawrence, Henry. Referred to: 423, 428

Lawson, Wilfrid (2nd Baronet). Referred to: 427

Leveson-Gower, Granville George (2nd Earl Granville).

note: see also The Times, 17 Nov., 1870.

referred to: 348

Lincoln, Abraham.

note: the references at 130, 131, and 131n are to Lincoln’s government, that at 140 is erroneously to a Presidential “Message.”

referred to: 130, 131, 131n, 132, 135, 140

— Emancipation Proclamation. Washington: n.p., 1863.

note: in effect 1 Jan., 1863.

referred to: 139

L’Hôpital, Michel de. Referred to: 304

Locke, John.

note: the second reference at 58 and that at 59 are in a quotation from Austin, that at 204 derives from Austin.

referred to: 58, 59, 204, 242, 243

— An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). In Works. New ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, et al., 1823, I-III, 176.

note: in SC. The quotation is in a quotation from John Austin.

quoted: 59

59.11-12 “ethics would rank with the sciences which are capable of demonstration.”] [paragraph] The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves, as understanding rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of these sciences. (II, 368-9 IV, iii. 18)

Louis IX (of France).

note: St. Louis.

referred to: 303, 401

Louis XI (of France). Referred to: 303

Louis XV (of France). Referred to: 334

Louis XVI (of France). Referred to: 286

Louis Napoléon. See Napoléon III.

Louis (of Savoy).

note: mother of Francis I of France.

referred to: 402

Loulé, Nuño Jose de Mendonça Rolim de Moura Barreto, Duke of.

note: one of the chiefs of the Portuguese rebellion of 1847 who later became Prime Minister.

referred to: 122

Lucan (Marcus Annaeus Lucanus).

note: the reference is to his writings in general.

referred to: 231

Lucretius Carus, Titus.De rerum natura (Latin and English). Trans. W.H.D. Rouse London: Heinemann, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1924.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. De rerum natura libri sex. ed. Gilbert Wakefield. 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute et al., Glasgow: Duncan, 1813), is in SC.

referred to: 254

Ludlow, John Malcolm Forbes. Referred to: 427

Macaulay, Thomas Babington.The History of England from the Accession of James II, 5 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1849-61.

note: a 5-vol. ed. formerly in SC.

referred to: 227

McFarland, James E. Referred to: 130

McLaren, Duncan. Referred to: 427

Mahon, Lord. See Philip Stanhope.

Maine, Henry. Referred to: 203

— Ancient Law. Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas. London: Murray, 1861.

quoted: 185-6, 186, 187

referred to: 169-70, 182, 184, 246

185.32-186.1 “The Jus Naturale, or law of nature,” . . . “is simply the jus gentium seen] [paragraph] The Jus Naturale, or Law of Nature, is simply the Jus Gentium or Law of Nations seen (52)

186.5 jus gentium] Jus Gentium (56)

186.7 jus gentium] Jus Gentium (56)

186.24 writers,” . . . “the] writers, the (97)

187.2 “the] The doctrines and institutions which may be attributed to it are the material of some of the most violent controversies debated in our time, as will be seen when it is stated that the (80)

187.5 the part” . . . “played] the part played (80)

187.34 “that] There cannot, I conceive, be any question that (92)

Mair, John.An Introduction to Latin Syntax, or, An Exemplification of the Rules of Construction, as Delivered in Mr. Ruddiman’s Rudiments, without Anticipating Posterior Rules. Edinburgh: Paton, et al., 1750

referred to: 221-2

Major, Edward William.

note: the reference is to a witness in the Gordon case.

referred to: 425

Mansfield, Lord. See William Murray.

Manual of the System of Teaching Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, in the Elementary Schools of the British and Foreign School Society. See Biber

Marcet, Jane.Conversations on Political Economy, in Which the Elements of That Science Are Familiarly Explained. London: Longman, et al., 1816

referred to: 315

Margaret (of Austria).

note: aunt of Emperor Charles V, regent of the Netherlands 1507-30.

referred to: 303, 402

Margaret (Duchess of Parma).

note: natural daughter of Emperor Charles V, regent of the Netherlands 1559-67.

referred to: 303

Maria Theresa (of Austria) Referred to: 401

Marshall, George. Referred to: 433

Martineau, Harriet.Illustrations of Political Economy. 9 vols. London: Fox. 1832-34

referred to: 315

— “The United States under the Presidentship of Mr. Buchanan,” Edinburgh Review, CXII (Oct., 1860), 545-82.

referred to: 136

Mary (of Hungary).

note: widow of Louis II of Hungary, sister of Emperor Charles V, regent of the Netherlands 1531-52.

referred to: 303

Mason, James Murray. Referred to: 130

Massey, William Nathaniel. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25.

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Massey, Chairman of the Commission.

quoted: 351-5, 363

referred to: 350

Maurice, Frederick Denison. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25.

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Maurice, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 358

referred to: 350

— Review of James Montgomery’s. Pelican Island, Westminster Review, VIII (Oct., 1827), 303-28.

referred to: 315

Mence, Richard.The Law of Libel. 2 vols. in 1. London: Pople, 1824.

reviewed: 1-34

quoted: 16, 19, 21

referred to: 20

16.25 “It] For—as to pardoning and overlooking a natural warmth—it (I, 162)

19.37 “the] By this doctrine, indeed, the (I, 206)

21.30 contend,” . . . “that] contend, that (I, 136)

21.36 farther] further (I, 136)

Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens Wenzei Lothar, Prince. Referred to: 383

Michelangelo Buonarroti.

note: JSM uses the spelling Michael Angelo.

referred to: 302

Mill, Harriet Hardy Taylor.

note: JSM’s wife, the references at 37-40, in an essay addressed to her are to her when married to John Taylor, those at 99 are to her just before her marriage to JSM.

referred to: 37-40, 99, 393-4

Mill, James. “Government” (1820). In Essays on Government, Jurisprudence Liberty of the Press and Law of Nations, Written for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. London: printed Innes, n.d. [1825].

note: this is the earliest collection (only fifty copies were printed) of reprints of James Mill’s articles for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the articles are separately paginated. The reference is inferred.

referred to: 24

— The History of British India. 3 vols. London: Baldwin, et al., 1817.

note: 3rd ed., 6 vols. (London: Baldwin, et al., 1826), is in SC.

referred to: 4n

— “Jurisprudence” (1821). In Essays.

referred to: 200

— “Liberty of the Press” (1821). Ibid.

note: JSM refers specifically to the appearance of the essay in the Supplement to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Constable 1824), where it appeared in V, 258-72, however, collation indicates that JSM was using the reprint.

quoted: 4-5, 13-14, 17

referred to: 4n

4.37 deposition] definition (3)

5.2-3 means [paragraph] As] means [1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] As (3-4)

5.9 or theft] or a theft (4)

13.30 Religion] Religion (34)

— Schools for All, in Preference to Schools for Churchmen Only, (or the State of the Controversy between the Advocates for the Lancasterian System of Universal Education, and Those Who Have Set Up an Exclusive and Partial System under the Name of the Church and Dr. Bell). London: Longman, et al., 1812.

note: reprinted from Philanthropist, II (1812), 57-108. The quotation, of the title, is indirect.

quoted: 63

Mill, John Stuart. “Corporation and Church Property,” Jurist, IV (Feb., 1833), 1-26. In CW, IV, 193-222.

note: the reference is to the pamphlet reprint, which has the same pagination. The passage has been collated with CW, and the substantive differences recorded as variants.

quoted: 65-6

— Jamaica—Question (10 Aug., 1866; Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 184, col. 2160.

referred to: 423n

— Speech on the Outbreak in Jamaica (19 July, 1866, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 184, cols. 1064-6.

referred to: 423

— Speech on the Disturbances in Jamaica (31 July, 1866, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 184, cols. 1797-1806.

referred to: 423n

— Speech on the Recent Court Martial in Jamaica (1 Aug., 1867, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 189, cols. 598-9.

referred to: 423n

Milton, John. Referred to: 252

— Lycidas (1638). In The Poetical Works of Mr. John Milton. London: Tonson, 1695, 1-3.

