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∥1 TREATISE I

viz. An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.∥

An Inquiry ∥2 Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.∥

SECTION I

Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation.

To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some Definitions, and Observations, either universally acknowledg’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.

∥5 Sensation.∥Art. ∥3 I∥. Those Ideas ∥4 which∥ are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of external Ob-jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

Different Senses.II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have ∥6 vast∥ Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some degree diffus’d over the whole Body.

The Mind how active.III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas, ∥7 which∥ were receiv’d separately; of comparing ∥8 their∥ Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio, or Degree; and of considering separately each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress’d jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation we commonly call Abstraction.

Substances.IV. The Ideas of ∥9 Substances∥ are compounded of the various simple Ideas jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses. We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And such Definitions may ∥10 raise an Idea clear enough∥ of the Substance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv’d the Substance; provided he has separately receiv’d by his Senses all the simple Ideas ∥11 which∥ are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin’d: But if ∥12 there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv’d, or if he wants any of the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceived by the Senses.∥

Education. Instruction.V.13 Hence it follows, “That when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those Qualitys, for Perception of which we have the proper Senses.” Thus if Beauty be desir’d by one who has not the Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais’d by some apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.

Pleasure. Pain.VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from ∥14 a∥ prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from ∥15 an∥ apprehension of Evil.

Different Ideas.VII. The ∥16 simple∥ Ideas rais’d in different Persons by the same Object, are probably ∥17 some way∥ different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines ∥18 to∥ which Men acquire an ∥19 Aversion∥, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation: ∥20 In this case∥ we are conscious that the Idea is alter’d from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of Idea may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys, as we advance in Years, ∥21 or when we are accustomed to any Object,∥ which may occasion an Indifference ∥22 toward∥ Meats we were fond of in our Childhood∥23^a; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. ∥24^bMany of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro the too great Intenseness of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the Intenseness of the Perception at least; nay sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold hand ∥25^cshall^c∥ feel warm^ab∥.

We shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of Fancy ∥26^aabout more complex Ideas of Objects, ∥27^bin which we regard^b∥ many Ideas of different Senses at once; as ∥28^cin^c∥ some Perceptions of those call’d primary Qualitys, and some secondary, as explain’d by Mr. Locke:i for instance, in the different Fancys about Architecture, Gardening, Dress. Of the two former we shall offer something in Sect. VI. As to Dress, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus^a∥, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of glaring Colours be look’d upon as an evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Fashion be commonly us’d by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly with that of the Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dislike to them in those who join the additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. But there ∥29 does not seem to be any∥ Ground to believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same ∥30 simple∥ Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or to the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same ∥31 simple∥ Idea should do so.

Complex Ideas.VIII. The only Pleasure of Sense, ∥32 which∥ ∥33 our∥ Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are ∥34 vastly∥ greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas’d with a Prospect of the Sun ∥35 arising∥ among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify’d by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

Beauty.IX. Let it be observ’d, that in the following Papers, the Word Beauty is taken for the Idea rais’d in us, and a Sense of Beauty for our Power of receiving this Idea. Harmony.Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover “what is the immediate Occasion of these pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them.”

Internal Sense.X. It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have in the common meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, ∥36 when they are plac’d beside each other, altho they may often confound their Names, when they occur a-part from each other; as some do the Names of Green and Blue:∥ they can tell in separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great distances as any men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall ∥37 find∥ no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a good Ear; and the like distinction we ∥38 should∥ probably acknowledge in other ∥39 Objects∥, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.

Different from External.XI.40 There will appear another Reason perhaps ∥41 afterwards∥, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an Internal Sense, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much concern’d, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ’d in sensible Objects, and accompany’d with like Pleasure: Such is that Beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.

XII. Let ∥42^aevery one here consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in his Description; from that cold lifeless Conception which we ∥43^bimagine in^b∥ a dull Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call a fine Taste. This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv’d from external Sensation; they can tell all the specifick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the Form of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a ∥44^cvastly^c∥ more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet but any man of a fine Taste. Our External ∥45^dSenses^d∥ may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something further necessary, not only to make ∥46^ea man^e∥ a compleat Master in Architecture, Painting or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or ∥47^fcapable of receiving^f∥ the highest Pleasure in contemplating them.^a∥ Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the External Senses are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, ∥48 often does∥ not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good Taste will en-joy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the Power of receiving such Impressions, an Internal Sense. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, ∥49 especially when we are told in what meaning the Word is applied.∥

Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.XIII.50 This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure ∥51 does not arise∥ from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; ∥52 but strikes us at first with the Idea of∥ Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it53 may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or ∥54 from∥ the Increase of Knowledge.*

XIV.55 And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will make an Object grateful, nor ∥56 View of∥ Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform’d Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur’d by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform’d; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.

This Sense antecedent to and distinct from prospects of interest.XV.57 Hence it plainly appears, “that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises ∥58 from Self-love∥ upon Prospect of Advantage.” Nay, do not we often see Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect of Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects ∥59 even of∥ this Advantage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus Advantageous, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they are thus constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc’d by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of Death, ∥60 or Love of Life,∥ may make us ∥61 chuse and∥ desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleasant; ∥62 and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can∥ make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or ∥63 Meat∥ disagreeable to it, ∥64 which was∥ not so antecedently to this Prospect. ∥65 Just in the same manner as to∥ the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the Pursuit of such Objects is frequently neglected, from prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of ∥66 Self-love∥, does not prove that we have no Sense of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-ballanc’d by a stronger Desire∥67 : So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never adduc’d as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity∥.

XVI.68 Had we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as beautiful: ∥69^aAnd in Faces I see no-thing ∥70^bwhich^b∥ could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and Smoothness of Surface:^a∥ And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different Views on many Occasions: ∥71 And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever∥ give us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use of before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grateful to* them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below.†

Beauty, Original or Comparative.∥73XVII.∥ ∥74 Beauty∥ is either Original or Comparative; or, if any like the Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be ∥75 observ’d∥, that by Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos’d to be in the Object, ∥76 which∥ should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, ∥77 Hot∥, Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, ∥78 which∥ excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine ∥79 that there is something in the Object just like our Perception∥. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having relation to Figure and Time, may indeed have a nearer resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, ∥80 which∥ seem not so much any Pictures of Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call’d beautiful. We therefore by* Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos’d an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv’d from the Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures∥82 , Theorems∥. Comparative or Relative Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or Resemblances of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections.

SECTION II

Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

Sense of Men.I. Since it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what Quality in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the occasion of them. And let it be here observ’d, that our Inquiry is only about the Qualitys ∥1 which∥ are beautiful to Men; or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the Sense of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects ∥2 which∥ occur to us, are beautiful, we mean ∥3 that such Objects are∥ agreeable to the Sense of Men: ∥4 for as there are not a few∥ Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, ∥5 so we see a variety of∥ other Animals ∥6 who∥ seem delighted with them; they may have Senses otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsom, may be to them a Paradise.

II. That we may more distinctly discover the general Foundation or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to consider it first in its simpler Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it.

Uniformity with Variety.III. The Figures ∥7 which∥ excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety. There are many Conceptions of Objects ∥8 which∥ are agreeable upon other accounts, such as Grandeur, Novelty, Sanctity, and some others, ∥9 which shall be mention’d hereafter.* ∥ But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity. This ∥10 will be plain from Examples.∥

Variety.First, the Variety increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Beauty of an equilateral Triangle is less than that of the Square; which is less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is surpass’d by the Hexagon. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas’d, the Proportion of them to the Radius, or Diameter of the Figure, ∥11 or of the Circle to which regular Polygons have an obvious Relation,∥ is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of Heptagons, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So in Solids, the Eicosiedron surpasses the Dodecaedron, and this the Octaedron, which is still more beautiful than the Cube; and this again surpasses the regular Pyramid: The obvious Ground of this, is greater Variety with equal Uniformity.

Uniformity.The greater Uniformity increases the Beauty amidst equal Variety, in these Instances: An Equilateral Triangle, or even an Isosceles, surpasses the Scalenum: A Square surpasses the Rhombus or Lozenge, and this again the Rhomboides, ∥12 which is∥ still more beautiful than the Trapezium, or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the regular Solids ∥13 vastly∥ surpass all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same is observable not only in the Five perfectly regular Solids, but in all those which have any considerable Uniformity, as Cylinders, Prisms, Pyramids, Obelisks; which please every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no Unity or Resemblance among the Parts.

Compound Ratio.Instances of the compound Ratio we have in comparing Circles or Spheres, with Ellipses or Spheroids not very eccentric; and in comparing the compound Solids, the Exoctaedron, and Eicosidodecaedron, with the perfectly regular ones of which they are compounded: and we shall find, that the Want of that most perfect Uniformity observable in the latter, is compensated by the greater Variety in the ∥14 others∥, so that the Beauty is nearly equal.

IV. These Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and might be confirm’d by the Judgment of Children in the simpler Figures, where the Variety is not too great for their Comprehension. And however uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may seem, yet this is perpetually to be observ’d, that Children are fond of all regular Figures in their little Diversions, altho they be no more convenient, or useful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they discover a Taste or Sense of Beauty, in desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.

Beauty of Nature.V. ∥15 It is∥ the same foundation ∥16 which∥ we have for our Sense of Beauty in the Works of Nature. In every Part of the World which we call Beautiful, there is a ∥17 vast∥ Uniformity amidst ∥18 an∥ almost infinite Variety. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design’d for the use of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any acquaintance. The Figures and Motions of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by Reasoning enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find ∥19 their Structure, Order∥, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of Beauty. Every particular Object in Nature does not indeed appear beautiful to us; but there is a ∥20 vast∥ Profusion of Beauty over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation: For not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion’d by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning distances; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly Spherical; the Orbits of their Revolutions generally Elliptick, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation: ∥21 now∥ these are Figures of great Uniformity, and therefore pleasing to us.

22 Further, to pass by the less obvious Uniformity in the Proportion of their Quantitys of Matter, Distances, Times of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of Uniformity amidst Variety, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each Planet, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? ∥23 by which∥, after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew’d; the alternate Successions of Light and Shade, or Day and Night, constantly pursuing each other around each Planet, with an agreeable and regular Diversity in the Times they possess the ∥24 several∥ Hemispheres, in the Summer, Harvest, Winter and Spring; and the various Phases, Aspects, and Situations, of the Planets to each other, their Conjunctions and Oppositions, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Constancy: These are the Beautys which charm the Astronomer, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant.

Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.*i

Earth.VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover’d with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how beautifully is it diversify’d with various Degrees of Light and Shade, according to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in Mountains, Valleys, Hills, and open Plains, which are variously inclin’d toward the great Luminary!

Plants.VII. If we descend to the minuter Works of Nature, what ∥25 vast∥ Uniformity among all the Species of Plants and Vegetables in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! ∥26 what exact∥ Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this Uniformity is not only observable in the Form in gross; ∥27 nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances∥, but in the Structure of their ∥28 minutest Parts,∥ which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowers of any one Species, we ∥29 often∥ see ∥30 an exact∥ Uniformity in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the Beauty which charms an ingenious Botanist. Nay, what ∥31 vast∥ Uniformity and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular Plant, ∥32 Leaf∥, or Flower! In all Trees and ∥33 most of the∥ smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either Cylinders nearly, or regular Prisms; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one Species the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another species, the Branches ∥34 spring∥ singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances: And the Branches in other Species ∥35 sprout∥ all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in ∥36 every∥ Species, all the Branches in the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that great Unity of Colours ∥37 which we often see∥ in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree, nay often all the Flowers of a Species.

Animals.VIII. Again, as to the Beauty of Animals, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find ∥38 vast∥ Uniformity among all the Species which are known to us, in the Structure of those Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the Unity of Mechanism, when we shall find ∥39 an∥ almost infinite diversity of Motions, all their Actions in walking, running, flying, swimming; all their serious Efforts for Self-preservation, all their freakish Contortions when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform’d by one simple Contrivance of a contracting Muscle, apply’d with inconceivable Diversitys to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain’d the same Ends; but then there had been less Uniformity, and the Beauty of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing Unity of Mechanism had been remov’d from them.

IX. Among Animals of the same Species, the Unity is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such Classes or Species, notwithstanding the great Diversitys in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ’d even in those call’d of the same Species. And then in each Individual, ∥40 what vast Beauty∥ arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of Nature, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of Beauty, tho no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow.

∥41^aAs to that most powerful Beauty in Countenances, Airs, Gestures, Motion, we shall shew in the second Treatise,* that it arises from some imagin’d Indication of morally good Dispositions of ∥42^bMind.^ab∥

Proportion.X. There is a further Beauty in Animals, arising from a certain Proportion of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a Statuary. The Statuary knows what Proportion of each Part of the Face to the whole Face is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportion of the Face to the Body, or any Parts of it; and between the Diameters and Lengths of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter’d, we shall have a Giant or a Dwarf. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in Miniature, without Relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in Giants, and falls below it in Dwarfs. There is a further Beauty arising from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of Strength; but this may be pass’d over, because probably it may be alleg’d, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from ∥43 an∥ opinion of Advantage, and not from the Form it self.

