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• Introduction
• Note On the Text
• Acknowledgments
• An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
• The Preface
• ∥ 1 Treatise I: Viz. an Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.∥
• Section I: Concerning Some Powers of Perception, Distinct From What Is Generally Understood By Sensation.
• Section II: Of Original Or Absolute Beauty.
• Section III: Of the Beauty of Theorems.
• Section IV: Of Relative Or Comparative Beauty.
• Section V: Concerning Our Reasonings About Design and Wisdom In the Cause, From the Beauty Or Regularity of Effects.
• Section VI: Of the Universality of the Sense of Beauty Among Men.
• Section VII: Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, As to Our Internal Senses.
• Section VIII: Of the Importance of the Internal Senses In Life, and the Final Causes of Them.
• ∥ 1 Treatise II: Viz. an Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue Or Moral Good.
• Introduction.
• Section I: Of the Moral Sense By Which We Perceive Virtue and Vice, and Approve Or Disapprove Them In Others.
• Section II: Concerning the Immediate Motive to Virtuous Actions.
• Section III: The Sense of Virtue, and the Various Opinions About It, Reducible to One General Foundation. the Manner of Computing the Morality of Actions.
• Section IV: All Mankind Agree In This General Foundation of Their Approbation of Moral Actions. the Grounds of the Different Opinions About Morals.
• Section V: A Further Confirmation That We Have Practical Dispositions to Virtue Implanted In Our Nature; With a Further Explication ∥ 1 of Our Instinct to Benevolence In Its Various Degrees ∥; With the Additional Motives of Interest, Viz. Honour, Shame
• Section VI: Concerning the Importance of This Moral Sense to the Present Happiness of Mankind, and Its Influence On Human Affairs.
• Section VII: A Deduction of Some Complex Moral Ideas, Viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, From This Moral Sense.

Copies used for editing A1: (a) University of Aberdeen, Queen Mother Library, shelf mark pi 1929 Hut i; (b) British Library, shelf mark 526.k.22 (reprinted in facsimile as volume 1 of Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, edited by Bernard Fabian, 7 vols., Hildesheim, 1969, 1971; also available as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections Online, http://www.gale.com/EighteenthCentury/); (c) University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, shelf mark 8⁰ Z 80 Jur.; (d) Cambridge University Library, Rare Books Department, shelf mark Hh.15.63. Other copies (not seen except for the photocopied title page): (e) University of Birmingham, Main Library, Special Collections, shelf mark Wigan B 1501.I7; (f) University of Glasgow, Special Collection, shelf mark Sp. Coll. 986.1

Copies used for editing B: (a) British Library, shelf mark 8413.b.6 (also available as a digital facsimile from Eighteenth Century Collections Online); (b) Yale University, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, shelf mark BJ1005 H88 (reprinted by Garland Publishers, New York, 1971).2

∥1 TREATISE II

viz. An Inquiry Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good.

• ——— Quod magis ad nos
• Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumne
• Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute beati:
• Quidve ad Amicitias, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos
• Et quae sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus.i

• —Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 72.∥

An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.

Introduction.

Moral Good and Evil.The Word Moral Goodness, ∥2 in this Treatise,∥ denotes our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, ∥3 and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.∥ Moral Evil, denotes our Idea of a contrary Quality, which excites ∥4 Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern’d in its natural Tendency.∥ We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover ∥5 whether we really have such Ideas, and what general Foundation there is in Nature for∥ this Dif-ference of Actions, as morally Good or Evil.

These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg’d Difference of Moral Good and Evil, from Natural. All Men who speak of moral Good, acknowledge that it procures ∥6 Love∥ toward those we apprehend possess’d of it; whereas natural Good does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward ∥7 those∥ they suppose possess’d of Honesty, Faith, Generosity, Kindness∥8 , even when they expect no Benefit from these admir’d Qualitys∥; and those who are possess’d of the natural Goods, such as Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no ∥9 Love∥ at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of Envy and Hatred. In the same manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be morally Evil, raises our ∥10 Hatred∥ toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude∥11 , even when they are no way hurtful to our selves∥; whereas we heartily love, esteem and pity many who are expos’d to natural Evils, such as Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death∥12 , even when we our selves suffer Inconveniencies, by these natural Evils of others∥.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, “Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions.”

Interest. Advantage.Because we shall afterwards frequently use the Words Interest, Advantage, natural Good, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call’d immediately Good. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call’d Advantageous: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love.

Our Sense of Pleasure is antecedent to Advantage or Interest, and is the Foundation of ∥13 it∥. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our Interest to do so; but Objects or Actions are Advantageous, and are pursu’d or undertaken from Interest, because we receive Pleasure from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is Advantageous or naturally Good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or ∥14 immediately. Such∥ Objects as we know, either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be immediately, or mediately Advantageous, or apt to minister Pleasure, we ∥15 are said to∥ pursue from Self-Interest, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine Prospects, Painting, Statues, are perceiv’d by our Senses to be immediately Good; and our Reason shews Riches and Power to be mediately so, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these natural Goods are pursu’d from Interest, or Self-Love.

Opinions about our Sense of moral Good and Evil.Now the greatest part of our latter Moralistsii establish it as undeniable, “That all moral Qualitys have necessarily some Relation to the Law of a Superior, of sufficient Power to make us Happy or Miserable;” and since all Laws operate only by Sanctions of Rewards, or Punishments, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of Self-Interest, they suppose, “that it is thus that Laws do constitute some Actions mediately Good, or Advantageous, and others the same way Disadvantageous.” They say indeed, “That a benevolent Legislator constitutes no Actions Advantageous to the Agent by Law, but such as in their own Nature tend to the natural Good of the Whole, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve the Virtue of others, because it has some small Tendency to our Happiness, either from its own Nature, or from this general Consideration, That Obedience to a benevolent Legislator, is in general Advantageous to the Whole, and to us in particular; and that for the contrary Reasons alone, we disapprove the Vice of others, that is, the prohibited Action, as tending to our particular Detriment in some degree.” ∥16 But∥ then they maintain, “That we are determin’d to Obedience to Laws, or deterr’d from Disobedience, merely by Motives of Self-Interest, to obtain either the natural Good arising from the commanded Action, or the Rewards promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the natural evil Consequences of Disobedience, or at least the Penaltys of the Law.”

Some other Moralistsiii suppose “an immediate natural Good in the Actions call’d Virtuous; that is, That we are determin’d to perceive some Beauty in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without reflecting upon any Advantage which can any way redound to us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure ∥17 accompanying∥ such of our own Actions as we call Virtuous, even when we expect no other Advantage from them.” But they alledge at the same time, “That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, or purchase Pictures, Statues, Landskips, from Self-Interest, to obtain this Pleasure which ∥18 accompanys the very Action, and which we necessarily enjoy in doing it.∥” The Design of the following Sections is to enquire into this matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offer’d may prove,

I. “That some Actions have to Men an immediate Goodness; or, that by a superior Sense, which I call a Moral one, we ∥19 perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin’d to love the Agent, (and much more do we perceive Pleasure in being conscious of having done such Actions our selves)∥ without any View of further natural Advantage from them.”

II. It may perhaps also appear, “∥20 That what excites us to these Actions which we call Virtuous, is not an Intention to obtain even this sensible Pleasure∥; much less the future Rewards from Sanctions of Laws, or any other natural Good, which may be the Consequence of the virtuous Action; but an entirely different Principle of Action ∥21 from Interest or Self-Love.∥”

SECTION I

Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.

Different Ideas of Moral and Natural Good.I. That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly different from those of natural Good, or Advantage, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no Sense of Good distinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; ∥1 our Admiration and Love∥ toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be much the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant Country, or Age, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the Mountains of Peru, while we are unconcern’d in the Spanish Trade. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections toward inanimate Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why should we ∥2 admire or love with Esteem∥ inanimate Beings? They have no Intention of Good to ∥3 us∥; their Nature makes them fit for our Uses, which they neither know nor study to serve. But it is not so with rational Agents: ∥4 they study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benevolent toward us.∥”

We are all then conscious of the Difference between that ∥5 Love and Esteem∥, or Perception of moral Excellence, which Benevolence excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of natural Goodness, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Object. Now “what should make this Difference, if all Approbation, or Sense of Good be from Prospect of Advantage? Do not inanimate Objects promote our Advantage, as well as Benevolent Persons who do ∥6 us∥ Offices of Kindness, and Friendship? Should we not then have the same endearing ∥7 Sentiments∥ of both? or only the same cold Opinion of Advantage in both?” The Reason why it is not so, must be this, “That we have a distinct Perception of Beauty, or Excellence in the kind Affec-tions of rational Agents; whence we are determin’d to admire and love such Characters and Persons.”

In Actions done to our selves.Suppose we reap the same Advantage from two Men, one of ∥8 whom∥ serves us ∥9 from Delight in our Happiness, and Love toward us;∥ the other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: both are in this Case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of moral Actions than those of Advantage: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call’d a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, ∥10 independent∥ on our Will.∥11* ∥

Of Evil, Moral and Natural.This perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of Evil, done to us designedly by a rational Agent. Our Senses of natural Good and Evil would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an Assault, a Buffet, an Affront from a Neighbour, a Cheat from a Partner, or Trustee, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a Beam, ∥12 a∥ Tile, or a Tempest; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments ∥13 of both∥. Villany, Treachery, Cruelty, would be as meekly resented as a Blast, or Mildew, or an overflowing Stream. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there may be equal natural Evil in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental, may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of moral Ideas may prevent our ∥14 Hatred∥ of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest natural Evil. Thus the Opinion of Justice in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of moral Evil in the Execution, or Hatred toward the Magistrate, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

In Actions toward others.II. In our Sentiments of Actions ∥15 which affect∥ our selves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of natural ∥16 and moral∥ Good, which ∥17 require∥ some Attention to separate ∥18 them∥. But when we reflect upon the Actions ∥19 which affect other Persons only,∥ we may observe the moral Ideas unmix’d with those of natural Good, or Evil. For let it be here observ’d, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted Advantageous, could never raise in us any Desire of publick Good, but only of what was good to our selves in particular. Nor could they ever make us ∥20 approve an∥ Action ∥21 because∥ of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others, and ∥22 a Delight in∥ their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing ∥23 from Hatred, Delight in the Misery of others∥, or Ingratitude, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.

It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin’d to tend to the natural Good of Mankind, or ∥24 of∥ some Parts of it. But whence this secret Chain between each Person and Mankind? How is my Interest connected with the most distant Parts of it? And yet I must admire ∥25 Actions which are beneficial to them∥, and love the Author. Whence this Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatred toward even feign’d Characters, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear Kind, Faithful, Compassionate, or of the opposite Dispositions, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no moral Sense, ∥26 which makes rational Actions appear Beautiful, or Deform’d∥; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the Approver,

Moral Ideas not from Interest.III. Some refin’d Explainers of Self-Love may tell us, “That we ∥27 hate, or love∥ Characters, according as we apprehend we should have been supported, or injur’d by them, had we liv’d in their Days.” But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of moral Good in Humanity, Mercy, Faithfulness, why should not Self-Love, ∥28 and our Sense of natural Good∥ engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful Tyrant, or Traitor? Why do not we love Sinon, or Pyrrhus, in the Aeneid? for had we been Greeks, these two would have been very advantageous Characters. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Aeneas?ii29 It is plain we have some secret Sense which determines our Approbation without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we should always favour the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue ∥30 , and suppose our selves engaged with that Party∥.31

Suppose any great Destruction occasion’d by mere Accident, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have been as disadvantageous to us as design’d Cruelty, or Malice; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the ∥32 Agents?∥ “Whence then this Difference?”

And further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even disadvantageous Actions, and perceive moral Good in them. A few ingenious Artisans, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in Manufactures which support Millions of Poor, ∥33 increase∥ the Wealth of almost every Person in the State, and make us formidable to our Neighbours. In a Nation not far distant from us, some resolute Burgomasters, full of Love to their Country, and Compassion toward their Fellow-Citizens, opprest in Body and Soul by a Tyrant, and Inquisition, with indefatigable Diligence, public Spirit, and Courage, support a tedious perilous War against the Tyrant and form an industrious Republick, which rivals us in Trade, and almost in Power.iii All the World sees whether the former or the latter have been more ad-vantageous to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the useful Refugee, or the public-spirited Burgomaster, by whose Love to his own Country, we have often suffer’d in our Interests? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than Advantage, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our Artisans is so obscure among us, and yet that of our Rivals is immortal.

Self-Love not the Ground of Approbation.IV. Some Moralists,iv who will rather twist Self-Love into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than Interest, may tell us, “That whatever profits one Part without detriment to another, profits the Whole, and then some small Share will redound to each Individual; that those Actions which tend to the Good of the Whole, if universally perform’d, would most effectually secure to each Individual his own Happiness; and that consequently, we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own Advantage.”

34 We need not trouble these Gentlemen to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any Advantage from Orestes’s killing the treacherous Aegysthus, or from the Actions of Codrus or Decius.v Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground, ∥35 even from Views of Interest, to approve the same Actions∥ which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.

36 Should any of our Travellers find some old Grecian Treasure, the Miser who hid it, ∥37 certainly perform’d∥ an Action more to the Traveller’s Advantage than Codrus or Orestes; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers’d, and lost in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this Miser must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in Virtue! For Self-Interest will ∥38 make us only esteem Men∥ according to the Good they do to our Selves, and not give us high Ideas of public Good, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of Cumberland,vi or Puffendorf, to admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude? Do not the former excite our Admiration, and Love, and Study of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the latter, our ∥39 Hatred,∥ Contempt and Abhorrence? Unhappy would it be for Mankind, if a Sense of Virtue was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such Metaphysicks.

Our Moral Sense cannot be brib’d.V. This moral Sense, either of our own Actions, or of those of others, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of Virtue may be counterballanc’d by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of Advantage. Let us consider this both as to our own Actions and those of others.

In judging of our own Actions.A Covetous Man shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from Interest. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our Sense of moral Actions? Should any one advise us to wrong a Minor, or Orphan, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a Benefactor; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very advantageous to us, propose even a Reward; our Sense of the Action is not alter’d. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician’s Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force our selves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

40 Had we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their Advantage, or Disadvantage, could we ever chuse an Action as Advantageous, which we are conscious is still Evil? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such high Bribes to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin’d Party, or of Tortures to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is ∥41 probably more∥ advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded by Advantage, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their own Sense of it, as well as in that of others, to whom the base Action was profitable?

If any one becomes satisfy’d with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his private Advantage, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the moral Principles of his new Party; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas’d with their Actions under some Appearance of moral Good, distinct from Advantage.

Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion.It may perhaps be alledg’d, “That in those Actions of our own which we call Good, there is this constant Advantage, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from Self-love, viz. That we suppose the Deity will reward them.” This will be more fully consider’d* ∥42 afterwards∥: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, who have scarce ∥43 any Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of future Rewards∥; and abhor any thing which is Treacherous, Cruel, or Unjust, without any regard to future Punishments.

44 But further, tho these Rewards, and Punishments, may make my own Actions appear advantageous to me, ∥45 and make me approve them from Self-Love,∥ yet they would never make me approve, and love another Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are advantageous indeed to the Agent; but his Advantage is not my Advantage: and Self-Love could never ∥46 influence me to approve∥ Actions as advantageous to others, or ∥47 to love∥ the Authors of them on that account.

Our Moral Sense of the Actions of others, not to be brib’d.∥48 This is∥ the second thing to be consider’d, ∥49 “Whether∥ our Sense of the moral Good or Evil, in the Actions of others, can be over-ballanc’d, or brib’d by Views of Interest.” ∥50 Now I may indeed∥ easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as morally Evil, if it were very Advantageous to me: Interest in that Case may overballance my Desire of Virtue in another. But no Interest ∥51 to my self∥ will make me approve an Action as ∥52 morally∥ Good, which, without that Interest to my self, would have appear’d morally Evil∥53 ; if, upon computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment of Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before when it was. In our Sense of moral Good or Evil, our own private Advantage or Loss is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear Good or Evil. This Sense therefore cannot be over-ballanc’d by Interest.∥ How ridiculous an Attempt wou’d it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or ∥54 to threaten him∥ into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his moral Notions? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.

Not occasion’d by Praise.VI. A late witty Author* says, “That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire ∥55 such Actions∥ as those of Regulus, or Decius, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by Panegyricks, and Statues, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most tractable, and useful.”vii Here first let us consider, If a Traitor, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as ∥56 a∥ Hero who defends us: And yet we can love the Treason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a gallant Enemy, who is very pernicious to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of Advantage?

57 Again, upon this Scheme what could a Statue or Panegyrick effect?—Men love Praise—They will do the Actions which they observe to be praised—Praise, with Men who have no other Idea of Good but Self-Interest, is the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as useful to them—Regulus, or Cato, or Decius,viii had no Advantage by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reap’d the Advantage might praise such Actions.—Regulus or Cato could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them the Advantage of Honour; and their own Actions they must have look’d upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas’d, without any thing amiable in them, ∥58^awhich they could contemplate or reflect upon with ∥59^bPleasure.^ab∥—Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?

But says* he, “These wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by their Statues and Panegyricks, that there was publick Spirit, and that this was in it self Excellent; and hence Men are led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their own Advantage.” So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in our selves!—for a Person who is wholly selfish, to imagine others to be publick-spirited!—for one who has no Ideas of Good but in his own Advantage, to be led, by the Persuasions of others, into a Conception of Goodness in what is avowedly detrimental to himself, and profitable to others; nay so entirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, ∥60 but so∥ far as he was conscious that it proceeded from a disinterested Study of the Good of others!—Yet this it seems Statues and Panegyricks can accomplish!

It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the Matter, “Whether some moral Actions do not at first View appear amiable, even to those who are unconcern’d in their Influence? ∥61^aWhether we do not ∥62^bsincerely^b∥ love a generous kind Friend, or Patriot, whose Actions procure Honour to him only without any Advantage to our selves?^a∥” It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the Whole, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the Advantage: But this only proves, that Reason and calm Reflection may recommend to us, from Self-Interest, those Actions, which at first View our moral Sense determines us to admire, without considering this Interest. Nay, our Sense shall operate even where the Advantage to our selves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A condemn’d Traitor may approve the Vigilance of a Cicero in discovering conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor’s Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the publick Good, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of Good is Self-Interest. Such a Person has no ∥63 Desire∥ of publick Good further than it tends to his own Advantage, which it does not at all in the present Case.

Nor Custom, Education, &c.VII. If what is said makes it appear, that we have some other amiable Idea of Actions than that of Advantageous to our selves, we may conclude, “That this Perception of moral Good is not deriv’d from Custom, Education, Example, or Study.” These give us no new Ideas: They might make us see ∥64 Advantage to our selves∥ in Actions whose Usefulness did not at first appear; or give us Opinions of some Tendency of Actions to our Detriment, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice, when upon the first View of the Action we should have observ’d no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as amiable or odious, ∥65 without∥ any Consideration of our own Advantage.

VIII. It remains then, “That as the Author of Nature has determin’d us to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his Goodness, as the Uniformity it self proves his Existence, whether we had a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not: ∥66 in the same manner∥ he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending the Good of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest private Good.”

This Moral Sense does not infer innate Ideas or Propositions.We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the other Senses, supposes any innate ∥67 Ideas,∥ Knowledge, or practical Proposition: We mean by it only a Determination of our Minds to receive ∥68^aamiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when ∥69^bthey^b∥ occur to our Observation^a∥, ∥70 antecedent∥ to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound to our selves from them; even as we are pleas’d with a regular Form, or an harmonious Composition, without having any Knowledge of Mathematicks, or seeing any Advantage in that Form, or Composition, different from the immediate ∥71 Pleasure.∥

SECTION II

Concerning the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions.

∥1 ∥The Motives of human Actions, or their immediate Causes, would be best understood after considering the Passions and Affections; but here we shall only consider the Springs of the Actions which we call virtuous, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the Moral Sense.

Affections, the Motives to Actions.I. Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always suppos’d to flow from some Affection toward ∥2 rational Agents∥; and whatever we call Virtue or Vice, is either some such Affection, or some Action consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear vitious, if it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted morally good. All the Actions counted religious in any Country, are suppos’d, by those who count them ∥3 so∥, to flow from some Affections toward the Deity; and whatever we call social Virtue, we still suppose to flow from Affections toward our Fellow-Creatures: for in this all seem to agree, “That external Motions, when accompany’d with no Affections toward God or Man, or evidencing no Want of the expected Affections toward either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them.”

4 Ask∥5 , for instance,∥ the most abstemious Hermit, if Temperance of it self would be morally good, supposing it shew’d no Obedience toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than Luxury; and he will easily grant, that it would be no moral Good, tho still it might be naturally good or advantageous to Health: And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs, ∥6 or Self-Interest,∥ wou’d only entitle its Possessor to Bedlam. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir’d, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the use of it∥7 , or as a natural Ability capable of an useful Application∥. Prudence, if it ∥8 was∥ only employ’d in promoting private Interest, is never imagin’d to be a Virtue: and Justice, or observing a strict Equality, if it ∥9 has∥ no regard to the Good of Mankind, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, is a Quality properer for its ordinary Gestamen, a Beam and Scales, than for a rational Agent. So that these four Qualitys, commonly call’d Cardinal Virtues, obtain that Name, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote publick Good, and denote Affections toward rational Agents; otherwise there would appear no Virtue in them.

Affections, disinterested.II. Now if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections which we ∥10 call virtuous, spring from∥ Self-love, or Desire of private Interest; since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, “∥11 That Virtue is not pursued from the Interest or Self-love of the Pursuer, or any Motives of his own Advantage.∥”

Love of Complacence, and Hatred of Displicence.The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, ∥12 are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two original Affections∥. Now in discoursing of Love ∥13 toward rational Agents∥, we need not be caution’d not to include that Love between the Sexes, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Desire of Pleasure, and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational Agents, is subdivided into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Be-nevolence: And Hatred is subdivided into Hatred of Displicence or Contempt, and Hatred of ∥14 Malice.∥ Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, “Whether they can be influenc’d by Motives of Self-Interest.”

Are entirely disinterested.∥15 Love of∥ Complacence, Esteem, or Good-liking, at first view appears to be disinterested, and so ∥16 the Hatred of∥ Displicence or Dislike; and are entirely excited by some moral Qualitys, Good or Evil, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very Frame of our Nature determines us ∥17 to love or hate,∥ to approve or disapprove, according to the moral Sense* above explain’d. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to ∥18 love with∥ Esteem, and Complacence, ∥19 a third∥ Person entirely unknown, or if known, apprehended to be cruel, treacherous, ungrateful; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation ∥20 of Love∥; but real ∥21 Love of∥ Esteem no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to ∥22 Hatred of∥ Contempt, which no Motive of Advantage can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as generous, kind, faithful, humane, tho in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid ∥23 loving it with∥ Es-teem, and Complacence. A Bribe may ∥24 possibly∥ make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of Advantage may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us ∥25 hate∥ him, while we ∥26 apprehend him as morally excellent∥. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of Advantage, nor execute it, without the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse, until we have blinded our selves into a ∥27 bad Opinion of the Person in a moral Sense∥.

Benevolence and Malice, disinterested.III. As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest. We never call that Man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his own Interest, without any ∥28 desire of, or delight in,∥ the Good of others. If there be any ∥29 Benevolence∥ at all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest. Thus, never were any human Actions more advantageous, than the Inventions of Fire, and Iron; but if these were casual, or if the Inventor only intended his own Interest in them, there is nothing which can be call’d Benevolent in them. Wherever then Benevolence is suppos’d, there it is imagin’d disinterested, and design’d for the Good of ∥30 others.∥

Self-Love join’d with Benevolence.But it must be here observ’d, That as all Men have Self-Love, as well as Benevolence, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider’d as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong Benevolence, as would have produc’d an Action without any Views of Self-Interest; that such a Man has also in View private Advantage, along with publick Good, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the Benevolence of the Action. When he would not have produc’d so much publick Good, had it not been for Prospect of Self-Interest, then the Effect of Self-Love is to be deducted, and his Benevolence is proportion’d to the remainder of Good, which pure Benevolence would have produc’d. When a Man’s Benevolence is hurtful to himself, then Self-Love is opposite to Benevolence, and the Benevolence is proportion’d to the Sum of the Good produc’d, ∥31 added to∥ the Resistance of Self-Love surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc’d by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the Benevolence of Actions is to be computed. ∥32 Since then, no Love to rational Agents can proceed from Self-Interest, every Action must be disinterested, as far as it flows from Love to rational Agents.∥

Cause of Benevolence.∥33 If any enquire, “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or Benevolence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some nice Views of Self-Interest? Or, how we can be mov’d to desire the Happiness of others, without any View to our own?” It may be answer’d, “That the same Cause which determines us to pursue Happiness for our selves, determines us both to Esteem and Benevolence on their proper Occasions; even the very Frame of our Nature, or a generous Instinct, which shall be afterwards explain’d.”

Benevolence presupposes Esteem.IV. Here we may observe, That as Love of Esteem and Complacence is always join’d with Benevolence, where there is no strong Opposition of Interest; so Benevolence seems to presuppose some small degree of Esteem, not indeed of actual good Qualitys; for there may be strong Benevolence, where there is the Hatred of Contempt for actual Vices; as a Parent may have great Benevolence to a most abandon’d Child, whose Manners he hates with the greatest Displicence: but Benevolence supposes a Being capable of Virtue. We judge of other rational Agents by our selves. The human Nature is a lovely Form; we are all conscious of some morally good Qualitys and Inclinations in our selves, how partial and imperfect soever they may be: we presume the same of every thing in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature: so that by this suppos’d remote Capacity of Virtue, there may be some small degree of Esteem along with our Benevolence, even when they incur our greatest Displeasure by their Conduct.∥

Human Nature incapable of sedate Malice.∥34 As to Malice,∥ Human Nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested Hatred, or a sedate ∥35 Delight in∥ the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our ∥36 Interest∥: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose those whose Interests are opposite to ours, it is only the Effect of Self-Love, and not of disinterested Malice. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as absolutely Evil; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of disinterested Malice: but as soon as we reflect upon human Nature, and form just Conceptions, this unnatural Passion is allay’d, and only Self-Love remains, which may make us, from Self-Interest, oppose our Adversarys.

Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our Pirates; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur’d some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more. Now let us calmly reflect that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy, and joyful, or may be involv’d in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of Love, Humanity, Kindness, and become Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves, when Self-Love ∥37 or regard to the Safety of better Men,∥ no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them, under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good moral Quality; whether we ∥38 would∥ wish them the Fate of Cadmus’s Army,i by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become Kind, Compassionate, and Friendly; contrive Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys; and form an honest happy Society, with Marriages, and

• Relations dear, and all the Charities
• Of Father, Son, and Brother ———*

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence ∥39 of them∥ from Self-Interest, or publick Love and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos’d to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any sedate Malice against any Person, or ∥40 delight in∥ his Misery. Our ∥41 Hatred∥ is only from Opposition of Interest; or if we can entertain sedate Malice, it must be toward a Character apprehended necessarily and unalterably Evil in a moral Sense; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: ∥42 and∥ perhaps no such Being occurs to us among the Works of a good Deity.

Other Affections disinterested.V. ∥43 Having∥ offer’d what may perhaps prove, That ∥44 our Love either of Esteem, or Benevolence, is not founded on Self-Love∥, or views of Interest; let us see “if some other Affections, in which Virtue may be plac’d, do arise from Self-Love;” such as Fear, or Reverence, arising from an Apprehension of Goodness, Power, and Justice. For no body apprehends any Virtue in base Dread and Servitude toward a powerful Evil Being: This is indeed the meanest Selfishness. Now the same Arguments which prove ∥45 Love of∥ Esteem to be disinterested, will prove this honourable Reverence to be so too; for it plainly arises from an Apprehension of amiable Qualitys in the Person, and Love toward him, which raises an Abhorrence of offending him. Could we reverence a Being because it ∥46 was∥ our Interest to do so, a third Person might bribe us into Reverence toward a Being neither Good, nor Powerful, which every one sees to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have ∥47 rational Agents for their Objects∥.

Objections.48VI. There is one Objection against disinterested ∥49 Love∥, which occurs from considering, “That nothing so effectually ∥50 excites∥ our Love toward rational Agents, as their Beneficence ∥51 to us∥; whence we are led to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from Self-Interest.” But let us here examine our selves more narrowly. Do we only ∥52 love∥ the Beneficent, because it is our Interest to ∥53 love them∥? Or do we chuse to love them, because our love is the means of procuring their Bounty? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we could be brib’d by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib’d to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible.

