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“It had been too my fortune, in the course of my service, to differ from the administration upon many of our most important public measures.”—p. iii.

“I was persuaded from Mr. Morris’s known political character and principles, that his appointment, and especially at a period when the French nation was in a course of revolution from an arbitrary to a free government, would tend to discountenance the republican cause there and at home, and otherwise weaken, and greatly to our prejudice, the connexion subsisting between the two countries.”—p. iv.

“Mr. Jay was nominated to Great Britain; which nomination too I opposed, because, under all the well-known circumstances of the moment, I was of opinion we could not adopt such a measure, consistently either with propriety, or any reasonable prospect of adequate success. I also thought, from a variety of considerations, it would be difficult to find, within the limits of the United States, a person who was more likely to improve, to the greatest possible extent, the mischief to which the measure naturally exposed us. This last example took place only a few weeks before my own appointment, which was on the 28th of May, 1794.”—p. iv.

“When I considered these circumstances, I was surprised that this proposal should be made to me by the administration, and intimated the same to the Secretary of State; who replied that my political principles, which were known to favor the French revolution and to cherish a friendly connexion with France, were a strong motive with the President for offering me the mission, since he wished to satisfy the French government what his own sentiments were upon those points.”—p. iv.

“Our affairs with France had fallen into great derangement, and required an immediate and decisive effort to retrieve them.”—p. iv.

“My instructions enjoined it on me to use my utmost endeavours to inspire the French government with perfect confidence in the solicitude, which the President felt for the success of the French revolution, of his own preference for France to all other nations as the friend and ally of the United States; of the grateful sense which we still retained for the important services that were rendered us by France in the course of our revolution; and to declare in explicit terms, that, although neutrality was the lot we preferred, yet, in case we embarked in the war, it would be on her side and against her enemies, be they who they might.”—pp. iv.-v.

“Upon this point [Mr. Jay’s mission to England] my instructions were as follows; ‘It is not improbable you will be obliged to encounter on this head suspicions of various kinds. But you may declare the motives of that mission to be, to obtain immediate compensation for our plundered property, and restitution of the posts.’ ”—p. v.

“Who [France and the United States] were now unhappily diverging from each other, and in danger of being thrown wholly apart; and, as I presumed, equally against the interest and inclination of both.”—p. vii.

“Upon my arrival in Paris, which was on the 2d of August, 1794, I found that the work of alienation and disunion had been carried further than I had before even suspected.”—p. vii.

“I presented my credentials to the commissary of foreign affairs, soon after my arrival; but more than a week had elapsed, and I had obtained no answer, when or whether I should be received. A delay beyond a few days surprised me, because I could discern no adequate or rational motive for it.”—p. vii.

“It was intimated to me that the Committee, or several at least of its members, had imbibed an opinion, that Mr. Jay was sent to England with views unfriendly to France, and that my mission to France was adopted for the purpose of covering and supporting his to England; that the one was a measure of substantial import, contemplating on our part a close union with England; and that the other was an act of policy, intended to amuse and deceive.”—p. vii.

“I thought I perceived distinctly, that not only the temper which had been shown by the committee, but the general derangement of our affairs with France, proceeded in a great measure, if not altogether, from the same cause, a suspicion that we were unfriendly to them.”—p. ix.

“My first note to the Committee of Public Safety on this subject bears date on the 3d of September, 1794; in which I discussed and combated copiously, and as ably as I could, the conduct of France in thus harassing our commerce against the stipulations of certain articles in our treaty with her; and urged earnestly the immediate repeal of the decrees, which authorized that proceeding.”—p. ix.

“I do not wish to be understood as having been guided by political motives only in expressing the sentiments contained in that clause; on the contrary, I admit they were strictly my own; affirming at the same time that they would never have been thus expressed, had I not been satisfied they were such, as it was honorable for the United States to express, and were likely also to promote their interest.”—p. x.

“From the Committee itself I could obtain no answer; and, from my informal applications to some of its members, I found that the difficulty of allowing our vessels to protect the property of English subjects, whilst they gave none to that of French citizens against the English cruisers, with that of distinguishing in our favor from the case of Denmark and Sweden, in which we were now involved, were objections of great weight with the Committee.”—p. xi.

“I thought I perceived, still remaining in the councils of that body, a strong portion of that suspicion of our views, in regard to our mission to England, so impressive upon my arrival, but which I had hoped was eradicated; and, the more earnestly I pressed an accommodation with my demands, the more obviously did this motive present itself to my view.”—p. xi.

“Nor did France invite us to the war, or manifest a wish that we should engage in it; whilst she was disposed to assist us in securing our claims upon those powers, against whom we complained of injuries.”—p. xvii.

