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Subject Area: Law
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

§ 115.: Strikes, continued, and Boycotts.— - Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, vol. 1 [1900]

Edition used:

A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint (St. Louis: The F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1900). Vol. 1.

Part of: A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, 2 vols.

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Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


§ 115.

Strikes, continued, and Boycotts.—

In the preceding section, I intended to consider the legal right and status of only those combinations of workmen, which are composed altogether of the striking workmen, and to leave for the present section the consideration of strikes, which are conducted or participated in by others than those who are the striking workmen. There is an important legal distinction between the two forms of strikes and labor combinations. To illustrate: The employees of a particular railroad system agree among themselves and without any co-operation with others, who are not in the same employment, that they will strike, unless the railroad authorities increase their wages or comply with the workmen’s demands for a change in any other of the terms of hiring. In such a supposable case, only two legal questions are involved: first, Have these employees of the same employer the right to combine to force the employer to the acceptance of their terms of contract? secondly, What means may they employ in bringing the employer to their terms? But this is not the common and prevalent form of labor combinations. Workmen of all trades do not combine against one particular employer. The workmen of a particular trade combine for their mutual protection against all employers in that trade. They form organizations, which include in their membership the employees of many different employers. The officers of the organization undertake to interview the employers of members of the union, and to lay down to them the terms of employment upon which alone the members of the union in their employ, or who are about to enter into their employ, will work for them. The walking delegate of the union threatens to call the employees from their work and to order them to strike, unless the terms which he dictates to the employer are complied with. And the military discipline of the trade union and other labor organizations, is most strikingly demonstrated by the prompt obedience which the individual workman renders to the walking delegate’s orders to stop work. They drop their tools as promptly as they do every day when they hear the dinner bell. It is a matter of no wonder that the employer indignantly resents the presence in his workshops of a person who bears to him no legal relation whatever, and who yet assumes to tell him what kind of a contract he shall make with his individual employees, under penalty of ordering a strike of the employees. And when the strike is ordered, the officers of the labor organization conduct and manage it, and it is with them that the employer must negotiate for a return of his men to work. We have, therefore, in every strike, an interference by an outsider with the contractual relations of two other persons. And the main legal questions in every labor dispute, which, however, are frequently very obscurely treated by the courts, are: first, under what circumstances can a third person interfere with the contractual relations of two others? And, secondly, what is the legal effect of such an interference when made, not by one outsider, but by a combination which is composed partly of outsiders and partly of one of the parties to the contract? And, thirdly, what means may be employed by the outside combination to enforce the compliance of the opposing party to the contract with the terms demanded by the combination? These questions, when put in this general form, reveal the almost complete identity of the legal rights of all combinations, whether they are of capitalists or workmen. What would be the judgment of the courts, in a case in which an association of employers was charged with having tried to force another employer, whether he was or was not a member of the association, to make certain labor contracts which the association had ordered, and which called for a reduction of the wages which the opposing employer was paying to his employees, or for an increase of the hours of work? Would the courts, on the petition of one of the workmen of the latter employer, give judgment for damages to such workman against the association of employers, if they were to employ any other means than moral suasion to enforce on all employers obedience to the orders of the association? No authority can be cited in direct support of either the affirmative or negative answer to these questions, because employers have not so far felt the necessity of combining to protect themselves against the exactions of combinations of workmen. But analogy will enable us to cite as such authority the law, heretofore presented, which determined how far combinations of capital are lawful in their attempt to control the price to the consumer of their several products of manufacture, or the value of services or goods to those who need them.1 In the same way that combinations of capital have been forced to incorporate, as the sole means of escaping the hostile legislation, so prevalent in this country, so would the labor combinations feel the need of corporate powers, if the law of conspiracy was as clearly laid down and applied to them as it is against the combinations of capital. If the labor in a particular trade for a particular territory were incorporated; and the employer had to make his contracts of hiring with the incorporated labor organization, no law would be violated in such a case. The labor corporation would fix its price and the terms upon which alone the employer could get the required labor; in the same way, and as lawfully as that the American Sugar Refining Company, or any one of the other incorporated trusts, determines the price at which their respective commodities shall be sold to the consumer. The contract for labor would in that case be made, not with the individual workmen, but with the labor corporation. It is also equally lawful for the trades-unions, as voluntary associations, under the law of partnerships, to make such contracts for labor with employers. Only when the labor contracts are made by the labor organizations, instead of by the individual workmen, can these organizations undertake the control of labor without being charged with an interference with the contractual relations of other parties. Inasmuch as most, if not all, of the labor contracts are made by the individual workmen; and the labor organizations, of which they are members, participate, if they do so at all, in the making of the labor contracts, only so far as to have a preliminary general understanding with the employer as to the terms and conditions of the proposed labor contracts, and do not actually make the contracts for the individual workmen, the union is not in any proper sense a party to the labor contract. Any attempt of the union, in such a case, even to enforce the preliminary agreement as to the terms and conditions of the employment, constitutes an interference with the performance of a contract, to which it is not a party. The legal character of most strikes, therefore, depends upon the determination of the right of a single individual, or of a number of individuals in combination, to interfere in the contractual relations of other parties.

Starting out with the general proposition of law, which has been explained and applied in preceding sections, and which is still, at least in part, the law of this country, viz.: that what one man may do singly, a number of men in combination may likewise do, at least in the pursuit of a just or lawful end; it is necessary to first determine when one man alone may lawfully disturb or destroy the contractual relations of others by the employment of lawful means. If a single laborer, who is employed for an indefinite period of time, becomes dissatisfied with the work or with the terms of employment, he has a right to abandon his situation at any time and without any notice whatever to the employer, unless the law controlling such employment requires such a notice to be given. And it would seem that a third person may lawfully advise him to seek other employment, aid him in procuring other work, and give him financial assistance while he is seeking another situation. This is what every considerate father does for his sons, and which is commonly done by friends for each other. There is undoubtedly no illegality, either of the employee, in quitting his employment in such a case, or of the father or friend in advising or aiding the employee in quitting his present position and seeking a more profitable position. Authorities are not needed in support of this proposition. But if the employee is working under a contract of hiring for a definite period of time, his abandonment of his position before the expiration of the contractual period of service is an unlawful act, because it is a breach of a contract for which the employee can be held liable in damages; and in some of the Southern States’ statutes, the breach of some of such contracts is made a criminal misdemeanor.1