∥54 But further∥, is not our ∥55 Love always∥ the Consequent of Bounty, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of Beneficence; but real Love always presupposes it, and ∥56 shall∥ necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from consideration of past Benefits. 57 Or can any one say he only loves the Beneficent, as he does a Field or Garden, because of its Advantage? His Love then must cease toward one who has ruin’d himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical Prosopopoeia animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. ∥58 And then again, our Love would be the same towards the worst Characters that ’tis towards the best, if they were equally bountiful to us, which is also false. Beneficence then must raise our Love as it is an amiable moral Quality∥: and ∥59 hence we∥ love even those who are beneficent to others.

∥60^aIt may be further alledg’d, “That Bounty toward our selves is ∥61^ba stronger Incitement to^b∥ Love, than equal Bounty toward others.” This is true for a Reason to be offer’d below:* but it does not prove, that in this Case our Love of Persons is from Views of Interest; since this Love is not prior to the Bounty, as the means to procure it, but subsequent upon it, even when we expect no more.^a∥ In the Benefits which we receive our selves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the Donor; and ∥62 from∥ the good Opinion we have of our selves, ∥63 we are apt to∥ look upon the Kindness ∥64 as∥ better employ’d, than when it is bestow’d on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that Bounty from a Donor apprehended as morally Evil, or extorted by Force, or conferr’d with some View of Self-Interest, will not procure real ∥65 Love∥; nay, it may raise Indignation, if we suspect Dissimulation of Love, or a Design to allure us into any thing Dishonourable: whereas wisely employ’d Bounty is always approv’d, and gains love to the Author from all who hear of it.

Virtue disinterested.If then no ∥66 Love∥ toward Persons ∥67 be influenc’d by∥ Self-Love, or Views of Interest, and all Virtue flows from ∥68 Love∥ ∥69 toward Persons∥, or some other Affection equally disinterested; it remains, “That there must be some other ∥70 Motive∥ than Self-Love, or Interest, which excites us to the Actions we call Virtuous.”

Objection from Religion.∥71^aVII. There may perhaps still remain another Suspicion of Self-Interest in our Prosecution of Virtue, ∥72^barising^b∥ from this, “That the whole Race of Mankind seems persuaded of the Existence of an Almighty Being, who will certainly secure Happiness either now, or hereafter, to those who are Virtuous, according to their several Notions of Virtue in various Places: and upon this Persuasion, Virtue may in all Cases be pursu’d from Views† of Interest.” Here again we might appeal to all Mankind, whether there be no Benevolence but what flows from a View of Reward from the Deity? Nay, do we not see a great deal of it among those who entertain few ∥74^cif any^c∥ Thoughts of Devotion at all? Not to say that this Benevolence ∥75^dscarce deserves^d∥ the Name, when we desire not, nor delight in the Good of others, ∥76^efurther^e∥ than it serves our own Ends.^a∥

∥77^aBut if we have no other Idea of Good, ∥78^bthan^b∥ Advantage to our selves^a∥, we must imagine that every rational Being ∥79 acts only∥ for its own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being, a good Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme ∥80 we should not be apt to think∥ there is any beneficent Being in Nature, or a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, if there is no Sense of Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, “That the Deity will make the Virtuous happy?” Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the Deity to do so? This I fancy will be look’d upon as very absurd, ∥81^aunless we suppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to the Deity, which determine him to consult the publick Good of his Creatures, and reward such as co-operate with ∥82^bhis^b∥ kind Intention^a∥. And if there be such Dispositions in the Deity, where is the impossibility of some small degree of this publick Love in ∥83 his∥ Creatures? And why must they be suppos’d incapable of acting but from Self-Love?

84 In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than Self-Love, I see no Foundation to expect Beneficence, or Rewards from God, or Man, further than it is the Interest of the Benefactor; and all Expectation of Benefits from a Being whose Interests are independent on us, must be perfectly ridiculous. What should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? Virtue is commonly suppos’d, upon this Scheme, to be only a consulting our own Happiness in the most artful way, consistently with the Good of the Whole; and in Vice the same thing is foolishly pursu’d, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the Good of the Whole. But how is the Deity concern’d in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of ∥85 a God it self∥, to believe the Deity is good in the Christian Sense, that is, studious of the Good of his Creatures? Perhaps the Misery of ∥86 his∥ Creatures may ∥87 give him as much∥ Pleasure, as their Happiness: And who can find fault, or blame such a Being to study their Misery; for what else should we expect? A Manicheanii Evil God, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a Good one, if there is no Excellence in disinterested Love, and no Being acts but for its own Advantage; unless we prov’d that the Happiness of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.

From Concomitant Pleasure.∥88^aVIII. The last, and only remaining Objection against what has been said, is this, “That ∥89^bVirtue perhaps^b∥ is pursu’d because of the concomitant Pleasure.” To which we may answer, first, by observing, that this plainly supposes a Sense of Virtue antecedent to Ideas of Advantage, upon which this Advantage is founded; and that from the very Frame of our Nature we are determin’d to perceive Pleasure in the practice of Virtue, and to approve it when practis’d by our selves, or others.

90^cBut further, may we not justly question, whether all Virtue is pleasant? Or, whether we are not determin’d to some amiable Actions in which we find no Pleasure? ’Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections justify themselves; or, we approve our being affected in ∥91^da certain^d∥ manner on ∥92^ecertain Occasions^e∥, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the Jealous, the Compassionate, think it reasonable they should be so upon the several Occasions which move these Passions; but we should not therefore say that Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy, or Pity are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these Passions because of the concomitant Pleasure. The matter is plainly this. The Frame of our Nature, on such Occasions as move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our being so: Nay, we dislike any Person who is not thus affected upon such occasions, notwithstanding the uneasiness of these Passions. ∥93^fThis^f∥ uneasiness determines us to endeavour an Alteration in the state of the Object; but not otherwise to remove the painful Affection, while the occasion is unalter’d: which shews that these ∥94^gAffections are neither chosen for their concomitant Pleasure, nor voluntarily brought ∥95^hupon our selves^h∥ with a view to private Good^g∥. The Actions which these Passions move us to, ∥96ⁱtend generallyⁱ∥ to remove the uneasy Passion by altering the state of the Object; but the ∥97^jRemoval of our Pain is seldom directly intended in the uneasy Benevolent Passions: nor is the Alteration intended in the State of the Objects by such Passions, imagin’d to be a private Good to the Agent, as it always is in the selfish Passions. If our sole Intention, in Compassion or Pity, ∥98^kwas^k∥ the Removal of our Pain,^j∥ we should run away, shut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of Compassion, which we seldom do: nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily ∥99^lexpose our selves to^l∥ Pain, unless Reason, and Reflection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination; or some selfish Affection, as fear of Danger, overballances it.

Now there are several morally amiable Actions, which flow from these Passions which are so uneasy; such as Attempts of relieving the Distress’d, of defending the Injur’d, of repairing of Wrongs done by our selves. These Actions are often accompany’d with no Pleasure in the mean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they are successful; unless it be that which may arise from calm Reflection, when the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to our moral Sense appears lovely and good: but this Pleasure is never intended in the Heat of Action, nor is it any Motive exciting to it.

Besides, In the pleasant Passions, we do not love, because it is pleasant to love; we do not chuse this State, because it is an advantageous, or pleasant State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a morally good Character. And if we could love, whenever we see it would be our Interest to love, Love could be brib’d by a third Person; and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the other Affections from which Virtue is suppos’d to flow: And from the whole we may conclude, “That the virtuous Agent is never apprehended by us as acting only from Views of his own Interest, but as principally influenc’d by some other Motive.”^a∥

The true Spring of Virtue.100IX. Having remov’d these ∥101 false∥ Springs of ∥102 virtuous Actions∥, let us next establish the true one, viz. some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others; even as the moral Sense,* above ∥103 explain’d∥, determines us to approve the Actions which flow from this Love in our selves or others. This disinterested Affection, may appear strange to Men impress’d with Notions of Self-Love, as the sole ∥104 Motive∥ of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest, and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its universal Extent.

Natural Affection.An honest Farmer will tell you, that he studies the Preservation and Happiness of his Children, and loves them without any design of Good to himself. But say some of our Philosophers,iii “The Happiness of their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery ∥105 gives them∥ Pain; and therefore to obtain the former, and avoid the latter, they study, from Self-Love, the Good of their Children.” Suppose several Merchants join’d in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them ∥106 is employ’d∥ abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain ∥107 from∥ their Share in the Loss: is this then the same Kind of Affection with that of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the Parent and Child? Do the Child’s Sensations give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent hungry, thirsty, sick, when ∥108 the Child is so∥? ∥109 “No, but his Love to the Child makes him affected with his Pleasures or Pains.” This Love∥ then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: ∥110 this Love∥ then must be disinterested. “No, ∥111 says another Sophist∥, Children are Parts of our selves, and in loving them we but love our selves in them.” A very good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they Parts of our selves? Not as a Leg or an Arm: We are not conscious of their Sensations. “But their Bodys were form’d from Parts of ours.” So is a Fly, or a Maggot which may breed in any discharg’d Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! There must be something else then which makes Children Parts of our selves; and what is this but that Affection which Nature determines us to have toward them? This Love makes them Parts of our selves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and wherever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to mutual Love, let each Individual be look’d upon as a Part of a great Whole, or System, and concern himself in the publick Good of ∥112 it.∥

113 But a later Author observes,*iv “That natural Affection in Parents is weak, till the Children begin to give Evidences of Knowledge and Affections.” Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges ∥114 was∥ true; as I fancy it is ∥115 in some measure, tho we may find in some Parents an Affection toward Idiots∥. The observing of Understanding and Affections in Children, which make them ∥116 appear moral∥ Agents, can increase Love toward them without prospect of Interest; for I hope this Increase of Love, is not from Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens’d for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a moral Capacity can be the occasion of increasing Love without Self-Interest, even from the Frame of our Nature; pray, may not this be a Foundation of weaker degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to all Mankind?

Publick Affections, natural.117X. And that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv’d no good Offices, form’d into Friendships, Familys, Partnerships, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not ∥118 be better pleas’d with∥ their Prosperity, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than with their Misery, and Ruin; and you shall find a Bond of Benevolence further extended than a Family and Children, altho the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his native Country, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv’d no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, ∥119 would it give him no Pleasure to hear of the Prosperity of his Country∥? Or could he, now that his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as ∥120 gladly hear∥ that it was laid waste by Tyranny or a foreign Power? I fancy his Answer would shew us a Benevolence extended beyond Neighbourhoods or Acquaintances. Let a Man of a compos’d Temper, out of the hurry of his private Affairs, ∥121 only∥ read of the Constitution of a foreign Country, even in the most distant parts of the Earth, and observe Art, ∥122 Design, and a Study∥ of publick Good in the Laws of this Association; and he shall find his Mind mov’d in their favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky part of it which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this ∥123 proves Benevolence to be in∥ some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no interfering Interest, which from Self-Love may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of rational Agents, capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets,v our good Wishes would still attend them, and we should ∥124 delight in∥ their ∥125 Happiness.∥

National Love.126XI. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call national Love, or Love of one’s native Country. Whatever place we have liv’d in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark’d the various Affections of human Nature; we have known many lovely Characters; we remember the Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections, and other human Sentiments: our moral Sense determines us to approve these lovely Dispositions where we have most distinctly observ’d them; and our Benevolence concerns us in the Interests of ∥127 the∥ Persons possess’d of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a national Love toward it also; nor has our own Country any other preference in our Idea, unless it be by an Association of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the Buildings, Fields, and Woods where we receiv’d them. This may let us see, how Tyranny, ∥128 Faction∥, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption of Manners, ∥129 and∥ any thing which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this national Love, and the dear Idea of a Country.

The Reason why natural Affections do not always appear.We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that apparent want of natural Affection among collateral Rela-tions, is, that these natural Inclinations, in many Cases, are overpower’d by Self-Love, where there happens any Opposition of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, ∥130 tho∥ with different degrees of Strength, according to the nearer or more remote Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the natural Affection of Benevolence ∥131 is∥ join’d with and strengthen’d by Esteem, Gratitude, Compassion, or other kind Affections; or on the contrary, weaken’d by Displicence, Anger, or Envy.

SECTION III

The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.

All Virtue Benevolent.I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv’d, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they ∥1 always∥ appear as Benevolent, or flowing from ∥2 Love of others∥, and ∥3 a∥ Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons belov’d, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos’d to flow from such Affections, appear morally Good, if while they are benevolent toward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others. Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagin’d; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos’d applicable to, and design’d for benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was before observ’d,* the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we ∥5 know∥ they proceeded from no kind Intentions ∥6 toward∥ others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow’d from as strong Benevolence.

Religion.II. ∥7 Hence those∥ Affections which would lead us to do good to our Benefactor, shall appear amiable, and the contrary Affections odious, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any advantage or hurt to him. Thus a sincere Love and Gratitude toward our Benefactor, a chearful Readiness to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a hearty Inclination to comply with his Intentions, and Contentment with the State he has plac’d us in, are the strongest Evidences of Benevolence we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly amiable. And under these is included all the rational Devotion, or Religion toward a Deity apprehended as Good, which we can possibly perform.

∥8 Gratitude.∥We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the Frame of our Nature, which is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence, viz. that as a Benefit conferr’d necessarily raises Gratitude in the ∥9 Person who receives it∥, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are wonderfully delightful to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be ∥10 lov’d∥, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc’d us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern’d in their Meanness. And thus the most abject ∥11 Person oblig’d∥ is capable, and inclin’d to make no small addition to our Happiness by his Love, and Gratitude, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

• ——— A grateful Mind
• By owing owes not, ∥12 and∥ still pays, at once
• Indebted and discharg’d ———*

As to external Performances of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and Education may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the Deity: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv’d, there also it is look’d upon to proceed from Love toward the Deity, or some other Affec-tion necessarily join’d with Love, as Reverence, Repentance, or Sorrow to have offended. So that the general Principle of Love, is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv’d. For as to Rites design’d only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but that they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various ∥13 speculative∥ Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity, it necessarily follows, “That, accordingly, Practices, and Approbation, must be various; tho all the moral Goodness of Actions is still presum’d to flow from Love.”

Social Virtues.III. Again, that we may see how ∥14 Love, or∥ Benevolence, is the Foundation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues, let us only observe, That amidst the diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow’d to be the way of deciding the Controversy about any disputed Practice, ∥15 viz.∥ to enquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will most effectually promote the publick Good. The Morality is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the universal natural Good of Mankind is agreed upon. That which pro-duces more Good than Evil in the Whole, is acknowledg’d Good; and what does not, is counted Evil. In this Case, we no other way regard the good of the Actor, or that of those who are thus enquiring, than as they make a Part of the great System.

In our late Debates about Passive Obedience, and the Right of Resistance in Defence of Privileges,i the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, “whether universal Submission would probably be attended with greater natural Evils, than temporary Insurrections, when Privileges are invaded; and not whether what tended in the Whole to the publick natural Good, was also morally Good?” And if a divine Command was alledg’d in favour of the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of natural Good to its own side, and determine our Election from Interest; and yet our Sense of the moral Good in Passive Obedience, would still be founded upon some Species of Benevolence, such as Gratitude toward the Deity, and Submission to his Will to whom we are so much oblig’d. But I fancy those, who believe the Deity to be Good, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the universal Good, than the contrary, either by prevent-ing the external Evils of Civil War, or by enuring Men to Patience, or some other Quality which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, Passive Obedience might be recommended as an inglorious Method of escaping a greater Mischief, but could never have any thing morally amiable in it.

But let us quit the Disputes of the Learned, on whom, it may be alledg’d, Custom and Education have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are approv’d or condemn’d, vindicated or excus’d. We are universally asham’d to say an Action is Just, because it ∥16 tends∥ to my Advantage, or to the Advantage of the Actor: And we as seldom condemn a beneficent kind Action, because it ∥17 is∥ not advantageous to us, or to the Actor. Blame, and Censure, are founded on a Tendency to publick Evil, or a Principle of private Malice in the Agent, or Neglect at least of the Good of others; on Inhumanity of Temper, or at least such strong Selfishness as makes the Agent careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we blame and censure when the Action no way affects our selves. All the moving and persuasive Vindications of Actions, which may, from some partial evil Tendency, appear evil, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some greater Good which counterballanc’d the Evil: “Severity toward a few, is Compassion toward multitudes.—Transitory Punishments are necessary for avoiding more durable Evils.—Did not some suffer on such Occasions, there would be no living for honest Men.”—and such like. And even when an Action cannot be entirely justify’d, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge; “That it was only the Effect of Inadvertence without Malice, or of partial good Nature, Friendship, Compassion, natural Affection, or Love of a Party?” All these Considerations shew what is the universal Foundation of our Sense of moral Good, or Evil, viz. Benevolence toward others on ∥18 one∥ hand, and Malice, or even Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the ∥19 apparent∥ publick Evil on the other. And let it be here observ’d, that we are so far from imagining all Men to ∥20 act∥ only ∥21 from∥ Self-Love, that we universally expect in others a Regard for the Publick; and do not look upon the want of this, as barely the absence of moral Good, or Virtue, but even as positively evil and hateful.

Moral Evil not always Malice.IV. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the general Foundation of our Sense of moral Evil more particularly. Disinterested Malice, or ∥22 Delight in∥ the Misery of others, is the highest pitch of what we count vitious; and every Action appears evil, which is imagin’d to flow from any degree of this Affection. Perhaps a violent Passion may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our rash angry Sentiments of our Enemys, may represent them as having such odious Dispositions; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer’d above,* that there is no such degree of Wickedness in human Nature, as in cold blood, to ∥23 be pleas’d with∥ the Misery of others, when it is ∥24 conceiv’d no∥ way useful to our Interests.

∥25^aThe Story of Nero and Paetusii may be alledg’d against this, but perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. Nero was ∥26^bconscious he^b∥ was hated by those whom the World call’d good Men, and that they were dangerous to him; he fancy’d his best Security lay in being terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas’d, to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from that Compassion which a Nero would imagine argu’d Weakness. This unfortunate Gentleman’s Happiness might by some foolish Courtier be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the Tyrant’s unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Per-son admir’d, and prefer’d before him. Any of these Motives of apparent Interest seem more probably to have influenc’d him, than that we should in him, and a few others, suppose^a∥ a Principle of calm Malice without Interest, of which the rest of Mankind seem entirely incapable.

Temper of a Tyrant.The Temper of a Tyrant seems ∥27 probably to be∥ a continu’d state of Anger, Hatred, and Fear. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the Tyrant are habitual. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we ∥28 plainly∥ find, that our Minds are wholly fill’d with Apprehensions of the Person who injur’d us, as if he ∥29 was∥ absolutely Evil, and delighted in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ’d in him: we forget ∥30 that∥ perhaps ∥31 only Self-Love, and not Malice, was his Motive; or∥ it may be some generous or kind Intention toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a Tyrant constantly forms concerning Mankind; and having very much weaken’d all kind Affections in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were ∥32 Men∥ really such as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if ∥33 these be∥ rashly form’d upon some sudden slight Views, it is no wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited to the real State of human Nature.

Ordinary Springs of Vice.The ordinary ∥34 Springs∥ of Vice ∥35 then∥ among Men, ∥36 must be∥ a mistaken Self-Love, made ∥37 so∥ violent, ∥38 as∥ to overcome Benevolence;39 or Affections arising from false, and rashly form’d Opinions of Mankind, which we run into thro the weakness of our Benevolence. When Men, who ∥40 had∥ good Opinions of each other, happen to have contrary Interests, they are apt to have their good Opinions of each other abated, by imagining a design’d Opposition from Malice; without this, they can scarcely hate one another. ∥41 Thus∥ two Candidates for the same Office wish each other dead, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other’s Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without Hatred; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were bestow’d on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it.

Self-Love indifferent.V. ∥42 The∥ Actions which flow solely from Self-Love, and yet evidence no Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, ∥43 seem perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense∥, and neither raise the Love or Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can ∥44 indeed discover∥ certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from Self-Love, consistently with the Good of the Whole, but every Mortal’s acting thus within these Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of the Whole; and the Want of such Self-Love would be universally pernicious. ∥45 Hence∥, he who pursues his own private Good, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the Good of the Whole; and much more he who promotes his own Good, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing good to Mankind; acts not only innocently, but also honourably, and virtuously: for in both these Cases, ∥46 a Motive of∥ Benevolence concurs with Self-Love to excite him to the Action. And thus a Neglect of our own Good, may be morally evil, and argue a Want of Benevolence toward the Whole. But when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention’d, and leads us into Actions detrimen-tal to others, and to the whole; or makes us insensible of the generous kind Affections; then it appears vitious, and is disapprov’d. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our Benevolence ∥47 becomes∥ so faint, as to let us ∥48 entertain∥ odious Conceptions of ∥49 Men∥, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were wholly Evil, or Malicious, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into malevolent Affections, or at least weaken our good ones, and make us really Vitious.

Self-Love not excluded by Benevolence.VI.50 Here we must also observe, that every moral Agent justly considers himself as a Part of this rational System, which may be useful to the Whole; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own Benevolence. Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the System ∥51 requires every one to be∥ innocently sollicitous about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings greater Evil to the Agent, than Good to others, however it may evidence ∥52 strong Benevolence or∥ a virtuous Disposition in the Agent, yet it ∥53 must be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to publick Good, when it has no such Tendency: so that a∥ Man who reason’d justly, and consider’d the whole, would not be led into it, ∥54 were his Benevolence ever so strong∥; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the Agent from a kind Action, did evidence a ∥55 strong Disposition to Virtue∥. Nay ∥56 further, if any Good was∥ propos’d to the Pursuit of an Agent, and he had a Competitor in every respect only equal to himself; the highest Benevolence possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his Competitor. A Man surely of the strongest Benevolence, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a Competitor of equal Merit with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of Benevolence; so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only equal Abilitys.

∥57^aWherever a Regard to my self, tends as much to the good of the Whole, as Regard to another; or where the Evil to my self, is equal to the Good obtain’d for another; tho by acting, in such Cases, for the good of another, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to my self, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive Benevolence; since the Moment of good to the Whole is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ’d, that this does not supersede the necessity of Liberality, or gratuitous Gifts, altho in such Actions the Giver loses ∥58^bas much as^b∥ the other receives; since the Moment of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a compound ∥59^cRatio^c∥ of the Quantity of the Good it self, and the Indigence of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater Addition to the happiness of the Receiver, than the Diminution it occasions in the happiness of the Giver: And that the most useful and important Gifts are those from the Wealthy to the Indigent. ∥60^dGifts^d∥ from Equals are not useless ∥61^eneither^e∥, since they often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of mutual Love: but Gifts from the Poor to the Wealthy are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of Gratitude, which are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the Wealthy, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor Giver.

In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the Agent, than Good to the Publick; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the Agent, tho ’tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the Agent be so great, as to make him incapable at another time, of promoting a publick Good of greater moment than what is attain’d by this Action; the Action may really be Evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater ∥62^fattainable^f∥ publick Good for a smaller one; tho at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.^a∥

Benevolence, how affected by the Qualitys of its Object.63VII. The moral Beauty, or Deformity of Actions, is not alter’d by the moral Qualitys of the Objects, any further ∥64 than∥ the Qualitys of the Objects increase or diminish the Benevolence of the Action, or the publick Good intended by it. Thus Benevolence toward the worst Characters, or the Study of their Good, may be as amiable as any whatsoever; yea often more so than that toward the Good, since it argues such a strong Degree of Benevolence as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the moral Evil in the Object. Hence the Love of unjust Enemys, is counted among the highest Virtues. Yet when our Benevolence to the Evil, encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the Beauty of the Action, or even makes it evil, as it betrays a Neglect of the Good of others more valuable; Beneficence toward whom, would have tended more to the publick Good, than that toward our65 Favourites: But Benevolence toward evil Characters, which neither encourages ∥66 them∥, nor enables them to do Mischief, nor diverts our Benevolence from Persons more useful, has as much moral Beauty as any whatsoever.

Qualitys determining our Election.67VIII. In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos’d, or to find which of them has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue ∥68 to judge thus∥; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the Dignity, or moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good, and Number of Enjoyers. ∥69 In∥ the same manner, the moral Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that, that Action is best, which ∥70 procures∥ the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.iii

Consequences, how they affect the Morality of Actions.71IX. Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix’d Nature, partly Advantageous, ∥72 and∥ partly Pernicious; that Action is good, whose good Effects preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that, evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may be Evil; and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil to many.

∥73^aBut the Consequences which affect the Morality of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen’d. ∥74^bFor^b∥ many Actions which have no immediate or natural evil Effects, nay which actually produce good Effects, may be evil; if a man foresees that ∥75^cthe evil^c∥ Consequences, which will probably flow from the Folly of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overballance all the ∥76^dGood produc’d by those Actions^d∥, or all the Evils which would flow from the Omission of ∥77^ethem^e∥: And in such Cases the Probability is to be computed on both sides. Thus if an Action of mine will probably, thro the ∥78^fMistakes^f∥ or Corruption of others, be made a Precedent in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho good in it self, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some mistaken Notion of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine evil, whenever the Evils ∥79^gwhich will probably^g∥ be occasion’d by the Action, ∥80^hare greater^h∥ than the Evils occasion’d by the Omission.

And this is the Reason that many Laws prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular Instances of ∥81ⁱthoseⁱ∥ Actions would be very useful; because an universal Allowance of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal Prohibition; nor could there be any more special Boundarys fix’d between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less evil Consequence than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in ∥82^jit.^aj∥

Partial Benevolence, how virtuous.∥83 X∥. From ∥84 the two last∥ Observations, we may see what Actions our moral Sense would most recommend to our Election, as the most perfectly Virtuous: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational Agents, to whom our Influence can ∥85 reach∥. All ∥86 Benevolence∥, even toward a Part, is amiable, ∥87 when∥ not inconsistent with the Good of the Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Virtue, unless our Beneficence be restrain’d by want of Power, and not want of Love to the Whole. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of Beauty, ∥88 unless∥ when the Good of the Whole requires a stricter Attachment to a Part, as in natural Affection, or virtuous Friendships; ∥89 or∥ when some Parts are so eminently useful to the Whole, that even universal Benevolence ∥90 would∥ determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus universal Benevolence would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of great and generous Characters in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any generous Society, whose whole Constitution ∥91 was∥ contriv’d to promote universal Good. Thus a good Fancy in Architecture, would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a compleatly regular Building, to chuse such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro the Whole, and not move him to make a vain unfinish’d Attempt in one Part, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to the Whole. And ∥92 the most perfect Rules of Architecture condemn an excessive∥ Profusion of Ornament on one Part, above the Proportion of the Whole, unless that Part be some eminent Place of the Edifice, such as the chief Front, or publick Entrance; the adorning of which, would beautify the Whole more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any other Part.

∥93^aThis Increase of the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions, according to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend, may shew us the Reason why Actions which flow from the nearer Attachments of Nature, such as that between the Sexes, and the Love of our Offspring, are not so amiable, nor do they appear so virtuous as Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach’d to us. The Reason is plainly this. These strong Instincts are by Nature limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as our Wives or Children; whereas a Disposition, which would produce a like Moment of Good to others, upon no special Attachment, ∥94^bif it was^b∥ accompany’d with natural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruitful of great and good Effects to the Whole.^a∥

Moral Dispositions and Abilitys.95 From this primary Idea of moral Good in Actions, ∥96 arises the Idea of∥ Good in those Dispositions, whether natural or acquir’d, which enable us to do good to others; or which are presum’d to be design’d, and acquir’d or cultivated for that purpose97 . And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our ∥98 Love to∥ the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin’d to be intended for publick Mischief, they make us hate him the more: Such are a penetrating Judgment, a tenacious Memory, a quick Invention; Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching; a Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death. These may be rather call’d natural Abilitys, than moral ∥99 Qualitys. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than they are employ’d for the publick Good, is foolish, and flows from our moral Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if∥ we plainly see them maliciously employ’d, they make the Agent more detestable.

How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of them.XI. To find a universal ∥100 Canon∥ to compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by our selves, or by others, we must observe the following Propositions, or Axioms.

∥101^a1. The moral Importance of any ∥102^bAgent^b∥, or the Quantity of publick Good produc’d by him, is in a compound Ratio of his Benevolence and Abilitys: or (by substituting the initial Letters for the Words, as M = Moment of Good, and μ = Moment of Evil) M = B × A.

2. ∥103^cIn like manner, the Moment of private Good, or Interest produc’d by any Person ∥104^dto himself^d∥, is in a compound Ratio of his Self-Love, and Abilitys: or (substituting the initial Letters) I = S × A.^c∥

3. When in comparing the Virtue of two ∥105^eActions, the Abilitys of the Agents are^e∥ equal; the ∥106^fMoment of publick Good produc’d by them in like Circumstances, is as the Benevolence: or M = B × 1^f.∥

4. When Benevolence in two Agents is equal, and other Circumstances alike; the Moment of publick Good is as the Abilitys: or M = ∥107^gA^g∥ × 1

5. The Virtue then of Agents, or their Benevolence, is always directly as the Moment of Good produc’d in like Circumstances, and inversly as their Abilitys: or B = .

6. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some good to our selves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to our selves, and good to the Publick; or either useful both to our selves and others, or pernicious to both; the entire ∥108^hMotive to^h∥ good Actions is not always Benevolence alone; ∥109ⁱor Motive to Evilⁱ∥, Malice alone; (nay, ∥110^jthis last is seldom any Motive at all^j∥) but in most Actions we must look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Benevolence, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of private Interest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence, when the good Action is any way difficult or painful in the Performance, or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent. ∥111^kIn the former Case, M = (B + S) × A = BA + SA; and therefore BA = M − SA = M −= I, and B = . In the latter Case, M = (B − S) × A = BA − SA; therefore BA = M + SA = M + I, and B = .^ak∥

These selfish Motives shall be* ∥112 hereafter∥ more ∥113 fully∥ explain’d; here we may in general denote them by the Word In-terest: which when it concurs with Benevolence, in any Action capable of Increase, or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than Benevolence alone in the same Abilitys; and therefore when the Moment ∥114 of Good, in an∥ Action partly intended for the Good of the Agent, is but equal to the Moment ∥115 of Good∥ in the Action of another Agent, influenc’d only by Benevolence, the former is less virtuous; and in this Case the Interest must be deducted to find the true Effect of the Benevolence, or Virtue. ∥116 In∥ the same manner, when Interest is opposite to Benevolence, and yet is surmounted by it; this Interest must be added to the Moment, to increase the Virtue of the Action, or the Strength of the Benevolence∥117 : Or thus, in advantageous Virtue, B = . And in laborious, painful, dangerous or expensive Virtue, B = . By Interest, in this last Case, is understood all the Advantage which the Agent might have obtain’d by omitting the Action, which is a negative Motive to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes positive.

Intention, and Foresight, affect Actions.But here we must observe, that no Advantage, not intended, altho casually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its Morality to make it less amiable; nor does any Difficulty or Evil unforeseen, or not resolved upon,118 make a kind Action more virtuous; since in such Cases Self-Love neither assists nor opposes Benevolence. Nay, Self-Interest ∥119 then only∥ diminishes the Benevolence, when without this View of Interest the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much Good would not have been produc’d by the Agent; and it extenuates the Vice of an evil Action, ∥120 only∥ when without this Interest the Action would not have been ∥121 pleasing to∥ the Agent, ∥122 or∥ so much Evil have been produc’d by him.

The ∥123 sixth∥ Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have Benevolence sufficient to ∥124 surmount∥ any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much Virtue in the Agent, tho he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult.

Perfect Virtue.Since then ∥125 Benevolence, or Virtue in any Agent, is as , or as , and no Being can act above his natural Ability∥; that must be the Perfection of Virtue where ∥126 M = A∥, or when the Being acts to the utmost of ∥127 his∥ Power for the publick Good; and hence the Perfection of Virtue in this Case, ∥128 or ,∥ is as Unity. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the Stoicks, “That a Creature suppos’d Innocent, by pursuing Virtue with ∥129 his∥ utmost Power, may in Virtue equal the Gods.” For in their Case, if ∥130 [A] or∥ the Ability be Infinite, unless ∥131 [M] or∥ the Good to be produc’d in the whole, be so too, the Virtue is not absolutely perfect; and the Quotient can never surmount Unity.

Moral Evil, how computed.∥132^aXII. The same Axioms may be apply’d to compute the moral Evil in Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to Evil, Hatred, tho it is oftner only Self-Love, with Inadvertence to its Consequences: then,

1st. The Moment of Evil produc’d by any Agent, is as the Product of his Hatred into his Ability, or μ = H × A. And,

2dly. In equal Abilitys, ∥133^bH = μ × 1^b∥.

3dly. When Hatred is equal; μ = A × 1 And,

4thly. The Degree of moral Evil, ∥134^cor Vice^c∥, which is equal to the Hatred or Neglect of publick Good, is thus express’d, H = .

5thly. The Motives of Interest may ∥135^dco-operate with Hatred, or oppose^d∥ it the same way as with Benevolence; and then according as Self-Interest may partly excite to the Action, and so diminish the Evil; or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the Malice which surmounts it, or H = , in like manner as in the Case of moral Good.^a∥

Intention, Foresight.But we must observe, that not only Innocence is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum’d from their Nature, in some measure inclin’d to publick Good;136 so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an Agent be reputed Evil: Nor is a direct Intention of publick Evil necessary to make an Action evil, it is enough that it flows from Self-Love, with a plain Neglect of the Good of others∥137^a, or an Insensi-bility of their Misery, which we either actually foresee, or have a probable Presumption of.

It is true indeed, that that publick Evil which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my present Action Criminal, or Odious; even altho I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either Malice, or want of Benevolence. But then it is also certain, that my prior Negligence, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the want of that Degree of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the Guilt properly lies in this Neglect, rather than in an Action which really flows from a good Intention. Human Laws however, which cannot examine the Intentions, ∥138^bor secret^b∥ Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain’d, which we are oblig’d to attain.

In like manner, no good Effect which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action morally Good; however Human ∥139^cLaws or Governours^c∥, who cannot search into Mens Intentions, or know their secret Designs, justly reward Actions ∥140^dwhich tend^d∥ to the publick Good, altho the Agent was engag’d to those Actions only by selfish Views; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them.

The difference in degree of Guilt between Crimes of Ignorance, when the Ignorance is Vincible, and Faulty, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and Crimes of Malice, or direct evil Intention, consists in this; that the former, by a prior Neglect, argues ∥141^ea^e∥ want of the due degree of Benevolence, or right Affection; the latter, evidences direct evil Affections, which are vastly more odious^a∥.

Morality distinct from Interest.XIII. ∥142 From Axiom the 5th∥, we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, “that we have a Sense of Goodness and moral Beauty in Actions, distinct from Advantage;” for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the Advantage which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward our selves, we ∥143 should∥ make no Account of the Abilitys of the Agent, but would barely esteem them according to their Moment. The Abilitys come in only to shew the Degree of Benevolence, which supposes Benevolence necessarily amiable. Who was ever the better pleas’d with a barren rocky Farm, or an inconvenient House, by being told that the poor Farm gave as great Increase as it could; or that the House accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose Moment is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the Beauty to alledge, “That it was all the poor Agent could do for the Publick, or his Friend.”

Morality of Characters.XIV. The moral Beauty of Characters arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the publick Good, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their fix’d Disposition, and not according to any particular Sallys of unkind Passions; altho ∥144 these∥ abate the Beauty of good Characters, as the Motions of the kind ∥145 Affections∥ diminish the Deformity of the bad ones. What then properly constitutes a virtuous Character, is not some few accidental Motions of Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude; but such a fix’d Humanity, or Desire of the publick Good of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of ∥146 Beneficence, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others: and a strong Benevolence will not fail to make us∥ careful of informing our selves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving ∥147 the Interests of Mankind∥. Every Motion indeed of the kind Affections appears in some degree amiable; but we denominate the Character from the prevailing Principle.

Instinct may be the spring of Virtue.XV. ∥148 I Know not for what Reason some will not allow that to be Virtue, which flows from Instincts, or Passions; but how do they help themselves? They say, “Virtue arises from Reason.” What is Reason but that Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End? The ultimate End propos’d by the common Moralists is the Happiness of the Agent himself, and this certainly he is determin’d to pursue from Instinct.∥ Now may not another Instinct toward the Publick, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct toward private Happiness? ∥149 And is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our Reason in pursuing the former, as the latter?∥ This is certain, that whereas we behold the selfish Actions of others, with Indifference at best, we see something amiable in every Action which flows from kind Affections or Passions ∥150 toward∥ others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way to attain their ∥151^aEnd. ∥152^bOur passionate Actions, as we shew’d* above, are not ∥153^calways^c∥ Self-interested; since our In-tention is not to free our selves from the Uneasiness of the Passion, but to alter the State of the Object.^ab∥

154 If it be said, “That Actions from Instinct, are ∥155 not the∥ Effect of Prudence and Choice;” this Objection holds full as strongly against ∥156 the∥ Actions which flow from ∥157 Self-Love; since the use of our Reason is as requisite, to find the proper Means of promoting publick Good, as private Good. And as it must be an Instinct, or a Determination previous to Reason, which makes us pursue private Good, as well as publick Good, as our End; there is the same occasion for Prudence and Choice, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see∥ no harm in supposing, “that Men are naturally dispos’d to Virtue, and not left merely indifferent, ∥158 to be ingag’d in Actions only as they appear to tend to their own private Good.∥” Surely, the Supposition of a benevolent universal Instinct, would recommend human Nature, and its Author, more to the Love of a good Man, and leave room enough for the Exercise of our Reason, in contriving and settling Rights, Laws, Constitutions; in inventing Arts, and practising them so as to gratify, in the most effectual manner, that generous Inclination. And if we must bring in Self-Love to make Virtue Rational, a little Reflection will discover, as ∥159 shall appear hereafter∥, that this Benevolence is our greatest Happiness; and thence we may ∥160 resolve to cultivate, as much as possible,∥ this sweet Disposition, and to despise every opposite Interest. Not that we can be truly Virtuous, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which ∥161 accompanies∥ Beneficence, without the Love of others: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of disinterested Love to others, as the Spring of our Actions. But Self-Interest may be our Motive, ∥162 in chusing to∥ continue in this agreeable State, tho it cannot be the sole, or principal Motive of any Action, which to our moral Sense appears Virtuous.163

Heroism, in all stations.∥164^aThe applying a mathematical Calculation to moral Subjects, ∥165^bwill^b∥ appear perhaps at first extravagant and wild; but some Corollarys, which are easily and certainly deduc’d below,* may shew the Conveniency of this Attempt, if it could be further pursu’d. At present, we ∥167^cshall only draw^c∥ this one^a∥, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest rank of Mankind, viz. “That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the most heroick Virtue.” For how small soever the Moment of publick Good be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his Abilitys ∥168 are∥ proportionably small, the ∥169 Quotient, which expresses the Degree of∥ Virtue, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the Prince, the Statesman, the General, are capable of true Heroism, tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus’d thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an honest Trader, the kind Friend, the faithful prudent Adviser, the charitable and hospitable Neighbour, the tender Husband and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet chearful Companion, the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good Offices which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, “that they are the only Heroes in Virtue.”

SECTION IV

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.

This Moral Sense universal.I. To ∥1 shew∥ how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the universal Foundation of this moral Sense, viz. Benevolence, we have observ’d already,∥2* ∥ that when we are ask’d the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we ∥3 perpetually∥ alledge its Usefulness to the Publick, and not to the Actor himself. If we are vindicating a censur’d Action, and maintaining it lawful, we ∥4 always∥ make this one Article of our Defence, “That it injur’d no body, or did more Good than Harm.” On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be prejudicial to others, besides the Actor; or to evidence at least a Neglect of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them; or when Gratitude, natural Affection, or some other disinterested Tye should have rais’d in us a Study of their Interest. ∥5^aIf we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any reflection upon its Tendency to publick Evil, it is ∥6^bstill occasion’d^b∥ by our Benevolence, which makes us concern’d for the Evils befalling ∥7^cthe Agent, whom we must always look upon as a part of the System.^ac∥ We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes ∥8 it∥ is, to alledge, “That the poor Man does harm to no body but himself;” and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet ∥9 if we examine the Matter well,∥ we shall find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are immediately prejudicial to our selves, and are often look’d upon as innocent toward others, do really tend to the publick Detriment, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have ∥10 been∥ inclin’d to do. This is the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury.

Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation.II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, of some really good moral Quality. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is ∥11 always∥ some really amiable and benevolent Appearance which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging ∥12 that Actions tend∥ to the publick Good, which do not; or be so ∥13 stupidly∥ inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix’d on some partial good Effects, we may quite over-look many evil Consequences which counter-ballance the Good. Our Reason may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some apparent Species of Benevolence which commands our Approbation. And this Sense, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted ∥14 from Motives of external Advantage, which are stronger than it∥, ∥15 ceases not∥ to operate, but ∥16 has Strength enough to make∥ us uneasy and dissatisfy’d with our selves; even as the Sense of Tasting ∥17 makes∥ us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion which we may ∥18 force∥ our selves, from Interest, to swallow.

False Approbations.It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “That many Actions are really done, and approv’d, which tend to the universal Detriment.” For the same way, Actions are often perform’d, and in the mean time approv’d, ∥19 which tend∥ to the Hurt of the Actor. But as we do not from the latter, infer the Actor to be void of Self-Love, or a Sense of Interest; no more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a Sense of Morals, or a desire of publick Good. The matter is plainly this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to publick, or private Good: Nay, sometimes violent Passions, while they last, will make ∥20 them∥ approve very bad Actions ∥21 in a moral∥ Sense, ∥22 or∥ very pernicious ones to the Agent, ∥23 as∥ advantageous: But this proves only, “That sometimes there may be some more violent Motive to Action, than a Sense of moral Good; or that ∥24 Men, by Passion, may become blind∥ even to their own Interest.”

∥25 But to prove that Men∥ are void of a moral Sense, we should find some Instances of cruel, malicious Actions, done, ∥26 and approv’d in others, when there is no Motive of Interest, real or apparent, save gratifying that very Desire of Mischief to others∥: We must find a Country where Murder in cold blood, Tortures, and every thing malicious, without any Advantage, is, if not approv’d, at least look’d upon with indifference, and raises no Aversion toward the Actors, in the unconcern’d Spectators: We must find Men with whom the Treacherous, Ungrateful, Cruel, are in the same account with the Generous, Friendly, Faithful, and Humane; and who approve the latter, no more than the former, in all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the natural Good or Evil befals other Persons. And it may be question’d, whether the Universe, tho large enough, and stor’d with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance, not only of a Nation, but even of a Club, or a single ∥27 Person, who∥ will think all Actions indifferent, but those which ∥28 regard∥ his own Concerns.

Diversity of Manners accounted for.III. From what has been said, we may easily account for the vast Diversity of moral Principles, in various Nations, and Ages; ∥29^awhich is indeed a good Argument against innate Ideas, or Principles, but will not evidence Mankind to be void of a moral Sense to perceive Virtue or Vice ∥30^bin Actions, when they^b∥ occur to their Observation.

The^a∥ Grounds of this Diversity are principally these:

From various Notions of Happiness.1st. Different Opinions of Happiness, or natural Good, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a courageous Disposition, where Liberty is counted a great Good, and War an inconsiderable Evil, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges, will have the Appearance of moral Good to our Sense, because of their appearing benevolent; and yet the same Sense of moral Good in Benevolence, shall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more abject and timorous, where Civil War appears the greatest natural Evil, and Liberty no great Purchase, make the same Actions appear odious. So in Sparta, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir’d, as naturally good to the State, was to abound in a hardy shifting Youth; Theft, if dexterously perform’d, was so little odious, that it receiv’d the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

31 But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on Benevolence, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the publick Good. For we are not to imagine, that this Sense should give us, ∥32 without∥ Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to Good or Evil: It only determines us to approve Benevolence, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate the contrary. So our Sense of Beauty does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres; but determines us to approve and delight in Uniformity amidst Variety, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preambles of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any dispu-ted Practice by the Moralists, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of the natural Good, or evil Consequences of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv’d, is still some Tendency to the greater natural Good of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

Travellers accounts of barbarous Customs.The same Reason may ∥33 remove∥ also the Objections against the Universality of this Sense, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning strange Crueltys practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in ∥34 sudden∥ angry Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower Benevolence in its strongest Ties; and if they really be universally allow’d, look’d upon as innocent, and vindicated; it ∥35 is certainly∥ under some Appearance of Benevolence; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemys, to avoid the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A love of Pleasure and Ease, may, in the immediate Agents, be stronger in some Instances, than Gratitude toward Parents, or natural Affection to Children. But that such Nations are continu’d, notwithstanding all the Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of natural Affection: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of publick Good, was the Ground of Laws, equally barbarous, enacted by Lycurgus and Solon, of killing the deform’d, or weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of useless Citizens.i

∥36^aA late ingenious Author* has justly observ’d the Absurdity of the monstrous Taste, which has possess’d both the Readers and Writers of Travels. ∥37^bThey scarce give us any Account^b∥ of the natural Affections, the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans, of the Indians; and as ∥38^crarely^c∥ do they mention their Abhorrence of Treachery among themselves; their Proneness to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several States; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or upon points of Honour. “These are but common Storys.—No need to travel to the Indies for what we see in Europe every Day.” The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting Horror, and making Men Stare. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the Indians in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the Prodigious. But a Human Sacrifice, a Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of Indians, in Nations no strangers to the Massacre at Paris, the Irish Rebellion, or the Journals of the Inquisition. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the Indian Sacrifices, flowing from a like Perversion of Humanity by Superstition, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous Credulity of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions ∥39^din other matters to Caution of Assent^d∥, for these marvellous Memoirs of Monks, Fryars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the Historys, Annals, Chronologys, receiv’d by Oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.^a∥

Use of Reason in Morals.Men have Reason given them, to ∥40 judge of the Tendencys of their∥ Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of publick Good; but it is still some Appearance of Good which they pursue. And it is strange, that Reason is universally allow’d to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv’d in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an Argument against any moral Sense; altho the bad Conduct is not ∥41 owing to∥ any Irregularity in the moral Sense, but ∥42 to a wrong∥ Judgment or Opinion. If putting the Aged to death, with all ∥43 its∥ Consequences, really tends to the publick Good, and ∥44 to∥ the lesser Misery of the Aged, it is no doubt justifiable; nay, perhaps the Aged chuse it, in hopes of a future State. If a deform’d, or weak Race, could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is just to put them to death. This all allow to be just, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for killing of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock’d, it is perhaps practis’d, and allow’d from Self-love; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any where. If Wood, or Stone, or Metal be ∥45 a Deity∥, have Government, and Power, and have been the Authors of Benefits to us; it is morally ∥46 amiable∥ to praise and worship them. Or if the true Deity be pleas’d with Worship before Statues, or any other Symbol of some more immediate Presence, or Influence; Image-Worship is virtuous. If he delights in Sacrifices, Penances, Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable. Our Sense of Virtue, generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason, than that they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.

Narrow Systems pervert the moral Sense.IV. The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence. We ∥47 insinuated∥ above,* that it is regular and beautiful to have stronger Benevolence, toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now if Men receive a low, or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead ∥48 them∥ to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for just; why Romans, and Greeks, could approve of making those they call’d Barbarians, Slaves.

Sects pernicious to Virtue.∥49^aA late ingenious Author∥50^b†^b∥ justly observes, “That the various Sects, Partys, ∥51^cFactions, Cabals^c∥ of Mankind in larger Societys, are all influenc’d by a publick Spirit: That some generous Notions of publick Good, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite Men of the same Faction or Cabal to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc’d by a sociable publick Spirit in a limited ∥52^dSystem.”^d∥ But certain it is, that Men are little oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into several Sects for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent Commerce, or Manufactures; Cabals for Defence of Liberty against a Tyrant; or even lower Clubs for Pleasantry, or Improvement by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable ∥53^enotion^e∥ of Sanctity, and Religion, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to God, or our own Species; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as Odious, Contemptible, Profane, because of their different Tenets, or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the publick Good; when the keenest Passions are rais’d about such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each other for what, of it self, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite Sects; (which is what all Partys commonly call Zeal) ’tis then no wonder if our moral Sense ∥54^fbe much^f∥ impair’d, and our natural Notions of Good and Evil almost lost; when our Admiration, and Love, or Contempt, and Hatred, are thus perverted from their natural Objects.

If any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the Party-Tenets of most of our Sects; or if they have heard of them, have either never espous’d any Sect, or all equally; they bid fairest for a truly natural and good Disposition, because their Tempers have never been soured about vain Trifles; nor have they contracted any Sullenness, or Rancour against any Part of their own Kind. If any Opinions deserve to be contended for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the Deity, and of our Fellow-Creatures: If any Opinions deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the Goodness of Providence, or represent our Fellow-Creatures as base and selfish, by instilling into us some ill-natur’d, cunning, shreud Insinuations, “that our most generous Actions proceed wholly from selfish Views.” This wise Philosophy of some Moderns, after Epicurus, must be fruitful of nothing but Discontent, Suspicion, and Jealousy; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory Injurys to which we might be expos’d by a good-natur’d Credulity. But thanks be to the kind Author of our Nature, that, in spite of such Opinions, our Nature it self leads us into Friendship, Trust, and mutual Confidence.^a∥

Were we freely conversant with Robbers, who shew a moral Sense in the equal or proportionable Division of their Prey, and in Faith to each other, we should find they have their own sublime moral Ideas of their Party, as Generous, Courageous, Trusty, nay Honest too; and that those we call Honest and Industrious, are imagin’d by them ∥55 to be∥ Mean-spirited, Selfish, Churlish, or Luxurious; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow’d, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess’d Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our profess’d Debauchees, our most dissolute Rakes, we shall find their Vices cloth’d, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of Liberty, Generosity, just Resentment against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures.

56 Perhaps never any Men pursu’d ∥57 Vice long with Peace of Mind∥, without some such deluding Imagination of moral Good,* while they may be still inadvertent to the barbarous and inhuman Consequences of their Actions. The Idea of an ill-natur’d Villain, is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. ∥59 Hence∥ we shall find, that the basest Actions are dress’d in some tolerable Mask. What others call Avarice, appears to the Agent a prudent Care of a Family, or Friends; Fraud, artful Conduct; Malice and Revenge, a just Sense of Honour, and a Vindication of our Right in Possessions, or Fame; Fire and Sword, and Desolation among Enemys, a just thorow Defence of our Country; Persecution, a Zeal for the Truth, and for the eternal Happiness of Men, which Hereticks oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a Sense of Virtue upon false Opinions, and mistaken Benevolence; upon wrong or partial Views of publick Good, and the means to promote it; or upon very narrow Systems form’d by like foolish Opinions. It is not a Delight in the Misery of others, or Malice, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our Historys; but generally an injudicious unreasonable Enthusiasm for some kind of limited Virtue.

• Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
• Ultra, quam satis est, Virtutem si petat ipsam.†ii

False Opinions of the divine Laws.V. The last Ground of Diversity which occurs, are the false Opinions of the Will or Laws of the Deity. To obey these we are determin’d from Gratitude, and a Sense of Right imagin’d in the Deity, to dispose at pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc’d Follys, Superstitions, Murders, Devastations of Kingdoms, from a Sense of Virtue and Duty, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe, “That all those Follys, or Barbaritys, rather confirm than destroy the Opinion of a moral Sense;” since the Deity is believ’d to have a Right to dispose of his Creatures; and Gratitude to him, if he be conceiv’d good, must move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not ∥60 conceiv’d good∥, Self-love may overcome our moral Sense of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

As for the Vices which ∥61 commonly∥ proceed from Love of Pleasure, or any violent Passion, since generally the Agent is soon sensible of their Evil, and ∥62 that sometimes∥ amidst the heat of the Action, they only prove, “That this moral Sense, and Benevolence, may be overcome by the more importunate Sollicitations of other Desires.”

Objection from Incest.VI. Before we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, viz. “That this Sense is natural, and independent on Custom and Education.” The Objection is this, “That we shall find some Actions always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations, ∥63 in which there appears nothing contrary to Benevolence∥; and that the same Actions shall in another Nation be counted innocent, or honourable.64 Thus Incest, among Christians, is abhorr’d at first appearance as much as Murder; ∥65 even by those who do not know or reflect upon any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind. Now we generally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so in all. This∥ Abhorrence ∥66 therefore∥ cannot be from Nature, since in Greece, the marrying half Sisters was counted honourable; and among the Persian Magi,iii the marrying of Mothers. Say they then, may not all our Approbation or Dislike of Actions arise the same way from Custom and Education?”

The Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said. Had we no moral Sense natural to us, we should only look upon Incest as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never ∥67 hate∥ other incestuous Persons, more than we do a broken Merchant; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a Sense of moral Good. And further, it is true, that ∥68 many who abhor Incest do not know, or reflect upon the∥ natural tendency of some sorts of Incest to the publick Detriment; but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the Deity, and that it exposes the ∥69 Person∥ concern’d to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg’d to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the Deity, to whom it is under such ∥70 Obligations. This then∥ is plainly a moral evil Quality apprehended in Incest, and reducible to the general Foundation of ∥71 Malice, or rather Want of Benevolence∥. Nay further, where this Opinion, “that Incest is offensive to the Deity,” prevails, Incest must have another direct Contrariety to Benevolence; since we must apprehend the Incestuous, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of Nature, to the lowest State of Misery, and Baseness, Infamy and Punishment. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the Deity’s abhorring ∥72 or prohibiting Incest; if no obvious natural Evils attend it∥, it may be look’d upon as innocent. And further, as Men who have the Sense of Tasting, may, by Company and Education, have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as unsavoury; so may Men, who have a moral Sense, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the moral Evil of Actions, altho they do not themselves discern in them any tendency to natural Evil; imagining that others ∥73 do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated, which raise an abhorrence without Reason. But∥ without a moral Sense, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as naturally disadvantageous to our selves.

Moral Sense not from Education.VII. The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; and detest the Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or the Treacherous. How strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation, mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of the more intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual!

SECTION V

A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a further Explication ∥1of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees∥; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity.

Degrees of Benevolence.I. We have already endeavour’d to prove, “That there is ∥2 a∥ universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:” But we are not to imagine that ∥3 this Benevolence is equal, or in the same degree toward all.∥ There are ∥4 some∥ nearer and stronger ∥5 Degrees∥ of Benevolence, when the Objects stand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain’d distinct Names; such as natural Affection, ∥6 and∥ Gratitude, ∥7^aor when Benevolence is increas’d by greater ∥8^bLove of ^ab∥ Esteem.

Natural Affection.One Species of natural Affection, viz. That in Parents towards ∥9 their∥ Children, has been consider’d already;* we ∥11 shall only observe further∥, That there is the same kind of Affection among collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable where no Opposition of Interest produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this natural Affection.

Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance.12 We may also observe, that as to the Affection of Parents, it cannot be entirely founded on Merit ∥13 or∥ Acquaintance; not only because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the ∥14 Love of∥ Esteem; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce Hatred, even toward Children apprehended to be vitious. And this Affection is further confirm’d to be from Nature, because it is always observ’d to descend∥15 , and not ascend∥ from Children to Parents mutually. Nature, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin’d Parents to the Care of their Children, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it∥16 ∥ to Reflection, and a Sense of Gratitude, to produce Returns of Love in Children, toward such tender kind Benefactors, who very seldom stand in such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil-dren did from them. Now did Acquaintance, or Merit produce natural Affection, we surely should find it strongest in Children, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin’d to Mankind, but extends to other Animals, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ’d to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their Dams. But as it is otherwise with rational Agents, so their Affections are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives.

Gratitude.II. ∥17 But∥ nothing will give us a juster Idea of the wise Order in which human Nature is form’d for universal Love, and mutual good Offices, than considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, which we call Gratitude. Every one knows that Beneficence toward our selves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises Gratitude, or a stronger Love toward the Benefactor, than equal Beneficence toward a third Person.* Now because of the ∥19 vast∥ Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habi-tations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to ∥20 vast∥ Multitudes; that our Benevolence might not be quite distracted with ∥21 a multiplicity∥ of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or ∥22^abecome useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes ∥23^bat vast distances^b∥, whose Interest we could not understand^a∥, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has ∥24^amore powerfully determin’d us to admire, and love the moral Qualitys of others which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will ∥25^btoward^b∥ those who are beneficent to our ∥26^cselves^a∥. This we call Gratitude. And thus a Foundation is laid^c∥ for joyful Associations in all kinds of Business, and virtuous Friendships.

By this Constitution also the Benefactor is more encourag’d in his Beneficence, and better secur’d of an increase of Happiness by grateful Returns,* than if his Virtue were only to be honour’d by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern’d, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin’d to love innumerable Multitudes, whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love∥28^a, were there not an increase of Love, according as the Object is more nearly attach’d to us, or our Friends, by ∥29^bgood^b∥ Offices which affect our selves, or them^a∥.

∥30 This∥ universal Benevolence toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of Gravitation, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the Universe; but∥31 , like the Love of Benevolence,∥ increases as the Distance is diminish’d, and is strongest when Bodys come to touch each other. Now this increase ∥32 of Attraction∥ upon nearer Approach, is as necessary ∥33 to the Frame of the Universe,∥ as that there should be any Attraction at all. For a general Attraction, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it ∥34 altogether.∥

∥35 This increase of Love toward the Benevolent,∥ according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits, is observable in the high degree of Love, which Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order ∥36 and Happiness∥ of human Society.