“In promising to communicate to the Committee the contents of this treaty as soon as I knew them, I did so in the expectation of fulfilling my promise, when I received a copy of the treaty from the department of state, and not before; for I expected no further information upon that subject from Mr. Jay.”—p. xviii.

“As he [Mr. Jay] had refused to send me a copy of the treaty, according to my request, by Mr. Purviance, and omitted, not to say refused (though indeed I understood his omission in the light of a refusal) otherwise to inform me of its contents by that very safe opportunity, I did not see how the correspondence could be continued on that subject, on his part.”—p. xx.

“These considerations will, I presume, likewise sufficiently explain why I would make no representation to the French government of the contents of that treaty, for which I became personally responsible, upon the mere authority of Mr. Jay, or other wise than upon a copy of the instrument itself.”—p. xxi.

“Such was my conduct upon the above occasion, and such the motives of it.”—p. xxii.

“In this he [the Secretary of State] notices my address to the Convention; as also my letter to the Committee of Public Safety of the 3d of September following; both of which acts he censures in the most unreserved and harsh manner. In the first he charges me with having expressed a solicitude for the welfare of the French Republic in a style too warm and affectionate, much more so than my instructions warranted; which too he deemed the more reprehensible, from the consideration, that it was presented to the Convention in public and before the world, and not to a committee in a private chamber; since thereby, he adds, we were likely to give offence to other countries, particularlyEngland, with whom we were in treaty; and since, also, the dictates of sincerity do not require that we should publish to the world all our feelings in favor of France.”—p. xxiii.

“For the future, he instructs me to cultivate the French Republic with zeal, but without any unnecessary éclat; and by my letter to the Committee, demanding an indemnity for spoliations, and a repeal of the decrees suspending the execution of certain articles of our treaty of commerce with France, he objects that I had yielded an interest it was my duty to secure.”—p. xxiii.

“Upon this occasion I thought proper, in reply to his first charge, to lay open, more fully than I had before done, some truths, at which, indeed, I had before only glanced; particularly the light in which our administration was viewed by the Committee upon my arrival.”—p. xxiii.

“It would be painful to go into details on this subject; but the circumstances here hinted will make it easy to conceive the unfavorable inferences, that must have been drawn respecting the temper and views of our administration.—note on p. xxiv.

“To express sentiments in private, which it was wished should not become public, appeared to me a strange doctrine to be avowed by the administration of a free people; especially as it was known that the sentiments, thus expressed, were in harmony with those of the people, and with those publicly and formally expressed by the representatives of the people.”—p. xxv.

“Well satisfied I am, that France declined taking them [the Floridas] in her treaty with Spain, which soon followed, from a fear it might weaken her connexion with the United States.”—p. xxvii.

“Had that treaty, then, never passed, and had we also otherwise preserved the ground upon which we stood with that nation in the commencement of its revolution, what might we not have expected from its friendship?”—p. xxvii.

“The prospect therefore of success in that important concern was now as fair as it could be.”—p. xxvii.

“Mr. Pinckney was aware of the benefit which would be derived from such aid; but yet did not consider himself at liberty to obtain it by showing a copy of Mr. Jay’s treaty, which I intimated might be necessary completely to remove the doubts, that were entertained in that respect, and therefore deemed it most suitable to say nothing to the Committee upon the subject of his mission.”—p. xxviii.

“It would at least have greatly embarrassed the administration to explain the cause of such a phenomenon to its credit; notwithstanding the advantage thereby gained to the public.”—p. xxviii.

“By these letters it appeared, that Mr. Jay had concluded a treaty upon other principles, than those to which his powers were restricted, as inferred from my instructions, and, of course, that the nature and object of his mission to England had been misrepresented, through me, to the French government.”—p. xxix.

“That the administration had injured me, was a point upon which I had no doubt; that it had likewise compromised its own credit, and with it that of the United States, was also a truth equally obvious to my mind.”—p. xxx.

“I assured him, however, that I should continue to endeavor to inspire the French government with a confidence, either that the treaty contained nothing improper, or would not be ratified in case it did.”—p. xxxi.

“At the moment, however, when Mr. Barlow was upon the point of embarking with our presents, &c., intelligence was received that a Mr. Donaldson, whom Colonel Humphreys had left at Alicant with a conditional power, but in the expectation that he would not proceed in the business till he heard further from him, had passed over to Algiers and concluded a treaty with that regency, and of course without the aid of France; and thus ended our application to the French government for its aid in support of our negotiations with those powers, and nearly in the same manner as that did, which I made for its aid in support of our negotiation with Spain.”—p. xxxii.

“From this period I had but one object to attend to, the preservation of our actual footing with France, which was, as already shown, as favorable as we could wish it to be.”—p. xxxiii.