Is it lawful for a third person to advise and aid an employee in breaking his contract, whether it is lawful or unlawful for the employee to break it? It is presumably true that if the third person was actuated only by friendly interest in the employee, and not by a malicious desire to injure the employer, no liability would attach to the third person for his interference as long as he limits his interference to persuasion, financial aid and efforts to secure for the employee a more desirable position. At least no authority to the contrary has come to my notice. But if the third person is actuated by a malicious desire to injure the employer, and his relations with the employee are not such as to support the presumption that the moving cause of his interference with the contractual relation of employer and employee was his friendly interest in the latter, then he is held to be liable in damages at common law by some of the cases both American and English.2 But in the United States, the cases are more numerous, which deny the right of action against a third person, who induces one to break his existing contract or to refrain from entering into any future contract. These cases hold very generally that the malicious motive of such a third person does not make his interference an actionable wrong, unless he employs unlawful means, such as deceit, misrepresentations, intimidation or duress.1

I have in the two preceding notes given a somewhat detailed statement of the cases, in which the attempt was made to hold a third person liable for a malicious interference with the contractual relations of others, because I believed it to be necessary for the support of my future criticism of the decisions in relation to strikes and boycotts. In studying these cases, one must bear in mind that some of them, which recognize the right of action for a malicious interference by one person in the contractual relations of others, are cases of enticement of domestic or menial servants from service, which under English statutes, and by statutes in some of the United States, are made actionable wrongs. When we eliminate these cases, we find that the undoubted trend of judicial opinion in this country is against the recognition of any legal liability, either civil or criminal, for any interference with the contractual relations of others, unless unlawful means are employed in effecting the interference. And the criticism of the English cases in the recent case of Allen v. Flood,1 would seem to prove a similar condition of the law in England.

That the employment of unlawful means, such as deceit, misrepresentation, intimidation, or duress, in effecting a successful interference with the contractual rights and liberty of others, would be an actionable wrong, does not admit of any doubt.1

We are now prepared for the answer to the question, whether a combination or conspiracy to interfere with the contractual relations of others is an actionable wrong, where no unlawful means are employed to secure that end, and where the motive of the interference is the promotion of the economic welfare of the parties interfering. This legal proposition is involved in every case of industrial boycott, and of every strike which is conducted in whole or in part by persons who are not striking employees.

Assuming that the law of conspiracy has been correctly stated, as including only cases in which the parties conspire to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means, the conclusion is irresistible that no strike or boycott is unlawful or actionable, unless unlawful means are employed, such as deceit, misrepresentation, intimidation, or threats of injury.

It seems to be settled that a trade union or labor organization is justified by law in ordering a strike of a part of its members, when their employer refuses to accept the terms of employment which are exacted by the union. Cases and statutes which are cited in the preceding section2 fully sustain this proposition. But sympathetic strikes, i. e., strikes by other bodies of workmen, in order to compel the unmanageable employer to come to terms, are unlawful, if boycotts are illegal. Indeed, they are nothing more than boycotts.

An historical explanation of the origin of the term “boycott” is not out of place in this connection, and it will serve to explain the fundamental reasoning of the cases on boycotting. The term, as describing a method of industrial warfare, arose during the Irish land troubles of the early eighties, in consequence of the manifesto of the Irish land league, that the payment of rents would be refused, if they were not reduced to what were claimed by the league to be reasonable amounts. During the disturbances which followed the attempt to give effect to the manifesto, the peasants came into conflict with a landlord of the name of Boycott. He had been known to be especially severe in making terms with his tenants; and when he refused to accede to the demands of the league and evicted his tenants for refusing to pay rent, almost the entire population of that community combined to force him to make terms with the league. The bakers, butchers and other tradesmen refused to have dealings with him. He could buy nothing wherewith to feed his family; all his domestic servants left him, and he could get none to take their places. He and his family were left alone in the midst of a more or less populous community, shunned as if they were lepers or criminals. Existence under such circumstances became unbearable, and he was forced to yield.1

Now, in the original boycott cases, as it has been in almost every other extensive case since then, both in England and America, the combination or conspiracy has been attended with violence and injury to, or trespasses upon the property and personal rights of those against whom the boycott was directed. In the celebrated case of the Queen v. Parnell, just cited, forcible possession or retention of the farms was a part of their plan of campaign, while the tenants refused to perform their own obligations under the leases. These boycotts were therefore conspiracies to do unlawful acts. But where the boycott is unaccompanied by infringements of the criminal law, as it is enforced against a single individual, or by clear trespasses upon the rights of others, it may be defined as a combination of persons to force one to terms by abstaining from having business and other relations with him. And in order that the boycott may be made more effective in its operations against one person, the participants in the combination usually threaten to boycott all persons who may dare to have relations of any kind with the objectionable person or persons. Such a combination differs in legal character from the capitalistic combinations only in the degree of danger that the procedures of the former will be accompanied by violence and disorder and by distinct trespasses upon the rights of others. Both kinds of combinations are engaged in an industrial war, and both are actuated by the same motive, viz.: the procurement of better prices for the commodities, which they have to sell; the commodity of the workmen being their labor. So far as the managers of a boycott are able to keep themselves and their co-conspirators from interfering with the legal rights of persons or of property of those who are boycotted, their actions in combination are actions which are thoroughly lawful, if they were done by individuals acting alone. If the boycott is unlawful, it must be so, only because the individuals are not allowed to do in concert what they are allowed to do singly. In previous sections of this chapter1 it has been declared, with a sufficiency of authority in support of the general proposition, to be the constitutional right of every American citizen to refuse to have business and social relations with any one who may displease him, and his motives for abstaining from associating with the objectionable person cannot be inquired into. And the cases, heretofore explained in the present section, demonstrate that the law in most of the United States does not recognize even a malicious interference with the contractual relations of others, when done by a single individual. It is conceded that conspiracy differs from other wrongful acts in that the malicious intent to harm another, by doing acts in themselves lawful, may make proof of an actionable conspiracy. But, in its application to the combinations of capitalists, it has been clearly set forth in preceding sections1 that a willful intent to do injury to others, does not make acts in themselves lawful, an unlawful conspiracy, when done in concert, where they are prompted by a just purpose, for example, the promotion of the material welfare of the actors. The cases, generally, sustain the right of labor combinations to order a strike of its members, when the employer refuses to accede to the terms of employment which are demanded of them.2 But the cases, which will be fully stated subsequently, in the main deny that the industrial purpose, viz., the promotion of the material welfare of the laboring class, justifies the conspiracy which is known as the boycott, even when nothing has been done by the boycotters, which would be unlawful as the act of a solitary individual. So far as these cases lay this down as the law relating to boycotting, they establish a different rule of conspiracy for the control of the actions of labor combinations, than what is applied to capitalistic combinations. Such a discrimination is clearly unconstitutional, in that it refuses to one class of citizens the equal protection of the laws, by establishing for the control of the actions of that class a more stringent law of actionable conspiracy than what is enforced against others.

