The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Textual Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Essays On Philosophy and the Classics
• Whately’s Elements of Logic 1828
• Notes On Some of the More Popular Dialogues of Plato 1834–35
• Editor’s Note
• The Protagoras
• The Phædrus
• The Gorgias
• The Apology of Socrates
• The Charmides
• The Euthyphron
• The Laches
• The Lysis
• The Parmenides
• Two Publications On Plato 1840
• Bailey On Berkeley’s Theory of Vision 1842, 1843
• Grote’s History of Greece [i] 1846
• Grote’s History of Greece [ii] 1853
• Bain’s Psychology 1859
• Grote’s Plato 1866
• Taine’s De L’intelligence 1870
• Berkeley’s Life and Writings 1871
• Grote’s Aristotle 1873
• Appendix: Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited In the Essays, With Variants and Notes

GROTE’S ARISTOTLE

1873

EDITOR’S NOTE

Fortnightly Review, n.s. XIII (Jan., 1873), 27-50, where the title is footnoted: “Aristotle. By George Grote. Edited by Alexander Bain, Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen, and G. Croom Robertson, Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic in University College, London. In two volumes. London [: Murray], 1872.” Signed “J. S. Mill.” The essay was reprinted in the posthumous 4th vol. of Dissertations and Discussions (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875), 188-230. Identified in JSM’s bibliography as “An article on Grote’s Aristotle in the Fortnightly Review for January 1st 1873” (MacMinn, 101). There is no copy in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

There are, exceptionally, two complete manuscripts of the essay, one a draft (Harvard), the other the press-copy (Library of Congress). These have been collated with the text; in the footnoted variants “H” indicates the Harvard manuscript; “C”, the Library of Congress manuscript; “73”, the Fortnightly Review. The variants also give the few places where the final text returns to a cancelled reading in the Harvard MS. For comment on the composition of the essay and related matters, see the Introduction and the Textual Introduction, xlii-xlv and xcii-xciv above.

>The first folio of the draft MS of “Grote’s Aristotle” Houghton Library, Harvard University

>The first folio of the press-copy MS of “Grote’s Aristotle” Library of Congress

Grote’s Aristotle

a book which should^aperform^a for Aristotle what the author of the present volumes had^baccomplished^b for Plato; which should^ccontain^c an accurate and exhaustive account of all his multifarious works, with a critical appreciation of them, both from the philosophical point of view and from the historical; would be as welcome to philosophers and scholars as the work by which Mr. Grote expounded Plato to English readers^d ; and would have been, perhaps, even more difficult to execute with that thoroughness which alone would have contented the eminent author. Seldom has^eany literary undertaking given^e more cause to lament the shortness of human life, and the impossibility of^f extending beyond the allotted limits lives valuable to mankind, than this work, in its present unfinished condition, exhibits. For Mr. Grote’s death was not, in the ordinary^gmeaning^g of the word, premature; he lived to the ripe age of seventy-six years; but this, his^hlatest^h production, down to the very chapter in which his pen was interrupted by fatal illness, shows an undiminished vigour of intellect and perseverance of mental industry, which raise sad thoughts of how muchⁱgoodⁱ work he might^jstill have done,^j if the merely animal and nutritive organs of his bodily frame had been capable of as long a^kpersistency^k of life and health as the properly human organ, the reasoning and thinking brain.^lRemembering^l , however, that this is^monly one among the many inherent imperfections of our existence on earth^m , and that a work of such magnitude, commenced after the age of seventy, wasⁿexceedinglyⁿ likely never to be completed, let us turn to the two goodly volumes which are the^oresult^o of the labours of those last years, and rather rejoice that so much has been given, and this of so excellent a quality, than mourn over what might have been if the^pconstitution^p of human life had been different.

For the work, though unfinished, is not a mere fragment: a part only of the task has been performed, but what is done is thoroughly done; a portion only of the ground has been covered, but what has been built on that portion is a completed structure in itself. The account of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of his position as a thinker on logic, is^qcomplete; and^q this includes, as is known, by far the greater part of what is permanently valuable in his contributions to the sum of human knowledge, as distinguished from the value, in an historical point of view, of^r his speculations, regarded as steps in the development of human thought. In the natural order of succession, the psychology and metaphysics follow^safter^s the logic; but on these time was only given to Mr. Grote to make a commencement. One^tchapter, abruptly broken off,^t is all that he had prepared on^uthese subjects^u to form part of the present treatise. But as far as regards the mere exposition of Aristotle, apart from criticism and comment, the blank is in a measure supplied by a full abstract, and, in part, translation, of the six principal books of the Metaphysica (as well as of two books of the De Cœlo,^[*]v intimately connected with them), which Mr. Grote had made^w, as a help^w to himself, not for publication, but which the editors have, very properly, printed in an appendix. An account of Aristotle’s psychology, contributed^xby him^x in 1868 to the third edition of Professor Bain’s work, The Senses and the Intellect,^[†] is^yalso^y reprinted as the last chapter of the treatise. The appendix contains two other papers, also written^zfor two of Mr. Bain’s treatises,^[‡] and there published, in which Mr. Grote gives his^z view of Aristotle’s doctrines^arespecting two of the principal questions on the border ground between logic and metaphysics^a . One is^bthe question^b which was the subject of his^cchief^c controversy with Plato, the nature of Universals; the other^d is that of First Principles. Both essays are as thorough and as highly finished as any part of the treatise itself. To these are now added^e compositions^fwhich, either wholly or in part, appear^f for the first time—one, a correction of the mistakes of Sir William Hamilton respecting the relation of Aristotle to what is called^g, by the Reid and Stewart school,^g the philosophy of Common Sense^h, of which philosophy Hamilton, on very insufficient grounds, claims him as an apostle^h ; and two short but valuable papers on Epicurus and on the Stoics, some account of whom was toⁱhave beenⁱ included in the work on Aristotle, as the earlier^jSocratic^j schools, the Megarics,^kthe^k Cynics, and Cyrenaics (what little is known of them) were comprehended in^lthat^l on Plato. The matter^mrelating to Aristotle in the appendix^m , together with the lucid expositionⁿ of some main points of his doctrine in the two chapters which stand as parts of the work itself, are a most valuable contribution to^othe^o knowledge and^punderstanding^p of Aristotle as a psychologist and metaphysician, and will not only lighten the labour of such as may take up the task after Mr. Grote, but will^qhelp materially^q to guide them into the true path.^rBut^r the greatest value of the work will^salways^s reside in the part^tof it^t which is completed, the analysis and appreciation of the treatises composing the Organon; a name and classification^u, it must be said,^u not of Aristotle’s^v making, but introduced by his^wcommentators^w to distinguish the logical treatises, those on the^xrules and method^x of philosophizing, from the^yfar^y greater number which aimed at^zsetting forth^z some of the results of philosophy.

When Aristotle is^acalled, not without justice,^a the founder of logic, this is not to be understood solely of^bthe portion of logic with which his name is specially identified,^b the doctrine of the syllogism. Of this, however, he ^cwas not only the great teacher, but^c expressly^dclaimed to be^d the creator. In one of the few passages of his voluminous writings which^econtain a direct^e reference to himself, he declares that on this subject he had no helps, and no precursors.^fUnlike^f rhetoric, on which there existed^ga copious body of^h theory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by successive traditions,^g in dialectic (he says)—

In such modest terms does Aristotle speak of what he had done for a theory which, in the judgment even of^jso distant an age as the present^j , he did not,^kas he himself says, merely^k commence, but completed,^lso^l far as completeness can be affirmed of^ma^m scientific doctrine. The theory, as it came from his hands, has proved its sufficiency by the practical rules which heⁿ grounded on it, and which have been found to cover every case and suffice for every purpose for which they were^ointended; and^o (^pexcept the easy addition of the hypothetical syllogism^p ) none of the attempts^qthat^q have been made, even by men of great knowledge and ability (some of the most notable of them in our own age), to give greater extension and precision to the syllogistic theory, have been able to make good their claim to any^rother value than^r that of a school exercise. Opinion, indeed, has varied, during the two thousand and more years^sthat separate us from Aristotle^s , respecting the utility of any such rules, and^t of the syllogistic theory itself. After having been long deemed the key to all science it came to be^uaccounted^u a mere incumbrance, and has only of late^vbecome a^v subject of rational estimation. All, however, that has been discovered or invented by modern thought has not invalidated the claim of the syllogism to be a correct analysis of the process of reasoning by general terms—the operation which establishes a conclusion by showing that it comes within the scope of a generalisation^wthat has already^w been assented to on evidence deemed^xsufficient; and^x the rules grounded on this analysis do all that rules can do to insure the correct performance of the operation: they point out the conditions^yrequisite^y for correctness, and distinguish with scientific precision the modes of error.^zIt has, no doubt, been shown (what was never clearly seen until lately) that the syllogism is not really a process of inference; all that there is of inference being completed in the induction from experience which gave us the generalisation we syllogize from. The syllogistic process merely maintains consistency between our general theorems from experience and our particular applications of it, and compels us to face the whole extent of the generalisation which is necessary to justify our inference in a given particular case. What is called Formal Logic is the logic of consistency: and consistency is not necessarily truth, but is one of the most essential conditions of it. A mastery of the syllogistic logic does not necessarily make a sound thinker, but goes far towards making a clear one; and a clear understanding is already well advanced on the road towards soundness.^z

But the merits of Aristotle in regard to logic are not confined within this, the narrowest acceptation in which the term is used; they extend to the widest. There are none of the operations of the intellect in the pursuit of truth to which his services were not considerable. He cannot indeed be credited with being the permanent legislator of any of the other departments of logic, as he was of the syllogism. Yet it will, we think, be found that he did as much for them as was compatible with the very early stage which scientific studies had then reached; for it was only after considerable trial of all the paths which^alay open to them^a , that mankind could discover which^b it is that leads to the desired end. As Aristotle was^c far from completing any logical theory save that of the syllogism, so he^ddid^d not claim to have originated any other. He says expressly that the inventor of definition and of induction was Socrates. What exactly it^ewas^e which he intended by these impressions to ascribe to Socrates,^fwe are reduced to gather mainly from other evidence^f . We know,^g both from the^hvivid^h dramatic representation by Plato of the mode of discussionⁱpractised byⁱ Socrates, and from the direct testimony of the more commonplace Xenophon, that it mainly consisted in attempting to ascertain “what” each of the facts or ideas which figure in the talk of the market-place and in the^jdeliberation^j of the public assembly “is;”^kor,^k in other words, in^la search after definitions^l . And though it is neither known, nor at all likely, that any rules for this investigation were laid down either by Socrates or by Plato, most of the Platonic dialogues are practical exemplifications of it.^mIn Mr. Grote’s opinion,^* the induction which Aristotle placed to the credit of Socrates, was the establishment of definitions by generalisation from an enumeration of particulars.^†m The Platonicⁿpracticeⁿ of dividing down to the thing which is the subject of inquiry,^owas regarded^o by Bacon as the nearest approach to a true method of induction to be found among the ancients, because it^pdid not proceed^p by simple enumeration, but by rejectiones et exclusiones debitas^[*]q—by an equal scrutiny of the instances in which the thing sought was absent, and of those in which it was present. But^q Plato practised this method only in inquiring into definitions: and,^rin its application^r to that investigation, Aristotle completely^sappropriated^s it; the doctrine that a definition must be per genus et differentiam being its theoretic generalisation, and the Predicamental Tree its paradigm.

^tBut Aristotle had a much larger and juster conception of the functions of Induction than merely this. He^t did for induction the^ufirst great thing that^u had to be done for it—^v the only great thing^wthat^w could be done for it in the then state of science; in doing which he had not, so far as we know, been anticipated by Socrates, while^xin Plato he had^x his chief adversary: he pointed out that induction is the ultimate ground and evidence of all^your^y knowledge. In^zsyllogizing (as he explains)^z we argue^adownward^a from general truths; but the general truths which are the ἀρχαὶ or ultimate premises of our^bsyllogisms^b must be^ccollected from particular^c experience. His practice^d, it must be admitted, seems to modern critics^d to have been^eoften^e very insufficiently^fgoverned^f by his own doctrine; but he was consistent in upholding the theory. And^ghis^g recognition of it^hdoes the more honour^h to hisⁱphilosophicalⁱ perspicacity, inasmuch as the only science in which,^jat the time when he lived^j , any considerable achievement had been made, was mathematics; a science in which the inductions that constitute the first premises are truths^kso obvious and familiar, that it is particularly easy to mistake them^k for intuitions^ldirectly apprehended by the mind; and they^l are, in fact, the example principally relied on by those^m who, down to and in our ownⁿtimesⁿ , deny Aristotle’s principle. In^ohis^o eyes, however, the axioms laid down in geometry, and those implied in arithmetic, are^pmerely the most obvious of our generalisations from observation. They are^p all learnt from sense: not^qmerely suggested by it^q to the mind, which afterwards perceives them to rest on a higher evidence, but^r actually proved by sense. If, by one of the schools between which philosophy is still divided, this is imputed to him as an error, the other, and in our opinion better, school sees in it a far-sighted anticipation of the ultimate verdict of philosophy.

Having thus put induction in its^sproper^s place, as the foundation and evidence of the truths from which all others flow, Aristotle does not inquire further into it, nor attempt to^tfind^t any scientific criterion^ufor distinguishing good induction from^u bad. His mind^vdoes not seem^v to have travelled beyond the primitive conception of induction,^wdescribed^w by Bacon as “Inductio per enumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria:”^[*] and he probably considered this sufficient for scientific, as he certainly did for dialectic purposes; for, in the Topica,^[†] he lays it down that if one party in the discussion produces a number of instances in support of a generalisation, and the other party is unable to produce any in contradiction to^xit^x , he must be held to admit it. That Aristotle should not have seen his way to the scientific tests of correct and incorrect induction, will not be surprising, if we consider that^ythose tests are all^y grounded upon the universality of the Law of Causation,^zand that this universality was^z not known nor admitted in Aristotle’s^atime^a , nor considered^bby him admissible^b . That the same phenomena always, without exception,^creappear^c whenever a determinate set of conditions is exactly realised, was a truth which had not dawned upon his mind;^dnor had the knowledge of nature, which at that early period had been acquired, as yet established this uniformity of sequence as an universal, but only as a partial truth^d . Aristotle not only believed that some of^ethe sequences which we now call^e laws of nature are true invariably, and others only for the most part, but^fadmitted^f as positive causes in nature two agencies of which uniformity could not in any sense be predicated, τύχη and τὸ αὐτομάτον, chance and spontaneity.^[*]gIt can surprise no one that when the first basis of scientific induction, the constancy of the course of nature, had been so imperfectly laid, the rules and tests of induction which have been built upon that basis after its soundness had been proved by three centuries of the successful application of induction to subjects of ever increasing intricacy and complication, could not be arrived at by divination.^g It is not, however,^hquite so obvious why Aristotle could^h not have seen as much of the matter as Bacon saw; for Bacon also lived at a time when physical science had madeⁱ few of its modern achievements, and such of them as it had made (those of Galileo) he^jseems to have been^j ignorant of. Accordingly Bacon, no more than Aristotle, was able, by his mere sagacity, to arrive at the true rules and tests of induction. But he did, by that rare sagacity, perceive that such tests and rules must be grounded on the application to the investigation of nature, of that comparison of affirmative and negative instances^kto discover their point of difference,^k which Socrates and Plato had introduced and Aristotle had adopted for the investigation of definitions^land for that only^l .^mIt^m may seem a great derogation from Aristotle’sⁿreach of thoughtⁿ that he should have left it to Bacon to make this step. But we should consider that though Bacon had no experience of the success of the modern induction, he had two thousand years’ experience of the failure of the ancient. There had^oby that time been ample evidence^o that the results arrived at by spontaneous generalisation from^pthe instances which first offer themselves, are not to^p be relied on. Such reliance was^qstill admissible^q in Aristotle’s time. For he was the very first who put that primitive^rinduction upon its proper trial^r , by using it systematically for scientific purposes; making a vast collection of such facts or^sreputed^s facts as he could procure, and trying what^tcould be done^t in the way of^udirect^u generalisation from them.^vThe need of a more artful method of induction was not likely to^v be felt until after the natural mode^wwas seen to have^w failed; and it was the failure of that mode, after an ample trial by such a man as Aristotle,^xto establish conclusions that would stand the test of practice,^x that awakened^yBacon, and not him alone,^y but all the most advanced minds in an age of^zrenewed^z intellectual activity, to the^aneed^a of a safer^band more penetrating^b inductive method.

These considerations ought to be borne in mind in judging of the numerous cases in which^cAristotle’s particular speculations have^c the appearance of being false to his own fundamental principle, that all knowledge is^d derived from experience. In Mr. Lewes’s book on Aristotle^e(a work,^fso^f far as the present writer’s knowledge of Aristotle enables him to judge, of exemplary fairness; but which,^gthough^g warmly acknowledging the great genius of Aristotle, yet dealing chiefly with his crude physical speculations, unavoidably gives a much stronger feeling of his defects than of his superiority),^e there are to be found abundant examples of conclusions drawn by him from premises which, to our^heyes^h , do not seem groundedⁱon experience at all, but onⁱ what he himself specially warns others against—preconceptions originating in the mind.^[*] We^jdoubt not^j , however, that Aristotle, if these assumptions had been questioned, would have unhesitatingly claimed for them the character of inductions from experience.^kTo take one instance:^k he frequently assumes as a principle from which^lconclusions may legitimately^l be drawn^mconcerning^m facts, that nature always aims at the best. Nothing, indeed, can be less scientific, or lessⁿsupportedⁿ by a true knowledge of nature, than this generalisation; but^oAristotle^o would have had no difficulty in citing as evidence of it, among other facts, all those adaptations^p(so far as then ascertained) on^p which writers on natural theology^qinsist^q as marks of benevolent design; and though he must have known of many^rfacts^r apparently pointing the other way, he could not then know how deeply that^sother way^s penetrates into the most intimate constitution of nature, and doubtless^tbelieved^t that they all admitted of explanations which would reconcile them with the theory.^uThe example we have chosen is a rather peculiar one, and we often find him building conclusions upon^u premises the connection of which with observed fact is, to modern apprehension, far more distant^v; but we^v still find him proceeding on some analogy, or apparent analogy, to some of the experiences of sense. These are not grounds on which he can^wfairly^w be charged with abandoning his^xfundamental^x principle. Rather, this mode of proceeding seems the inevitable first stage of the attempt to make a^ybroad^y and far-reaching application of^zthe^z principle. For it is now well understood that science^adoes not advance by the mere^a collection of materials, but by using^bthem^b , as fast as collected, in^cthe construction of^c provisional generalisations, fitted to give a definite direction to further inquiry,^dand themselves destined, according to the results of fresh inquiry, to be corrected, limited, or totally abandoned^d . The first set of provisional generalisations were naturally and properly drawn from the most obvious facts. Generalisation “ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt pronuncians,” so deservedly^econdemned^e by Bacon^[*]fas the final method^f of scientific procedure, is^gquite legitimate as^g its first stage; and if the provisional character of^hthe^h generalisations was lost sight of, and they were mistaken forⁱproved truthsⁱ , the responsibility does not lie with Aristotle, who took^jthe greatest pains to enlarge^j the stock of facts, and who^kcertainly neither dreamed nor^k desired that his speculations should be accepted as infallible. It is true, he can hardly have imagined how very far his generalisations would prove to be from a genuine interpretation of nature. For he did not know, nor did any one then know, that the most familiar parts of nature are often the most intricate and complex, and that there are none of which the ultimate laws^ldiffer more widely^l from anything which first appearances give^m indication of.

