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Subject Area: Law
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

§ 161.: Limitations upon legislative authority.— - Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, vol. 2 [1900]

Edition used:

A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint (St. Louis: The F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1900). Vol. 2.

Part of: A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, 2 vols.

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§ 161.

Limitations upon legislative authority.—

The power of a government to impose taxes is almost without limitation and necessarily so, because of the varied character of governmental functions and needs. Chief Justice Marshall has almost denied the existence of any limitations upon the power of taxation. He said, in one case, “the power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable or the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and offensive taxation. The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies of the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse.” It is “unfit for the judicial department to inquire what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of the power.”1

It is undoubtedly true that the power of the legislature to determine the rate of taxation is limited only by its wise discretion, and may be extended so as to involve a complete confiscation of all the taxable property within the State, if the payment of such a tax could be enforced. There would be no redress in the courts for such an abuse of the power. It is also true that the selection of the objects of taxation is without limitation, except those imposed by the United States constitution and arising out of the inter-relation of the Federal and State governments.2

The State may freely determine upon what occupations and manufactures to impose a license or excise tax, and may exempt others from the burden of taxation with or without laudable reasons; it may determine what is taxable property, and exempt from the levy any kind of property in the exercise of its discretion. The arbitrary character of the exemptions in any of these cases furnishes no ground for an appeal to the courts.1 But, usually, as a matter of course, there is a public reason, upon which the exemption may be justified. For the promotion of the public welfare, educational and religious institutions and their property are often exempted from taxation, and the right to make the exemption has been rarely questioned.2 For the purpose of lightening the burden of the poorer classes, and relieving the State of the danger of consequent pauperism, the State may very properly exempt from taxation the tools and other means of support of the wage-earner. But it has been held to be unconstitutional to make exemptions from taxation on account of sex or age, as for example, widows, maids and female minors. Such an act was declared to be void.3 Classes or kinds of property may be exempted, as well as classes of persons.4 But the legislature of the State must determine for itself what shall be objects of taxation. The county or municipal authorities cannot be permitted or authorized by the legislatures to make the exemptions.5 Statutory exemptions are always very strictly construed against the individual and in favor of the public;6 and ordinarily a general exemption by the State from taxation does not extend to assessments by the municipal authorities for a local improvement.1

In many of the State constitutions, exemptions from taxation are prohibited, except so far as they are expressly authorized by the provisions of the constitution. And the permitted exemptions are usually confined to religious and eleemosynary institutions.

In reference to these matters, as just explained, the power of taxation is practically without limitation, at any rate subject to very few limitations. But it would not do to say that every legislative act, which assumes the exercise of the power of taxation, will be constitutional. Levies can be made upon the property of the individual which will transcend the object of taxation, as well as violate its spirit. The levy of a tax is only permissible, except under a tyrannical government, when it is made for a public purpose, and it is proportioned uniformly among the objects or subjects of taxation. When a tax is imposed for some private or individual benefit, or is not uniformly imposed upon those who ought to bear it, it is perfectly proper; nay, it is the duty of the courts, to interfere and prohibit what may be justly called an extortion.2 But the term “public purpose” must not be used in this connection in any narrow sense. Taxes are levied for a public purpose, not only when they are designed to pay the salaries of government officials, to erect and keep in repair government buildings; to maintain the public roads, harbors and rivers in a fit condition, and to provide for the defenses of the country. Taxes may not only be levied for such purposes, but also for all purposes of public charity. It is a public purpose to erect with State funds, obtained from taxes, penitentiaries, orphan and lunatic asylums, hospitals and lazarettos, public schools and colleges.1 It is a public purpose to provide pensions for the soldier and other employees of the government, when they have become disabled in service or superannuated.2 And whenever there is a reasonable doubt as to the character of the purpose for which the tax was levied, the doubt should be solved in favor of the power of the legislature to lay the tax.3 But if the purpose be truly private; if the tax in effect takes the property of one man and gives it to another, it is illegal and it is the duty of the courts to enjoin its collection.1 For example, it has been held unlawful to levy taxes in aid of manufacturing and other private industrial enterprises,2 for the relief of farmers, whose crops have been destroyed, to supply them with seeds and provisions,3 or for making loans to persons whose homes have been destroyed by fire.4 It has also been held illegal to pay a subscription to a private corporation that is to be devoted to a private purpose.5 On the other hand, it has been repeatedly held that the legislature may authorize counties and municipal corporations to subscribe for capital stock in railroad companies in aid of their construction and may levy a tax in order to pay the subscription.6

