The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Note On the Text
• Acknowledgments
• An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
• The Preface
• ∥ 1 Treatise I: Viz. an Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.∥
• Section I: Concerning Some Powers of Perception, Distinct From What Is Generally Understood By Sensation.
• Section II: Of Original Or Absolute Beauty.
• Section III: Of the Beauty of Theorems.
• Section IV: Of Relative Or Comparative Beauty.
• Section V: Concerning Our Reasonings About Design and Wisdom In the Cause, From the Beauty Or Regularity of Effects.
• Section VI: Of the Universality of the Sense of Beauty Among Men.
• Section VII: Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, As to Our Internal Senses.
• Section VIII: Of the Importance of the Internal Senses In Life, and the Final Causes of Them.
• ∥ 1 Treatise II: Viz. an Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue Or Moral Good.
• Introduction.
• Section I: Of the Moral Sense By Which We Perceive Virtue and Vice, and Approve Or Disapprove Them In Others.
• Section II: Concerning the Immediate Motive to Virtuous Actions.
• Section III: The Sense of Virtue, and the Various Opinions About It, Reducible to One General Foundation. the Manner of Computing the Morality of Actions.
• Section IV: All Mankind Agree In This General Foundation of Their Approbation of Moral Actions. the Grounds of the Different Opinions About Morals.
• Section V: A Further Confirmation That We Have Practical Dispositions to Virtue Implanted In Our Nature; With a Further Explication ∥ 1 of Our Instinct to Benevolence In Its Various Degrees ∥; With the Additional Motives of Interest, Viz. Honour, Shame
• Section VI: Concerning the Importance of This Moral Sense to the Present Happiness of Mankind, and Its Influence On Human Affairs.
• Section VII: A Deduction of Some Complex Moral Ideas, Viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, From This Moral Sense.

SECTION IV

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.

This Moral Sense universal.I. To ∥1 shew∥ how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the universal Foundation of this moral Sense, viz. Benevolence, we have observ’d already,∥2* ∥ that when we are ask’d the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we ∥3 perpetually∥ alledge its Usefulness to the Publick, and not to the Actor himself. If we are vindicating a censur’d Action, and maintaining it lawful, we ∥4 always∥ make this one Article of our Defence, “That it injur’d no body, or did more Good than Harm.” On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be prejudicial to others, besides the Actor; or to evidence at least a Neglect of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them; or when Gratitude, natural Affection, or some other disinterested Tye should have rais’d in us a Study of their Interest. ∥5^aIf we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any reflection upon its Tendency to publick Evil, it is ∥6^bstill occasion’d^b∥ by our Benevolence, which makes us concern’d for the Evils befalling ∥7^cthe Agent, whom we must always look upon as a part of the System.^ac∥ We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes ∥8 it∥ is, to alledge, “That the poor Man does harm to no body but himself;” and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet ∥9 if we examine the Matter well,∥ we shall find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are immediately prejudicial to our selves, and are often look’d upon as innocent toward others, do really tend to the publick Detriment, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have ∥10 been∥ inclin’d to do. This is the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury.

Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation.II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, of some really good moral Quality. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is ∥11 always∥ some really amiable and benevolent Appearance which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging ∥12 that Actions tend∥ to the publick Good, which do not; or be so ∥13 stupidly∥ inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix’d on some partial good Effects, we may quite over-look many evil Consequences which counter-ballance the Good. Our Reason may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some apparent Species of Benevolence which commands our Approbation. And this Sense, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted ∥14 from Motives of external Advantage, which are stronger than it∥, ∥15 ceases not∥ to operate, but ∥16 has Strength enough to make∥ us uneasy and dissatisfy’d with our selves; even as the Sense of Tasting ∥17 makes∥ us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion which we may ∥18 force∥ our selves, from Interest, to swallow.

False Approbations.It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “That many Actions are really done, and approv’d, which tend to the universal Detriment.” For the same way, Actions are often perform’d, and in the mean time approv’d, ∥19 which tend∥ to the Hurt of the Actor. But as we do not from the latter, infer the Actor to be void of Self-Love, or a Sense of Interest; no more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a Sense of Morals, or a desire of publick Good. The matter is plainly this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to publick, or private Good: Nay, sometimes violent Passions, while they last, will make ∥20 them∥ approve very bad Actions ∥21 in a moral∥ Sense, ∥22 or∥ very pernicious ones to the Agent, ∥23 as∥ advantageous: But this proves only, “That sometimes there may be some more violent Motive to Action, than a Sense of moral Good; or that ∥24 Men, by Passion, may become blind∥ even to their own Interest.”