ⁿ Neither let us^ogreatly blame Aristotle^o for not having more carefully sifted the evidence of his facts. It is^pcharged^p against him that in the natural history of fishes, for example, he^qsets^q down as facts^rwhatever^r were told to him as such by fishermen, some of which were real^sresults of^s observation, while others were^tmere^t popular superstitions; but he had^u, mostly, no means^u of distinguishing the one from the other.^vHe was forced to receive a great proportion of his information on trust. The age of scientific specialists had not yet arrived.^v Had he devoted his time, like Mr. Buckland, to a careful personal observation of the character and habits of fishes, he would have become,^wwithout^w doubt, a very remarkable ichthyologist; but could he have written even the History of Animals,^[*] not to^xmention^x the Organon, the Ethics,^[†] or the Rhetoric?^[‡] In his day, the greatest service which any one could do to physical science, was to make the largest possible collection of^yphysical^y facts, and^zto link them together even by conjecture, leaving^z it to the future to eliminate those which the more ^aattentive^a observation thus directed to them did not confirm. Aristotle did this, with an industry and often an intelligence deserving high praise; nor is it imputable to him that a dictum of his came to be thought, by a succession of^bgenerations^b , better evidence of truth than the use of their eyes.

Intimately connected with his opinion respecting the foundation of all our knowledge in sensible experience, is his view of the nature of Universals; which^cexcited more interest and more discussion among^c those who succeeded him than his doctrine of Induction, and contributed^dmost^d to make him be considered as the founder and chief of the school of sensible experience, in opposition to the Platonic or^eRealistic-Idealist^e school. Plato, it is well known, gave great prominence in many of his principal Dialogues, to the doctrine, that all individual and sensible objects being in a perpetual^fprocess of^f change, never being, but^galways^gbecoming, there could be no knowledge, in^hany true sense of the term^h , of them, but only of certain archetypes or Forms, cognisable by intellect alone; which Formsⁱareⁱ the attributes in their^jcompleteness^j , an imperfect semblance of which we recognise in the best objects of sense. These Forms^k(called by him Ideas, ἰδέαι, one of the Greek equivalents of form)^k had^l, according to him,^l a separate existence of their own, quite apart from^msense. The^m gods lived in the constant contemplation of them, whichⁿwas only possible toⁿ the human mind after a thorough training in philosophy, and^ocould be complete^o only in a life after death. These were the only real Entia, or beings; the world of sense was^psomething^p half-way between Entity and Non-Entity. Such is the doctrine^qrespecting^q Universals which is called, and justly called, Platonic; though Plato also left very forcible statements of its difficulties, and the objections to which it was liable; coupled, however, with the declaration that in spite of all these, unless the doctrine is admitted, no knowledge is possible. Against this theory Aristotle carries on^ran unrelaxing^r polemic; and gives, in considerable detail, his reasons for rejecting it. But, being a constructive as well as a critical thinker, he sets up a counter theory.^[*] According to this, individual objects of sense, instead of not being Entia at all, are so^smore specially and in a fuller degree than any other things^s . He calls them, and them alone, First Substances. Genera and Species^tare^t substances also (Second Substances), but not self-existent, like Plato’s Forms; on the contrary, he denies them all existence, except in, and as implicated with, some First Substance. Attributes^u, though also included among Entia, could still less be admitted to have a separate existence^u . Without going the length of the Nominalist doctrine, which holds nothing to be universal but names, Aristotle takes up a^v middle position, analogous to that of the modern Conceptualists;^wbut differing from them^w in this, that^xwhereas they consider^x Universals as notions in the mind, made up from the world of sense by the intellect itself through a process of abstraction,^y Aristotle regarded them as^z having a real external existence;^aas only perceived, not made, by the intellect; perceived^a , however, not as^bindependent^b entities, but as inseparable elements of the objects perceived by sense. The antagonism between this^ctheory^c and Plato’s,^dthe two doctrines placing the seats^d of objective reality at opposite poles, the one in individuals, the other in the highest generalities, accounts for the character assigned to Aristotle^eof being^e the head and front of the à posteriori, as Plato is^fheld to be^f of the à priori metaphysics. But it is^gnoticeable^g that^h in the hands of theⁱschool that predominated in the Middle Agesⁱ , who assuredly looked up to Aristotle with an almost servile deference,^jhis philosophy^j grew into a well-defined system of Realism, from which it was reserved to^kthinkers of a much later date to emancipate thought^k . Mr. Grote was of opinion that this^lmisinterpretation, as he considered it,^l was in a measure owing to the very imperfect possession of Aristotle’s writings^mby^m the early Middle Ages. In aⁿprivateⁿ letter quoted by the editors in their preface,^oMr. Grote^o says that he should be able to show “how much the improved views of the question of Universals depended on the fact that more and more of the works of Aristotle, and better texts, became known to Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and their successors. During the centuries immediately succeeding Boethius, nothing of Aristotle, except the Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione,^[*] was known, and these in a Latin translation. Most fortunately, the Categories was never put out of sight; and it is there that the doctrine of Substantia Prima stands clearly proclaimed.”^*

But though the doctrine of Substantia Prima, in the book on the Categories, thoroughly excludes Plato’s form of realism, that of Substantia Secunda, which is there combined with it, afforded a basis on which it was possible to erect another^p realistic doctrine. Universals, as understood by Aristotle, were not indeed, like Plato’s, extra rem, but they were in re, and not solely in the cognising mind. The difference, no doubt,^qwas great between the two doctrines^q . As conceived by Aristotle, universals would perish if there were no particulars to predicate them of:

This was^sa great^s advance on the doctrine, that the only reality, and the only^tpossible subject of science, exists^t in a sphere altogether apart from particulars^u; and it did not, like that, cultivate a disdain of the physical details among which lies the only real road to the discovery of the laws of nature. But^u the admission of general substances, though only as embodied in individual substances, gave^va^v loop-hole^wthrough which, in another shape, the realism which is a natural outgrowth of the human mind^w could creep in; and a world of argument and discussion was found necessary again to dislodge it. The^xtendency to believe that a real thing is signified wherever there is a real word, was in this instance^x favoured by some of the leading doctrines of Aristotle in^ymetaphysic^y proper: especially by^z two distinctions, which run through^aall^a his “Philosophia Prima”—the analysis of every object of perception or thought into two ingredients, Matter and Form, and the cognate distinction between Potential and Actual being; the matter of a thing being only potentially the thing, until the superinduction of the form makes it actually so. These forms, which he does not call ἰδέαι, like^bthose of Plato,^b but εἴδη,^cand^c which are in reality the attributes of objects, are thus the actual creators of^d objects as they exist in ἐντελεχεία or completedness; and^ethis attribution to forms^e of a kind of active power, made it difficult to avoid^fregarding^f them as substantive entities: whether existing outside the individual thing or only in it, seeming from that point of view to be of little consequence.^gIndeed, Aristotle^hactually^h makes it one of his reproaches against Plato’s Ideas, that from their immobility in themselves, and complete severance from individual bodies, they could not haveⁱaⁱ moving force, whereby anything can be made to become; whereas his εἴδη were actual causes.^g

^j The real expulsion^kof the objective existence of universals from philosophy was left^k to be effected by the Nominalist schoolmen, towards the end of the Middle Ages: since which the only dispute remaining open is between the pure Nominalism of Hobbes, and the Conceptualism of Locke and Brown; the one seeing nothing in general names but a collection of resembling objects and a word; the other superadding a mental representation, called^l an abstract idea, a general notion, or a concept. Nevertheless, though Aristotle did not finally accomplish the work, he will always be honourably recognised as the thinker who began it;^mthe first who saw that knowledge begins in particulars, and rises from them to the universal, and that our knowledge of universals is but the knowledge of something which exists in the particulars, some point which a number of particulars have in common; the first, therefore, who diverted intellect^m from the path which could only lead,ⁿand did for ages leadⁿ , to making philosophy a jingle of mystical^oabstractions, and turned it into that better path which lands us at the goal of a truer philosophy, the most general and comprehensive expression of real facts.^o

In the remaining^pbranches^p of logic, those which relate to propositions, and to the^qmodes^q of signification of terms, the services of Aristotle^rwere less signal, but not less indispensable^r . Before him, the expression of the operations of the mind in language had scarcely received the merest commencement of^slogical^s analysis: we see by Plato that technical terms did not yet exist even for the subject and predicate of a proposition, still less for the differences of (so-called) quantity and quality in propositions, the equivalence or non-equivalence of different forms, and the modes of opposition^tamong^t propositions—a^usure^u proof that these distinctions, elementary as they^vare^v , had not yet excited sufficient attention to^whave led^w to their being generalised^x. Even Plato, as Mr. Grote points out,^*x shows a curious want of perception of some of them;^yand^y his predecessors and some of his cotemporaries were^zentangled^z in many puzzles,^awhich would have been puzzles to no one to whom these distinctions were familiar, but^a from which they^bcould find^b no means of extrication but through some^cpalpable^c absurdity.^dIt is impossible, without some knowledge of the early speculations of mankind before their^esimplest^e logical instruments were duly fashioned,^d to appreciate the debt due to those who first gave to such of those instruments as are now the most familiar, the precision^fwhich fits them^f for their work. This merit may justly be claimed for Aristotle, in^grespect^g to almost all the terminology and distinctions of formal logic. Of the “positive theory of propositions which we read in his treatise De Interpretatione,” Mr. Grote remarks:

It is another^rservice of Aristotle to logic^r , that he was the first^sto treat^s largely and systematically of the ambiguities of terms; and (though not unfrequently misled by them himself) made a practice, through all his writings, of distinguishing the various senses in which the principal terms of philosophy were used, and even discriminating between meanings^tthat^t are wholly different and those which are connected by some tie of analogy with one another. Of this last distinction he makes frequent use in the generalities of his^uphilosophy. For^u example, he says that Ens^v, or Being,^v though predicable of all the categories (substance, quantity, quality, &c.) is not predicated of them as a^wgenus is predicated of its various^w species, in one and the same sense;^xbut yet, not in senses wholly unconnected with one another. A^x quality, for instance, is not a Being in^yexactly^y the same sense as a Substance is; it is called a Being by a kind of analogy: and some Beings, therefore, may be^z, and are,^z more or less Beings than others;^a less fully Beings, Beings in a less complete degree. In connection with this, let us mention that, as Mr. Grote points out, Aristotle^bin some degree^b anticipated the acute remark of Hobbes, first brought into its due position of importance by James Mill,^[*] respecting the double meaning of^cto be^c ; “first, per se, as meaning existence; next, relatively, as performing the function of copula in predication. . . . We may truly say Homer is a poet” (copula), “but we cannot truly say Homer is” (existence). “He tells us, in reply either to Plato or to some other contemporaries, that though we may truly say Non-Ens est opinabile, we cannot truly say Non-Ens est, because the real meaning of the first of these propositions is Non-Ens est opinabile non esse.”^* We see in some of Plato’s dialogues what an amount of verbal fallacy, and even of genuine perplexity, arose from^dinattention to^d this double meaning.

In the book on the Categories, Entia or Beings, in the^elarge^e extension which Aristotle^fallows^f to the term (an^gextension^g including whatever can be thought or spoken about^haffirmatively, and excluding, if anything, only negatives^h ), are distinguished, and arranged under heads; but only in respect of their capacity of entering into a proposition.ⁱOneⁱ kind of Ens, the individual object, or Substantia Prima, is unfit to be predicated of anything except itself, and can enter into a proposition only as a subject. Genera and Species, or Second Substances, may be predicates as well as subjects; and they, as well as all the other Categories, communicate some special kind of information respecting the subject of which they are predicated. Substance is the answer to the question, What^jis it. Quantity to How great is it. Quality to Of what sort is it^j . Ad aliquid, or Relation, to What character has it in reference to something else. And so with the other Categories—Where, When, Posture, Dress or Equipment, Action, and^k Being acted upon. There has been an endless amount of writing for, against, and in explanation of, the validity of this classification. Mr. Grote, while himself criticizing it from the point of view of the Relativity of^lall^l human knowledge, defends it, not without success, against some of the minor criticisms which have been made^mby (among others)^m the present writer.^[†] The best which can be said in favour of it will be found in the acute work of Dr. Franz Brentano, on the different meanings of ens according to Aristotle;^* a^obook often cited^o and highly appreciated by Mr. Grote. Dr. Brentano attempts to^pdetect^p the logical process^q, never stated by Aristotle himself, whereby he^q was led to constitute precisely those ten Categories; and though (as Mr. Grote thinks) he may not have^rproved^r that Aristotle^sreally did^s reach them by that path, he has undoubtedly shown that they might have been so reached, and that the classification^tadmits of a valid defence^t from the Aristotelian point of view. Dr. Brentano has also, we think, completely proved (what has sometimes been denied) that although, in the scheme of the Categories, the idea of predication was predominant, Aristotle did also regard them as the Summa Genera in a classification of Things. To have made the first attempt at a classification of Things in general in their logical aspect, external realities and mental abstractions^utaken^u together, was so^vconsiderable^v a step, that one may more justly wonder that its defects are not greater, than at their being so great as they are. The detailed^wdiscussion of the several^w Categories brings out various properties and distinctions which are permanently^xvalid^x , and have passed into modern thought.

Thus far of Aristotle as a logician: in which character^yhis performances, considered under the double aspect of originality and substantial value, have justly earned for him^y the highest honour which it has been in the power of any one to deserve in that science. As a psychologist and metaphysician he stands on a much lower level^z, and his labours in those fields have seldom more than an historical interest^z . Except an incidental remark here and there,^ahis claims to have made^a any real contribution to positive knowledge on those subjects^brest on^b the share he had in laying the foundation of the doctrine of Association. The amount of that share is much disputed. Sir William Hamilton, in one of the elaborate dissertations appended to his edition of Reid, claims for Aristotle to have been “at once the founder and finisher of the theory of association:”^[*] meaning, of course, the laws of association itself,^c not the modern applications of it to the explanation of the more^dcomplex^d mental phenomena^e, most of which applications Hamilton did not admit^e . He^facknowledges^f that in order to establish^gthis high claim on behalf of Aristotle, it^g is necessary to correct^hmisconceptions “which^h , bequeathed by the first, have been inherited by the last of Aristotle’s interpreters.”^*iIf, therefore, the philosopher knew all that Hamilton believed him to have known, he did not succeed in transmitting the knowledge to his most distinguished pupils. But this, which to most people would seem a defect, enhances, in Hamilton’s eyes, the glory of the master.ⁱ “Aristotle,” he says, “has been here so long misapprehended only because he was so far ahead of his expositors. Nor is there a higher testimony to his genius than that it required a progress in philosophy of two thousand years before philosophers were prepared to apprehend his meaning, when the discovery of that meaning was abandoned to their own intelligence.”^†jLooking solely at his own pages, Hamilton seems to make^j out a strong case.^kUnfortunately for him,^k Mr. Grote has shown, in a paper^lnow first published (in the appendix), that Hamilton’s capacity^l of putting a meaning into passages of Aristotle^mwhich Aristotle never thought of, exceeded anything for which our previous knowledge of Hamilton had prepared us. Mr. Grote himself, however,^m says, in more measured language, thatⁿAristotle, in his account of Memory and Reminiscence,ⁿ “displays an acute and penetrating intelligence of the great principles of the Association of Ideas,”^omore, however, in^o reference to reminiscence^pthan to memory; “and the exaggerated prominence that he has given to the distinction between the two (determined apparently by a wish to keep the procedure of man apart from that of animals) tends to perplex his description of the associative process.”^p‡ Had we possessed from Mr. Grote that ^qminute^q examination of the treatise on Memory and Reminiscence which would doubtless have formed part of his work on Aristotle, instead of the brief notice of it in the essay contributed to^rMr.^r Bain, we should have been better able to judge how far, if at all, in this case (as, according to Mr. Lewes, in many branches of physics) modern knowledge has been read into Aristotle’s words.

The^spart^s of Aristotle’s writings known as the Metaphysica did not receive that name from the philosopher himself; it was invented by his Greek editors, and signified merely the position which they assigned to those writings in their arrangement of his works. Aristotle’s own name for the subject matter of them was ἡ πρώτη ϕιλοσοϕία,^[*]t a phrase adopted from him by Bacon and Hobbes as a name for the highest generalities of philosophy. It was in this sense that Aristotle used it, and what he included^uunder^u it consisted of all that^vbelonged^v to Being as such—^w Ens quatenus Ens; together with—

^x This principium contradictionis,^yor^y Law of Contradiction, has ever since been recognised as the ultimate principle of^zall syllogistic, which is as much as to say of all general,^z reasoning; the validity of which^aconsists in^a the fact that to deny the conclusion,^baccepting^b the premises, involves a contradiction; and^cits real, and only real, function^c is to keep our particular judgments consistent, and^dthe reverse of those judgments^d inconsistent, with the general propositions to which we have previously given our assent. The distinct laying down of this axiom^e(“and its supplement or correlative, the maxim of the Excluded Middle”)^e[*] was the necessary completion of the theory of the syllogism.^fObvious as these maxims appear, the clear perception that the evidence of general reasoning depends on them was a capital step in philosophy, and shows the determination of Aristotle to follow subjects up to their first principles.^f

The question arises, what is the ground of^gthese^g axioms themselves; and Aristotle does not blink this question. There were thinkers in and before his time,^hparticularly^h Herakleitus and his followers, who denied the axiom of contradiction. Aristotle

ⁱ Mr. Grote gives a full^jexposition of this opinion^j of Aristotle, but himself dissents from it, observing that the^kworst dilemma to which the supposed opponent could be reduced is that^k of falling into another contradiction^l—a difficulty^l which, by maintaining that a self-contradiction^mis not necessarily^m false, heⁿhasⁿ declared himself willing to face. In Mr. Grote’s opinion, the proof of the Axiom of Contradiction, like that of all other axioms,^ois^o inductive. “All that can really be done in the way of defence is, to prove the Maxim in its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases. If your opponent is willing to grant these particular cases, you establish the general Maxim against him by way of induction; if he will not grant them, you cannot prove the general Maxim at all.”^* This is indeed hunting the doctrine of à priori knowledge from its last refuge: and we should be heartily glad if we were able to agree with Mr. Grote^p: so important do we deem it both to philosophy and to practice to leave nothing standing which countenances the notion that there is a kind of knowledge independent of experience^p . But it seems to us that though the meaning of^qthe two maxims,^q of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, like that of all other propositions expressed in general terms, is only understood by means of particular cases,^rthose axioms^r stand, in one respect, on a different ground from axioms in general.^sThe proposition that the affirmation and denial of the same fact cannot both be true, is at once assented to for this reason, that^s the judging one^tof them to be true and judging^t the other to be false are not two different acts^uof the mind, but the same act^u . We assent with like readiness to the statement that they cannot both be false, because the judging either^v to be false is the very same mental act with judging the other to be true. This identity of the mental operation constitutes the^wvery meaning of the^w words in which the axioms are^xexpressed;^x it is impossible to understand the words “true” and “false,”^y the words “is” and “is not,”^zin any other sense^z . For this reason it seems to us that the axioms in question do not need the support of a^agathered experience;^a they have their root in a mental fact which makes it impossible to contravene them^* —a fact implied in^kevery form of words which can be used to express them.^klUndoubtedly, however, the impossibility must be felt in particular instances before it can be assented to in general terms; and in this sense it must be granted to Mr. Grote that the proof of the generalisation lies in the particular instances.^l†