Since the legislature is prohibited from making levies for private purposes, it cannot authorize municipal corporations to do so.1

But great difficulty is experienced in enforcing an observance of this limitation, if any desire is manifested to violate it, since the legislature usually makes one levy of tax in a gross sum to cover all the probable expenditures of the government during the fiscal year, and there is rarely, if ever, a special levy for each item of expenditure. It would certainly hamper very seriously the operations of government, if each taxpayer were allowed to question the legality of the levy, because one of the proposed items of expenditure is not for a public purpose. In such a case, the interest of the individual must yield to the public good, and apart from a change of representatives at the next election, there is probably no remedy, unless the treasurer or other disbursing officer should refuse to apply the public funds to the unlawlul purpose. But if a special stamp or license tax should be levied for a private purpose, the taxpayer can resist the payment, and demand from the ordinary courts protection against the action of the tax collector.

A tax levy may also be open to objection because it does not comply with the constitutional requirement of uniform apportionment. Until very recently it has been supposed that Congress was subjected to this limitation of the power of taxation, in the same sense in which it is imposed upon the State legislatures and municipal councils by the State constitutions. But, recently, the United States Supreme Court, in sustaining the constitutionality of the national tax upon inheritances, declared that the national constitution imposed upon Congress, in the exercise of power of taxation, the duty of observing geographical uniformity, and not uniformity and equality as to individuals.1 The language of the State constitutions in this connection is not invariably the same, and in some of them the language is sufficiently variant to account for the contradiction of authorities; but as a general proposition, they are considered to make about the same requirement. Taxation must be equal and uniform, but the constitutions do not require that the same rule of uniformity should be employed in the apportionment of all taxes. No one rule of uniformity can be devised, which will be applicable to all kinds of taxation, and consequently for each mode of taxation there must be a special rule of apportionment. Thus, for example, the taxation of property is apportioned according to the value, it being considered that such an apportionment will bring about a more perfect equalization of the tax than any other rule. But in laying a tax upon professions and occupations, a different rule of uniformity must be followed.2 And the usual rule is to establish a scale of taxation upon the occupations, graded in proportion to their relative profits. The meaning, therefore, of this constitutional limitation is that whatever the rule of apportionment is, it must be uniformly and impartially applied to all objects of the special taxation.3 There cannot be any partial discrimination between persons or property living in the same taxing district, and falling within the established rule of apportionment. The State has the right to determine the limits of the taxing district,1 but when the taxing district is established, and the rule of apportionment determined upon, the tax must be uniformly apportioned throughout the taxing district. There cannot be different rules of apportionment for different persons or different sections of the district.2

The charge of illegality, because of the violation of the constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity in the apportionment, is most commonly brought against local assessments so-called. It is very common at the present day for municipal corporations, instead of providing for the improvement of the streets, the construction of sewers and drains, and other local arrangements for the promotion of health and comfort, by the imposition of a general tax, collectible from all the taxpayers of the city according to the value of their taxable property, to apportion the cost of the improvement among those contiguous proprietors who are more directly benefited by the improvement. There are two modes of apportionment of the cost of these local improvements, both of which have been sustained as being a substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement of uniformity. One method is a more or less arbitrary apportionment of the cost according to the legislative judgment of the benefit received by each proprietor from the improvement,1 while it has in the other cases been held to be equally lawful to make a taxing district of one street of a city, and apportion the cost of improvements among abutting proprietors in proportion to the frontage of their lots.2 The reasoning of the courts is invariably that in local assessments, as in the case of a general tax, there is a more or less successful attempt at uniformity, although the rules of apportionment may be different. “A property tax for the general purposes of the government, either of the State at large, or of a county, city, or other district, is regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It apportions the burden according to the benefit, more nearly than any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives more benefit from taxation in the protection and improvement of his property than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more. But the amount of each man’s benefit in general taxation cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty; and for that reason a property tax is adopted, instead of an estimate of benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated to a reasonable certainty.1 At least this has been supposed and assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty it is to prescribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose determination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful power, is conclusive.”

CHAPTER XI.