∥25 But to prove that Men∥ are void of a moral Sense, we should find some Instances of cruel, malicious Actions, done, ∥26 and approv’d in others, when there is no Motive of Interest, real or apparent, save gratifying that very Desire of Mischief to others∥: We must find a Country where Murder in cold blood, Tortures, and every thing malicious, without any Advantage, is, if not approv’d, at least look’d upon with indifference, and raises no Aversion toward the Actors, in the unconcern’d Spectators: We must find Men with whom the Treacherous, Ungrateful, Cruel, are in the same account with the Generous, Friendly, Faithful, and Humane; and who approve the latter, no more than the former, in all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the natural Good or Evil befals other Persons. And it may be question’d, whether the Universe, tho large enough, and stor’d with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance, not only of a Nation, but even of a Club, or a single ∥27 Person, who∥ will think all Actions indifferent, but those which ∥28 regard∥ his own Concerns.

Diversity of Manners accounted for.III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the vast Diversity of moral Principles, in various Nations, and Ages; ∥29^awhich is indeed a good Argument against innate Ideas, or Principles, but will not evidence Mankind to be void of a moral Sense to perceive Virtue or Vice ∥30^bin Actions, when they^b∥ occur to their Observation.

The^a∥ Grounds of this Diversity are principally these:

From various Notions of Happiness.1st. Different Opinions of Happiness, or natural Good, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a courageous Disposition, where Liberty is counted a great Good, and War an inconsiderable Evil, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges, will have the Appearance of moral Good to our Sense, because of their appearing benevolent; and yet the same Sense of moral Good in Benevolence, shall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more abject and timorous, where Civil War appears the greatest natural Evil, and Liberty no great Purchase, make the same Actions appear odious. So in Sparta, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir’d, as naturally good to the State, was to abound in a hardy shifting Youth; Theft, if dexterously perform’d, was so little odious, that it receiv’d the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

31 But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on Benevolence, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the publick Good. For we are not to imagine, that this Sense should give us, ∥32 without∥ Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to Good or Evil: It only determines us to approve Benevolence, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate the contrary. So our Sense of Beauty does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres; but determines us to approve and delight in Uniformity amidst Variety, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preambles of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any dispu-ted Practice by the Moralists, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of the natural Good, or evil Consequences of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv’d, is still some Tendency to the greater natural Good of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

Travellers accounts of barbarous Customs.The same Reason may ∥33 remove∥ also the Objections against the Universality of this Sense, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning strange Crueltys practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in ∥34 sudden∥ angry Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower Benevolence in its strongest Ties; and if they really be universally allow’d, look’d upon as innocent, and vindicated; it ∥35 is certainly∥ under some Appearance of Benevolence; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemys, to avoid the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A love of Pleasure and Ease, may, in the immediate Agents, be stronger in some Instances, than Gratitude toward Parents, or natural Affection to Children. But that such Nations are continu’d, notwithstanding all the Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of natural Affection: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of publick Good, was the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by Lycurgus and Solon, of killing the deform’d, or weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of useless Citizens.i

∥36^aA late ingenious Author* has justly observ’d the Absurdity of the monstrous Taste, which has possess’d both the Readers and Writers of Travels. ∥37^bThey scarce give us any Account^b∥ of the natural Affections, the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans, of the Indians; and as ∥38^crarely^c∥ do they mention their Abhorrence of Treachery among themselves; their Proneness to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several States; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or upon points of Honour. “These are but common Storys.—No need to travel to the Indies for what we see in Europe every Day.” The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting Horror, and making Men Stare. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the Indians in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the Prodigious. But a Human Sacrifice, a Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of Indians, in Nations no strangers to the Massacre at Paris, the Irish Rebellion, or the Journals of the Inquisition. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the Indian Sacrifices, flowing from a like Perversion of Humanity by Superstition, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous Credulity of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions ∥39^din other matters to Caution of Assent^d∥, for these marvellous Memoirs of Monks, Fryars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the Historys, Annals, Chronologys, receiv’d by Oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.^a∥