note: the volume includes, separately paged, Poems upon Several Occasions, 3rd ed. (London: Tonson, 1695), of which Lycidas is the first.

quoted: 320

320.14-16 “scorn delights and live laborious days” . . . “noble minds,” . . . “last infirmity.”. Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise. (That last infirmity of Noble mind), / To scorn delights, and live laborious days, / But the fair Guerdon when we hope to find, / And think to burst out into sudden blaze, / Comes the blind Fury with th’abhorred shears, / And slits the thin spun life (2, 70-6)

— Paradise Lost (1667). Ibid., 1-343.

referred to: 407

Mitchell, Charles. Referred to: 423

Molesworth, William. Speech on National Education, The Cornish Guardian and Western Chronicle (Truro), 13 June, 1834, 2-3.

quoted: 64, 66, 67

64.21 “In] [no paragraph] He will then see how it is, that in (2)

66.27 “The so-called] [no paragraph] For my own part, sir, I am prepared to maintain, that the so called (2)

66.28 quality, as] quality, that, as (2)

66.30 null. All] null [9-sentence omission] A system such as that now exists in England in which all (2)

Monks, Albert.

note: a child whose death was caused by a nurse’s (Elizabeth Baker’s) cruelty.

referred to: 103

Monkswell, Lord. See Robert Collier.

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de.De l’esprit des loix, du rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la constitution de chaque gouvernement, les moeurs, le climat, la religion, le commerce, &c. 2 vols. Geneva: Barrillot, 1748.

note: the reference at 178 derives from John Austin.

quoted: 5n

referred to: 178

5n.5 Les paroles] [no paragraph] Les paroles (I, 313)

5n.10 criminelle. On] criminelle, on (I, 314)

Montfort, Jeanne, comtesse de. Referred to: 402

Montfort, Simon de. Referred to: 271

Moore, Thomas.

note: the reference is to his songs.

referred to: 252

Morley, Samuel. Referred to: 427

The Morning Chronicle. Referred to: 34

Morrill, Justin Smith.

note: the reference is to the “Morrill Tariff” (1861).

referred to: 132

Morton, Thomas.Speed the Plough. London: Longman and Rees, 1800.

note: the reference is to a character. Mrs. Grundy.

referred to: 332, 333

Motley, John Lothrop. Quoted: 159

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus. Referred to: 302, 315, 316

Mundella, Anthony John. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869,” PP, 1871, XIX, 818-25.

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Mundella, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 368-9

referred to: 350

Murchison, Roderick Impey.

note: the reference is to him as one of the members of the Eyre Defence Committee.

referred to: 428

Murray, William. (Lord Mansfield). Speech for the Plaintiff in the Case of Omychund v. Barker, 1744, 26 English Reports 21.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Austin. Originally appeared in 1 Atk. 30.

quoted: 192

192.23 them. All] them. [8-paragraph omission] [paragraph] All (22)

192.23 once. A] once, now a particular species of Indians appears, hereafter another species of Indians may arise, a (22-3)

192.24 that . . . pure] [in italics] (23)

192.24 fountains] fountain (23)

192.25 is superior] is for this reason superior (23)

Myrtis. Referred to: 314

Nadir Quli Beg.

note: known as Nadir Shah.

referred to: 286

Napoleon I (of France). Referred to: 345, 407

Napoleon III (of France).

note: the reference at 132 is to his free-trade tariff vis-a-vis Britain.

referred to: 132, 344

Nelson, Alexander Abercromby. Referred to: 423, 425, 430-1, 432, 434, 435

Nero, Claudius Caesar.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Holt.

referred to: 18

New York Tribune. Article on emigration to Kansas, 19 Oct., 1854, 4.

quoted: 139, 156

139.14-15 “peculiar institution”]. We do not know how much the number of emigrants has been increased by their exertions, but the fact that before the season is concluded not far from two thousand will have been forwarded from this vicinity alone, while those from New-England have been much more numerous, sufficiently indicates the utility of this peculiar institution. (4)

156.5 [see collation for 139.14-15 above]

Newman, Francis William. Referred to: 427

Newton, Isaac. Referred to: 236

Nightingale, Florence.Suggestions for Thought to the Searchers after Truth among the Artizans of England. 3 vols. London: printed Eyre and Spottiswoode (not published), 1860.

referred to: 319

Oldham, Mary Ann.

note: a nurse whose cruelty led to the death of a child (John Gaywood).

referred to: 103-4

Olmsted, Frederick Law.The Cotton Kingdom. A Traveller’s Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the American Slave States. 2 vols. New York: Mason, London: Low, 1861.

note: dedicated to JSM.

referred to: 134, 136

Omychund.

note: not otherwise identified. The reference, in a quotation from Austin, is to the case of Omychund v. Barker in 1744. Austin (JSM following) uses the spelling Omichund.

referred to: 192

Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso). Metamorphoses (Latin and English). Trans. Frank Justus Miller. 2 vols. London: Heinemann, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1916.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Opera omnia (Amsterdam: Blaviana, 1683) is in SC.

quoted: 247

Owen, Robert. Referred to: 77

— “The Address of Robert Owen, at the Great Public Meeting, Held at the National Labour Exchange, Charlotte-street, Fitzroy-square, on the 1st of May, 1833, Denouncing the Old System of the World, and Announcing the Commencement of the New,” The Crisis, II (11 May, 1833), 140-3.

note: see also Robert Owen and Alexander Campbell, Debate. The passage referred to reads (in “The Address”). “All will then be fully conscious, and will openly acknowledge, that pure chastity consists in forming this connexion only when affection exists between the parties, and that it is a vile, abominable, and injurious prostitution to form or continue this connexion when there is no affection between the parties, even when they are what is called legally bound to each other.” (141)

referred to: 48-9

— A New View of Society, London: Cadell and Davies, 1813.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Biber.

referred to: 71

— and Alexander Campbell Debate on the Evidences of Christianity, Containing an Examination of the “Social System,” and of All the Systems of Scepticism of Ancient and Modern Times. Held in the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, from the 13th to the 21st of April, 1829, 2 vols. Bethany, Va.: Campbell, 1829.

note: Owen’s definitions of chastity and prostitution appear in several formulations in various of his works, and there is no clue as to which of them JSM had in mind. Unfortunately, the only hard evidence as to the dating of JSM’s manuscript is the watermark date, 1832. The closest approximation to JSM’s wording is found in the Debate of 1829. “For real chastity consists, in connexion with affection, and prostitution, in connexion without affection” (I, 120 Wed. forenoon, 15 Apr.) It may be, however, that JSM was writing later than 1832, in which case he might have been alluding to the version in Robert Owen, “The Address” (1833), q.v.

referred to: 48-9

Pakington, John Somerset. “Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on the Administration and Operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1866 and 1869.” PP. 1871, XIX, 818-25

note: the “quotations” are questions asked by Pakington, a member of the Commission.

quoted: 360-3, 363, 363-8

referred to: 350, 369

Paley, William.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 59

— The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), 15th ed. 2 vols. London: Faulder, 1804.

note: the reference is from a quotation from John Austin. This ed. is in SC.

referred to: 59

Palmerston, Lord. See Henry John Temple

Pandects See Heineccius.

Parker, John William, Jr.

note: contributed a headnote to JSM’s “The Negro Question,” which is here quoted as a footnote, JSM’s article appeared as a letter to the editor.

quoted: 87n

Payne, J. Horne. Referred to: 426, 432

Perry, James. See Thomas Bayly Howell, State Trials.

Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich.

note: the reference is in a self-quotation from “Corporation and Church Property.”

referred to: 65

Petronius Arbiter.Satyricon. In Petronius, Seneca, “Apocolocyntos” (Latin and English). Trans. Michael Heseltine, rev. E.H. Warmington, London: Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969, 1-379

note: this ed. used for ease of reference SC. contains the Satyricon, ed. Gabbema (Utrecht, 1654).

quoted: 231

231.3 curiosa felicitas] Homerus testis et lyrici Romanusque Vergilius et Horatii curiosa felicitas (294, 118, 17-18)

Philip IV (of France).

note: called Philippe le Bel.

referred to: 286

Philip (of Macedon). Referred to: 231

Philips, Robert Needham. Referred to: 427

Phillips, Wendell. Letter to John Stuart Mill.

note: no copy of the letter has been located.

quoted: 133n

Phinn, Thomas. Speech in Amendment to Mr. Fitzroy’s Bill (10 Mar., 1853; Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 124, cols. 1419-21.

referred to: 105, 106

Pindar. Referred to: 314

Pitt, William.

note: see also under Parliamentary Papers, “The King’s Proclamation,” 21 May, 1792.

referred to: 26

Place, Francis. Referred to: 3

— On the Law of Libel, with Strictures on the Self-Styled “Constitutional Association,” London: Hunt, 1823.

note: all the essays, except the last, first appeared in weekly front-page instalments in the British Luminary and Weekly Intelligencer, from 3 Nov. to 22 Dec., 1822.

reviewed: 1-34

quoted: 33

33.26-7 boasting . . . We . . . boasting of] boasting of (5)

Plato.

note: the reference at 229 is to the Dialogues in general.

referred to: 225, 229, 230, 254

— Republic (Greek and English). Trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. London: Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826), is in SC.

referred to: 176, 270, 399

Pollock, Jonathan Frederick. Referred to: 107

Pope, Alexander.An Essay on Man (1733-34). In The Works of Alexander Pope with Notes and Illustrations by Joseph Warton and Others. Ed. Joseph Warton, et al., 9 vols. and Supplementary Vol., London: Priestley, 1822 (Suppl. Vol., London: Hearne, 1825), III, 1-160.

note: the quotation is indirect. This ed. is in SC.

quoted: 241

241.15 the proper study of mankind.] Know then thyself, presume not God to scan. The proper study of Mankind is Man (53, II, 2)

Potter, Thomas Bayley. Referred to: 427

Pratt, Charles (Lord Camden). Referred to: 25

— Charge to the Jury in the Case of Entick v. Carrington, 1704, 95 English Reports 814.

note: the quotation derives from Francis Holt, q.v. Originally appeared in 2 Wils. K.B. 286.

quoted: 24

24.34 “All] One word more for ourselves, we are no advocates for libels, all (818)

24.34 libels] them (818)

24.35 a court] us (818)

24.35 they will] we shall (818)

24.35 their] our (818)

Proudfoot, Ann. Referred to: 107

Prussian Code. See under Statutes, Prussia.

Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus). The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian (Latin and English). Trans. H.E. Butler. 4 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

referred to: 229

Racine, Jean Baptiste.Les plaideurs (1668). In Oeuvres, avec des commentaires par I.L. Geoffroy. 7 vols. Paris: Le Normant, 1808, II, 259-423.

note: in SC. The quotation is in a quotation from Biber.

quoted: 69

69.34 “Point d’argent, point de Suisse.”] Point d’argent, point de suisse, ma porte etoit close (II, 277, I, i, 15)

Ramsay, Gordon Duberry. Referred to: 426, 433

Ramsay, James Andrew Broun (Earl of Dalhousie). “Minute by the Governor-General of India, Concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief” (13 Feb., 1856), PP, XLV, 643-53.

referred to: 120

Raphael (Raphael Sanzio).

note: JSM uses the spelling Raffaelle.

referred to: 316

Raymond, Robert. Speech in the Trial of Richard Francklin, 1731. In A Complete Collection of State Trials. Ed. Thomas Bayly Howell. 34 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1809-28, Vol. XVII, cols. 658-9.

note: the quotation is from Francis Holt (q.v. for the collation).

quoted: 29

— Speech in the Trial of Thomas Woolston, 1729. 94 English Reports 113.

note: originally appeared in 1 Barn K.B. 163.

quoted: 29

29.27 “that the] But the second of these points the Court said, they would not suffer to be argued, for the (113)

29.29 written] writ (113)

Reid, Thomas. Referred to: 463

Reynolds, Joshua. Referred to: 317

— Discourse VII (1776). In Works. Ed. Edmond Malone. 4th ed. 3 vols. London: Cadell and Davies, 1809, I, 187-242.

note: in SC.

quoted: 319n

319n.1 “It] [paragraph] It (I, 230)

319n.3 Circle.—To] circle [paragraph] To (I, 230)

Roebuck, John Arthur. Speech in Introducing a Motion on National Education (3 June, 1834, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 24, cols. 127-30.

referred to: 63

Rolt, John.

note: the reference is to the Attorney-General. See also “The Jamaica Committee and Mr. Eyre.” The Times, 29 July, 1867.

referred to: 423

Romilly, Samuel. “Bentham on Codification,” Edinburgh Review, XXIX (Nov., 1817), 217-37

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Austin.

quoted: 190

190.37-8 The . . . promulgation.] [not in italics] (231)

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Referred to: 187

Ruddiman, Thomas.The Rudiments of the Latin Tongue; or, A Plain and Easy Introduction to Latin Grammar. Edinburgh: the Author, 1714.

note: a popular nineteenth-century edition of this work is that edited by another Scotsman. John Hunter, Ruddiman’s Rudiments of the Latin Tongue, with an Appendix on the Moods and Tenses of the Greek and Latin Verb (Cupar Tullis, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, London: Whittaker, Glasgow: Turnbull, Dublin Johnston and Deas, 1820).

referred to: 221

Ruskin, John.

note: the reference at 428 is to him as one of the members of the Eyre Defence and Aid Committee.

referred to: 317, 428

Russell, John (Lord). Speech on Public Business (10 Feb., 1853; Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 124, cols. 17-23.

referred to: 106

— Speech at Newcastle (14 Oct., 1861). Spectator, 19 Oct., 1861, 1135.

referred to: 159

Russell, William Howard. “The Civil War in America,” The Times, 13 Sept., 1861, 9

note: one of a series of articles which ran from 16 Apr., 1861, to 23 Apr., 1862.

referred to: 135, 161-2

Rylands, Peter. Referred to: 350

Sá de Bandeira, Bernardo.

note: one of the chiefs of the Portuguese rebellion of 1847, who later became Prime Minister.

referred to: 122

Sand, George. See Dupin

Sandwith, Humphrey. Referred to: 427

Sappho. Referred to: 314

Savigny, Friedrich Karl von.

note: the reference derives from Austin.

referred to: 204

Scott, John (Lord Eldon).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Austin.

referred to: 189

Scott, Walter.Rob Roy. 3 vols. Edinburgh: Constable, 1818

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 92

Sedgwick, Robert.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Carlyle.

referred to: 92

Seward, William Henry. Letter to Lord Lyons, 26 Dec., 1861. In “The Trent Affair,” The Times, 13 Jan., 1862, 9.

quoted: 131n

referred to: 130

131n.1 “if] In coming to my conclusion I have not forgotten that, if (9)

131n.2 the Union] this Union (9)

Shaen, William.

note: solicitor for the Jamaica Committee. See also “The Jamaica Committee and Mr. Eyre.” The Times, 29 July, 1867.

referred to: 425, 427, 431, 432

Shakespeare, William. Referred to: 252, 302, 414

— Henry the Eighth. In The Riverside Shakespeare. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974, 980-1017.

referred to: 414

— Othello Ibid., 1198-1248.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 55

Sharp, Granville. Referred to: 141

Shelley, Percy Bysshe.

note: the reference is to his poetry in general.

referred to: 233

— “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty.” In Rosalind and Helen, a Modern Eclogue, with Other Poems. London: Ollier, 1819, 87-91.

referred to: 254

Shepherd, Samuel.

note: quoted from Thomas Jonathan Wooler. A Verbatim Report (q.v. for the collations). JSM mistakenly identifies him as Master of the Rolls in 1825. Robert Gifford (q.v.) held that office.

quoted: 30, 30-1

referred to: 31

Slidell, John. Referred to: 130

Shrewsbury, Earl of. See Talbot.

Smith, Adam.

note: the reference is in a quotation from JSM’s “Corporation and Church Property.”

referred to: 65

— “Essay on the History of Astronomy.” See “The Principles . . .”