We have now reached the limits of the portion of Aristotle’s ontology and psychology which is fully explained and^adiscussed^a by Mr. Grote. To go on to the remainder with no more of that invaluable assistance than^b the abstract of the Metaphysica^c in the appendix, and the analysis of the DeAnimâ^[*] written for Professor Bain’s treatise,^[†] would be an undertaking^dwhich could only be practicable^d after a study of the original^elittle short of that which had been given by Mr. Grote^e . The difficulty of finding a meaning, intelligible to modern habits of thought, in trains of speculation so^falien to^f our methods, expressed in phraseology^gfor which we have no equivalents, and which seems to us hopelessly entangled and^g irremediably confusing, is extreme; and the result is seldom, unless in an historical point of view (nor always even in that), of a value commensurate with the difficulty. The Metaphysica, or^h such part of it as has come down to us (for its fragmentary appearance has struck the commentators, andⁱit has been conjectured to have neverⁱ been completed), turns^jprincipally^j upon the two antitheses^kwe have already referred to^k , that of Matter and Form, and that of Potential and Actual. Everything is composed of Matter and Form, except^lan hypothetical^l First Matter which has no Form, and a Form which has no Matter, and is the Divine Intelligence. But those composite objects^mwhich have both Matter and Form,^m are all of them Matter in relation to any different or additionalⁿFormsⁿ which they are capable of taking on. Everything^ois^o potentially whatever it is capable of becoming, and^pby virtue of the appropriate Form^p it becomes what it does become.^qrBesides Matter and Form, Aristotle recognises another element, Privation.^rsSome changes^t are produced, not by a Form, but by the Privation of a Form; thus, he^udoes not recognise a Form of Health and a Form of Sickness, but regards^u sickness as the privation of health;^v a sick man, from being potentially well, becomes actually so by^wreceiving^w the Form of Health; but a healthy man becomes sick, not^xthrough^x a Form of Sickness, but through^ythe^y Privation of the Form of Health.^s These notions, and the^znumerous^z minutiæ and subtleties into which they are followed out, even were they liable to no other objection, would tell us nothing of the laws of phenomena; they^agive no power of prediction, and explain nothing; they are but^a a particular mode of restating the^bfacts^b to be explained. To say that it is the union of the form of health with^cthe matter of the body^c which makes the man healthy, is^dbut^d to say, in technical language, that he is made healthy by health. If^ethe Form of Health is anything different from the fact of health, it is^e an imaginary entity conjured up out of an abstraction, and supposed to be immanent in all things^fthat possess^f the property it is the form of; as, in a still earlier stage of speculation, gods were thought to be immanent in rivers, and nymphs in trees.^gThere is a state of the human mind in which these metaphysical fictions seem to convey explanation; and Aristotle, with all his far-sighted perception that the source of knowledge is observation of particulars, had not got beyond that state.^g

^hWhat is commonly called the Psychology^h of Aristotle is a theory of the various souls, or living principles, which he recognises as existing in nature, and regards as the Forms or Active Principles of life in its different degrees; though he hardly regards them as objectively distinct from one another, but rather as modifications ofⁱa singleⁱ Principle, successively superinduced by the addition of^jmore^j attributes.^kHis classification of the supposed agents fairly coincides with the modern classification of the phenomena.^k The first is the Nutritive Soul, common to animal and vegetable life. The second is the Sensitive^l, which is also the Locomotive^l Soul, common to all animals. The third and highest is the Noëtic, or Intellectual Soul, belonging to man alone. This last, again, he finds it necessary to subdivide into the passive, or merely receptive intelligence, and the active intelligence, or νου̑ς ποιητικός; the latter of which is the moving force, ^mthrough^m which what is merely potential in the passive intelligence becomes actual.^[*] No part of the speculations of Aristotle is more obscure than the theory ofⁿtheⁿ νου̑ς ποιητικός, which he regarded as a part of the universal νου̑ς of the universe, independent of the bodily frame, and^otherefore capable^o of surviving it, though whether or not with a personal immortality^premains^p matter of dispute. The subject is^qbut^q slightly touched on in the essay by Mr. Grote which^ris printed as^r the last chapter of his treatise. A^s full and elaborate treatment of it, grounded on a comprehensive view of Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrines,^thas been given^t by a writer already mentioned, Dr. Franz Brentano,^uin a work^uOn the Psychology of Aristotle, especially with reference to the νου̑ς ποιητικός,^* which,^whaving been published as lately as 1867^w , does not seem to have been known to Mr. Grote when he wrote his essay^x; and which, without venturing to decide whether the author has established all his points, the present writer cannot help noting as one of the most thoroughly executed pieces of philosophical research and exegesis^x which it has been his fortune to meet with.

The Ethics, Politics,^[†] and Rhetoric of Aristotle are not^ytouched upon^y by Mr. Grote, and the present^zis not a convenient^z occasion for^asaying much about them; still less about the Poetics.^a[‡] We may^bsay, however, of the Rhetoric, that^b besides its special worth in^cregard^c to its particular subject, which is even now considerable,^dit^d is one of the^erichest^e repositories of incidental remarks on human nature and^fhuman affairs that^f the ancients have bequeathed to^gus. In^g this consists also, in our judgment, the principal value of the Ethics and Politics, which, as treatises on^hthose special^h subjects, have for their most markedⁱcharacteristics thatⁱ dread of extremes and^jlove of the via media which were deeply rooted in Aristotle’s mind. The Politics, in lieu^j of the adventurous anticipations of genius^kwhich we find in the Republic of Plato, presents us with^k the mode of thinking of a Liberal Conservative, or rather, of a moderate aristocratical politician, at Athens. In the main,^lit^l is a philosophic consecration of existing facts (witness its strange defence of slavery),^[*] choosing by preference among those facts^msuch as^m tend towards stability, rather than towards improvement.ⁿIt should be remembered that, unless so far as Plato may be considered an exception, none of the ancient politicians or philosophers believed in progress; their highest hopes were limited to guarding society against its natural tendency to degeneration.ⁿ

There remains^oto be noticed^o one work of Aristotle, which is copiously analyzed and^pcommented on^p by Mr. Grote, and which is of great importance to^qa^q correct understanding of the Greek mind: the treatise which^r, under the name of Topica, is included in the Organon, and of which the Sophistici Elenchi is properly the concluding book^r . Both^sthe conception and^s the detail of this work^tare of a nature to^t puzzle, and, when not properly understood,^uto^u scandalize, the modern mind. It is a treatise on Dialectic Reasoning, as distinguished from Demonstrative, which last had been elaborately treated in the^vAnalytics. Dialectic^v , as there understood, is^w the art of arguing for victory, not for truth,^xand instruction in that art is the declared^x object of the treatise. In order justly to appreciate such^ya design^y , and to perceive how it could coexist, as in Aristotle’s case the whole collection of his writings witnesses that it did, with an indefatigable ardour in the pursuit of truth, it is necessary to remember how large a place in Grecian life was occupied by contests of skill between individuals, in matters both physical and intellectual. When we^zthink of^z the vast honour understood to^aaccrue^a , not only^bto the actual victor but to the city he belonged to^b , by his gaining a prize in the Olympic festival^camong which prizes one for poetry was included)^c , and the^dnumerous^d minor^ecompetitions^e of a similar kind in the various Greek states,^fby which the minds of aspiring persons were kept perpetually on the stretch to acquire celebrity by successes of this nature; it cannot be wondered at^f that after Dialectics, or regulated discussion by question and answer, had been introduced by Zeno of Elea, and brought to perfection by Socrates and Plato, this also should have become extensively popular as a game of skill. In this game, a thesis, usually on some^gimportant and highly interesting subject^g , was propounded for discussion,^hthe propounder undertaking^h to defend it against allⁱobjections. The assailants were required to proceed by puttingⁱ questions to him, which must be such as admitted of^jan explicit^j answer by yes or no, nor was any other kind of answer permissible.^kIf the assailants were able to reduce the respondent to admissions inconsistent with each other or with the thesis, they were victorious; if they failed to do this, the victory was with the respondent.^k In this intellectual exercise no wrong was done to truth,^lthe known object being,^l not to disprove the thesis, but to test the disputant’s ability to defend it against objections. How completely ^msuch^m was the sole object is shown in this, that the assailant of the thesis was not allowed to propound positive arguments against it; he could only put questions to the respondent, and must derive his refutation from the respondent’s own answers. There is nothing immoral in arguing for victory when that is theⁿobject professedⁿ , and the only wrong^othat could^o be committed in the case^pwas^p a violation of the rules of the game. These rules were of course framed with a view to render such contests possible, to make them intelligible and interesting to an audience, and to secure a fair field and fair play to both^qsides. This explains^q why the premises introduced by the arguers were required to be ἔνδοξα, (in the language of the casuists, borrowed no doubt from Aristotle, probable opinions), that is, they must be opinions either^rheld generally^r by mankind, or maintained by some respected authority. However true they might be, if they were recondite, and remote from common apprehension, the respondent could not reasonably be expected to be prepared for them; while, if they had good authority on their side, it was not even necessary that the person using them should believe them to be true, truth not being the object, but to reduce the respondent to an inconsistency, and it^sbeing^s always open to him^tto admit them or not^t . The same thing explains why it was^u lawful, even in the opinion of Aristotle, to entrap the respondent into an admission, which on calm reflection he would not have made; for this equally answered the purpose of testing his skill and knowledge. On the other hand, the licenses allowed by the game might be pushed too far, and the allowable kinds and degrees of artifice might be exceeded in such a manner as to defeat the legitimate^vpurpose of the trial of skill. This^v , Aristotle says, was^woften done by dishonest persons, or persons^w of a litigious disposition; and the concluding book,^xDe Sophisticis Elenchis^x , is composed of warnings against^ytheir^y malpractices.

^zThe purpose of Aristotle, in giving instructions for success in these contests, went much farther than merely to qualify people for being victorious over an adversary. The study and practice were^z , he said, of great utility in reference to the pursuit of truth. “First” (^awe now^a quote from Mr. Grote) “the debate is a valuable and stimulating mental exercise.”^bThis was the simplest and most obvious of its recommendations.^b “Secondly, it is useful for our intercourse with the multitude: for the procedure directs us to note and remember the opinions of the multitude, and such knowledge will facilitate our intercourse with them; we shall converse with them out of their own opinions, which we may thus be able beneficially to modify.” This is^cinteresting,^c as indicating Aristotle’s opinion^d(differing from that of many of the ancient philosophers)^d that the philosopher ought not to keep^ealoof^e from the multitude, and^fwithdraw himself from^f the duty of advising them for their good by arguments drawn^gfrom^g their own opinions. “Thirdly, dialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the processes of science and philosophy, and upon the truths thereby acquired. For it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both sides of every question, and thus assists us in detecting and discriminating truth and falsehood.”^* Of this benefit^hfrom^h dialectic exercise, Aristotle’s own practice affords aⁱremarkable verificationⁱ : for he very^jfrequently^j commences his investigation of a difficult question by^ka detailed^k enumeration and statement of the ἀπορίαι, the difficulties or puzzles, which affect it; and there is no way in which his method of studying a subject sets a more beneficial example. In this respect^lhe was greatly^l in advance not only of his own time, but^m of ours. His general advice for exercise and practice in Dialecticⁿis admirably adapted toⁿ the training of one’s own mind^ofor^o the pursuit of truth. “You ought to test every thesis by first assuming it to be true, then assuming it to be false, and following out the consequences on both sides.”^pThis was already the practice of the Eleatic dialecticians, as we see in the Parmenides^q .^p

We are far from asserting that the dialectic contests of the Greeks, or the public disputations of the Middle Ages which^ssucceeded to^s them, had never any but a beneficial^teffect^t ; that they had not their snares and their temptations, and that the good they effected might not be still better attained by other means. But the fact remains that no such means have been provided, and that the old^utraining has^u disappeared, even from the Universities, without having been^vreplaced^v by any other. There is no reason why a practice so useful for the pursuit of truth should not be employed when the^wattainment^w of truth is the^xsole^x object. We have known this most effectually done by a set of young students of philosophy, assembling on certain days to read regularly through some standard book on psychology,^y logic, or political economy; suspending the reading whenever any one had a difficulty to propound or an idea to start, and carrying on the discussion from day to day, if necessary for weeks, until the point raised had been searched to its inmost depths, and no difficulty or obscurity capable of removal by discussion remained. The intellectual training given by these debates, and especially the habit they gave of leaving no dark corners unexplored—of searching out all the ἀπορίαι, and never passing over^zany^z unsolved difficulty—has been felt, by those who took part, to have been invaluable to them as a mental discipline. There would be nothing impracticable in making exercises of this kind a standing element of the course of instruction in the higher branches of knowledge; if the teachers had any^aperception^a of the want which such discussions would supply, or thought it any part of their business to form thinkers, instead of “principling” their pupils (as Locke expresses it) with ready-made knowledge.^[*] But the saying of James Mill, in his essay on Education, is as true now as when it was written—that even the theory of education is far behind the progress of knowledge, and the practice lamentably behind even the theory.^[†]

^b We now take our leave of Aristotle, referring the reader for fuller knowledge to Mr. Grote’s book; which, as a guide to all the parts of Aristotle’s speculations that are included in it, fulfils the expectations excited by his work on Plato, and leaves nothing to regret but that the remainder of the Aristotelian writings have not had the benefit of the same clear exposition and philosophical criticism, and that a general estimate of Aristotle and of what he did, by so competent a judge, has not been bestowed on us. Besides the matter already spoken of, the work contains a life of Aristotle, and a discussion of the canon of his writings; in both of which, the use made of scanty materials is worthy the author of the History of Greece. It is a curious and almost unique accident, that although many of the writings of Aristotle have been lost, we are actually in possession of some, and those among the most important, which were not accessible to his followers for many generations after the death of his immediate successor, Theophrastus. The collection of manuscripts made by Aristotle and enlarged by Theophrastus, which contained the most precious of the Aristotelian treatises, remained near a century and a half in a hiding place under ground, at Skepsis in Asia Minor, to prevent their being seized by the kings of Pergamus to enrich the royal library; and they emerged from thence after the extinction of the Attalid dynasty, so injured by damp and worms that many passages had to be restored conjecturally: first by anincompetent editor, Apellikon; afterwards more intelligently, but necessarily with increase of difficulty, by Andronicus of Rhodes, somewhat later than the time of Cicero, in whose early youth the books were brought to Rome from Athens by Sylla. So narrowly did posterity escape the loss of one of the chief treasures of Grecian antiquity; many of the treatises having only come down to us through these damaged manuscripts: the condition of which is probably responsible for much of the obscurity which has given so much trouble to commentators and to students: for Aristotle’s literary style, though often awkward (being both prolix and elliptical) is by no means, in his best preserved works, deficient in clearness.

Appendix

Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited in the Essays, with Variants and Notes

mill, like most nineteenth-century authors, is somewhat cavalier in his approach to sources, his identifications being often vague and his quotations not exact. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the analytic Index). Included also, at the end of the Appendix, is the one reference to British statute law, under the heading “Statutes.” The material otherwise is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each author and work quoted or referred to in the text. Both the speakers and those persons referred to in JSM’s translations of Plato’s dialogues are included in this Appendix, with an indication in the notes of the instances when the references and quotations occur in the translation and summary—i.e., when they are Plato’s—but not when they appear in JSM’s comments on the dialogues. (Legendary figures do not appear in this Index.) Similarly, the notes indicate which references and quotations are taken by JSM from other sources.

The entries take the following form:

1. Identification: author, title, etc., in the usual bibliographic form.

2. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, and any other relevant information.

3. Lists of the pages where works are reviewed, quoted, and referred to.

4. A list of substantive variants between JSM’s text and his source, in this form: page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).

The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. Omissions of two sentences or less are given in full; only the length of other omissions is given. In a few cases, following the page reference to the source, cross-references are given to footnoted variants in the present text. When the style has been altered by setting down quotations, the original form is retained in the entries. There being uncertainty about the actual Greek texts used by JSM, the Loeb editions of the Classics are used when possible, and the quotations are not collated.

Acumenus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 86

Adeimantus.

note: the reference at 167 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167, 396

Adrastus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 86

Æantodorus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Ælian, Claudius.Varia Historia Epistolae Fragmenta. Ed. Rudolph Hercher. Leipzig: Teubneri, 1866.

referred to: 327n.

Æschines.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

— Against Timarchus, in The Speeches of Æschines (Greek and English). Trans. Charles Darwin Adams. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1919, 4-155.

quoted: 398

referred to: 389

— On the Embassy, in ibid., 162-301.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 284

Æschylus.

referred to: 317

— Prometheus Bound, in Æschylus (Greek and English). Trans. Herbert Weir Smyth. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963, I, 214-315.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 280

Agis III (of Sparta).

note: the reference at 300 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 300, 337n

Albertus Magnus.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 489

Alcæus. Referred to: 315n

Alcibiades.

note: the reference at 143 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 143, 166n, 316, 331, 395

Aldrich, Henry.Artis logicæ compendium. Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1691.

note: a copy of the 2nd ed. (ed. H. L. Mansel [Oxford: Graham, 1852]), which the reference antedates, in JSM’s library, Somerville College; in that ed. the quotation is on 91; the reference at 23 is on 24 ff. The quotation (a translation) is in a quotation from Whately. The work, frequently reprinted and translated, is also known as Artis logicæ rudimenta and (as JSM indicates at 20) “the Oxford Logic.”

quoted: 32

referred to: 20, 23, 29

32n.2-3 “This . . . all.”] [translated from:] 2. Inductio; in qua ponitur quantum opus est de singulis, & deinde assumitur de universis; ut Hic, & illa & iste magnes trahit ferrum; Ergo omnis. [The passage continues:] Est igitur Enthymema quoddam; nempe Syllogismus in Barbara, cujus minor reticetur. (23)

Alexander (the Great).

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr.

referred to: 243, 312, 323, 336n

Anacharsis. Referred to: 397n

Anacreon.

note: the reference at 67 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 67, 315n

Anaxagoras.

note: the reference at 87 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus, that at 160 in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 87, 160, 286, 397n

Anaximander. Referred to: 381

Anaximenes. Referred to: 380

Andron.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 124

Andronicus (of Rhodes). Referred to: 510

Anon. “Bailey’s Review of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision,” Spectator, XV (8 Jan., 1842), 41-2.

referred to: 262

Antalcidas. Referred to: 323

Antiphon.

note: the reference at 167 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology, that at 222 is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides.

referred to: 167, 222, 327

Antisthenes (the Cynic).

note: the reference at 492 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 378, 492

Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius. Referred to: 397

Anytus.

note: the references at 153-71 passim are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 153, 158-9, 162-4, 167, 169, 171, 393, 398

Apellicon (Apellikon). Referred to: 510

Apollodorus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167, 171

Aratus. Referred to: 337n

Archelaus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 113, 118, 147

Ariosto, Ludovico.Orlando Furioso. 3 vols. Orleans: Couret de Villeneuve, 1785.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 284

Aristeides (Aristides) (the Just).

note: the reference at 147 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 147, 322, 327, 333, 416, 417n

Aristippus (the Cyrenaic). Referred to: 378, 392

Aristocrates.

note: the reference at 114 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 114, 395

Aristodemus. Referred to: 323

Ariston.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Aristophanes.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 326

— Acharnians, in Aristophanes (Greek and English). Trans. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, I, 2-117.

quoted: 333

— The Clouds, in ibid., I, 262-401.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 153, 153n, 154

— The Knights, in ibid., I, 120-259.

quoted: 317

Aristophon.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 98

Aristotle.

note: the references at 298, 300, 302, 320, 334, 415 are in quotations from Grote. The Loeb eds. of Aristotle are used throughout for ease of reference. Various Greek eds. of different works are in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 12, 23, 26, 84n, 95, 274, 298, 300, 302, 310n, 313, 320, 334, 336n, 377-8, 382, 386, 410, 415, 419, 421, 475-510 passim

— Analytica Priora, in The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (Greek and English). Trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, 198-530.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 12

referred to: 498

— Analytica Posteriora, in Posterior Analytics, Topica (Greek and English). Trans. Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, 24-260.

referred to: 12, 505

— The “Art” of Rhetoric (Greek and English). Trans. J. H. Freese. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

referred to: 486, 504-5

— Categories, in The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (Greek and English). Trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, 12-108.

referred to: 489, 494

— De Anima, in On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath (Greek and English). Trans. W. S. Hett. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935, 8-202.

referred to: 501-2, 504

— De Cœlo. See On the Heavens.

— De Interpretatione, in The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (Greek and English). Trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, 114-78.

referred to: 489, 492-3, 492n-493n

— Historia Animalium (Greek and English). Trans. A. L. Peck. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965-70.

referred to: 486

— The Metaphysics (Metaphysica) (Greek and English). Trans. Hugh Tredennick. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1933.

note: the quotations all derive from Grote; those at 489-90 and 498 are indirect.

quoted: 380n, 489-90, 497-8

referred to: 476, 488, 497-502

— The Nicomachean Ethics (Greek and English). Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

referred to: 486, 504-5

— On the Heavens (Greek and English). Trans. W. K. C. Guthrie. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.

referred to: 476

— On Sophistical Refutations, in On Sophistical Refutations, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away, On the Cosmos (Greek and English). Trans. E. S. Forster and D. J. Furley. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955, 10-154.

note: the quotation at 478 is a translation from Grote.

quoted: 400, 478

referred to: 505, 507

— Organon.

note: the Organon consists of The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topica and On Sophistical Refutations.

referred to: 477, 486, 505

— The Physics (Greek and English). Trans. Philip H. Wickstead and Francis M. Cornford. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

referred to: 483

— The Poetics, in Aristotle, The Poetics, “Longinus,” On the Sublime, Demetrius, On Style (Greek and English). Trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe and W. Rhys Roberts. London: Heinemann: New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927, 4-116.

referred to: 504

— Politics (Greek and English). Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1932.

referred to: 504-5

— Sophistici Elenchi. See On Sophistical Refutations.