This criticism must, of course, be considered, as if the anti-trust laws had not been enacted, and that monopolistic combinations of capital had not been made unlawful by these statutes. With these statutes in force against capitalistic combinations, and not equally enforced against labor combinations, as has been explained in the preceding section; the law of conspiracy, as it has been developed and applied against labor organizations and workmen in the boycott cases may be reasonably considered as a rough attempt at securing to all the equal protection of the laws. And I do not desire to be understood in my criticism as intending to do more than to secure as far as possible a rigid adherence to the individualistic principle of the liberty of all, in the industral warfare,—which is now being waged, year by year with greater intensity,—to do anything which does not constitute a trespass upon the rights of others, as long as the motive of the act, which may be injurious to others, is the promotion of the material welfare of the actors. It may be constitutional to prohibit all combinations in restraint of trade, and make the forming of one an actionable wrong, even though the motive be reasonable, as it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Joint Traffic Association1 and by the New York Court of Appeals in another case;2 but the nearly equal division of the former court on that question would incline one to consider it as still unsettled. But it certainly cannot be declared to be in conformity with the constitutional requirement of equality of all men before the law, to prohibit all combinations of capital or of employers, and to permit combinations of labor. If it is constitutional to punish laborers, who combine for their material success in the industrial relations of life, if in their recognition of the solidarity of the interests of all workmen, they undertake to secure a combination of all of them, in separate trade-unions, according to trades, or in one large association of labor, including all the workmen in all the related trades; and, in order to force all the workmen to co-operate with them by joining the labor union, and subjecting themselves to the rules and regulations of the union, they forbid union men to work where non-union men are employed; then surely it is not constitutional to permit a combination of traders to force to the wall, by the use of their economic power, a trader who does not come within the combination. The same purpose actuates the members of both kinds of combinations and the acts of both are either lawful or unlawful, according as it is finally determined, whether voluntary, i. e. unincoporated, industrial combinations may or may not be suppressed, without violating the constitutionally guaranteed liberty of contract.

In a number of the States, statutes have been enacted, which prohibit boycotting expressly, and, in some cases, very drastically. In those States, boycotting is a statutory offense, and need not be proven to be a common law conspiracy. An enumeration of the States, in which such statutes are to be found, is not necessary to the present inquiry. They all substantially prohibit boycotting, as it has been defined above. They make any interference with the contractual relations of others by a combination or organization an actionable wrong, it matters not what was the motive, or what the means employed. A statement of the cases on boycotting will now be given.

The preceding discussion makes it evident that a boycott, which is accompanied by any kind of violence and the obstruction of the prosecution of the business of the person who is boycotted, would undoubtedly subject the individuals engaged therein to legal liability. For such acts are unlawful, whether they are committed by one or by many.1 Of these cases, that of the People v. Wilzig, will serve best as an illustration. In order principally to enforce the employment of union musicians and waiters and the dismissal of non-union men, at the well-known saloon and music hall of Mr. Theiss on East Fourteenth street in New York City, the Knights of Labor and Central Labor Union, ordered a boycott of the place, and in consequence a body of men walked up and down in front of the saloon, with placards and signs, announcing that Theiss was an enemy of union labor and warning everybody to stay away from his saloon. These placards and notices were signed by “The Boycott Committee of the Central Labor Union.” For fifteen days a crowd of over five hundred people obstructed the ingress and egress to this saloon. The boycotters succeeded finally in making Theiss yield to their demands and to pay them a large sum of money to cover the expenses of the boycott. It is manifest that such disorder and extortion are in violation of the law, irrespective of the element of combination, and the defendant was justly punished. These union men were clearly undertaking, by unlawful means, to compel Theiss’ submission to their demands. Somewhat akin to actual violence or disorder, or obstruction of the business of the objectionable person, are the cases in which in the place of positive acts of that unlawful kind, are threats of violence and of obstruction to the prosecution of one’s business.1 In Murdock v. Walker, the court issued an injunction against employees who had been discharged, restraining them “from gathering about the plaintiff’s place of business, and from following his employees to and from work, and gathering about their boarding places, and from any and all manner of threats, intimidation, ridicule and nuisance.” In the somewhat celebrated case of Sherry v. Perkins, in the course of a strike, a laster’s union, composed in part of the striking employees, paraded up and down in front of the plaintiff’s works, carrying banners with the announcement: “Lasters are requested to keep away from P. P. Sherry’s. Per order L. P. U.” The presence of a large number of striking workmen, carrying such a banner, was undoubtedly such a show of force as to justify the court in declaring it to be the equivalent of a threat of physical violence, which was sufficient to prevent other workmen from applying for the places which had been vacated by the strikers. It was therefore intimidation to the non-union workmen and obstruction to the prosecution of the plaintiff’s business. Such a show of force in such a cause would have been just as unlawful if done by one individual. The parading of one powerful giant, carrying such a banner because he had been discharged from the plaintiff’s employ, might have had the effect of obstructing the plaintiff’s business, and would have brought the giant within the clutches of the law. In Vegelahn v. Guntner, a divided court held that a patrol of two men in front of plaintiff’s business, who were giving to all workmen notice of the strike and persuading them not to enter into the plaintiff’s employ, was an unlawful intimidation. The court said: “Intimidation is not limited to threats of violence or of physical injury to person or property. It has a broader signification and there also may be a moral intimidation, like those which were found to exist in Sherry v. Perkins.” The dissenting judges, Mr. Chief Justice Field and Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the patrol of two men carried no threat of violence, and simple persuasion not to enter into plaintiff’s employ was a lawful means of carrying on the industrial competition between the employer and employee. But in that opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes holds that combined persuasion may be actionable. He says: “I agree, whatever may be the law in the case of a single defendant (Rice v. Albee, 164 Mass. 88), that when a plaintiff proves that several persons have conspired to injure his business, and have done acts producing that effect, he shows temporal damage and a cause of action, unless the facts disclose, or the defendant proves, some ground of excuse or justification. And I take it to be settled, and rightly settled, that doing that damage by combined persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it by falsehood or by force.” He evidently accepts the definition of conspiracy of the English courts, as laid down in Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor.1