— An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2 vols. London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776.

note: in SC is the 3-vol. 8th ed. (1796), which JSM may have used, as well as a gift copy of McCulloch’s ed. (4 vols. [1828]), and Rogers’ ed. (2 vols. [1869]).

referred to: 65

— “The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries. Illustrated by the History of Astronomy.” In Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Ed. Joseph Black and James Hutton. London: Cadell and Davies, 1795.

note: in SC.

quoted: 25

25.7 “more] Law and order seem indeed to have been established in the great monarchies of Asia and Egypt, long before they had any footing in Greece yet, after all that has been said concerning the learning of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, whether there ever was in those nations any thing which deserved the name of science, or whether that despotism which is more (27)

25.7 leisure and security] security and leisure (27)

25.8 itself.] itself, and which prevailed over all the East, prevented the growth of Philosophy, is a question which, for want of monuments, cannot be determined with any degree of precision (27)

— The Theory of Moral Sentiments; or, An Essay towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves To Which Is Added, A Dissertation on the Origin of Languages (1759), 6th ed. 2 vols. London: Strahan and Cadell; Edinburgh: Creech and Bell, 1790.

note: this ed., in which the passage referred to first appeared, is in SC.

referred to: 13

Smith, Goldwin. Referred to: 427

Smith, Sydney. “Female Education.” In The Works of the Rev. Sydney Smith (1839-40), 2nd ed. 3 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1840, I, 200-20.

note: reprinted from Edinburgh Review, XV (Jan., 1810), 299-315. Harriet Mill’s page reference conforms to the 2nd ed.

quoted: 401n

401n.2 “A] [paragraph] A (I, 200)

Smith, William Henry.Remarks on Law Reform, Addressed More Particularly to the General Reader. London: Maxwell, 1840.

reviewed: 81-4

quoted: 83-4

84.8 rules] rule (8)

84.16 its origin] its origin (9)

84.21 English] English (9)

84.22 history.] history! (9)

84.24 with it] with it (9)

84.28 monks Must] monks, must (9)

Socrates. Referred to: 314

Somerville, Mary. Referred to: 315

Spencer, Herbert. Referred to: 427

Staël-Holstein, Anne Louise Germaine Necker, baronne de. Referred to: 315

— Delphine, 4 vols. Geneva: Paschoud, 1802.

note: in SC. The title page (from which JSM quotes) identifies the passage as coming from her Mélanges.

quoted: 279

279.37 peut] doit (title page)

279.37 femme doit s’y] femme s’y (title page)

Stanley, Charlotte (Countess of Derby). Referred to: 402

Stanley, Edward George Geoffrey Smith (Earl of Derby). Speech on the Treaty Relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (4 July, 1867, Lords), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 188, cols. 968-74.

note: the reference is to “one of our leading statesmen.”

referred to: 344

Stephen, James Fitzjames.

note: counsel to the Jamaica Committee.

referred to: 425, 427, 431

— “English Jurisprudence,” Edinburgh Review, CXIV (Oct., 1861), 456-86.

referred to: 169, 176n

Stephenson, George. Referred to: 222

Stewart, Dugald. Referred to: 240, 463

Storks, Henry Knight. Referred to: 424n, 426

Stowe, Harriet Beecher.Uncle Tom’s Cabin, or, Life among the Lowly. 2 vols. Boston: Jewett, 1852.

note: the reference at 136 is to “the Legrees or the St. Clairs”, that at 284 to “Uncle Tom” and his “cabin.”

referred to: 136, 284

Swift, Jonathan.A Full and True Account of the Battle Fought Last Friday, between the Ancient and the Modern Books in Saint James’s Library (1704). In The Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D., Dean of St. Patrick’s, Dublin: Containing Additional Letters Tracts, and Poems. Not Hitherto Published; with Notes, and a Life of the Author. Ed. Walter Scott. 19 vols. Edinburgh: Constable; London: White, et al., Dublin: Cumming, 1814, XI, 213-60.

note: in SC.

referred to: 220

— A Letter to a Young Clergyman, Lately Entered into Holy Orders (1720). Ibid., VIII, 331-60.

quoted: 231

231.5-6 “the right words in the right places”] Proper words, in proper places, make the true definition of a style (VIII, 337)

— Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World By Lemuel Gulliver (1726). Ibid., XII, 1-382.

referred to: 293

Tacitus, Cornelius.

note: the reference at 229 is to “all the writings.”

referred to: 229, 254

Talbot, Henry John Chetwynd (Earl of Shrewsbury and Talbot).

note: the reference is to the Chairman of the Eyre Defence and Aid Committee.

referred to: 428

Talfourd, Thomas Noon.

note: the reference is to “Serjeant Talfourd’s Act,” 2 & 3 Victoria, c. 54 (17 Aug., 1839), q.v.

referred to: 285

Taylor, Harriet. See Harriet Hardy Taylor Mill.

Taylor, Peter Alfred.

note: the reference is to him as Treasurer of the Jamaica Committee, and co-signer of the accounts published here as App. E.

referred to: 427, 429

Temple, Henry John (Lord Palmerston).

note: the reference is to him as an opponent of the Suez Canal.

referred to: 117

— Speech on the Isthmus of Suez Canal—Resolution (1 June, 1858, Commons), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 150, cols. 1379-84.

referred to: 116

Temple, William. “An Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning” (1690). In The Works of Sir William Temple, Bart Complete. 4 vols. London: Rivington, et al., 1814, III, 444-518.

note: in SC.

referred to: 220

Thibaut, Anton Friedrich Justus.

note: the reference derives from John Austin.

referred to: 204

Thomson, James, and David Mallet. “An Ode” [“Rule, Britannia”]. In Alfred: A Masque. London: Millar, 1740.

note: the reference is simply to the commonly applied title.

referred to: 252

Thou, Jacques Auguste de.Historia sui temporis. 5 vols. Paris: Drouart, 1604-08.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from biber, for the rest of the maxim, see Franck, Paradoxa.

quoted: 66

66.14-15 Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur,] inde Carafa Lutetiam regni metropolim, tanquam Pontificis legatus solita pompa ingreditur, ubi cum signum crucis, ut fit, ederet, verborum, quae proferri mos est, loco, ferunt, eum, ut erat securo de numine animo et summus relligionis derisor, occursante passim populo et in genua ad ipsius conspectum procumbente, saepius secreta murmuratione haec verba ingeminasse. Quandoquidem populus iste vult decipi decipiatur. (II, 298-9, XII)

Thucydides.Thucydides (Greek and English). Trans. Charles Forster Smith. 4 vols. London: Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958.

note: the reference at 229 is to the “speeches in Thucydides.” Two other Greek eds., Opera, ed. Baverus and Beckius, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1790-1804), and Polemos Peloponnesiakos, 8 vols. (Glasgow: Foulis, 1759), were formerly in SC.

referred to: 229, 231

Tiberius Claudius Nero.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Holt.

referred to: 18

Tillotson, John (Archbishop of Canterbury).

note: the reference is in a quotation from John Austin.

referred to: 60

The Times.

note: anonymous articles follow chronologically.

referred to: 158

— Article on the Norfolk Circuit, 21 Mar., 1853, 7.

referred to: 107

— Article on the Police Courts, 25 Mar., 1853, 7.

note: Hammill is not otherwise identified than as a London police magistrate.

quoted: 105n

105n.8 Mr. Hammill. “Though he] Mr. Hammili said that this was one of the worst cases of the kind that had ever come under his notice, and, although he (7)

— “America,” 26 July, 1862, 14.

note: this column reports the passage in the Senate of a bill to admit West Virginia as a state. On 30 July, The Times reported (11) that the vote in the House was deferred until December. The bill passed into law on 31 Dec., 1862, as 37th Congress, Sess. III, c. 6. An Act for the Admission of the State of West Virginia into the Union and for Other Purposes (q.v).

referred to: 162

— “The Jamaica Committee,” 16 Jan., 1866, 3.

referred to: 422-3

— “Ex-Governor Eyre at Southampton,” 23 Aug., 1866, 7.

referred to: 428

— “The Jamaica Prosecutions,” 30 Mar., 1867, 12.

referred to: 432

— “The Jamaica Prosecutions,” 12 Apr., 1867, 11.

referred to: 432

— “The Jamaica Committee and Mr. Eyre,” 29 July, 1867, 12.