“By me it was never introduced; for, as I had no new communication to make to the Committee upon it, whereby to remove the suspicions that were entertained of its contents, and any allusion to it in that state could of course only serve to revive unpleasant sensations to our disadvantage, I thought it most eligible to keep it out of view.”—p. xxxiii.

“It was soon obvious that this aggression of Great Britain upon the rights of neutral nations, being made with the intent to increase the distress of famine which was then raging at Paris, and thereby promote the disorders which were in part attributable to that cause, excited a ferment in the French councils, which was not pointed against Great Britain alone.”—pp. xxxiii., xxxiv.

“About the middle of August, 1795, American gazettes were received at Paris, containing copies of the English treaty, whereby its contents were made known to the committee of public safety without my aid. From this period, therefore, all mystery upon that subject was at an end. The possession of the treaty enabled the French government to judge for itself upon all the points which it involved. Nor was the effect which it produced an equivocal one; for there did not appear to me to be a description of persons, not in the interest of the coalesced powers, who did not openly and severely censure it.”—p. xxxiv.

“But as yet it was not known that the treaty was ratified, nor certain that it would be, for the spontaneous and almost universal disapprobation that was bestowed upon it throughout the United States, as soon as it was seen, was sufficient at least to inspire a doubt on that point.”—p. xxxv.

“The appearance of the treaty excited the general disgust of France against the American government, which was now diminished by the opposition which the American people made to the treaty.”—pp. xxxv., xxxvi.

“Under existing circumstances it would not only be necessary for the administration to avail itself of some well pronounced character in regard to the great question which now agitates the world, to whose care the negotiation should be committed, but that in other respects extraordinary circumspection should be used in the prosecution of the negotiation itself.”—p. xxxvii.

“The letter of June 1st contained a justification of the conduct of the administration in forming a commercial treaty with Great Britain at that period; and likewise a vindication of the administration against the charge of a want of candor (which seemed to be apprehended) in the explanations that were given by it of the motives of that mission; in which the idea of a commercial power was always withheld.”—p. xxxvii.

“The letter of July 2d contained advice, that the treaty was not ratified, and that the President was undecided upon the point of ratification.”—p. xxxvii.

“It was inferred from these letters, that, when that of June 1st was written, the executive had resolved to ratify the treaty in case the Senate approved it, and that the hesitation which afterwards took place proceeded more from the shock, which the general disapprobation of the treaty by the people gave the administration, than from any disinclination on its own part to the ratification.”—p. xxxviii.

“It was likewise inferred, that that letter was written with a view to lay the foundation for such an event, in the expectation the ratification would probably embroil us with France.”—p. xxxviii.

“In one particular the contents of this letter affected me personally, by affirming that my instructions had not warranted the construction I had given them, in explaining, as I had done, the motives of Mr. Jay’s mission to London.”—p. xxxviii.

“Of the symptoms of discontent, which I witnessed, I had before given frequent intimations.”—p. xl.

“My wish was to conciliate the French government towards the treaty which was now ratified, and most anxiously had I looked to the administration for the means of doing it.”—p. xliii.

“Acts of candor when performed, if acknowledged by the party to whom they are said to be rendered, ought not to be boasted of by those who perform them.”—p. xliii.

“Indeed it professes to notice, and in fact notices, only one article, the 18th, and in so doing, admits in effect all the objections that were urged against it.”—p. xliii.

“Would the administration, in a demand of payment for those seizures, which took place after the treaty was concluded, distinguish the cases, and confine that demand to such vessels as were taken in their route to a blockaded port, saying, ‘For these only will we be paid, but for the others, comprehending perhaps ninety-nine out of a hundred, we will not;’ and thus revive the controversy, which it was said was thus amicably closed? This, it is presumed, would not be done.”—p. xliv.

“With respect to the declaration, that we were an independent people, and had a right to decide for ourselves, &c., so often repeated, I did not perceive how it applied at the time; there had been no question on that point that I knew of.”—p. xlv.

“France had attempted to impose on us no conditions; had asked of us no favors; on the contrary had shown a disposition to render us many; under which circumstances we had made a treaty with Britain.”—p. xlv.

“To reconcile France to that treaty, I expected to have been authorized to explain to her government how long the commercial part was to remain in force; to state it formally, that we were ready to enter into a new commercial treaty with her, and upon what principles, to be commenced either in Paris or Philadelphia. In which expectation, and with a view to the event of a ratification, I had told the administration, when I advised it of the ill effect the treaty, whose contents were then known, had produced, that I should await its orders without any the slightest compromitment either of it or myself.”—p. xlv.

“But it was my duty to answer this letter, which I did without a comment; for it was improper for me to censure, and useless to advise.”—p. xlvi.

“I showed, it is true, no mark of undue condescension to that government.”—p. xlvi.