The Beauty arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider’d under the Head of Relative Beauty, or Design.*

Fowls.XI. The peculiar Beauty of Fowls can scarce be omitted, which arises from the ∥44 vast∥ Variety of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a ∥45 vast∥ Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species, ∥46 and∥ a perfect Uniformity in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the Beauty of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately.

Fluids.XII. If our Reasonings about the Nature of Fluids be just, the vast Stores of Water will give us an Instance of Uniformity in Nature above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish’d, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos’d form’d in all the parts of this Globe. The same Uniformity there is probably among the Parts of other Fluids as well as Water: and the like must be observ’d in several other natural Bodys, as Salts, Sulphurs, and such like; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend upon an Uniformity in the Figures of their Parts.

Harmony.XIII. Under Original Beauty we may include Harmony, or Beauty of Sound, if that Expression can be allow’d, because Harmony is not usually conceiv’d as an Imitation of any thing else. Harmony often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of Uniformity. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call’d ∥47 Concords∥. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in Time with ∥48 two Vibrations∥ of its Octave; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its Fifth; and so on in the rest of the ∥49^aCon-cords. ∥50^bNow no Composition can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the most part, dispos’d according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the Key, which governs the whole, and to the Time and Humour, in which the Composition is begun: ∥51^ca frequent and inartificial^c∥ Change of any of which will produce the greatest, and most unnatural Discord.^b∥ This will appear, by observing the Dissonance which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A like^a∥ Uniformity is also observable among the Bases, Tenors, Trebles of the same Tune.

∥52^aThere is indeed ∥53^bobservable^b∥, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of Discords: They often give as great Pleasure as continu’d Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with Variety, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means not yet known: Certain it is however that they have their place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions.^a∥ Some other Powers of Musick may be consider’d ∥54 hereafter∥.*

XIV. But in all these Instances of55 Beauty let it be observ’d, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg’d is this, “That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety:” We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man’s Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite ∥56 these∥ Perceptions in him.

SECTION III

Of the Beauty of Theorems.

Theorems.I. The Beauty of Theorems, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, ∥1 being∥ of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of Beauty; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing Variety with Uniformity: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.

II. For in one Theorem we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often ∥2 an Infinity∥ of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas, and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47th Proposition of the first Book of Euclid’s Elements contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible Sizes of right-angled Triangles, as you make the Area greater or less; and in each of these Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar Triangles, as you vary the Proportion of the Base to the Perpendicular; all which ∥3 Infinitys of∥ Infinites agree in the general Theorem. ∥4^aIn Algebraick, and Fluxional Calculations, we shall ∥5^bstill find a greater^b∥ Variety of particular Truths included in general Theorems; not only in general Equations applicable to all Kinds of Quantity, but in more particular Investigations of Areas and Tangents: In which one Manner of Operation shall discover Theorems applicable to ∥6^cinfinite^c∥ Orders or Species of Curves, to the infinite Sizes of each Species, and to the infinite Points of the ∥7^dinfinite^d∥ Individuals of each Size.^a∥

Foundation of their Beauty.III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or Unity of an Infinity of Objects, in the general Theorem, to be the Foundation of the Beauty or Pleasure attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind ∥8 in which we are∥, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but ∥9 only∥ heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or Beauty, notwithstand-ing the Variety, till we can discover some sort of Unity, or reduce them to some general Canon.

Little Beauty in Axioms.IV. Again, let us ∥10 take∥ a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, Every Whole is greater than its Part; and we shall find no Beauty in the Contemplation. ∥11 For tho∥ this Proposition ∥12 contains∥ many Infinitys of particular Truths; yet the Unity is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin’d Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the Cylinder is greater than the inscrib’d Sphere, and this again greater than the Cone of the same Altitude and Diameter ∥13 with∥ the Base, we shall find no pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater ∥14 and∥ less, without any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each other the constant Ratio of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the Theorem, and how are we ravish’d with its first Discovery!

Easy Theorems.∥15^aWe may likewise observe, that easy or obvious Propositions, even where the Unity is sufficiently distinct, and determinate, do not please us so much as those, which being less obvious, give us some Surprize in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that a Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Isosceles ∥16^bTriangle, bisects^b∥ the Base, or the Reverse; or, that Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular. These Truths we ∥17^calmost^c∥ know Intuitively, without Demonstration: They are like common Goods, or those which Men have long possessed, which do not give such sensible ∥18^dJoys^d∥ as much smaller new Additions may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from Surprize; for the same Novelty of a single Experiment does not please us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a new, or unexpected Advantage, that Surprize, or Novelty is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only ground of Delight in ∥19^eTruth.^ae∥

Corollarys.V. There is another Beauty in Propositions, ∥20 which cannot be omitted; which is∥, When one Theorem ∥21 contains∥ a ∥22 vast∥ Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus ∥23 that Theorem which gives us the Equation of a Curve, whence perhaps most of its Propertys may be deduc’d, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition∥: Such a Theorem ∥24 also∥ is the 35th of the 1st Book of Euclid, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin’d Areas is deduc’d, by Resolution into Triangles, which are the halfs of so many Parallelograms; and these are each respectively equal to so many Rectangles of the Base into the perpendicular Altitude: The 47th of the 1st ∥25 Book∥ is another of like Beauty, and so are many ∥26 others∥.

27 In the search of Nature there is the like Beauty in the Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal Forces, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is Gravitation, in Sir Isaac Newton’s Scheme; ∥28 such also is the Knowledge of the Original of Rights, perfect and imperfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner of Translations; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc’d in the various Relations of human Life.∥

It is easy to see how Men are charm’d with the Beauty of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one Genesis, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one Theorem of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other ∥29 Advantage∥ from such Manner of Deduction, ∥30 than∥ the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the Beauty: nor could Love of Fame excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas’d with them immediately, by this internal Sense of their Beauty.

Fantastick Beauty.It is no less easy to see into what absurd ∥31 Attempts∥ Men have been led by this Sense of Beauty, and ∥32 a silly Affectation∥ of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the Mathematicks. ’Twas this probably which set Descartesi on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, viz. Cogito, ergo sum; while others ∥33 with as little Sense contended∥, that Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of Principium humanae Cognitionis absolutè primum. Mr. Leibnitzii had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a sufficient Reason for every thing in Nature, and ∥34 brags to Dr. Clarkeiii ∥ of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; ∥35 but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting.* ∥ If we look into particular Sciences, we ∥36 may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them,∥ the Inconveniences of this Love of Uniformity. ∥37 How∥ aukardly ∥38 is Puffendorfiv forc’d to∥ deduce the several Dutys of Men to God, themselves, and their Neighbours, from his single fundamental Principle of Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind?39 This Observation ∥40 might easily be extended farther, were it necessary; and∥ is a strong Proof that Men ∥41 have a Sense of Beauty in∥ Uniformity in the Sciences, ∥42 even from the Contortions of common Sense they are led into by pursuing it∥.

VI. This Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal Theorems, may really be call’d a kind of Sensation; since it necessarily accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge it self43 , being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the same. And however Knowledge enlarges the Mind, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds of Business, whence Advantage may also arise to us; yet we may leave it in the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleasure without any such prospect of Advantage from the Discovery of his Theorem. All ∥44 which∥ can thence be infer’d is only this, that as in our external Senses, so in our internal ones, the pleasant Sensations generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason would have recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag’d our pursuits from Self-interest.

VII.45 If any alledge, “that this Pleasure in Theorems arises only at first, upon the Novelty of the Discovery, which occasions Surprize:” It must be own’d indeed that* Novelty is generally very agreeable, and heightens the Pleasure in the Contemplation of Beauty; but then the Novelty of a particular Truth, found out by measuring, as above mention’d, gives no considerable Pleasure, nor Surprize. That then which is pleasant and surprizing, is the first Observation of this Unity amidst such a great Variety. There is indeed another kind of Surprize, which adds to the Beauty of some Propositions less universal, and may make them equally pleasant with more universal ones; as when we discover a general Truth which seem’d before, upon some confus’d Opinion, to be a Falshood: as that Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve. This is like that Joy, which may be very strong and violent, upon the unexpected Arrival of a small Advantage, from that Occasion from which we apprehended great Evil; but still this Unity of many Particulars in the general Theo-rem, is necessary to make it pleasant, in any case.

Works of Art.VIII.46 As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro the various artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should ∥47 constantly∥ find the Foundation of the Beauty which appears in them, ∥48 to be∥ some kind of Uniformity, or Unity of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a ∥49 vast∥ Diversity of Proportions possible, and different Kinds of Uniformity, so there is room enough for that Diversity of Fancys observable in Architecture, Gardening, and such like Arts in different Nations; they all may have Uniformity, tho the Parts in one may differ from those in another. The Chinese or Persian Buildings are not like the Grecian and Roman, and yet the former has its Uniformity of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the Europeans call Regular, the Uniformity of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are regular Figures, and either equal or similar at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are Parallelopipedons or square Prisms; the Pillars, Cylinders nearly; the Arches Circular, and all those in the same Row equal; there is the same Proportion every where observ’d in the same Range between the Diameters of Pillars and their Heights, their Capitals, the Dia-meters of Arches, the Heights of the Pedestals, the Projections of the Cornice, and all ∥50 the∥ Ornaments in each of our five Orders. And tho other Countrys do not follow the Grecian or Roman Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain’d, a Uniformity, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one part from ∥51 that∥ Proportion which is observ’d in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the Beauty of the Whole.

52IX. The same might be observ’d thro all other Works of Art, even to the meanest Utensil; the Beauty of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of Uniformity amidst Variety, without which they ∥53 appear∥ mean, irregular and deform’d.

SECTION IV

Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

Comparative Beauty.I. If the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of absolute Beauty be just, we may easily understand wherein relative Beauty consists. All Beauty is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call relative is that which is apprehended in any Object, commonly consider’d as an Imitation of some Original: And this Beauty is founded on a Conformity, or a kind of Unity between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some Object in Nature, or some establish’d Idea; for if there be any known Idea as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or Idea by, we may make a beautiful Imitation. Thus a Statuary, Painter, or Poet, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece retains that Grandeur, and those marks of Strength, and Courage, which we imagine in that Hero.

1 And farther, to obtain comparative Beauty alone, it is not necessary that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of absolute Beauty may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact Imitation shall still be beautiful, tho the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the Deformitys of old Age in a Picture, the rudest Rocks or Mountains in a Landskip, if well represented, shall have abundant Beauty, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were absolutely beautiful, and as well ∥2 represented.∥

Description in Poetry.II. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of natural Objects or Persons; and this relative Beauty is what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar Beauty of their Works. By the Moratae Fabulae, or the ἢθη of Aristotle, we are not to understand virtuous Manners ∥3 in a moral Sense∥, but a just Representation of Manners or Characters as they are in Nature; and that the Actions and Sentiments be suited to the Characters of the Persons to whom they are ascrib’d in Epick and Dramatick Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our Passions, to prove that a Poet should ∥4 not∥ draw ∥5 his Characters perfectly Virtuous∥; these Characters indeed abstractly consider’d might give more Pleasure, and have more Beauty than the imperfect ones which occur in Life with a mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of imperfect Men with all their Passions, than of morally perfect Heroes, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of ∥6 which∥ consequently we cannot judge exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And further, thro Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch’d and affected by the imperfect Characters; since in them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the Contrasts of Inclinations, and the Struggles between the Passions of Self-Love and those of Honour and Virtue, which we often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of Beauty for which Homer is justly admir’d, as well as for the Variety of his Characters.

Probability, 7 Simily∥, Metaphor.III. Many other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc’d under this Class of relative Beauty: The Probability is absolutely necessary to make us imagine Resemblance; it is by Resemblance that the Similitudes, Metaphors and Allegorys are made beautiful, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar’d to it have Beauty or not; the Beauty indeed is greater, when both have some original Beauty or Dignity as well as Resemblance: and this is the foundation of the Rule of studying Decency in Metaphors and ∥8 Similys∥ as well as Likeness. The Measures and Cadence are instances of Harmony, and come under the head of absolute Beauty.

Proneness to compare.IV. We may here observe a strange Proneness in our Minds to make perpetual Comparisons of all things which occur to our Observation, even ∥9 those which would seem very remote∥. There are certain Resemblances in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily found a Comparison; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy: Inanimate Objects have often such Positions as resemble those of the human Body in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the Body are Indications of ∥10 certain∥ Dispositions in the Mind, so that our very Passions and Affections as well as other Circumstances obtain a Resemblance to natural inanimate Objects. Thus a Tempest at Sea is often an Emblem of Wrath; a Plant or Tree drooping under the Rain, of a Person in Sorrow; a Poppy bending its Stalk, or a Flower withering when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a blooming Hero; an aged Oak in the Mountains shall represent an old Empire, a Flame seizing a Wood shall represent a War. In short, every thing in Nature, by our strange inclination to Resemblance, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern’d; and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need only look into Homer or Virgil. A fruitful Fancy would find in a Grove, or a Wood, an Emblem ∥11 for∥ every Character in a Commonwealth, and every turn of Temper, or Station in Life.