note: containing William Shaen’s request of 10 July, 1867, to the Attorney-General, John Rolt, and the latter’s refusal of 13 July.

referred to: 432

— “Prosecution of Ex-Governor Eyre,” 28 Feb., 1868, 10.

referred to: 432

— “Ex-Governor Eyre,” 3 June, 1868, 9-10.

referred to: 429

— “Lord Granville’s Answer to the Russian Circular,” 17 Nov., 1870, 9.

referred to: 348

— “The Treaty of 1856. Prince Gortschakoff’s Note,” 18 Nov., 1870, 3.

note: Gortschakoff’s Note was dated 19 (i.e., 31 new style) Oct., 1870.

referred to: 344, 347-8

Tocqueville, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clérel de.De la democratie en Amérique. 4 vols. Paris: Gosselin, 1835-40.

note: in SC.

quoted: 147

147.7-8 “are . . . Spain.”] [translated from.] Il ne fait pas plus chaud dans le sud de 1 Union que dans le sud de l’Espagne et de l’Italie (2) [footnote omitted] (II, 336)

Tufnell, Edward Carleton.

note: the quotation is in Chadwick’s “Copy of Two Papers” (q.v. for the collation)

quoted: 213-14

Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, Baron de L’Aulne.

note: the reference is in a quotation from John Austin.

referred to: 204

Turner, Joseph Mallord William. Referred to: 317

Turpin, Richard (“Dick”).

note: his name became proverbial for highway robbers.

referred to: 137

Ulfilas.

note: JSM uses the spelling Ulphila.

referred to: 315

Vaughan, James. Referred to: 432

Victoria (of England). Referred to: 270, 302, 378, 423, 424

Virchow, Rudolph.Untersuchungen uber die Entwickelung des Schadelgrundes. Berlin Reimer, 1857.

referred to: 311

Virgil (Publius Virgilius Maro).

note: the reference is to his poetry in general.

referred to: 233

— Georgics. In Virgil (Latin and English). Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. 2 vols. London: Heinemann, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1922, I, 80-236.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Two editions of Opera. 2 vols. (London, 1800) and (London: Priestley, 1821) are in SC.

referred to: 254

Walker, Robert James.Jefferson Davis and Repudiation, Letter of Hon. Robert J. Walker. London: Ridgway, 1863.

note: Walker was the financial agent of the United States in Britain and Europe, working to secure war loans. This work (dated 1 July, 1863), which went through three editions in the year, is in answer to a letter in The Times of 25 March that denied Jefferson Davis’s involvement and indicated that there was confusion between Jefferson Davis and Reuben Davis. Walker vehemently argues that Jefferson Davis was involved in the repudiation of the Mississippi Union Bank bonds. His assertions are not founded on fact. In 1840 the Legislature of the State of Mississippi repudiated the Union Bank bonds on the ground that their issue was contrary to the state constitution. However, until 1843, when he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the Legislature, Jefferson Davis played no political role in Mississippi. This Civil War propaganda may have found its source in Reuben Davis’s sneers at the protests of the bondholders, and was carried to Britain by a former U.S. senator from Mississippi to rally support for the North among those British investors who had lost heavily in the repudiation of the bank bonds. Although Jefferson Davis denied the story for his whole life, and there was plenty of evidence to support his claims, as late as 1887. Theodore Roosevelt, in his Life of Thomas H. Benton (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin), reiterated the propaganda. The uncertainty behind the story may have prompted Mill to delete this passage.

referred to: 141n

Warner, Hiram. Speech on Slavery in the Territories (1 Apr., 1856, House of Representatives), Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, Sess. I, 1856. Washington: Rives, 1856, 297-300.

quoted: 155

155.5-7 slaveholder,’ . . . “in] slaveholder in (299)

155.14 starved out] starved out (300)

155.16 certain limits] certain specified limits (300)

Welles, Gideon. Referred to: 130

Westmorland, Henry.

note: see his evidence in Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Jamaica Royal Commission, PP, 1866, XXXI, 866-92.

referred to: 425

Whately, Richard. Referred to: 145

— Elements of Logic, London: Mawman, 1826.

note: this ed. and the 9th ed. (London: Parker, 1848) in SC. The indirect quotation is of phrasing that also appears in Whately’s Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, q.v.

quoted: 225

referred to: 223

225.25-6 to mistake familiarity for accurate knowledge.] Familiar acquaintance is perpetually mistaken for accurate knowledge (274)

— Introductory Lectures on Political Economy (1831). 2nd ed. London: Fellowes, 1832.

note: Lecture IX, from which the indirect quotation is taken, is not in the 1st ed. Similar phrasing appears in Whately’s Elements of Logic, q.v.

quoted: 225

225.25-6 to mistake familiarity for accurate knowledge.] Whereas this circumstance adds to the difficulty, on account of our liability, in any subject, to mistake familiar acquaintance for accurate knowledge,—from our having, in addition to all that is to be learnt, much also to unlearn, of prejudices insensibly imbibed,—and from the influence of personal interests and feelings in biassing the judgment, on almost every question that can arise (224)

White, James. Referred to: 427

Wilderspin, Samuel.The Infant System, for Developing the Intellectual and Moral Powers of All Children from One to Seven Years of Age (1823). 6th ed. London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1834.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Biber. The 1st ed. had as its title On the Importance ofEducating the Infant Children of the Poor, other editions before the 6th were entitled Infant Education, or, Remarks on the Importance of Educating the Infant Poor. The 6th ed. postdates Biber’s work, but the rhymes do not both appear in any of the earlier eds. consulted.

quoted: 72

72.20 A pretty sum, or I’m mistaken.] That is paid for certain fees. (265)

72.22 Which . . . bacon.] That . . . cheese (265)

72.25 beef] beef [as in Biber] (277)

Wilkes, Charles. Referred to: 130

Wood, Thomas.An Institute of the Laws of England, or, The Laws of England in Their Natural Order, According to Common Use (1720). 2nd ed. London: Sare, 1722.

note: one of the six legal authorities cited by Francis Holt (q.v.). The edition he used has not been identified.

referred to: 21

Wooler, Thomas Jonathan.A Verbatim Report of the Two Trials of Mr. T.J. Wooler, Editor of the Black Dwarf, for Alledged Libels, before Mr. Justice Abbott, and a Special Jury, on Thursday, June 5, 1817. London: Wooler, 1817

note: title page says “Taken in Short Hand by an Eminent Writer, and Revised by T.J. Wooler.” The collations below are from the speeches of Charles Abbott (q.v.) and Samuel Shepherd (q.v.), which are taken from this work.

quoted: 30, 30-1, 31

30.14 To impute] [no paragraph] But then. Gentlemen, it must be a fair and honest discussion of their measures, for to impute (5)

30.15 established form of government] established government (5)

30.20 government against] government, and against (6)

30.35 “They (the ministers) would not make] [paragraph] The defendant then goes on as follows in a subsequent part of his publication—“Nothing operates so forcibly upon the nerves of the murderer.” &c.—“They would call themselves the government, and would make their will the general law, but they dare not,”—they would not, gentlemen, make (14)

31.16 “It] [no paragraph] It (80)

31.17 discussing] discussion (80)

31.20 law, if] law.—If (80)

31.20 begins] begin (80) [treated as printer’s error in this ed.]