“Those considerations appeared to me to be so strong and pressing, that I concluded, as soon as they were brought to the view of the administration, he [Mr. Parish] would be removed, and of course that the measure was already taken. In which expectation I answered the minister politely, intimating that I should communicate to our government the request of his in that respect, not doubting that it would be readily complied with.”—p. xlvii.

“The subsequent management of the affair upon the application of the French government showed, that the incident became rather a cause of irritation, than of conciliation with that government; notwithstanding the evident impolicy of such a procedure at the time, on account of the crisis to which we were brought. For, although the administration (not being able to resist the objections to his continuance) did remove him, yet it was done in a manner so as to show the French government it was not done in compliance with its request.”—p. xlvii.

“Much, too, was said in that address of the advantage of our accommodation with Britain, as likewise of the favorable disposition of that power towards us, without the slightest attention being shown to the French Republic.”—p. xlviii.

“Unless indeed it was referred to in the picture of distress above noticed, as was inferred by the French government, as I understood from good authority at the time.”—p. xlviii.

“In the course of the year 1795, the French government had repealed, as already shown, all the decrees which were passed during the mission of Mr. Morris, under which our trade had been harassed.”—p. xlviii.

“Yet none of these acts, or of the disposition which produced them, were even glanced at in the President’s address to Congress; although it was to be inferred, such notice would have produced a good effect, and although it was then as just as it was politic to notice them.”—p. xlviii.

“This conduct in the administration was the more extraordinary, from the consideration that those decrees, by whose authority our trade was harassed, with the harassment itself, had been announced in former communications to the Congress, when the British depredations were announced.”—p. xlviii.

“Under such circumstances, it was impossible for me to succeed in conciliating the French government towards the British treaty, since my efforts were not only not seconded in that respect by our administration, but absolutely counteracted by it.”—p. xlviii.

“Nevertheless I continued to pursue the same line of conduct, that I had done before, being resolved not to relax in my efforts, however unsuccessful I might be.”—p. xlviii.

“The sequel of my mission exhibits an interesting but painful spectacle, the distinguishing characteristics whereof are; the avowed decision of the French government to take some measure towards us in consequence of our treaty with England, as illustrated by many examples; with my efforts to prevent any such measure taking effect; and the attack made on me by our administration, upon pretexts equally unjust, frivolous, and absurd.”—p. xlix.

“On the 15th of February, 1796, I called on the minister of foreign affairs to state to him the distress of many of our citizens, merchants at Paris, on account of their claims upon the French government, with a view to engage his aid for their relief; but was immediately diverted from that object by information which he gave me, that the Directory had at length made up its mind how to act in regard to our treaty with England; which it considered as having annulled our treaty of alliance with France, from the period of its ratification; and had appointed or intended to appoint an envoy extraordinary, to repair to Philadelphia to remonstrate against it; adding that he was ordered to send me an official note upon the subject, which he should accordingly do.”—p. xlix.

“I attended him again on the day following, and remonstrated most earnestly against the measure, urging every argument that I could avail myself of to divert the government from it; offering to enter with him, whenever he thought fit, into a discussion of his objections to our treaty, or any other act of our government; assuring him, that I should not only be always ready to enter with him into such explanations, but in the present instance should do it with pleasure, since, by being possessed of our view of the subject, they would be better able to decide whether the complaint was well or ill founded, and of course how far it merited to be considered in that light.”—p. xlix.

“Upon this occasion, as upon the preceding one, the minister declined stating any specific objections to the treaty, or any other act of our government, and therefore I could make no specific defence.”—p. xlix.

“A summary of those complaints was presented me by the minister of foreign affairs.”—p. l.

“From the period of my audience by the Directory, and more especially after my communication with the minister of foreign affairs was handed in, I had frequent conferences with several of the members of the Directory, in which I labored to promote the same object, and at one time, as I thought, with complete success: being informed by a member, upon one of those occasions, that the Directory had done nothing towards us in regard to its complaints, and he presumed would not.”—p. li.

“Near seven months had now elapsed since the minister of foreign affairs communicated to me the discontent of the Directory on account of our treaty with England, and its decision to make the same known to our government by an envoy extraordinary, to be despatched to the United States; in the course of which time I had not received a single line from the department of state (a letter of the 7th of January excepted, which applied to another subject), although I had regularly informed it of every incident that occurred, and although the crisis was a very important one, requiring the profound attention of the administration.”—p. lii.

“In the beginning of November, 1796, I received a letter from the Secretary of State of the 22d of August, announcing my recall by the President of the United States. In this letter, the Secretary refers me for the motives of that measure to his former letter of the 13th of June. He adds, however, in this that the President was further confirmed in the propriety of that measure by other concurring circumstances, but of which he gave no detail.”—p. liii.