Intention.V. Concerning that kind of comparative Beauty which has a necessary relation to some establish’d Idea, we may observe, that some Works of Art acquire a distinct Beauty by their Correspondence to some universally suppos’d Intention in the ∥12 Artificer∥, or the Persons who employ’d ∥13 him∥: And to obtain this Beauty, sometimes they do not form their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of original Beauty separately consider’d; because a Composition of this relative Beauty, along with some degree of the original Kind, may give more Pleasure, than a more perfect original Beauty separately. Thus we see, that strict Regularity in laying out of Gardens in Parterres, Vista’s, parallel Walks, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation of Nature even in some of its Wildnesses. And we are more pleas’d with this Imitation, especially when the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin’d Exactness of regular ∥14 Works∥. So likewise in the Monuments erected in honour of deceased Heroes, although a Cylinder, or Prism, or regular Solid, may have more original Beauty than a very acute Pyramid or Obelisk, yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos’d Intentions of Stability, and being conspicuous. For the same reason Cubes, or square Prisms, are generally chosen for the Pedestals of Statues, and not any of the more beautiful Solids, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the reason too, why Columns or Pillars look best when made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.

VI. The like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of original Beauty, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of Beauty being founded, as was above explain’d, on Uniformity amidst Variety, but only an Evidence that our Sense of Beauty of the Original Kind may be vary’d and over ballanc’d by another kind of Beauty.

VII. This Beauty arising from Correspondence to Intention, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of Beauty in the Works of Nature, by considering how the Mechanism of the various Parts known to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some System or Whole. We generally suppose the Good of the greatest Whole, or of all Beings, to have been the Intention of the Author of Nature; and cannot avoid being pleas’d when we see any part of this Design executed in the Systems we are acquainted with. The Observations already made on this Subject are in every one’s hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of mechanical Philosophy. ∥15 We shall only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in∥ seeing any Design well executed by curious Mechanism, even when his own Advantage is no way concern’d; ∥16 and also∥ in discovering the Design to which any complex Machine is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the Machine before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design.17

The Arguments by which we prove Reason and Design in any Cause from the Beauty of the Effects, are so frequently us’d in some of the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to enquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

SECTION V

Concerning our Reasonings about Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty or Regularity of Effects.

Sense, Arbitrary in its Author.I. There seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of Beauty with the Uniformity or Regularity of the Objects, from the Nature of things, ∥1 antecedent∥ to some Constitution of the Author of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other Minds ∥2 may∥ be so fram’d as to receive no Pleasure from Uniformity; and we actually find that the same regular Forms ∥3 seem not∥ equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear ∥4 afterwards∥. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument∥5 , viz.∥ That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve Uniformity, is merely arbitrary in the Author of our Nature; and that there are an infinity of Tastes or Relishes of Beauty possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, and appear beautiful to it. And then it is plain, that from the Perception of Beauty in any one Effect, we should have no reason to conclude Design in the Cause: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas’d with such Irregularity as may be the effect of an undirected Force.* But then, as there are an Infinity of Forms ∥9 possible∥ into which any System may be reduc’d, an Infinity of Places in which Animals may be situated, and an Infinity of Relishes or Senses ∥10 in these Animals∥ is suppos’d possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance be plac’d in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as infinite to one at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from Chance, that a multitude of Animals agreeing in their Sense of Beauty should obtain agreeable Places.

Undirected Force.II. ∥11 There is also∥ the same Probability, that in any one System of Matter an Undirected Force ∥12 will∥ produce a regular Form, as any one given irregular one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the irregular Forms into which any System may be rang’d, surpass in multitude the Regular, as Infinite does Unity; for what holds in one small System will hold in a Thousand, a Million, a Universe, with more Advantage, viz. that the irregular Forms possible infinitely surpass the Regular. For Instance, the Area of an Inch Square is capable of an Infinity of regular Forms, the Equilateral Triangle, the Square, the Pentagon, Hexagon, Heptagon, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of Irregular, as an Infinity of Scalena for the one equilateral Triangle, an Infinity of Trapezia for the one Square, of irregular Pentagons for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System agitated by undesigning Force, it ∥13 is∥ infinitely more probable that it ∥14 will∥ resolve itself into an irregular Form, than a regular. Thus, that a System of six Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular Hexagon, is at least infinite to Unity; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason.

15 We see this confirm’d by our constant Experience, that Regularity never arises from any undesign’d Force of ours; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any Regularity in the disposition of a System capable of many other ∥16 Dispositions∥, there must have been Design in the Cause; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy’d.

But this Conclusion is too rash, unless some further Proof be introduc’d; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of Beauty in Regularity, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of Regularity, and seldom ever design Irregularity; ∥17 hence∥ we judge the same of other Beings too, ∥18 viz.∥ that they study Regularity, and presume upon Intention in the Cause wherever we see it, making Irregularity always a Presumption of Want of Design: ∥19 Whereas if other Agents have different Senses of Beauty,∥ or if they have no Sense of it at all, Irregularity may as well be design’d as Regularity. And then let it be observ’d, that in this Case there is just the same reason to conclude Design in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one; for since there are an Infinity of other Forms possible as well as this irre-gular one produc’d, and since to such a Being* void of a Sense of Beauty, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply’d by an Agent void of a Sense of Beauty, would equally prove Design; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration, ∥21 too subtile to be certain,∥ that there is no proper Agent without Design and Intention, and that every Effect flows from the Intention of some Cause.

Similar Forms by Chance, impossible.III. This however follows from the above ∥22 mention’d∥ Considerations, that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a cubick Inch, as infinite of the first Power does Unity, and that this whole Mass were some way determin’d from its own Nature without any Design in a Cause (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into ∥23 the solid Content of a cubick Inch∥, and into a prismatick Form whose Base should always be ½ of a square Inch; suppose these Conditions determin’d, and all others left to undirected Force; all ∥24 which∥ we could expect from undirected Force in this Case would be one equilateral Prism, or two perhaps; because there are an Infinity of irregular Prisms possible of the same Base, and solid Content: and when we ∥25 met∥ with many such Prisms, we must probably conclude ∥26 them produc’d by Design,∥ since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of Hazard.

IV. But if ∥27 this∥ infinite Mass was ∥28 no way∥ determin’d to a prismatick Form, we could only expect from its casual Concourse one Prism of any Kind, since there ∥29 is an Infinity of other Solids∥ into which the Mass might be resolv’d; and if we found any great number of Prisms, we should have ∥30 reason to presume∥ Design: so that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the first Power, we could not from any Concourse or Agitation expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension and Form, we should have so much Presumption for Design.

V. There is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the crystallizing of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming; for in this we frequently see regular Forms arising, tho there is nothing ∥31 suppos’d in this Affair but an undirected Force of Attraction∥. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of crystalliz’d Bodys have fix’d regular Forms ∥32 given∥ them in the Constitution of Nature; and then it is easy to conceive how their Attractions may produce regular Forms: but unless we suppose some preceding Regularity in the Figures of attracting Bodys, they ∥33 can∥ never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of Matter, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any Concourse have produc’d any Number of similar Bodys Regular or Irregular.

Combinations by Chance, impossible.VI. And let it be here observ’d, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of Design could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of Chance or undesign’d Force, ∥34 after∥ an Infinity of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolution of every Form except the regular one, that the Parts might be prepar’d for a new Agitation. Thus, supposing we could expect one equilateral Prism of any given Dimensions should be form’d from undirected Force, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin’d to resolve ∥35 itself∥ into Bodys of a given solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since it is infinite to one after the solid Content is obtain’d, that the Body shall not be Prismatical; and allowing it Prismatical, it is infinite to one that it shall not be Equilateral:) And again, supposing another Infinity of Matter determin’d to resolve itself into Tubes, of Orifices exactly equal to the Bases of the former Prisms, it is again at least as the second Power of Infinite to Unity, that not one of these Tubes shall be both Prismatick and Equiangular; and then if the Tube were thus form’d, so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the Prisms and no more, it is infinite to one that they shall never meet in infinite Space; and should they meet, it is infinite to one that the Axes of the Prism and Tube shall never happen in the same strait Line; and supposing they did, it is again as infinite to three, that Angle shall not meet Angle, so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is, “that all the Powers of Chance in infinite Matter, agitated thro infinite Ages, could ever effect this small Composition of a Prism entering a Prismatick Bore; and, that all our hazard for it would at most be but as three is to the third Power of Infinite.” And yet the smallest Design could easily effect it.

VII. May we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an absolute strict Impossibility, “That all the Powers of undirected Force should ever effect such a complex Machine ∥36 as∥ the most imperfect Plant, or the meanest Animal, even in one Instance?” for the Improbability just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these natural Bodys surpasses that simple Combination above mention’d.

VIII. Let it be here observ’d, “That the preceding Reasoning from the Frequency of regular Bodys of one Form in the Universe, and from the Combinations of various Bodys, is intirely inde-pendent on any Perception of Beauty; and would equally prove Design in the Cause, altho there were no Being which perceiv’d Beauty in any Form whatsoever:” for it is in short this, “That the recurring of any Effect oftner than the Laws of Hazard ∥37 determine∥, gives Presumption of Design; and, That Combinations which no undesign’d Force could give us reason to expect, must necessarily prove the same; and that with superior probability, as the multitude of Cases in which the contrary ∥38 might∥ happen, surpass all the Cases in which this could happen:” which appears to be in the simplest Cases at least as Infinite ∥39 does∥ Unity. And the frequency of similar irregular Forms, or exact Combinations of them, is an equal Argument of Design in the Cause, since the Similarity, or exact Combinations of irregular Forms, are as little to be expected from all the Powers of undirected Force, as any sort whatsoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to something like a Theorem, altho the Idea of Infinite be troublesome enough to manage in Reasoning. The Powers of Chance, with infinite Matter in infinite Ages, may answer Hazards as the fifth Power of Infinite and no more: thus the Quantity of Matter may be conceiv’d as the third Power of Infinite and no more, the various Degrees of Force may make another Power of Infinite, and the Number of Rencounters may make the fifth. But this last only holds on Supposition, that after every Rencounter there is no Cohesion, but all is dissolv’d again for a new Concourse, except in similar Forms or exact Combinations; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see dissimilar Bodys cohering as strongly as any, and rude Masses more than any Combinations. Now to produce any given Body, in a given Place or Situation, and of given Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, one Power of Infinite at least to obtain the Place or Situation; when the Situation is obtain’d, the solid Content requires another Power of Infinite to obtain it; the Situation and Solidity obtain’d require, for accomplishing the simplest given Shape, at least the other three Powers of Infinite. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided Prism or Parallelopiped; that the Surfaces should be Planes requires one Power; that they should be Parallel in this Case, or inclin’d in any given Angle in any other Case, requires another Power of Infinite; and that they should be in any given Ratio to each other, requires at least the third Power: for in each of these Heads there ∥40 is still an Infinity at least∥ of other Cases possible beside the one given. So that all the Powers of Chance could only produce perhaps one Body of every simpler Shape or Size at most, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one Pyramid, or Cube, or Prism perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir’d, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more complex Figures, and in all Combinations of Bodys, and in similar Species, which we never could reasonably hope from Chance; and therefore where we see them, we must certainly ascribe them to Design.

Combinations of irregular Forms, equally impossible.X. The Combinations of regular Forms, or of irregular ones exactly adapted to each other, require such vast Powers of Infinite to effect them, and the Hazards of the contrary Forms are so infinitely numerous, that all Probability or Possibility of their being accomplish’d by Chance seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in Art. vi. ∥41 of∥ this Section about the Prism and Tube, to our simplest Machines, such as a pair of Wheels of our ordinary Carriages; each Circular, Spokes equal in length, thickness, shape; the Wheels set Parallel, the Axle-tree fix’d in the Nave of both, and secur’d from coming out at either End: ∥42 Now∥ the Cases in which the contrary might have happen’d from undirected Concourses, were there no more requir’d than what is just now mention’d, must amount in Multitude to a Power of ∥43 Infinite∥ equal to every Circumstance requir’d. What shall we say then of a Plant, a Tree, an Animal, a Man, with such multitudes of adapted Vessels, such Articulations, Insertions of Muscles, Diffusion of Veins, Arterys, Nerves? The Improbability that such Machines ∥44 should be the Effect of Chance, must be near the infinitesimal Power of Infinite to Unity.∥

XI. Further, were all the former Reasoning from Similarity of Forms and Combinations groundless, and could Chance give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise ∥45 ourselves∥ one of these Forms among an Infinity of others. When we see then such a multitude of Individuals of a Species, similar to each other in a ∥46 vast∥ number of Parts; and when we see in each Individual, the corresponding Members so exactly ∥47 like∥ each other, what possible room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe? None but the barest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing every thing which is not strict Demonstration.

XII. This Argument, ∥48 as∥ has been already observ’d,* is quite abstracted from any Sense of Beauty in any particular Form; for the exact Similarity of a hundred or a thousand Trapezia, proves Design as well as the Similarity of Squares, since both are equally above all the Powers of undirected Force or Chance∥49 , as the hundredth or thousandth Power of Infinite surpasses Unity;∥ and what is above the Powers of Chance, must give us proportionable Presumption for Design.

Thus, allowing that a Leg, or Arm, or Eye, might have been the Effect of Chance, (which was shewn to be most absurd, and next to absolutely impossible) that it ∥50 would∥ not have a corresponding Leg, Arm, Eye, exactly similar, must be a hazard of a Power of Infinite proportion’d to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of Cases increas’d, in which it would not have a corresponding Member similar: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the twentieth or thirtieth Power of Infinite to Unity, that the corresponding Part should not be similar. What shall we say then of the similar Forms of a whole Species?