The phrase, “boycott,” on account of the common accompaniment of violence, has come to mean, in the minds of many, the infliction of bodily injury, the forcible obstruction of business, or destruction of property, or one or more of these unlawful acts. Hence in Brace v. Evans, it was declared that “the use of the word boycott is in itself a threat.” In that case, the strikers, carrying placards with the words, “Boycott Brace Brothers,” followed the plaintiffs’ wagons, and, having thus ascertained plaintiffs’ customers, visited them and endeavored to persuade them from having business with the plaintiffs. This case corresponds in legal character with that of Sherry v. Perkins.

In another class of cases, the strikers indulge in the use of abusive epithets towards those who seek business relations with the boycotted person, or publish and distribute cards and circulars, notifying everyone of the boycott, and requesting all friends of union labor to abstain from dealing with the person boycotted. These actions have been repeatedly held to be unlawful actions, when it is the work of an organization.1

The case of Barr v. Essex Trades Council displays in a most striking form the great possibilities of the boycott, as a weapon of industrial warfare, when the boycotters are both numerous and united. A more or less detailed statement of the facts of this case will prove profitable. The suit for injunction was brought by the proprietor and publisher of a newspaper in Newark, New Jersey, against eighteen labor unions which were associated together, under the control of a central body, which was known as the Essex Trades Council, and which was composed of delegates from the component labor unions. If the members of any one of these unions had a labor dispute with any employer, and the employer refused to accede to the demands of the labor union, a report of the dispute was made to the council, and the council made it the common cause of all the associated unions. The council also issued cards, to be displayed in the shop windows of all dealers, who were reported as friends of organized labor, announcing that fact, and recommending the dealer to the patronage of all union workmen. In order to secure the patronage of the unions, the tradesman had to enter into an agreement with the council that he would keep for sale, as far as possible, only those goods which were declared by one of the unions to be “fair,” and he entered into a similar agreement not to engage laborers who were not approved by the unions. Those dealers, who were not favorably reported upon by a labor union within two months, were at once placed under the condemnation of the council, which practically amounted to a boycott. To enable the control of the tradesmen to become more effective, the council published in pamphlet form what they called “The Fair List of Newark, N. J.,” which contained the names of all those who were approved of by the council as worthy of the patronage of workmen. In that list were to be found the names of business and professional men, covering almost every business and profession. Outside of the original Irish combination against Captain Boycott, there probably has never been a more extensive and more carefully thought-out plan for the control of those with whom laboring men have to deal. If such an union of workmen in a city the size of Newark could have relied upon the loyalty of all its members, and upon the intelligence, administrative ability and fair-mindedness of its officers, the ordinary and usual economic superiority of capitalists and employers in the industrial strife would have been removed. Apart from the agreement, which they exacted from tradesmen whom the council favored, not to purchase goods or employ labor, which were under the ban of the council, it would be difficult to find in this statement any element, which is properly characterized as an actionable wrong. And yet it was a boycott of all those, who did not comply with the demands of the Trades Council.

The plaintiff had fallen under the condemnation of the typographical union, which belonged to the Trades Council, because he purchased “plate matter” in New York for use in the printing of his paper, in opposition to the wishes of the union, to which all his employees belonged. He refused to comply with the demands of the union to give up the use of this “plate matter,” which were stereotype plates; whereupon the union reported the dispute to the council, and the latter body declared a boycott against the newspaper, and issued and distributed throughout the city of Newark, a circular which read as follows: “Friends, one and all! Leave this council-boycotting Newark Times alone. Cease buying it! Cease handling it! Cease advertising in it! Keep the money of fair men moving only among fair men. Boycott the boycotter of organized fair labor.” The court held this to be an unlawful combination, and that, although there was neither disorder, violence, nor threats of violence, the intimidation or duress of the plaintiff, caused by his fear of the loss of his business, made the boycott an actionable conspiracy.

Similar conclusions were reached in a number of cases where there was no other wrongful element than the threat of injury to the business of another, if he did not break off business relations with some other person who had incurred the displeasure or hostility of the striking workmen.1 The sympathetic strikes of the employees of one railroad, because they handle the freight or the cars of another railroads, whose employees are on a strike, are of the same character and they have all been held to be actionable conspiracies.2

Two recent cases illustrate in a very interesting way the sweeping character of the American cases on this subject. In one case3 a liverymen’s association prohibited its members from doing business with any person who did not patronize its members exclusively. The association was held to have violated the law of conspiracy as well as the law argainst monopolies.4

The greater number of actionable conspiracies, assuming more or less the form of the boycott, and all of them constituting interferences with the contractual relations of other parties, involve the antagonism of labor unions to the employment of non-union men, and the procurement of their discharge or the prevention of their employment, by threats of a withdrawal of the union men from the same employment. With the exception of a few earlier cases,1 and one late case,2 which are to the contrary, the American cases very generally hold all such combinations against non-union men to be actionable conspiracies, even though no other means be employed than the threat of striking on the part of the union men, if non-union men are employed; and even where the only overt act is an agreement of the employer with the union that he will employ only union men.3 The case of Curran v. Gale is a very clear enunciation of the doctrine that it is an actionable conspiracy for an employer and a labor union to enter into an agreement that none but union men shall be employed by the former; or if a non-union man should be employed, he shall be discharged, if he does not within four weeks become a member of the union. The court held that the combination against the non-union man was unlawful without any specific agreement with the employer; and that the agreement was itself unlawful, and did not diminish the illegality of the action of the union in securing the dismissal of the non-union man, because he did not join the union. The court says, in part:4 —

“Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or to restrict, that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions under the penalty of the loss of their positions, and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. It would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities. It would, to use the language of Mr. Justice Barrett in People ex rel. Gill v. Smith (5 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 513), ‘impoverish and crush a citizen for no reason connected in the slightest degree with the advancement of wages or the maintenance of the rate.’ Every citizen is deeply interested in the strict maintenance of the constitutional right freely to pursue a lawful avocation, under conditions equal as to all, and to enjoy the fruits of his labor without the imposition of any conditions not required for the general welfare of the community. The candid mind should shrink from the results of the operation of the principle contended for here; for there would certainly be a compulsion, or a fettering, of the individual, glaringly at variance with that freedom in the pursuit of happiness, which is believed to be guaranteed to all by the provisions of the fundamental law of the State.”