Use of Reason in Morals.Men have Reason given them, to ∥40 judge of the Tendencys of their∥ Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of publick Good; but it is still some Appearance of Good which they pursue. And it is strange, that Reason is universally allow’d to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv’d in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an Argument against any moral Sense; altho the bad Conduct is not ∥41 owing to∥ any Irregularity in the moral Sense, but ∥42 to a wrong∥ Judgment or Opinion. If putting the Aged to death, with all ∥43 its∥ Consequences, really tends to the publick Good, and ∥44 to∥ the lesser Misery of the Aged, it is no doubt justifiable; nay, perhaps the Aged chuse it, in hopes of a future State. If a deform’d, or weak Race, could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is just to put them to death. This all allow to be just, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for killing of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock’d, it is perhaps practis’d, and allow’d from Self-love; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any where. If Wood, or Stone, or Metal be ∥45 a Deity∥, have Government, and Power, and have been the Authors of Benefits to us; it is morally ∥46 amiable∥ to praise and worship them. Or if the true Deity be pleas’d with Worship before Statues, or any other Symbol of some more immediate Presence, or Influence; Image-Worship is virtuous. If he delights in Sacrifices, Penances, Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable. Our Sense of Virtue, generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason, than that they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.

Narrow Systems pervert the moral Sense.IV. The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence. We ∥47 insinuated∥ above,* that it is regular and beautiful to have stronger Benevolence, toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now if Men receive a low, or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead ∥48 them∥ to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for just; why Romans, and Greeks, could approve of making those they call’d Barbarians, Slaves.

Sects pernicious to Virtue.∥49^aA late ingenious Author∥50^b†^b∥ justly observes, “That the various Sects, Partys, ∥51^cFactions, Cabals^c∥ of Mankind in larger Societys, are all influenc’d by a publick Spirit: That some generous Notions of publick Good, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite Men of the same Faction or Cabal to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc’d by a sociable publick Spirit in a limited ∥52^dSystem.”^d∥ But certain it is, that Men are little oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent Commerce, or Manufactures; Cabals for Defence of Liberty against a Tyrant; or even lower Clubs for Pleasantry, or Improvement by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable ∥53^enotion^e∥ of Sanctity, and Religion, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to God, or our own Species; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as Odious, Contemptible, Profane, because of their different Tenets, or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the publick Good; when the keenest Passions are rais’d about such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each other for what, of it self, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects; (which is what all Partys commonly call Zeal) ’tis then no wonder if our moral Sense ∥54^fbe much^f∥ impair’d, and our natural Notions of Good and Evil almost lost; when our Admiration, and Love, or Contempt, and Hatred, are thus perverted from their natural Objects.

If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the Party-Tenets of most of our Sects; or if they have heard of them, have either never espous’d any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest for a truly natural and good Disposition, because their Tempers have never been soured about vain Trifles; nor have they contracted any Sullenness, or Rancour against any Part of their own Kind. If any Opinions deserve to be contended for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of our Fellow-Creatures: If any Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the Goodness of Providence, or represent our Fellow-Creatures as base and selfish, by instilling into us some ill-natur’d, cunning, shreud Insinuations, “that our most generous Actions proceed wholly from selfish Views.” This wise Philosophy of some Moderns, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but Discontent, Suspicion, and Jealousy; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory Injurys to which we might be expos’d by a good-natur’d Credulity. But thanks be to the kind Author of our Nature, that, in spite of such Opinions, our Nature it self leads us into Friendship, Trust, and mutual Confidence.^a∥

Were we freely conversant with Robbers, who shew a moral Sense in the equal or proportionable Division of their Prey, and in Faith to each other, we should find they have their own sublime moral Ideas of their Party, as Generous, Courageous, Trusty, nay Honest too; and that those we call Honest and Industrious, are imagin’d by them ∥55 to be∥ Mean-spirited, Selfish, Churlish, or Luxurious; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow’d, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess’d Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our profess’d Debauchees, our most dissolute Rakes, we shall find their Vices cloth’d, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of Liberty, Generosity, just Resentment against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.