Gross Similarity by Chance, impossible.51XIII. If it be objected, “That natural Bodys are not exactly similar, but only grosly so to our Senses; as that a Vein, an Artery, a Bone is not perhaps exactly similar to its Correspondent in the same Animal, tho it appears so to our Senses, which ∥52 judge only∥ of the Bulk, and do not discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the Dissimilarity is always sensible, often in the internal Structure, and ∥53 often, nay∥ always in the external Appearance.” To remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, “That the multitude of Cases wherein sensible Dissimilitude cou’d have happen’d, are still infinitely more than all the Cases in which sensible Similitude ∥54 might∥;” so that the same Reasoning holds from sensible Similarity, as from the mathematically exact: And again, “That the Cases of gross Dissimilarity do in the same manner surpass the Cases of gross Similarity possible, as infinite does one.”

55XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance. ∥56 Suppose∥ a Trapezium of a foot Square in Area ∥57 should∥ appear grosly similar to another, while no one side differs, by 1/10 of an Inch; or no Angle in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten ∥58 Minutes∥: now this tenth of an Inch is infinitely divisible, as ∥59 are also∥ the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of insensible Dissimilarity under apparent Similarity are really Infinite. But then it is also plain that there are an Infinity of different sensibly dissimilar Trapezia, even of the same Area, ac-cording as we vary a Side by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and ∥60 vary∥ the Angles and another Side so as to keep the Area equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of sensible Dissimilitude the several Tenths are infinitely divisible as well as in the first Case; so that the multitude of sensible Dissimilaritys are to the multitude of insensible Dissimilaritys under apparent Resemblance, still as the second Power of Infinite to the first, or as Infinite to Unity. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible sensible Dissimilaritys in such complex Bodys as Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins, Skeletons?

61XV. As to the Dissimilaritys of Animals of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of gross Dissimilarity are Infinite; and then every Case of gross Dissimilarity contains also all the Cases of insensible Dissimilarity. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species grosly similar, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of ∥62 gross∥ Dissimilaritys possible, and then in each of these Cases of gross Dissimilarity, there are an Infinity of Cases of nicer Dissimilarity, since 1/3 of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two Cockle-Shells which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of insensible Differences, but still there are an Infinity of possible sensible Differences; and then in any one of the sensibly different Forms, there may be the same Infinity of insensible Differences beside the sensible one: So that still the hazard for even gross Similarity from Chance is Infinite to one, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even gross Similarity is retain’d; since the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which sensible Dissimilarity may happen; and this Infinity combin’d with the infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises the Hazard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the Cartesian or Epicurean Hypothesis, even granting their Postulatum of undirected Force impress’d on infinite Matter; and seems almost a Demonstration of Design in the Universe.

63XVI. One Objection ∥64 more∥ remains to be remov’d, viz. “That some imagine, this Argument may hold better à Priori than à Posteriori; that is, we have better Reason to believe, when we see a Cause about to act, without Knowledge, that he will not attain any given, or desir’d End; than we have on the other hand to believe, when we see ∥65 the∥ End actually attain’d, that he acted with Knowledge: Thus, say they, when a ∥66 particular Person∥ is about to draw a Ticket in a Lottery, where there is but one Prize to a thousand Blanks, it is highly probable that he shall draw a Blank; but suppose we have seen him actually draw for himself the Prize, we have no ground to conclude that he had Knowledge or Art to accomplish this End.” But the Answer is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have, from the very Circumstances of the Lottery, very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that Art can have no place; so that a Probability of a ∥67 thousand to one∥, ∥68 does∥ not surmount those Arguments: But let the Probability be increas’d, and it will soon surmount ∥69 all∥ Arguments to the contrary. For instance, If we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would question whether he us’d Art or not: much less would we imagine it were Chance, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred, or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater number of Blanks. Now in the Works of Nature the Case is entirely different: we have not the least Argument against Art or Design. An intelligent Cause is surely at least as probable a Notion as Chance, general Force, Conatus ad Motum, or the Clinamen Principiorum, to account for any Effect whatsoever: And then all the Regularity, Combinations, Similaritys of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was Design and Intelligence in the Cause of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all ∥70 Art∥ in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly improbable.

Irregularity does not prove want of Design.71XVII. Let it be here observ’d also, “That a rational Agent may be capable of impressing Force ∥72 without∥ intending to produce any particular Form, and of designedly producing irregular or dissimilar Forms, as well as regular and similar:” And hence it follows, “That altho all the Regularity, Combination and Similarity in the Universe, are Presumptions of Design, yet Irregularity is no Presumption of the contrary; unless we suppose that the Agent is determin’d from a Sense of Beauty always to act regularly, and delight in Similarity; and that he can have no other inconsistent Motive of Action:” Which last is plainly absurd. We do not want in the Universe many Effects which seem to have been left to the general Laws of Motion upon some great Impulse, and have many Instances where Similarity has been ∥73 plainly design’d∥ in some respects, and probably neglected in others; or even Dissimilarity design’d. Thus we see the general exact Resemblance between the two Eyes of most persons; and yet perhaps no other third Eye in the World ∥74 is∥ exactly like them. We see a gross Conformity of shape in all Persons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two Individuals of any Species are undistinguishable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species.

Wisdom, Prudence.75XVIII. Hitherto the Proof amounts only to Design or Intention barely, in opposition to blind Force or Chance; and we see the Proof of this is independent on the arbitrary Constitution of our internal Sense of Beauty. Beauty is often suppos’d an Argument of more than Design, to wit, Wisdom and Prudence in the Cause. Let us enquire also into this.

Wisdom denotes the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means; and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the Cause to be wise, we must know what is best to the Cause or Agent. Among men who have pleasure in contemplating Uniformity, the Beauty of Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is Good to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a Being void of this Sense of Beauty. And therefore the Beauty apparent to us in Nature, will not of itself prove Wisdom in the Cause, unless this Cause, or Author of Nature be suppos’d Benevolent; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or Good to the Supreme Cause; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his Wisdom. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of Beauty produc’d in Nature, and expos’d to the View of any rational ∥76 Agent∥; since upon supposition of a benevolent Deity, all the apparent Beauty produc’d is an Evidence of the Execution of a Benevolent Design, to give ∥77 him∥ the Pleasures of Beauty.

78 But what more immediately proves Wisdom is this; when we see any Machine with a ∥79 vast∥ Complication of Parts actually obtaining an End, we justly conclude, “That since this could not have been the Effect of Chance, it must have been intended for that End, which is obtain’d by it;” and then the Ends or Intentions, being in part known, the Complication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to this End, is an Evidence “of a comprehensive large Understanding in the Cause, according to the Multi-plicity of Parts, and the Appositeness of their Structure, even when we do not know the Intention of the Whole.”

General Causes.80XIX. There is another kind of Beauty ∥81 also which is still pleasing to our Sense, and∥ from which we conclude Wisdom in the Cause as well as Design, ∥82 and that is,∥ when we see many useful or beautiful Effects flowing from one general Cause. There is a very good Reason for this Conclusion among Men. Interest must lead Beings of limited Powers, who are uncapable of a great diversity of Operations, and distracted by them, to chuse this frugal Oeconomy of their Forces, and to look upon such Management as an Evidence of Wisdom in other Beings like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them, for even beside this Consideration of Interest, they are determin’d by a Sense of Beauty where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of other Agents about whose Oeconomy we are not sollicitous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in Clock-work, that three or four Motions of the Hour, Minute, and second Hands, and monthly Plate, should arise from one Spring or Weight, rather than from three, or four Springs, or Weights, in a very Compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same Purposes with equal exactness? Now the Foundation of this Beauty plainly appears to be ∥83 Uniformity∥ or Unity of Cause amidst Diversity of Effects.

General Laws.84XX. We ∥85 shall* hereafter∥ offer some Reasons, why the Author of Nature ∥86 may∥ chuse to operate in this manner by General Laws and Universal extensive Causes, altho the Reason just now mention’d does not hold with an Almighty Being. This is certain, That we have some of the most delightful Instances of Universal Causes in the Works of Nature, and that the most studious men in these Subjects are so delighted with the Observation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of Wisdom in the Administration of Nature, from a Sense of Beauty.

87XXI. The wonderfully simple Mechanism which performs all Animal Motions, was mention’d* already; nor is that of the inanimate Parts of Nature less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Principle of Heat, deriv’d to us from the Sun, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of Rains, Springs, Rivers, Winds, and the universal Cause of Vegetation! The uniform Principle of Gravity preserves at once the Planets in their Orbits, gives Cohesion to the Parts of each Globe, and Stability to Mountains, Hills, and artificial Structures; it raises the Sea in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels; it drains the Earth of its superfluous Moisture, by Rivers; it raises the Vapours by its Influence on the Air, and brings them down again in Rains; it gives an uniform Pressure to our Atmosphere, necessary to our Bodys in general, and more especially to Inspiration in Breathing; and furnishes us with an universal Movement, capable of being apply’d in innumerable Engines. How incomparably more beautiful is this Structure, than if we suppos’d so many distinct Volitions in the Deity, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the general Law! ∥88 We may rashly imagine that∥ this latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and ∥89 it∥ would have been no distraction to Omnipotence: But then the great Beauty had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather chuse to run the hazard of its casual Evils, than part with that harmonious Form which has been ∥90 an∥ unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.

Miracles.91XXII. Hence we see, “That however Miracles may prove the Superintendency of a voluntary Agent, and that the Universe is not guided by Necessity or Fate, yet that Mind must be weak and inadvertent, which needs them to confirm the Belief of a Wise and Good Deity; since the deviation from general Laws, unless upon very extraordinary Occasions, must be a presumption of Inconstancy and Weakness, rather than of steddy Wisdom and Power, and must weaken the best Arguments we can have for the Sagacity and Power of the universal Mind.”

SECTION VI

Of the Universality of the Sense of Beauty among Men.

Internal Sense not an immediate Source of Pain.I. We before* insinuated, “That all Beauty has a relation to some perceiving Power;” and consequently since we know not ∥1 how great a∥ Variety of Senses ∥2 there∥ may be among Animals, there is no Form in Nature concerning which we can pronounce, “That it has no Beauty;” for it may still please some perceiving Power. But our Inquiry is confin’d to Men; and before we examine the Universality of this Sense of Beauty, or their agreement in approving Uniformity, it may be proper to consider, “∥3 whether∥, as the other Senses which give us Pleasure do also give us Pain, so this Sense of Beauty does make some Objects disagreeable to us, and the occasion of Pain.”

4 That many Objects give no pleasure to our Sense is obvious, many are certainly void of Beauty: But then there is no Form which seems necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other Evil from it, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our external Senses, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as Smells, Tastes, and some separate Sounds: ∥5 but as∥ to our Sense of Beauty, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of it self, had we never observ’d any thing better of the Kind. Deformity is only the absence of Beauty, or deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species: Thus bad Musick pleases Rusticks who never heard any better, and the finest Ear is not offended with tuning of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no Harmony is expected; and yet much smaller Dissonancy shall offend amidst the Performance, where Harmony is expected. A rude Heap of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas’d with Irregularity in Architecture, where Beauty was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we ∥6 call now∥ ugly or deform’d, and had we never seen or expected greater Beauty, we should have receiv’d no disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our Sense of Beauty seems design’d to give us positive Pleasure, but not ∥7 positive∥ Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises from disappointment.

Approbation and Dislike from Association of Ideas.II. There are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any ∥8 positive∥ Deformity which of it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of expected Beauty, or much more from their carrying some natural indications of morally bad Dispositions, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in Countenances, Airs, and Gestures. That this is not occasion’d by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long acquaintance we are sure of finding sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness, altho the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas ∥9 if any thing was∥ naturally disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, ∥10 it∥ would always continue so, even although the Aversion we might have toward it were counterballanc’d by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais’d by some Objects, which are only the Effect of Fear for our selves, or Compassion ∥11 toward∥ others, when either Reason, or some foolish Association of Ideas, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form it self: for we find that most of ∥12 those∥ Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov’d the Fear, may become the occasions of Pleasure; as ∥13 ravenous∥ Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley.

Associations.III. We shall see* ∥14 hereafter∥, “That Associations of Ideas make Objects pleasant, and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such Pleasures; and the same way, the casual Conjunctions of Ideas may give a Disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the Form it self.” And this is the occasion of many fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Animals, and to some other Forms: Thus ∥15 Swines∥, Serpents of all Kinds, and some Insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by many People, who have got some accidental Ideas associated to them. And for Distastes of this Kind, ∥16 no∥ other Account can be given.

Universality of this Sense.IV. But as to the universal Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty from Uniformity amidst Variety, we must consult Experience: and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of understanding simple Arguments, tho few are capable of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove this Sense of Beauty universal, “if all Men are better pleas’d with Uniformity in the simpler Instances than the contrary, even when there is no Advantage observ’d attending it; and likewise if all Men, according as their Capacity enlarges, so as to receive and compare more complex Ideas, ∥17 have a greater∥ Delight in Uniformity, and are pleas’d with its more complex Kinds, both Original and Relative.”