A number of English cases have maintained the same position as to the illegality of interference by union men with the employment of non-union men.1 But so far as these cases may be taken as holding such acts of hostility to non-union men to be actual conspiracies at the common law, and not merely actionable under the different English statutes, which have from time to time imposed special restrictions upon labor combinations, they are undoubtedly overruled by the recent case of Allen v. Flood.1 The facts of this case were these: Allen, as the delegate of a union of iron-workers, represented to the Glengall Iron Company that if they did not discharge two of their workmen, Flood and Taylor, all the iron-workers would leave their employ; because the two workmen, who were wood-workers, had on other jobs done iron work, which was against the interest of the iron-workers. The Glengall Iron Company, under the intimidation of the fear that the iron-workers would leave the company if these workmen were retained in their employ, dismissed Flood and Taylor. The judgment was rendered in the trial court against Allen, but it was reversed in the House of Lords by a divided court. The prevailing judgment was that Allen had not been guilty of any actionable wrong in thus securing the dismissal of Flood and Taylor, inasmuch as there was no proof of violence, or threats, or other physical intimidation being employed to secure such dismissal. The court relied upon the prior case of Mogul S. S. Co. v. Macgregor, which has been so fully discussed in a preceding section.2

In rendering judgment for the appellant and reversing the judgment below in favor of Flood and Taylor, Judge Herschell said in part:3 —

“It is said that the statement that the defendant would call the men out, if made, was a threat. It is this aspect of the case which has obviously greatly influenced some of the learned judges. Hawkins, J., says that the defendant, without excuse or justification, ‘willfully, unlawfully, unjustly and tyrannically, invaded the plaintiffs’ right by intimidating and coercing their employers to deprive them of their present and future employment,’ and that the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to maintain this action. But ‘excuse or justification’ is only needed where an act is prima facie wrongful. Whether the defendant’s act was so is the matter to be determined. To say that the defendant acted ‘unlawfully’ is with all respect to beg the question, which is whether he did so or not. To describe his acts as unjust and tyrannical proves nothing, for these epithets may be and are, in popular language, constantly applied to acts which are within a man’s rights and unquestionably lawful. In my opinion these epithets do not advance us a step towards the answer to the question which has to be solved. The proposition is reduced to this, that the appellant invaded the plaintiff’s right by intimidating and coercing their employers. In another passage in his opinion the learned judge says that there is no authority for the proposition that to render threats, menaces, intimidation or coercion available as elements in a cause of action, they must be of such a character as to create fear of personal violence. I quite agree with this. The threat of violence to property is equally a threat in the eye of the law. And many other instances may be given. On the other hand it is undeniable that the terms ‘threat,’ ‘coercion,’ and even ‘intimidation,’ are often applied in popular language to utterances which are quite lawful and which give rise to no liability either civil or criminal. They mean no more than this, that the so-called threat puts pressure, and perhaps extreme pressure, on the person to whom it is addressed to take a particular course. Of this again, numberless instances might be given. Even then if it can be said without abuse of language that the employers were ‘intimidated and coerced’ by the appellant, even if this be in a certain sense true, it by no means follows that he committed a wrong or is under any legal liability for his act. Everything depends on the nature of the representation or statement by which the pressure was exercised. The law cannot regard the act differently because you choose to call it a threat or coercion instead of an intimidation or warning.

“I understood it to be admitted at the bar, and it was indeed stated by one of the learned judges in the Court of Appeal, that it would have been perfectly lawful for all the ironworkers to leave their employment and not to accept a subsequent engagement to work in the company of the plaintiff. At all events I cannot doubt that this would have been so. I cannot doubt either that the appellant or the authorities of the union would equally have acted within his or their rights if he or they had ‘called the men out.’ They were members of the union. It was for them to determine whether they would become so or not, and whether they would follow or not follow the instructions of its authorities, though no doubt if they had refused to obey any instructions which under the rules of the union it was competent for the authorities to give, they might have lost the benefits they derived from membership. It is not for your lordships to express any opinion on the policy of trade unions, membership of which may undoubtedly influence the action of those who have joined them. They are now recognized by law; there are combinations of employers as well as of employed. The members of these unions, of whichever class they are composed, act in the interest of their class. If they resort to unlawful acts they may be indicted or sued. If they do not resort to unlawful acts, they are entitled to further their interests in the manner which seems to them best, and most likely to be effectual. If, then, the men had ceased to work for the company either of their own motion or because they were ‘called out,’ and the company in order to secure their return had thought it expedient no longer to employ the plaintiffs, they could certainly have maintained no action. Yet the damage to them would have been just the same. The employers would have been subjected to precisely the same ‘coercion’ and ‘intimidation,’ save that it was by act and not by prospect of the act; they would have yielded in precisely the same way to the pressure put upon them, and been actuated by the same motive, and the aim of those who exercised the pressure would have been precisely the same. The only difference would have been the additional result that the company also might have suffered loss. I am quite unable to conceive how the plaintiffs can have a cause of action, because, instead of the iron workers leaving, either on their own motion, or because they were called out, there was an intimation beforehand that either the one or the other of these courses would be pursued. * * * The object which the appellant and the iron workers had in view was that they should be freed from the presence of men with whom they disliked working, or to prevent what they deemed an unfair interference with their rights by men who did not belong to their craft—doing the work to which they had been trained. Whether we approve or disapprove of such attempted trade restrictions, it was entirely within the right of the iron workers to take any steps, not unlawful, to prevent any of the work which they regarded as legitimately theirs being intrusted to other hands. * * *

“The iron workers were no more bound to work with those whose presence was disagreeable to them than the plaintiffs were bound to refuse to work because they found that this was the case. The object which the defendant, and those whom he represented, had in view throughout was what they believed to be the interest of the class to which they belonged; the step taken was a means to that end. The act which caused the damage to the plaintiffs was that of the iron company in refusing to employ them. The company would not subordinate their own interests to the plaintiffs. It is conceded that they could take this course with impunity. Why, then, should the defendants be liable because he did not subordinate the interests of those he represented to the plaintiffs? Self-interest dictated alike the act of those who caused the damage, and the act which is found to have induced them to cause it.”