Woolston, Thomas.

note: the reference is to his trial in 1729 for “a deistical work.” A Discourse on the Miracles of Our Saviour, in View of the Present Controversy between Infidels and Apostates, 6 pts. (London: the Author, 1727-29).

referred to: 29

Wordsworth, William. Referred to: 254

— “Weak is the will of Man, his judgment blind,” Miscellaneous Sonnets. Pt. I, xxxi. In The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. 5 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1827, II, 285.

note: in SC.

quoted: 39

39.18 “imagination lofty and refined”] Imagination is that sacred power. Imagination lofty and refined / ’Tis hers to pluck the amaranthine Flower / Of Faith, and round the Sufferer’s temples bind / Wreaths that endure affliction’s heaviest shower, / And do not shrink from sorrow’s keenest wind (II, 285, 9-14)

Wreight, Henry. Referred to: 212

Yorke, Philip (Lord Hardwicke). Speech for the Plaintiff in the Trial of Richard Francklin, 1731. In A Complete Collection of State Trials, Ed. Thomas Bayly Howell. 34 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1809-28, Vol. XVII, cols. 664-76.

note: the quotation is taken from Francis Holt (q.v.) For the collation, see Howell.

quoted: 29

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS

“Treaty with the Nawaub Vizier, Saadit Ali” (10 Nov., 1801). In Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties. Ed. Lewis Hertslet, et al. 31 vols. in 24. London: Butterworth, 1820-1925, VIII, 663.

referred to: 120

“Report from the Select Committee on the State of Education, with the Minutes of Evidence, and Index,” PP, 1834, IX, 1-261.

referred to: 63, 67

“Report from His Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiry into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws,” PP, 1834, XXVII-XXXIX.

referred to: 105

“First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Municipal Corporations in England and Wales,” PP, 1835, XXIII, 1-49.

referred to: 67

“An Account Showing the Imports into the United Kingdom of Sugar, Molasses, Rum, Coffee, and Cocoa, from the West Indies and British Guiana, for the Years 1831 to 1847 Both Inclusive,” PP, 1847-48, LVIII, 547-9.

referred to: 89

“First Report from the Select Committee on Ceylon and British Guiana. Together with the Minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix,” PP, 1849, XI, 1-466.

referred to: 89

“A Petition of the Female Inhabitants of the Borough of Sheffield in the County of York, in Public Meeting Assembled, Praying Their Lordships ‘to Take into Their Serious Consideration the Propriety of Enacting an Electoral Law Which Will Include Adult Females within Its Provisions”’ (13 Feb., 1851). Journals of the House of Lords, 1851, LXXXIII, 23.

referred to: 415

“A Bill for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Assaults on Women and Children,” 16 Victoria (10 Mar., 1853), PP, 1852-53, I, 9-12.

note: referred to by JSM as “Mr. Fitzroy’s Bill.” Enacted as 16 & 17 Victoria, c. 30. An Act for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Aggravated Assaults upon Women and Children, and for Preventing Delay and Expense in the Administration of Certain Parts of the Criminal Law (14 June, 1853). The quotation at 104 is indirect.

reviewed: 101-8

quoted: 104

104.14-15 with or without hard labour] When any Person shall be charged before Two Justices of the Peace, or any Magistrate of the Police Courts of the Metropolis sitting at any such Police Court, with an Assault upon a Female or upon a Male Child under the Age of Twelve Years, either upon the Complaint of the Party aggrieved or otherwise, it shall be lawful for the said Justices or Police Magistrate, if the Assault is of such an aggravated Nature that it cannot in their opinion be sufficiently punished by them under the Provisions of the Statute Ninth George the Fourth, Chapter Thirty-one, and if it shall appear to them that a Prosecution of it by Indictment is not likely to be effectual (owing to the Sex or Age of the Party injured), to proceed to hear and determine the same in a summary Way, and if they shall find the Charge to be proved, to convict the Person accused, and every Offender so convicted shall be liable to be imprisoned in the Common Gaol or House of Correction, with or without Hard Labour, for a Period not exceeding Six Calendar Months, or to pay a Fine not exceeding (together with Costs) the Sum of Twenty Pounds, and in default of Payment to be imprisoned as aforesaid, with or without Hard Labour, for Six Calendar Months unless such Fine and Costs be sooner paid, and such Conviction shall be a Bar to all future Proceedings, civil or criminal, for or in respect of the same Assault. (9-10)

“General Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, for the Re-establishment of Peace, with Three Conventions Annexed Thereto; Signed at Paris: March 30, 1856,” PP, 1856, LXI, 1-34.

referred to: 344, 345, 347

“Draft of Treaty between the East India Company and the King of Oude,” PP, 1856, XLV, 597-9.

referred to: 120

“Treaty of Commerce between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French” (23 Jan., 1860), PP, 1860, LXVIII, 467-77.

note: the reference is to “Cobden’s Treaty.”

referred to: 132

“Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State of Popular Education in England,” PP, 1861, XXI, Pt. I, 1-707.

referred to: 209n, 212

“Treaty between Her Majesty and the United States of America for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade,” PP, 1862, LXI, 373-85.

note: signed 7 Apr., 1862.

referred to: 162

“Petition for Extension [of the Elective Franchise] to All Householders without Distinction of Sex” (Public Petition no. 8501, presented 7 June, 1866), Reports of Select Committee on Public Petitions, 1866, 697, and Appendix, 305.

note: presented by JSM to the House of Commons.

referred to: 270

“Papers Laid before the Royal Commission of Inquiry by Governor Eyre,” PP, 1866, XXX, 1-488.

note: the reference is to other documents relating to the Jamaica disturbances.

referred to: 422

“Report of the Jamaica Royal Commission; with Minutes of Evidence and Appendix,” PP, 1866, XXX, 489-531; XXXI, 1-1172.

referred to: 422, 424, 430, 431

“Papers Relating to the Disturbances in Jamaica,” PP, 1866, LI, 145-506.

note: the reference is to other documents relating to the Jamaica disturbances.

referred to: 422

“Treaty Relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg” (11 May, 1867), PP, 1867, LXXIV, 415-22.

note: the reference is to “almost the last treaty we entered into.”

referred to: 344

“Report of Commissioners on Education in Schools in England, Not Comprised within Her Majesty’s Two Recent Commissions on Popular Education and Public Schools, with Appendices, Miscellaneous Papers, Answers to the Commissioners’ Questions, and Minutes of Evidence” (21 vols.), PP, 1867-68, XXVIII, Pts. I-XVII.

note: JSM’s evidence is in “Miscellaneous Papers,” PP, XXVIII, Pt. II, 67-72.

referred to: 209-14

STATUTES

Following the British statutes, those of France, Prussia, and the United States are listed, each list is chronological. In the British section information is taken from the Statutes at Large.

18 Elizabeth, c. 3. An Act for Setting of the Poor on Work, and for Avoiding of Idleness (1576).

referred to: 370

43 Elizabeth, c. 2. An Act for the Reliefe of the Poore (1601).

referred to: 105

31 Charles II, c. 2. An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for the Prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas (27 May, 1679).

note: known as the Habeas Corpus Act.

referred to: 7, 26, 131n

6 George II, c. 31. An Act for the Relief of Parishes and Other Places from Such Charges as May Arise from Bastard Children Born within the Same (1733).

referred to: 370

26 George II, c. 33. An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages (1753).

note: one of the statutes which abolished what JSM calls the “enormities” in marriage law, in this case the binding nature of marriage contracts.

referred to: 283

34 George III, c. 54. An Act to Empower His Majesty to Secure and Detain Such Persons as His Majesty Shall Suspect Are Conspiring against His Person and Government (23 May, 1794).

referred to: 26

42 George III, c. 85. An Act for the Trying and Punishing in Great Britain Persons Holding Publick Employments for Offences Committed Abroad, and for Extending the Provisions of an Act, Passed in the Twenty-first Year of the Reign of King James, Made for the Ease of Justices and Others in Pleading in Suits Brought against Them, to All Persons, Either in or out of This Kingdom, Authorized to Commit to Safe Custody (22 June, 1802).

note: the Colonial Governors’ Act under which the indictment of Governor Eyre was attempted (not the earlier 11 & 12 William III, c. 12).

referred to: 425, 429, 433

49 George III, c. 68. An Act to Explain and Amend the Law of Bastardy, So Far as Relates to Indemnifying Parishes in Respect Thereof (3 June, 1809).

referred to: 370

60 George III and 1 George IV, c. 8. An Act for the More Effectual Prevention and Punishment of Blasphemous and Seditious Libels (30 Dec., 1819). See Thomas Bayly Howell, State Trials.