— Topica, in Posterior Analytics, Topica (Greek and English). Trans. Hugh Tredennick and E. S. Forster. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, 272-738.

referred to: 482, 505

Aristoxenus.Elements of Harmony.

note: as the references derive from Grote (Plato, I, 217n), no ed. is cited.

referred to: 386n, 421n

Artaxerxes II (Mnemon). Referred to: 323

Aspasia.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 335

Bacchylides. Referred to: 315n

Bacon, Francis. Referred to: 12, 93, 310n, 341, 483, 497

— De Augmentis Scientiarum, in The Works of Francis Bacon. Ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. 14 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1857-74, I, 415-840.

note: for ease of reference this ed., which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is used, though JSM’s references antedate it. Most of JSM’s phrasal quotations are paraphrases, and that at 482 is undoubtedly summary, so no collation is given (cf. Novum Organum, same reference). The quotations at 12-13 and 93 are indirect.

quoted: 12-13, 12n-13n, 93, 482

referred to: 33

12n.7-13n.3 Siquidem . . . delitescere aliquid] Qui enim modum acute introspexerit quo ros iste æthereus scientiarum, similis illi de quo loquitur poëta,

—aërei mellis cœlestia dona,

colligatur, (cum et scientiæ ipsæ ex exemplis singulis, partim naturalibus partim artificialibus, tanquam prati floribus et horti, extrahantur,) reperiet profecto animum suapte sponte et nativa indole Inductionem solertius conficere, quam quæ describitur a dialecticis; siquidem . . . delitescere aliquod (620)

— Novum Organum, in ibid., I, 119-365.

note: for ease of reference this ed., which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is used, though JSM’s references antedate it. No collation is given for 482 which is undoubtedly summary (cf. De Augmentis, same reference). The quotation at 93 is indirect, as is that at 370, which is in a quotation from Bain.

quoted: 93, 310n, 370, 379, 380, 480, 482, 485

referred to: 411

310n.11-12 “Opinio copiæ” . . . “maxima causa inopiæ est.”] Atque cum opinio copiæ inter maximas causas inopiæ sit; quumque ex fiducia præsentium vera auxilia negligantur in posterum; ex usa est, et plane ex necessitate, ut ab illis quæ adhuc inventa sunt in ipso operis nostri limine (idque relictis ambagibus et non dissimulanter) honoris et admirationis excessus tollatur; utili monito, ne homines eorum aut copiam aut utilitatem in majus accipiant aut celebrent. (125)

310n.13-14 notiones temere a rebus abstractas.] Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis. (158)

310n.23-4 “intellectus sibi permissus,”] Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectus; nihil est eorum quæ intellectus sibi permissus congessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum, nisi novo judicio se stiterit et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit. (138)

379.22 naturam rei in ipsa re perscrutatur.] Nemo enim alicujus rei naturam in ipsa re fœliciter perscrutatur, sed ampliande est inquisitio ad magis communia. (180)

380.22 notiones temerè à rebus abstractæ] [see entry at 310n.13-14]

480.23 rejectiones et exclusiones debitas] At Inductio quæ ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde, post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentetum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excutiendas definitiones et ideas, hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur. (205)

485.24 “ex . . . sunt pronuncians,”] Inductio enim quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex . . . sunt, pronunciat. (205)

Bailey, Samuel.A Letter to a Philosopher, in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley’s Theory of Vision, and in further elucidation of its unsoundness. London: Ridgway, 1843.

reviewed: 265-9

quoted: 266, 267, 268

referred to: 255n, 265

266.26-7 ‘inexplicable how any . . . intelligence’ . . . ‘except] [paragraph] How any . . . intelligence, with such explicit declarations before him, could write in the following strain is inexplicable, except (49)

267.9 ‘material or physical lines,’ since ‘imaginary or hypothetical lines] [paragraph] It will be acknowledged by all that the major premiss of the first syllogism, if it has any meaning at all, must signify material or physical lines. If it meant anything else, it would be palpably inadmissible, since imaginary or hypothetical lines (36)

268.25 ‘bluntness,’ ‘confidence,’ or ‘arrogance,’] If they [Mill and Ferrier] do not always avoid an approach to a needless tone of bluntness and asperity, perhaps of arrogance; if the suaviter in modo is principally wanting, as commonly happens, when its absence is not compensated by the fortiter in re; if confidence is sometimes most conspicuous where diffidence would have been most appropriate—these are faults we all of us naturally fall into when we come in our turn to seat ourselves in the critical chair. (4)

— A Review of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation. London: Ridgway, 1842.

reviewed: 247-65

quoted: 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 261, 264, 265

251.26-7 “outness” . . . “immediately . . . sight?”] Outness, he affirms, is not immediately . . . sight, but only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision. (20)

252.3-7 [paragraph] Outness . . . vision. . . . By a . . . for.] [no paragraph; see above 251.26] [ellipsis indicates 1-page omission] He tells us, in the passage already quoted, that by a . . . for. (20-1)

252.16-18 “but . . . object;”] He maintains, that because the internal feeling has been found to be accompanied by the external one, it will, when experienced alone, not only suggest the external sensation, but . . . object. (21)

252.19-21 [paragraph] “It . . . asserted,” . . . “without . . . process:”] [no paragraph] It . . . asserted, without . . . process. (21)

252.31-2 “converted . . . object,”] [see above 252.16-18]

253.18-21 [paragraph] Distance of . . . shorter;] [paragraph] “It is, I think, agreed by all, that distance of . . . shorter.” (38; Bailey is quoting Berkeley’s An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, q.v.)

253.22-3 “must appear . . . point.”] “If we consider that the distance of any object from the eye is a line turned endways to it, and that this line must consequently appear . . . point, we shall be sensible that distance from the eye cannot be the immediate object of sight, but that all visible objects must naturally be perceived as close upon the organ, or more properly, perhaps like all other sensations, as in the organ which perceives them.” (39; Bailey is quoting Adam Smith’s “Of the External Senses,” q.v.)

253.29 “see the rays of light”] [paragraph] If this is to be considered as a true interpretation of Berkeley’s language, his sole argument is founded on the fallacy that we see the ends of the rays of light coming from an object to the retina, but not the length of the rays. (39-40)

255.12 “universal impressions of mankind.”][paragraph] As this is a doctrine wholly contrary to the universal and natural impressions of mankind, we should expect it to be supported by an appeal to facts of every description likely to throw light upon the subject. (37)

256.10-13 [paragraph] Virtually . . . plane. . . . Solid . . . solid:”] This is virtually . . . plane—an argument in which there is no connection between premises and conclusion. Let us, however, take it literally as it is put. Solid . . . solid. (44-5)

261.7 [paragraph] It is manifest [ . . . ,] by] [no paragraph] It is manifest by (29)

261.7 many young animals] many of them (29)

261.10-11 dropped; the young . . . crocodiles, says Sir Humphry Davy, hatched] dropped. “The young . . . crocodiles,” says Sir Humphry Davy. “hatched (29)

261.12 water; the] water. The (29)

261.13 hatched.] hatched*.” [footnote: *Life of Sir H. Davy, by John Davy, M.D., vol. ii, p. 80.](29)

264.22-3 [paragraph] “There is] [no paragraph] In the whole of this celebrated narrative there is (183)

264.27-35 [paragraph] He . . . time.] [no paragraph] “He . . . time.” (178; Bailey is quoting Cheselden; he omits the closing quotation marks)

265.19 “when . . . eye;”] [paragraph] Mr. Ware’s patient was a boy seven years old (Master W—), and antecedently to the operation could distinguish colours when . . . eye, but not forms*. [footnote: *Philosophical Transactions for 1801, p. 382.] (193)

Bain, Alexander.The Emotions and the Will. London: Parker, 1859.

reviewed: 341-73, esp. 361-71

quoted: 362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 368-9, 369-70, 371, 371-2

362.27 “the] [paragraph] I. We shall begin with the (58)

362.27 vent of emotion] vent of emotion (58)

362.28 outburst;”] outburst. (58)

362.33-4 “the extensive] [paragraph] IV. The extensive (58)

362.34-5 Tender Affections.”] Tender Affections constitute a well-marked order or family of emotion.” (58)

365.9 “the] These [two fundamental component elements of the Will] are, first, the (327)

365.11 feelings;”] feelings; and, secondly, the link between a present action and a present feeling, whereby the one comes under the control of the other. (327)

365.33 “nothing . . . incumbrance”] I consider the word ‘necessity’ as nothing . . . incumbrance in the sciences of the present day.* [footnote omitted] (549)

366.6 [paragraph] A] [no paragraph] A (555)

366.14 fallacy. . . . For the] fallacy. I am not inquiring minutely at present into all the meanings of the term consciousness, a task reserved for the dissertation that is to conclude this volume; it is enough to remark, that for the (555)

366.14 word [consciousness] implies] word implies (555)

366.30 nature; on] nature. On (556)

366.33 exception. . . . If] [ellipsis indicates 1-page omission] (556-7)

367.2 “the . . . moment:”] The only case of this sort that I am able to specify is the testimony that each individual gives as to the . . . moment. (558)

368.13 An intellectual] We shall see that an intellectual (568)

368.13 is indispensable] is likewise indispensable (568)

368.17 on an] on our (569)

368.28 “the] In all such cases the (570)

368.28 tested] tested (570)

368.29 actions”] actions, and the subject matter of it is some supposed fact, or occurrence, of nature. (570-1)

368.42 [paragraph] I] [no paragraph] I (585)

369.14 validity. . . . We] validity. This does not exclude the operations termed induction, deduction, analogy and probable inference; because these are to be pursued exactly to the length that experience will justify, and no farther. We (586)

369.14 after trials] after many trials (586)

369.16 same. . . . It] same. I cut down a tree and put a portion of it into water observing that it floats; I then infer that another portion would float, and that the wood of any other tree of the same species would do so likewise. It (586)

369.22 operations.] [long footnote, referring to JSM’s Logic, omitted] (586)

369.43 [paragraph] A] [no paragraph] A (582)

370.3 scepticism. . . . We] [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] (582-3)

370.3 it [belief] as] it rather as (583)

370.5 The “anticipation] ‘The anticipation (583)

370.12 undertaken. . . . The] undertaken. In an opposite condition of things, where intellect and knowledge have made very high progress, and constitutional activity is feeble,—a sceptical, hesitating, incredulous temper of mind is the usual characteristic. The (583)

370.16 cases most] cases the most (583)

370.17 correction. . . . Sound] [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] (583)

370.20 race. . . . The] race. Observation is unanimous on the point. The (583-4)

371.7 [paragraph] There] [no paragraph] There (615)

371.13 awakens] wakens (615)

371.34 concerned.] concerned. *[footnote omitted] (161)

371.41 [paragraph] To] [no paragraph] To (638)

372.26 no impression] no one impression (639)

372.34 knowledge of] knowledge to [printer’s error?] (640)

— Mental and Moral Science. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1868.

note: the appendices, separately paginated, are in the first volume; the reference is to App. A, “History of Nominalism and Realism,” 1-24, and App. B, “The Origin of Knowledge,” 34-48, which Grote contributed to Bain’s volumes, and which were reprinted, slightly modified, in Grote’s Aristotle as Appendices I and II.

referred to: 476

— The Senses and the Intellect. London: Parker, 1855.

note: see also 3rd ed., below.

reviewed: 341-73, esp. 352-61

quoted: 356-8, 358-9, 359-60, 360, 361

356.22 an organ] our organs (292)

356.23 instincts. The] instincts. (See his chapter on Instincts, Essays on the Active Powers.) The (293)

356.28 eating. This] eating. [paragraph] This (293)

356.38-9 years of life. . . . [paragraph] But] year of life. At the moment of birth, voluntary action is all but a nonentity. [paragraph] 28. According to this view, therefore, there is a process of acquirement in the establishing of those links of feeling and action that volition implies: this process will be traced and exemplified in the following Book, and also, at some future time, in a detailed discussion of the whole subject of volition. But (293)

357.13-14 action. . . . [paragraph] If] [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] (294)

357.23 movement. . . . The] movement. Once assume that the two waves occur together in the same cerebral seat—a wave of painful emotion, and a wave of spontaneous action tending to subdue the pain,—there would arise an influence out of the former to sustain and prolong the activity of the latter. The (295)

357.47-8 spontaneity. . . . [paragraph] By] [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] (295-6)

357.48 acquisition, coming under the law of association, the] acquisition, which I shall afterwards dwell upon, the (296)

358.7 “notes of observation] The following are notes of observations (404n)

358.8-9 of their birth] after birth (404n)

358.12 attitude; a] attitude. A (405n)

358.26-7 of its limbs] with two limbs (405n)

358.43 was yet] was as yet (405n)

359.14-15 progress, and locomotion] progress. Locomotion (406n)

359.24-5 mouth. . . . [paragraph] The] mouth. [paragraph] I am not able to specify minutely the exact periods of the various developments in the self-education of those two lambs, but the above are correct statements to the best of my recollection. The (406n)

359.25 three] these (406n)

359.27 sensation] sensations (406n)

360.4 Present] Present (451)

360.4 like] Like (451)

361.14-16 “where . . . state”] It remains for us yet to consider the case where . . . state. (544)

361.18-19 “the . . . trains,”] the . . . trains. [a heading] (562)

361.20 “obstructive association.”] obstructive associations. [a heading] (564)

361.22-3 “combinations . . . experience,”] By means of association, the mind has the power to form combinations . . . experience. (571)

— 3rd ed. London: Longmans, Green, 1868.

referred to: 476,502; see Grote, “Psychology of Aristotle.”

Bekker, Immanuel.

referred to: 39; see Plato, Platonis et quæ vel Platonis. . . .

Bentham, Jeremy. Referred to: 61, 387, 405

— Book of Fallacies. London: Hunt, 1824.

note: in Works, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), II. The work was edited by Peregrine Bingham.

referred to: 31

Berkeley, George. Referred to: 348, 465

— The Works of George Berkeley, D. D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his writings hitherto unpublished, With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy. Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871.

note: though the references and quotations, 247-69 passim, to An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision antedate this ed., it is used for ease of reference.

reviewed: 451-71

— Alciphron: or, the Minute Philosopher, in Works, II, 13-339.

referred to: 465-6

— The Analyst: A discourse addressed to an infidel mathematician, in Works, III, 253-98.

referred to: 467

— Commonplace Book, in Works, IV, 419-502.

referred to: 453

— A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics, in Works, III, 299-336.

referred to: 467

— An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in Works, I, 25-112.

quoted: 251, 253

referred to: 247-69 passim, 453-7

251.26 “outness”] 46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence that the ideas of space, outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight; they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. (I, 55)

253. 18-21 Distance . . . shorter;] 2. It is, I think, agreed by all that distance . . . shorter. (I, 35)

— Passive Obedience, or the Christian doctrine of not resisting the Supreme Power, in Works, III, 103-39.

referred to: 468

— Querist, in Works, III, 351-405.

quoted: 469

469.13-14 “a ticket . . . this power.”] And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket . . . transfer such power? (III, 391)

— Siris: A chain of Philosophical reflexions and inquiries concerning the virtues of Tar-water, and divers other subjects connected together and arising one from another, in Works, II, 359-508.

quoted: 470

referred to: 463

470.16 connection or] connexion and (II, 479)

— Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. The design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of Human Knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the Soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Also to open a method for rendering the sciences more easy, useful, and compendious, in Works, I, 255-360.

quoted: 459, 465n, 466

459.18 “shared] My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth which was before shared (I, 359)

459.18 philosophers:] the philosophers:—(I, 359)

459.19-20 those things . . . real things;] [in italics] (I, 359)

459.20-1 the things . . . mind.] [in italics] (I, 359)

465n.7-8 “to apply . . . perceived”] Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply . . . perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, several saw the same thing, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. (I, 343-4)

465n.8-9 “philosophers . . . identity,”] But if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers, . . . identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. (I, 344)

465n.9 “all . . . word.”] But who sees not that all . . . word? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term same applied to it? (I, 344)

465n.10 “Suppose] Or, suppose (I, 344)

465n.16 abstracted idea of identity] [in italics] (I, 344)

466.17 “sceptics and atheists”] [see title]

— A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, are inquired into, in Works, I, 131-238.

quoted: 460, 461, 463

460.8 “that] To this I answer, that (I, 184)

460.20 “not excited from within”] [see above, 514.9-14]

461.1 spirit does] spirit actually does (I, 157)

461.16-17 “the configuration . . . corpuscles,”] To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, . . . corpuscles, must certainly be false. (I, 168)

461.19 “but] For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but (I, 168)

461.24 anything. Whence] anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence (I, 168)

463.7 “atheism and scepticism.”] [see full title]

Bible. New Testament. Referred to: 437

— I Corinthians.

note: the quotation (of 2:9) is indirect.

quoted: 421

— Luke.

note: the indirect quotation (of 23:34) is in a quotation from Thirlwall’s translation of Niebuhr.

quoted: 242

— Matthew.

note: the indirect quotation (of 23:24) is in a quotation from Thirlwall’s translation of Niebuhr.

quoted: 243

— Old Testament. Referred to: 437

— I Samuel.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Bacon, is to Chap. 16.

referred to: 13n

Boeckh, August.Ueber die vierjährigen Sonnenkriese der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen. Berlin: Reimer, 1863.

note: the quotation (from p. 150), in JSM’s translation, derives from Grote.

quoted: 388-9

388.39-389.1 “he . . . lectures.”] [translated from Grote’s quotation:] Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vorträge. (Grote, Plato, I, 123n; Boeckh, 150.)

Boethius.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 489

Brentano, Franz.Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom νου̑ς ποιητικός. Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867.

referred to: 504

— Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung, 1862.

referred to: 494-5

Brown, Thomas. Referred to: 19, 247, 341, 352, 491

— Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Tait; London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820.

note: concerning the reference at 352, it may be noted that Brown frequently uses the term “mental physiology.”

referred to: 261, 352, 360

Buckland, Frank. Referred to: 486

Burgerdicius. See Burgersdyk, Francis.