“* * * I do not doubt that every one has a right to pursue his trade or employment without ‘molestation’ or ‘obstruction,’ if those terms are used to imply some act in itself wrongful. This is only a branch of a much wider proposition, namely that every one has a right to do any lawful act he pleases without molestation or obstruction. If it be intended to assert that an act not otherwise wrongful always becomes so, if it interferes with another’s trade or employment, and needs to be excused or justified, I say that such a proposition in my opinion has no solid foundation in reason to rest upon. A man’s right not to work or not to pursue a particular trade or calling, or to determine when or where or with whom he will work is in law a right of precisely the same nature and entitled to just the same protection as a man’s right to trade or work.”

Commenting on the Mogul case, and claiming it as an authority in support of the appellant, Lord Herschell continues:—

“In that case the very object of the defendants was to induce shippers to contract with them, and not to contract with the plaintiffs, and thus to benefit themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs, and to injure them by preventing them from getting a share of the carrying trade. Its express object was to molest and interfere with the plaintiffs in the exercise of their trade. It was said that this was held lawful, because the law sanctions acts which are done in furtherance of trade competition. I do not think the decision rests on so narrow a basis, but rather on this, that the acts by which the competition was pursued were all lawful acts, that they were acts not in themselves wrongful, but a mere exercise of the right to contract with whom, and when, and under what circumstances, and upon what conditions they pleased. I am aware of no ground for saying that competition is regarded with special favor by the law; at all events I see no reason why it should be so regarded. * * * But if the alleged exception could be established, why is not the present case within it?

“What was the object of the defendant and the workmen he represented, but to assist themselves in their competition with the shipwrights? A man is entitled to take steps to compete to the best advantage in the employment of his labor, and to shut out, if he can, what he regards as unfair competition, just as much as if he was carrying on the business of a ship-owner. The inducement the appellant used to further his end was the prospect that the members of his union would not work in company with what they deemed unfair rivals in their calling. What is the difference between this case and that of a union of ship-owners who induce merchants not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs, by the prospect that if at any time they employ the plaintiffs’ ships they will suffer the penalty of being made to pay higher charges than their neighbors at the time when the defendants’ ships alone visit the ports? In my opinion there is no difference in principle between the two cases.”1

This subject of boycotting has recently been very fully considered by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a case1 in which the facts raise squarely the question whether a perfectly peaceful boycott brings the boycotter within the condemnation of the criminal law. In this case, the plaintiff conducted a laundry business, engaging others to do the work, she receiving and delivering the same to her customers. In consequence of her refusal to fix the price for her work, in accordance with the scale of prices established by the laundrymen’s association, she was boycotted; and those who had contracted with her to do her work, were induced to break their contracts with her, no force or fraud being used. The court held this to be an unlawful conspiracy, and punishable as such. A petition for rehearing was made, on the ground that counsel for defendants had, since the first hearing, met with the case of Allen v. Flood, and wanted it considered by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The court denied the rehearing, and added that the facts of Allen v. Flood were different from those in the present case. In the original hearing of the case1 in declaring this boycott to be an unlawful conspiracy, the court said: “Appellants and those persons who refused to do appellee’s work, had each a separate and independent right to unite with the organization known as the ‘Chicago Laundrymen’s Association,’ but they had no right separately, or in the aggregate, with others, to insist that the appellee should do so, or to insist that appellee should make her scale of prices the same as that fixed by the association, and make her refusal to do this a pretext for destroying and breaking up her business. A combination by them to induce others not to deal with appellee, or enter into contracts with her, or do any further work for her, was an actionable wrong. Every man has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will, and any one who invades that right without lawful cause or justification, commits a wrong.”

In denying the petition for a rehearing,1 the Court say:—

“The facts in the case of Allen v. Flood are entirely different from the facts presented in this record. There was no contract in that case, the breach of which was induced by the defendant (meaning, as stated in another part of the opinion, that in the case of Allen v. Flood, the men, who were discharged, at the instance of Allen, were only employed from day to day). Here, existing contracts which were a property right in the plaintiff (the appellee) were broken, and this was brought about by the action of the defendants in inducing those contracting with her to violate their contracts. This caused a right to be taken away, in consequence of which she was injured and damaged.” If this explanation of the difference in the facts of the two cases is to be accepted as an announcement that the Supreme Court of Illinois would have decided the Doremus case in accordance with the ruling in the case of Allen v. Flood, if there had been no continuing contract for the doing of the laundry work of the plantiff, the court has made a material modification of the generally prevalent American doctrine.

This modern view of the law of conspiracy is not limited in its application to the acts of labor combinations. Giving only a passing reference to a conspiracy of church members to get rid of the minister,2 we find that in some cases, it is held to be an actionable wrong for a combination of tradesmen to agree not to sell goods to a particular person or a particular class of persons, but the cases do not all hold the same view. In one case, an association of retail dealers in lumber agreed not to buy of manufacturers who sold directly to consumers. Such associations of middle men are to be found in almost every city and town, and most of them pursue this policy. This, action of the association was held to be lawful.1 But, in Indiana, a similar condemnation of the sale of lumber to brokers, who did not keep lumber yards, was declared to be an unlawful conspiracy; and the manufacturer, against whom the rule was enforced, could recover damages.2 The same conclusion was reached as to the illegality of the acts of an association of wholesale lumber dealers who had agreed not to sell to any but regular retail dealers, in threatening to notify the retail dealers not to deal with plaintiff unless he joined their association.3 It was also held to be an unlawful and actionable conspiracy for manufacturers, in a boycott of a rival manufacturer, to agree not to sell their goods to dealers who bought the goods of the latter.4 In the note below5 will be found cases cited, in which the boycott of rival dealers was purely malicious, and was conducted without any justifiable motive and not in pursuit of any justifiable economic end. They were, of course, declared to be actionable wrongs. In a Texas case, it was held to be an actionable conspiracy for dealers to agree not to sell to a consumer, who was indebted to one of them; and the court expressly laid down the rule, that, while a person has the right to refuse to have dealings with another, with or without reason, “the privilege is limited to the individual action of the party who asserts the right. It is not equally true that one person may from such motives influence another person to do the same thing.”1 But a contrary ruling was made in some Kentucky cases2 in which a similar agreement, not to sell to any one indebted to any member of the association, was made a part of the obligations of the members. Likewise, in a Rhode Island case, it was held to be lawful for an association of plumbers to agree not to buy of wholesale dealers in plumbers’ goods, who sold to a plumber who was not a member of the plumbers’ association. This was held to be lawful competition.3