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of this Sense in ∥18 the∥ simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of Harmony, because as soon as we find an Ear ∥19 incapable∥ of relishing complex Compositions, such as our Tunes are, no further Pains are employ’d about such. But in Figures, did ever any Man make choice of a Trapezium, or any irregular Curve, for the Ichnography ∥20 or Plan∥ of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of ∥21 Convenience∥? or to make the opposite Walls not parallel, or unequal in Height? Were ever Trapeziums, irregular Polygons or Curves chosen for the Forms of Doors or Windows, tho these Figures might have answer’d the Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great part of the ∥22 Time, Labour∥ and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting the Stones and Timber to the regular Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of Dress, none was ever quite void of Uniformity, if it were only in the resemblance of the two Sides of the same Robe, and in some general Aptitude to the human Form. The Pictish Painting had always relative Beauty by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were originally beautiful: however justly we ∥23 might∥ apply Horace’s Censure of impertinent Descriptions in Poetry.

Sed non erat his locus ———*i

But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by the casual spilling of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas’d with an inequality of Heights in Windows of the same Range, or dissimilar Shapes of them? with unequal Legs or Arms, ∥24 Eyes∥ or Cheeks in a Mistress? It must ∥25 however be∥ acknowledg’d, “That Interest ∥26 may often∥ counterballance our Sense of Beauty in this Affair as well as in others, and superior good Qualitys may make us overlook such Imperfections.”

Real Beauty alone pleases.V. Nay further, it may perhaps appear, “That Regularity and Uniformity are so copiously diffus’d thro the Universe, and we are so readily determin’d to pursue this as the Foundation of Beauty in Works of Art, that there is scarcely any thing ever fancy’d as Beautiful, where there is not really something of this Uniformity and Regularity.” We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible Beauty, where it is but very imperfect; but still it is some degree of Beauty which pleases, altho there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our Sense acts with full Regularity when we are pleas’d, altho we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.

27 A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the Architecture of his country to be the most perfect: and a Conjunction of ∥28 some∥ hostile Ideas, may make him have an Aversion to Roman Buildings, and study to demolish them, as some of our Reformers did the Popish Buildings, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship, from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practised: and yet it is still real Beauty which pleases the Goth, founded upon Uniformity amidst Variety. For the Gothick Pillars are uniform to each other, not only in their Sections, which are Lozenge-form’d; but also in their Heights and Ornaments: Their Arches are not one uniform Curve, but yet they are Segments of similar Curves, and generally equal in the same Ranges. The very Indian Buildings have some kind of Uniformity, and many of the Eastern nations, tho they differ much from us, yet have great ∥29 Regularity∥ in their Manner, as well as the Romans in theirs. Our Indian Screens, which wonderfully supply ∥30 the regular Imaginations of our Ladys∥ with Ideas of Deformity, in which Nature is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the Beauty arising from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to Nature; and yet they cannot divest themselves of all Beauty and Uniformity in the separate Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give some wild Pleasure from Variety, since some Uniformity to the human Shape is still retain’d.

History pleases in like manner.VI. There is one sort of Beauty which might perhaps have been better mention’d before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste or Relish of it is universal in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the Beauty of History. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of Gazettes, which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the Historian: The superior Pleasure then of History must arise, like that of Poetry, from the Manners; ∥31 as∥ when we see a Character well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an Interest of State laid open, or an artful View nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an Unity of Design at least: And this may be observ’d in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them.

VII. What has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquirys into the Universality of the Sense of Beauty, “That there may be real Beauty, where there is not the greatest; and that there are an Infinity of different Forms which ∥32 may∥ all have some Unity, and yet differ from each other.” So that Men may have different Fancys of Beauty, and yet Uniformity be the universal Foundation of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as Beautiful. And we shall find that it is so in the Architecture, Gardening, Dress, Equipage, and Furniture of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where Uniformity still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of it.

Diversity of Judgments concerning our Senses.VIII. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the internal and external Senses. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. Locke have ∥33 shaken off the groundless Opinions about∥ innate Ideas, than to alledge, “That all our Relish for Beauty, and Order, is either from ∥34 prospect of Advantage,∥ Custom, or Education,” for no other Reason but the Variety of Fancys in the World: and from this they conclude, “That our Fancys do not arise from any natural Power of Perception, or Sense.” And yet all allow our external Senses to be Natural, and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas’d, or diminish’d, by Custom, or Education, and counterballanc’d by Interest, yet are really antecedent to Custom, Habit, Education, or Prospect of Interest. Now it is certain, “That there is at least as great a variety of Fancys about their Objects, as the Objects of Beauty:” Nay it is much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancys or Relishes of the external Senses to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the agreeable or disagreeable: and yet we all allow “that these are natural Powers of Perception.”

The Reason of it.IX. The Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we have got distinct Names for the external Senses, and none, or very few, for the Internal; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to look upon the former as some way more fix’d, and real and natural, than the latter. The Sense of Harmony has got its Name, ∥35 viz.∥ a good Ear; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a natural Power of Perception, or a Sense some way distinct from Hearing: now it is certain, “That there is as necessary a Perception of Beauty upon the presence of regular Objects, as of Harmony upon hearing certain Sounds.”

An internal Sense does not presuppose innate Ideas.X. But let it be observ’d here once for all, “That an internal Sense no more presupposes an innate Idea, or Principle of Knowledge, than the external.” Both are natural Powers of Perception, or Determinations of the Mind to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the presence of Objects. The internal Sense is, a passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety. Nor does there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mind should be always determin’d to receive the Idea of Sweet, when Particles of such a Form enter the Pores of the Tongue; or to have the Idea of Sound upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one seems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the same Power could with equal ease constitute the former the occasion of Ideas as the latter.

Associations Cause of Disagreement.XI. The Association of Ideas* above hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the Sense of Beauty, as well as in the external Senses; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects of Beauty, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than those of Beauty or Deformity. And here it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these Associations. The Beauty of Trees, their cool Shades, and their Aptness to conceal from Observation, have made Groves and Woods the usual Retreat to those who love Solitude, especially to the Religious, the Pensive, the Melancholy, and the Amorous. And do not we find that we have so join’d the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the Heathen Priests might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their Deitys; and hence we join Ideas of something Divine to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our Churches, from the perpetual use of them only in religious Exercises. The faint Light in Gothick Buildings has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our Poet shews in his Epithet,

——— A Dim religious Light.*ii

In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of Actions, or Places, or Dresses of Persons, or Voice, or Song, which have occur’d at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but these Approbations, or Distastes, are remote from the Ideas of Beauty, being plainly different Ideas.

Musick, how it pleases differently.XII. There is also another Charm in Musick to various Persons, which is distinct from the Harmony, and is occasion’d by its raising agreeable Passions. The human Voice is obviously vary’d by all the stronger Passions; now when our Ear discerns any resemblance between the Air of a Tune, whether sung or play’d upon an Instrument, either in its Time, or ∥36 Modulation,∥ or any other Circumstance, to the sound of the human Voice in any Passion, we shall be touch’d by it in a very sensible manner, and have Melancholy, Joy, Gravity, Thoughtfulness excited in us by a sort of Sympathy or Contagion. The same Connexion is observable between the very Air of a Tune, and the Words expressing any Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho but one of them affects our Senses.

37 Now in such a diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas which may be ∥38 join’d∥ with Forms of Bodys, or Tunes, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a variety of Passions, it is no wonder “that they should often disagree in their Fancys of Objects, even altho their Sense of Beauty and Harmony were perfectly uniform;” because many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Persons Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very wild Country may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very beautiful Places may be, if they were the Scenes of his Misery. And this may help us in many Cases to account for the Diversitys of Fancy, without denying the Uniformity of our internal Sense of Beauty.

XIII. Grandeur and Novelty are two Ideas different from Beauty, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to the present Subject. See Spectator No. 412.

SECTION VII

Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, as to our internal Senses.

I. Custom, Education, and Example are so often alledg’d in this Affair, as the occasion of our Relish for beautiful Objects, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in a certain Conduct in Life, in a moral ∥1 Sense∥, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear “that there is a natural Power of Perception, or Sense of Beauty in Objects, antecedent to all Custom, Education, or Example.”

Custom gives no new Sense.II. Custom, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to Actions, it only gives a disposition to the Mind or Body more easily to perform those Actions which have been frequently repeated, but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of Fear, and Dread of any powerful Presence; and so Custom may connect the Ideas of religious Horror to certain Buildings: but ∥2 Custom could never∥ have made a Being naturally incapable of Fear, receive such Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were advantageous or disadvantageous, Custom could only have made us more ready at perceiving the Advantage or Disadvantage of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects. When the Blood or Spirits of which Anatomists talk are rouz’d, quicken’d, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutriment; or any Glands frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain that to preserve the Body easy, we ∥3 shall∥ delight in Objects of Taste which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to ∥4 it∥, if they promote that agreeable State which the Body had been accustom’d to. Further, Custom will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais’d uneasy Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but Custom can never give us any Idea of ∥5 a Sense different from those∥ we had antecedent to it: It will never make the Blind approve Objects as coloured, or those who have no Taste approve Meats as delicious, however they might ∥6 approve them as∥ Strengthning or Exhilarating. Were our Glands and the Parts about them void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the Blood, ∥7 Custom could never∥ make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So by like Reasoning, had we no natural Sense of Beauty from Uniformity, Custom could never have made us imagine any Beauty in Objects; if we had had no Ear, Custom could never have given us the Pleasures of Harmony. When we have these natural Senses antecedently, Custom may make us capable of extending our Views further, and of receiving more complex Ideas of Beauty in Bodys, or Harmony in Sounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness of Perception. But however Custom may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of Beauty, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how ∥8 is∥ it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as Milton* represents our Ancestor in upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene.

Custom in like manner ∥9 may∥ make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as advantageous; but he would never have imagin’d it Beautiful, had he no natural Sense of Beauty. Custom may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex Theorems, but we all find the Pleasure or Beauty of Theorems as strong at first as ever. Custom makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated Uniformity, which escapes the Observation of Novices in any Art; but all this presupposes a natural Sense of Beauty in Uniformity: for had there been nothing in Forms, which was constituted ∥10 the necessary∥ occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, Beauty or Deformity, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

Nor Education.III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, ∥11 which are∥ sometimes true and sometimes false; and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, ∥12 which in reality have∥ no such Qualitys. And further, by Education there are some strong Associations of Ideas without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to break asunder. Thus Aversions are rais’d to Darkness, and to many kinds of ∥13 Meat∥, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais’d in like manner. But in all these Instances, Education never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not naturally Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe that very healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally Blind prejudic’d against Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they ∥14 perhaps hear∥ Men dispraise one Colour, ∥15 and may∥ imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses∥16 , but that is all∥: And the same way, a Man naturally void of Taste could by no Education receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic’d in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no natural Sense of Beauty and Harmony, we ∥17 could never∥ be prejudic’d in favour of Objects or Sounds as Beautiful or Harmonious. Education may make an unattentive Goth imagine that his Countrymen have attain’d the Perfection of Archi-tecture; and an Aversion to their Enemys the Romans, may have join’d some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form’d these Prejudices, had he been void of a Sense of Beauty. Did ever blind Men debate whether Purple or Scarlet were the finer Colour? or could any Education prejudice them in favour of either as Colours?

Thus Education and Custom may influence our internal Senses, where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And ∥18 then∥ if the finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this presupposes our Sense of Beauty to be natural. Instruction in Anatomy, Observation of Nature, and of those Airs of the Countenance and Attitudes of Body, which accompany any Sentiment, Action, or Passion, may enable us to know where there is a just Imitation: but why should an exact Imitation please upon Observation, if we had not naturally a Sense of Beauty in it, more than the observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and should we ∥19 observe∥ them ever so often, we ∥20 should∥ never dream of their growing Beautiful.

Prejudices how removed.IV. There is something worth our Observation as to the manner of rooting out the Prejudices of Education, not quite foreign to the present purpose. When the Prejudice arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force our selves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus Opinions of Superstition are best remov’d by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their Virtue, or ∥21 by observing that they∥ despise such Opinions. But when the Prejudice arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of natural Evil, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the Evil be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove the Prejudice, as in that against Meats: But where the Evil is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with our selves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the Prejudice; such is the Case of our Fear of Spirits in the dark, and in Church-yards. And when the Evil is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a future State, it is then hardest of all to remove the Prejudice; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of superstitious Prejudices against Actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out.

Example not the Cause of internal Sense.V. Example seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we act very much for Pleasure, or private Good; and ∥22 are thereby∥ led to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some Perfection in the Objects which we see others pursue, and Evil in those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the Example of others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of Evil in Objects ∥23 to which we had an Aversion∥. But all this is done upon an Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we have; for no Example will induce the Blind or Deaf to pursue Objects as Colour’d or Sonorous; nor could Example any more engage us to pursue Objects as Beautiful or Harmonious, had we no ∥24 natural Sense of Beauty or Harmony∥.

