- Preface.
- Preface to the Second Edition.
- State and Federal Control of Persons and Property. Vol. I.
- Chapter I.: Scope of the Government Control and Regulation of Personal Rights.
- § 1.: Police Power—defined and Explained.—
- § 2.: The Legal Limitations Upon Police Power.—
- § 3.: Construction of Constitutional Limitations.—
- § 4.: The Principal Constitutional Limitations.—
- § 5.: Table of Private Rights.—
- Chapter II.: Government Regulation of Personal Security.
- § 10.: Security to Life.—
- § 11.: Capital Punishment, When Cruel and Unusual.—
- § 12.: Security to Limb and Body—general Statement.—
- § 13.: Corporal Punishment—when a Cruel and Unusual Punishment.—
- § 14.: Personal Chastisement In Certain Relations.—
- § 15.: Battery In Self-defense.—
- § 16.: Abortion.—
- § 17.: Compulsory Submission to Surgical and Medical Treatment.—
- § 18.: Security to Health—legalized Nuisance.—
- § 19.: Security to Reputation—privileged Communications. 3 —
- § 20.: Privilege of Legislators.—
- § 21.: Privilege In Judicial Proceedings.—
- § 22.: Criticism of Officers and Candidates For Office.—
- § 23.: Publications Through the Press.—
- § 24.: Security to Reputation—malicious Prosecution.—
- § 25.: Advice of Counsel, How Far a Defense.—
- Chapter III.: Personal Liberty.
- § 26.: Personal Liberty—how Guaranteed.—
- Chapter IV.: Government Control of Criminal Classes.
- § 27.: The Effect of Crime On the Rights of the Criminal—power of State to Declare What Is a Crime.—
- § 28.: Due Process of Law.—
- § 29.: Bills of Attainder.—
- § 30.: Ex Post Facto Laws.—
- § 31.: Cruel and Unusual Punishment In Forfeiture of Personal Liberty and Rights of Property.—
- § 32.: Preliminary Confinement to Answer For a Crime—commitment of Witnesses.—
- § 33.: What Constitutes a Lawful Arrest.—
- § 34.: Arrests Without a Warrant.—
- § 35.: The Trial of the Accused.—
- § 36.: The Trial Must Be Speedy.—
- § 37.: Trials Must Be Public.—
- § 38.: Accused Entitled to Counsel.—
- § 39.: Indictment By Grand Jury Or By Information.—
- § 40.: The Plea of Defendant.—
- § 41.: Trial By Jury—legal Jeopardy.—
- § 42.: Right of Appeal.—
- § 43.: Imprisonment For Crime—hard Labor—control of Convicts In Prison.—
- § 43 A.: Convict Lease System.—
- Chapter V.: The Control of Dangerous Classes, Otherwise Than By Criminal Prosecution.
- § 44.: Confinement For Infectious and Contagious Diseases.—
- § 45.: The Confinement of the Insane.—
- § 46.: Control of the Insane In the Asylum.—
- § 47.: Punishment of the Criminal Insane.—
- § 48.: Confinement of Habitual Drunkards.—
- § 49.: Police Control of Vagrants.—
- § 50.: Police Regulation of Mendicancy.—
- § 51.: Police Supervision of Habitual Criminals.—
- § 52.: State Control of Minors.—
- Chapter VI.: Regulations of the Rights of Citizenship and Domicile.
- § 53.: Citizenship and Domicile Distinguished.—
- § 54.: Expatriation.—
- § 55.: Naturalization.—
- § 56.: Prohibition of Emigration.—
- § 57.: Compulsory Emigration.—
- § 58.: Prohibition of Immigration.—
- § 59.: The Public Duties of a Citizen.—
- Chapter VII.: State Regulation of Morality and Religion.
- § 60.: Crime and Vice Distinguished—their Relation to Police Power.—
- § 61.: Sumptuary Laws.—
- § 62.: Church and State—historical Synopsis.—
- § 63.: Police Regulation of Religion—constitutional Restrictions.—
- § 64.: State Control of Churches and Congregations.—
- § 65.: Religious Criticism and Blasphemy Distinguished.—
- § 66.: Permissible Limitations Upon Religious Worship.—
- § 67.: Religious Discrimination In Respect to Admissibility of Testimony.—
- § 68.: Sunday Laws.—
- Chapter VIII.: Freedom of Speech and Liberty of the Press.
- § 81.: Police Supervision Prohibited By the Constitutions.—
- Chapter IX.: Regulation of Trades and Occupations.