9 George IV, c. 31. An Act for Consolidating and Amending the Statutes in England Relative to Offences against the Person (27 June, 1828).

referred to: 104

3 & 4 William IV, c. 73. An Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies; for Promoting the Industry of the Manumitted Slaves; and for Compensating the Persons Hitherto Entitled to the Services of Such Slaves (28 Aug., 1833).

note: the reference at 112 is to the Compensating Clause.

referred to: 106, 112

4 & 5 William IV, c. 76. An Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws Relating to the Poor in England and Wales (14 Aug., 1834).

note: the reference at 213, to sect 48, is in a quotation from Tufnell, that at 214 is to the Poor Law Inspectors.

referred to: 105, 213, 214, 367, 370

2 & 3 Victoria, c. 54. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants (17 Aug., 1839).

note: known as Serjeant Talfourd’s Act.

referred to: 285

7 & 8 Victoria, c. 101. An Act for the Further Amendment of the Laws Relating to the Poor in England (9 Aug., 1844).

note: primarily deals with the support of bastards.

referred to: 370

11 Victoria, c. 20. An Act to Authorize for One Year, and to the End of the Then Next Session of Parliament, the Removal of Aliens from the Realm (9 June, 1848).

referred to: 131n

11 & 12 Victoria, c. 35. An Act to Empower the Lord Lieutenant or Other Chief Governor or Governors of Ireland to Apprehend, and Detain until the First Day of March 1849, Such Persons as He or They Shall Suspect of Conspiring against Her Majesty’s Person and Government (25 July, 1848).

note: suspended the Habeas Corpus Act.

referred to: 131n

12 Victoria, c. 2. An Act to Continue until the First Day of September 1849 an Act of the Last Session, for Empowering the Lord Lieutenant or Other Chief Governor or Governors of Ireland to Apprehend and Detain Such Persons as He or They Shall Suspect of Conspiring against Her Majesty’s Person and Government (27 Feb., 1849).

referred to: 131n

16 & 17 Victoria, c. 30 (14 June, 1853). See, under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill for the Better Prevention and Punishment of Assaults on Women and Children” (10 Mar., 1853).

16 & 17 Victoria, c. 137. An Act for the Better Administration of Charitable Trusts (20 Aug., 1853).

referred to: 213, 214

18 & 19 Victoria, c. 126. An Act for Diminishing Expense and Delay in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Certain Cases (14 Aug., 1855).

note: see 27 & 28 Victoria, c. 80.

referred to: 353

20 & 21 Victoria, c. 85. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Clauses in England (28 Aug., 1857).

note: the reference at 283 is to this statute as one of those which abolished what JSM calls the “enormities” in marriage law, that at 285 is to its provision for legal separation.

referred to: 283, 285

24 & 25 Victoria, c. 100. An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland Relating to Offences Against the Person (6 Aug., 1861).

note: see sect. 43 for assaults against women. The reference at 283 is to this as one of the statutes which abolished what JSM calls the “enormities” in marriage law.

quoted: 288

referred to: 283, 288

288.3 “aggravated assaults”] Persons convicted of aggravated Assaults on Females and Boys under Fourteen Years of Age may be imprisoned or fined (margin note, 573)

27 & 28 Victoria, c. 80. An Act to Extend the Provisions of “The Criminal Justice Act, 1855” to the Liberties of the Cinque Ports and to the District of Romney Marsh in the County of Kent (29 July, 1864).

note: this Act extended, as its title indicates, the provisions of 18 & 19 Victoria, c. 126 (q.v.) The Cinque Ports and Romney Marsh had been excluded by 19 & 20 Victoria, c. 118.

referred to: 353

29 Victoria, c. 35. An Act for the Better Prevention of Contagious Diseases at Certain Naval and Military Stations (11 June, 1866).

note: superseded the first Contagious Diseases Act, 27 & 28 Victoria, c. 85. An Act for the Prevention of Contagious Diseases at Certain Naval and Military Stations (29 July, 1864).

referred to: 351-71

32 & 33 Victoria, c. 96. An Act to Amend the Contagious Diseases Act, 1866 (11 Aug., 1869).

referred to: 351-71

FRANCE

Code civil des Français. Paris: Imprimerie de la république, 1804.

note: known after 1807 as the Code Napoleon. The reference derives from Austin.

referred to: 193n

PRUSSIA

Allgemeines Landrecht fur die Preussischen Staaten (5 Feb., 1794).

note: the reference derives from Austin.

referred to: 193n

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled In Congress, July 4, 1776. Philadelphia: Dunlap, 1776.

note: known as the Declaration of Independence.

quoted: 397

397.6 governed.] governed, that Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

The Constitution or Frame of Government, for the United States of America. Boston: Fleet, 1787.

note: the references at 133n are in a quotation from Phillips.

referred to: 132, 133n, 140, 161, 162, 163

2nd Congress, Sess. II, c. 7. An Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons Escaping from the Service of Their Masters (12 Feb., 1793).

note: one of the fugitive slave laws. They were abolished in 1864 (38th Congress, Sess. I, c. 166).

referred to: 133n

Constitution of Texas 1845. In The Constitutions of the State of Texas, with the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, the Constitution of the Confederate States, and of the United States. Annotated by John Sayles. 4th ed. St. Louis, Mo.: Gilbert, 1893, 185-222.

referred to: 297

Constitution of the State of California 1849. San Francisco, printed at the office of the Alta California, 1849.

referred to: 297

31st Congress, Sess. I, c. 60. An Act to Amend, and Supplementary to, the Act Entitled “An Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons Escaping from the Service of Their Masters,” Approved February Twelfth, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety-three (18 Sept., 1850)

note: one of the fugitive slave laws. They were abolished in 1864 (38th Congress, Sess. I, c. 166).

referred to: 133n

36th Congress, Sess. II, c. 68. An Act to Provide for the Payment of Outstanding Treasury Notes, to Authorize a Loan, to Regulate and Fix the Duties on Imports, and for Other Purposes (2 Mar., 1861).

referred to: 132

Constitution, Adopted Unanimously by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, March 11, 1861. In The Federal and the Confederate Constitutions for the Use of Government Officers and for the People. Cincinnati: Watkin, 1862

referred to: 127, 132, 135, 140

37th Congress, Sess. II, Resolution 26. Joint Resolution Declaring that the United States Ought to Cooperate with. Affording Pecuniary Aid to Any State Which May Adopt the Gradual Abolishment of Slavery (10 Apr., 1862)

referred to: 162

37 Congress, Sess. II, c. 54. An Act for the Release of Certain Persons Held to Service or Labor in the District of Columbia (16 Apr., 1862)

referred to: 132, 162

37th Congress, Sess. II, c. 111. An Act to Secure Freedom to All Persons within the Territories of the United States (19 June, 1862)

referred to: 162

37th Congress, Sess. II, c. 195. An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes (17 July, 1862)

note: see sects. 9, 10.

referred to: 139

37th Congress, Sess. III, c. 6. An Act for the Admission of the State of West Virginia into the Union, and for Other Purposes (31 Dec., 1862)

note: this Act was reported as having been passed by the Senate in “America.” The Times. 26 July, 1862 (q.v.). The vote by the House was deferred until Dec., 1862 at which time the bill was passed.

referred to: 162

Constitution of the State of Nevada 1864. In Statutes of the State of Nevada Passed at the First Session of the Legislature, 1864-65. Carson City, New Church, 1865, 39-71.

referred to: 297

Constitution of the State of Georgia as Passed by the Constitutional Convention Assembled at Atlanta, Ga., March 11th, 1868. Augusta: Ga. Pughe, 1868

referred to: 297

[a-a]unless indeed [first cancelled by HTM]

[b-b][first read] was in entire [altered by JSM to] was alone in [which was cancelled first by HTM and replaced, first by HTM, by interlined final version]

[[*] ]The last paragraph, especially the last line, which concludes f. 2v, is crowded in (the final word is interlined below), as though to conclude, or else to avoid disturbing what was already written on 3r.

[[*] ]The text here stops about nine lines above the bottom of f. 4v.

[[†] ]The text here stops about two lines above the bottom of f. 5v.

[[*] ]Elizabeth Fry.

[[†] ]Similar, but competing, systems, founded by Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster. The text here stops about seven lines above the bottom of f. 9v.

[[*] ]See Luke, 9:11-15.

[a-a][marked for deletion in pencil by HTM]

[b-b][altered in pencil by HTM to] law or custom

[c-c][altered in pencil by HTM to] deference

[[*] ]I.e., of those in Dissertations and Discussions, 2 vols. (London: Parker, 1859).