Example may make us ∥25 conclude without Examination,∥ that our Countrymen have obtain’d the Perfection of Beauty in their Works, or that there is less Beauty in the Orders of Architecture or Painting us’d in other Nations, and so content our selves with very imperfect Forms. ∥26 And∥ Fear of Contempt as void of Taste or Genius, ∥27 often∥ makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have naturally a fine Genius, or the internal Senses very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad Taste pretend ∥28 to∥ ∥29 a∥ Perception of ∥30 Beauty∥ ∥31 which in reality they have not∥: But all this presupposes some natural Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty and Harmony. Nor can Example effect any thing further, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv’d by those of a good Taste in such Affairs.

SECTION VIII

Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them.

Importance of the internal Senses.I. The busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam’d Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, “That the Gratifications of our internal Senses are as natural, real, and satisfying Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we commonly pursue Wealth and Power.” For how is Wealth or Power advantageous? How do they make us happy, or prove good to us? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our Senses or Facultys of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these Senses or Facultys only the External ones? No: Every body sees, that a small portion of Wealth or Power will supply more Pleasures of the external Senses than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than A-bundance, which cloys that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment: and hence the Poet’s Advice is perfectly just;

——— Tu pulmentaria quaere Sudando ———*i

In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except in good Offices and moral Pleasures) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of Beauty, Order, and Harmony.

∥1^aIt is true indeed, that ∥2^bthe Enjoyment of^b∥ the ∥3^cnoblest^c∥ Pleasures of the internal Senses, in the Contemplation of the Works of Nature, ∥4^dis^d∥ expos’d to every one without Expence; the Poor and the Low, may have as free ∥5^ea^e∥ use of these Objects, in this way, as the Wealthy or Powerful. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the Property is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy’d by others beside the Proprietor. But then there are other Objects of these internal Senses, which require Wealth, or Power to procure the use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in Architecture, Musick, Gardening, Painting, Dress, Equipage, Furniture; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without Property. And there are some confus’d Imaginations, which often lead us to pursue Property, even in Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These are the ultimate Motives of our pursuing the greater Degrees of Wealth, where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions.^a∥

This is confirm’d by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these Senses. As soon as they think they are got above the World, or extricated from the Hurrys of Avarice and Ambition; banish’d Nature will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of Beauty and Order in their Houses, Gardens, Dress, Table, Equipage. They are never easy without some degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see Regularity, Decency, Beauty, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or their Posterity; and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible ∥6 Effects∥ of their Labours. Nor without this, could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

There may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a thorow Miser, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold dull Thought of Possession; but such an Instance in an Age, must not be made the Standard of Mankind against the whole Body.

If we examine the Pursuits of the Luxurious, who ∥7 in the opinion of the World is∥ wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ’d to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as fine Attendants, regular Apartments, Services of Plate, and the like. ∥8 Besides∥, a large share of the Preparation must be suppos’d design’d for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, ∥9 as∥ to please Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites. How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these internal Sensations may be overlook’d in our Philosophical Inquirys about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, “That they employ us more, and are more efficacious in Life, either to our Pleasure, or Uneasiness, than all our external Senses taken together.”

Final Cause of the internal Senses.II. As to the final Causes of this internal Sense, we need not enquire, “whether, to an almighty and all-knowing Being, there be any real Excellence in regular Forms, in acting by general Laws, in knowing by Theorems?” We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any way; nor need we enquire, “whether other Animals may not discern Uniformity and Regularity in Objects which escape our Observation, and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive Beauty, from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which our Senses are not ∥10 fit∥ to examine or compare?” We shall confine our selves to a Subject where we have some certain ∥11 Foundation∥ to go upon, and only enquire, “if we can find any Reasons worthy of the great Author of Nature, for making such a Connection between regular Objects, and the Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them; or, what Reasons might possibly influence him to create the World, as it at present is, as far as we can observe, every where full of Regularity and Uniformity?”

12 Let it be here observ’d, that as far as we know ∥13 concerning∥ any of the great Bodys of the Universe, we see Forms and Motions really Beautiful to our Senses; and if we were plac’d in any Planet, the apparent Courses would still be Regular and Uniform, and consequently Beautiful to ∥14 our Sense∥. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same manner adapted to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation with ours.

But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain’d in the following Propositions.

1. The manner of Knowledge by universal Theorems, and of Operation by universal Causes, as far as we can attain ∥15 it,∥ must be most convenient for Beings of limited Understanding and Power; since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and consequently their Reason, without any Sense of Beauty, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent Advantage.

2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain’d, than irregular Objects; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a Pillar or two, with an intermediate Arch, and Cornice, form a distinct Idea of a whole regular Building, if we know of what Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a Side and solid Angle, we have the whole regular Solid; the measuring one Side, gives the whole Square; one Radius, the whole ∥16 Circle∥; two Diameters, an Oval; one Ordinate and Abscissa, the Parabola; ∥17 and so on in more complex Figures which have any Regularity, which can be entirely determin’d and known in every Part∥ from a few Data: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any irregular Form, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of rude Rocks, and Pebbles, and confus’d Heaps, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the regular Forms: for such irregular Objects distract the Mind with Variety, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. From ∥18 these∥ two Propositions it follows, “That Beings of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own Interest, must chuse to operate by the simplest Means, to invent general Theorems, and to study regular Objects, if they be ∥19 as useful as∥ irregular ones; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching ∥20 out∥ each different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless Variety of dissimilar Ideas in irregular Objects.”

4. But then, beside this Consideration of Interest, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, ∥21 antecedent∥ to the Constitution of the Author of Nature, ∥22 between∥ regular Forms, Actions, Theorems, and that sudden sensible Pleasure excited in us upon observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention’d in the former Proposition. And possibly, the Deity could have form’d us so as to have receiv’d ∥23 no∥ Pleasure from such ∥24 Objects∥, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the Beautys of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but then every ∥25 one∥ seems ∥26 vastly∥ more delighted with ∥27 the peculiar Beautys of its own Species, than with those of a different one,∥ which seldom raise any desire ∥28 but among Animals of the same Species with the one admir’d∥. This makes it probable, that the Pleasure is not the necessary Result of the Form it self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever∥29 ; but depends upon a voluntary Constitution,∥ adapted to preserve the Regularity of the Universe, and is probably not the Effect of Necessity but Choice in the Supreme Agent, who constituted our Senses.

From the divine Goodness.5. Now from the whole we may conclude, “That supposing the Deity so kind as to connect sensible Pleasure with certain Actions or Contemplations, beside the rational Advantage perceivable in them; there is a great moral Necessity, from his Goodness, that the internal Sense of Men should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make Uniformity amidst Variety the Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so, but on the contrary, if irregular Objects, particular Truths, and Operations pleased us, beside the endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since Reason and Interest would lead us to simple general Causes, while a contrary Sense of Beauty would make us disapprove them: Universal Theorems would appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a contrary Sense would set us on the search after ∥30 particular∥ Truths: Thought and Reflection would recommend Objects with Uniformity amidst Variety, and yet this perverse Instinct would involve us in Labyrinths of Confusion and Dissimilitude. And hence we see “how suitable it is to the sagacious Bounty which we suppose in the Deity, to constitute our internal Senses in the manner in which they are; by which Pleasure is join’d to the Contemplation of those Objects which a finite Mind can best imprint and retain the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to those Actions which are most efficacious, and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those Theorems which most enlarge our Minds.”

Reason of general Laws.31III. As to the other Question, “What Reason might influence the Deity, whom no ∥32 Diversity∥ of Operation could distract or weary, to chuse to operate by simplest Means and general Laws, and to diffuse Uniformity, Proportion and Similitude thro all the Parts of Nature which we can observe?” Perhaps there may be some real Excellence in this Manner of Operation, and in these Forms, which we know not: but this we may probably say, that since the divine Goodness, for the Reasons above mention’d, has constituted our Sense of Beauty as it is at present, the same Goodness might ∥33 determine∥ the Great Architect to adorn this ∥34 vast∥ Theatre in ∥35 a manner∥ agreeable to the Spectators, and that part which is expos’d to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasant to them; especially if we suppose that he design’d to discover himself to them as Wise and Good, as well as Powerful: for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro the whole Earth, of his Art, Wisdom, Design, and Bounty, than they can possibly have for the Reason, Counsel, and Good-will of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse, with full Persuasion of ∥36 these qualities in them, about∥ their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the Deity by general Laws, there is ∥37 still a further Reason from a Sense∥ superior to these already consider’d, even that of Virtue, or the Beauty of Action, which is the Foundation of our greatest Happiness. For were there no general Laws fix’d in the Course of Nature, there could be no Prudence or Design in Men, no rational Expectation of Effects from Causes, no Schemes of Action projected, ∥38 or∥ any regular Execution. If then, according to the Frame of our Nature, our greatest happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, “The Universe must be govern’d, not by particular Wills, but by general Laws, upon which we can found our Expectations, and project our Schemes of Action.” ∥39^aNay further, tho general Laws did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp’d their ∥40^bEf-fects^b∥ whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually, ∥41^cand justly^c∥ supersede all human Prudence and Care about Actions; since a superior Mind did thus relieve Men from their Charge.^a∥

∥42 The End of the First Treatise.∥

[i. ]John Locke (1632–1704) developed the theory of simple and complex ideas, and of primary and secondary qualities in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 1690), bk. 2, “Of Ideas,” and bk. 4, “Of Knowledge and Opinion.”

[* ]See above, Art. 6.

[* ]See Art. ∥72 5∥.

[† ]Sect. 7.

[* ]This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of ∥81 Pleasure∥ to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self, and Resemblance to some Original.

[* ]See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.

[* ]Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2 v. 12.

[i. ]Translation: “Where the excitement pleasantly beguiles the hard toil.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 136.

[* ]Sect. vi. Art. 3.

[* ]See Sect. iv. Art. 7.

[* ]See Sect. vi. Art. 12.

[i. ]René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher and mathematician, published the cogito-ergo-sum principle first in his Discours de la méthode (1637) and in his Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), meditations 2 and 3.

[ii. ]Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), German philosopher, mathematician, historian, and jurist, discovered differential and integral calculus, and developed the first binary arithmetic. Of his numerous writings and extensive correspondence, little was published during his lifetime. The principle of sufficient reason is central to his metaphysics and logic; see his Monadologie (1720). In an exchange of letters with Samuel Clarke (see note iii below), he discussed the philosophical principles of Newton’s physics, especially space and time. See The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998).

[iii. ]Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), English theologian and philosopher, was a friend of Newton whose philosophical doctrine he defended against Leibniz (see note ii above).

[* ]See the Letters which pass’d between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz, Pag. 23.

[iv. ]Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) was the leading author on natural law in the Enlightenment. See De Jure Naturae et Gentium (Lund, 1672; translation: The Law of Nature and Nations, London, 1703) and De officio hominis et civis (Lund, 1673; translation: The Whole Duty of Man, London, 1691).

[* ]See Sect. vi. Art. 13. and the Spectator there referr’d to.

[* ]∥6^aBy undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any particular Form. ∥7^bThis ^b∥ Conatus ad motum, without an actual Line of Direction, seems such a gross absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that it is ∥8^cbelow the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it^c∥. But Men have so many confus’d Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho it were granted them, is insufficient to answer the appearances in the Regularity of the World; and this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what to a Man of just Thought will appear pretty Obvious, that there can be no Thought-less Agent; and that Chance and Nature are mere empty Names, as they are us’d on this Occasion, relative only to our Ignorance.^a∥

[* ]There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention’d, and a Being which has no Intention for any reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same with Chance, but not the former. For tho a Being has no sense of Beauty, he may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular Forms; and the observation of greater Regularity in any number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected Force, is a presumption of Design and Intention in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos’d to have no sense of Beauty in such Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus supposing the Deity ∥20 no way necessarily∥ pleas’d with Regularity, Uniformity, or Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a sense of Beauty founded on these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.

[* ]See above, Art. viii.

[* ]See the last Section.

[* ]See above, Sect. ii. Art. 8.

[* ]See above Sect. i. Art. 17. Sect. iv. Art. 1.

[* ]See below Art. 11, 12. of this Section.

[* ]Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.

[i ]Translation: “But for such things there was no place.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 450.

[* ]See above Art. 3. of this Section.

[* ]Milt. Il Penseroso.

[ii ]John Milton (1608–74), English poet and author. His major poems are On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, L’Allegro, and Il Penseroso (early works), Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained (later works). He wrote extensively on theological and political issues as well (for example, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 1643; The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, 1649; The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, 1660).

[* ]See Paradise Lost, Book 8.

[* ]Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.

[i. ]Translation: “So earn your sauce with hard exercise.” Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 138.

[1.]Divisional title page not in C and D.

[2.]D (p. 1): An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Treatise I. Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.

[3.]In A: Arabic numerals in Treatise I.

[4.]A (p. 1): that

[5.]In A: No marginal headings in Treatise I and Treatise II.

[6.]C (p. 2), D (p. 2): great

[7.]A (p. 2): that

[8.]Omitted in C (p. 2), D (p. 2).

[9.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: Corporeal Substances

[10.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: raise a clear enough Idea

[11.]A (p. 3): that

[12.]A (p. 3): he has not received any of these Ideas, or wants the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can ever raise in him any Idea of that Sense in which he is deficient.

[13.]A (pp. 3–4): articles V and VI are interchanged. Instructions for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 3).

[14.]Not in A (p. 4).

[15.]Not in A (p. 4).

[16.]Not in A (p. 4). Instructions for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 3).