STATE REGULATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

SECTION162.Laws regulating the creation and acquisition of interests in personal property—Real and personal property herein distinguished.
163.Statute of uses and rule against perpetuity, as regulations of personal property.
164.Regulation and prohibition of the sale of personal property.
165.Laws regulating disposition of personal property by will.
166.Involuntary alienation.
167.Control of property by guardian.
168.Destruction of personal property on account of illegal use.
169.Destruction of personal property in the interest of public health.
170.Laws regulating use of personal property.
171.Prohibition of possession of certain property.
172.Regulation and prohibition of the manufacture of certain property.
173.Carrying of concealed weapons prohibited.
174.Miscellaneous regulations of the use of personal property.
175.Laws regulating the use and keeping of domestic animals.
176.Keeping of dogs.
177.Laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals.
178.Regulation of contracts and other rights of action.
179.Regulation of ships and shipping.

[1]McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428, 430. See, also, Providence Bk. v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Portland Bk. v. Apthrop, 12 Mass. 252; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 491; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 21 Pa. St. 145; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones (N. C.), 552; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Mayor, 28 Ohio St. 521; Board of Education v. Mclandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227.

[2]As to which, see post, § 231.

[1]Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62 (16 Am. Rep. 395; Durach’s Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491; Stratton v. Collins, 43 N. J. 563; New Orleans v. Fourchy, 30 La. Ann. pt. 1, 910; New Orleans v. People’s Bank, 32 La. Ann. 82; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; People v. Colman, 3 Cal. 46.

[2]It is no violation of the constitutional principle of religious liberty to exempt the property of religious institutions from taxation. Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa, 275 (26 Am. Rep. 138.)

[3]State v. Indianapolis, 69 Ind. 375 (35 Am. Rep. 223.)

[4]Butler’s Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 48; Sioux City v. School District, 55 Iowa, 150.

[5]Farnsworth Co. v. Lisbon, 62 Me. 451; Wilson v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; State v. Parker, 33 N. J. 213; State v. Hudson, etc., Commissioners, 37 N. J. 11; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; State v. County Court, 19 Ark. 360; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Wilson v. Supervisors of Sutter, 47 Cal. 91.

[6]Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 528; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. 177; Trustees of M. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hodges, 7 Lea, 663.

[1]Seamen’s Friend Society v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181; Universalist Society v. Providence, 6 R. I. 235; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn. 581; Matter of Mayor, etc., 11 Johns. 77: Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J. 385; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St. 69; Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517; Orange, etc., R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 185; Lafayette v. Orphan Asylum, 4 La. Ann. 1; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508 (8 Am. Rep. 480); Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599.

[2]“It is the clear right of every citizen to insist that no unlawful or unauthorized exaction shall be made upon him under the guise of taxation. If any such illegal encroachment is attempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial tribunals for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being taken and appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the constitution and laws.” Bigelow, Ch. J., in Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 575. See, also, to the same effect, Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11 Am. Rep. 185); Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Weismer v. Douglass, 64 N. Y. 91 (21 Am. Rep. 588); Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8 Am. Rep. 255); People v. Townsend Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452; People v. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22; Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Hansen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28.

[1]But it is only for the support of public charities that the government may tax the people. A levy of a tax for donation to some private benevolent or charitable institution is void. St. Mary’s Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310.

[2]Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Speer v. School Directors of Blairville, 50 Pa. St. 150.

[3]“To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and declaring the tax void, the absence of all public interest in the purposes for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush.” Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652. See Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 411 (8 Am. Rep. 578).

[1]“The legislature has no constitutional right to * * * lay a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such authority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legislative power. This would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public interest or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money from the owners of it into the possession of those who have no title to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid the legislature to usurp any other power not granted to them.” Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 21 Pa. St. 147, 168.

[2]Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11 Am. Rep. 185); Commercial Bank v. Iola, 2 Dill. 353.

[3]State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418. But the United States, as well as the State governments, have frequently come with the public funds to the rescue of the people of sections which have been inundated by floods, or devastated by disease or fire; and it would seem that the State aid under such circumstances differed little if at all from the ordinary bestowal of aims upon the poor, and is equally justifiable, as being a public charity.

[4]Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (15 Am. Rep. 39).

[5]Weismer v. Douglass, 64 N. Y. 91 (21 Am. Rep. 586).

[6]Zabriskkie v. Cleveland, C. & R. R. Co., 23 How. 381; Bissell v. ity of Jeffersonville, 54 How. 287; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. 364; Curtis v. Butler Co., 24 How. 435; Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; Gulpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Seybert v. City of Pittsburg, 1 Wall. 272; Van Hortrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291; Mayer v. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384; Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Riggs v. Johnson, 6 Wall. 166; Lee Co. v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181; City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; Tipton Co. v. Rogers, L. & M. Works, 103 U. S. 523. The cases from the State courts are too numerous to cite in detail. But see, to the same effect, Supervisors of Portage Co. v. Wis. Cent. R. R. Co., 121 Mass. 460; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Williams v. Duanesburg, 66 N. Y. 129; Brown v. County Comrs., 21 Pa. St. 37; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58.