56 Perhaps never any Men pursu’d ∥57 Vice long with Peace of Mind∥, without some such deluding Imagination of moral Good,* while they may be still inadvertent to the barbarous and inhuman Consequences of their Actions. The Idea of an ill-natur’d Villain, is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. ∥59 Hence∥ we shall find, that the basest Actions are dress’d in some tolerable Mask. What others call Avarice, appears to the Agent a prudent Care of a Family, or Friends; Fraud, artful Conduct; Malice and Revenge, a just Sense of Honour, and a Vindication of our Right in Possessions, or Fame; Fire and Sword, and Desolation among Enemys, a just thorow Defence of our Country; Persecution, a Zeal for the Truth, and for the eternal Happiness of Men, which Hereticks oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a Sense of Virtue upon false Opinions, and mistaken Benevolence; upon wrong or partial Views of publick Good, and the means to promote it; or upon very narrow Systems form’d by like foolish Opinions. It is not a Delight in the Misery of others, or Malice, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our Historys; but generally an injudicious unreasonable Enthusiasm for some kind of limited Virtue.

• Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
• Ultra, quam satis est, Virtutem si petat ipsam.†ii

False Opinions of the divine Laws.V. The last Ground of Diversity which occurs, are the false Opinions of the Will or Laws of the Deity. To obey these we are determin’d from Gratitude, and a Sense of Right imagin’d in the Deity, to dispose at pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc’d Follys, Superstitions, Murders, Devastations of Kingdoms, from a Sense of Virtue and Duty, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe, “That all those Follys, or Barbaritys, rather confirm than destroy the Opinion of a moral Sense;” since the Deity is believ’d to have a Right to dispose of his Creatures; and Gratitude to him, if he be conceiv’d good, must move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not ∥60 conceiv’d good∥, Self-love may overcome our moral Sense of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

As for the Vices which ∥61 commonly∥ proceed from Love of Pleasure, or any violent Passion, since generally the Agent is soon sensible of their Evil, and ∥62 that sometimes∥ amidst the heat of the Action, they only prove, “That this moral Sense, and Benevolence, may be overcome by the more importunate Sollicitations of other Desires.”

Objection from Incest.VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, viz. “That this Sense is natural, and independent on Custom and Education.” The Objection is this, “That we shall find some Actions always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations, ∥63 in which there appears nothing contrary to Benevolence∥; and that the same Actions shall in another Nation be counted innocent, or honourable.64 Thus Incest, among Christians, is abhorr’d at first appearance as much as Murder; ∥65 even by those who do not know or reflect upon any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind. Now we generally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so in all. This∥ Abhorrence ∥66 therefore∥ cannot be from Nature, since in Greece, the marrying half Sisters was counted honourable; and among the Persian Magi,iii the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our Approbation or Dislike of Actions arise the same way from Custom and Education?”

The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had we no moral Sense natural to us, we should only look upon Incest as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never ∥67 hate∥ other incestuous Persons, more than we do a broken Merchant; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a Sense of moral Good. And further, it is true, that ∥68 many who abhor Incest do not know, or reflect upon the∥ natural tendency of some sorts of Incest to the publick Detriment; but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the Deity, and that it exposes the ∥69 Person∥ concern’d to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg’d to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the Deity, to whom it is under such ∥70 Obligations. This then∥ is plainly a moral evil Quality apprehended in Incest, and reducible to the general Foundation of ∥71 Malice, or rather Want of Benevolence∥. Nay further, where this Opinion, “that Incest is offensive to the Deity,” prevails, Incest must have another direct Contrariety to Benevolence; since we must apprehend the Incestuous, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of Nature, to the lowest State of Misery, and Baseness, Infamy and Punishment. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the Deity’s abhorring ∥72 or prohibiting Incest; if no obvious natural Evils attend it∥, it may be look’d upon as innocent. And further, as Men who have the Sense of Tasting, may, by Company and Education, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as unsavoury; so may Men, who have a moral Sense, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the moral Evil of Actions, altho they do not themselves discern in them any tendency to natural Evil; imagining that others ∥73 do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated, which raise an abhorrence without Reason. But∥ without a moral Sense, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as naturally disadvantageous to our selves.

Moral Sense not from Education.VII. The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; and detest the Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or the Treacherous. How strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation, mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of the more intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual!

[* ]See above, Sect. iii, Art. 3. Par. 3.

[i. ]Concerning Solon, Hutcheson refers to a passage in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneion Hypotypóseon, Book III, 211, in Sextus Empiricus, ed. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), vol. 1, p. 267, reporting that the father had been allowed to kill his son. Lycurgus’s law on killing of the weak and malformed is mentioned in Plutarch’s Lives, ed. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), vol. 1, p. 255.

[* ]Ld. Shaftesbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.

[† ]Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. 1. p. 110.

[* ]See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. ∥58 2∥.

