Front Page Titles (by Subject) § 10.: Security to life.— - A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, vol. 1
§ 10.: Security to life.— - Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint, vol. 1 
A Treatise on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States considered from both a Civil and Criminal Standpoint (St. Louis: The F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1900). Vol. 1.
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- Preface to the Second Edition.
- State and Federal Control of Persons and Property. Vol. I.
- Chapter I.: Scope of the Government Control and Regulation of Personal Rights.
- § 1.: Police Power—defined and Explained.—
- § 2.: The Legal Limitations Upon Police Power.—
- § 3.: Construction of Constitutional Limitations.—
- § 4.: The Principal Constitutional Limitations.—
- § 5.: Table of Private Rights.—
- Chapter II.: Government Regulation of Personal Security.
- § 10.: Security to Life.—
- § 11.: Capital Punishment, When Cruel and Unusual.—
- § 12.: Security to Limb and Body—general Statement.—
- § 13.: Corporal Punishment—when a Cruel and Unusual Punishment.—
- § 14.: Personal Chastisement In Certain Relations.—
- § 15.: Battery In Self-defense.—
- § 16.: Abortion.—
- § 17.: Compulsory Submission to Surgical and Medical Treatment.—
- § 18.: Security to Health—legalized Nuisance.—
- § 19.: Security to Reputation—privileged Communications. 3 —
- § 20.: Privilege of Legislators.—
- § 21.: Privilege In Judicial Proceedings.—
- § 22.: Criticism of Officers and Candidates For Office.—
- § 23.: Publications Through the Press.—
- § 24.: Security to Reputation—malicious Prosecution.—
- § 25.: Advice of Counsel, How Far a Defense.—
- Chapter III.: Personal Liberty.
- § 26.: Personal Liberty—how Guaranteed.—
- Chapter IV.: Government Control of Criminal Classes.
- § 27.: The Effect of Crime On the Rights of the Criminal—power of State to Declare What Is a Crime.—
- § 28.: Due Process of Law.—
- § 29.: Bills of Attainder.—
- § 30.: Ex Post Facto Laws.—
- § 31.: Cruel and Unusual Punishment In Forfeiture of Personal Liberty and Rights of Property.—
- § 32.: Preliminary Confinement to Answer For a Crime—commitment of Witnesses.—
- § 33.: What Constitutes a Lawful Arrest.—
- § 34.: Arrests Without a Warrant.—
- § 35.: The Trial of the Accused.—
- § 36.: The Trial Must Be Speedy.—
- § 37.: Trials Must Be Public.—
- § 38.: Accused Entitled to Counsel.—
- § 39.: Indictment By Grand Jury Or By Information.—
- § 40.: The Plea of Defendant.—
- § 41.: Trial By Jury—legal Jeopardy.—
- § 42.: Right of Appeal.—
- § 43.: Imprisonment For Crime—hard Labor—control of Convicts In Prison.—
- § 43 A.: Convict Lease System.—
- Chapter V.: The Control of Dangerous Classes, Otherwise Than By Criminal Prosecution.
- § 44.: Confinement For Infectious and Contagious Diseases.—
- § 45.: The Confinement of the Insane.—
- § 46.: Control of the Insane In the Asylum.—
- § 47.: Punishment of the Criminal Insane.—
- § 48.: Confinement of Habitual Drunkards.—
- § 49.: Police Control of Vagrants.—
- § 50.: Police Regulation of Mendicancy.—
- § 51.: Police Supervision of Habitual Criminals.—
- § 52.: State Control of Minors.—
- Chapter VI.: Regulations of the Rights of Citizenship and Domicile.
- § 53.: Citizenship and Domicile Distinguished.—
- § 54.: Expatriation.—
- § 55.: Naturalization.—
- § 56.: Prohibition of Emigration.—
- § 57.: Compulsory Emigration.—
- § 58.: Prohibition of Immigration.—
- § 59.: The Public Duties of a Citizen.—
- Chapter VII.: State Regulation of Morality and Religion.