Burgersdyk, Francis.Institutionam logicarum libri duo. Cambridge: Field, 1660.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 27n

Burke, Edmund.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 325

Butler, Samuel.Hudibras. Ed. Zachary Grey. 2 vols. London: Vernor and Hood, et al., 1801.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 30

30.31 —“All] For rhetoric, he could not ope / His mouth, but out there flew a trope: / And when he happen’d to break off / I’ th’ middle of his speech, or cough, / H’ had hard words ready to shew why, / And tell what rules he did it by; / Else, when with greatest art he spoke, / You’d think he talk’d like other folk: / For all (Part I, Canto I, lines 80-90; I.12-13)

Byron, George Gordon.

note: the references derive from Grote.

referred to: 279

— The Works of Lord Byron. Ed. Thomas Moore. 17 vols. London: Murray, 1832-33, XI.

note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is a translation from Goethe, which was possibly made by Goethe himself and sent by him to Byron (see Byron’s Works, XI, 71n, immediately preceding the passage from which the quotation is taken); Moore also gives the reference to the German printed version in Kunst und Altherthum; the reference given on 279 is to the edition of Goethe’s Werke in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Actually JSM takes the quotation from Grote’s “Grecian Legends and Early History”; cf. the collation s.v.

quoted: 279

referred to: 280

279.15 [paragraph] He [Byron] has] [no paragraph] He has (72)

279.15 him. There] him. He has repeatedly portrayed it; and scarcely any one feels compassion for this intolerable suffering, over which he is ever laboriously ruminating. There (72)

279.16 and in] and which, in (72)

279.18 or presence] or actual presence (72)

279.19 lady.] lady.* [footnote omitted; it is from this footnote that Grote quotes Moore’s comment which is quoted (from Grote) by JSM at 279.10-13] (72)

279.21 to whom suspicion] on whom any suspicion (72)

279.22 after. This] after. [paragraph] This (72)

— “Manfred,” in ibid., XI, 2-75.

note: the reference, which concerns Goethe’s comments on Byron, derives from Grote’s “Grecian Legends and Early History,” q.v.

referred to: 279

Cæsar, Claudius.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grey used by Grote.

referred to: 285n

Cæsar, Julius.

note: the references are in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 284

Calixtus II (Pope). Referred to: 283

Callias (son of Hipponicus).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 154

Callicles.

note: the references at 97-150 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias, in which Callicles is a character.

referred to: 97-150 passim, 396, 397n

Carlyle, Thomas. Referred to: 387, 433

— “Novalis,” in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. 5 vols. London: Fraser, 1840, II.

note: this ed. probably was in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is from von Hardenberg (q.v.), but there can be little doubt that JSM took it from Carlyle.

quoted: 466

Cephalus.

note: the references at 222 are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides, in which Cephalus is a character.

referred to: 222

Chærephon.

note: the references at 97-150 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias, in which Chærephon is a character; that at 155 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 97-150 passim, 155

Charlemagne. Referred to: 283-4

Charles II (of England). Referred to: 467

Charmides.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Charmides, in which Charmides is a character.

referred to: 175-8, 185-6

Cheselden, William. “An Account of some Observations made by a young Gentleman, who was born blind, or lost his Sight so early, that he had no Remembrance of ever having seen, and was couch’d between 13 and 14 Years of Age,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, XXXV (1728), 447-50.

note: the quotation and references derive from Bailey; Cheselden’s “Account” is reprinted by Fraser in his edition of Berkeley’s Works (q.v.), I, 444-6.

quoted: 264

referred to: 263-4, 267, 267n-268n, 454, 457 .

264.27 He] When he first saw, he was so far from making any Judgment about Distances, that he thought all Objects whatever touch’d his Eyes, (as he express’d it) as what he felt, did his Skin; and thought no Objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho’ he could form no Judgment of their Shape, or guess what it was in any Object that was pleasing to him: He (448)

264.32 relate. Having] relate; Having (448)

264.35 “So, puss, I . . . time.”] So Puss! I . . . Time. (448)

Christ. See Jesus.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Referred to: 510

— Letters to Atticus (Latin and English). Trans. E. O. Winstedt. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1912.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The Elzevir ed. of 1642 is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 378

378.28 “Socratici viri”] O Socrates et Socratici viri! numquam vobis gratiam referam. (III, 230; xiv.9)

Cimon (Kimon).

note: the references at 133, 141, 143 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias; that at 334 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 133, 141, 143, 334, 435

Cleisthenes (Kleisthenes).

note: the reference at 326 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 326-7

Cleomenes (Kleomenes) (of Sparta).

note: the reference at 300 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 300, 337n

Cleon. Referred to: 323, 331

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor.Biographia Literaria; or Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and Opinions. 2 vols. in 1. London: Rest Fenner, 1817.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 354

— “Notes on John Smith,” in The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. 4 vols. London: Pickering, 1836-39, III, 415-19.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is indirect.

quoted: 463

Comte, Auguste. Referred to: 443

Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de. Referred to: 93, 94, 95, 355, 445

Conington, John. “Grote’s History of Greece,” Edinburgh Review, XCIV (July, 1851), 204-28.

referred to: 309n

Cooper, Anthony Ashley.

note: i.e., the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury.

referred to: 466

Corinna. Referred to: 315, 315n

Cousin, Victor. Referred to: 443

— Cours de philosophie. Histoire de la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle. École sensualiste—Locke. 2 vols. Brussels: Hauman, 1836.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 345

— Fragments philosophiques. Paris: Sautelet, 1826.

referred to: 355

— Trans. Œuvres de Platon. See under Plato.

— See also Plato, Lachès, ou du courage, in Œuvres, trans. Cousin.

Crackanthorp. See Crakanthorp.

Crakanthorp, Richard.Logicæ libri quinque: de prædicabilibus, de prædicamentis, de syllogismo, de syllogismo demonstrativo, de syllogismo probabili. London: Teage, 1622.

note: JSM’s spelling is Crackanthorp; his reference to Cap. 5 is mistaken, the passage being in Cap. 6.

quoted: 26

referred to: 27n

26.34 “implicat manifestam contradictionem,”] Hoc enim cogitare implicat manifestam contradictionem: nam in eo ipso quòd est rationalis, habet in se radicem ac necessariam causam à quâ fluit, & in quâ implicite continetur potentia ridendi: quare si quis cogitare posset hominem carere hâc potentia, æque cogitare posset hominem esse rationâlem, & non esse rationalem, vel esse Hominem & non esse hominem. (29)

Cratylus (Kratylus).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 429

Critias.

note: the references at 175-86 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Charmides, in which Critias is a character.

referred to: 166n, 175-86 passim, 327, 385

Critobulus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167, 171

Criton.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167, 171

Crœsus. Referred to: 295, 299

Ctesippus.

note: the references at 210-21 passim are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Lysis, in which Ctesippus is a character.

referred to: 210-21 passim

Cyrus. Referred to: 311

Damon.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches.

referred to: 197, 206, 208

Darius.

note: the reference at 80 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; that at 121 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias; that at 213 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Lysis.

referred to: 80, 121, 213

Davy, Humphry. See Davy, John.

Davy, John, ed. The Collected Works of Sir Humphry Davy. 9 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1839-40.

note: the reference (actually an indirect quotation), which is in a quotation from Bailey, is to a passage from Humphry Davy’s notebooks quoted in John Davy’s “Memoirs of the Life of Sir Humphry Davy,” Vol. I of The Collected Works.

referred to: 261

Demetrius Phalereus. Referred to: 336n

Democritus (Demokritus). Referred to: 44n, 428

Demodocus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

De Morgan, Augustus. Referred to: 468

Demosthenes.

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr; that at 298 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 243, 298, 312-13, 317

— Contra Lacritum (“Against Lacritus”), in Private Orations (Greek and English). Trans. A. T. Murray. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936, I, 278-314.

referred to: 389

— De Corona, in De Corona and De Falsa Legatione (Greek and English). Trans. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926, 18-228.

referred to: 312

Descartes, René. Referred to: 341, 451

Diogenes Laertius.Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Greek and English). Trans. R. D. Hicks. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925.

note: the “Life of Socrates” referred to at 242 is in Vol. I, 148-76. One of the passages quoted at 44n is also quoted at 425.

quoted: 44n, 425

referred to: 242, 382

Dion.

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr.

referred to: 243, 311

Dionysius (the elder, of Syracuse). Referred to: 311

Dionysius (the younger, of Syracuse).

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr.

referred to: 243, 311

Dionysius (of Halicarnassus). On Literary Composition: Being the Greek Text of De Compositione Verborum (Greek and English). Trans. W. Rhys. London: Macmillan, 1910.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference.

referred to: 386

Dionysodorus. Referred to: 393

Du Trieu, Philippus.Manuductio ad logicam, sive dialectica studiosæ juventuti ad logicam præparandæ. London: printed McMillan, 1826.

note: this reprint, which was formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College (Grote’s copy is in the University of London Library), of the 1662 edition (Oxford: Oxlad and Pocock; also formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College) was made for the group, including JSM, studying at Grote’s house in the 1820s (see Autobiography, ed. Stillinger, 74).

referred to: 20, 20n, 27n

Edward I (of England).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 284

Eginhard.Early Lives of Charlemagne by Eginhard and the Monk of St. Gall. Trans. and ed. by A. J. Grant. London: Chatto and Windus, 1922.

note: the reference is general; this ed. is cited merely for the title.

referred to: 283

Elizabeth I (of England).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 301

Empedocles (Empedokles). Referred to: 210, 380

Epaminondas. Referred to: 311, 332

Ephialtes. Referred to: 327

Epicurus. Referred to: 61, 477

Epigenes.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Eryximachus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 86

Eucleides (Eukleides) (the Megaric). Referred to: 378

Euclid. Referred to: 26

Euclides (the archon). Referred to: 309

Eudoxus. Referred to: 388

Euœnus (of Paros).

note: the reference at 85 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; that at 155 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 85, 155

Euripides.

note: the reference at 86 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; that at 160n is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 86, 160n, 317

— Antiope.

note: this drama is not extant; the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 122

Euthydemus. Referred to: 393

Euthyphron.

note: the references are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Euthyphron, in which Euthyphron is a character.

referred to: 187-96 passim

Fabyan, Robert.The New Chronicles of England and France. In Two Parts. Named by Himself the Concordance of Histories. Ed. Henry Ellis. London: Rivington, 1811.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Grote, is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 284

Ferrier, James Frederick. Referred to: 343

—“Berkeley and Idealism,” Blackwood’s Magazine, LI (June, 1842), 812-30.

referred to: 266

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Referred to: 345, 387

Fourier, Charles. Referred to: 329, 387

Fraser, Alexander Campbell, ed. The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his writings hitherto unpublished, With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871.

reviewed: 451-71; see also Berkeley, Works.

quoted: 470

470.21-5 “the . . . remarkable,” . . . “every . . . thought. It . . . letters.”] On the whole, the . . . remarkable; although curiously it has been much overlooked even by those curious in the history and bibliography of British philosophy. Every . . . thought. There is the unexpectedness of genius in its whole movement. It . . . letters, and it draws this Platonic spirit from a thing of sense so commonplace as Tar. (II, 343-4)

Funccii. See Funck.

Funck, Johann.Chronologia. Hoc est, omnium temporum et annorum ab initio mundi, usque ad annum a nato Christo 1552. Wittenberg: Hoffmann, 1601.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grey that JSM quotes from Grote’s History. The reference to anno mundi 4017 is on p. 94 of this edition. The reference to anno mundi 3105 is not in this, or the 1st ed. (Basil, 1554); it is, however, the date given in Holinshed’s Chronicles (in the History, Bk. II, Chap. v).

referred to: 285n

Galileo, Galilei. Referred to: 483

Geoffrey of Monmouth.The British History of Geoffrey of Monmouth. In 12 Books. Trans. A. Thompson. A new ed. rev. and collected by A. J. Giles. London: Bohn, 1842.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Grote, is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 284

George I (of England). Referred to: 467

George II (of England). Referred to: 467

Gibbon, Edward.The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols. London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776-88.

referred to: 337n

Glaucon. Referred to: 396

Goethe, Wolfgang von. “Manfred, a dramatic poem by Lord Byron,” in Werke. 55 vols. Stuttgart and Tübingen: Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1828-33, XLVI, 216-20.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. In this ed. the essay appears in the section “Englische Literatur.” The quotation (in translation) and references are taken from Grote’s “Grecian Legends and Early History”; Grote took them from Moore (s.v. Byron, Works).

quoted: 279

referred to: 280

Gorgias (of Leontium).

note: the reference at 85 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; those at 97-150 are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias, in which Gorgias is a main character; that at 154 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 85, 97-150 passim, 154, 394

Grafton, Richard.Grafton’s Chronicle; or, History of England, from the Year 1189 to 1558 inclusive. London: Johnson, 1809.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Grote, is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 284

Grey, Zachary.Critical, Historical and Explanatory Notes on Shakspeare. 2 vols. London: Manby, 1754.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 285n

Grote, George.Aristotle. Ed. Alexander Bain and G. Croom Robertson. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1872.

note: at 476 Mill is referring to Appendix I, pp. 243-68, and Appendix II, pp. 284-300, of the Aristotle, which were first published, in slightly different form, as appendices to Bain’s Mental and Moral Science (1868), q.v.

reviewed: 475-510

quoted: 478, 489, 492-3, 494, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500n, 501n, 508, 509

478.4-6 “A . . . of theory . . . traditions,”] To him [Tisias] succeeded Thrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom partial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we have now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a . . . of rhetorical theory . . . traditions. (II, 131) [cf. 478^g-g,h]

478.10-11 application. . . . The syllogism] application. [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] The Syllogism (II, 132-3)

489.7 “how much] If I had time to carry the account farther, I should have been able to show how much (I, vii)

494.3-5 “first . . . predication. . . . We . . . is”] So, too, we . . . is. We see by this last remark, how distinctly Aristotle assigned a double meaning to est: first . . . predication. (I, 181-2)

496.22-4 “displays . . . Ideas,” . . . “and] In this account of Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle displays . . . Ideas. But these principles are operative not less in memory than in reminiscence; and (II, 217)

497.16 the axioms] But, along with these, Aristotle includes another matter also: viz., the critical examination of the Axioms (II, 140)

497.18 foremost] firmest (II, 140)

498.2-3 (“and . . . Middle”)] Thus it is, that he introduces us to the Maxim of Contradiction, and . . . Middle. (II, 141)

498.12 goes] Yet he nevertheless goes (II, 143)

498.19 first. . . . In] first. Still, though in (II, 143)

498.21 Principii.” . . . “Aristotle] Principii, Aristotle (II, 143)

498.25 words.] words, defining them in a manner significant alike to himself and to others,—each word to have either one fixed meaning, or a limited number of different meanings, clear and well defined. (II, 144)

500n.24 “true to the believer, false to the disbeliever”] He proclaimed that each man was a measure for himself alone, and that every opinion was true to the believer, false to the disbeliever; while they criticize him as if he had said—Every opinion is alike true and false; thus leaving out the very qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his theory. (II, 150-1)

501n.7-8 “the autonomy . . . himself;”] This is an appeal to other men, as judges each for himself and in his own case: it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy . . . himself. (II, 150)

508.1-3 “First . . . exercise.” . . . “Secondly] First . . . exercise; and, if a methodized procedure be laid down, both parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more efficaciously. Secondly (II, 391)

508.7-12 modify.” . . . “Thirdly] modify. Thirdly (I, 391)

508.26-509.1 sides.” . . . “When] sides. When (I, 63-4)

509.5 one another] each other (I, 64)

509.7 defence. The same] defence. [paragraph] This same (I, 64)

— “Grecian Legends and Early History,” Westminster Review, XXXIX (May, 1843), 285-328.

note: the article is ostensibly a review of B. G. Niebuhr’s Griechische Heroen Geschichten; it is reprinted in Grote’s Minor Works (London: Murray, 1873), 75-134, where the relevant passage occurs on 80 ff. JSM’s Byron, Goethe, and Moore references (q.v.) derive from this passage, in which Grote quotes Moore and Goethe (in translation), the Goethe passage deriving from Moore.

quoted: 279, 279-80, 280-1, 286-7

referred to: 279

279.10-13 “numerous fictions” . . . “palmed upon the world” as his “romantic . . . existed,”] To these exaggerated, or wholly false, notions of him, the numerous fictions palmed upon the world of his romantic . . . existed, have no doubt considerably contributed; and the consequence is, so utterly out of truth and nature are the representations of his life and character long current on the Continent, that it may be questioned whether the real ‘flesh and blood’ hero of these pages—the social, practical-minded, and, with all his faults and eccentricities, English Lord Byron—may not, to the over-exalted imaginations of most of his foreign admirers, appear but an ordinary, unromantic, and prosaic personage.” (289; Grote is quoting Moore’s Life of Byron, q.v.)

279.15 He [Byron] has] He has (289; here and for the next four entries, Grote is quoting from Goethe as translated in Moore’s edition of Byron)

279.16 and in] and which (we cite the translation as we find it) in (289)

279.17 Astarte] Astarté (289)

279.19-23 When . . . after.] [in italics] (289)

279.21 to whom] on whom (289)

280.1 hero] hero (290)

280.9 vox. Some] vox: some (290)

280.9 forward and] forward or (290)

280.16 god] God (291)

280.17 omniloquent Zeus] Omniloquent Zeus* [footnote omitted] (291)

280.42 being] having been (293)

281.7 nearer the] nearer to (293)

287.3 exhibit.”] exhibit—γιγνομενα μὲν, κὰι ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ ἀυτὴ ϕύσις τω̑ν ἀνϕρώπων ἠ̑: (305)

— History of Greece. 12 vols. London: Murray, 1846-56.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, heavily (for JSM) annotated, esp. in Vols. I and II, but throughout, even in Vol. XII (1856), which he did not review. Vols. I and II (1846) are the subject of JSM’s first major review (273-305 above); Vols. IX and X (1852), and XI (1853) are ostensibly the subject of his second major review (309-37 above), but he also deals in large part with the intervening volumes (III and IV, 1847; V and VI, 1849; VII and VIII, 1850), which he had reviewed in the Spectator (see the Textual Introduction, lxxxv-lxxxvi above). Grote’s work is divided into two very unequal parts: Part I, “Legendary Greece” (Vol. I; Vol. II, 1-277), and Part II, “Historical Greece” (Vol. II, 279-615; Vols. III-XII).

reviewed: 273-305 (Vols. I & II), 309-37 (Vols. IX, X, XI)

quoted: 274, 275n, 277-8, 284-5, 287, 292-3, 296, 296-7, 297, 297-8, 298, 298-9, 300-1, 301-2, 303, 311, 316-17, 318-19, 319-20, 325-6, 334-6

referred to: 377, 378, 383, 388, 510

274.30-2 “First, to . . . readers, the general picture of the Grecian world,”] [paragraph] It is that general picture which an historian of Greece is required first to . . . readers;—a picture not merely such as to delight the imagination by brilliancy of colouring and depth of sentiment, but also suggestive and improving to the reason. (I, vii)

274.33 “The historian,” he says, “will] Not omitting the points of resemblance as well as of contrast with the better-known forms of modern society, he will (I, vii)

274.35-6 stationary; and to set forth the action] stationary. He will develope the action (I, vii)

274.38 inferior] superior (I, viii) [treated as typographical error]

275n.8 “feminine” . . . “masculine”] And it must be confessed that what may be called the feminine attributes of the Greek mind—their religious and poetical vein—here [in the first two volumes] appear in disproportionate relief, as compared with the masculine capacities—with those powers of acting, organising, judging, and speculating, which will be revealed in the forthcoming volumes. (I, xvii; see the Textual Introduction, lxxxvi above)

277.30 ground] grounds (I, 572)

277.33 cotemporary] contemporary (I, 572)

277.35-6 improbabilities. It] improbabilities; it (I, 572)

278.2-3 fact. [paragraph] The ] fact. [no paragraph; 3-page omission; paragraph] The (I, 573, 576)

278.5 the presumption] the usual presumption, (I, 576)

278.11 inapplicable,] [footnote omitted] (I, 576)

278.17-18 course. [paragraph] It] course. How active and prominent such tendencies were among the early Greeks, the extraordinary beauty and originality of their epic poetry may teach us. [paragraph] It (I, 577)

278.20 truth.] [footnote omitted which contains reference to Grote’s “Grecian Legends and Early History,” q.v.] (I, 577)

278.26 eagerly believed] eagerly welcomed (I, 578)

278.34 world—legends] world, and of which no country was more fertile than Greece—legends (I, 578)

284.22 nations. With] nations: with (I, 639)

284.24 faith. The] faith: the (I, 639)

284.24 downwards,] downward (I, 639)

284.27 Kings] kings (I, 639)

284n.4 p.131] p.131, note. [corresponding to p.128n in the ed. here cited] (I, 639n)

284n.5 Francus, the son] Francus son (I, 640n)

284.36 Agamemnon.] [footnote omitted] (I, 640)

285.4 deface] efface (I, 640)

285.5 deeds. They] deeds: they (I, 640)

285.6 their setting] thus setting [printer’s error?] (I, 640)

285.7 generally. Yet, in spite] generally². [footnote and 1 1/2 pages omitted] [paragraph] Yet in spite of the general belief of so many centuries—in spite of the concurrent persuasion of historians and poets—in spite of the declaration of Milton, extorted from his feelings rather than from his reason, that this long line of quasi-historical kings and exploits could not be all unworthy of belief—in spite (I, 640-2)