Love of Honour.III. From considering that ∥37 strong Determination in our Nature to∥ Gratitude, and Love toward our Benefactors, which was already shewn to be disinterested;* we are easily led to consider another Determination of our Minds, equally natural with the former, which is to ∥38 delight∥ in the good Opinion and Love of others, even when we expect no other Advantage from them, except what flows from this Constitution, whereby Honour is made an immediate Good. This Desire of Honour I would call Ambition, had not Custom join’d some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a violent desire of Honour, and of Power also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by Nature subjected to a grievous Sensation of Misery, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other Evil from them. This we call Shame; which in the same manner ∥39 is constituted an immediate Evil, as we said Honour was an immediate Good.∥

Now were there no moral Sense, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be delighted with Honour, or sub-jected to the uneasiness of Shame; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the World. The World may have ∥40 the worse Opinion of him for it; but what subjects my Ease to the Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, we∥ shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only reason of Shame, and it has no immediate Evil, or Pain in it, distinct from Fear of Loss; then wherever we expose our selves to Loss, we should be asham’d, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwise.

A Merchant, for instance, ∥41 lest it should impair his Credit∥, conceals a Shipwrack, or a very bad Market, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of Shame? Has he that Anguish, that Dejection of Mind, and Self-condemnation, which one shall have whose Treachery is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin’d morally good, tho they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant’s Sense; that is, the Opinion of their Wealth, or fitness for Business? Was any Man ever asham’d of impoverishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend?

The Foundation of Morals not the Opinions of our Country.IV. The Opinions of our Country are by some made the first Standard of Virtue. They alledge, “That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between moral Good, and Evil: And then, say they, Ambition, or the Love of Honour, is our chief Motive.” But what is Honour? It is not ∥42 the being∥ universally known, no matter how. A covetous Man is not honour’d by being universally known as covetous; nor a weak, selfish, or luxurious Man, when he is known to be so: Much less can a treacherous, cruel, or ungrateful Man, be said to be honour’d for his being known as such. A Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of Leger-de-main, is not honour’d for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of Admiration and Surprize to Multitudes. Honour then is the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum’d to be apply’d that way; for Abilitys constantly apply’d to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that Ambition∥43 , or Love of Honour is really selfish∥; but then ∥44 this∥ Determination to love Honour, presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it.

45 And let it be observ’d, that if we knew an Agent had no other Motive of Action ∥46 than∥ Ambition, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow’d not from any Love to others, or Desire ∥47 of∥ their Happiness. When Honour is thus constituted by Nature pleasant to us, it may be an additional Motive to Virtue, as we said above,∥48* ∥ the Pleasure arising from Reflection on our Benevolence was: but the Person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, acts immediately from the Love of others; however these refin’d Interests may be joint Motives to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every kind Inclination, and to despise every contrary Interest, as giving a smaller Happiness than Reflection on his own Virtue, and Consciousness of the Esteem of others.

Shame is in the same manner constituted an immediate Evil, and influences us the same way to abstain from moral Evil; not that any Action or Omission would appear virtuous, where the sole Motive was Fear of Shame.

Opinions flow from the Moral Sense.V. But to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of moral Good or Evil. If any Opinion be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ’d to be advantageous to the Agent, we may be led to believe so too, and then Self-Love may make us undertake it; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed pernicious to the Agent. If an Action pass for advantageous to the Publick, we may believe so too; and what next? If we have no disinterested Benevolence, what shall move us to undertake it? “Why, we love Honour; and to obtain this Pleasure, we will undertake the Action from Self-Interest.” Now, is Honour only the Opinion of our Country that an Action is advantageous to the Publick? No: we see no Honour paid to the useful Treachery of an Enemy whom we have brib’d to our Side, to casual undesign’d Services, or to the most useful Effects of Compulsion on Cowards; and yet we see Honour paid to unsuccessful Attempts to serve the Publick from sincere Love to it. Honour then presupposes a Sense of something amiable besides Advantage, ∥49 viz.∥ a Sense of Excellence in a publick Spirit; and therefore the first Sense of moral Good must be antecedent to Honour, for Honour is founded upon it.50 The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the publick Good; but that our Company honours such Actions, and loves the Agent, must flow from a Sense of some Excellence in this Love of the Publick, and serving its Interests.

“We therefore, say they again, pretend to love the Publick, altho we only desire the Pleasure of Honour; and we will applaud all who seem to act in that manner, either that we may reap Advantage from their Actions, or that others may believe we really love the Publick.” But shall any Man ever ∥51 really love the Publick, or study the Good of others in his heart, if Self-love be∥ the only spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really ∥52 love∥ Men who appear to love the Publick, without a moral Sense? ∥53 No: we could form no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these Pretenders to publick Love, we should hate∥ them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a moral Sense, provided we had none our selves: They never could make us admire Virtue, or virtuous Characters in others; but could only give us Opinions of Advantage, or Disadvantage in Actions, according as they tended ∥54 procure to∥ us the Pleasures of Honour, or the Pain of Shame.

But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a moral Sense of Goodness in Actions, and that they are capable of disinterested Love; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are morally Evil, when perhaps they are not so; and then our Sense may determine us to have an Aversion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the same way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as good; and then our desire of Honour may co-operate with Benevolence, to move us to such Actions: but had we no Sense of moral Qualitys in Actions, ∥55 nor any∥ Conceptions of them, ∥56 except∥ as advantageous or hurtful, we never could have honour’d or lov’d Agents for publick Love, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected our selves in particular. We might have form’d the metaphysical Idea of publick Good, but we had never desir’d it,57 further than it tended to our own private Interest, without a Principle of Benevolence; nor admir’d and lov’d those who ∥58 were∥ studious of it, without a moral Sense. So far is Virtue from being (in the Language of a late*i Author) the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride; that Pride, in the bad meaning of that Word, is the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.

Moral Sense, not from Love of Honour.VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of Honour. Suppose a State or Prince, observing the Money which is drawn out of England by Italian Musicians, ∥59 should∥ decree Honours, Statues, Titles, for great Musicians: This would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of Musick; and ∥60 Men of a good Ear would approve of∥ the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a good Ear, or make them delight in Harmony? Or could it ever make us really love a Musician, who study’d nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a Patriot, or a generous Friend? I doubt not. And yet Friendship, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear exceedingly amiable.

Let us take another Instance. Suppose Statues, and triumphal Arches were decreed, as well as a large Sum of Money, to the Discoverer of the Longitude, or any other useful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raise a universal Desire of such Knowledge from Self-Love; but would Men therefore love a Mathematician as they do a virtuous Man? Would a Mathema-tician love every Person who had attain’d Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he observ’d it, altho he knew that it was not accompany’d with any Love to Mankind, or Study of their Good, but with Ill-nature, Pride, Covetousness? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please, if we do not discern a benevolent Intention in the Application, or presume upon it; we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who is possess’d of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of Esteem and Love, which our nature determines us to appropriate to Benevolence, or Virtue.

Love of Honour, and Aversion to Shame, may often move us to do Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no Good in them our selves: And Compliance with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the Agent, from Spectators who see no moral Good in the Action it self. But without some Sense of Good in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy’d with themselves when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to Virtue; and therefore we must have, by Nature, a moral Sense of it antecedent to Honour.

This will shew us with what Judgment a late*ii Author compares the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, and Approbation of it, to the manner of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It shall appear ∥61 afterward∥,† that our Approbation of some Gestures, and what we call Decency in Motion, depends upon some moral Ideas in People of advanc’d Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only good Nature, an Inclination to please, and Love of Praise, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir’d; and not any Perception of Excellence in this Behaviour. ∥62 Hence∥ they are not sollicitous about Gestures when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; ∥63 nor do they ever∥ love or approve others for ∥64 any∥ Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between Gestures, and moral Qualitys; or reflect on the good Nature, which is evidenc’d by such a Compliance with the desire of the Company.

False Honour.VII. The considering Honour in the manner above explain’d, may shew us the reason, why Men are often asham’d for things which are not vitious, and honour’d for what is not virtuous. For, if any Action only appears vitious to any Persons or Company, altho it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the Agent; and then he may be asham’d, or suffer Uneasiness in being thought morally Evil. ∥65 The∥ same way, those who look upon an Action as morally good, will honour the Agent, and he may be pleas’d with the Honour, altho he does not himself perceive any moral Good in what has procur’d it.

Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame.Again, we shall be asham’d of every Evidence of moral Incapacity, or Want of Ability; and with good ground, when this Want is occasion’d by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look’d upon as indecent in any Country, offensive to others, ∥66 or∥ deform’d; we shall, out of our ∥67 Love to∥ the good Opinions of others, be asham’d to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on Nature, but is merely the Effect of Custom. Thus being observ’d in ∥68 those∥ Functions of Nature which are counted indecent and offensive, will make us uneasy, altho we are sensible that they really do not argue any Vice or Weakness. But on the contrary, since moral Abilitys of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application,69 procure the Esteem of others, we shall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham’d of any Discovery of our want of such Abilitys. This is the reason that Wealth and Power, the great Engines of Virtue, when presum’d to be intended for benevolent Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure Honour from others, and are apt to beget Pride in the Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion which may be either good or evil, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be the Joy which arises from the real or imagin’d Possession of Honour, or Claim to it. ∥70 The∥ same are the Effects of Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.

But whenever it appears that Men have only their private Advantage in view, in the application of these Abilitys, or natural Advantages, the Honour ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an ill-natur’d Application. Thus some Misers are asham’d of their Wealth, and study to conceal it; as the malicious or selfish do their Power: Nay, this is very often done where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their Abilitys, increases the moral Good of any little kind ∥71 Action∥, which they can find in their hearts to perform.

Selfishness shameful.In short, we always see Actions which flow from publick Love, accompany’d with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only malicious, but even selfish ones, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of private Pleasure is the ordinary occasion of Vice; and when Men have got any lively Notions of Virtue, they generally begin to be asham’d of every thing which betrays Selfishness, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal’d from those who do not partake with us. Such are venereal Pleasures between Persons marry’d, and even eating and drinking alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks; whereas a hospitable Table is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind, generous Offices between marry’d Persons, where there is no Suspicion of Self-love in the Agent; but he is imagin’d as acting from Love to his Associate. This, ∥72 I fancy, first introduc’d Ideas of Modesty in polite Nations, and Custom has strengthen’d them wonderfully∥; so that we are now asham’d of many things, upon some confus’d implicit Opinions of moral Evil, tho we know not upon what account.

Honour and Shame, often from some Associations of Ideas.Here too we may see the reason, why we are not asham’d of any of the Methods of Grandeur, or high-Living. There is such a Mixture of moral Ideas, of Benevolence, of Abilitys kindly employ’d; so many Dependants supported, so many Friends entertain’d, assisted, protected; such a Capacity imagin’d for great and amiable Actions, that we are never asham’d, but rather boast of such things: We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our State and Magnificence should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of moral Ideas, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of State, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas’d with a Company of Statues surrounding his Table, so artfully contriv’d as to consume his various Courses, and inspir’d by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in praise of their Fare? Or with so many Machines to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?

The Shame we suffer from the Meanness of Dress, Table, Equipage, is entirely owing to the same reason. This Meanness is often imagin’d to argue Avarice, Meanness of Spirit, want of Capacity, or Conduct in Life, of Industry, or moral Abilitys of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion’d by a good Action. How ∥73 many∥ would be asham’d to be surpriz’d at a Dinner of cold Meat, who will boast of their having fed upon Dogs and Horses at the Siege of Derry?iii And they will all tell you that they were not, nor are asham’d of it.

This ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between external Grandeur, Regularity in Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges of Honour, and some moral Abilitys greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some recluse Philosophers apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count miraculous, viz. That Civil Governors of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible Awe, and Authority, quell ∥74 the∥ Spirits of the Vulgar, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer’d by those Associations ∥75 which might be rais’d among∥ the Disaffected, or Factious of any State; who are daring enough among their Equals, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize.

∥76 Hence also we may∥ discover the reason, why the gratifying our superior Senses of Beauty and Harmony, or the Enjoyment of the ∥77 Pleasures∥ of Knowledge, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho our Enjoyment were known to all the World. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that altho we pursue these Enjoyments from Self-love, yet∥78 , since∥ our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to ∥79 others, no∥ Man is imagin’d any way inhumanly selfish, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same Regularity or Harmony which delights me, may at the same time delight multitudes; the same Theorem shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain’d thousands. ∥80 Men therefore are not∥ asham’d of such Pursuits, since they ∥81 never, of themselves,∥ seduce us into any thing malicious, envious, or ill-natur’d; nor does any one apprehend another too selfish, from ∥82 his∥ pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure.83

This View of Honour and Shame may also let us see the reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais’d, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really selfish; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc’d by hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.

Compassion a motive to Virtue.VIII. Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind, which strongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and that is Compassion; by which we are dispos’d to study the Interest of others, without any Views of private Advantage. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv’d in, unless the Person be imagin’d ∥84 evil∥, in a moral Sense: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov’d, even in that Case. Advantage may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome Pity; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of Hatred or Anger may represent a Person as absolutely evil, and so extinguish Pity; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another disinterested View may even in cold blood overcome Pity; such as Love to our Country, or Zeal for Religion. Persecution is generally occasion’d by Love of Virtue, and ∥85 a∥ Desire of the eternal Happiness of Mankind, altho our Folly makes us chuse absurd Means ∥86 to promote it∥; and is often accompany’d with Pity enough to make the Persecutor uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the Heretick as absolutely and entirely evil.

We may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of human Nature is adapted to move Compassion. Our ∥87 Misery or Distress immediately appears∥ in our Countenance, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who from Observation, universally understand the meaning of those dismal Airs. We mechanically send forth Shrieks and Groans upon any surprizing Apprehension of Evil; so that no regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them∥88 . This is the Voice of Nature, understood by all Nations, by which∥ all who are present are rous’d to our Assistance, and sometimes our injurious Enemy is made to relent.

We observ’d above,* that we are not immediately excited by Compassion to desire the Removal of our own Pain: we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we are excited directly to desire the Relief of the Miserable; ∥90 without any imagination that this Relief is a private Good to our selves: And∥ if we see this impossible, we may by Reflection discern it to be vain for us to indulge our Compassion any further; and then ∥91 Self-love prompts us to∥ retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and ∥92 to endeavour∥ to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such Reflection, People are hurry’d by a natural, kind Instinct, to see Objects of Compassion, and expose themselves to this Pain when they can give no reason for it; as in the Instance of publick Executions.

This same Principle leads men to Tragedys; only we are to observe, that another strong reason of this, is the moral Beauty of the Characters and Actions which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be ∥93 pleas’d to∥ see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept strangers to the moral Qualitys of the Sufferers, or their Characters and Actions. As in such a case, there would be no Beauty to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.

It was the same Cause which crouded the Roman Theatres to see Gladiators. There the People had frequent Instances of great Courage, and Contempt of Death, two great moral Abilitys, if not Virtues. Hence Cicero looks upon them as great Instructions in Fortitude. The Antagonist Gladiator bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the courageous and artful one, really obtain’d a Reputation of Virtue, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of Self-defence. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their natural Instinct to Compassion, was the true occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for.

What Sentiments can we imagine a Candidate would have rais’d of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of Misery; had he drain’d Hospitals and Infirmarys of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many Slaves, and without94 any Resistance, butcher’d them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however Compassion95 might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his Antagonist chose a Diversion apparently more virtuous, or with a Mixture of Scenes of Virtue.

Compassion natural.How independent this Disposition to Compassion is ∥96 on∥ Custom, Education, ∥97 or∥ Instruction, will appear from the Prevalence of it in Women and Children, who are less influenc’d by these. That Children ∥98 delight in some Actions which∥ are cruel and tormenting to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from Malice, or want of Compassion, but from their Ignorance of those signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a Curiosity to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their Compassion often becomes too strong for their Reason; as it generally does in beholding Executions, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, or Pain in the Malefactor, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the ∥99 State.∥

SECTION VI

Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.

Importance of the Moral Sense.I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain’d of every where, this moral Sense has a greater Influence on Mankind than is generally imagin’d, altho it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of publick Good, and often overcome by Self-love. But we shall offer some further Considerations, to prove, “That it gives us more Pleasure and Pain than all our other Facultys.” And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, “That ∥1 where-ever∥ any morally good Quality gives Pleasure from Reflection, or from Honour, the contrary evil one will give proportionable Pain, from Remorse and Shame.” Now we shall consider the moral Pleasures, not only separately, but as they are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary Pleasures of Life.

All ∥2 Men∥ seem persuaded of some Excellency in the Possession of good moral Qualitys, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of moral Evil, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc’d by moral Sentiments, yet it is certain, that Self-interested Passions frequently overcome them, and partial Views of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really morally evil, apprehending it to be good. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern’d; for in these Sentiments human Nature is calm and undisturb’d, and shews its true Face.

Now ∥3 should∥ we imagine a rational Creature in a sufficiently happy State, ∥4 tho his∥ Mind was, without Interruption, wholly occupy’d with pleasant Sensations of Smell, Taste, Touch, &c. if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? ∥5 Should∥ we not think the State low, mean and sordid, if there were no Society, no Love or Friendship, no good Offices? What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the external Senses, with such long Intervals as human Nature at present must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the Luxurious happy? How insipid and joyless are the Reflections on past Pleasure? And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the nauseous Satietys, and Languors in the Intervals? This Frame of our Nature, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the external Senses, points out to us, “That there must be some other more durable Pleasure, without such tedious Interruptions, and nauseous Reflections.”

Let us even join with the Pleasures of the external Senses, the Perceptions of Beauty, Order, Harmony. These are no doubt more noble Pleasures, and seem to inlarge the Mind; and yet how cold and joyless are they, if there be no moral Pleasures of Friendship, Love and Beneficence? Now if the bare Absence of moral Good, makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of contrary Dispositions is always imagin’d by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a wrathful, malicious, revengeful, or envious Being, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all ∥6 the Pleasures of the external and internal Senses? The internal Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, contribute greatly indeed toward soothing∥ the Mind into a forgetfulness of Wrath, Malice or Revenge; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while these Affections possess the Mind, there is nothing but Torment and Misery.

Castle-builders prove it.What Castle-builder, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he ∥7 should∥ be happy, ever made acknowledg’d Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish’d for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain’d it? We always conduct our selves in such Resveries, according to the Dictates of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich’d by some innocent Accident.

But Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger, have nothing so detestable in them, that our Self-love cannot allow us to be often expos’d to them. ∥8 On the contrary∥, the Virtues which these give us occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero in Romance, or Epic, brought to his high-est Pitch of Happiness, without going thro them all. Where there is no Virtue, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the Romance, or Epos must end. Nay, the Difficulty,† or natural Evil, does so much increase the Virtue of the good Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of Benevolence in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of external Prosperity or natural Good, without any thing moral or virtuous, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where Virtue ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

Virtue own’d superior to all Pleasure.Let us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of Virtue to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon Vice as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of Regulus,ii10 without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that gallant Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how ∥11 a better∥ Fate? Should he have comply’d with the Terms of the Carthaginians, and preserv’d himself from the intended Tortures, tho to the detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, that Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes.—“Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals.”—What else do we wish then, but that the Carthaginians had relented of their Cruelty, or that Providence, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him out of their hands.

12 Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin’d to judge Virtue with Peace and Safety, preferable to Virtue with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the Virtuous, the Publick-spirited, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We ∥13 should∥ never have imagin’d him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of his Virtue. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted foolishly in secu-ring his Virtue, his Honour, at the expence of his Ease, his Pleasure, his Life. Nor can we think these latter Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are entirely lost.

Necessary in other Pleasures.II. Let us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. Wealth and External Pleasures bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in Wealth, some suppos’d beneficent Intention of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our Familys, or Kinsmen? And in our imagin’d Happiness ∥14 from∥ external Pleasure, ∥15 are not some Ideas∥ always included of some moral Enjoyments of Society, some Communication of Pleasure, something of Love, of Friendship, of Esteem, of Gratitude? Who ever pretended to a Taste of ∥16 these∥ Pleasures without Society? Or if any seem violent in pursuit of ∥17 them∥, how base and contemptible do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure?

18 Now were there no moral Sense, no Happiness in Benevolence, and did we act from no other Principle than Self-love; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Sen-ses, which we could not ∥19 enjoy alone∥, with less trouble and expence than in Society. But a Mixture of the moral Pleasures is what gives the alluring Relish; ’tis some Appearance of Friendship, of Love, of communicating Pleasure to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the Luxurious from being nauseous and insipid. And this partial Imagination of some good moral Qualitys, some Benevolence, in Actions which have many cruel, inhuman, and destructive Consequences toward others, is what has kept Vice more in countenance than any other Consideration.*

But to convince us further wherein the Happiness of Wealth, and external Pleasure lies; let us but suppose Malice, Wrath, Revenge; or only Solitude, Absence of Friendship, of Love, of Society, of Esteem, join’d with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet Love, Friendship, Society, Humanity, tho accompany’d with Poverty and Toil, nay even with smaller degrees of Pain, such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews, “That Virtue is the chief Happiness in the ∥21 Judgment of all∥ Mankind.”

The Charm in Beauty.III. There is a further Consideration which must not be pass’d over, concerning the External Beauty of Persons, which all allow to have ∥22 a∥ great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended Morality, some natural or imagin’d Indication of concomitant Virtue, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of Beauty. Let us consider the Characters of Beauty, which are commonly admir’d in Countenances, and we shall find them to be Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tenderness, Good-nature; that is, that certain Airs, Proportions, je ne scai quoy’s, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilitys or Dispositions toward them. As we observ’d above* of Misery, or Distress appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all habitual Dispositions of Mind, form the countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our violent Passions are obvious at first view in the Countenance; so that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller degrees of them give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now when the natural Air of ∥24 a∥ Face approaches to that which any Passion would form it unto, we make a conjecture from this concerning the leading Disposition of the Person’s Mind.

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward large Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes; unless we knew from themselves under what Idea ∥25 such Features∥ are admir’d, whether as naturally beautiful in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum’d Indications of some moral Qualitys; we may more probably conclude that it is the latter; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion ∥26 towards∥ Faces among our selves. And ∥27 as to those∥ Features which we count naturally disagreeable as to Form, we know the Aversion on this account is so weak, that moral Qualitys shall procure a liking, even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the Irregularity, or want of that Regularity which is common in others. With us certain Features are imagin’d to denote Dulness; as hollow Eyes, large Lips; a Colour of Hair, Wantonness: and may we not conclude the like Association of Ideas, ∥28 perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in Nature,∥ to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

In the same manner, when there is nothing grosly disproportion’d in any Face, what is it we dispraise? ∥29 It is∥ Pride, Haugh-tiness, Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity, Wantonness; which some Countenances discover in the manner above hinted at? And ∥30 these∥ Airs, when brought by Custom upon the most regular Set of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as the contrary Airs have given the strongest Charms to Countenances, which ∥31 were∥ far from Perfection in external Beauty.

∥32 One cannot but observe the Judgment of Homer, in his Character of Helen. Had he ever so much rais’d our Idea of her external Beauty,∥ it would have been ridiculous to have engag’d his Countrymen in a War for such a Helen as Virgil has drawn her. He therefore still retains something ∥33 amiable in a moral Sense,∥ amidst all her Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

The Cause of different Fancys of Beauty.This Consideration may shew us one Reason, among many others, for Mens different Fancys, or Relishes of Beauty. The Mind of Man, however generally dispos’d to esteem Benevolence and Virtue, yet by more particular Attention to some kinds of it than others, may gain a stronger Admiration of some moral Dispositions than others. Military Men, may admire Courage more than other Virtues; Persons of smaller Courage, may admire Sweetness of Temper; Men of Thought and Reflection, who have more extensive Views, will admire the like Qualitys in others; Men of keen Passions, expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm’d by Compliance: the Proud, may like those of higher Spirit, as more suitable to their Dignity; tho Pride, join’d with Reflection and good Sense, will recommend to them Humility in the Person belov’d. Now as the various Tempers of Men make various Tempers of others agreeable to them, so they must differ in their Relishes of Beauty, according as it denotes the several Qualitys most agreeable to themselves.

This may also shew us, how in virtuous Love there may be the greatest Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. Love it self gives a Beauty to the Lover, in the Eyes of the Person belov’d, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the strongest Charm possible, and that which will have the greatest Power, where there is not some very great Counter-ballance from worldly Interest, Vice, or gross Deformity.

Air, Motion, Gestures.IV. This same Consideration may be extended to the whole Air and Motion of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes Chearfulness, Ease, a Condescension, and Readiness to oblige, a Love of Company, with a Freedom and Boldness which always accompanys an honest, undesigning Heart. On the contrary, what is shocking in Air, or Motion, is Roughness, Ill-nature, a Disregard to others, or a foolish Shame-facedness, which evidences a Person to be unexperienc’d in Society, or Offices of Humanity.

With relation to these Airs, Motions, Gestures, we may observe, that considering the different Ceremonys, and Modes of shewing respect, which are practis’d in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude that there is no natural Connexion between any of these Gestures, or Motions, and the Affections of Mind which they are by Custom made to express. But when Custom has made any of them pass for Expressions of such Affections, by a constant Association of Ideas, some shall become agreeable and lovely, and others extremely offensive, altho they were both, in their own Nature, perfectly indifferent.

The Spring of Love between the Sexes.V. Here we may remark the manner in which Nature leads Mankind to the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin’d us to it, without any great prospect of Happiness; as we see Hunger and Thirst determine us to preserve our Bodys, tho few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The Sexes might have been engag’d to Concurrence, ∥34 as∥ we imagine the Brutes are, by Desire only, or by a Love of sensual Pleasure. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in Marriage? Who would have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a Family, and Education of Children? Or who, from the general Motive of Benevolence ∥35 alone∥, would have chosen to subject himself to natural Affection toward an Offspring, when he could ∥36 so easily foresee what∥ Troubles it might occasion?

37 This Inclination therefore of the Sexes, is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Sollicitations of Uneasiness, or the bare desire of sensible Pleasure. 38 Beauty gives a favourable Presumption of good moral Dispositions, and Acquaintance confirms this into a real Love of Esteem, or begets it, where there is little Beauty. This raises an expectation of the greatest moral Pleasures along with the sensible, and a thousand tender Sentiments of Humanity and Generosity; and makes us impatient for a Society which we imagine big with unspeakable moral Pleasures: where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service, being an Evidence of this strong Love ∥39 of∥ Esteem, is mutually receiv’d with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation. And where Prudence and Good-nature influence both sides, this Society may answer all their Expectations.

Nay, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the fair Sex, and we shall find, ∥40 that Love of sensible Pleasure is not∥ the chief Motive of Debauchery, or false Gallantry. Were it so, the meanest Prostitutes would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that ∥41 Men∥ are fond of Good-nature, Faith, Pleasantry of Temper, Wit, and many other moral Qualitys, even in a Mistress. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, viz. “That Chastity it self has a powerful Charm in the Eyes of the Dissolute, even when they are attempting to destroy it.”

This powerful Determination even to a limited Benevolence, and other moral Sentiments, is observ’d to give a ∥42 strong∥ biass to our Minds ∥43 toward∥ a universal Goodness, Tenderness, Humanity, Generosity, and contempt of private Good in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our external Deportment, and in our relish of Beauty, Order, and Harmony. As soon as a Heart, before hard and obdurate, is soften’d in this Flame, we shall observe∥44 , arising along with it,∥ a Love of Poetry, Musick, the Beauty of Nature in rural Scenes, a Contempt of other selfish Pleasures of the external Senses, a neat Dress, a humane Deportment, a Delight in and Emulation of every thing which is gallant, generous and friendly.

Society, Friendships, from our Moral Sense.In the same manner we are determin’d to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our Necessitys, or Prospects of Interest; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of Love, Good-nature, and other morally amiable Qualitys in those we converse with. ∥45 And∥ among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to Chearfulness, a Delight to raise Mirth in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an agreeable, innocent, good-natur’d, and easy state of Mind, as we are conscious of while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven’d by moderate Laughter.

The Power of Oratory founded on it.VI. Upon this moral Sense is founded all the Power of the Orator. The various Figures of Speech, are the several Manners which a lively Genius, warm’d with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify’d by Custom: and they only move the Hearers, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the Speaker; which are communicated to the Hearers, as we* observ’d above of one Passion, viz. Pity.