- § 85.: General Propositions.—
- § 86.: Prohibition As to Certain Classes.—
- § 87.: Police Regulation of Skilled Trades and Learned Professions.—
- § 88.: Regulation of Practice In the Learned Professions.—
- § 89.: Regulation of Sale of Certain Articles of Merchandise.—
- § 90.: Regulations to Prevent Fraud.—
- § 91.: Legal Tender and Regulation of Currency.—
- § 92.: Free Coinage of Silver and the Legal Tender Decisions.—
- § 93.: Legislative Restraint of Importations—protective Tariffs.—
- § 94.: Liberty of Contract, a Constitutional Right.—
- § 95.: Compulsory Formation of Business Relations—common Carriers and Innkeepers Exceptions to the Rule—theaters and Other Places of Amusement.—
- § 96.: Regulation of Prices and Charges.—
- § 97.: Later Cases On Regulating Prices and Charges—regulations Must Be Reasonable—what Is a Reasonable Regulation, a Judicial Question.—
- § 98.: Police Regulation of the Labor Contract.—
- § 99.: Regulation of Wages of Workmen—mode of Measuring Payment—compulsory Insurance and Membership In Benefit Societies—release From Liability For Injuries to Employees.—
- § 100.: Regulation of Wages of Workmen, Continued—time of Payment—medium of Payment—fines and Deductions For Imperfect Work—mechanics’ Lien and Exemption of Wages.—
- § 101.: Prohibition of Employment of Aliens—exportation of Laborers—importation of Alien Laborers Under Contract—chinese Labor—employers Compelling Workmen to Leave Unions.—
- § 102.: Regulating Hours of Labor.—
- § 103.: Regulations of Factories, Mines and Workshops—sweatshops. 1 —
- § 104.: Period of Hiring—breach Or Termination of Labor Contract—compulsory Performance of Labor Contract—requirement of Notice of Discharge—employers Required to Give Statement of Reasons For Discharge.—
- § 105.: Regulations of the Business of Insurance.—
- § 106.: Usury and Interest Laws.—
- § 107.: Prevention of Speculation.—
- § 108.: Prevention of Combinations In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 109.: A Combination to “corner” the Market.—
- § 109a.: Contracts Against Liability For Negligence Prohibited.—
- § 110.: Common Law Prohibition of Combinations In Restraint of Trade Restated.—
- § 111.: Industrial and Corporate Trusts, As Combinations In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 112.: Modern Statutory Legislation Against Trade Combinations, Virtual Monopolies, and Contracts In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 113.: Different Phases of the Application of Anti-trust Statutes—factor’s System—control of Patents—combinations Against Dishonest Debtors—agreements to Sell Only to Regular Dealers—combinations of Employers to Resist Combinations of Employees—departmen
- § 114.: Labor Combinations—trades Unions—strikes.—
- § 115.: Strikes, Continued, and Boycotts.—
- § 116.: Wagering Contracts Prohibited.—
- § 117.: Option Contracts, When Illegal.—
- § 118.: General Prohibition of Contracts On the Ground of Public Policy.—
- § 119.: Licenses.—
- § 120.: Prohibition of Occupations In General. 5 —
- § 121.: Prohibition of Trade In Vice—social Evil, Gambling, Horse-racing.—
- § 122.: Prohibition of Trades For the Prevention of Fraud—adulterations of Goods—harmful Or Dangerous Goods—prohibition of Sale of Oleomargarine.—
- § 123.: Prohibition of Ticket-brokerage—ticket-scalping Prohibited and Punished.—
- § 124.: Prohibition of Sale of Game Out of Season—prohibition of Export of Game.—
- § 125.: Prohibition of the Liquor Trade.—
- § 126.: Police Control of Employments In Respect to Locality. 3 —
- § 127.: Monopolies—general Propositions.—
- § 128.: Monopolies and Exclusive Franchises In the Cases of Railroads, Bridges, Ferries, Street Railways, Gas, Water, Lighting, Telephone and Telegraph Companies.—
- § 129.: Patents and Copyrights, How Far Monopolies.—
- § 130.: When Ordinary Occupations May Be Made Exclusive Monopolies—saloons—banking—insurance—peddling—building and Loan Associations—restriction of Certain Trades to Certain Localities—slaughterhouses—markets.—
- § 131.: National, State and Municipal Monopolies.—
§ 116.
Wagering contracts prohibited.—
At all times in the history of the English and American law, gambling of every variety has been the subject of police regulation. The lower and more common forms of gambling, when conducted as a business, are now uniformly prohibited and the prosecution of them made a penal offense. Ordinarily, however, wagers or bets are only so far prohibited or regulated that the courts refuse to perform the contracts. Independently of statute, no wager of any kind constitutes a penal offense. It requires statutory legislation to make betting a misdemeanor. Indeed, such legislation would be open to serious constitutional objections. Gambling or betting of any kind is a vice and not a trespass, and inasmuch as the parties are willing victims of the evil effects, there is nothing which calls for public regulation. But when they pursue gambling as a business, and set up a gambling house, like all others who make a trade of vice, they may be prohibited and subjected to severe penalties. And so, also, if they apply to the courts for aid in enforcing the contracts made in the indulgence of this vice, the courts can properly refuse to assist them.