“In her [America’s] foreign relations nothing is to be seen but the waste and pillage of her commerce, sometimes by several powers, always by some one power; and little less than anarchy at home; for the seeds of discontent, jealousy and disunion have been scattered throughout these States, in the course of few years past, with a wasteful hand. By what means then was this state of things produced, and why was it produced?”—pp. lii., liv.

“It is well known, that the executive administration has heretofore guided all our measures; pursuing, in many instances, a course of policy equally contrary to the public feeling, and the public judgment.”—p. liv.

“But, by this attack on me, a new topic has been raised for discussion, which has drawn the public attention from the conduct of the administration itself; for, in consequence, the only question now before the public seems to be, whether I have merited the censure thus pronounced upon me by the administration, or have been dealt hardly by. But this was a mere political manœuvre, intended doubtless to produce that effect.”—p. liv.

“Whether I have performed my duty to my country, as I ought to have done, in the various, contradictory, and embarrassing situations, in which I was placed by the administration, is a point upon which my country will determine, by the facts and documents submitted to it. Upon this point I fear not the result.”—p. liv.

“Nor should I, in respect to myself, add a word to the light which those documents contain, being willing so far as the propriety of my own conduct is involved, to submit the point to the judgment of my countrymen, upon the documents alone.”—p. liv.

“The Secretary adds, it is true, in his letter of the 22d of August following, that there were other concurring circumstances, which confirmed the President in the propriety of the measure he had taken towards me; but these he did not then communicate, nor has he since, though called on to do it; nor has he communicated other testimony to support the charge already raised.”—p. lv.

“These were the only letters, which I received from the department of state on that subject, after the treaty was submitted to the Senate; or indeed before, except such as showed the fluctuating state of the executive mind respecting the ratification.”—p. lvi.

“The first of these facts, it is true, was not then known to the Secretary; for as the object, at that time contemplated by the Committee, was not pursued, on account I presume of the change of government which took place immediately afterwards in France, and might possibly never be revived, I declined mentioning it to our administration from motives of delicacy to both governments; wishing, if to be avoided, that no such evidence of the discontent of France should appear in my correspondence.”—p. lvi.

“I believe no instance can be adduced by the administration of any counsel being asked or attention shown on its part to the counsels of the French nation, from the commencement of the administration to the present day, nor to the counsels of a minister of that nation; one instance only excepted, in which his counsel was asked, but immediately rejected.”—p. lvii.

“In short he seems to have concluded, from the moment those letters were forwarded to me, that he had put that nation under my care, and, if I did not keep it in order, that I merited censure.”—p. lvii.

“I shall only observe upon it, that, had I been called on for a proof of my activity and zeal to preserve tranquillity between the two countries, I should have urged the delay of the French government to complain, discontented as it was, as a most satisfactory one. Indeed I do not know, before the government did complain, how I could produce any other.”—p. lviii.

“My efforts produced an effect for a certain term only.”—p. lviii.

“A sufficient one, however, to have permitted the administration to interpose and assist me.”—p. lviii.

“The course which I pursued was a plain one.”—p. lix.

“Yet it was known, that the French government was jealous of the object of the mission, which produced that treaty, from the period of its nomination; that it suspected the treaty was founded upon principles injurious to France before its contents were seen; and that those suspicions were confirmed when they were seen.”—p. lix.

“Whether I contributed in any degree to divert the French government from opposing the ratification of that treaty, or taking its measures after the treaty was ratified, I will not pretend to say.”—p. lix.

“To determine this latter point, some attention is due to the conduct of the administration through every stage of this European controversy; for the whole of its conduct forms a system, which ought to be taken together, to judge correctly of its motives in any particular case.”—p. lx.

“The first is the appointment of a person as minister plenipotentiary to France, in the commencement of the French Revolution, who was known to be an enemy to that revolution, and a partisan of royalty; whereby the name and weight of America (no inconsiderable thing at that time in that respect) was thrown into the scale of kings, against that of the people and of liberty.”—p. lx.

“Fourth, my appointment to the French republic.”—p. lx.

“It being known that, with other members of the Senate, I had opposed in many instances the measures of the administration, particularly in that of the mission of Mr. Morris to France, and of Mr. Jay to London; from the apprehension those missions would produce, in our foreign relations, precisely the ill effect they did produce.”—pp. lx., lxi.

“The instructions that were given me, to explain to the French government the motives of Mr. Jay’s mission to London, not as an act of condescension on our part, at the demand of the French government, but of policy, to produce tranquillity and give satisfaction, whilst the negotiation was depending; by which instructions, if the existence of a power to form a commercial treaty was not positively denied, yet it was withheld, and the contrary evidently implied.”—p. lxi.

“The strong documents, that were put in my possession at that period, by the administration, of its attachment to France and the French Revolution; so different from any thing before expressed.”—p. lxi.