285.10 King] king (I, 642)

285n.3 anachronisms] anachronisms (I, 642n)

285n.4 anno mundi . . . anno mundi] anno mundi . . . anno mundi (I, 642n)

287.19-22 “Though . . . story;”] For though . . . story. (I, 570)

292.6 The] [no paragraph] The (II, 235)

292.13 Iliad.] [footnote omitted] (II, 235)

292.20 Achillêis. [paragraph] Nothing] [concluding sentence of paragraph, and further 2 pages omitted] (II, 236-8)

292.23 calamities of] calamities to (II, 238)

292.31 to be] to me (II, 239)

292.36 books,] [16-paragraph footnote omitted] (II, 239)

292.41 and following] and in the following (II, 243)

293.7 strives] shines [printer’s error?] (II, 244)

293.10 wounds;] [footnote omitted] (II, 244)

293.13 spoil] to spoil (II, 244)

293.14 heroes. I] heroes: I (II, 244)

293.16 excess and] excess of [printer’s error?] (II, 244)

296.10-14 “that . . . necessity;”] The tenth book, or Doloneia, though adapted specially to the place in which it stands, agrees with the books between the first and eighth in belonging only to the general picture of the war, without helping forward the march of the Achillêis; yet it seems conceived in a lower vein, and one is unwilling to believe that . . . necessity¹. [footnote omitted] (II, 267-8)

296.36-297.1 “the . . . Achilles,”] Nor is the reasoning of Nitzsch of much force to rebut the presumptions hence arising; for the . . . Achilles, and would have no painful feeling, requiring to be relieved, in leaving off at the moment in which it is gratified. (II, 266)

297.14-15 antipathy, and] antipathy, or [printer’s error?] (II, 108)

297.16 existence;”] existence. (II, 108)

297.17-19 “the . . . The Laws . . . sympathies.”] In view of the latter [the citizen of historical Athens], the . . . “The Laws” . . . sympathies: but of this discriminated conception of positive law and positive morality³ [footnote omitted], the germ only can be detected in the Homeric poems. (II, 110-11)

298.2 produced. Didactic] produced: didactic (II, 105)

298.27 possessors. But] possessors: for the pass of Thermopylæ between Thessaly and Phocis, that of Kithærôn between Bœotia and Attica, or the mountainous range of Oneion and Geraneia along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which an inferior number of brave men could hold against a much greater force of assailants. But (II, 298)

298.40-1 city communities] city-communities¹ [footnote omitted] (II, 299)

299.6 æsthetical. . . .] æsthetical. For these reasons, the indefinite multiplication of self-governing towns, though in truth a phænomenon common to ancient Europe as contrasted with the large monarchies of Asia, appears more marked among the ancient Greeks than elsewhere: and there cannot be any doubt that they owe it, in a considerable degree, to the multitude of insulating boundaries which the configuration of their country presented. (II, 299)

299.7 same [geographical] causes] same causes (II, 299)

299.13 men. . . .] men: moreover the contrast between the population of Greece itself, for the seven centuries preceding the Christian æra, and the Greeks of more modern times, is alone enough to inculcate reserve in such speculations. (II, 300)

299.18 rocks] rocks¹ [footnote omitted] (II, 300)

300.20 [paragraph] Taking [paragraph] The present is not the occasion to enter at length into that combination of causes which partly sapped, partly overthrew, both the institutions of Lycurgus and the power of Sparta; but taking (II, 527)

300.29 of the] of their (II, 527)

301.8 of inequality] of all inequality (II, 528)

301.13 receded. . . . We] receded. It was thus that the fancies, longings, and indirect suggestions of the present assumed the character of recollections out of the early, obscure, and extinct historical past. Perhaps the philosopher Sphærus of Borysthenês (the friend and companion of Kleomenês¹ [footnote omitted] and the disciple of Zeno the Stoic), author of works now lost both on Lycurgus and Socrates and on the constitution of Sparta, may have been one of those who gave currency to such an hypothesis; and we (II, 529)

301.13 that [this hypothesis] would] that if advanced, it would (II, 529)

301.18 Poor-law] Poor Law (II, 530)

301.28 Lived] From the early age of seven years throughout his whole life, as youth and man no less than as boy, the Spartan citizen lived (II, 505)

301.35 night] nights (II, 505)

301.35-6 belonged. . . . [paragraph] The] belonged. [ellipsis indicates 11-page omission] [no paragraph] The (II, 505, 516)

301.39 character] character¹ [footnote omitted] (II, 517)

302.3 conceived] conceive (II, 517)

302.8 war] war¹ [footnote omitted] (II, 518)

302.10 abroad. . . . When] abroad. Such exclusive tendency will appear less astonishing if we consider the very early and insecure period at which the Lycurgean institutions arose, when none of those guarantees which afterwards maintained the peace of the Hellenic world had as yet become effective—no constant habits of intercourse, no custom of meeting in Amphiktyony from the distant parts of Greece, no common or largely frequented festivals, no multiplication of proxenies (or standing tickets of hospitality) between the important cities, no pacific or industrious habits anywhere. When (II, 518)

302.14 them . . . the] them—we shall not be surprised that the language which Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war addresses to his army in reference to the original Spartan settlement, was still more powerfully present to the mind of Lycurgus four centuries earlier—“We are a few in the midst of many enemies, we can only maintain ourselves by fighting and conquering².” [footnote omitted] [paragraph] Under such circumstances, the (II, 518-19)

302.30 us] us¹ [footnote omitted] (II, 519)

303.18-20 founder;” . . . “of] founder. Now this was one of the main circumstances (among others which will hereafter be mentioned) of (II, 477)

311.22 “despot’s progress.”] [paragraph] Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of his fellow-countrymen. (X, 616)

316.41-317.1 “that . . . Demos of Pnyx,”*] A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræeus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with “that . . . Dêmus of Pnyx”—so Aristophanes¹ [footnote gives, inter alia, the same text and reference as JSM’s footnote] calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. (IV, 138)

318.2 than imitators] than mere imitators [concerning all the variant readings from here to 319.3 see JSM’s footnote, 319n] (VI, 193)

318.3 its aim] its permanent aim (VI, 193)

318.4 one;] man: (VI, 193)

318.4-6 while in . . . by worth] while looking to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man’s chance of advancement is determined not by party-favour but by real worth (VI, 193)

318.6 his particular] his own particular (VI, 193)

318.7 back] back² [footnote omitted] (VI, 193)

318.7-8 he . . . state] he really has the means of benefiting the city (VI, 193)

318.9 intolerance] tolerance (VI, 193) [treated as typographical error]

318.9-10 tastes and pursuits] daily pursuits (VI, 193)

318.10 does] may do (VI, 193)

318.11 we put] we ever put (VI, 193)

318.11 looks] looks³ [footnote omitted] (VI, 193)

318.11-12 which are offensive . . . damage.] Which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. (VI, 193-4)

318.13 misconduct in] wrong on (VI, 194)

318.15-16 of the wronged, and such as, though unwritten, are] of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are (VI, 194)

318.19 arrangements] establishments (VI, 194)

318.19 pain and annoyance] the sense of discomfort (VI, 194)

318.21-2 as of those] as those (VI, 194)

318.22 produce] grow (VI, 194)

318.24 any one] even an enemy either (VI, 194)

318.25 or spectacle . . . it:] or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him; (VI, 194)

318.26 artifices . . . spirit,] quackery than to our native bravery, (VI, 194)

318.30-2 strength. . . . [paragraph] We combine taste for the beautiful with frugality of life, and cultivate intellectual speculation] strength. [ellipsis indicates 5-sentence omission] [no paragraph] For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge (VI, 195)

318.32 enervated] enervated¹ [footnote omitted] (VI, 195)

318.32-3 for the service . . . talk;] not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: (VI, 195-6)

318.34 himself so] his poverty (VI, 196)

318.34-5 may . . . his] may rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of (VI, 196)

318.35-7 Our . . . matters;] The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: (VI, 196)

318.37-8 politics . . . one. Far from] these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them: far from (VI, 196)

318.39-40 think . . . arrives] complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it (VI, 196)

318.40-1 a . . . action] the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution (VI, 196)

318.42 daring, debate induces] boldness—debate introduces (VI, 196)

319.1 ought] men are properly (VI, 196)

319.2 accurately] precisely (VI, 196)

319.24 [paragraph] The stress which he [Pericles] lays] [paragraph] But even making allowance for this [Pericles’ contrast of Sparta and Athens], the stress which he lays (VI, 200)

319.27 pursuits,] pursuit— (VI, 200)

320.17 Xenophon] Xenophon¹ [footnote omitted] (VI, 201)

325.13 [paragraph] Democracy] [no paragraph] Democracy (IV, 237)

325.32 Herodotus] Herodotus¹ [footnote omitted] (IV, 238)

325.38-9 results. . . . Among] results, for a Grecian community. Among (IV, 238)

326.4 sedition] sedition² [footnote omitted] (IV, 238)

326.10 Pericles] Periklês¹ [footnote omitted] (IV, 239)

326.15 agony] agony² [footnote omitted] (IV, 239)

334.32 Pericles] Periklês¹ [footnote omitted] (VI, 386)

335.12 circumstances] circumstances¹ [footnote omitted] (VI, 387)

335.18 it. First] it: First (VI, 387)

335.27 aggrandizement. Nikias] aggrandisement: Nikias (VI, 388)

335.46 another] another¹ [footnote omitted] (VI, 389)

— Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates. 3 vols. London: Murray, 1865.

note: some of the quotations are indirect. In a note (not quoted by JSM) to the passage cited on 417-18, Grote, while praising JSM’s Utilitarianism, criticizes him for calling Socrates’ doctrine Utilitarian.

reviewed: 377-440

quoted: 380n, 381, 382, 389, 390, 390n, 392, 392-3, 410, 411, 412, 413, 413-14, 414, 415, 423, 424-5, 427, 428-30, 430, 431, 433-4

referred to: 500n-501n, 510

380n.1-2 “an axiom” . . . “occupying] [paragraph] This axiom is to be noted as occupying (I, 15n)

381.11 He adopted] Not thinking that water, or any other known and definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted (I, 5)

381.14 further] farther (I, 5)

381.15-16 force, . . . indestructible.] [two footnotes omitted] (I, 5)

381.23-6 “which . . . future,” . . . “really . . . apprehension,” . . . “is . . . divided,”] We talk of things generated or destroyed—things coming into being or going out of being—but this phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which . . . future. [footnoteomitted] Nothing is really . . . apprehension. [footnote omitted] In like manner we perceive plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is . . . divided. [footnote omitted] (I, 21)

382.4 “who] [paragraph] It is Zeno who (I, 96)

389.23-4 “one . . . writings.”] I think it is one . . . writings, as an exposition of [continued in next quotation] (II, 45)

390.5 “of] [see previous entry] (II, 45)

390.11 general] [footnote omitted] (II, 46)

390n.5 received] conceived (I, 252n)

390n.6 and] the (I, 252n) [cf. 390^b-b]

390n.7 antipathy,’ &c.] antipathy, &c. (I, 252n) [treated as typographical error]

390.13 “for] He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs, appealing to his hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most powerful associations are grouped; and taking for (II, 47)

390.16-19 “teaches . . . they:”] He describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right: he teaches, . . . they. (II, 73)

390.19 “what he] What he (II, 77)

392.31 “those] I [Socrates] think that those (I, 390)

392.32 wilfully,] wilfully— (I, 390)

392.32 unwillingly.”] unwillingly. (I, 390)

392.34 if this dialogue had] [paragraph] Now, if the dialogue just concluded had (I, 394)

393.1 Athens.] [footnote omitted] (I, 394)

410.33 [paragraph] In] [no paragraph] In (I, 258)

410.35 afterwards.] [footnote omitted] (I, 258)

410.36 further] farther (I, 258)

410.40 opinions.] [footnote omitted] (I, 258)

411.2 notions.”] notions— τὸ γὰρ ὀρθου̑σθαι γνώμαν, ὀδυνᾳ̑. (II, 12)

412.13 on] upon (II, 108)

412.15-16 “The affirmative Sokrates only stands his] In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will and protest, as in the Philêbus and Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his (I, 323)

413.15 afterwards. When] afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher—that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them—this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true. [footnote omitted] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties—not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When (I, 270)

413.21 &c.] [footnote omitted] (I, 271)

413.26 one,] [footnote omitted] (I, 214)

414.1 himself] [footnote omitted] (I, 215)

414.3 individuals] individualities (I, 215)

414.31 “immature] It is important that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until this advanced age—and not imparted, as they are among us at present, to immature (III, 103)

414.32-3 convictions.] [footnote omitted] (III, 103)

415.31 “Aristotle,” . . . “in] [chapter opening] Aristotle, in (II, 90)

415.32 in] on [printer’s error?] (II, 90)

423.18 “teaching and . . . meaning;”] Teaching and . . . meaning: the only process really instructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably prosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within. [footnote omitted] (II, 18)

423.19 “to] [paragraph] When we come to the Menon and the Phædon, we shall hear more of the Platonic doctrine—that knowledge was to (I, 230n)

424.24 [paragraph] Freedom of] [paragraph] Indeed this freedom of (II, 154)

424.30 or make] or must make (II, 155)

424.40 discriminating] discriminative (II, 155)

425.1 on] upon (II, 155)

425.2 intellect. . . .] [ellipsis indicates omission of footnote and one page of text (mostly translation from Plato’s Phædon, with another footnote)] (II, 155-6)

425.4 specially] especially (II, 156)

425.9 on] upon (II, 157)

425.12 that] which (II, 157)

425.12-13 for them] for them (II, 157)

427.23 “To say] Nevertheless, to say (II, 512)

428.37 [paragraph] How] [no paragraph] How (II, 549)

429.1 is not] is not (II, 549)

429.4 unmeaning. Now] [footnote and paragraph break omitted] (II, 549)

429.5 Theætêtus,] [footnote omitted] (II, 549)

429.9 copiously] [footnote omitted] (II, 549)

429.12 these] those [printer’s error?] (II, 549)

429.18 him.] [footnote omitted] (II, 549)

429.20 Kratylus.] [footnote omitted] (II, 550)

429.25 no way] noway (II, 550)

430.2 Typhôs.] [footnote omitted] (II, 551)

430.6 “evanescent] But the difference [between right actions and right opinions] is, that they [right opinions] are evanescent (II, 10)

430.8 “by . . . reasoning”] They are exalted into knowledge, when bound in the mind by . . . reasoning: [footnote omitted] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before described. (II, 10; this sentence follows immediately that last quoted)

431.1 not] The value of them [all the dialogues] consists, not in the result, but in the discussion—not (II, 551)

431.9 ϕιλόλογον),] [footnote omitted] (II, 551)

431.10 be] appear (II, 551)

431.30 “the] Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the Treatise De Legibus), the (II, 394)

433.7 [paragraph] “The] [no paragraph] The [setting altered in this edition] (II, 483)

433.11 true] True (II, 483)

433.13 art.] [footnote omitted] (II, 483)

433.16 governed.] [footnote omitted] (II, 483)

433.20 art.] [footnote omitted] (II, 484)

433.23 it.] [footnote omitted] (II, 484)

433.23-4 base, evil, unjust,] [in italics] (II, 484)

433.28 formula.] [footnote omitted] (II, 484)

433.30 worse. How] worse. [paragraph] How (II, 484)

433.31 be . . . if] be (continues the Eleate), if (II, 484)

433.31 and] or [printer’s error?] (II, 484)

433.34 whenever] when (II, 484)

433.37 discontent!] [footnote omitted] (II, 484)

433.40 laws!] [footnote omitted] (II, 485)

433.44 exercised.] [footnote omitted] (II, 485)

434.5 tyranny,] [footnote omitted] (II, 485)

434.6 second-best;] [footnote omitted] (II, 485)

434.9 mischiefs.] [footnote omitted] (II, 485)

434.12 is. We] is. [footnote omitted] [paragraph] We (II, 485)

434.12 therefore . . . that] therefore (the Eleate goes on) that (II, 485)

434.15 governments,] [footnote omitted] (II, 486)

434.30 them.] [footnote omitted] (II, 486)

— “Psychology of Aristotle.” Appendix to Alexander Bain. The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed. London: Longmans, Green, 1868, 611-67.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 476-7, 502, 504

Hamilton, William. Referred to: 342-3, 477, 501n

— “Contribution towards a history of the doctrine of mental suggestion or association” (Note D^**), in Works of Thomas Reid. Ed. William Hamilton. Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart; London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846, 889-910.

quoted: 495, 496

495.28-9 “at once . . . theory of association:”] It is, in consequence of his very manifest meaning having been here not merely misunderstood, but actually reversed, by his interpreters, that Aristotle’s doctrine did not exert its merited influence; and that he himself has not as yet, been universally acknowledged, at once, . . . theory of Association. (901)

496.5-6 “which . . . interpreters.”] I shall likewise translate what, (but only what,) of any moment, is to be found in the relative commentary of Themistius; because this, both in itself and in reference to Aristotle, is, on the matter in question, a valuable, though wholly neglected, monument of ancient philosophy;—because, from the rarity of its one edition, it is accessible to few even of those otherwise competent to read it;—but, above all, because we herein discover the origin of those misconceptions, which . . . interpreters. (891)

— Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. Chiefly from the Edinburgh Review; corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in Notes and Appendices. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans; Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1852.

note: the reference, which derives from Grote’s Plato, is to Appendix I, “Philosophical,” part 2, “Testimonies to the more special fact, that all our knowledge, whether of Mind or of Matter, is only phænomenal,” which is an appendix to the 1st essay, “On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned.”

referred to: 426

Hardenberg, Friedrich Leopold von.Novalis Schriften. Ed. Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel. 2 vols. Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1805.

note: the quotation (which JSM almost certainly took from Carlyle’s review [Critical and Miscellaneous Essays (London: Fraser, 1840), Vol. II] of the 4th ed. of Novalis Schriften) is from “Moralische Unsichten,” the 3rd of the “Fragmente vermischten Inhalts.”

quoted: 466

466.25 “God-intoxicated” Spinoza] [paragraph] Spinoza ist ein Gott-trunkener Mensch. (II, 362)

Hardyng, John.The Chronicle of John Hardyng. Ed. Henry Ellis. London: Rivington, 1812.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Grote, is general; this ed. is cited merely for the title.

referred to: 284

Hartley, David. Referred to: 247, 341-2, 347, 352, 354-5, 451

Hauser, Caspar. Referred to: 350

Hecatæus. Referred to: 287

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Referred to: 344, 381, 425, 500n

Henry VIII (of England). Referred to: 467

Heraclitus (Herakleitus). Referred to: 381-2, 425-6, 498, 500n

Herodicus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 98

Herodotus.Herodotus (Greek and English). Trans. A. D. Godley. 4 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1921.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. Two Greek and Latin editions (9 vols., Glasgow: Foulis, 1761; 7 vols., Edinburgh: Laing, 1806) formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation at 325 is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 282n, 325, 325n, 390n

referred to: 295

Hesiod.

note: the reference at 173 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 173, 276, 286, 288, 295

— “Eoiai.”

note: a “lost” poem of Hesiod (see Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns, pp. xxii-xxiv); the reference is to Grote’s spelling of the title, “Eœæ.”

referred to: 305n

— Theogony, in Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns and Homerica (Greek and English). Trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964, 78-154.

referred to: 281

— Works and Days, in ibid., 2-64.

note: the quotation at 178, which is indirect, is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Charmides; that at 215 is in his translation of Plato’s Lysis.

quoted: 178, 215

Hippias.

note: the references at 46 ff. are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras, in which Hippias is a character; that at 85 is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; that at 154 is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology; that at 392-3 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 46 ff., 85, 154, 389, 392, 392-3, 409, 417n

Hippocrates (the physician, of Cos).

note: the reference at 45 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras; that at 87 is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 45, 87

Hippocrates.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras, in which Hippocrates is a character.

referred to: 45 ff.