Now the Passions which the Orator attempts to raise, are all founded on moral Qualitys. All the bold Metaphors, or Descriptions, all the artificial Manners of Expostulation, Arguing, and addressing the Audience, all the Appeals to Mankind, are but more lively Methods of giving the Audience a stronger impression of the moral Qualitys of the Person accus’d, or defended; of the Action advis’d, or dissuaded: And all the Antitheses, or Witticisms; all the Cadences of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of no consequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of Morality. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the Speaker, among those who already favour his Party, but they oftner raise Contempt in his Adversarys. But when you display the Beneficence of any Action, the good Effect it shall have on the Publick in promoting the Welfare of the Innocent, and relieving the unjustly distressed; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be recommended, display his Humanity, Generosity, Study of the publick Good, and Capacity to promote it, his Contempt of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him Love and Esteem. If at the same time you shew his Distress, or the Injurys he has suffer’d, you raise Pity, and every tender Affection.

On the contrary, represent the Barbarity, or Cruelty of any Action, the Misery it shall procure to the Kind, the Faithful, the Generous, or only to the Innocent; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breasts of the Audience, tho they were not the Persons who would have suffer’d by it. The same way, would you make a Person infamous, and despis’d and hated, represent him as cruel, inhuman, or treacherous toward the most distant rational Agents; or shew him only to be selfish, ∥46 and∥ given to solitary Luxury, without regard to any Friend, or the Interest of others; and you have gain’d your Point as soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay, ∥47 how does it∥ stop our Admiration of any celebrated Action, to suggest, “That the Author of it was no Fool; he knew it would turn to his own Advantage?”

Now, are the Learned and Polite the only Persons who are mov’d by such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the Moralists and Politicians, or the Art of Rhetorick, to be capable of being persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting Self-Interest? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the rude undisciplin’d Multitude most affected? Where had Oratory so much Power as in popular States, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? Reflection, and Study, may raise in Men a Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ’d upon themselves: but rude Nature is still open to every moral Impression, and carry’d furiously along without Caution, or Suspense. It was not the Groves of the Academy, or the polish’d Stones of the Portico, or the manag’d Horses of Greece, which listen’d to the Harp of an Amphion, or an Orpheus;iv but the Trees, and Rocks, and Tygers of the Forest: which may shew us, “That there is some Sense of Morality antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments proving the private Interest of the Person who is persuaded, to be connected with the publick Good.”

Poetry pleases from this Moral Sense.VII. We shall find ∥48 this∥ Sense to be the Foundation ∥49 also∥ of the chief Pleasures of Poetry. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the Numbers, Measures, Metaphors, Similitudes.* But as the Contemplation of moral Objects, either of Vice or Virtue, affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and ∥50 more∥ powerful manner, than natural Beauty, or (what we commonly call) Deformity; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to our moral Sense, and affect us more vehemently, than the ∥51 Representation∥ of natural Objects in the liveliest Descriptions. Dramatic, and Epic Poetry, are entirely address’d to this Sense, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of Characters, distinctly represented as morally good, or evil; as might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions separately.

Where we are studying to raise any Desire, or Admiration of an Object really beautiful, we are not content with a bare Narration, but endeavour, if we can, to present the Object it self, or the most lively Image of it. And ∥52 hence∥ the Epic Poem, or Tragedy, ∥53 gives∥ a ∥54 vastly∥ greater Pleasure than the Writings of Philosophers, tho both aim at recommending Virtue. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be judicious, natural, and lively, will make us admire the Good, and detest the Vitious, the Inhuman, the Treacherous and Cruel, by means of our moral Sense, without any Reflections of the Poet to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that Horace has justly made Knowledge in Morals so necessary to a good Poet:

And again:

• Qui didicit Patriae quid debeat, & quid Amicis,
• Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hospes,
• Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, quae
• Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto
• Reddere Personae scit convenientia cuique.†vi

Imagery in Poetry founded on the Moral Sense.Upon this same Sense is founded the Power of that great Beauty in Poetry, the Prosopopoeia, by which every Affection is made a Person; every natural Event, Cause, Object, is animated by moral Epithets. For we join the Contemplation of moral Circumstances and Qualitys, along with natural Objects, to increase ∥58 their∥ Beauty or Deformity; and ∥59 we∥ affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections describ’d, by representing them as Persons. Thus a shady Wood must have its solemn venerable Genius, and proper rural Gods; every clear Fountain, its sacred chaste Nymph; and River, its bountiful God, with his Urn, and perhaps a Cornu-copia diffusing Plenty and Fruitfulness along ∥60 its∥ Banks. The Day-light is holy, benign, and powerful to banish the pernicious Spirits of the Night. The Morning is a kind, officious Goddess, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering in Light to Gods and Men. War is an impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster, whom no Virtue, no Circumstance of Compassion, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is unrelenting; the Arrow and Spear are impatient to destroy, and carry Death on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are also frightful Personages, ∥61 counterfeiting with their rude Throats∥ the Thunder of Jove. The moral Imagery of Death is every where known, viz. his Insensibility to Pity, his Inflexibility, and universal impartial Empire. Fortune is inimitably drawn by Horace,* with all her Retinue and Votaries, and with her rigid severe Minister, Necessity. The Qualitys of Mind too become Persons. Love becomes a Venus, or a Cupid; Courage, or Conduct, a Mars, or a Pallas protecting and assisting the Hero; before them march Terror and Dread, Flight and Pursuit, Shouts and Amazement. Nay, the most sacred Poets are often led into this Imagery, and represent Justice and Judgment as supporting the Almighty’s Throne, and Mercy and Truth going before his Face: They shew us Peace as springing up from the Earth, and Mercy looking down from Heaven.

Every one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of moral Ideas, than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of Homer, and is prepar’d, from the Council of the Gods, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful Description which ever was imagin’d of shooting an Arrow, meets with its moral Epithet,

• ——— μελαινάων ἕρμ’ ὀδυνᾴων,†
• ——— The Source of blackest Woes;vii

he will find himself more mov’d by this Circumstance, than by all the Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.

History.63VIII. History derives its chief Excellence from the representing the Manners and Characters; the Contemplation of which in Nature being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure when well related.

Painting.64IX. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of Face-painting is but a poor Entertainment, when compar’d with those Pieces which represent moral Actions, Passions, and Characters.65

SECTION VII

A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.

I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence∥1 . It remains to be explain’d, how we acquire more particular Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting∥ from any Law, Human, or Divine.

Obligation.If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, ∥2 abstracting∥ from the Laws of a Superior? We must answer according to the various Senses of the word Obligation. If by Obligation we understand a Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas’d with our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to ∥3 it∥; in this meaning of the word Obligation, there is naturally an Obligation upon all Men to Benevolence; and they are still under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of ∥4 their∥ Actions, this moral Sense leads them to Evil; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken’d. For it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this internal Sense, and Instinct ∥5 toward∥ Benevolence, will either influence our Actions, or ∥6 else∥ make us very uneasy and dissatisfy’d; and we shall be conscious that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any Law whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole ∥7 benevolent∥, and what not; as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear’d ∥8 benevolent∥: ∥9 or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur’d will not fail to upbraid us.∥ So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a serious Inquiry into the Tendency of his Actions, and a perpetual Study of universal Good∥10 , according to the justest Notions of it∥.

But if by Obligation, we understand a Motive from Self-interest, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a Sense of such ∥11 an∥ Obligation, by reflecting on this Determination of our Nature to approve Virtue, to be pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon our having done virtuous Actions, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any other Enjoyment.* We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of Obligation, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of benevolent and social Actions, to be the most probable means of promoting the natural Good of every Individual; as Cumberland and Puffendorf have prov’d: And all this without Relation to a Law.

But further, if our moral Sense be suppos’d exceedingly weaken’d, and the selfish Passions grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our Understanding be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry’d by our Passions into precipitate and rash Judgments, that malicious Actions shall ∥12 promote our Advantage more∥ than Beneficence; in such a Case, if it be inquir’d what is necessary to engage Men to beneficent Actions, or induce a steady Sense of an Obligation to act for the publick Good; then, no doubt, “A Law with Sanctions, given by a superior Being, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must be necessary to counter-ballance those apparent Motives of Interest, to calm our Passions, and give room for the recovery of our moral Sense, or at least for a just View of our Interest.”

How far Virtue can be taught.II. Now the principal Business of the moral Philosopher is to shew, from solid Reasons, “That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of the Benevolent, either from the Pleasures of Reflection, Honour, natural Tendency to engage the good Offices of Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for our Happiness in this World; or from the Sanctions of divine Laws discover’d to us by the Constitution of the Universe;” that so no apparent Views of Interest may counteract this natural Inclination: but not to attempt proving, “That Prospects of our own Advantage of any kind, can raise in us ∥13 real Love to∥ others.” Let the Obstacles from Self-love be only remov’d, and Nature it self will incline us to Be-nevolence. Let the Misery of excessive Selfishness, and all its Passions, be but once explain’d, that so Self-love may cease to counteract our natural Propensity to Benevolence, and when this noble Disposition gets loose from these Bonds of Ignorance, and false Views of Interest, it shall be assisted even by Self-love, and grow strong enough to make a noble virtuous Character. Then he is to enquire, by Reflection upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the universal Good, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ’d, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our good Inclinations may be directed by Reason, and a just Knowledge of the Interests of Mankind. But Virtue it self, or good Dispositions of Mind, are not directly taught, or produc’d by Instruction; ∥14 they must be originally implanted in our Nature, by its great Author; and afterwards strengthen’d and confirm’d by our own Cultivation.∥

Objection.∥15^aIII. We are often told, “That there is no need of supposing such a Sense of Morality given to Men, since Reflection, and Instruction would recommend the same Actions from Arguments of Self-Interest, and engage us, from the acknowledg’d Principle of Self-love, to the Practice of them, without this unintelligible Determination to Benevolence, or the occult Quality of a moral Sense.”

Moral Sense, not from Reflection.It is perhaps true, that Reflection and Reason might lead us to approve the same Actions as advantageous. But would not the same Reflection and Reason likewise, generally recommend the same Meats to us which our Taste represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude that we have no Sense of Tasting? Or that such a Sense is useless? No: The use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty Reason we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the external Senses, or to ∥16^bdirect^b∥ our Actions for the Good of the Whole, without this moral Sense. Nor could we be so strongly determin’d at all times to what ∥17^cis^c∥ most conducive to either of these Ends, without these expeditious Monitors, and importunate Sollicitors; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of Self-Interest, as by those delightful Sensations.

This natural Determination to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality. But is it any way more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise Esteem, or Contempt, than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give Pleasure, or Pain; or the Act of Volition should move Flesh and Bones? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the Indian’s Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with this Determination to love and approve, or ∥18^dhate^d∥ and despise Actions and Agents, without any Views of Interest, as they appear benevolent, or the ∥19^econtrary.^e∥

When they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such Sense, antecedent to all Prospect of Interest, “That these Actions for the most part are really advantageous, one way or other, to the Actor, the Approver, or Mankind in general, by whose Happiness our own State may be some way made better;” may we not ask, supposing the Deity intended to impress such a Sense of something amiable in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) what sort of Actions would a good God determine ∥20^fus^f∥ to approve? Must we deny the possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no Advantage to Man-kind, or to love Agents for their being eminent Triflers? If then the Actions which a wise and good God must determine us to approve, if he give us any such Sense at all, must be Actions useful to the Publick, this Advantage can never be a Reason against the Sense it self. After the same manner, we should deny all Revelation which taught us good Sense, Humanity, Justice, and a rational Worship, because Reason and ∥21^gInterest^g∥ confirm and recommend such Principles, and Services; and should greedily embrace every Contradiction, Foppery, and Pageantry, as a truly divine Institution, without any thing humane, or useful to Mankind.

Moral Sense judges of Laws.IV. The Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of Good and Evil from the private Advantage of the Actor, or from Relation to a Law and its Sanctions, either known from Reason, or Revelation, are perpetually recurring to this moral Sense which they deny; not only in calling the Laws of the Deity just and good, and alledging Justice and Right in the Deity to govern us; but by using a set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only meaning. Obligation, with them, is ∥22^honly^h∥ such a Constitution, either of Nature, or some governing Power, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to act in a certain manner. Let this Definition be substituted, wherever we meet with the words, ought, should, must, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the Deity must act rationally, must not, or ought not to punish the Innocent, must make the state of the Virtuous better than that of the Wicked, must observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, must, ought, should, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable.^a∥

23V. But that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not on Laws, may plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves; and that not only of human Laws, but of the divine. What else can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, “That the Laws of God are just, and holy, and good?” Human Laws may be call’d good, because of their Conformity to the Divine. But to call the Laws of the supreme Deity good, or holy, or just, if all ∥24 Goodness, Holiness∥, and Justice be constituted by Laws, or the Will of a Superior any way reveal’d, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, “That God wills what he wills.”25

26 It must then first be suppos’d, that there is something in Actions which is apprehend-ed absolutely good; and this is Benevolence, or ∥27 a Tendency to∥ the publick natural happiness of rational Agents; and that our moral Sense perceives this Excellence. And then we call the Laws of the Deity good, when we imagine that they are contriv’d to promote the publick Good in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the Deity is call’d ∥28 good∥, in a moral Sense, when we apprehend that his whole Providence tends to the universal Happiness of his Creatures; whence we conclude his Benevolence, and ∥29 Delight∥ in their Happiness.

Some tell us, “That the Goodness of the divine Laws, consists in their Conformity to some essential Rectitude of his Nature.”i But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, essential Rectitude, and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a perfectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence.

Difference between Constraint, and Obligation.Hence we may see the Difference between Constraint, and Obligation. There is indeed no Difference between Constraint, and the second Sense of the word Obligation, viz. a Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest, if we only mean external Interest, distinct from the delightful Consciousness which arises from the moral Sense. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by Constraint, we do not understand ∥30 an∥ external Force moving our Limbs without our Consent, for in that Case we are not Agents at all; but that Constraint which arises from the threatening and presenting some Evil, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there seems a universally acknowledg’d Difference between even this sort of Constraint, and Obligation. We never say we are oblig’d to do an Action which we count base, but we may be constrain’d to it; we never say that the divine Laws, by their Sanctions, constrain us, but oblige us; nor do we call Obedience to the Deity Constraint, unless by a Metaphor, ∥31 tho∥ many own they are influenc’d by fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an almighty evil Being should require, under grievous Penaltys, Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude, we would call this Constraint. The difference is plainly this. When any ∥32 Sanctions co-operate∥ with our moral Sense, in exciting us to Actions which we count morally good, we say we are oblig’d; but when Sanctions of Rewards or ∥33 Punishments∥ oppose our moral Sense, then we say we are brib’d or constrain’d. In the former Case we call the Lawgiver good, as designing the publick Happiness; in the latter we call him evil, or unjust, for the suppos’d contrary Intention. But were all our Ideas of moral Good or Evil, deriv’d solely from opinions of private Advantage or Loss in Actions, I see no possible difference which could be made in the meaning of these words.

Rights.34VI. From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights. Whenever it appears to us, that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow’d in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good, we say that ∥35 any Person∥ in such Circumstances, has a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing. And according as this Tendency to the publick Good is greater or less, the Right is greater or less.

Perfect Rights.The Rights call’d perfect, are of such necessity to the publick Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable; and it actually makes those miserable, whose Rights are thus ∥36 violated. On∥ the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every Instance, tends to the publick Good, either directly, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part. Hence it plainly follows, “That ∥37 to allow∥ a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such Rights, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the Publick, than the Violation of them with Impunity.” And as to the general Consequences, the universal use of Force in a ∥38 State of Nature∥, in pursuance of perfect Rights, seems exceedingly advantageous to the Whole, by making every one dread any Attempts against the perfect Rights of others.

Right of War, and Punishment.39 This is the moral Effect which attends proper Injury, or a Violation of the perfect Rights of others, viz. A Right to War, and all Violence which is necessary to oblige the Injurious to repair the Damage, and give Security against such Offences for the future. ∥40^aThis is the sole Foundation of the Rights of punishing Criminals, and of violent Prosecutions of our Rights, in a ∥41^bState of Nature^b∥. And these Rights, ∥42^cbelonging originally to the Persons injur’d, or their voluntary, or invited Assistants,^c∥ according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, ∥43^din a State of Nature,^d∥ being by ∥44^ethe^e∥ Consent of the ∥45^fPersons injur’d^f∥, transferr’d to the Magistrate in a Civil State, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment.^a∥ Instances of perfect Rights are those to our Lives; to the Fruits of our Labours; to demand Performance of Contracts upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to direct our own Actions either for publick, or innocent private Good, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and many others of like nature.

Imperfect Rights.Imperfect Rights are such as, when universally violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable. These Rights tend to the improvement and increase of positive Good in any Society, but are not absolutely necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them, only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any Good which they had before. From this Description it appears, “That a violent Prosecution of such Rights, would generally occasion greater Evil than the Violation of them.” Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases, would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain’d to perform them. Instances of imperfect Rights are those which the poor have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.

46 The Violation of imperfect Rights, only argues a Man to have such weak Benevolence, as not to study advancing the positive Good of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of per-fect Rights, argues the injurious Person to be positively evil or cruel; or at least so immoderately selfish, as to be indifferent about the positive Misery and Ruin of others, when he imagines he can find his Interest in it. In violating the former, we shew a weak Desire of publick Happiness, which every small View of private Interest over-ballances; but in violating the latter, we shew our selves so entirely negligent of the Misery of others, that Views of increasing our own Good, overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the absence of Good, is more easily born than the presence of Misery; ∥47 so∥ our good Wishes toward the positive Good of others, ∥48 are∥ weaker than our Compassion toward their Misery. He then who violates imperfect Rights, shews that his Self-love overcomes only the Desire of positive good to others; but he who violates perfect Rights, betrays such a selfish Desire of advancing his own positive Good, as overcomes all ∥49 Compassion∥ toward the Misery of others.

External Rights.Beside these two sorts of Rights, there is a third call’d External; as when the doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet the ∥50 universally∥ denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear’d from the Use of this Faculty. And hence it appears, “That there can be no Right to use Force in opposition even to external Rights, since it tends to the universal Good to allow Force in pursuance of them.”

Civil Societys substitute Actions in Law, instead of the Force allow’d in the State of Nature.

Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensome on one side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity antecedent to that Law; as when a register’d Deed takes place of one not register’d, altho prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.

What Rights, can be opposite.Now whereas no action, Demand, or Possession, can at once be either necessary to the publick Good, or conducive to it, and at the same time its contrary be either necessary or conducive to the same end; it follows, “That there can be no Opposition of perfect Rights among themselves, of imperfect among themselves, or between perfect and imperfect Rights.” But it may often tend to the publick Good, to allow a Right of doing, possessing, or demanding, and of using Force in pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more humane and kind in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim’d his Right. But yet a violent Opposition to these Rights, would have been vastly more pernicious than all the Inhumanity in the use of them. And therefore, ∥51 tho∥ external Rights cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to imperfect Rights, but imperfect Rights, tho violated, give no Right to ∥52 Force. Hence∥ it appears, “That there can never be a Right to Force on both Sides, or a ∥53 just War on both Sides∥ at the same time.”

Rights alienable, and unalienable.54VII. There is another important Difference of Rights, according as they are Alienable, or Unalienable. To determine what Rights are alienable, and what not, we must take these two Marks:

1st. If the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our Right; and if it be so, then,

2dly. It must appear, that ∥55 to transfer∥ such Rights may serve some valuable Purpose.

By the first Mark it appears, “That the Right of private Judgment, or of our inward Sentiments, is unalienable;” since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we our selves, or any other Person ∥56 pleases. So∥ are also our internal Affections, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the second Mark it appears, “That our Right of serving God, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not alienable;” because it can never serve any valuable purpose, to make Men ∥57 worship∥ him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a direct Right over our Lives or Limbs, is not alienable to any Person; so that he might at Pleasure put us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a Right to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of importance to the Publick; and it may often serve a most valuable end, to subject the direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a publick Good; as Soldiers do to their General, or to a Council of War: and so far this Right is alienable. These may serve as Instances to shew the use of the two Marks of alienable Rights, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.

The Foundation of Property.58VIII. That we may see the Foundation of some of the more important Rights of Mankind, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their Labour and Industry; and consequently, ∥59 when once Men become so numerous, that the natural Product of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing System, that such a Tenour of Conduct be observ’d, as shall most effectually promote Industry; and that Men∥ abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, that general Benevolence alone, is not a Motive strong enough to Industry, to bear Labour and Toil, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from Self-love. For the strengthning therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of external Interest. Self-love is really as necessary to the Good of the Whole, as Benevolence; as that Attraction which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the regular State of the Whole, as Gravitation. Without these additional Motives, Self-love would generally oppose the Motions of Benevolence, and concur with Malice, or influence us to the same Actions which Malice would. “∥60 That∥ Tenour of Action then, ∥61 which∥ would take away the stronger Ties of Benevolence, or the additional Motives of Honour and Advantage, from our Minds, and so hinder us from pursuing industriously that Course which really increases the Good of the Whole, is evil; and we are oblig’d to shun it.”

First then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away all Motives ∥62 to Industry from Self-love, or the nearer Ties; and leaves us no other Motive than general Benevolence:∥ nay, it exposes the Industrious as a constant Prey to the Slothful, and sets Self-love against Industry. This is the Ground of our Right of Dominion and Property in the Fruits of our Labours; without which Right, we could scarce hope for any Industry, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. Industry will be confin’d to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of general Benevolence, if we are not allow’d to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the Right which Men have to lay up for the future, the Goods which will not be spoil’d by it; of alienating them in Trade; of Donation to Friends, Children, Relations: otherwise we deprive Industry of all the Motives of Self-love, Friendship, Gratitude, ∥63 and∥ natural Affection. The same Foundation there is for the Right of Disposition by Testament. The Presumption of ∥64 this∥ Disposition, is the Ground of the Right of Succession to the Intestate.

The external Right of the Miser to his useless Hoards, is founded also on this, that allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage Industry, and take away all the Pleasures of Generosity, Honour, Charity, which cease when Men can be forc’d ∥65 to∥ these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a Miser, and who is not.

Right of Marriage.Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the Males one of the strongest Motives to publick Good, viz. natural Affection; and discourage Industry, as has been shewn above.

Commerce.The Labour of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the Right of Commerce, and alienating our Goods; and also the Rights from Contracts and Promises, either to the Goods acquir’d by others, or to their Labours.

Right of Civil Government.∥66^aThe great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudic’d Arbitrators, impower’d to decide the Controversys which ordinarily arise, thro the partiality of Self-love, among Neighbours; as also from prudent Directors, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the publick Good, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign Injurys; but also be arm’d with Force sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad: these Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the Right Men have to constitute Civil Government, and to subject their alienable Rights to the Disposal of their Governours, under such Limitations as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an external Right at least, to dispose of them, ∥67^bas their Prudence shall direct^b∥, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no further.^a∥

Corollarys for comparing the degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions.68IX. These Instances may shew how our moral Sense, by a little Reflection upon the tendencys of actions, may adjust the Rights of Mankind. Let us now apply the general ∥69 Canon∥ laid down above,* for comparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc’d.†

From Ability.1. The Disappointment, in whole or in part, of any Attempt, Good or Evil, if it be occasion’d only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the moral Good, or Evil; for as in good Attempts, the Moment of Good, ∥72 or [M]∥ is diminish’d, or vanishes in such a case, so does the Ability, ∥73 or [A]∥ likewise: The Quotient then may still be the same. ∥74 This holds equally∥ in evil Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg’d good or evil by the Events, any ∥75 further∥ than they might have been foreseen by the Agent in evil Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were good, in good Actions; for then only they argue either Love or Hatred in the Agent.

Interest.2. Secular rewards annex’d to Virtue, and actually influencing the Agent fur-ther than his Benevolence would, diminish the moral Good ∥76 as far∥ as they were necessary to move the Agent to the action, or to make him do more Good than otherwise he would have done; for by increasing the Interest, ∥77 or [I] positive,∥ to be subtracted, they diminish the Benevolence. But additional Interests which were not necessary to have mov’d the Agent, such as the Rewards of a good Being for Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do not diminish the Virtue. In this however no Mortal is capable of judging another. Nor do the Prospects of grateful Returns for Benefits which we would have conferr’d gratuitously, diminish the Generosity. This Corollary may be apply’d to the Rewards of a future State, if any Person conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of virtue itself: If they be not conceiv’d as something distinct from those Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a virtuous Disposition.

3. External Advantage exciting us to Actions of evil tendency to others, if without this Prospect of Advantage we would not have undertaken them, diminishes the Evil of the Action; such as the Prospects of great Rewards, of avoiding Tortures, or even the uneasy Sollicitations of violent selfish ∥78 Passions. This∥ is com-monly call’d the greatness of Temptation. The reason of this is the same with that in the former Case∥79 , since H = ∥. We may here also remember again, that we are more uneasy upon the presence of Pain, than upon the absence of Good; and hence Torture is a more extenuating Circumstance than Bribes, engaging us to Evil, because ∥80 [I] is greater.∥

Detriment.4. The surmounting the uneasy Sollicitations of the selfish Passions, increases the Virtue of a benevolent Action, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. for now the Interest becomes negative; the Subtraction of which increases the Quantity.

5. A malicious Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen Disadvantages to the Agent, for the same reason: particularly,

Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions.6. The Knowledge of a Law prohibiting an evil Action, increases the Evil by increasing the negative Interest to be subtracted; for then the ill-natur’d Inclination must be so strong as to surmount all the ∥81 Motives of Self-love, to avoid∥ the Penaltys, and all the Motives of Gratitude toward the Law-giver. This is commonly call’d sinning against Conscience.

7. Offices of no Toil or Expence, have little Virtue generally, because the ability is very great, and there is no contrary Interest surmounted.

8. But the refusing of them may be very vitious, as it argues an absence of good Affection, and ∥82 often produces∥ a great enough Moment of natural Evil. And,

Degree of Right.9. In general, the fulfilling the perfect Rights of others has little Virtue in it; for thereby ∥83 no∥ Moment of Good is produc’d ∥84 more than there was before∥; and the Interest engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of War in a State of ∥85 Nature.∥

10. But the violating ∥86 perfect, or even external Rights,∥ is always exceedingly evil, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the selfish Motives surmounted by this vitious Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case.

11. The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an imperfect Right; and generally, the stronger their Right is, there is the less Virtue in fulfilling it, but the greater Vice in violating it.

Strength of Ties.∥87 Lemma. The stronger Ties of Benevolence, in equal Abilitys, must produce a greater Moment of Good, in equally good Characters, than the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection, Gratitude, Friendship, have greater Effects than general Benevolence. Hence,∥

12. In equal Moments of Good produc’d by two Agents, when one acts from general ∥88 Benevolence∥, and the other from a nearer Tie; there is greater Virtue in the Agent, who produces equal Good from the ∥89 weaker∥ Attachment, and less Virtue, where there is the ∥90 stronger∥ Attachment, which yet produces no ∥91 more∥.

13. But the Omission of the good Offices of the stronger Ties, or Actions contrary to them, have greater Vice in them, than the like Omissions or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; since our Selfish-ness or Malice must appear the greater, by the strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in co-operating with Gratitude, natural Affection, or Friendship, we evidence less Virtue in any given Moment of Good produc’d, than in equally important Actions of general Benevolence: But Ingratitude to a Benefactor, Negligence of the Interests of a Friend, or Relation; or Returns of evil Offices, are vastly more odious, than equal negligence, or evil Offices toward Strangers.

What Offices to be prefer’d, when there appears any Opposition.14. When we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of Benevolence, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination; according to the wise Order of Nature, ∥92 who∥ has constituted these Attachments. Thus, we are rather to be Grateful than Liberal, rather serve a Friend, or Kinsman, than a Stranger of only equal Virtue, when we cannot do both.

∥93^a15. Or more generally, since there can be no Right, Claim, or Obligation to Impossibilitys; when two Actions to be done by any Agent, would both tend to the good of Mankind, but they cannot be perform’d both at once; that which occasions most Good is to be done, if the Omission of the other occasions no prepollent Evil. If the omission of either, will occasion some new natural Evil, that is to be omitted, whose Omission will occasion the least Evil. Thus, if two Persons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we are to relieve the more valuable, when we cannot relieve both. Ingratitude, as it evidences a worse Temper than neglect of Beneficence; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suspicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be Grateful, rather than Beneficent, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion new positive Evil, or continuance in a State of Pain, whereas the Omission of another would only prevent some new positive Good; since a State of Pain is a greater Evil, than the absence of Good, we ∥94^bare^b∥ to follow Compassion, rather than Kindness; and relieve the Distressed, rather than increase the Pleasures of the Easy; when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose contrary Obligations, or Dutys; the more important Office is our present Duty, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no moral Evil.^a∥

The Original of Government.∥95^aX. From Art. vii.96^b it follows, “That all human Power, or Authority, must consist in a Right transferr’d to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an external Right to do or command every thing.” For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable Rights, there must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance. The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such cases, are, when they foresee that, thro their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that Governours, in the main very useful to the Publick, have ∥97^cby^c∥ some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the ruin of others. Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments.