“The resentment shown by the administration on account of the publication of those documents; it having been intended they should produce their effect, at the same time, and yet be kept secret.”—p. lxi.

“The approbation bestowed on me by the administration when I made vehement pressures on the French government for a repeal of its decrees, under which our commerce was harassed, exhibiting a picture of its spoliations, &c.; and the profound silence and inattention of the administration, when those decrees were repealed, and a disposition shown by that government to assist us in other cases.”—p. lxi.

“The power given to Mr. Jay to form a commercial treaty with England, in the midst of a war, by a special mission, at a time when no such advance was made to treat on that subject with France, and her advances at best coolly received.”—p. lxi.

“The witholding from me the contents of that treaty until after the meeting of the Senate; notwithstanding the embarrassment to which I was in the interim personally exposed, in consequence of the explanations I had before given to the French government, by order of the administration, of the motives of the mission which produced it; which deportment proves clearly, that the administration did not deal fairly with me from the commencement.”—p. lxi.

“The submission of the treaty to M. Adet after the advice of the Senate, before the ratification of the President; at a time when, as it appears by satisfactory documents, it was resolved to ratify it; which submission therefore was probably not made to obtain M. Adet’s counsel, in which light it would have been improper, especially as it had been withheld from his government; but to repel an objection to the candor of the administration, in its conduct in preceding stages.”—pp. lxi., lxii.

“The character of the treaty itself, by which (according to the administration) we have departed from the modern rule of contraband, with respect to many articles made free by modern treaties.”—p. lxii.

“The conduct of the administration after the ratification of the treaty, being in all cases irritable towards France.”—p. lxii.

“I should not notice my recall, being in itself a circumstance too trivial to merit attention, if it were not for the state in which our affairs were in my hands, when my recall was decided; being at a period, when it appeared I had succeeded in quieting the French government for the time, and was likely to do it effectually.”—p. lxii.

“To be left there to that precise time, and then withdrawn and censured, seems to authorize a presumption, that I was left there in the first instance in the expectation I would not defend that treaty, and in consequence whereof a rupture would ensue, and recalled afterwards, when it was known I had done my duty, and was likely to prevent a rupture.”—p. lxii.

“Whether the nature of this crisis contributed in any degree to influence our measures, by repelling us from France and attracting us towards England, is submitted for others to determine.”—p. lxiii.

“Be this, however, as it may, it is nevertheless obvious, that the policy itself was at best short-sighted and bad.”—p. lxiii.

“To stand well with France, through the whole of this European war, was the true interest of America; since great advantage was to be derived from it in many views, and no injury in any.”—p. lxiii.

“What would have been the condition of these States had France been conquered, and the coalesced powers triumphed, it is easy to perceive.”—p. lxiii.

“For, if she was conquered, it did not seem likely, that we should accomplish any of our objects with those powers; nor could we profit by her success otherwise than by preserving a good understanding with her.”—p. lxiv.

“The beneficial effects, too, of this stipulation, which was respected by France at the time that treaty passed, was most sensibly felt upon our navigation and commerce; for, in consequence of it, we were then become the principal carriers of the enemies of France.”—p. lxiv.

“It was highly for the interest of America to improve our footing in that commerce; and easy was it to have done so, had due attention been paid to the necessary means of improving it.”—p. lxiv.

“Nor was it difficult to stand well with France through the whole of this crisis, and profit by her fortunes, without the smallest possible loss or even hazard. The demonstration of this position is complete; for we know, that, although our ground was once lost by the administration in the course of the present war, it was nevertheless afterwards recovered; although it is much easier to preserve a friendship, whilst at the height, than to recover it after it is gone.”—p. lxiv.

“And how was it recovered? Not by any address on my part, for I pretend to none.”—p. lxv.

“Nor did we hazard any thing in any view by standing well with France, whilst much was to be gained. The administration admits she did not wish us to embark in the war. Perhaps this was admitted to preclude the claim of merit for not wishing it.”—p. lxv.

“Such was the situation of America in the commencement of this war! Such our standing with the French nation, so advantageous in itself, so easy to preserve! And yet all these advantages have been thrown away; and, instead of that secure and tranquil state, which we might have enjoyed throughout, we have been likewise plunged, so far as the administration could plunge us, into a war with our ancient ally, and on the side of the kings of Europe contending against her for the subversion of liberty!

“Had France been conquered, to what objects that administration would have aspired, has fortunately by her victories been left a subject for conjecture only.”—p. lxv.

“We might have stood well with France, avoiding all the losses we have sustained from her; enjoying the benefit of the principles of free trade, and even appeared as an advocate for those principles, and without going to any extremity.”—p. lxvi.