- § 60.: Crime and Vice Distinguished—their Relation to Police Power.—
- § 61.: Sumptuary Laws.—
- § 62.: Church and State—historical Synopsis.—
- § 63.: Police Regulation of Religion—constitutional Restrictions.—
- § 64.: State Control of Churches and Congregations.—
- § 65.: Religious Criticism and Blasphemy Distinguished.—
- § 66.: Permissible Limitations Upon Religious Worship.—
- § 67.: Religious Discrimination In Respect to Admissibility of Testimony.—
- § 68.: Sunday Laws.—
- Chapter VIII.: Freedom of Speech and Liberty of the Press.
- § 81.: Police Supervision Prohibited By the Constitutions.—
- Chapter IX.: Regulation of Trades and Occupations.
- § 85.: General Propositions.—
- § 86.: Prohibition As to Certain Classes.—
- § 87.: Police Regulation of Skilled Trades and Learned Professions.—
- § 88.: Regulation of Practice In the Learned Professions.—
- § 89.: Regulation of Sale of Certain Articles of Merchandise.—
- § 90.: Regulations to Prevent Fraud.—
- § 91.: Legal Tender and Regulation of Currency.—
- § 92.: Free Coinage of Silver and the Legal Tender Decisions.—
- § 93.: Legislative Restraint of Importations—protective Tariffs.—
- § 94.: Liberty of Contract, a Constitutional Right.—
- § 95.: Compulsory Formation of Business Relations—common Carriers and Innkeepers Exceptions to the Rule—theaters and Other Places of Amusement.—
- § 96.: Regulation of Prices and Charges.—
- § 97.: Later Cases On Regulating Prices and Charges—regulations Must Be Reasonable—what Is a Reasonable Regulation, a Judicial Question.—
- § 98.: Police Regulation of the Labor Contract.—
- § 99.: Regulation of Wages of Workmen—mode of Measuring Payment—compulsory Insurance and Membership In Benefit Societies—release From Liability For Injuries to Employees.—
- § 100.: Regulation of Wages of Workmen, Continued—time of Payment—medium of Payment—fines and Deductions For Imperfect Work—mechanics’ Lien and Exemption of Wages.—
- § 101.: Prohibition of Employment of Aliens—exportation of Laborers—importation of Alien Laborers Under Contract—chinese Labor—employers Compelling Workmen to Leave Unions.—
- § 102.: Regulating Hours of Labor.—
- § 103.: Regulations of Factories, Mines and Workshops—sweatshops. 1 —
- § 104.: Period of Hiring—breach Or Termination of Labor Contract—compulsory Performance of Labor Contract—requirement of Notice of Discharge—employers Required to Give Statement of Reasons For Discharge.—
- § 105.: Regulations of the Business of Insurance.—
- § 106.: Usury and Interest Laws.—
- § 107.: Prevention of Speculation.—
- § 108.: Prevention of Combinations In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 109.: A Combination to “corner” the Market.—
- § 109a.: Contracts Against Liability For Negligence Prohibited.—
- § 110.: Common Law Prohibition of Combinations In Restraint of Trade Restated.—
- § 111.: Industrial and Corporate Trusts, As Combinations In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 112.: Modern Statutory Legislation Against Trade Combinations, Virtual Monopolies, and Contracts In Restraint of Trade.—
- § 113.: Different Phases of the Application of Anti-trust Statutes—factor’s System—control of Patents—combinations Against Dishonest Debtors—agreements to Sell Only to Regular Dealers—combinations of Employers to Resist Combinations of Employees—departmen
- § 114.: Labor Combinations—trades Unions—strikes.—
- § 115.: Strikes, Continued, and Boycotts.—
- § 116.: Wagering Contracts Prohibited.—
- § 117.: Option Contracts, When Illegal.—
- § 118.: General Prohibition of Contracts On the Ground of Public Policy.—
- § 119.: Licenses.—
- § 120.: Prohibition of Occupations In General. 5 —
- § 121.: Prohibition of Trade In Vice—social Evil, Gambling, Horse-racing.—
- § 122.: Prohibition of Trades For the Prevention of Fraud—adulterations of Goods—harmful Or Dangerous Goods—prohibition of Sale of Oleomargarine.—
- § 123.: Prohibition of Ticket-brokerage—ticket-scalping Prohibited and Punished.—
- § 124.: Prohibition of Sale of Game Out of Season—prohibition of Export of Game.—
- § 125.: Prohibition of the Liquor Trade.—
- § 126.: Police Control of Employments In Respect to Locality. 3 —
- § 127.: Monopolies—general Propositions.—
- § 128.: Monopolies and Exclusive Franchises In the Cases of Railroads, Bridges, Ferries, Street Railways, Gas, Water, Lighting, Telephone and Telegraph Companies.—
- § 129.: Patents and Copyrights, How Far Monopolies.—
- § 130.: When Ordinary Occupations May Be Made Exclusive Monopolies—saloons—banking—insurance—peddling—building and Loan Associations—restriction of Certain Trades to Certain Localities—slaughterhouses—markets.—
- § 131.: National, State and Municipal Monopolies.—
Security to life.—