[17.]Not in A (p. 4).

[18.]Not in A (p. 5), C (p. 5).

[19.]A (p. 5): Aversion to

[20.]Omitted in C (p. 5), D (p. 5).

[21.]Not in A (p. 5).

[22.]A (p. 5): towards

[23.]Not in A (p. 5).

[24.]Addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 3).

[25.]Alterations and Additions (p. 3): will

[26.]A (p. 5): in our Dress, and some other Affairs; and yet this may arise from a like accidental Conjunction of Ideas: as for instance,

[27.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 309]: including

[28.]Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 5), D (p. 6).

[29.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: appears no

[30.]Not in A (p. 6).

[31.]Not in A (p. 6).

[32.]A (p. 6): that

[33.]C (p. 6), D (p. 6): many

[34.]C (p. 6), D (p. 6): far

[35.]A (p. 6): rising

[36.]Not in A (p. 7).

[37.]A (p. 8): relish

[38.]A (p. 8): wou’d

[39.]A (p. 8): Affairs

[40.]New paragraph added in D2, D3 (p. 9): We generally imagine the brute Animals endowed with the same sort of Powers of Perception as our External Senses, and having sometimes greater Acuteness in them: but we conceive few or none of them with any of these sublimer Powers of Perception here call’d Internal Senses; or at least if some of them have them, it is in a Degree much inferior to ours.

[41.]C (p. 9), D (p. 9): hereafter

[42.]D2, D3 (p. 10): Let one consider, first, That ’tis probable a Being may have the full Power of External Sensation, which we enjoy, so as to perceive each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of comparing, or of discerning the Similitudes or Proportions: Again, It might discern these also, and yet have no Pleasure or Delight Accompanying these Perceptions. The bare Idea of the Form is something separable from Pleasure, as may appear from the different Tastes of men about the Beauty of Forms, where we don’t imagine that they differ in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secundary Qualities. Similitude, Proportion, Analogy, or Equality of Proportion, are Objects of the Understanding, and must be actually known before we know the natural Causes of our Pleasure. But Pleasure perhaps is not necessarily connected with the Perception of them: and may be felt where the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt where the Proportion is observed.

[43.]A (p. 9): imagine to be in

[44.]C (p. 10): much

[45.]A (p. 9): Sense

[46.]Not in A (p. 9).

[47.]A (p. 9): to receive

[48.]D2, D3 (p. 10): may often

[49.]Not in A (p. 10).

[50.]D2, D3 (p. 11): not numbered.

[51.]D2, D3 (p. 11): is different

[52.]D2, D3 (p. 11): we are struck at the first with the

[53.]Footnote in A (p. 10): *See above, Art. 5.

[54.]D2, D3 (p. 11): may bring along that peculiar kind of Pleasure, which attends

[55.]D2, D3 (p. 11): numbered XIII.

[56.]Not in A (p. 10).

[57.]D2, D3 (p. 12): numbered XIV.

[58.]Omitted in C (p. 12), D (p. 12).

[59.]A (p. 11): of even

[60.]Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).

[61.]Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).

[62.]D2, D3 (p. 13): but cannot

[63.]A (p. 12): Meats

[64.]A (p. 12): that were

[65.]C (p. 13), D (p. 13): The same holds true of

[66.]C (p. 13), D (p. 13): Interest

[67.]Omitted in C (p. 13), D (p. 13).

[68.]D2, D3 (p. 13): numbered XV.

[69.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 13).

[70.]A (p. 12): that

[71.]C (p. 13), D1 (p. 13): And Custom, Education, or Example, could never

D2, D3 (pp. 13–14): ’Tis true, what chiefly pleases in the Countenance, are the Indications of Moral Dispositions; and yet were we by the longest Acquaintance fully convinc’d of the best Moral Dispositions in any Person, with that Countenance we now think deform’d, this would never hinder our immediate Dislike of the Form, or our liking other Forms more: And Custom, Education, or Example, [p. 14] could never

[72.]A (p. 13): 6

[73.]XVI.

[74.]D2, D3 (p. 14): Beauty, in Corporeal Forms,

[75.]A (p. 13): noted

[76.]A (p. 13): that

[77.]A (p. 13): Heat

[78.]A (p. 13): that

[79.]C (p. 13), D (p. 14): otherwise

[80.]A (p. 14): that

[81.]A (p. 14): Pleasure as

[82.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 15).

[1.]A (p. 15): that

[2.]A (p. 15): that

[3.]Not in A (p. 15).

[4.]C (p. 16), D (p. 16): for there are many

[5.]C (p. 16), D (p. 16): and yet

[6.]Omitted in C (p. 16), D (p. 16).

[7.]A (p. 15): that

[8.]A (p. 16): that

[9.]A (p. 16): that shall be touched at* afterwards. [Same footnote.]

[10.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: may seem probable, and hold pretty generally.

[11.]Not in A (p. 18). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).

[12.]A (p. 17): which yet is

[13.]Not in C (p. 18), D (p. 18).

[14.]C (p. 19), D (p. 19): former

[15.]Omitted in C (p. 19), D (p. 19).

[16.]Omitted in C (p. 19), D (p. 19).

[17.]C (p. 19), D (p. 19): surprizing

[18.]Not in A (p. 18).

[19.]A (pp. 18–19): the Structure, and Order

[20.]C (p. 20), D (p. 20): great

[21.]A (p. 19): and

[22.]No new paragraph in A (p. 19).

[23.]C (p. 21), D (p. 21): Thus

[24.]A (p. 20): various

[25.]C (p. 22), D (p. 22): great

[26.]C (p. 22), D (p. 22): how near the

[27.]C (p. 22), D (p. 22): in brackets.

[28.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: minuter Parts, even of those,

[29.]Not in A (p. 21).

[30.]C (p. 22), D (p. 22): a very great

[31.]C (p. 22), D (p. 22): great

[32.]A (p. 21): or Leaf

[33.]Not in A (p. 21).

[34.]A (p. 21): shall spring

[35.]A (p. 21): shall sprout

[36.]C (p. 23), D (p. 23): each

[37.]Not in A (p. 22).

[38.]C (p. 23), D (p. 23): surprizing

[39.]A (p. 22): that

[40.]C (p. 24), D (p. 24): how universal is that Beauty which

[41.]Not in A (p. 23).

[42.]C (p. 25), D (p. 25): Mind. In Motion there is also a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting the Time and Air of Music, which is observed in regular Dancing.

[43.]Not in A (p. 24).

[44.]C (p. 26), D (p. 26): great

[45.]C (p. 26), D (p. 26): considerable

[46.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: and frequently

[47.]A (p. 25): Chords

[48.]A (p. 26): every second Vibration [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).]

[49.]A (p. 26): Chords. Now good Compositions, beside the Frequency of these Chords, must retain a general Unity of Key, an Uniformity among the Parts in Bars, Risings, Fallings, Closes. The Necessity of this will appear, by observing the Dissonance which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A greater

[50.]Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).

[51.]Alterations and Additions (p. 4): an artificial

[52.]Not in A (p. 26), and no new paragraph. Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 4–5).

[53.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 4).

[54.]A (p. 26): afterwards

[55.]New footnote in D2, D3 (p. 29): *There is nothing singular in applying the Word Beauty to Sounds. The Antients observe the peculiar Dignity of the Senses of Seeing and Hearing, that in their Objects we discern the καλὸν [beauty], which we don’t ascribe to the Objects of the other Senses.

[56.]D1 (p. 29): the

D2, D3 (p. 29): these

[1.]A (p. 27): because

[2.]D2, D3 (p. 30): a Multitude

[3.]Omitted in D (p. 31).

[4.]A (p. 28, wrongly numbered p. 21): Thus also one Fluxional Calculation shall determine the Tangents of all Algebraick Curves; of these Curves there are infinite Orders and Species possible[,] of each Species infinite Sizes, or Magnitudes of Areas, of each Size infinite Individuals, of each Individual Curve an Infinity of Points, from which Tangents may be drawn. But all these Infinitys of Infinites are exactly comprehended in the general Theorem, which fixes the Lengths of the Subtangents, or their Proportion to the Abscissa. [Instruction for alteration already in Alterations and Additions (p. 5).]

[5.]D2, D3 (p. 31): find a like

[6.]D2, D3 (p. 31): many

[7.]D2, D3 (p. 31): innumerable

[8.]A (p. 28, wrongly numbered p. 21): which we are in [Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 31).]

[9.]D2, D3 (p. 31): are only

[10.]D1 (p. 32): make

D2, D3 (p. 32): take

[11.]A (p. 29): Because however

[12.]A (p. 29): does contain

[13.]A (p. 29), C (p. 32), D (p. 32): of

[14.]D1 (p. 32): or

D2, D3 (p. 32): and

[15.]Paragraph not in A (p. 29). Instruction for addition of this paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 5–6).

[16.]Alterations and Additions (p. 5): does also bisect

[17.]Alterations and Additions (p. 6): also

[18.]Alterations and Additions (p. 6): Joy

[19.]C (p. 33), D (p. 33): Truth. Another kind of Surprize in certain Theorems increases our Pleasure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we discover a general Truth, which upon some confused Notion we had reputed false: as that Asymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil. But still the Unity of many Particulars in the general Theorem is necessary to give Pleasure in any Theorem.

[20.]A (p. 29): which cannot be omitted; which is this [Omitted in C (p. 34), D1 (p. 34), D2, D3 (p. 33).]

[21.]A (p. 29): shall contain

[22.]C (p. 34), D1 (p. 34), D2, D3 (p. 33): great

[23.]D2, D3 (p. 33): there are some leading, or fundamental Propertys, upon which a long Series of theorems can be naturally built

[24.]Not in D2, D3 (p. 34).

[25.]Not in A (p. 30).

[26.]D2, D3 (p. 34): others in higher Parts of Geometry

[27.]No new paragraph in A (p. 30), D2, D3 (p. 34).

[28.]D2, D3 (p. 34): What is the Aim of our ingenious Geometers? A continual Inlargement of theorems, or making them extensive, shewing how what was formerly known of one Figure extends to many others, to Figures very unlike the former in Appearance.

[29.]A (p. 31): Advantage in Life

[30.]A (p. 31): besides

[31.]A (p. 31): Whimsys

[32.]C (p. 35), D (p. 35): an Affectation

[33.]D2, D3 (p. 35): pleaded

[34.]D2, D3 (p. 35): boasts

[35.]Without footnote in A (p. 31). Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 35).

[36.]D2, D3 (p. 35): see

[37.]A (p. 32): Dr. Cumberland has taken a great deal of needless Pains to reduce the Laws of Nature to one general practical Proposition; and how

[38.]D2, D3 (p. 35): does Puffendorf

[39.]A (p. 32): As if they had not been better drawn, each respectively, from their immediate Sources, viz. Religion, Self-Love, and Sociableness.

[40.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 35).

[41.]C (p. 36), D1 (p. 36), D2, D3 (p. 35): perceive the Beauty of

[42.]A (p. 32): notwithstanding the Contortions of Common Sense they may be led into by pursuing it

D2, D3 (p. 36): since they are led into unnatural Deductions by pursuing it too far

[43.]D2, D3 (p. 36) add note: *Aristotle (Ethic. Nicom. I. ro. c. 3. [NE, X 2, 1174a 4–8]) justly observes, that we have certain natural Propensitys to certain Actions, or to the Exercise of certain natural Powers, without a View to, or Intention of, obtaining those Pleasures which naturally accompany them. Περὶ πολλὰ σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεϑα ἂν, καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιϕέϱοι ἡδονήν, οἰ̑ον ὀϱα̑ν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀϱετὰς ἔχειν· εἰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τουτοις ἡδοναὶ, οὐδὲν διαϕέϱει· ἑλοίμεϑα γὰϱ ἂν ταυ̑τα, καὶ εἰ μὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν ἀπ’ αὐτω̑ν ἡδονή. [Translation: “Also there are many things which we should be eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory, knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure resulted from them.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 588.]

[44.]A (p. 33): that

[45.]Article not in A (p. 33), C (p. 37), D1 (p. 37), D2, D3 (pp. 36–37). Instruction for addition of the entire paragraph (without numeration and without footnote) already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 6–7).

[46.]A (p. 33): wrongly numbered VI. In C (p. 37), D (p. 37): numbered VII.

[47.]Not in A (p. 33).

[48.]A (p. 33): to be constantly

[49.]C (p. 37), D (p. 37): great

[50.]Not in A (p. 34).

[51.]D2, D3 (p. 38): the

[52.]A (p. 34): numbered VII; C (p. 38), D (p. 38): numbered VIII.

[53.]A (p. 34): shall appear

[1.]No new paragraph in A (p. 35).

[2.]C (p. 40), D (p. 40): represented. Nay, perhaps the Novelty may make us prefer the Representation of Irregularity.

[3.]Omitted in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310].

[4.]A (p. 36): not out of choice

[5.]A (p. 36): the finest Characters possible for Virtue

[6.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: whom

[7.]D1, D2, D3 (p. 41): Simile

[8.]D1, D2, D3 (p. 41): Similes

[9.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: of those which seem very remote

C (p. 42), D (p. 42): of those which are very different from each other

[10.]Not in A (p. 38).