While it is not the habit, in general, for employers to combine for mutual protection against employees, since in most cases the individual employer finds himself strong enough to cope with the demands of the trade union, a combination has been made among certain classes of employers, street-car companies for example, one of whose regulations is that the members, on being notified, shall not give employment to a workman who is on a strike with a member of the combination. When a strike is ordered, in such a case, a list of the names of the strikers is sent to the members of the association, who will, in carrying out their obligations to the association, refuse to give employment to a striker who applies for work. In Pennsylvania, it has been held that such a combination does not constitute an unlawful conspiracy.4 But a contrary ruling was made in a case in which an apprentice, who had been in the employ of B. & Co., under indentures which were supposed to be valid but which were not, was discharged, and the employer notified others in the same trade not to engage this apprentice. The court held that the apprentice was entitled to damages, because this notice of his discharge had prevented his procuring employment.1

A word of explanation, why I have given so much prominence to the two English cases of Mogul Steamship Company v. MacGregor, and Allen v. Flood, in this discussion, is not inappropriate. In England, the right of capitalists, manufacturers and traders to combine for mutual economic advantage, has never been materially affected by statutory modifications. On the other hand, combinations of workingmen have until a late day been prohibited in England by statute. These statutes have now been repealed, and trades-unions and other labor combinations have been expressly legalized. The first of these English cases gives a most elaborate statement of the common law as to the legality of capitalistic combinations; while the second case presents the same law as it bears upon the legality of labor combinations, both unaffected by statutory condemnation or restrictions of such combinations. In the United States, on the other hand, legislatures have been so exceedingly active in controlling, restricting, and finally in prohibiting all combinations in restraint of trade and competition, that it is almost impossible for an analytical jurist to determine to what degree these statutes have controlled the judicial opinion, as to what acts constitute at common law an actionable conspiracy. A comparison of these two English cases with the American decisions on trade and labor combinations will also be helpful in pointing out how much confusion of thought can be created by ill-considered and poorly constructed legislation on a problem, which reaches so deep down into the mysteries of human desires, and which is so completely within the control of the inexorable laws of nature, and the social forces.

SECTION116.Wagering contracts prohibited.
117.Option contracts, when illegal.

[1]See, also, post, same section, cases of boycott of one tradesman by associations of tradesmen.

[1]See ante, § 104.

[2]Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 333; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 355; Jones v. Stanley, 76 N. C. 355; Doremus v. Hennesy, 62 Ill. App. 391. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, is held to be the leading English case in support of this proposition. In Lally v. Cantwell, 40 Mo. App. 44 and Dannenberg v. Ashley, 10 Ohio C. C. Rep. 558; 1 O. C. D. 40, it was held that a third person, who maliciously procured the discharge of a servant, was actionable civilly. In Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory, 1 Q. B. 147, a third person was held to be liable for inducing a subscriber of the plaintiffs to violate his agreement not to communicate to non-subscribers the information which was supplied to him by the plaintiffs. In Graham v. St. Charles Street Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, 1656, the foreman of a street railway was held to be liable to the plaintiff, because in hiring and discharging men, the foreman discriminated against those who traded, or were disposed to trade, at plaintiff’s grocery. The malicious intent to injure plaintiff’s business seems to have been clearly made out in this case, without any other motive, which might have made his action appear at all reasonable. In International & G. M. Ry. Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, it was held to be unlawful for a railroad to prohibit its present employees from patronizing a certain boarding-house, even though the alleged motive was to avoid troublesome litigation with the proprietor of the boarding house or interference with its own regulations, as long as the necessity of such regulations is not made apparent. But the court conceded to the railroad the right, in employing workmen, to stipulate with them that they shall not patronize the boarding-house in question, since it was the undoubted right of the railroad to choose its own employees, and reject those who will not comply with the imposed conditions of employment.

[1]Thus in Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, the defendant, in the pursuit of his desire to purchase certain goods, which a third party had already contracted to buy from plaintiff, maliciously, and with the intent to injure the plaintiff, induced this third party to break his contract with the plaintiff. The court held that no actionable wrong had been committed by the defendant. The same conclusion was reached by the same court in Bourlier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, where a theater manager had maliciously induced an actress to leave another theater, where she was performing under a contract of service. The actress was, of course, liable, but not the rival theater manager. In State v. Hoover, 107 N. C. 795, the court denied to the plaintiff any right of action against the defendant for inducing the plaintiff’s tenant to break his contract of lease, and abandon the farm which he held under lease. The plaintiff’s attorney endeavored to secure a judgment against the defendant on the ground that he had violated the statute which prohibited any one from enticing away a servant, holding that the tenant was a servant, inasmuch as one of the terms of the lease was that he should do some work for the plaintiff. This contention the court denied. In Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Brothers Commission Co., 138 Mo. 439, it was held that an action would not lie against a third person for inducing another to break his contract with plaintiff, where the contractual relation was not that of master and servant. In Robinson v. Texas Pine Land Assn. (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), 40 S. W. 843, the defendant who kept a truck-store and sold the same kind of goods as the plaintiff did, and who paid the employees in non-transferable orders on its store, threatened to discharge such employees if they traded at plaintiff’s stores, and notified them that these orders or pay-checks would not be honored if they were transferred to plaintiff. These acts of the defendant were held to be lawful, and to give to plaintiff no action for damages. A similar ruling was made on a similar statement of facts in Payne v. Western, etc., Ry. Co., 13 Lea, 507. It was also held to be lawful for an employer to prohibit his employees from renting plaintiff’s houses, in Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225. And in Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, where the superintendent of a stone quarry maliciously procured the discharge of an employee by refusing to let the employer take stone from the quarry as long as he retained the employee in his employ, he was held to be guilty of no actionable wrong against such employee.

[1]1898, A. C. 1, 25.

[1]Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82; Angle v. Chicago & St. Paul &c. Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1; Lally v. Cantwell, 40 Mo. App. 524; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 582; Bourlier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 140.