The legal guaranty of the protection of life is the highest possession of man. It constitutes the condition precedent to the enjoyment of all other rights. A man’s life includes all that is certain and real in human experience, and since its extinction means the deprivation of all temporal rights, the loss of his own personality, so far as this world is concerned, the cause or motive for its destruction must be very urgent, and of the highest consideration, in order to constitute a sufficient justification. If there be any valid ground of justification in the taking of human life, it can only rest upon its necessity as a means of protection to the community against the perpetration of dangerous and terrible crimes by the person whose life is to be forfeited. When a person commits a crime, that is, trespasses upon the rights of his fellow-men, he subjects his own rights to the possibility of forfeiture, including even the forfeiture of life itself; and the only consideration, independently of constitutional limitations, being, whether the given forfeiture, by exerting a deterrent influence, will furnish the necessary protection against future infringements of the same rights. That is, of course, only a question of expedience addressed to the wise discretion of legislators, and does not concern the courts. Except as a punishment for crime, no man’s life can be destroyed, not even with his consent. Suicide, itself, is held to be a crime, and one who assists another in the commission of suicide is himself guilty of a crime. This rule of the common law is in apparent contradiction with the maxim of the common law, which in every other case finds ready acquiescence, viz.: an injury (i. e. a legal wrong) is never committed against one who voluntarily accepts it, volenti non fit injuria. If a crime be in every case a trespass upon the rights of others suicide is not a crime, and it would not be a crime to assist one “to shuffle off this mortal coil.” But the dread of the uncertainties of the life beyond the grave so generally “makes us rather bear those ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of,” that we instinctively consider suicide to be the act of a deranged mind; and on the hypothesis that no sane man ever commits suicide the State may very properly interfere to prevent self-destruction, and to punish those who have given aid to the unfortunate man in his attack upon himself, or who have with his consent, or by his direction, killed a human being. But if we hold suicide to be in any case the act of a sane man, I cannot see on what legal grounds he can be prevented from taking his own life. It would be absurd to speak of a man being under a legal obligation to society to live as long as possible. The immorality of the act does not make it a crime, and since it is not a trespass upon the rights of any one, it is not an act that the State can prohibit. But even if suicide be declared a crime, the act has carried the criminal beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, and consequently no punishment could be inflicted on him. The common law in providing that the body of a suicide should be buried at the cross-roads with a stake driven through it, and that his property shall be forfeited to the crown, violated the fundamental principle of constitutional law that no man can be condemned and punished for an offense, except after a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which the accused is given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. It is somewhat different where one man kills another at the latter’s request. If it be held that the man who makes the request is sane, the killing is no more a crime than if it was done by the unfortunate man himself. But in consideration of the difficulty in proving the request, and the frequent opportunities for felonious murders the allowance of such deeds would afford, the State can very properly prohibit the killing of one man by another at the former’s request. These considerations would justify this exercise of police power, and in only one case is it supposed that any fair reason may be given for allowing it, and that is, where one is suffering from an incurable and painful disease. If the painful sufferer, with no prospect of a recovery or even temporary relief from physical agony, instead of praying to God for a deliverance, should determine to secure his own release, and to request the aid of a physician in the act, the justification of the act on legal grounds may not be so difficult. But even in such a case public, if not religious, considerations would justify a prohibition of the homicide.
4 Bl. Com. 188, 189.
See post, § 60.
See post, § 60.