Hipponicus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 154

Hippothales.

note: the references at 210-21 passim are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Lysis, in which Hippothales is a character.

referred to: 210-21 passim

Hobbes, Thomas. Referred to: 247, 250, 341, 451, 466, 491, 497

— “Computation or Logic.” Part I of Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Ed. William Molesworth. 11 vols. London: Bohn, 1839-45, I, 1-90.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 494

— “Physics, or the Phenomena of Nature.” Part IV of Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body, in ibid., 387-532.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM’s reference is vague, but the doctrine referred to is covered in the passage cited. The quotation is indirect.

quoted: 371

Holinshed, Raphael.Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 6 vols. London: Johnson, 1807.

note: the reference, which is general, is in a quotation from Grote in which it is spelled “Hollinshed”; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 284

Homer.

note: the references at 71, 92 are in JSM’s translations of Plato; the reference at 141 is not to be found in the received text of Homer.

referred to: 71, 92, 141, 173, 286, 494

— Iliad (Greek and English). Trans. A. T. Murray. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

note: a two-volume Greek ed. of the Iliad and the Odyssey (Oxford, 1800) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The references at 292-3 are in a quotation from Grote; the quotations at 99 and 123 are from JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias; that at 162 is from his translation of Plato’s Apology; and that at 202 is from his translation of Plato’s Laches.

quoted: 99, 123, 162, 202, 294n, 296

referred to: 277, 283, 287-97, 316, 392

— Odyssey (Greek and English). Trans. A. T. Murray. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

note: a two-volume Greek ed. of the Iliad and the Odyssey (Oxford, 1800) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation at 167 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology; that at 177 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Charmides; those at 209 (the same as that at 177) and 214 are in his translation of Plato’s Lysis; all are indirect.

quoted: 167, 177, 209, 214

referred to: 147, 281, 283, 290-2, 294, 316, 392

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). “Carmina,” Liber III, iii, in The Odes and Epodes (Latin and English). Trans. C.E. Bennett. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914, 178-84.

note: this ed. is used for ease of reference. Opera (Glasgow: Mundell, 1796) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 327, 416

327.8-9 “civium ardor prava jubentium” . . . “vultus instantis tyranni,”] Iustum et tenacem propositi virum / non civium ardor prava iubentium, / non vultus instantis tyranni / mente quatit solida necque Auster, / dux inquieti turbidus Hadriae, / nec fulminantis magna manus Iovis; / si fractus in labatur orbis, / in pavidum ferient ruinae. (178; II. 1-8)

416.17 tenax propositi] [cf. previous entry]

Horne Tooke. See Tooke, John Horne.

Hume, David. Referred to: 44n, 341, 443, 451, 462, 466

Hyperbolus. Referred to: 331

Isocrates. Referred to: 300, 394

—Oratio ad Philippum (“To Philip”), in Isocrates (Greek and English). Trans. George Norlin. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1928, I, 246-338.

note:Opera omnia (Paris: Auger, 1782) formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 389

James I (of England). Referred to: 467

James II (of England). Referred to: 467

Jesus. Referred to: 149, 150, 314

Johnson, Samuel. See under Boswell.

Jouffroy, Théodore. Referred to: 443

Kallikles. See Callicles.

Kant, Immanuel. Referred to: 93, 341, 346, 451, 461

Laches.

note: the references at 197-209 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches, in which Laches is a character.

referred to: 197-209, 409

Lagrange, Louis. Referred to: 468n

Lamachus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches.

referred to: 206

Laromiguière, Pierre.Leçons de philosophie sur les principes de l’intelligence ou sur les causes et sur les origines des idées. 6th ed. 2 vols. Paris: Fournier, 1844.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 355

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. Referred to: 445, 451

note: JSM always uses the spelling Leibnitz.

Leitch, John. See Müller, Karl Otfried, Introduction.

Leon (of Salamis).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 166

Lewes, George Henry.Aristotle: a chapter from the history of science, including analyses of Aristotle’s scientific writings. London: Smith, Elder, 1864.

referred to: 484, 497

— “Mr. Grote’s Plato,” Fortnightly Review, II (Sept., 1865), 169-83.

referred to: 383-4

Lewis, George Cornewall. “Grote’s History of Greece,” Edinburgh Review, XCI (Jan., 1850), 118-52.

referred to: 309n

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott.A Greek-English Lexicon, based on the German work of Francis Passow. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1843.

referred to: 493n

Littré, Emile. Referred to: 444

Livy (Titus Livius). Referred to: 329

Locke, John. Referred to: 19, 84n, 93, 94, 95, 222, 247, 341-2, 345, 347, 443, 451, 457-8, 491

— Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Works. New ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, Sharpe, Offor, Robinson, and Evans, 1823, I-III.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is indirect; the reference is to Locke’s indebtedness to Molyneux.

quoted: 53

referred to: 457

— “Several Letters to Anthony Collins, Esq.,” in ibid., X, 260-98.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passage cited contains explicitly the second of the two phrases, but the sense of the first is also present; a somewhat similar passage appears in “Some Familiar Letters,” ibid., IX, 303.

quoted: 251

— Of the Conduct of the Understanding, in ibid., III, 203-89.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 510

510.3 “principling”] [paragraph] There is, I know, a great fault among all sorts of people of principling their children and scholars, which at last, when looked into, amounts to no more but making them imbibe their teacher’s notions and tenets by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere to them whether true or false. (277)

Louis IX (Saint Louis, of France). Referred to: 283

Louis XIV (of France).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 335

Lucian. “Anacharsis, or Athletics,” in Lucian (Greek and English). Trans. A. M. Harmon. 8 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925, IV, 1-69.

note: this ed. used for ease of reference. Opera Omnia (Amsterdam and Utrecht, 1843-6) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 397n-398n

Luther, Martin. Referred to: 387, 414

Lycan.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 158, 169, 171

Lycurgus.

note: the reference at 80 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; those at 301-2 are in quotations from Grote.

referred to: 80, 299-302

Lysanias.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Lysias.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 62-96 passim

Lysimachus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches, in which Lysimachus is a character.

referred to: 197-209 passim

Lysis.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Lysis, in which Lysis is a character.

referred to: 210-21 passim

Mahabharat. Referred to: 282

Malebranche, Nicolas. Referred to: 462, 465

— Recherche de la vérité, in Œuvres. Ed. Jules Simon. 2 vols. Paris: Charpentier, 1842, II.

referred to: 457

Mandeville, Bernard. Referred to: 466, 466n

Marcus Aurelius. See Antoninus.

Mausolus. Referred to: 324

Melesias.

note: the references at 197-209 passim are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches, in which Melesias is a character; that at 334 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 197-209 passim, 334

Meletus (Melitus).

note: the references at 151-74 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology; those at 187-96 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Euthyphron; it is not known why JSM uses the incorrect spelling “Melitus” in these translations.

referred to: 151-74 passim, 187-96 passim, 393, 398

Menexenus.

note: the references are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Lysis, in which Menexenus is a character.

referred to: 210-21 passim

Menon. Referred to: 409

Mervoyer, Pierre Maurice.Étude sur l’association des idées. Paris: Durand, 1864.

referred to: 444

Midas (the Phrygian).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 83

Mikkus. Referred to: 389

Mill, James. Referred to: 247, 352

— Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 2 vols. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 342, 361, 367, 494

— 2nd ed. Ed. John Stuart Mill. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869.

referred to: 458n

— “Education,” in Essays. London: printed by J. Innes, n.d.

note: this is the earliest collection (only fifty copies were printed) of reprints of James Mill’s articles for the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica; the articles are separately paginated. The quotation is indirect.

quoted: 510

— A Fragment on Mackintosh. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1835.

referred to: 466n

Mill, John Stuart. “Bailey on Berkeley’s Theory of Vision,” Westminster Review, XXXVIII (Oct., 1842), 318-36.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 247-65 above; the references are in JSM’s “Rejoinder” to Bailey’s reply to this article.

referred to: 266-8

— An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865.

referred to: 458n

— “Gorgias,” Monthly Repository, VIII (Oct., Nov., and Dec., 1834), 691-710, 802-15, and 829-42.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 97-150 above.

referred to: 152

— “Grote’s History of Greece [Vols. V and VI],” Spectator, XXII (3 March, 1849), 202-3.

quoted: 333-6

333.22 The] But the (202) [cf. 333^t-t]

333.22 the middle period] this division (202) [cf. 333^u-u]

333.28 cotemporaries] contemporaries (202) [cf. 333^v-v]

334.14 were.] were, the greatest people who have yet appeared on this planet. (202) [cf. 334^w]

334.23 [centred heading] character of nicias (203) [cf. 334^x]

— “Grote’s Greece—Volumes V and VI,” Spectator, XXII (10 March, 1849), 227-8.

quoted: 318-19, 319-20

318.8 And our] Our (227) [cf. 318^f-f]

318.9 tolerance] intolerance [printer’s error in S?] (227) [cf. 318^g-g]

318.9 tastes and] daily (227) [cf. 318^h-h]

318.10 does] may do (227) [cf. 318^i-i]

318.11 we] we ever (227) [cf. 318^j]

318.11-12 are offensive, though they do no positive damage] though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend (227) [cf. 318^k-k] .

319.24 [paragraph] The] [no paragraph] But even making allowance for this, the (227) [cf. 319^m-m]

319.24 he [Pericles] lays] he lays (227) [cf. 319^n-n]

319.27 pursuits] pursuit (227) [cf. 319^o-o]

320.15 farther] further (227) [cf. 320^p-p]

320.38 [paragraph] The] [paragraph] There have been few things lately written more worthy of being meditated on than this striking paragraph. The (227) [cf. 320^r]

— “Grote’s Greece—Volumes VII and VIII,” Spectator, XXIII (16 March, 1850), 255-6.

quoted: 309n-310n, 327-8, 329, 331-2

309n.8 give the] give the briefest analysis of a dissertation so rich in matter, or the (256) [cf. 309^b]

310n.7 case with] case in (256) [cf. 310^c-c]

327.35 These men ought] In all these points the Athenian people were honourably distinguished, not only from the Greek oligarchies, but from their own oligarchichal party; who showed during two intervals of ascendancy, the periods of the Four Hundred and of the Thirty, of what enormities they were capable; and who ought (256)

328.1 as a] as the (256) [cf. 328^b-b]

328.2 it.] it: for during the whole of its existence, such men as Critias and his compeers were prominent in the first ranks of public discussion, and continually filled the high offices of the state. (256)

329.27 his hero Socrates] by his Socratic dialectics he (256) [cf. 329^i-i]

331.22 seventh volume] present volumes (256) [cf. 331^o-o]

— “Phædrus,” Monthly Repository, VIII (June, and Sept., 1834), 404-20, and 633-46.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 62-96 above.

referred to: 152

— Preface and Notes to James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869.

referred to: 458n

— “Protagoras,” Monthly Repository, VIII (Feb., and March, 1834), 89-99, and 203-11.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 39-61 above.

referred to: 68n, 106n, 135n, 152

— A System of Logic. London: Parker, 1843.

note: in Collected Works, Vols. VII and VIII.

referred to: 494

Milman, Henry Hart. “Grote’s History of Greece,” Quarterly Review, LXXVIII (June, 1846), 113-44.

referred to: 303

Miltiades.

note: the references at 133, 141 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 133, 141, 317n, 435

Milton, John.Paradise Lost, in The Poetical Works of Mr. John Milton. London: Tonson, 1695, 1-343.

note: in all these quotations Mill is alluding to Aristophanes’ The Clouds; the wording of the translation of Plato’s Apology, however, echoes the Milton passage here cited.

quoted: 153, 154, 157, 394

394.13 “make . . . reason.”] But all was false and hollow; though his tongue / Dropt manna, and could make . . . reason, to perplex and dash / Maturest counsels. (31; II, 110-13)

Mitford, William.The History of Greece. 10 vols. London: Cadell and Davies, 1818-20.

note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 275, 305n, 336

Mithæcus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 143

Molyneux, William.

referred to: 457; see Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

The Monk of St. Gall.Early Lives of Charlemagne by Eginhard and the Monk of St. Gall. Trans. and ed. A. J. Grant. London: Chatto and Windus, 1922.

note: the reference is general; this ed. cited merely for the title.

referred to: 283

Moore, Thomas. “Life of Lord Byron.” See Byron, Works.

Mueller, Carl Otfried. See Müller, Karl Otfried.

Mueller, Johannes Peter. See Müller, Johannes Peter.

Müller, Friedrich Max.Lectures on the Science of Language, Delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in February, March, April, & May, 1863. 2nd Series. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1864.

quoted: 404n

404n. 1-2 Nature . . . Belief] [in italics] (526)

Müller, Johannes Peter.Elements of Physiology. Trans. William Baly. 2 vols. London: Taylor and Walton, 1837, 1842.

note: the pagination in the two vols. is consecutive.

referred to: 355

Müller, Karl Otfried.History of the Literature of Ancient Greece. 2 vols. Trans. George Cornewall Lewis and John William Donaldson. London: Baldwin, 1840-42.

note: this ed., whose page references correspond to JSM’s, published in the “Library of Useful Knowledge” by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The work was later reprinted in 3 vols.; JSM’s library contains the vol. subtitled “to the Period of Isocrates” (trans. Lewis; London: Baldwin, 1847). Grote gives the reference (to Chap. iv, §5) in the passage here also cited by JSM.

referred to: 291n

— Introduction to a Scientific System of Mythology. Trans. John Leitch. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1844.

note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 289

referred to: 288

289.26-8 every . . . entity] [in italics] (61)

Müller, Max. See Müller, Friedrich Max.

Myrtis. Referred to: 315n

Nausicydes.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 124

Nero Claudius Cæsar.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grey used by Grote.

referred to: 285n

Newton, Isaac. Referred to: 310n

Niceratus (Nikeratus).

note: the reference at 208 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches; that at 334 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 208, 334

Nicias (Nikias).

note: the reference at 114 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias; those at 197-209 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches, in which Nicias is a character; the references at 326, 334-6 are in quotations from Grote. For the quotation at 319n, s. v. Thucydides.

referred to: 114, 197-209, 316, 319n, 326, 331, 334-6, 395

Nicostratus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Niebuhr, Barthold Georg.The History of Rome. 3 vols. Trans. Julius Charles Hare and Connop Thirlwall (Vols. I and II); William Smith and Leonhard Schmitz (Vol. III). London (Vols. I and II printed Cambridge): Taylor, 1828 (Vol. I), 1832 (Vol. II); Taylor and Walton, 1842 (Vol. III).

note: a German ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Reimer, 1827-32 [Vol. II is of the 1836 ed.]), is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, as are the two vols. of lectures ed. Schmitz (London: Taylor and Walton, 1844) that complete Niebuhr’s History.

referred to: 276, 277, 304, 328, 330

— Lectures on Ancient History, from the earliest times to the taking of Alexandria by Octavianus. Comprising the History of the Asiatic Nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Macedonians and Carthaginians. Trans. Leonhard Schmitz. 3 vols. London: Taylor, Walton, and Maberly, 1852.

referred to: 331

— “On Xenophon’s Hellenica.” Trans. Connop Thirlwall. Philological Museum, I (1832), 485-98.

note: the quotation and the reference are both to the passage (494-6) that Smith quotes in a note to Wiggers’ Life of Socrates (for the collation, see Wiggers). Concerning Niebuhr’s claim to originality (accepted by JSM at 323), see also Connop Thirlwall, “Death of Paches,” Philological Museum, II (1833), 236-40.

quoted: 242-3

referred to: 323

“Novalis.” See Hardenberg.

Nunneley, Thomas.On the Organs of Vision: Their Anatomy and Physiology. London: Churchill, 1858.

note: Fraser reprints the relevant passage in his edition of Berkeley’s Works (q.v.), I, 446-8.

referred to: 454, 457

Octavia (Julius Cæsar’s daughter).

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grey used by Grote.

referred to: 285n

Orthagoras (the flute player).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras.

referred to: 48

Owen, Robert. Referred to: 329, 387

Paches.

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr.

referred to: 243, 323

Paley, William. Referred to: 467

Paralus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Parmenides.

note: the references at 222-38 passim are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides.

referred to: 222-38 passim, 381-2, 412, 426

Paulus, Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob. Referred to: 287

Peisander. Referred to: 327

Pericles.

note: the references at 48, 52, 395 are in JSM’s translations of Plato’s Protagoras; those at 86-7 are in his translation of Plato’s Phædrus; those at 103, 114, 133, 141, 143 are in his translation of Plato’s Gorgias, and that at 435 derives from the Gorgias; those at 298, 319-20, 326, 334-5 are in quotations from Grote.

referred to: 48, 52, 86, 87, 103, 114, 133, 141, 143, 298, 311, 316-17, 319-21, 326-7, 331-5, 395, 435

— Funeral Oration. See Thucydides, History.

quoted: 318-19

referred to: 377, 397n

Phædrus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus, in which he is a character.

referred to: 62-96 passim

Pheidias.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras.

referred to: 45

Philip (of Macedon).

note: the reference at 243 is in a quotation from Niebuhr; that at 284 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 243, 284, 312

Philopœmen. Referred to: 337n

Phocion. Referred to: 336n

Phrynichus.

note: the quotation is from Thucydides, History, q.v.

quoted: 328

referred to: 322

Pindar.

note: the quotation derives from Herodotus, q.v.

quoted: 390n

referred to: 315, 315n

— The Odes of Pindar Including Principal Fragments (Greek and English). Trans. John Sandys. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.

note: the indirect quotation is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

quoted: 122

Pisistratus. Referred to: 291, 299, 327

Pittacus.

note: the quotation is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras.

quoted: 54

Plato.

note: the Loeb eds. of Plato are used for ease of reference. Bekker’s ed. [11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826)] is in JSM’s library, Somerville College; the references at 167, 171 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology; those at 242-3 are in a quotation from Niebuhr; those at 298, 301-2, 320, 492, 494 are in quotations from Grote; that at 470 is in a quotation from Fraser.

referred to: 39-45, 61-2, 84n, 93-6, 167, 171, 186, 210, 222-4, 238, 241-3, 282, 298, 300-2, 310, 310n, 314, 320, 329, 332, 336n, 377-440 passim, 451, 463, 466, 470, 475-7, 480, 483, 487-94, 506; see also Routh.

— Platonis et quæ vel Platonis esse feruntur vel Platonica solent comitari scripta Græce omnia ad codices manuscriptos. With notes by Immanuel Bekker. 11 vols. London: Priestley, 1826.

note: this ed. is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM’s reference is to an “English bookseller” (Richard Priestley) who, aided by a “German scholar” (Bekker), “recently produced an excellent edition of Plato,” and subsequently (in 1827) became bankrupt. Vols. X and XI of the edition have as title Platonis dialogi Latine juxta interpretationem Ficini aliorumque.

referred to: 39

— The Works of Plato, viz. his fifty-five Dialogues and twelve Epistles. Trans. F. Sydenham and Thomas Taylor. 5 vols. London: Taylor, 1804.

referred to: 42

— Œuvres de Platon. Trans. Victor Cousin. 13 vols. Paris: Bossange, 1822-40.

note: the reference (in 1834) is to the work as in progress.

referred to: 42n

— Platonis Euthydemus et Gorgias (Greek and Latin). Ed. Martin Joseph Routh. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1784.

referred to: 39

— Apology (Apologia), in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo, Phædrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1917, 68-144.

translated with commentary: 151-74

quoted: 153n, 399

referred to: 403, 435

— The Apology of Socrates, the Crito, and Part of the Phædo, with Notes from Stallbaum and Schleiermacher’s Introductions. [Ed. William Smith.] London: Taylor and Walton, 1840.

note: Stallbaum’s notes are trans. by Gillespie, Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the Apology by Thirlwall (originally for the Philological Museum, II [1833], 556-61), Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the Crito presumably by Smith.

reviewed: 241-3

— Charmides, in Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955, 8-90.

translated with commentary: 175-86

referred to: 53n, 187, 407, 408, 439n

— Cratylus (Kratylus), in Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914, 6-190.

note: the references at 429 are in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 393, 429

— Critias (Kritias), in Timæus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1929, 258-306.

referred to: 385-6

— Crito (Kriton), in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo, Phædrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1914, 150-90.

referred to: 241, 417n

— Epinomis, in Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927, 426-86.

referred to: 385-6, 421

— Erastæ (The Lovers), in ibid., 312-38.

referred to: 407

— Euthydemus, in Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1924, 378-504.

referred to: 393, 435; see also Platonis Euthydemus et Gorgias.