“And instead of a situation so advantageous, so honorable, so satisfactory to our country, what is that unto which our government has conducted us?”—p. lxvi.

“Long will it be before we shall be able to forget what we are, nor will centuries suffice to raise us to the high ground from which we have fallen.”—p. lxvi.

“They would most probably have pressed . . . after the example was given.”—p. 89.

“For a while, as it was circulated only in private, . . . to those who mentioned it to me.”—pp. 89, 90.

“He [Jay] was sent to England upon an especial business only; to demand reparation for injuries, and to which his authority was strictly limited.”

“To day, however, I was favored with yours of 28th of the same month, by which I find you consider yourself at liberty to communicate to me the contents of the treaty.”—pp. 113, 114.

“Mr. Purviance is from Maryland, a gentleman of integrity and merit, and to whom you may commit whatever you may think proper to confide with perfect safety.”—p. 114.

“Our former minister was not only without the confidence of the government, but an object of particular jealousy and distrust.”—p. 119.

“In addition to which it was suspected, that we were about to abandon them for a connection with England, and for which purpose principally, it was believed that Mr. Jay had been sent there.”—p. 119.

“My first reception was marked with circumstances which fully demonstrated these facts . . . . I was viewed with a jealous eye, and kept at the most awful distance.”—p. 119, 120.

“Into what consequences this policy, which was hostile to us, might lead . . . Thus circumstanced, what course did policy dictate that I should pursue?”—p. 120.

“The doors of the committee, as already mentioned, were closed against me.”—p. 120.

“Or was it to be presumed, that the declarations of friendship which they contained, would produce in the councils of that body any change of sentiment, advised as it had been, and armed as it was, with a series of contrary evidence, and in which it would place a greater confidence.”—p. 120.

“If then our good understanding with France was broken, or the necessary concert between us incomplete, Britain would only have to amuse us till the crisis had passed, and then defy us.”—pp. 121, 122.

“I trusted . . . that no concession would be made to my discredit, in favor of that [English] administration.”—p. 122.

“Had the fortunes of France been unprosperous upon my arrival here, the motive for greater caution would have been stronger. But the case was in every respect otherwise. Her fortunes were at the height of prosperity, and those of her enemies decisively on the decline.”—p. 122.

“Upon the third point but little need be said. I have some time since transmitted to you a decree which carried the treaty into effect, and yielded the point in question.”—p. 123.

“And I now declare, that I am of opinion, if we stood firmly upon that ground, there is no service within the power of this republic to render, that it would not render us, and upon the slightest intimation.”—p. 123.

“For at that time I had reason to believe that it contemplated to take under its care, and to provide for, our protection against Algiers; for the expulsion of the British from the western posts.”—p. 124.

“How then does his [Jay’s] conduct correspond with his own doctrine; having in his three several letters communicated a particular article, and promised in the second the whole [treaty].”—p. 140.

“In short, had I been in a private station, is it probable he would have written or communicated any thing to me on the subject?”—p. 140.

“But in reviewing now his several letters, it is difficult to ascertain what he intended to do, or what his real object was in writing them: For he says in these, that he is not at liberty to disclose the purport of his treaty, and yet promises it: That he will give me the contents or principal heads, to enable me to satisfy this government; but yet will give them only in confidence, and of course under an injunction, that will put it out of my power to give the satisfaction intended.”—p. 141.

“I am likewise persuaded, that if I had been authorised to declare, generally, from my own knowledge (being the minister on the ground, and responsible for the truth of the declaration) that the treaty did not interfere with our engagements with this republic, &c., it ought not to be published,—it would have been satisfactory. And had the communication been sent to me even in this last stage, such would have been my conduct, and most certainly such the effect.”—p. 142.

“I had then gained such an insight into their councils, as to satisfy me, that all our great national objects, so far as they were connected with this Republic, were more easily to be secured by a frank and liberal deportment, than a cool and reserved one.”—p. 142.

“In consequence I waited on the diplomatic section of the committee, and made the representation as above, repeating Mr. Jay’s motive for withholding the communication, as urged by himself: ‘That it belonged to the sovereign power alone to make it, &c.’ ”—p. 147.

“I thought it best to send the paper in by my secretary, Mr. Gauvain.”—p. 148.

“Transactions of old standing, I have not lately formally pressed, because I knew that the government was embarrassed on the score of finance, and because I thought it would be better to wait the issue of the business depending with you in June next.”—p. 160.

“The claim of 15,000 dollars I mentioned long since would be admitted without a word, and that it ought to be so understood at the treasury. I omitted it in my more early applications to this government, because I wished to progress with the greater objects first, and more latterly, for the reasons above suggested.”—p. 161.

“As I have had no communication with this government upon the subject of this treaty since its contents were known, it is of course impossible for me to say what the impression it has made is.”—p. 207.