[[†] ]Harriet Taylor Mill, his wife, who died in 1858.

[a-a]59 excellencies

[b-b]59,67 hostile It

[[*] ]Paulina Kellogg Wright Davis.

[[†] ]Jacob Gilbert Forman, “Women’s Rights Convention at Worcester, Mass.,” New York: Daily Tribune, 26 Oct., 1850, p. 6.

[[*] ]Ibid., 25 Oct., 1850, p. 6.

[[†] ]Ibid., 26 Oct., 1850, p. 6.

[[‡] ]Ibid.

[c-c]68 the style

[[*] ]A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled (Philadelphia: Dunlap, 1776).

[d-d]67 governors

[e-e]67 remained

[[†] ]For another version of this charge, see Edward Barrington de Fonblanque, The Life and Labours of Albany Fonblanque (London: Bentley, 1874), p. 6, and Mill, Essays on England, Ireland, and the Empire, CW, Vol. VI (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 353n.

[[*] ]Plato, Republic. (Greek and English), trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), Vol. I, pp. 444-52 (Bk. V); and Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain (Paris: Agasse, 1795), p. 367.

[f-f]68 men

[[*] ]See Forman. “Women’s Rights Convention,” 25 Oct., 1850, p. 6.

[* ]An excellent passage on this part of the subject, from one of Sydney Smith’s contributions to the Edinburgh Review, we gwillg not refrain from quoting. “A great deal has been said of the original difference of capacity between men and women, as if women were more quick and men more judicious—as if women were more remarkable for delicacy of association, and men for stronger powers of attention. All this, we confess, appears to us very fanciful. That there is a difference in the understandings of the men and the women we every day meet with, everybody, we suppose, must perceive, but there is none surely which may not be accounted for by the difference of circumstances in which they have been placed, without referring to any conjectural difference of original conformation of mind. As long as boys and girls run about in the dirt, and trundle hoops together, they are both precisely alike. If you catch up one-half of these creatures, and train them to a particular set of actions and opinions, and the other half to a perfectly opposite set, of course their understandings will differ, as one or the other sort of occupations has called this or that talent into action. There is surely no occasion to go into any deeper or more abstruse reasoning, in order to explain so very simple a phenomenon.” ([“Female Education” (1810), in] Sydney Smith’s Works, [2nd ed., 3 vols. (London: Longman, et al., 1840).] Vol. I, p. 200.)

[h]68 most of

[i-i]-68

[[*] ]Charlotte de la Tremoille Stanley.

[[†] ]Margaret of Austria and Louise of Savoy, respectively.

[j]59,67 first,

[k-k]68 should

[l-l]68 had

[m-m]68 earned!

[* ]The truly horrible effects of the present state of the law among the lowest of the working population, is exhibited in those cases of hideous maltreatment of their wives by working men, with which every newspaper, every police report, teems. Wretches unfit to have the smallest authority over any living thing, have a helpless woman for their household slave. These excesses could not exist, if women both earned, and had the right to possess, a part of the income of the family. [This note is appended to the end of the sentence in 59, 67, 75.]

[n-n]68 necessarily

[o-o]68 eternally

[[*] ]See, e.g., Claude Adrien Helvétius, De l’esprit (Paris: Durand, 1758), pp. 53-5.

[p-p]68 man

[q-q]68 women,—the

[r-r]68 the

[s-s]68 amongst

[t-t]-59,67,68

[u-u]-59,67

[v-v]59,67 unequals. The

[[*] ]John Milton, Paradise Lost (1667), in The Poetical Works (London: Tonson, 1695), pp. 1-343.

[[†] ]As did Napoleon I.

[w-w]68 had

[x-x]68 superiors?

[y-y]68 But this supposes other than mere dilettante instruction, given as an elegant amusement or agreeable accomplishment, not as a power to be used. Mental cultivation adapted for show and not for use, which makes pigmies of men, is the only kind given or proposed to be given to women by the present reformers of their education.

[z-z]-59,67

[a-a]59,67 encouraging

[b-b]59,67 her

[c-c]68 suffer!

[d-d]68 titles

[e-e]68 to

[f-f]67 vulgar

[[*] ]Horace, Satires, in Satires, Epistles and Ars poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 52 (I, iv, 43-4).

[[*] ]Griselda is the heroine of Story 10, Day 10, of Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron (1353), whose loyal patience became proverbial; for the speeches, see William Shakespeare, Henry the Eighth, II, i, 55-78 and 100-36 (Buckingham), and III, ii, 407-21 and 428-57 (Wolsey), in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 990-1 and 1005, respectively.

[g-g]68 paper

[[*] ]Forman, “Women’s Rights Convention,” 26 Oct., 1850, p. 6.

[h-h]-68

[[†] ]“A Petition of the Female Inhabitants of the Borough of Sheffield in the County of York, in Public Meeting Assembled, Praying Their Lordships ‘to Take into Their Serious Consideration the Propriety of Enacting an Electoral Law. Which Will Include Adult Females within Its Provisions.”’ (13 Feb., 1851), Journals of the House of Lords, 1851, LXXXIII, 23.

[a-a]67 cases to which they apply

[b-b]67 familiar to

[c-c]67 mind;

[d-d]-67

[e-e]67 would

[f-f]67 fluently and with

[g-g]67 would

[h]67 I might go much further, but

[i-i]67 speak out

[j-j]67 about railways

[k-k]-67

[l-l]67 higher,

[m-m]-67

[n-n]67 turned a deaf ear to

[o-o]67 that

[p]67 attempt to

[q-q]67 But I will say confidently

[r-r]67 ejecting them from

[s-s]67 time

[t-t]67 need

[u-u]67 Let me say a few words more on this strangely

[v-v]67 be. So narrow a conception

[w-w]67 our idea

[x-x]67 now more rapidly

[y-y]67 , the things

[z-z]67 know are more and more multiplied

[a-a]67 knowledge

[b-b]67 one who

[c-c]67 it with minute accuracy,

[d-d]67 extent

[e-e]67 cut up into subdivisions

[f-f]67 portion, the district

[g-g]67 ratio

[h-h]67 range

[i-i]67 if in order to know that little completely, it is necessary to remain wholly ignorant of all the rest, what will soon be the worth of a man, for any human purpose except his own infinitesimal fraction of human wants and requirements? His state will be even worse than that of simple ignorance. Experience proves

[j-j]67 , breeding

[k-k]67 pursuit, besides

[l-l]67 large views, from

[m-m]67 in and appreciate the grounds

[n-n]67 We should have to expect that human nature would be

[o-o]-67

[p-p]67 by its very proficiency

[q-q]67 But matters

[r-r]67 there is no ground for so dreary an anticipation

[s-s]67 few vague impressions

[t-t]67 discriminated between

[u-u]67 and

[v]67 only

[w-w]67 know these

[x-x]67 in its great features

[y-y]-67

[z-z]67 for the purposes of their special pursuit. There is no incompatibility between knowing a wide range of subjects up to this point, and some one subject with the completeness required by those who make it their principal occupation. It is this combination which gives an enlightened public

[a-a]67 each taught by its attainments in its own province what real knowledge is, and knowing enough of other subjects to be able to discern who are those that know them better. The amount of knowledge is not to be lightly estimated, which qualifies us for judging to whom we may have recourse for more. The elements of the more important studies being widely diffused, those who have reached the higher summits find a public capable of appreciating their superiority, and prepared to follow their lead. It is thus too that minds are formed

[b-b]67 guiding

[c-c]67 practical

[d-d]67 he who would deal competently with them as a thinker, and not as a blind follower of a party, requires not only

[e-e]67 life, both moral and material, but

[f-f]67 neither the experience of life, nor any

[g-g]-67

[h-h]67 should be our aim

[i-i]67 the one thing

[j-j]67 subjects

[k-k]67 interest

[l-l]67 accurately,

[m-m]67 life in their

[n-n]67 and

[o-o]67 idle

[p-p]-67

[q-q]67 to form no

[r-r]67 every useful branch of general, as distinct from professional, knowledge

[s-s]67 curriculum

[t-t]67 There are things which are better learnt

[u-u]67 when the