— Euthyphron, in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo, Phædrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1914, 6-58.

translated with commentary: 187-96

referred to: 406

— Gorgias, in Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953, 258-532.

note: the references at 413, 415 are in quotations from Grote; many of the quotations are summary or indirect.

translated with commentary: 97-150

quoted: 106n, 390n, 394, 395, 401, 419, 435

referred to: 394-6, 399, 401, 407, 413, 415-16, 418, 422-4; see also Platonis Euthydemus et Gorgias.

— Greater Hippias (Hippias Major), in Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914, 336-422.

referred to: 389, 392, 407, 409

— Hipparchus, in Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927, 278-304.

referred to: 407

— Kratylus. See Cratylus.

— Kritias. See Critias.

— Kriton. See Crito.

— Laches, in Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1924, 6-82.

translated with commentary: 197-209

referred to: 186, 187, 406, 409

— Lachès, ou du courage, in Œuvres de Platon. Trans. Victor Cousin. 13 vols. Paris: Bossange, 1822-40, V.

note: Vol. V has 1823 on the title page (though Vol. IV has 1827, and Vol. VI, 1831).

quoted: 203n

203n.2 “Constance”] Il me semble que le courage est une certaine constance de l’âme, puisqu’il faut en donner une définition générale et applicable à tous les cas. (369)

— Laws (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

quoted: 397n

referred to: 385-6, 395, 414, 417n, 418, 424, 434-5, 438

— Leges. See Laws.

— Lesser Hippias (Second Hippias), in Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914, 428-74.

referred to: 389, 392-3

— Lysis, in Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925, 6-70.

translated with commentary: 210-21

referred to: 389, 407, 408

— Meno (Menon), in Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, 264-370.

quoted: 398, 422, 430

referred to: 398, 407, 409, 430, 435

— Minos, in Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927, 388-420.

referred to: 407

— Parmenides, in Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914, 198-330.

translated with commentary: 222-38

referred to: 381, 385, 412-13, 508

— Phædo (Phædon), in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo, Phædrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947, 200-402.

note: the references at 413 and 424-5 are in quotations from Grote.

referred to: 412-13, 422-5, 431

— Phædrus, in ibid., 412-578.

note: the references at 413 and 430 are in quotations from Grote.

translated with commentary: 62-96

quoted: 430n

referred to: 291, 407, 412-14, 423, 430, 463

— Philebus, in The Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925, 202-398.

note: the reference at 413 is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 420

referred to: 387, 413-14, 418

— Politicus (Politikos). See The Statesman.

— Protagoras, in Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, 92-256.

note: the reference at 413 is in a quotation from Grote.

translated with commentary: 39-61

referred to: 106n, 197, 328-91, 395, 401n, 407-8, 413, 417-19

— Republic (Greek and English). Trans. Paul Shorey. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.

note: the reference at 301-2 is in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 399, 400, 411, 438

referred to: 77n, 285, 301-2, 386, 396-7, 407, 412, 414, 416, 418-21, 426n, 428, 430, 434-9, 505

— Second Alcibiades, in Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927, 228-72.

referred to: 435

— Second Hippias. See Lesser Hippias.

— Seventh Epistle, in Timæus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1929, 476-564.

referred to: 405n, 431

— Sophist (Sophistes), in Theætetus, Sophist (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1921, 264-458.

note: the references and the quotation at 429 are in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 397, 426n, 429

referred to: 385, 400-2, 405, 407, 428

— The Statesman (Politicus, Politikos), in The Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925, 4-194.

note: the references at 433-4 are in a quotation from Grote in which part of the dialogue is summarized.

referred to: 385, 405, 407, 432-4

— Symposium (Symposion), in Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925, 80-244.

referred to: 414

— Theætetus, in Theætetus, Sophist (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1921, 6-256.

note: the references at 429 are in a quotation from Grote.

quoted: 430

referred to: 385, 391, 407, 409, 417n, 426, 428-30, 501n

— Timæus, in Timæus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. London: Heinemann, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1929, 16-252.

note: the reference at 413 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 385-6, 413, 420n

Plutarch.Lives (Greek and English). Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. 11 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914.

note: the reference at 326 concerns Solon’s proclamation against neutrality.

referred to: 300, 326

Polus.

note: the reference at 85 is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; those at 97-150 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias, in which Polus is a character.

referred to: 85, 97-150 passim, 394-6

Polycleitus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras.

referred to: 45

Porphyry. Referred to: 23

Priestley, Richard.

referred to: 39; see Plato, Platonis et quæ vel Platonis. . . .

Prior, Thomas. Referred to: 471

Prodicus (Prodikus).

note: the reference at 46 ff. are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras, in which Prodicus is a character; that at 85 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; that at 154 is in his translation of Plato’s Apology; that at 178 is in his translation of Plato’s Charmides; that at 207 is in his translation of Plato’s Laches.

referred to: 46 ff., 85, 154, 178, 207, 389, 391-2

— “The Choice of Hercules.” See Xenophon, Memorabilia.

referred to: 329, 391

Protagoras.

note: the references at 42-61 passim are to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras, in which he is a character; that at 85 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; the quotations are from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, q.v.

quoted: 44n, 425

referred to: 42-61 passim, 85, 389, 392-3, 395, 401n, 426-8, 501n

Pythagoras. Referred to: 381

Pythodorus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides.

referred to: 222

Quarterly Review.

note: the references are to “Church of England writers” who unjustly criticize the Sophists; no specific reference seems justified, but apposite are articles by Thomas Mitchell (XXI [1819], 281-6; XXVII [1822], 385-8—mentioned by Francis Sparshott in his Introduction, above xxiin—and XXXIII [1826], 332-56), J. G. Lockhart (XXVII [1828], 32-50), and H. N. Coleridge (XLIV [1831], 389-414).

referred to: 43, 47n

Rabelais, François.

note: the passage is not in Rabelais, though traditionally ascribed to him. See, e.g., Diderot, Le Neveu de Rameau, ed. Jean Fabre (Geneva: Droz, 1963), 9. Cf. also the first sentence of Voltaire’s Ce qu’on ne fait pas et ce qu’on pourrait faire (1742), and Paul-Louis Courier’s “Lettre à Messieurs de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres” (1819). None of these gives the whole, or the exact notion, of the passage JSM cites; presumably there is a source for all which we have not located.

quoted: 149

Ramayun. Referred to: 282

Ramus, Peter. Referred to: 405

Reid, Thomas. Referred to: 3, 247, 251, 341, 343, 443, 477

— Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 3 vols. Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1803.

note: the references at 13n and 343-4 are to the first part, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, which is in Vols. I and II; that at 356, which is in a quotation from Bain, is to the second part, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind.

referred to: 13n, 343-4, 356

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Referred to: 387

Routh, Martin Joseph. See Plato, Platonis Euthydemus et Gorgias.

Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul. Referred to: 443

Ruskin, John.Modern Painters. 5 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1851-60.

note: the reference is to Vol. II, which consists of Part III, “Of Ideas of Beauty.”

referred to: 363-4

St. Thomas Aquinas.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 489

Sappho.

note: the reference at 67 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 67, 315n

Sarambus (the tavern keeper).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 143

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. Referred to: 341

Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst. “Introduction to Plato’s Apology of Socrates.” Trans. Connop Thirlwall. Philological Museum, II (1833), 556-61.

referred to: 151, 151n; see also Plato, The Apology, the Crito . . . , ed. Smith.

— “On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher.” Trans. Connop Thirlwall. Philological Museum, II (1833), 538-55.

note: the German essay appeared in Berlin Transactions, 1815.

referred to: 41, 241-2; see also Wiggers.

Scott, Robert. See Liddell.

Shaftsbury (3rd Earl of). See Cooper.

Shakespeare, William.Cymbeline.

note: as the reference is general, no ed. is cited.

referred to: 284

— Hamlet.

note: the quotation is indirect. The comparative passage is taken from the Variorum Edition of Horace H. Furness.

quoted: 224

224.22 like to a cloud, & yet extremely unlike a whale.] Hamlet. Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in shape of a camel? / Polonius. By the mass, and ’tis like a camel indeed. / Hamlet. Methinks it is like a weasel. / Polonius. It is backed like a weasel. / Hamlet. Or like a whale? / Polonius. Very like a whale. (III, ii, 359-65)

— King Lear.

note: the quotation is in a quotation by Grote from Grey. The comparative passage is taken from the Variorum Edition of Horace H. Furness.

quoted: 285n

referred to: 284

285n.2 Nero . . . darkness,] Edgar. Frateretto calls me, and tells me Nero . . . darkness. (III, vi, 6-7)

Shelley, Mary.Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus. 3 vols. London: Lackington, Hughes, Harding, et al., 1818.

referred to: 348

Simonides. Referred to: 315n

— “Human Imperfection,” in Anthologia Lyrica Graeca. Ed. Ernestus Diehl. 2 vols. Leipzig: Teubneri, 1925, II, 62-6.

note: the quotation, which is indirect, is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Protagoras.

quoted: 54

Skedasus (daughters of). Referred to: 323

Sleeman, William Henry.Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official. 2 vols. London: Hatchard, 1844.

note: in the Preface to the 2nd ed. (1849) of Vols. I and II of his History of Greece, Grote says JSM’s “excellent notice” of the History in the Edinburgh brought Sleeman’s book to his attention, and he added references to it in his notes.

referred to: 288n, 290n

Smith, Adam. Referred to: 247, 469

— An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. With a Commentary by the Author of “England and America” [E. G. Wakefield]. 4 vols. London: Knight, 1835-39.

note: for ease of reference this ed. is used. In Somerville College there are the 2-vol. 8th ed. (London, 1796), the 2-vol. ed., ed. Rogers (Oxford, 1869), and a gift copy of J. R. McCulloch’s ed. (4 vols. Edinburgh: Black, Tait, 1828), Vol. I inscribed: “To John Mill Esq / This copy of the edition of a / work to the value of which / he has essentially contributed / is presented by his friend / the Editor”.

referred to: 439

— “Of the External Senses,” in Essays on Philosophical Subjects. London: Cadell and Davies; Edinburgh: Creech, 1795, 195-244.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation, which JSM takes from Bailey, appears in the fifth section, “On the Sense of Seeing.”

quoted: 253

253.22-3 “Must appear . . . point.”] But if we consider that the distance of any object from the eye, is a line turned endways to it; and that this line must consequently appear . . . point; we shall be sensible that distance from the eye cannot be the immediate object of Sight, but that all visible objects must naturally be perceived as close upon the organ, or more properly, perhaps, like all other Sensations, as in the organ which perceives them. (216)

Smith, Sydney. “Female Education,” Edinburgh Review, XV (Jan., 1810), 299-315.

quoted: 275n-276n

276n.10-11 action. There] action: there (299)

Smith, William. See Plato, The Apology, the Crito . . . , ed. Smith; and Wiggers.

Socrates.

note: the references at 39-238 passim are to JSM’s translations of Plato’s dialogues, in which Socrates is the main character; that at 241 is in a quotation from Niebuhr; those at 298 and 320 are in quotations from Grote.

referred to: 39-238 passim, 241, 242, 286, 298, 309, 309n-310n, 314, 320, 327, 329, 336^y, 377-440 passim, 480, 481, 483, 506

Solon.

note: the references at 80, 92 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus; those at 201 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches; the first at 326 is in a quotation from Grote. For Solon’s Speech to Crœsus, referred to at 295, see Herodotus; for his proclamation against neutrality, referred to at 326, see Plutarch.

referred to: 80, 92, 201, 295, 313, 326-7, 397n

Sophocles.

note: the reference at 86 is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 86, 317

— Philoctetes, in Sophocles (Greek and English). Trans. F. Storr. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1919, II, 361-493.

referred to: 392

Sophroniscus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Laches.

referred to: 197

Spencer, Herbert.Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855.

note: by “the dissertation prefixed” to the work, JSM presumably refers (342n) to Part I, “General Analysis,” which is based on Spencer’s “The Universal Postulate,” Westminster Review (Oct., 1853). As to 367, while Spencer generally has different aims and uses different language. JSM would appear to have in mind such arguments as those in Part II, Chap. v, and Part IV, passim (see, e.g., 517, 529, 580).

referred to: 342n, 367

Spinoza, Baruch. Referred to: 451, 466

Stasinus. Fragment 20, in Epicorum Græcorum Fragmenta. Ed. Godofredus Kinkel. Leipzig: Teubneri, 1877, 30-1.

note: the quotation is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Euthyphron.

quoted: 193

Statutes. See below 561.

Stesichorus. Referred to: 71

Stewart, Dugald. Referred to: 93, 247, 261, 341, 343, 477

— Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Vol. I, London: Strahan and Cadell; Edinburgh: Creech, 1792; Vol. II, Edinburgh: Constable; London: Cadell and Davies, 1814; Vol. III, London: Murray, 1827.

referred to: 11, 261

Sulla. See Sylla.

Swift, Jonathan.Gulliver’s Travels, in The Works of Jonathan Swift, D. D., Dean of St. Patrick’s, Dublin; containing additional letters, tracts, and poems, not hitherto published; with notes and a life of the author. Ed. Walter Scott. 19 vols. Edinburgh: Constable; London: White, Cochrane, and Gale, Curtis and Fenner; Dublin: Cumming, 1814, XII.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The indirect quotation, which is in a quotation from Grote, is from Voyage IV (“A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms”), Chap. iii. (As the phrase recurs in Swift, no page reference is given.) In Swift, saying “the thing which was not” is equivalent to lying or expressing falsehood.

quoted: 429

— A Tale of a Tub, in ibid., XI, 1-211.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is indirect.

quoted: 493n

493n.6-8 Lord Peter had studied the works of Aristotle, and . . . wonderful treatise . . . which teaches . . . find a . . . except itself.] But about this time it fell out, that the learned brother aforesaid had read Aristotle’s dialectica, and . . . wonderful piece . . . which has the faculty of teaching . . . find out a . . . but itself; like commentators on the Revelations, who proceed prophets without understanding a syllable of the text. (85)

Sylla (Sulla). Referred to: 510

Taine, Hippolyte.Histoire de la littérature anglaise. 4 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1863-4.

referred to: 443

— De l’Intelligence. 2 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1870.

reviewed: 443-7

quoted: 444

444.24-37 Under . . . these.] [translated from:] Si je ne me trompe, on entend aujourd’hui par intelligence, ce qu’on entendait autrefois par entendement et intellect, à savoir la faculté de connaître; du moins, j’ai pris le mot dans ce sens. [paragraph] En tout cas, il s’agit ici de nos connaissances, et non d’autre chose. Les mots faculté, capacité, pouvoir, qui ont joué un si grand rôle en psychologie ne sont, comme on le verra, que des noms commodes au moyen desquels nous mettons ensemble, dans un compartiment distinct, tous les faits d’une espèce distincte; ces noms désignent un caractère commun aux faits qu’on a logés sous la même étiquette; ils ne désignent pas une essence mystérieuse et profonde, qui dure et se cache sous le flux des faits passagers. C’est pourquoi je n’ai traité que des connaissances, et, si je me suis occupé des facultés, c’est pour montrer qu’en soi et à titre d’entités distinctes, elles ne sont pas. [paragraph] Une pareille précaution est fort utile. Par elle, la psychologie devient une science de faits; car ce sont des faits que nos connaissances; on peut parler avec précision et détails d’une sensation, d’une idée, d’un souvenir, d’une prévision, aussi bien que d’une vibration, d’un mouvement physique; dans l’un comme dans l’autre cas, c’est un fait qui surgit; on peut le reproduire, l’observer, le décrire; il a ses précédents, ses accompagnements, ses suites. De tout petits faits bien choisis, importants, significatifs, amplement circonstanciés et minutieusement notés, voilà aujourd’hui la matière de toute science; chacun d’eux est un spécimen instructif, une tête de ligne, un exemplaire saillant, un type net auquel se ramène toute une file de cas analogues; notre grande affaire est de savoir quels sont ces éléments, comment ils naissent, en quelles façons et à quelles conditions ils se combinent, et quels sont les effets constants des combinaisons ainsi formées. [paragraph] Telle est la méthode qu’on a tâché de suivre dans cet ouvrage. Dans la première partie, on a dégagé les éléments de la connaissance; de réduction en réduction, on est arrivé aux plus simples, puis de là aux changements physiologiques qui sont la condition de leur naissance. Dans la seconde partie, on a d’abord décrit le mécanisme et l’effet général de leur assemblage, puis, appliquant la loi trouvée, on a examiné les éléments, la formation, la certitude et la portée de nos principales sortes de connaissances, depuis celle des choses individuelles jusqu’à celle des choses générales, depuis les perceptions, prévisions et souvenirs les plus particuliers jusqu’aux jugements et axiomes les plus universels. (I, 3-5)

Tennyson, Alfred. “Eleänore,” in Poems. London: Moxon, 1833, 25-32.

quoted: 420n

420n.11 melody.] melody, / Which lives about thee, and a sweep / Of richest pauses, evermore / Drawn from each other mellow-deep, / Who may express thee, Eleänore? (28; 13-17)

Thales. Referred to: 380-1

Theætetus. Referred to: 409, 430

Theages.

note: the reference is to JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167, 395

Thearion (the baker).

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 143

Themistocles.

note: the references at 103, 133, 141, 143 are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 103, 133, 141, 143, 333, 435

Theodorus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 82, 85

Theodotides.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Theodotus.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Apology.

referred to: 167

Theophrastus. Referred to: 510

Theramenes.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 334

Thirlwall, Connop. Referred to: 41

— The History of Greece. New Ed. 8 vols. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845-52.

note: the work first appeared, in 8 vols., in Dionysius Lardner’s The Cabinet Cyclopædia (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1835 ff.), to which the references at 242 and 275n are relevant.

quoted: 281-2

referred to: 242, 275, 275n, 330

281.34-282.1 “were . . . Theogony . . . forms;” . . . “whence . . . shapes.”] [paragraph] Before we make any remark on this hypothesis, we must consider the view which Herodotus takes of the change introduced by native poets into the Greek mythology: Whence . . . shapes, on these points the knowledge of the Greeks may be said to be but of yesterday. And he subjoins, as a reason, the comparatively late age of Homer and Hesiod; who, as he says, were . . . theogony . . . forms. (I, 211)

— Trans. B. G. Niebuhr’s History of Rome. See Niebuhr.

— Trans. B. G. Niebuhr’s “On Xenophon’s Hellenica.” See Niebuhr, and Wiggers.

— Trans. F. D. Schleiermacher’s Introduction to The Apology of Socrates. See Plato, The Apology, the Crito . . . , ed. Smith.

— Trans. F. D. Schleiermacher’s “On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher.” See Schleiermacher.

— “Socrates, Schleiermacher, and Delbrueck,” Philological Museum, II (1833), 562-87.

referred to: 151n

Thrasybulus. Referred to: 155n, 309

Thrasymachus.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 82, 85, 87, 394, 396-7, 397n

Thucydides (son of Melesias).

note: the references are in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 334

Thucydides. Referred to: 300, 329, 330

— Thucydides (Greek and English). Trans. Charles Foster Smith. 4 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

note: the references at 377, 397n and the quotations at 318-19, 319 are to Pericles’ funeral oration, which is recorded by Thucydides (I, 318-40; II, 35-46); the passage quoted at 328 is contained in that quoted at 323n.

quoted: 317n, 318-19, 319, 319n, 323n, 328

referred to: 322, 327, 377, 397n

Timæus.

note: the reference at 413 is in a quotation from Grote.

referred to: 385, 413

Timarchus. Referred to: 389

Timoleon. Referred to: 311

Tisander.

note: the reference is in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Gorgias.

referred to: 124

Tisias.

note: the references are in JSM’s translation of Plato’s Phædrus.

referred to: 85, 89

Tooke, John Horne. Επεα πτεροεντα. Or, The Diversions of Purley. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Johnson, 1798, 1805.

note: although the precise words are not used by Tooke, the doctrine is averred.