“For this purpose, then, the person to whom we commit the trust, should possess the confidence of this government.”—pp. 209, 210.

“But can we accomplish what we wish by the fortunes of France, by any negotiation we can set on foot, without any effort of our own; and if any such effort is to be made, of what kind must it be?”—p. 210.

“As Mr. Fenwick has always proved himself to be an useful, indeed a valuable, officer in the station he holds, and as the error imputed to him might be the effect of judgment only, and which I think it was,—I have thought I could not better forward your views or the interest of my country, than by continuing him in the discharge of the duties of his office, till the President shall finally decide in his case.”—p. 297.

“I observed, further, that France had gained credit by her late conduct towards us: For whilst England had seized our vessels, and harassed our trade, she had pursued an opposite, and more magnanimous policy; and which had produced, and would continue to produce, a correspondent effect, by encreasing our resentment against England, and attachment to France. But as soon as the latter should assume an hostile or menacing deportment towards us, would this motive diminish, and the argument it furnished lose its force.”—p. 313.

“I asked him, what were his objections to the treaty; and to which he replied, as before, in general rather than in precise terms.”—p. 314.

“The courts of justice in the United States have taken, and continue daily to take, cognizance of prizes, which our privateers conduct into their ports, notwithstanding the express clause of the treaty which prohibits it.”—p. 321.

“The admission of English vessels of war into the ports of the United States, against the express stipulation of the 17th article of the treaty; that is to say, when they have made prizes upon the republic, or its citizens.”—p. 322.

“The consular convention, which makes a part of our treaties, is equally unexecuted in two of its most important clauses: The first, which grants to our consuls the right of judging exclusively all controversies which take place between French citizens, has become illusory, from a defect in the law which gives to our consuls the means of executing their judgments.”—p. 322.

“The judges charged, by the law, to deliver mandats of arrest, have lately required the presentation of the original register of the equipage, in despite of the 5th article of the treaty, which admits in the tribunals of the two powers copies certified by the consuls.”—p. 322.

“The arrestation in the port of Philadelphia, in the month of August, 1795, of the Captain of the Corvette Cassius, for an act committed by him on the high seas . . . violates moreover the right of nations, the most common; which puts the officers of public vessels under the safeguard of their flag.”—p. 322.

“The arrestation, in the waters of the United States, of the packet boat in which the minister sailed: The search made in his trunks, with the avowed object of seizing his person and his papers, merited an example.”—p. 323.

“Third complaint. The treaty concluded in November, 1794, between the United States and Great Britain. It would be easy to prove, that the United States, in that treaty, have sacrificed, knowingly and evidently, their connection with the republic; and the rights, the most essential and least contested, of neutrality.”—p. 323.

“To sacrifice, exclusively to this power, the objects which are necessary for the equipment and construction of vessels—is not this to depart evidently from the principles of neutrality?”—p. 323.

“After this, Citizen Minister, the executive directory thinks itself founded, in regarding the stipulations of the treaty of 1778, which concern the neutrality of the flag, as altered and suspended in their most essential parts, by this act, and that it would fail in its duty, if it did not modify a state of things which would never have been consented to, but upon the condition of the most strict reciprocity.”—p. 356.

“You will observe, that in my reply to your complaints, I have heretofore confined myself strictly to the subject of those complaints; never going beyond them, to expose in return the injuries we have received from this Republic, in the course of the present war.”—pp. 358, 359.

“Because I was disposed to yield every possible accommodation to your present exigencies that my duty would permit.”—p. 359.

“I do not wish to be understood as assuming to myself the merit of this delay.”—p. 371.

“I well know, that I have done every thing in my power, and from the moment of my arrival to the present time, to promote harmony between the two republics, and to prevent this from taking any step which might possibly disturb it.”—p. 371.

“One of the members however observed, that the abandonment of the principle that free ships made free goods, in favor of England, was an injury of a very serious kind to France; and which could not be passed by unnoticed.”—p. 374.

“He told me explicitly, they had no object with respect to Canada for themselves, but wished it separated from England: That they were not anxious about Louisiana, and if they took it, it would be only in case of a war between Spain and England . . . That, with respect to our interior, we had no cause to be uneasy; for there did not exist, in the breast of a member of the government, an intention to wish to disturb it.”—p. 377.

“But, Citizen Minister, you know too well from what side the first blow was given to that friendship, which our two nations had sworn to.”—p. 390.

“It shall not be the fault of the executive directory, Citizen Minister, if the political relations between the two nations are not speedily reestablished on the footing they ought to be, and if the clouds, which cast a gloom on our alliance, be not dispelled, by frank and loyal explanations; to which it will be anxious to listen above all, Citizen Minister, when they shall be made through you.”—p. 391.