[11.]D (p. 43): of

[12.]B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 43): Artificers

D (p. 43): Artificer

[13.]B [Errata, p. xxvi]: them

C (p. 43), D (p. 43): him

[14.]A (p. 39): Work

[15.]A (p. 41): We may only here observe the Pleasure which any one shall receive from

[16.]A (p. 41): as also that pleasant Sensation he shall have

[17.]New footnote in D2, D3 [Corrigenda, pp. 305–6]: *’Tis surprising to see the ingenious Author of Alciphroni alledging, that all Beauty observed is solely some Use perceived or imagined; for no other Reason than this, that the Apprehension of the Use intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and some other Things of obvious Use; and that we like those Forms most, which are fittest for the Use. Whereas we see, that in these very Things Similitude of parts is regarded, where unlike Parts would be equally useful: thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the same Use, tho’ unlike, were they equally long; tho’ one were strait, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-shape for a Door would bear a more manifest Aptitude to the human Shape, than that which Artists require. And then what is the Use of these Imitations of Nature, or of its Works, in Architecture? Why should a Pillar please which has some of the Human Proportions? Is the End or Use of a Pillar the same as of a Man? Why the Imitation of other natural or well-proportioned Things in the Entablature? Is there then a Sense of Imitation, relishing it where there is no other Use than this, that it naturally pleases? Again; Is no Man pleased with the Shapes of any Animals, but those which he expects Use from? The Shapes of the Horse or the Ox may promise Use to the Owner; but is he the only Person who relishes the Beauty? And is there no Beauty discerned in Plants, in Flowers, in Animals, whose Use is to us unknown? But what is still more surprising, is his representing Aristotle as giving the ἐπαινετόν [laudable], for the Notion of the καλὸν [beauty]: when he has so often told us, “that the καλὸν is prior to it; that we love Praise from others, as it gives Testimony to, and confirms our Opinion of, our being possessed of Virtue, or the καλὸν; and that the superior Excellency of this, which we antecedently perceive, is the Reason why we love Praise.” See Ethic. Ad Nicom. Lib. i. c. 5.ii and often elsewhere. ’Tis true that the καλὸν is laudable, and, as Plato asserts, all-wise, ἡδὺ, καὶ ὠϕέλιμον [the pleasant and the profitable] at last; and so does every one maintain who asserts a Moral Sense, in that very Assertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of making this an Objection to Moral Sense.

[1.]A (p. 42): antecedently

[2.]A (p. 42): may possibly

[3.]A (p. 42): do not seem

[4.]C (p. 46), D (p. 46): hereafter

[5.]A (p. 42): possible,

[6.]A (p. 43): This Expression is taken from the Cartesian Scheme, in which the Author of Nature is supposed to have designedly impress’d a general Force or Conatus ad motum upon the Mass of Matter, without any Direction whatsoever. This nonsensical Notion did so much prevail, and men have so many confused Conceptions of Nature and Chance, as real Beings operating without Wisdom or Design, that it may be useful to shew that their very absurd Postulatum is wholly insufficient, tho it were granted them, to answer the Appearances in the Regularity of the World. And this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section.

[7.]B [Errata, p. xxvi], C (p. 47), D (p. 47): The

[8.]D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310]: below our Notice

[9.]Deleted in B [Errata, p. xxvi]. Printed again in C (p. 47), D (p. 47): possible

[10.]Not in A (p. 43).

[11.]A (p. 43): It is also certain that there is

[12.]A (p. 43): may

[13.]A (p. 44): shall be

[14.]A (p. 44): shall

[15.]No new paragraph in A (p. 44).

[16.]A (p. 44): Positions

[17.]A (p. 45): and hence

[18.]Not in A (p. 45).

[19.]A (p. 45): Whereas if different Senses of Beauty be in other Agents,

[20.]C (p. 50), D (p. 50): not immediately

[21.]Omitted in C (p. 50), D (p. 50).

[22.]A (p. 46): offered

[23.]A (p. 46): cubick Inches solid Content

C (p. 51), D (p. 51): Parts whose solid Contents were each a cubick Inch

[24.]A (p. 47): that

[25.]A (p. 47): meet

[26.]A (p. 47): Design as producing them,

[27.]A (p. 47): the

[28.]C (p. 51), D (p. 51): not

[29.]A (p. 47): are an infinity of other Forms possible, we could only expect from the casual Concourse of such a Mass as was suppos’d in the last Case, one Prism of any Kind, since there are an Infinity of other Solids possible

[30.]A (p. 47): Presumption for

[31.]A (p. 48): in this Affair but an undirected Force of Attraction suppos’d

[32.]A (p. 48): given to

[33.]A (p. 48): shall

[34.]A (p. 49): even after

[35.]Not in A (p. 49).

[36.]A (p. 50): as is that of

[37.]A (p. 50): do determine

[38.]A (p. 51): might possibly

[39.]D (p. 55): does to

[40.]A (p. 52): are at least still an infinity

[41.]D2, D3 (p. 57): in

[42.]Not in A (p. 53).

[43.]D2, D3 (p. 57): infinites

[44.]D2, D3 (p. 57): arising daily in such Numbers in all Parts of the Earth with such Similarity of Structure, should be the Effect of Chance, is beyond all Conception or Expression.

[45.]Not in A (p. 54).

[46.]C (p. 58), D (p. 58): great

[47.]A (p. 54): like to

[48.]A (p. 54): as it

[49.]Omitted in D2, D3 (p. 58).

[50.]A (p. 55), C (p. 58), D (p. 58): should

[51.]A (p. 55): wrongly numbered 12. The following articles of this section wrongly numbered accordingly.

[52.]A (p. 55): only judge

[53.]Omitted in C (p. 59), D (p. 59).

[54.]C (p. 59), D (p. 59): might be retained

[55.]A (p. 56): numbered 13.

[56.]Not in A (p. 56).

[57.]A (p. 56): shall

[58.]A (p. 56): Minutes perhaps

[59.]A (p. 56): also are

[60.]A (p. 56): varying

[61.]A (p. 57): numbered 14.

[62.]C (p. 61), D (p. 61): sensibly different gross

[63.]Entire article not in A (p. 58). Instruction for addition of the entire paragraph (without numeration) already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 7–8).

[64.]Alterations and Additions (p. 7): further

[65.]Alterations and Additions (p. 7): an

[66.]Alterations and Additions (p. 7): man

[67.]Alterations and Additions (p. 8): 1000 to 1

[68.]C (p. 63), D (p. 63): may

[69.]Alterations and Additions (p. 8): all moral

[70.]Alterations and Additions (p. 8): Art, or Wisdom

[71.]A (p. 58): numbered 15.

[72.]A (p. 58): when he is not

[73.]A (p. 59): designed plainly

[74.]Not in A (p. 59).

[75.]A (p. 59): numbered 16.

[76.]C (p. 65), D (p. 65): Agents

[77.]C (p. 65), D (p. 65): them

[78.]No new paragraph in A (p. 60).

[79.]C (p. 65), D (p. 65): great

[80.]A (p. 61): numbered 17.

[81.]Omitted in C (p. 66), D (p. 66).

[82.]Omitted in C (p. 66), D (p. 66).

[83.]D (p. 67): an Uniformity,

[84.]A (p. 62): numbered 18.

[85.]A (p. 62): may perhaps* afterwards. [Footnote identical.]

[86.]A (p. 62): may possibly

[87.]A (p. 62): numbered 19.

[88.]A (p. 63): And yet

[89.]Not in A (p. 63).

[90.]A (p. 64): the

[91.]A (p. 64): numbered 20.

[1.]A (p. 65): the

[2.]A (p. 65): which

[3.]A (p. 65): if

[4.]No new paragraph in A (p. 65).

[5.]A (p. 66): for

[6.]C (p. 71), D (p. 71): now call

[7.]D (p. 71): a positive

[8.]Omitted in C (p. 72), D (p. 72).

[9.]A (p. 67): what were

C (p. 72), D (p. 72): if any thing were

[10.]Not in A (p. 67).

[11.]A (p. 67): towards

[12.]A (p. 67): these

[13.]A (p. 67): in ravenous

[14.]A (p. 68): afterwards

[15.]A (p. 68), C (p. 73), D (p. 73): Swine

[16.]A (p. 68): there is no

[17.]A (p. 69): do further extend their

[18.]Not in A (p. 69).

[19.]A (p. 69): not capable

[20.]Not in A (p. 69).

[21.]A (p. 69): Conveniency

[22.]A (p. 69): Time and Labour

[23.]C (p. 75), D (p. 75): might here

[24.]A (p. 70): or Eyes

[25.]A (p. 70): be however

[26.]A (p. 70): often may

[27.]No new paragraph in A (p. 71).

[28.]A (p. 71): some of the

[29.]A (p. 71): Regularity and Beauty

[30.]C (p. 76), D (p. 76): our Imaginations

[31.]Omitted in C (p. 77), D (p. 77).

[32.]A (p. 73): shall

[33.]C (p. 78), D (p. 78): rejected

[34.]A (p. 74): Advantage, or

[35.]Not in A (p. 75).

[36.]A (p. 77): Key,

[37.]No new paragraph in A (p. 78).

[38.]A (p. 78): conjoin’d

[1.]C (p. 84), D (p. 84): Species

[2.]A (p. 80): no Custom could

[3.]A (p. 80): will

[4.]A (p. 80): the Taste

[5.]A (p. 80): different Sense from what

[6.]A (p. 80): like such as proved

[7.]A (p. 81): no Custom would

[8.]A (p. 81): were

[9.]A (p. 82): could

[10.]A (p. 82): necessarily the

[11.]Not in A (p. 82).

[12.]A (p. 82): when in reality the Object has

[13.]A (p. 83): Meats

[14.]A (p. 83): hear perhaps

[15.]A (p. 83): they

[16.]Not in A (p. 83).

[17.]A (p. 83): never could

[18.]Not in A (p. 84).

[19.]A (p. 84): repeat our Attention to

[20.]A (p. 84): shall

[21.]A (p. 85): seeing them

[22.]A (p. 86): hence are

[23.]A (p. 86): which we had an Aversion to

[24.]A (p. 86): Sense of Beauty or Harmony naturally

[25.]A (p. 87): without Examination conclude,

[26.]A (p. 87): And often

[27.]Not in A (p. 87).

[28.]Not in A (p. 87).

[29.]C (p. 92), D (p. 92): a livelier

[30.]A (p. 87): Ideas of Beauty

[31.]A (p. 87): when they do not perceive them

C (p. 92), D (p. 92): than in reality they have

[1.]Entire paragraph not in A (p. 89). Instruction for addition of the entire paragraph already in Alterations and Additions (p. 9).

[2.]Omitted in C (p. 94), D (p. 94).

[3.]Alterations and Additions (p. 9): greatest

[4.]C (p. 94), D (p. 94): are

[5.]Not in C (p. 94), D (p. 94).

[6.]A (p. 89): Effect

[7.]C (p. 96), D (p. 96): is imagined

[8.]A (p. 90): Beside

[9.]Omitted in C (p. 96), D (p. 96).

[10.]A (p. 91): fitted

[11.]A (p. 91): Foundations

[12.]No new paragraph in A (p. 91).

[13.]A (p. 91): of

[14.]C (p. 97), D (p. 97): us

[15.]A (p. 92): to this Manner

[16.]A (p. 93): Circle pretty nearly

[17.]C (p. 99), D (p. 99): thus also other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determined

[18.]A (p. 93): the last

[19.]A (p. 93): but equal in Use with

[20.]Not in A (p. 94).

[21.]A (p. 94): antecedently

[22.]A (p. 94): between the

[23.]C (p. 100), D (p. 100): no immediate

[24.]D (p. 100): Object

[25.]A (p. 94): one in its own Species

[26.]C (p. 100), D (p. 100): far

[27.]A (p. 94): their peculiar Beautys, than with the Beautys of a different Species

[28.]Omitted in C (p. 100), D (p. 100). In D2, D3 [Corrigenda, p. 310] this footnote follows: *See Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. c. 27.

[29.]A (p. 94): . This present Constitution is much more

[30.]A (p. 95): singular

[31.]A (p. 96): not numbered.

[32.]A (p. 96): Diversitys

[33.]C (p. 102), D (p. 102): have determined

[34.]C (p. 102), D (p. 102): stupendous

[35.]A (p. 96): that manner which should be

[36.]A (p. 97): this in

[37.]A (p. 97): a further Reason from a Sense still

[38.]A (p. 97): nor

[39.]Not in A (p. 97). Instruction for addition already in Alterations and Additions (pp. 9–10).

[40.]Alterations and Additions (p. 10): Effect

[41.]Not in Alterations and Additions (p. 10).

[42.]Not in A (p. 97), C (p. 103), D (p. 103). Instruction for addition in Alterations and Additions (p. 10): End of the first Treatise.

[i. ]George Berkeley, Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, in The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, vol. 3 (London, 1950), Third Dialogue, sects. 4–12, pp. 118–32.

[ii. ]Hutcheson paraphrases Aristotle and Plato using another paraphrase in Berkeley’s Alciphron, p. 118. The passage indicated reads “men’s motive in pursuing honour seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. H. Rackham [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937], p. 15; NE I 3, 1095b 22ff.); compare Plato, Alcibiades, II, 145c.

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