A wager or bet, according to Mr. Bouvier, is “a contract by which two parties or more agree that a certain sum of money or other things, shall be paid or delivered to one of them on the happening, or not happening, of an uncertain event.” Employing the word in this sense, it is pretty well settled that all wager contracts were not void at common law. The distinction between the legal and the illegal wagers seems to rest upon the good or evil character of the event or act, which constitutes the subject-matter of the wager. If the wager was about a harmless and legal act or event, the wager was itself legal, and the wager contract could be enforced. But if the wager has reference to the happening or doing of some act which is illegal or against good morals, the wager is void and will not be enforced. In no part of the civilized world are contracts for the insurance of life or property against accidental destruction held to be invalid.
The English doctrine is clearly sustained, as a part of the common law, by the decision of some of the American courts. But, except in the matter of insurance contracts, all wager contracts are declared to be invalid in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Pennsylvania, whatever may be the character of the event or act, which constitutes the foundation for the wager. In many of the States, the common law is changed by statutes which prohibit all wager contracts, and forbid their enforcement by the courts. Thus, by the New York Revised Statutes, “all wagers, bets, or stakes, made to depend upon any race, or upon any gaming by lot or chance, casualty, or unknown or contingent event whatever, shall be unlawful. All contracts for, or on account of, any money or property or thing in action so wagered, bet or staked shall be void.” It is to be observed, that in all of these judicial and legislative determinations of the illegality of wagering contracts, although they differ in respect to the legality of particular wagers, they all rest upon the proposition that the prohibited wagers tend to develop and increase the spirit of gambling and at the same time serve no useful purpose. For these reasons all contracts, based upon such wagers, are declared to be illegal. Inasmuch as insurance contracts serve a useful purpose, they are not prohibited; and it is not likely that a law, prohibiting them, would be sustained. It is, therefore, the evil effect of betting, coupled with its practical uselessness, that justifies its prohibition; for all unobjectionable contracts have, as an incident of property, an inalienable right to some effective remedy in the courts of the country.
See, ante, § 60.
See, post, § 120. See contra State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168; State ex rel. Matthews v. Forsythe, 147 Ind. 466; Wooten v. State, 23 Fla. 335; State v. Donovan (Nev.), 15 Pac. 783.
Thus it was lawful at common law to bet that A. has purchased a wagon of B. (Good v. Elliott, 3 T. R. 693); or to bet on a cricket-match. Walpole v. Saunders, 16 E. C. L. R. 276. See, also, generally, in support of the position taken above, Sherborne v. Colebach, 2 Vent. 175; Hussey v. Crickell, 3 Campb. 168; Grant v. Hamilton, 3 M. L. 100; Cousins v. Mantes, 3 Taunt. 515; Johnson v. Lonsley, 12 C. B. 468; Dalby v. India Life Ins. Co., 15 C. B. 365; Hampden v. Walsh, L. R. 12 B. D. 192.
Thus, wagers are void, which rest upon the result of an illegal game (Brown v. Leeson, 2 H. Bl. 43); which involve the abstinence from marriage (Huntley v. Rice, 10 East. 22); which refer to the expected birth of an illegitimate child (Ditchburn v. Goldsmith, 4 Campb. 152); or to the commission of adultery. Del Costa v. Jones, Cowp. 729. See also, to the same effect, Shirley v. Sankey, 2 Bos. & P. 130; Etham v. Kingsman, 1 B. & Al. 684.
Bunn v. Rikes, 4 Johns. 426; Campbell v. Richardson, 10 Johns. 406; Dewees v. Miller, 5 Harr. 347; Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zabr. 576; Dunman v. Strother, 1 Tex. 89; Wheeler v. Friend, 22 Tex. 683; Monroe v. Smelley, 25 Tex. 586; Grant v. Hamilton, 3 McLean (U. S. C. C.), 100; Smith v. Smith, 21 Ill. 244; Richardson v. Kelley, 85 Ill. 491; Petillon v. Hipple, 90 Ill. 420; Carrier v. Brannan, 3 Cal. 328; Johnson v. Hall, 6 Cal. 359; Johnson v. Russell, 37 Cal. 670.
See Lewis v. Littlefield, 15 Me. 233; McDonough v. Webster, 68 Me. 530; Gilmore v. Woodcock, 69 Me. 118; Babcock v. Thompson, 3 Pick. 446; Ball v. Gilbert, 12 Met. 399; Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 150; Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N. H. 152; Clark v. Gibson, 12 N. H. 386; Winchester v. Nutter, 52 N. H. 507; Collamer v. Day, 2 Vt. 144; Tarlton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9; Phillips v. Ives, 1 Rawle, 36; Brua’s Appeal, 5 Sm. 294.
1 Rev. Stats. N. Y. 661, § 8.
Similar legislation is to be found in New Hampshire, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio and Iowa, and other States.
See, post, § 178.