Absolute Government.But by absolute Government, either in Prince, or Council, or in both jointly, we understand a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State∥98^d, or whole People^d∥; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of ∥99^ethe^e∥ Goods, manner of Levying, or the proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand. But in all States this tacit Trust is presuppos’d, “that the Power ∥100^fconferr’d^f∥ shall be employ’d according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good.” So that whenever the Governours openly profess a Design of ∥101^gdistroying^g∥ the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the essential Trust suppos’d in all ∥102^hconveyance of Civil Power^h∥, is violated, and the Grant thereby made void.

Limited Government.A Prince, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously Limited; either when the consent of the one may be necessary to the validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expresly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, ∥103ⁱor bothⁱ∥ jointly: as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expresly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of Election of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council is determin’d, and the Intention of their Assembling declar’d. In all such cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very Form of Government, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern’d in such a manner, by a Prince, or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very regular State, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg’d either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly beside that of the whole People associated into that State. To say, that upon a Change attempted in the very Form of ∥104^jthe^j∥ Government, by the supreme Power, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution itself, will not prove that the supreme Power has such a Right; unless we confound all Ideas of Right with those of external Force. The only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against such perfidious Trustees.

The nature of despotick Power.Despotick Power, is that which Persons injur’d may acquire over those Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over those who stand oblig’d to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to. This Power itself, is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights of the Governed which are naturally Unalienable; or to any thing which is not of some Moment ∥105^ktoward Repair^k∥ of Damage, Payment of Debt, or Security against future Offences. The Characteristick of de-spotick Power, is this, “that it is solely intended for the good of the Governours, without any tacit Trust of consulting the good of the Governed.” Despotick Government, in this Sense, is ∥106^ldirectly^l∥ inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government.

From the Idea of Right, as above explain’d, we must necessarily conclude, “that there can be no Right, or Limitation of Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good.” And therefore in Cases of extreme Necessity, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv’d from Ruin, it must certainly be Just and Good in limited Governours, or in any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own preservation, beyond the Limits fix’d by the Constitution, in some transitory acts, which are not to be made Precedents. And on the other hand, when an equal Necessity to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may counteract them. This Privilege of flagrant Necessity, we all allow in defence of the most perfect private Rights: And if publick Rights are of more extensive Importance, so are also publick Necessitys. These Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never over-ballance the Evils of vio-lating a tolerable Constitution, by an arbitrary act of Power, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their important Rights are ∥107^msecur’d^m∥ from the Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice of their Governours. Nor can any Magistracy be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where there are frequent Terrors of Insurrections. Whatever temporary acts therefore may be allow’d in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the transitory act of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a Person, or Council, elected, or limited by themselves, that they should soon have confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys, since no ∥108ⁿAssumerⁿ∥ of Government, can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the satisfaction and security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow,^a∥ “That except when Men, for their own Interest, or out of ∥109 publick Love∥, have by Consent subjected their Actions, or their Goods within certain Limits to the ∥110 Disposal∥ of others; no Mortal can have a Right from his superior Wisdom, or Goodness, or any other Quality, to give Laws to others without their Consent, express or tacit; or to dispose of the Fruits of their Labours, or of any other Right whatsoever.” ∥111 And therefore superior Wisdom, or Goodness, gives no Right to Men to govern others.^b∥

Divine Government founded on Wisdom and Goodness.But then with relation to the Deity, suppos’d omniscient and benevolent, and secure from Indigence, the ordinary Cause of Injurys toward others; it must be amiable in such a Being, to assume the Government of weak, inconstant Creatures, often misled by Selfishness; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from publick Love, as being contriv’d for the Good of the Whole, and for the greatest private Good consistent with it; and ∥112 every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the Divine Laws, than by his own greatest Prudence and∥ Circumspection. Hence we imagine, “That a good and wise God must have a perfect Right to govern the Universe; and that all Mortals are oblig’d to universal Obedience.”

Divine Justice what.The Justice of the Deity is only a Conception of his universal impartial Benevolence, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the universal Good, and inforce them with the most effectual Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments.

Creation not the Ground of God’s Dominion.113XI. Some imagine that the Property the Creator has in all his Works, must be the true Foundation of his Right to govern.ii Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the publick Good, that none should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods, acquir’d by the Labour of another, which we call his Property; and hence we imagine that Creation is the only Foundation of God’s Dominion. But if the Reason∥114* ∥ of establishing the Rights of Property does not hold against a perfectly wise and benevolent Being, I see no Reason why Property should be necessary to his Dominion. ∥115 Now∥ the Reason does not hold: For an infinitely wise and good Being, could never ∥116 employ his assumed Authority to∥ counteract the universal Good. The tie of Gratitude is stronger indeed than bare Benevolence; and therefore supposing two equally wise and good Beings, the one our Creator, and the other not, we ∥117 should∥ think our selves more oblig’d to obey our Creator. But supposing our Creator malicious,118 and a good Being condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his Right to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of Benevolence and Property concur in the one only true Deity, as far as we can know, join’d with infinite Wisdom and Power.

Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness.119XII. If it be here enquir’d, “Could not the Deity have given us a different or contrary determination of Mind, viz. to approve Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?” ∥120 It is certain, there is∥ nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But as in the first Treatise,* we resolv’d the Constitution of our present Sense of Beauty into the divine Goodness, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our moral Sense to his Goodness. For if the Deity be really benevolent, ∥122 or delights in∥ the Happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolent Intentions. For, ∥123 even∥ upon the Supposition of a contrary Sense, every rational Being must ∥124 still∥ have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, ∥125 that∥ universal Benevolence and a social Temper, ∥126 or a certain Course of external∥ Actions, would most effectually promote the external Good of every one, according to the Reasonings of Cumberland and Puffendorf; while at the same time this perverted Sense of Morality would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin’d us to the quite contrary, viz. Barbarity, Cruelty, and Fraud; and universal War, according to Mr. ∥127 Hobbs∥,iii would really have been our natural State; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy’d when we follow’d the Directions of either.

Whence this universal Opinion of the Divine Goodness.128XIII. It has ∥129 often been∥ taken for granted in these Papers, “That the Deity is morally good;” tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition. If we ∥130 enquire into∥ the Reason of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments à priori, from the Idea of an Independent Being, to prove his Goodness. But there is abundant Probability, deduc’d from the whole Frame of Nature, which seems, as far as we know, plainly contriv’d for the Good of the Whole; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design’d for ∥131 vastly∥ prepollent Good. ∥132 Nay∥, this very moral Sense, implanted in rational Agents, to ∥133 delight in∥, and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the Good of others, is one of the strongest Evidences of Goodness in the Author of Nature.

134 But these Reflections are ∥135 no way∥ so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated ∥136 by any one∥. What then more probably leads Mankind into that Opinion, is this. The obvious Frame of the World gives us Ideas of boundless Wisdom and Power in its Author. Such a Being we cannot conceive indigent, and must conclude happy, and in the best State possible, since he can still gratify himself. The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in universal efficacious Benevolence: and hence we conclude the Deity benevolent in the most universal impartial manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of Perfection ∥137 but∥ Benevolence, and those Capacitys or Abilitys which are necessary to make it effectual; such as Wisdom, and Power: at least we can have no ∥138 other valuable∥ Conception of it.

FINIS.

TEXTUAL NOTES

This book is set in Adobe Garamond, a modern adaptation by Robert Slimbach of the typeface originally cut around 1540 by the French typographer and printer Claude Garamond. The Garamond face, with its small lowercase height and restrained contrast between thick and thin strokes, is a classic “old-style” face and has long been one of the most influential and widely used typefaces.

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[1. ]Referring to the copy of A1 from the British Library as reprinted in the Collected Works, ed. B. Fabian (Hildesheim: Olms, 1969, 1971), vol. 1, Thomas Mautner (in Francis Hutcheson, On Human Nature, ed. T. Mautner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 170) lists three misprints in the quotation from Cicero on the title page (factisve for factisque; conservandum for conservandam; cernerentur for cerneretur). Only the second one of these could be verified. Referring to the copy of A1 from the Bodleian Libary at Oxford he lists a missing word (tanquam) in the same quotation, which allegedly is displayed in the British Library copy; in fact it is missing in all versions of the first edition. It is introduced with the second edition (B) only.

[2. ]The Garland reprint (New York, 1971) of this work reports a wrong shelf mark (K8.H97 b726) of Yale University Library as its original source; K8.H97 b726 refers to a copy of the third edition (C) of 1729 (both books are located in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

[i. ]Translation: “We discuss matters which concern us more, and of which it is harmful to be in ignorance—whether wealth or virtue makes men happy, whether self-interest or uprightness leads us to friendship, what is the nature of the good and what is its highest form.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Satires, II.vi.72–76, p. 216.

[ii. ]Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1651, pt. 1, chaps. 14, 15; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1690, bk. 4, chap. 28; similar views are in Calvin and Calvinist theology, see John Calvin, Commentaries on the Bible, vol. 13, pt. 2.

[iii. ]Here Hutcheson probably thinks of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue, bk. 1, pt. 2, sect. 1).

[* ]See the Preface, Page 6.

[* ]Tragedy of Hamlet.

[i. ]Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act 2, scene 2, verse 562: “What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba . . .?”

[ii. ]According to Virgil (Aeneid 2, 57) Sinon used deceit to make the Trojans take the wooden horse into the city. Pyrrhos I, king of Epirus, 306–302 and 297–277 bc, defeated the Romans in 280/279 but lost most of his own troops, hence the phrase Pyrrhic victory. Priam, king of Troy and grieving father of Hector, who was slain by Achilles in the Trojan War. Choroebos (Greek: Korroibos) liberated Argos from a disaster sent by Apollo; as punishment Choroebos had to carry a holy tripod and to found a city where he dropped it (see Pausanias, Description of Greece, 4.17.4). According to legend, Aeneas escaped the conquered Troy and, after a long odyssey, founded Rome.

[iii. ]Hutcheson refers to the Dutch struggle for freedom from Spain.

[iv. ]For example, Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 1, and Bernard Mandeville, Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue (in the second edition of The Fable of the Bees, 1723).

[v. ]Orestes, according to legend, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, killed his mother and her lover Aegisthus to avenge their assassination of Agamemnon (Aeschylus, Oresteia, especially The Libation Bearers; Euripides, Electra; Sophocles, Electra). Codrus, the last king of Athens, gave his life fighting against Sparta in order to free Athens (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, V, 62). Publius Decius Mus (Roman consul, 340 bc) supposedly was killed in the war against the Latins (340–338 bc) near Capua (see Cicero, De Finibus, II, 61; see note viii below).

[vi. ]Richard Cumberland (1632–1718) criticized Hobbes in the work De legibus naturae disquisitio philosophica (London, 1672); translation: A Treatise of the Law of Nature, London, 1727.

[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 7.

[* ]See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.

[vii. ]Hutcheson used the third edition of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, London, 1724 (ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols., Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, p. 393); the text is not a quotation but a paraphrase of Mandeville.

[viii. ]Marcus Atilius Regulus (consul 267 and 256 bc) was a prisoner of the Carthagenians during the First Punic War and was later (?249 bc) sent back to Rome in order to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he advised against it, went back to Carthage, and was murdered cruelly. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis (95–46 bc) was an educated Stoic and politician. As a republican he was a firm adversary of Caesar; he committed suicide after the battle near Thapsus in Utica (see Cicero’s Cato). According to Livy (8, 6–11) P. Decius Mus sacrificed himself in the war against the Latins in 340 bc near Capua; see note v above.

[* ]See the same Author in the Same Place.

[† ]Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.

[ix. ]Translation: “The olive has no hardness within, the nut has none without.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 398. The correct location of the text is not Ep. 1. Lib. 2, but Ep. 2. Lib. 1. v. 31.

[* ]See Sect. i.

[i. ]On Athene’s advice Cadmus sowed the teeth of a dragon he had killed. Out of these teeth grew an army, most of which killed each other (except for the five Spartoi, the progenitors of the Thebans).

[* ]Milt. Par. Lost, B. iv. v. 756.

[* ]See Sect. v. Art. 2.

[† ]See above Sect. i. Art. 5. Par. ∥73 4∥.

[ii. ]Manicheanism, named after its Persian founder Mani (209–76?), was a religion of later antiquity, whose syncretic system contained Zoroastrian and Gnostic doctrines. Hutcheson refers to the Manichean dualism: evil and the demons of matter (hyle) control the present material world and constantly struggle against the powers of light; the human soul, imprisoned in the body, is part of the good god. Mandeville gives a favorable description of Manicheanism in Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National Happiness, 2nd ed. (London, 1729); 1st ed. 1720, 103ff.

[* ]See Sect. i.

[iii. ]For example, Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. F. B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), vol. 1, p. 75.

[* ]See the Fable of the Bees, Page 68, 3d Ed.

[iv. ]Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 75.

[v. ]Travels to moons and planets were a popular literary subject during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most famous writer of such travels was Cyrano de Bergerac, Histoire comique des états et empires de la lune, Paris, 1657, translated as Selenarhia, or the Government of the World in the Moon, a Comical History, by Sir Thomas St. Serfe, London, 1659. Other writers include David Russen, Iter Lunare: or, a Voyage to the Moon, London, 1705, and Daniel Defoe, The Consolidator, or, Memoirs of Sundry Transactions from the World in the Moon, London, 1705. Of major importance for scientific speculation was Bernard de Bouvier de Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, Paris, 1686; there were several contemporary English translations.

[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. ∥4 6. Par. 2∥.

[* ]Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55.

[i. ]George Berkeley’s Passive Obedience (1712) was criticized by the Molesworth circle. See The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, 1953), vol. 4, pp. 17–46, and the editors’ introduction, pp. 3–11.

[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 4.

[ii. ]Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic of republican attitude, who had written a biography of Cato with a clear bias against Caesar, was accused of high treason by Nero and committed suicide after his conviction in ad 66.

[iii. ]This maxim became the central phrase of utilitarianism. Also used by Cesare Beccaria (1738–94) in the introduction to his work Dei dilitti e delle pene (Livorno, 1764). Jeremy Bentham calls it the “principle of utility”; compare with the title of chapter 1 of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London, 1789), ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: Athlone, 1970), p. 11.

[* ]Vide Sect. v.

[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 8.

[* ]See Sect. vii. Art. ∥166 8, 9∥.

[* ]See above, Sect. iii, Art. 3. Par. 3.

[i. ]Concerning Solon, Hutcheson refers to a passage in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneion Hypotypóseon, Book III, 211, in Sextus Empiricus, ed. R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), vol. 1, p. 267, reporting that the father had been allowed to kill his son. Lycurgus’s law on killing of the weak and malformed is mentioned in Plutarch’s Lives, ed. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), vol. 1, p. 255.

[* ]Ld. Shaftesbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.

[† ]Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. ii. Vol. 1. p. 110.

[* ]See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. ∥58 2∥.

[† ]Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.

[ii. ]Translation: “Let the wise bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 286–87.

[iii. ]The Magi were the priestly caste of the ancient Persian Zoroastrian or Mazdean religion.

[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2∥10 , 3∥.

[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. ∥18 Par. 3∥.

[* ]See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. ∥27 Par.∥ 2.

[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.

[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.

[* ]Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3d Ed.

[i. ]Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 51.

[* ]See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d. Ed.

[ii. ]Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, ed. Kaye, vol. 1, p. 52.

[† ]See Sect. vi. Art. 4.

[iii. ]Overcrowded with some thirty thousand Protestant refugees, Londonderry (or Derry) withstood a siege by the dethroned King James II from April to July 1689.

[* ]See Sect. ii. Art. 8. ∥89 Par. 2.∥

[* ]Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. v. 10.

[i. ]Translation: “O, that some lucky strike would disclose to me a pot of money. . . .” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 210.

[† ]Sect. iii. Art. xi. ∥9 Axiom 6.∥

[ii. ]See editor’s note viii to Treatise II, Sect. I.

[* ]See above, Sect. iv. Art. 4. Par. ∥20 4, 5∥.

[* ]See Sect. ∥23 V∥. Art. 8. Par. 2.

[* ]See Homer, Iliad 2. v. 356, 590.

[iii. ]Translation: “Helen’s fear and lonesome sighs.”

[* ]See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

[iv. ]“The Groves of the Academy” refers to the Academy in Athens, the school of philosophers founded by Plato; Zeno of Citium founded the school that derived its name from the stoa (“portico” or colonnade), the Stoic school, also in Athens. According to legend, Amphion’s lyre moved the stones into place for the city wall of Thebes; Orpheus could charm wild beasts, plants, and stones with his lyre-playing.

[* ]See Treatise I. Sect. ii. Art. 13. Sect. iv. Art. 3.

[* ]Hor. de Arte Poet. ∥55 v.∥ 309.

[v. ]Translation: “Of good writing the source and fount is wisdom.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, p. 476.

[† ]Hor. de Arte Poet. ∥56 v.∥ 312 ∥57 &c∥.

[vi. ]Translation: “He who has learned what he owes his country and his friends, what love is due a parent, a brother, and a guest, what is imposed on senator and judge, what is the function of a general sent to war, he surely knows to give each character his fitting part.” Horace, ibid., p. 476.

[* ]See Lib. 1. Od. 35.

[† ]See Homer, Iliad 4. ∥62 v.∥ 117.

[vii. ]That is, Pandaros’ arrow shot at Menelaos.

[* ]See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.

[i. ]See Samuel Clarke, Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1706), chap. 1, sects. 3, 4, 6, in D. D. Raphael, British Moralists 1650–1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 199–214.

[* ]See Sect. iii. Art. 11∥70 , 12∥.

[† ]See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. ∥71 3∥.

[ii. ]Compare John Locke’s criticism of Robert Filmer in Two Treatises of Government, Treatise 1, vol. 5, chap. 3, pp. 222ff., from The Works of John Locke, 10 vols. (London, 1823).

[* ]See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.

[* ]Sect. viii. Art. 2. ∥121 Prop.∥ 5.

[iii. ]Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. 1, chaps. 13, 14, 15; pt. 2, chap. 17; in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury; now first collected and edited by Sir William Molesworth, vol. 3 (London, 1839; Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1966).

[39.]C and D: relative or comparative

[1.]Separate leaf in B with pagination 109. Entire page omitted in C and D. D (p. 105): The title “Treatise II.” is displayed on the top of the first page of the text.

[2.]Not in A (p. 101).

[3.]C (p. 104), D (p. 105): attended with Desire of the Agent’s Happiness.

[4.]C (p. 104), D (p. 105): Condemnation or Dislike. Approbation and Condemnation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained.

[5.]A (p. 101): some general Foundation of

[6.]C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Approbation and Good-will

[7.]C (p. 105), D (p. 106): these

[8.]Omitted in C (p. 105), D (p. 106).

[9.]C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Approbation or Good-will

[10.]C (p. 105), D (p. 106): Dislike

[11.]Omitted in C (p. 105), D (p. 106).

[12.]Omitted in A (p. 102), C (p. 105), D (p. 106).

[13.]A (p. 103): them

[14.]A (p. 103): immediately; and such

[15.]Not in A (p. 103).

[16.]C (p. 108), D (p. 109): And

[17.]C (p. 108), D (p. 109): arising from reflection upon

[18.]C (p. 108), D (p. 109): arises from Reflection upon the Action, or some other future advantage.

[19.]C (p. 109), D (p. 110): approve the Actions of others, and perceive them to be their Perfection and Dignity, and are determin’d to love the Agent; a like Perception we have in reflecting on such Actions of our own

[20.]C (p. 109), D (p. 110): That the Affection Desire, or Intention, which gains Approbation to the Actions flowing from it, is not an Intention to obtain even this sensible Pleasure [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310) substitutes “pleasant Self-Approbation” for “sensible Pleasure” and wrongly attributes the alteration to p. 109].

[21.]C (p. 109), D (p. 110): from Self-Love, or Desire of private Good.

[1.]C (p. 110), D (p. 111): the Sensations and Affections

[2.]C (p. 111), D (p. 112): approve or love

[3.]C (p. 111), D (p. 112): us, or to any other Person

[4.]C (p. 111), D (p. 112): they study the Interest, and desire the Happiness of other Beings with whom they converse. [In A the text following this passage is not an independent paragraph.]

[5.]A (p. 108): Esteem

C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation

[6.]Not in A (p. 108).

[7.]C (p. 111), D (p. 112): Approbation

[8.]A (p. 109): which

[9.]C (p. 112), D (p. 113): from an ultimate Desire of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us;

[10.]A (p. 109): independently

[11.]Footnote not in A (p. 109).

[12.]A (p. 109): or

[13.]C (p. 112), D (p. 113): on both Occasions

[14.]C (p. 113), D (p. 114): Condemnation

[15.]A (p. 110): done toward

[16.]Not in A (p. 110).

[17.]A (p. 110): requires

[18.]Not in A (p. 110).

[19.]A (p. 110): which do not affect our selves, but other Persons,

[20.]A (p. 110): pleas’d with any

[21.]C (p. 113), D (p. 114): merely because

[22.]C (p. 114), D (p. 115): an ultimate Desire of

[23.]C (p. 114), D (p. 115): from Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others without view to any prevalent Good to the Publick

[24.]A (p. 111): that of

[25.]A (p. 111): beneficent Actions toward them

C (p. 114), D (p. 115): Actions which shew Good-will toward them

[26.]C (p. 114), D (p. 115): which makes benevolent Actions appear Beautiful

[27.]C (p. 115), D (p. 116): approve or condemn

[28.]Not in A (p. 112).

[29.]Inserted here in C (p. 115), D (p. 116): Would not the Parsimony of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the Generosity of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don’t we then approve both alike?

[30.]Not in A (p. 112).

[31.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 306–7] add: As Mr. Hobbes explains all the Sensations of Pity by our Fear of the like Evils [Editor’s note: Leviathan, pt. 1, chap. 6], when by Imagination we place ourselves in the Case of the Sufferers; so others explain all Approbation and Condemnation of Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination: We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended Worth of the Sufferer, or according to the Affection we formerly had to him; since the Sufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our Suffering the like: So this Explication will ne[v]er account for our high Approbation of brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detr[i]mental both to the Agent, and to those for whose Service they were intended; here there is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure, when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young Tarquin, he does not imagine that he has chang’d his Sex like Caeneus. And then, when one corrects his Imagination, by remembring his own Situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral Approbation and Condemnation continues as lively as it was before, tho’ the Imagination of Advantage is gone. [Editor’s note: According to legend, Sextus, son of Tarquinius Superbus, raped Lucretia, sparking off the popular uprising that ended the Roman monarchy and ushered in the Roman republic. Caeneus, a mythical figure, was originally a woman and given a change of sex by Poseidon.]

[32.]C (p. 116), D (p. 117): Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent Simplicity, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a prey to others, may be as advantageous a Disposition as the most prudent Generosity, to those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former.

[33.]A (p. 113): and increase

[34.]No new paragraph in A (p. 114).

[35.]C (p. 118), D (p. 119): to judge certain Actions advantageous to us

[36.]No new paragraph in A (p. 115).

[37.]A (p. 115): did certainly perform

[38.]C (p. 118), D (p. 119): recommend Men to us only

[39.]Omitted in C (p. 119), D (p. 120).

[40.]No new paragraph in A (p. 116).

[41.]A (p. 117): more probably

[42.]C (p. 121), D (p. 122): hereafter

[43.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: any Dispositions of Piety, or Thoughts of future Rewards

[44.]No new paragraph in A (p. 118).

[45.]Omitted in C (p. 122), D (p. 123).

[46.]C (p. 122), D (p. 123): recommend to me

[47.]C (p. 122), D (p. 123): make me like

[48.]Not in A (p. 119).

[49.]A (p. 119): is, “whether

[50.]A (p. 119): I may

[51.]Not in A (p. 119).

[52.]Not in A (p. 119).

[53.]A (p. 119): . The Sense of the moral Good, or Evil, cannot be over-ballanced by Interest.

[54.]C (p. 123), D (p. 124): Threatnings

[55.]A (p. 119): any Actions, such

[56.]D (p. 124): an

[57.]No new paragraph in A (p. 120).

[58.]A (p. 121): in the Contemplation or Reflection upon which they could be pleas’d.

[59.]C (p. 124), D (p. 125): Pleasure. Nay, what should excite a Cato or a Decius to desire Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were useful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in such Conduct?

[60.]A (p. 121): but in so

[61.]Not in A (p. 122).

[62.]C (p. 126), D (p. 127): sincerely approve and

[63.]C (p. 126), D (p. 127): Approbation of publick Spirit, nor Desire

[64.]C (p. 127), D (p. 128): private advantage

[65.]A (p. 123): abstractly from

[66.]A (p. 124): so

[67.]A (p. 124): Ideas, or

[68.]C (p. 128), D (p. 129): the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions observed

[69.]A (p. 124): they shall

[70.]A (p. 124): antecedently

[71.]C (pp. 128–30), D (pp. 129–31): Pleasure. That we may discern more distinctly the Difference between moral Perceptions and others, let us consider, when we taste a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of Pleasure; when another tastes it, we only conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleasure; and, abstracting from some previous Good-Will or Anger, his enjoying this Pleasure is to us a matter wholly indifferent, raising no new Sentiment or Affection. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in [C: p. 129, D: p. 130] virtuous Actions, we are not always conscious of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursuing private Pleasures, as will appear hereafter: ’tis only by reflex Acts upon our Temper and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310): “that Virtue never fails to give Pleasure” substitutes for “that we enjoy the Delights of Virtue”]. When also we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not necessarily imagine him then to enjoy Pleasure, tho’ we know Reflection will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous Temper raises Sentiments of Approbation, Esteem or Admiration, and the Affection of Good-will toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: Approbation of another’s Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho’ ’tis attended with some small Pleasure. Virtue is then called Amiable or Lovely, from its raising Good-will or Love in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent’s perceiving the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it under that View. A virtuous Temper is called Good or Beatifick, not that it is always attended with Pleasure in the Agent; much less that some small Pleasure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is persuaded that the reflex Acts of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him the highest Pleasures. The admired Qua-[C: p. 130, D: p. 131]lity is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent or the Approver; tho’ ’tis a sure source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho’ attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.

[1.]C (p. 131), D (p. 132) introduce the marginal heading: Nature

[2.]C (p. 131), D (p. 132): sensitive Natures

[3.]A (p. 125): religious

[4.]No new paragraph in A (p. 126).

[5.]Not in A (p. 126).

[6.]Not in A (p. 126).

[7.]Not in A (p. 126).

[8.]A (p. 126): were

[9.]A (p. 126): have

[10.]A (p. 127): call virtuous, do spring from

C (p. 133), D (p. 134): approve as virtuous, are either

[11.]C (p. 133), D (p. 134): That Virtue springs from some other Affection than Self-Love, or Desire of private Advantage. And where Self-Interest excites to the same Action, the Approbation is given only to the disinterested Principle.

[12.]C (p. 133), D (p. 134): are commonly included under the Names Love and Hatred

[13.]Omitted in C (p. 133), D (p. 134).

[14.]C (p. 134), D (p. 135): Malice. Complacence denotes Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho’ the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. Benevolence is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called Dislike and Malice.

[15.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[16.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[17.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[18.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[19.]C (p. 134), D (p. 135): toward a

[20.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[21.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[22.]Omitted in C (p. 134), D (p. 135).

[23.]Omitted in C (p. 135), D (p. 136).

[24.]Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi].

[25.]C (p. 135), D (p. 136): disapprove

[26.]C (p. 135), D (p. 136): retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions

[27.]C (p. 135), D (p. 136): false Opinion about his Temper

[28.]C (p. 135), D (p. 136): ultimate Desire of

[29.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: real Good-will or Kindness

[30.]C (p. 136), D (p. 137): others. To raise Benevolence, no more is required than calmly to consider any sensitive Nature not pernicious to others. Gratitude arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or those we love; Complacence is a Perception of the moral Sense. Gratitude includes some Complacence, and Complacence still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no opposition of Interests.

[31.]A (p. 130): and

[32.]Not in A (p. 130), C (p. 137), D (p. 138). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 10).

[33.]The following two paragraphs are not in C (p. 137) and D (p. 138); instead, fourteen new pages are added: [Margin heading: Benevolence is disinterested.] IV. There are two ways in which some may deduce Benevolence from Self-Love, the one supposing that “we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be for our Interest to have this Affection, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as it may tend to procure some external Reward from God or Man.” The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our Choice or Volition; but “supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of their Nature to desire whatever is apprehended [C: p. 138, D: p. 139] as the Means of any private Happiness; and that the Observation of the Happiness of other Persons, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to the Observer, as their Misery is the Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in Consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we begin to desire the Happiness of others as the Means of obtaining this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of others in a happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire either the Happiness of another, or any Event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the Means of some Happiness or Pleasure to ourselves; but own at the same time, that Desire is not raised in us directly by any Volition, but arises necessarily upon our apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness.