[1]Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400.

[1]See ante, § 137a, pp. 658-661.

[2]As to the uniformity of the tax on occupations, see ante, § 119.

[3]See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tidewater Co. v. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. St. 100; Galtin v. Tarborough, 78 N. C. 119; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; Bureau Co. v. Railroad Co., 44 Ill. 229; Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502; Philles v. Hiles, 42 Wis. 527; Ex parte Robinson, 12 Nev. 263; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; New Orleans v. Dubarry, 33 La. Ann. 481 (39 Am. Rep. 273); State v. Rolle, 30 La. Ann. 991; Walters v. Duke, 31 La. Ann. 668; State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312 (21 Am. Rep. 765). But see, contra, Sims v. Jackson, 22 La. Ann. 440; State v. Endom, 23 La. Ann. 663; State v. So. Ca. R. R. Co., 4 S. C. 376.

[1]But the tax district must be of uniform character, so that the tax shall fall upon those who are almost equally benefited by the expenditure. It has thus been held unlawful for a legislature to extend the limits of a city so as to include farming lands, and thus increase the revenue of the city. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194. But see, contra, Stilts v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53 (24 Am. Rep. 661); New Orleans v. Cazelear, 27 La. Ann. 156. See, also, Kelly v. Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 170; Hewitt’s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242.

[2]Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 675; Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis. 510; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 15; Kent v. Kentland, 62 Ind. 291 (30 Am. Rep. 182); State v. New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 354; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boone Co., 44 Ill. 240; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; Commissioners of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19 Kans. 234 (27 Am. Rep. 101); East Portland v. Multnomah Co., 6 Ore. 62. But see, contra, Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355; Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179.

[1]People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85 (22 Am. Dec. 622); Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush. 233; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 461; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. 227; McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292; Weber v. Rheinhard, 73 Pa. St. 370 (13 Am. Rep. 747); Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill. 383; Howard v. The Church, 18 Md. 451; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Sessions v. Crunkleton, 20 Ohio St. 349; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667 (3 Am. Rep. 309); Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Mich. 431; Cook v. Slocum, 27 Minn. 500; LaFayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76. See, contra, State v. Charleston, 12 Rich. 702.

[2]Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Northern R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Lamsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282. Contra, McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349; Perry v. Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31.

[1]People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 427. In Ohio, the legislature has expressly authorized the municipal governments to apportion local assessments, either according to the frontage of lots or their assessed value. In declaring this law to be constitutional, Peck, J., says: “It is said that asseessments as distinguished from general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a compensation proportioned to the special benefits derived from improvement and that in the case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be in any degree benefited by the improvement. It is quite true that the right to impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent, but it by no means follows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance, or that its absence will render the assessment invalid. The rule of apportionment, whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property abutting on the street alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rule to another owner. One could not be assessed ten per cent, another five, another three, and another left altogether unassessed, because he was not in fact benefited. It is manifest that the actual benefits resulting from the improvement may be as various almost as the number of the owners and the uses to which the property may be applied. No general rule, therefore, could be laid down which would do equal and exact justice to all. The legislature have not attempted so vain a thing, but have prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be made, and left the city authorities free to adopt either. The mode adopted by the council becomes the statutory equivalent for the benefits conferred, although in fact the burden imposed may greatly preponderate. Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159. See, generally, Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8 Am. Rep. 255); Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265; Philadelphia v. Rule, 93 Pa. St. 15; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St. 520; White v. People, 94 Ill. 604; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; St. Joseph v. O’Donaghue, 31 Mo. 345; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497. See for an exhaustive treatment of this subject, Cooley Const. Lim. 616, 634; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., §§ 752, 761, and Tiedeman on Municipal Corporations, §§ 259, 259a.

Note.—The subject of taxation is so extensive that it is itself sufficient to constitute the subject of a separate volume, and an exhaustive treatment of it in the present connection would have swelled the volume beyond reasonable proportions. Moreover, the power of taxation is not commonly considered a branch of the police power. While I am convinced that it is scientifically correct to consider taxation as the imposition of a burden in the exercise of the police power of the government, the fact that the subject has been fully and thoroughly treated by distinguished writers (see Cooley Const. Lim. 592, 646; 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., §§ 735, 822; Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law, ch. 10), has led me in explaining the power of taxation as a branch of police power, to content myself with stating the constitutional objections that might be made to different forms of taxation, supporting the statements by a liberal citation of authorities.