[2]§ 114.

[1]See Reg. v. Parnell, 14 Cox C. C. 508.

[1]§§ 107, 108.

[1]§§ 108, 110-112.

[2]See ante, § 114.

[1]U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505.

[2]People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251.

[1]For cases, involving more or less of these reprehensible and unlawful trespasses upon the rights of others, see Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S. 197; Regina v. Druitt, 10 Cox C. C. 592; U. S. v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212; Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 41; Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811; Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449; O’Neill v. Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 403.

[1]See Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. R. 48; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 429; Brace v. Evans, 3 R. & Corp. L. J. 561; Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595; O’Neill v. Behanna, 182 Pa. St. 236; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92.

[1]L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598. See ante, §§ 110, 114.

[1]State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46; Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. 135; Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers’ Union (Cincinnati Sup. Ct.), 23 Wkly. L. B. (O.) 48; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters & Trimmers’ Assembly, 77 Md. 396.

[1]Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912.

[2]Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803; United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 828; United States v. Debs, 63 Fed. 436; Toledo A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730; Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590.

[3]Gatzow v. Buening (Wis. 1900), 81 N. W. 1003.

[4]See, also, on the same lines, except that it was a boycott, directed against a particular person. Ertz v. Produce Exchange Co. (Minn. 1900), 81 N. W. 737.

[1]Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499.

[2]Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Oreg. 527.

[3]Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48; Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. 135; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters’ and Trimmers’ Assembly, 77 Md. 396; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; Curran v. Gale, 22 N. Y. S. 826; 2 Misc. Rep. 553; s. c. 152 N. Y. 33. There are many other cases, in which attempts have been made to prevent non-union workmen from obtaining employment, or retaining their positions, but they are complicated by threats and fears of physical violence, opprobrious epithets, and by annoying pursuit by the union men. These cases have already been cited in connection with a statement of the law in regard to the use of unlawful means.

[4]Curran v. Gale, 152 N. Y. 33.

[1]Reg. v. Hewitt, 5 Cox C. C. 162; Rex v. Bykerdike, 1 Moody & R. 179; Perham’s Case, 5 H. & M. 30; Shelbourne v. Oliver, 13 L. T. R. [n. s.] 630.

[1](1898) A. C. 1. To the same effect, Connor v. Kent, 2 Q. B. 545.

[2]See ante, §§ 110, 114.

[3]Allen v. Flood, 1898, A. C. 1, 128.

[1]The following is a quotation from the confirmatory opinion of Lord Watson, p. 78, Allen v. Flood:—

“It is, in my opinion, the absolute right of every workman to exercise his own option with regard to the persons in whose society he will agree to continue to work. It may be deplorable that feelings of rivalry between different associations of workingmen should ever run so high as to make members of one union seriously object to continue their labor in company with members of another trade union; but so long as they commit no legal wrong, and use no means which are illegal, they are at perfect liberty to act upon their own views.”

There were other more elaborate opinions dissenting from the prevailing opinion of Lord Herschell, but to the American student the following quotation from the opinion of Lord Cave (p. 36), seems to be the most important:—

“Bearing in mind the dicta of Lord Holt and Sir William Erle, which have been already cited, and remembering how men earn their livelihood by almost insensible gradations, from disposing of their labor only, through disposing of goods which owe what value they possess solely to the labor which has been spent upon them, up to disposing of goods in which the labor spent upon them forms a continually decreasing portion of their value, it seems impossible at the present day to hold that there is one law for the comparatively rich trader, and another for the comparatively poor working man living by his labor, and I, therefore, answer the first part of the question put to us by saying that in my opinion Allen, in inducing their employers to dismiss the respondents from their employment, was guilty of a violation of their right to freely dispose of their labor without molestation, and that this is an actionable wrong, unless he can justify it by showing that he had some lawful cause or excuse for what he did. * * * Now in the present case, disregarding all questions as to whether Allen couched his inducement in the form of a threat or of advice, and as to whether he correctly or incorrectly reported to the employers what had taken place between himself and the boiler-makers, there remains the fact that Allen induced their employers to cease employing the respondents, not because the boiler-makers wished to do, or could do, the work on which the respondents were then employed, but because the respondents had been previously guilty of doing iron work in Mills & Knight yards. His motive therefore, was not to secure the work they were then doing for the boiler-makers, but to punish the respondents for what they had previously done, and, according to Edmonds and Halkett when they spoke about it not being right to visit Mills & Knight’s sins on the Glengall Iron Company, Allen said that the boiler-makers would be called out from any yard the respondents went to, and that they (the respondents) would not be allowed to work anywhere in London River. Now, although according to the principles of the Mogul case (23 Q. B. D. 598) the action of Allen might have been justified on the principles of trade competition, if it had been confined to the time when the respondents were doing ironwork, and were therefore acting in competition with the boiler-makers, it appears to me that soon as he overstepped these limits and induced their employers to dismiss them by way of punishment, his action was without just cause or excuse, and consequently malicious within the legal meaning of the term. * * * If this is not malicious, I ask where the line is to be drawn. Might Allen lawfully have carried out his threat, and with impunity have procured the dismissal of the respondents from every yard in London by way of punishment, and not in the way of competition?”

[1]Doremus v. Hennessy (Ill.), 52 N. E. 924; rehearing denied, 54 N. E. 524.

[1]Doremus v. Hennessy (Ill.), 52 N. E. 924, 925.

[1]Doremus v. Hennesy (Ill. ’99), 54 N. E. 524.

[2]Fisher v. Schuri, 73 Wis. 370. The petition, which was held to state a good cause of action, charged this combination of church members with “unlawfully, maliciously and without just cause * * * conspiring, conniving and contriving to injure plaintiff,” etc.

[1]Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223.

[2]Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592.

[3]Olive v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 630.

[4]Dueber Watch-case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 24 N. Y. S. 647; 3 Misc. Rep. 582. This same dispute gave rise to an action in the Federal courts, but the court denied relief on the ground that the case did not involve any question relating to interstate commerce. S. c. 55 Fed. 851.

[5]Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N. J. L. 318; Murray v. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483.

[1]Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400.

[2]Schulten v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224; Brewster v. Miller (Ky. 1897), 41 S. W. 301.

[3]Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255.

[4]Bradley v. Pierson, 148 Pa. St. 502.

[1]Blumenthal v. Shaw, 77 Fed. 954; 23 C. C. A. 590.