[Margin heading: The first contrary Opinion confuted.] That the former Scheme is not just, may appear from this general Consideration, that “neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised by Volition.” If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever toward any Object, even the most improper: we might raise Jealousy, Fear, Anger, Love, toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage Men to external Actions, or to the [C: p. 139, D: p. 140] Dissimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any Affection, may indeed turn our Attention to those Qualitys in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor Desire, will ever raise any Affection in us.

But more particularly, that Desire of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any Pleasure accompanying the Affection itself: for ’tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with Pleasure; nay, ’tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy than pleasant. ’Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections justify themselves; while they continue, (as Malebranch expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the [C: p. 140, D: p. 141] Jealous, the Compassionate, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy or Pity are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent. Uneasiness generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this Sensation tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire, but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure.

The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleasures of Self-Approbation by our Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the Prospect of an Interest [C: p. 141, D: p. 142] equivalent to this of Self-Approbation, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that that Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally selfish?

But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a Desire of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these pleasant Reflections on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in natural Affection toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the Absence of which is indeed the greatest Vice, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by Choice, with a View to obtain this private Good.

In like manner, if no Volition of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any Volition raise them from Prospects of eternal Rewards, or to avoid eternal Punishments. The former Motives differ from these only [C: p. 142, D: p. 143] as smaller from greater, shorter from more durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us angry at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and jealous of the most faithful and affectionate, or sorrowful for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a future State, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration.* [C: p. 143, D: p. 144]

’Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the virtuous Benevolence jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no Opposition of apparent Interest, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater Interest. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a disinterested Desire partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an evil Deity in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity only from the same Motives, without any Love or Gratitude towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no Approbation. We plainly see that [C: p. 144, D: p. 145] a Change of external Circumstances of Interest under an evil Deity, without any Change in the Disposition of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity.

Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho’ there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the Sanction of the Law is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more Benevolence, nor no other Affection, than those in one forced by the Law to be Curator to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the Success of his Attempts, or the Happiness of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct.

[Margin heading: The second Opinion confuted.] V. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any Volition upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some pleasant Sensations which we expect to feel [C: p. 145, D: p. 146] upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among Friends, Parents and Children, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from Self-Love as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the Means of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man approves the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring Wealth or sensual Pleasure to ourselves? If a Person had wagered concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer’s Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be approved as virtuous? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this case may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this Connection: nor do [C: p. 146, D: p. 147] we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure. When we do generous Offices, we all often feel Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our Pursuit of their Happiness we have no Intention of obtaining this delight. We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole ultimate Intention or Desire the freeing ourselves from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person in Distress, (C, p. 146: “or”; omitted in D, p. 147) to take away this Connection, so that we should be easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free us from our Pain, which upon this Scheme is the sole End proposed by the compassionate Person.—Don’t we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless calm Reflection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some selfish Affection, as Fear of Danger, over-power it. [C: p. 147, D: p. 148]

To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly annihilated, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the Future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life?** Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the Means of private Good, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of Annuities?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, ’tis hard to account: perhaps ’tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of simple Ideas.—Desire, say they, is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence [C: p. 148, D: p. 149] of any Good.—Whereas Desire is as distinct from Uneasiness, as Volition is from Sensation. Don’t they themselves often speak of our desiring to remove Uneasiness? Desire then is different from Uneasiness, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies it, as Extension does the Idea of Colour, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the Means of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of removing our own Uneasiness is an ultimate Desire: and why may we not have other ultimate Desires?

“But can any Being be concerned about the Absence of an Event which gives it no Uneasiness?” Perhaps superior Natures desire without uneasy Sensation. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the Means of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this Uneasiness, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves by desiring it. So likewise we may feel Delight upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the Means of obtaining this [C: p. 149, D: p. 150] Delight; even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion to.

VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our moral Sense, our Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others? To what Purpose serves the wise Order of Nature, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are eternal Rewards appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have benevolent Affections, and consequently turn our Attention to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent contrary Motives, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310) substitute “Virtuous” for “Virtues”] were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible additional Motives to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good Affection, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of Self-Interest; or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external Acts [C: p. 150, D: p. 151] of Beneficence, and to restrain them from Vice.*** [C: p. 151, D: p. 152]

From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others; and that our moral Sense determines us [C, p. 151, D1, p. 152, D3, p. 152: only] [D2, p. 152: instead of “only” a lacuna of approximately four letters] to approve [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310): only such] Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

[34.]Not in A (p. 132), no new paragraph. In C (p. 151), D (p. 152): numbered VII.

[35.]C (p. 151), D (p. 152): ultimate Desire of

[36.]A (p. 132): Interests

[37.]Not in A (p. 133).

[38.]A (p. 133): would rather

[39.]Not in A (p. 133).

[40.]C (p. 153), D (p. 154): ultimate Desire of

[41.]C (p. 153), D (p. 154): calm Ill-will

[42.]C (p. 153), D (p. 154): yet

[43.]A (p. 134): Now having

C (p. 153), D (p. 154): numbered VIII.

[44.]C (p. 153), D (p. 154): neither our Esteem nor Benevolence, is founded on Self-Love

[45.]Omitted in C (p. 154), D (p. 155).

[46.]A (p. 134): were

[47.]C (p. 154), D (p. 155): been reputed virtuous

[48.]C (p. 154), D (p. 155): numbered IX.

[49.]C (p. 154), D (p. 155): Good-Will

[50.]A (p. 135): procures

[51.]Not in A (135). In C (p. 154), D (p. 155): , and especially toward ourselves

[52.]C (p. 154), D (p. 155): wish well to

[53.]C (p. 154), D (p. 155): do so

[54.]A (p. 135): And further

C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Nay, farther

No new paragraph in A (p. 135), C (p. 155), D (p. 156).

[55.]C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Good-will

[56.]C (p. 155), D (p. 156): will

[57.]New paragraph in C (p. 155), D (p. 156).

[58.]C (p. 155), D (p. 156): Beneficence then must increase our Good-will, as it raises Complacence, which is still attended with stronger degrees of Benevolence

[59.]A (p. 136): hence it is that we

[60.]Omitted in C (pp. 155–56), D (pp. 156–57).

[61.]A (p. 136): much more powerful to excite

[62.]A (p. 136): by

[63.]Not in A (p. 137).

[64.]Not in A (p. 137).

[65.]C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will

[66.]C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will

D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: ultimate Good-will

[67.]C (p. 156), D (p. 157): arises from

[68.]C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Good-will

D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: such Good-will

[69.]Omitted in C (p. 156), D (p. 157).

[70.]C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Affection

[71.]Paragraph omitted in C (p. 156), D (p. 157).

[72.]A (p. 137): taken

[73.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 5

[74.]Not in A (p. 138).

[75.]A (p. 138): does scarce deserve

[76.]A (p. 138): any farther

[77.]No new paragraph in A (p. 138). In C (p. 156), D (p. 157): Had we no other ultimate Desire but that of private Advantage

[78.]A (p. 138): but

[79.]A (p. 138): must only act

[80.]A (p. 138): we can have no reason to imagine that

[81.]C (p. 157), D (p. 158): by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the Deity

[82.]A (p. 139): this

[83.]Not in A (p. 139).

[84.]No new paragraph in A (p. 139).

[85.]C (p. 158), D (p. 159): infinite Power and Art

[86.]Not in A (p. 139).

[87.]A (p. 140): be as capable of giving him

[88.]Entire article VIII omitted in C (p. 158), D (p. 159).

[89.]A (p. 140): perhaps Virtue

[90.]No new paragraph in A (p. 140).

[91.]A (p. 140): such a

[92.]A (p. 140): such an Occasion

[93.]A (p. 141): And then this

[94.]A (p. 141): Passions are not from Self-Love [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 11).]

[95.]Alterations and Additions (p. 10): on

[96.]A (p. 141): do tend generally in fact

[97.]A (p. 141): removal of our Pain is not directly intended; for then [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 11).]

[98.]Alterations and Additions (p. 11): were

[99.]A (p. 141): run into

[100.]C (p. 158), D (p. 159): numbered X.

[101.]A (p. 143): falsely suppos’d

[102.]A (p. 143): those Actions which are counted Virtuous

[103.]A (p. 143): suppos’d

[104.]C (p. 159), D (p. 160): Spring

[105.]Not in A (p. 144).

[106.]A (p. 144): bustles

[107.]D (p. 160): for

[108.]C (p. 160), D (p. 161): his Children are

[109.]C (p. 160), D (p. 161): No; but his naturally implanted Desire of their Good, and Aversion to their misery, makes him affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleasures or Pains. This Desire

[110.]C (p. 160), D (p. 161): it

[111.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: say others

[112.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 307–8]: it. Another Author thinks all this easily deducible from Self-Love. “Children are not only made of our Bodies, but resemble us in Body and Mind; they are rational agents as we are, and we only love our own Likeness in them.” Very good all this. What is Likeness? ’Tis not individual Sameness; ’tis only being included under one general or specifical Idea. Thus there is Likeness between us and other Mens Children, thus any Man is like any other, in some Respects; a Man is also like an Angel, and in some Respects like a Brute. Is there then a natural Disposition in every Man to love his Like, to wish well not only to his individual Self, but to any other like rational or sensitive Being? and this Disposition strongest, where there is the greatest Likeness in the more noble Qualities? If all this is called by the Name Self-Love; be it so: The highest Mystick needs no more-disinterested Principle; ’tis not confined to the Individual, but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to all; since each one some way resembles each other. Nothing can be better than this Self-Love, nothing more generous.

 If any allege, That “Parents always derive Pleasure, often Honour, and sometimes Wealth, from the Wisdom and Prosperity of their Children, and hence all Parental Solicitude arises;” let us recollect what was said above; all these Motives cease upon Approach of Death, and yet the Affection is as strong then as ever. Let Parents examine their own Hearts, and see if these views are the only Springs of their Affection, and that toward the most infirm, from whom there is least Hope.

[113.]No new paragraph in A (p. 145).

[114.]A (p. 145): were

[115.]Not in A (p. 145).

[116.]A (p. 145): appear to be moral

[117.]C (p. 161), D (p. 162): numbered XI.

[118.]C (p. 162), D (p. 163): more desire

[119.]C (p. 162), D (p. 163): would he not rather desire the Prosperity of his Country

[120.]C (p. 162), D (p. 163): readily wish

[121.]Not in A (p. 147).

[122.]A (p. 147): and Design, and Study

[123.]A (p. 147): argues a Benevolence in

[124.]C (p. 163), D (p. 164): desire

[125.]C (p. 163), D (p. 164): Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or less extensive, are properly disinterested, not even founded on any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, Art. IV. of this Section.

[126.]C (p. 163), D (p. 164): numbered XII.

[127.]C (p. 164), D (p. 165): those

[128.]A (p. 148): and Faction

[129.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: or

[130.]A (p. 149): but

[131.]A (p. 149): may be

[1.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: generally

[2.]A (p. 150): the Love of others

C (p. 165), D (p. 166): Good-will to others

[3.]Not in A (p. 150).

[4.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 6. Par. 3

C (p. 166), D (p. 167): 9. Par. 2

[5.]A (p. 151): know that

[6.]D (p. 167): towards

[7.]A (p. 151): Hence it is, that those

[8.]No marginal heading in D (p. 167).

[9.]A (pp. 152–53): Beneficiary

[10.]D (p. 168): belov’d

[11.]A (p. 152): Beneficiary

[12.]D (p. 168): but

[13.]Omitted in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310].

[14.]Omitted in C (p. 168), D (p. 169).

[15.]Not in A (p. 153).

[16.]A (p. 155): tended

[17.]A (p. 155): was

[18.]C (p. 171), D (p. 172): the one

[19.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: manifest

[20.]A (p. 156): be acted

[21.]A (p. 156): by

[22.]C (p. 171), D (p. 172): ultimate Desire of

[23.]C (p. 172), D (p. 173): desire

[24.]A (p. 157): conceiv’d to be no

[25.]D3 (pp. 173–74): The frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the Nero’s and Domitian’s, are often alleged in Opposition to all this; but perhaps unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all those whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under a false Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of escaping by his Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: it weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. Power becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in Ostentation of it, he may break through all regards to Justice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in such a Course. Any of these apparent interests seem better to account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than the supposing in them

[26.]A (p. 157): conscious that he

[27.]Omitted in D3 (p. 174).

[28.]Omitted in D3 (p. 174).

[29.]A (p. 158), C (p. 173), D (p. 174): were

[30.]A (p. 158): that it is

[31.]A (p. 158): only Self-Love, and not Malice, which was his Motive; or

C (p. 173), D (p. 174): he acted from Self-Love, and not Malice, or,

[32.]A (p. 158): Mankind

[33.]D3 (p. 174): they are

[34.]C (p. 174), D (p. 175): Spring

[35.]Not in A (p. 159).

[36.]A (p. 159): must then be supposed to be

[37.]A (p. 159): too

[38.]A (p. 159): so as

[39.]D3 (p. 175) adds: or such strong Appetites, or Passions either selfish, or toward some narrow Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good;

[40.]A (p. 159): had mutually

[41.]Not in A (p. 159).

[42.]Omitted in D3 (p. 175).

[43.]D3 (pp. 175–76): seem of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vitious.

[44.]A (p. 160): discover indeed

[45.]A (p. 160): And hence

[46.]Omitted in C (p. 175), D (p. 176).

[47.]A (p. 161): is

[48.]A (p. 161): run into any

[49.]A (p. 161): Mankind

[50.]D3 (pp. 177–78) inserts a new article with the margin heading “Benevolence of different Kinds” and numbered VI. The remaining articles of section III are renumbered accordingly. VI. Benevolence is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop Cumberland always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, ’tis highly necessary to observe, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a calm, extensive Affection, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered.* [p. 178]

Now tho’ all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: ’Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of Benevolence is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho’ of a lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho’ it does not justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person, from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to larger Societys.

[51.]A (p. 161): requires that every one should be

[52.]D3 (p. 179a): the Strength of some particular kind Attachment, or of [In D3 the page numbers are used twice subsequently. The first page 179 begins with “in part”; the first page 180 begins with “in such.” The second page 179 begins with “Happiness”; the second page 180 begins with “nevolence”.]

[53.]A (p. 161): shews it to be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of the Tendency of an Action to the publick Good, which does not in Reality tend to it: so that a wise

[54.]D3 (p. 179a): by the calm extensive Benevolence, how strong soever it were

[55.]D3 (p. 179a): strong virtuous Disposition

[56.]A (p. 162): further were there any Good

[57.]Not in A (p. 162). Instruction for addition of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 11–13).

[58.]C (p. 177), D1, D2 (p. 178), D3 (p. 180a): what

[59.]D3 (p. 180a): Proportion

[60.]D3 (p. 180a): Yet Gifts

[61.]Omitted in D3 (p. 180a).

[62.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 13).

[63.]Wrongly corrected in D2 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: VIII. In D3 this correction is correct [Corrigenda, p. 310, referring to p. 179b].

[64.]A (p. 162): than as

[65.]A (p. 163): injurious

[66.]Omitted in C (p. 179), D1, D2 (p. 180), D3 (p. 180b).

[67.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to delete the number.

[68.]A (p. 163): thus to judge

[69.]A (p. 164): And in

[70.]A (p. 164): accomplishes

[71.]C (p. 180), D (p. 181): not numbered.

[72.]Not in A (p. 164).

[73.]A (pp. 164–65): But by the Consequences of Actions, we are not only to understand the immediate Effects directly produc’d by them, but also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen’d. Thus many Actions which have no immediate evil Effects; nay, which actually produce good Effects, may be evil, if their universal Al-lowance would be more detrimental to Mankind than their universal Prohibition; or if there be no fixed Standard, that Men may easily know when such Actions are allow’d, and when prohibited; or when such Actions, however useful in particular Instances, might be Precedents to the greatest Mischief. As for Example, the Execution of Justice by private Persons on Offenders, in any State not entirely perverted from the Ends of Government; the violating the Rights of worthless Persons, in favor of those of great moral Capacitys, and of great Benevolence; the protecting the Innocent by false Testimony in a Court of Justice, and such like, may be very useful in singular Instances: but then the Allowance of such Actions would lead into the greatest Mischief, since every one would judge for himself what Cases were proper, and what not, and then there could be no Certainty of Life, Possessions, and Evidences: and hence such Practices are universally counted evil. [Instruction for alteration of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 13–14).]

[74.]Alterations and Additions (p. 13): Thus

[75.]Alterations and Additions (p. 13): the accidental evil

[76.]Alterations and Additions (p. 13): good effects he proposes to attain by the Action

[77.]Alterations and Additions (p. 13): it

[78.]C (p. 181), D (p. 182): Mistake

[79.]Alterations and Additions (p. 14): to

[80.]Alterations and Additions (p. 14): are probably greater

[81.]Alterations and Additions (p. 14): these

[82.]C (pp. 182–83), D (pp. 183–84): it. [new article] (D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to delete the number.) IX. ’Tis here to be observed, that tho’ every kind Affection abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our calm Affections, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our particular Passions; calm Self-Love quite distinct from Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust, or Anger; so calm Good-will toward others is different from Pity, passionate Love, the parental Affection, or the Passion of particular Friends. Now every kind Passion which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is an universal calm Good-will toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent [C: p. 183, D: p. 184] with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue.*

[83.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to read IX.

[84.]C (p. 183), D (p. 184): these

[85.]A (p. 165): extend

[86.]C (p. 183), D (p. 184): Beneficence

[87.]A (p. 166): if

[88.]C (p. 183), D (p. 184): even

[89.]C (p. 183), D (p. 184): except

[90.]C (p. 183), D (p. 184): does

[91.]A (p. 166): is

[92.]D2, D3 (p. 185): he would condemn a great

[93.]C (pp. 184–85), D (pp. 185–86): This Constitution of our Sense, whereby the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions which flow from the nearer Attachments of Nature, such as that between the Sexes, and the Love of our Offspring, do not appear so virtuous as Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach’d to us; has been chosen by the Author of Nature for this good Reason, “That the more limited Instincts tend to produce a smaller Moment of Good, be-[C: p. 185, D: p. 186]cause confined to small numbers. Whereas the more extensive calm Instinct of Good-will, attended with Power, would have no Bounds in its good Effects, and would never lead into any Evil, as the particular Passions may: and hence it is made more lovely to our Sense, that we might be induced to cultivate and strengthen it; and make it check even kind Passions, when they are opposite to a greater Good.”

[94.]A (p. 167): were it

[95.]D2, D3 (p. 186): numbered X.

[96.]D2, D3 (p. 186): may arise a Notion of moral

[97.]D2, D3 (p. 186): or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and usually accompany it

[98.]C (p. 185), D (p. 186): Approbation of

[99.]A (p. 168): Qualitys Good or Evil. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than as they are employ’d for the publick Good, is foolish, and flows from our moral Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if

D2, D3 (p. 186): Qualitys: And we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral Approbation. But if

[100.]D2, D3 (p. 187): Rule

[101.]In D2, D3 (pp. 187–88) all formulae are omitted, and the axioms read as follows:

1. The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his Benevolence and Abilitys. For ’tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his selfish Principles, and his Abilitys. We speak here only of the external Goods of this World, which one pursues from some selfish Principles. For as to internal Goods of the Mind, these are most effectually obtain’d by the Exercise of other Affections than those called Selfish, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the Good of others.

2. In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys are equal, the Moments of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodness of the Temper, or the Benevolence; and when the Tempers are equal, the Quantitys of Good are as the Abilitys.

3. The Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the Moment of Good, when other Circumstances are equal, and inversly as the Abilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is less Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.

4. But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some good to ourselves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to ourselves, and good to the Publick; or either useful both to ourselves and others, or pernicious to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always Benevolence alone; or of Evil, Malice alone (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found); but in most Actions we must look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Benevolence, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of private Interest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence, when the good Action is any way difficult or painful in the Performance, or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent.

[102.]A (p. 168): Character

[103.]Not in A (p. 168). The following axioms are numbered accordingly, 2, 3, 4, 5. Instruction for addition of this paragraph (without numeration) already in Alterations and Additions (p. 14).

[104.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 14).

[105.]C (p. 186), D1 (p. 187): Agents, the Abilitys are

[106.]A (p. 169): Benevolence is as the Moment of publick Good, produced by them in like Circumstances: or B = M × 1.

[107.]D1 (p. 187): B

[108.]C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): Spring of

[109.]C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): or of Evil

[110.]C (p. 187), D1 (p. 188): sedate Malice is rarely found

[111.]Not in A (p. 169). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 15).

[112.]A (p. 170): afterwards

[113.]Not in A (p. 170).

[114.]A (p. 170): in one

[115.]Not in A (p. 170).

[116.]A (p. 170): And in

[117.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 189).

[118.]A (p. 171): tend to

[119.]A (p. 171): only then

[120.]Not in A (p. 171).

[121.]C (p. 189), D (p. 190): done by

[122.]A (p. 171): nor

[123.]A (p. 171): fifth

[124.]A (p. 171): have surmounted

[125.]D2, D3 (p. 190): in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent, the Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none can act beyond their natural Abilitys

[126.]D2, D3 (p. 190): the Moment of Good produced equals the Ability

[127.]A (p. 172): its

[128.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 190).

[129.]A (p. 172): its

[130.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 190).

[131.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 191).

[132.]D2, D3 (p. 191): XII. In the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, directly as the Moment of Evil effected, and inversly as the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any real ultimate Intention of Mischief, and never ultimate deliberate Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or Appetite, some kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind Passions.

The Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they cooperate with or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they diminish the Moral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to surmount such Motives of Interest.

[133.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: μ = H × 1

[134.]A (p. 173): or the Degree of Vice

[135.]A (p. 173): be co-operating with Hatred or opposing

[136.]Footnote in D2, D3 (p. 191): *See Treatise IV. § 6.

[137.]The following three paragraphs not in A (p. 174). Instruction for addition of the following three paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 15–16).

[138.]Alterations and Additions (p. 16): or the secret

[139.]Alterations and Additions (p. 16): Laws, and Governours

[140.]Alterations and Additions (p. 16): which in fact tend

[141.]Alterations and Additions (p. 16): the

[142.]A (p. 174): From Axiom the 4th

D2, D3 (p. 193): From the former Reasonings

[143.]A (p. 174): would

[144.]A (p. 175): these do

[145.]A (p. 175): Affections may

[146.]D2, D3 (p. 194): Beneficence; and makes us

[147.]D2, D3 (p. 194): their Interests

[148.]D2, D3 (pp. 195–96): Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. ’Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower Kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to the general Good. Those calmer Determinations of the Will, whether of greater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That “Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;” as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to Action where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End.* For this see Treatise IV. Sect. i and ii.

The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one his own Hap-piness; and yet this he seeks by Instinct.

[149.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 196).

[150.]A (p. 176): towards

[151.]D2, D3 (p. 196): End consistently with the general Good.

[152.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 196).

[153.]A (p. 176): generally

[154.]No new paragraph in A (p. 176), D2, D3 (p. 196). Not in Errata.

[155.]A (p. 176): not so much the

[156.]Not in A (p. 176).

[157.]A (p. 176): Self-Love: And I see

[158.]A (p. 176): to be engag’d into Actions only as they shall appear to tend to their own private Good.

C (p. 196), D1 (p. 197), D2, D3 (p. 196): until some prospect of Interest allures them to it.

[159.]A (p. 177): it may appear afterwards

[160.]A (p. 177): resolve, as much as possible, to cultivate

[161.]C (p. 196), D (p. 197): arises from

[162.]C (p. 197), D1 (p. 198), D2, D3 (p. 197): in studying to raise these kind Affections, and to

[163.]New footnote in D2, D3 (pp. 197–98): *’Tis thus we must understand many places of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others of the Antients, when they speak of “natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue.” ’Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the ϕυσικαὶ ἀϱεταὶ [natural virtues], implanted in us: They appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature; such are our Desires of Knowledge, our Relish for Beauty, especially of the Moral Kind, our Sociable Affections. These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general Instinct. We must not thence con-clude, that all our Affections spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good. Disinterested Affections are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it. (See Cicer. De Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) This would be manifestly contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on Friendship, Patriotism, and other Subjects. See Aristotle in the Magn. Moral. & Nicom. On Friendship; and Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.

[164.]D2, D3 (p. 198): From the preceding Reasonings we shall only draw this one Inference

[165.]A (p. 177): may

[166.]A (p. 177): 6, 7

[167.]A (p. 178): may only take

[168.]A (p. 178): be

[169.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 198).

[1.]A (p. 179): see

[2.]Footnote not in A (p. 179).

[3.]D2, D3 (p. 200): universally

[4.]D2, D3 (p. 200): generally

[5.]Not in A (p. 179). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 16–17).

[6.]Alterations and Additions (pp. 16–17): occasion’d still

D2, D3 (p. 201): generally occasion’d

[7.]D2, D3 (p. 201): others.* [and the following footnote:] *Beside that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have also an immediate natural Relish for certain Powers and Abilitys, and the regular Exercise of them; and a Dislike and Contempt of a Person who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don’t think of any Subserviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a vigorous or a mean Character, than a virtuous or vitious one.

[8.]A (p. 180): this

[9.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 201).

[10.]Not in A (p. 180).

[11.]A (p. 180): still

[12.]A (p. 180): Actions to tend

[13.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 202).

[14.]D2, D3 (p. 202): by stronger Motives of external Advantage

[15.]A (p. 181): yet does not cease

[16.]D2, D3 (p. 202): makes

[17.]A (p. 181): shall make

[18.]A (p. 181): command

[19.]A (p. 181): which in fact tend

[20.]A (p. 181): us

[21.]D2, D3 (p. 202): by their Moral

[22.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): and conceive

[23.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): to be

[24.]A (p. 182): Men may be blinded by Passion,

[25.]No new paragraph in A (p. 182): But to prove that some Men

[26.]C (p. 202), D (p. 203): without any Motive of Interest, real or apparent; and approved without any Opinion of Tendency to publick Good, or flowing from Good-will

[27.]A (p. 182): Person, of such Sentiments who

[28.]A (p. 182): touch

[29.]C (p. 203), D (p. 204): and the

[30.]A (p. 183): when Actions

[31.]No new paragraph in A (p. 184).

[32.]A (p. 184): antecedent to

[33.]A (p. 184): take away

[34.]D (p. 205): such

[35.]A (p. 185): shall certainly be

[36.]Not in A (p. 185). Instruction for addition of this paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 17–18).

[37.]C (p. 206), D (p. 206): They are sparing enough in Accounts

[38.]C (p. 206), D (p. 206): transiently

[39.]Alterations and Additions (p. 18): to Caution of Assent in other matters

[40.]A (p. 186): judge, and compare the Tendencys of

[41.]Not in A (p. 186).

[42.]A (p. 186): in the

[43.]A (p. 186): the

[44.]Omitted in C (p. 207), D (p. 208).

[45.]C (p. 208), D (p. 208): Deities

[46.]A (p. 187): amiable, gratefully

[47.]C (p. 208), D (p. 209): intimated

[48.]A (p. 187): us

[49.]The following two paragraphs not in A (p. 188). Instruction for addition of the following two paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 18–21).

[50.]Footnote not in Alterations and Additions (p. 18).

[51.]Alterations and Additions (p. 18): Cabals, Factions

[52.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): System.”* [and the following footnote:]

[53.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): Notions

[54.]Alterations and Additions (p. 20): be very much

[55.]A (p. 188): as

[56.]No new paragraph in A (p. 188).

[57.]A (p. 188): with Peace a long Tract of Vice

[58.]B (p. 210): 1

B [Errata, p. xxvi]: 2

C (p. 212), D (p. 213): 1

[59.]A (p. 189): And hence

[60.]A (p. 190): conceiv’d as good

[61.]A (p. 190): are commonly observ’d to

[62.]A (p. 191): sometimes so,

[63.]A (p. 191): where yet there is nothing contrary to Benevolence apparent in the Actions

[64.]A (p. 191): Now we generally allow, that what is from Nature in one Nation, would be so in all.

[65.]A (p. 191): and yet we cannot find any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind, at least among Collaterals: Now this

[66.]Not in A (p. 191).

[67.]C (p. 215), D (p. 216): disapprove

[68.]A (p. 192): it is very hard to shew any

[69.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: Persons

[70.]A (p. 192): Obligations; and this

[71.]A (p. 192): want of Benevolence, or Malice

[72.]A (p. 193): Incest, or prohibiting it; since it does not appear that any obvious natural Evils follow from it

[73.]A (p. 193): do so: but

[1.]D2, D3 (p. 218): of our Benevolent Instincts of various Kinds

[2.]D1 (p. 218): an

D2, D3 (p. 218): a

[3.]D2, D3 (p. 218): all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike strong.