[† ]Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.

[ii. ]Translation: “Let the wise bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 286–87.

[iii. ]The Magi were the priestly caste of the ancient Persian Zoroastrian or Mazdean religion.

[1.]A (p. 179): see

[2.]Footnote not in A (p. 179).

[3.]D2, D3 (p. 200): universally

[4.]D2, D3 (p. 200): generally

[5.]Not in A (p. 179). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 16–17).

[6.]Alterations and Additions (pp. 16–17): occasion’d still

D2, D3 (p. 201): generally occasion’d

[7.]D2, D3 (p. 201): others.* [and the following footnote:] *Beside that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have also an immediate natural Relish for certain Powers and Abilitys, and the regular Exercise of them; and a Dislike and Contempt of a Person who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don’t think of any Subserviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a vigorous or a mean Character, than a virtuous or vitious one.

[8.]A (p. 180): this

[9.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 201).

[10.]Not in A (p. 180).

[11.]A (p. 180): still

[12.]A (p. 180): Actions to tend

[13.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 202).

[14.]D2, D3 (p. 202): by stronger Motives of external Advantage

[15.]A (p. 181): yet does not cease

[16.]D2, D3 (p. 202): makes

[17.]A (p. 181): shall make

[18.]A (p. 181): command

[19.]A (p. 181): which in fact tend

[20.]A (p. 181): us

[21.]D2, D3 (p. 202): by their Moral

[22.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): and conceive

[23.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): to be

[24.]A (p. 182): Men may be blinded by Passion,

[25.]No new paragraph in A (p. 182): But to prove that some Men

[26.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): without any Motive of Interest, real or apparent; and approved without any Opinion of Tendency to publick Good, or flowing from Good-will

[27.]A (p. 182): Person, of such Sentiments who

[28.]A (p. 182): touch

[29.]C (p. 203), D (p. 204): and the

[30.]A (p. 183): when Actions

[31.]No new paragraph in A (p. 184).

[32.]A (p. 184): antecedent to

[33.]A (p. 184): take away

[34.]D (p. 205): such

[35.]A (p. 185): shall certainly be

[36.]Not in A (p. 185). Instruction for addition of this paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 17–18).

[37.]C (p. 206), D (p. 206): They are sparing enough in Accounts

[38.]C (p. 206), D (p. 206): transiently

[39.]Alterations and Additions (p. 18): to Caution of Assent in other matters

[40.]A (p. 186): judge, and compare the Tendencys of

[41.]Not in A (p. 186).

[42.]A (p. 186): in the

[43.]A (p. 186): the

[44.]Omitted in C (p. 207), D (p. 208).

[45.]C (p. 208), D (p. 208): Deities

[46.]A (p. 187): amiable, gratefully

[47.]C (p. 208), D (p. 209): intimated

[48.]A (p. 187): us

[49.]The following two paragraphs not in A (p. 188). Instruction for addition of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 18–21).

[50.]Footnote not in Alterations and Additions (p. 18).

[51.]Alterations and Additions (p. 18): Cabals, Factions

[52.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): System.”* [and the following footnote:]

[53.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): Notions

[54.]Alterations and Additions (p. 20): be very much

[55.]A (p. 188): as

[56.]No new paragraph in A (p. 188).

[57.]A (p. 188): with Peace a long Tract of Vice

[58.]B (p. 210): 1

B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 2

C (p. 212), D (p. 213): 1

[59.]A (p. 189): And hence

[60.]A (p. 190): conceiv’d as good

[61.]A (p. 190): are commonly observ’d to

[62.]A (p. 191): sometimes so,

[63.]A (p. 191): where yet there is nothing contrary to Benevolence apparent in the Actions

[64.]A (p. 191): Now we generally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so in all.

[65.]A (p. 191): and yet we cannot find any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind, at least among Collaterals: Now this

[66.]Not in A (p. 191).

[67.]C (p. 215), D (p. 216): disapprove

[68.]A (p. 192): it is very hard to shew any

[69.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: Persons

[70.]A (p. 192): Obligations; and this

[71.]A (p. 192): want of Benevolence, or Malice

[72.]A (p. 193): Incest, or prohibiting it; since it does not appear that any obvious natural Evils follow from it

[73.]A (p. 193): do so: but

[52.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): System.”* [and the following footnote:]

[* ]Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part. 3. Sect. 2. p. 110. Vol. 1.