[4.]Omitted in C (p. 218), D (p. 218).

[5.]D2, D3 (p. 218): Kinds

[6.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 218).

[7.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 218).

[8.]Omitted in C (p. 218), D (p. 218).

[9.]Not in A (p. 195).

[10.]Not in A (p. 195).

[11.]A (p. 195): may only further observe

[12.]No new paragraph in A (p. 196).

[13.]C (p. 219), D (p. 219): and

[14.]Omitted in C (p. 219), D (p. 219).

[15.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more strongly and constantly than it ascends

[16.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: more

[17.]A (p. 197): But there is

[18.]A (p. 197): Part 2

[19.]C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great

[20.]C (p. 220), D (p. 220): great

[21.]D1 (p. 220): Maultiplicity

D2 (p. 220): a Multiplicity

D2 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: a Multiplicity

D3 (p. 220): Maultiplicity

D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: a Multiplicity

[22.]A (p. 197): be made useless towards multitudes, whose Interests, at vast distances, we could not understand

D (p. 221): become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes, whose Interest we could not understand

[23.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 221).

[24.]C (p. 221), D (p. 221): so well ordered it, that as our Attention is more raised by those good Offices which are done to our selves or our Friends, so they cause a stronger Sense of Approbation in us, and produce a stronger Benevolence toward (D1, p. 221: towards) the Authors of them

[25.]A (p. 198): towards

[26.]A (p. 198): selves; which we call Gratitude; and thus has laid a Foundation

[27.]A (p. 198): Part

[28.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 221).

[29.]Not in A (p. 198).

[30.]D2, D3 (p. 221): The

[31.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).

[32.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).

[33.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 222).

[34.]D2, D3 (p. 222): altogether. Beside this general Attraction, the Learned in these Subjects shew us a great many other Attractions among several Sorts of Bodys, answering to some particular Sorts of Passions, from some special Causes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere, may represent the Self-Love of each Individual.

[35.]D2, D3 (p. 222): These different Sorts of Love to Persons

[36.]Not in A (p. 199).

[37.]D2, D3 (p. 222): natural

[38.]C (p. 223), D (p. 223): desire and delight

[39.]A (p. 200): as Honour, is constituted an immediate Evil.

[40.]C (pp. 223–24), D (pp. 223–24): an Opinion of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of the World? Why, perhaps, he

[41.]A (p. 201): from Interest

[42.]A (p. 201): to be

[43.]A (p. 202): is founded on Self-Love

[44.]A (p. 202): our

[45.]No new paragraph in A (p. 202).

[46.]A (p. 202): but

[47.]D (p. 225): to

[48.]Footnote not in A (p. 202).

[49.]Not in A (p. 204).

[50.]New footnote in C (p. 227), D (p. 227): *This should be considered by those who talk much of Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, as Things much desired; while yet they allow no moral Sense.

[51.]C (p. 228), D (p. 228): be heartily approved and admired, when we know that Self-Love is

[52.]C (p. 228), D (p. 228): admire

[53.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: No; we should distrust all Pretenders to such a Temper, and hate

[54.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: to procure

A (p. 205), C (p. 228), D (p. 228): to procure to

[55.]A (p. 205): form’d

[56.]A (p. 205): but

[57.]A (p. 206): any

[58.]D (p. 229): are

[59.]A (p. 206): did

[60.]C (p. 230), D (p. 230): all Men would look upon

[61.]C (p. 232), D (p. 232): hereafter

[62.]A (p. 209): And hence

[63.]A (p. 209): and they never

[64.]Not in A (p. 209).

[65.]A (p. 209): And the

[66.]A (p. 210): and

[67.]C (p. 233), D (p. 233): Desire of

[68.]A (p. 210): some of the

[69.]C (p. 233), D (p. 233) add: and of having been acquired by Virtue,

[70.]A (p. 211): And the

[71.]A (p. 211): Actions

[72.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: strengthens the natural Modesty in civiliz’d Nations, as Habits and Education improve it

[73.]A (p. 213): many are there who

[74.]A (p. 214): the very

[75.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: of

[76.]A (p. 214): We may also hence

[77.]D (p. 237): Pleasure

[78.]A (p. 214): as

[79.]A (p. 215): others, so no

[80.]A (p. 215): And therefore none are

[81.]A (p. 215): do not of themselves ever

[82.]Not in A (p. 215).

[83.]New footnote in C (p. 238), D (p. 238): *See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true, in the Essay on the Passions, p. 6.

[84.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: morally evil [an apparently incomplete correction]

[85.]Not in A (p. 216).

[86.]Not in A (p. 216).

[87.]A1 (p. 216): Misery and Distress immediately appear

A1 [Errata]: Misery or Distress

A2, A3 (p. 216): Misery and Distress immediately appears

[88.]A (p. 217): : Thus

[89.]Not in A (p. 217).

[90.]A (p. 217): and

[91.]A (p. 217): from Self-love we

[92.]A (p. 217): study

[93.]A (p. 218): pleas’d barely to

[94.]A (p. 219): meeting with

[95.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or Curiosity

[96.]A (p. 219): of all

[97.]Not in A (p. 219).

[98.]A (p. 219): do delight in some Actions which in fact

[99.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 308]: State. Some have alleged, That “however the Sight of another’s Misery some way or other gives us Pain, yet the very feeling of Compassion is also attended with Pleasure: This Pleasure is superior to the Pain of Sympathy, and hence we desire to raise Compassion in ourselves, and incline to indulge it.” Were this truly the Case, the Continuation of the Suffering would be the natural Desire of the Compassionate, in order to continue this State, not of pure Pleasure indeed, but of Pleasure superior to all Pains.

[1.]A (p. 221): wherever it appears, that

[2.]A (p. 222): Mankind

[3.]A (p. 222): would

[4.]A (p. 222): when his

C (p. 245), D (p. 245): whose

[5.]A (p. 222): Would

[6.]A (pp. 223–24): the external Sensations of Pleasure, or all the Opportunitys of seeing the most beautiful regular Prospects, and hearing the most harmonious Sounds, or obtaining the most extensive Knowledge? These internal Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, have a great Power to sooth

[7.]A (p. 224): would

[8.]A (p. 224): Nay

[9.]A (p. 225): Par. 5.

[10.]C (p. 248), D (p. 248) insert: as related by Cicero and some others,

[11.]C (p. 248), D (p. 248): better a

[12.]No new paragraph in A (p. 226).

[13.]A (p. 226): would

[14.]A (p. 227): of

[15.]A (p. 227): some Ideas are

[16.]Not in A (p. 227).

[17.]A (p. 227): such Pleasures

[18.]No new paragraph in A (p. 227).

[19.]A (pp. 227–28): obtain the solitary Perceptions of

[20.]A (p. 228): 2

[21.]A (p. 228): universal Judgment of

[22.]Not in A (p. 229).

[23.]A (p. 229): 4

[24.]A (p. 229): any

[25.]A (p. 230): it is that such Forms

[26.]A (p. 230): toward

[27.]A (p. 230): for these Irregularitys of

[28.]D2, D3 (p. 253): upon some probable Foundation in Nature, and sometimes without any,

[29.]C (p. 253), D (p. 253): Is it

[30.]A (p. 231): those

[31.]A (p. 231): are

[32.]D2, D3 (p. 253) [no new paragraph]: Had Homer, in his Character of Helen, rais’d our Idea of her external Beauty to the greatest Height, yet

[33.]D2, D3 (p. 254): morally amiable

[34.]A (p. 234): even as

[35.]Not in A (p. 234).

[36.]A (p. 234): foresee all the

[37.]No new paragraph in A (p. 234).

[38.]New paragraph in A (p. 234).

[39.]C (p. 257), D (p. 257): and

[40.]A (p. 235): that it is not Love of sensible Pleasure which is

[41.]A (p. 235): we

[42.]A (p. 236): great

[43.]C (p. 258), D (p. 258): towards

[44.]Not in A (p. 236).

[45.]Omitted in D (p. 259).

[46.]Not in A (p. 239).

[47.]A (p. 239): how far does it go to

[48.]A (p. 240): the same moral

[49.]Not in A (p. 240).

[50.]D (p. 262): a more

[51.]D (p. 262): Representations

[52.]A (p. 241): hence it is that

[53.]A (p. 241): give

[54.]C (p. 263), D (p. 263): far

[55.]C (p. 263), D (p. 263): ver.

[56.]C (p. 264), D (p. 264): ver.

[57.]Not in A (p. 242).

[58.]A (p. 242): the

[59.]Not in A (p. 242).

[60.]A (p. 242): his

[61.]A (p. 243): with their rude throats counterfeiting

[62.]C (p. 266), D (p. 266): ver.

[63.]Not numbered in A (p. 244).

[64.]Not numbered, no new article in A (p. 244).

[65.]In A pages 244–48 follow articles VIII and IX, which in the later editions became articles III and IV of Section 7: B (pp. 270–74), C (pp. 271–74), D (pp. 271–75). Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 21).

[1.]A (p. 249): ; and that we have Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstractly

[2.]A (p. 249): abstractly

[3.]A (p. 249): this Sense

[4.]Not in A (p. 250).

[5.]C (p. 268), D (p. 268): of

[6.]Omitted in D (p. 268).

[7.]C (p. 268), D (p. 268): beneficent

[8.]C (p. 268), D (p. 268): good

[9.]Not in A (p. 250).

[10.]Not in A (p. 250).

[11.]Not in A (p. 251).

[12.]A (p. 251): more promote our Advantage

[13.]C (p. 270), D (p. 270): virtuous Benevolence toward

[14.]A (p. 253): but are the Effect of the great Author of all things, who forms our Nature for them.

[15.]In A (p. 253) articles III and IV appear instead at the end of Section 6, numbered VIII and IX (pp. 244–48).

[16.]C (p. 272), D (p. 272): influence

[17.]A (p. 245): were

[18.]C (p. 273), D (p. 273): condemn

[19.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 308–9]: contrary. Some also object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Absurdity. But ’tis manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the calm Motions of the Will toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward present Objects of Sense. Again, ’tis plain there is something in certain Tempers of Brutes,* which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem, tho’ we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punishments won’t have these Effects upon them, which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or punished than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Punishing of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no wise End of Government?

[20.]Omitted in C (p. 273), D (p. 273).

[21.]A (p. 247): Interest do

[22.]A (p. 248): nothing else but

[23.]A (p. 253): wrongly numbered II (instead of III).

[24.]A (p. 253): Goodness, and Holiness

[25.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Or that his Will is conformable to his Will.

[26.]No new paragraph in A (p. 254).

[27.]C (p. 275), D (p. 275): Desire of

[28.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda p. 311]: morally good [an apparently incomplete correction]

[29.]C (p. 276), D (p. 276): Desire [In D1 and D3 pagination error: 267 instead of 276.]

[30.]Not in A (p. 255).

[31.]A (p. 255): altho

[32.]A (p. 255): Sanctions are join’d to co-operate

[33.]A (p. 255): Threatnings

[34.]A (p. 256): numbered IV.

[35.]C (p. 277), D (p. 277): one

[36.]A (p. 256): violated: And on

[37.]A (pp. 256–57): allowing

[38.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty

[39.]No new paragraph in A (p. 257).

[40.]Not in A (p. 257). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 21).

[41.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: Natural Liberty

[42.]C (p. 279), D (p. 279): naturally residing in the Persons injur’d, or their voluntary, or invited Assistants, to use force

[43.]Omitted in C (p. 279), D (p. 279).

[44.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 21).

[45.]Alterations and Additions (p. 21): injured Party

[46.]No new paragraph in A (p. 258).

[47.]A (p. 259): so the Power of

[48.]A (p. 259): is

[49.]A (p. 259): the Power of Compassion

[50.]A (p. 259): universal

[51.]A (p. 261): however

[52.]A (p. 261): Force: and hence

[53.]A (p. 261): War on both Sides just

[54.]A (p. 261): numbered V.

[55.]A (p. 261): a Power to transfer

D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: the Power of transferring

[56.]A (p. 262): pleases: and so

[57.]A (p. 262): serve

[58.]A (p. 262): numbered VI.

[59.]A (p. 262–63): all Men are oblig’d to observe such a Tenour of Action as shall most effectually promote Industry; and to

Alterations and Additions (p. 21): when Men are so numerous, that the natural Product of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; all men are oblig’d to observe such a Tenour of Action as shall most effectually promote Industry; and to

[60.]A (p. 263): Whatever

[61.]Not in A (p. 263).

[62.]A (p. 264): of Self-Love from Industry, and leaves Benevolence alone; [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 22).]

[63.]Not in A (p. 264).

[64.]Omitted in D (p. 286).

[65.]A (p. 265): into

[66.]Not in A (p. 265). Instruction for addition of this paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (p. 22).

[67.]Alterations and Additions (p. 22): according to their Prudence

[68.]A (p. 265): numbered VII.

[69.]D2, D3 (p. 288): Rules

[70.]Not in A (p. 265).

[71.]A (p. 265): 2

[72.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 288).

[73.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 288).

[74.]A (p. 266): And so

[75.]A (p. 266): farther

[76.]A (p. 266): in as far

[77.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 289).

[78.]A (p. 267): Passions: And this

[79.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 289).

[80.]D2, D3 (p. 290): the Motives of private Interest are greater.

[81.]D2, D3 (p. 290): selfish Motives from

[82.]A (p. 268): has often

[83.]D2, D3 (p. 291): no new

[84.]Omitted in D (p. 291).

[85.]D2, D3 (p. 291): natural Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society.

[86.]A (p. 269): perfect Rights, or even external ones,

[87.]D2, D3 (p. 291): A stronger and less extensive Tie of Benevolence, in equal Abilitys, must produce a greater Moment of Good to the Object of it, in equally good Characters, than the weaker Ties. Thus, natural Affection, Gratitude, Friendship, have greater Effects than general Benevolence: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Persons under no special Relation.

[88.]D2, D3 (p. 292): Benevolence alone

[89.]D2, D3 (p. 292): more extensive, but less passionate

[90.]D2, D3 (p. 292): more violent, or passionate

[91.]C (p. 292), D2, D3 (p. 292): more. The general Benevolence (C, p. 292, D1, p. 292: also) appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the Constitution of our moral Sense [C, p. 292, D1, p. 292 add after “Sense” a footnote: *See Sect. 3 Art. IX & Art. X § 2.]

D2, D3 (p. 292) add: , than any particular Passion. [and add a footnote after “Sense”]: *See Sect. 3. Art. ix. The Author all along supposes, that no Man acts without some Desire, or Instinct, or Affection, or Appetite; that of these Attachments of the Will, some are calm and unpassionate, others are passionate; some are extensive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in each of these Divisions, manifestly appears more amiable; and consequently, caeteris paribus, the Virtue is less, in any given Quantity, of Good done from the violent, passionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain Remarker thence argues, “That then the Virtue is highest, when there is no Desire, Affection, or Attachment at all; or when we act solely from Reason, without any Affection to any Thing.” One may retort this Reasoning in a like Case. In any given Momentum of Bodies, there the Velocity is greater, where there is least Matter; consequently, it is there greatest, where there is no Matter at all.

[92.]C (p. 293), D (p. 293): which

[93.]Not in A (p. 270). Instruction for addition of this paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 23–24).

[94.]Alterations and Additions (p. 23): ought

[95.]The following five paragraphs are not in A (pp. 270–71); instead: VIII. Let us not imagine, that from the above Idea of Right it will follow, that the wise and benevolent have a perfect Right to dispose of the Labours or Goods of the weak or foolish, because perhaps they would better employ them for the publick Good than the unskilful Possessors can; for tho in some particular Cases this might happen to do good, as when a good-natur’d Octavius assum’d the Government of a distracted Commonwealth; yet what would be the Consequence of allowing this universally, while there is no acknowledg’d Standard, or Judge of superior Wisdom or Benevolence, which every one would be too apt to claim? And as each Man is more nearly engag’d for his own Good by Self-love, than another is by mere Benevolence, he will scarcely be brought to believe, that another understands his Interest, or pursues it, better than he could himself. And what Happiness can remain to the Govern’d, while there is any Suspicion of either the Benevolence or Wisdom of the Governor? Especially when there are too great Presumptions, that Governors may be sway’d by Self-love against the publick Good. From this Consideration, as well as the natural Love of Liberty, and Inclination both to act and judge for our selves, we justly conclude, [Instruction for addition of the five paragraphs already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 24–30).]

[96.]Alterations and Additions (p. 24) adds footnote: *See Art. v. of the first Edition.

[97.]Alterations and Additions (p. 25): unawares, or in

[98.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 25).

[99.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 25).

[100.]Alterations and Additions (p. 25): transferr’d

[101.]Alterations and Additions (p. 25): ruining

[102.]Alterations and Additions (p. 25): Forms of Civil Government

[103.]Alterations and Additions (p. 26): or of both

[104.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 27).

[105.]Alterations and Additions (p. 27): toward the Repair

[106.]Alterations and Additions (pp. 27–28): intirely

[107.]D (p. 298): secure

[108.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: violent Usurper

[109.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: regard to a publick Good

[110.]A (p. 271): Pleasure

[111.]Not in A (p. 272).

[112.]A (p. 272): we should be better guided by them than by our own utmost

[113.]A (p. 273): numbered IX.

[114.]Footnote not in A (p. 273).

[115.]A (p. 273): But

[116.]A (p. 273): (by his assuming Authority)

[117.]A (p. 273): would

[118.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: as some ancient Hereticks did,

[119.]A (p. 274): numbered X.

[120.]C (p. 302), D (p. 302): There seems

[121.]A (p. 274): Par.

[122.]C (p. 302), D (p. 302): and desires

[123.]Not in A (p. 274).

[124.]Not in A (p. 274).

[125.]A (p. 274): that a

[126.]A (p. 274): Course of such external

D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 311]: or with a suitable Course of

[127.]C (p. 302), D (p. 302): Hobbes

[128.]A (p. 275): numbered XI.

[129.]A (p. 275): been often

[130.]A (p. 275): would know

[131.]Omitted in C (p. 303), D (p. 303).

[132.]A (p. 275): Yea

[133.]C (p. 303), D (p. 303): approve

[134.]No new paragraph in A (p. 275).

[135.]C (p. 303), D (p. 303): not

[136.]Omitted in C (p. 303), D (p. 303).

[137.]C (p. 304), D (p. 304): more than

[138.]C (p. 304), D (p. 304): more lovely

[33.]The following two paragraphs are not in C (p. 137) and D (p. 138); instead, fourteen new pages are added: [Margin heading: Benevolence is disinterested.] IV. There are two ways in which some may deduce Benevolence from Self-Love, the one supposing that “we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be for our Interest to have this Affection, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as it may tend to procure some external Reward from God or Man.” The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our Choice or Volition; but “supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of their Nature to desire whatever is apprehended [C: p. 138, D: p. 139] as the Means of any private Happiness; and that the Observation of the Happiness of other Persons, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to the Observer, as their Misery is the Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in Consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we begin to desire the Happiness of others as the Means of obtaining this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of others in a happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire either the Happiness of another, or any Event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the Means of some Happiness or Pleasure to ourselves; but own at the same time, that Desire is not raised in us directly by any Volition, but arises necessarily upon our apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness.

[Margin heading: The first contrary Opinion confuted.] That the former Scheme is not just, may appear from this general Consideration, that “neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised by Volition.” If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever toward any Object, even the most improper: we might raise Jealousy, Fear, Anger, Love, toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage Men to external Actions, or to the [C: p. 139, D: p. 140] Dissimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any Affection, may indeed turn our Attention to those Qualitys in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor Desire, will ever raise any Affection in us.

But more particularly, that Desire of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any Pleasure accompanying the Affection itself: for ’tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with Pleasure; nay, ’tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy than pleasant. ’Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections justify themselves; while they continue, (as Malebranch expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the [C: p. 140, D: p. 141] Jealous, the Compassionate, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy or Pity are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent. Uneasiness generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this Sensation tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire, but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure.

The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleasures of Self-Approbation by our Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the Prospect of an Interest [C: p. 141, D: p. 142] equivalent to this of Self-Approbation, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that that Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally selfish?

But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a Desire of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these pleasant Reflections on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in natural Affection toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the Absence of which is indeed the greatest Vice, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by Choice, with a View to obtain this private Good.

In like manner, if no Volition of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any Volition raise them from Prospects of eternal Rewards, or to avoid eternal Punishments. The former Motives differ from these only [C: p. 142, D: p. 143] as smaller from greater, shorter from more durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us angry at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and jealous of the most faithful and affectionate, or sorrowful for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a future State, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration.* [C: p. 143, D: p. 144]

’Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the virtuous Benevolence jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no Opposition of apparent Interest, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater Interest. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a disinterested Desire partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an evil Deity in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity only from the same Motives, without any Love or Gratitude towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no Approbation. We plainly see that [C: p. 144, D: p. 145] a Change of external Circumstances of Interest under an evil Deity, without any Change in the Disposition of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity.

Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho’ there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the Sanction of the Law is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more Benevolence, nor no other Affection, than those in one forced by the Law to be Curator to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the Success of his Attempts, or the Happiness of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct.

[Margin heading: The second Opinion confuted.] V. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any Volition upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some pleasant Sensations which we expect to feel [C: p. 145, D: p. 146] upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among Friends, Parents and Children, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from Self-Love as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the Means of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man approves the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring Wealth or sensual Pleasure to ourselves? If a Person had wagered concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer’s Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be approved as virtuous? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this case may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this Connection: nor do [C: p. 146, D: p. 147] we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure. When we do generous Offices, we all often feel Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our Pursuit of their Happiness we have no Intention of obtaining this delight. We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole ultimate Intention or Desire the freeing ourselves from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person in Distress, (C, p. 146: “or”; omitted in D, p. 147) to take away this Connection, so that we should be easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free us from our Pain, which upon this Scheme is the sole End proposed by the compassionate Person.—Don’t we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless calm Reflection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some selfish Affection, as Fear of Danger, over-power it. [C: p. 147, D: p. 148]

To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly annihilated, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the Future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life?** Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the Means of private Good, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of Annuities?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, ’tis hard to account: perhaps ’tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of simple Ideas.—Desire, say they, is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence [C: p. 148, D: p. 149] of any Good.—Whereas Desire is as distinct from Uneasiness, as Volition is from Sensation. Don’t they themselves often speak of our desiring to remove Uneasiness? Desire then is different from Uneasiness, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies it, as Extension does the Idea of Colour, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the Means of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of removing our own Uneasiness is an ultimate Desire: and why may we not have other ultimate Desires?

“But can any Being be concerned about the Absence of an Event which gives it no Uneasiness?” Perhaps superior Natures desire without uneasy Sensation. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the Means of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this Uneasiness, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves by desiring it. So likewise we may feel Delight upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the Means of obtaining this [C: p. 149, D: p. 150] Delight; even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion to.

VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our moral Sense, our Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others? To what Purpose serves the wise Order of Nature, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are eternal Rewards appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have benevolent Affections, and consequently turn our Attention to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent contrary Motives, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310) substitute “Virtuous” for “Virtues”] were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible additional Motives to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good Affection, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of Self-Interest; or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external Acts [C: p. 150, D: p. 151] of Beneficence, and to restrain them from Vice.*** [C: p. 151, D: p. 152]

From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others; and that our moral Sense determines us [C, p. 151, D1, p. 152, D3, p. 152: only] [D2, p. 152: instead of “only” a lacuna of approximately four letters] to approve [D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 310): only such] Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

[50.]D3 (pp. 177–78) inserts a new article with the margin heading “Benevolence of different Kinds” and numbered VI. The remaining articles of section III are renumbered accordingly. VI. Benevolence is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop Cumberland always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, ’tis highly necessary to observe, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a calm, extensive Affection, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered.* [p. 178]

Now tho’ all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: ’Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of Benevolence is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho’ of a lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho’ it does not justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person, from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to larger Societys.

[82.]C (pp. 182–83), D (pp. 183–84): it. [new article] (D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] instruct to delete the number.) IX. ’Tis here to be observed, that tho’ every kind Affection abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our calm Affections, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our particular Passions; calm Self-Love quite distinct from Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust, or Anger; so calm Good-will toward others is different from Pity, passionate Love, the parental Affection, or the Passion of particular Friends. Now every kind Passion which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is an universal calm Good-will toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent [C: p. 183, D: p. 184] with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue.*

[148.]D2, D3 (pp. 195–96): Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. ’Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower Kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to the general Good. Those calmer Determinations of the Will, whether of greater or less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That “Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;” as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to Action where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End.* For this see Treatise IV. Sect. i and ii.

The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one his own Hap-piness; and yet this he seeks by Instinct.

[52.]Alterations and Additions (p. 19): System.”* [and the following footnote:]

[19.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 308–9]: contrary. Some also object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Absurdity. But ’tis manifest, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this Scheme places the highest Virtue, to wit, the calm Motions of the Will toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Passions toward present Objects of Sense. Again, ’tis plain there is something in certain Tempers of Brutes,* which engages our Liking, and some lower Good-will and Esteem, tho’ we do not usually call it Virtue, nor do we call the sweeter Dispositions of Children Virtue; and yet they are so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Punishments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Rewards, or Punishments won’t have these Effects upon them, which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or punished than by the immediate Pleasure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Punishing of which, in Creatures void of Reason and Reflection, can answer no wise End of Government?

[* ]These several Motives of Interest, which, some alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Prospect of external Advantage of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the Volition of external Actions immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others. Now being willing to do external Actions which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without any Desire of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money.The Prospect of Rewards from the Deity, of future Pleasures from the Self-Approbation of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to desire or wish to have the Affection of Benevolence in our Hearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives would make us will or choose to raise benevolent Affections: But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the Happiness of others; for, from Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now the having those Affections is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Re-[C: p. 143, D: p. 144]wards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or miserable, but according to the Goodness of our Affections. If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raise them.

[** ][Note added in D2, D3 (Corrigenda, p. 307)]: Cic. de Finib. lib. ii. c. 31. [today: II, 99] Ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio, indicat innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam, &c. [Translation: “That provision for the care of children, that loyalty to friendship and affection, that observance of these solemn duties with his latest breath, prove that there was innate in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by pleasure nor elicited by prizes and rewards.” Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 190.]

[*** ]Let it be also remembered, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an additional Motive to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper Motive to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the Promises of this Life as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as i Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. which imports no more than this, “That if there were no resurrection, and consequently Christ had not risen, and therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution:” Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution was, Hope of Reward.Another Text insisted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. But this only means, either “that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existence and Goodness,” which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of “embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward.” Now this does not prove either that our sole, or our strongest Incitement to virtuous Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward.Heb. XII. ver. 2. is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, “That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings,” not that this was the principal Spring of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. Not to mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that ἀντί is seldom used for the final Cause; but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the Socinians: And then this Verse may be thus translated; [C: p. 151, D: p. 152] “Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the Cross.” Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that some Antithesis between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such Antitheses. For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour’s sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to Philip. II. ver. 6, 7.Whoever would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, will find disinterested Love more inculcated, and Motives of Gratitude more frequently suggested, than any others.

[* ]See Treatise III. Sect. ii. Art. 3 and Treatise IV. Sect. vi. Art. 4. [Editor’s note: Hutcheson thought of the Inquiry and the Essay as a coherent whole. Consequently he is here referring to the two Treatises making up the Essay, namely, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, London, 1728.]

[* ]See Essay on Passions, Sect. 2. Art. 3. And Illustrations, Sect. 6. Art. 4.

[* ]These Gentlemen should either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools, or else confute it better; that the πϱοαίϱεσις [choice] which is necessary in virtuous Actions is ὄϱεξις βουλευτικὴ [intention of will]: And that Virtue needs not only the λογὸν ἀληϑῆ [logical truth], but the ὄϱεξις ὀϱϑήν [right intention]. These very Authors who deny any Affections or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of sublime Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of sublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled Disposition of Will, or a constant Determination, or Desire to act in Conformity to Reason, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill-natur’d Adversary would call this an Instinct, an Essential or Natural Disposition of Will, an Affectionate Determination toward a very sublime Object presented by the Understanding. See Aristotle’s Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. and Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. [MM I 18, 1189b 32ff.; I 35, 1196b 4ff.; and II 7–8, 1204a 19ff.] and in many other Places.

[* ]Ld. Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part. 3. Sect. 2. p. 110. Vol. 1.

[* ]Cicero is not ashamed to say of some Brutes, Videmus indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, desideria,—secreta à voluptate humanarum simulacra virtutum. De Finib. Lib. II. c. 33. [today: II, 110]. [Translation: “In a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection, and also recognition and recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure,. . .” Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 202.]